WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005800040001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 19, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Nor
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
RETURN TO RECORDS CENT
;1;
IEDIATEI.Y A T:fi,II USE
JOB, 22-h~-B 0X-, ~ -
Secret
48
9 May 1967
No. 0290/67
ARMY review(s) completed.
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V+ SECRET v
(Information as of noon EDT, 18 May 1967
VIETNAM
North Vietnamese forces are maintaining a heavy pres-
sure against US Marine positions just south of the
Demilitarized Zone. Captured documents and POWs con-
tinue to suggest enemy preparations for intensive
:fighting in the highlands. Hanoi is inaugurating
new evacuation measures and Saigon is gearing up for
a major political race for the presidency.
CONFUSION DEEPENS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Mounting Red Guard violence--despite new official in-
junctions against "anarchy"--has further obscured the
confused situation in Communist China.
CHINESE COMMUNISTS MOUNT CAMPAIGN AGAINST HONG KONG
Peking's intention probably is to undermine the posi-
tion of the colonial government (as it did earlier in
Macao), to enhance its own popular support, but to stop
short of expelling the British because of the colony's
economic importance to China.
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Europe
THE KENNEDY ROUND AGREEMENT
The eleventh-hour accord has averted a crisis which
could have weakened the international trading system
and perhaps seriously damaged US relations with the
EEC.
DE GAULLE'S PRESS CONFERENCE
He said he would not veto Britain's bid to enter the
Common Market but made it clear that the British would
have a hard time getting in.
EAST GERMANY AGAIN REBUFFED IN QUEST FOR RECOGNITION
Its foreign minister has just visited five Arab states,
none of which would agree to recognize the Communist
German regime.
EGYPT CONTINUES HARASSMENT OF ARABIAN PENINSULA
Cairo has "arranged" the release of the two US prison-
ers in Yemen, but is bombing border towns in Saudi
Arabia and conducting heavy air raids against dissi-
dent Yemeni tribes.
SYRIA AND EGYPT PREPARE FOR EXPECTED ISRAELI ATTACK
The danger of Arab-Israeli hostilities became acute
this week as a result of recent Syrian-supported ter-
rorist activity in Israel. Israel has threatened
large-scale reprisal against Syria if the terrorism
continues. Egyptian and Syrian forces are on "full
alert," and Israel is taking "appropriate measures"
in the face of the Arab preparations.
NIGERIAN CRISIS CONTINUES
Relations between the federal government and the East-
ern and Western regions are at a low ebb, and any sud-
den unilateral action could tear the country apart.
SECRET
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Western Hemisphere
AFTERMATH OF GUERRILLA LANDING IN VENEZUELA
President Leoni now has the evidence he needs to take
to the Organization of American States the issue of
Cuban meddling in the affairs of other states. He has
little prospect of changing Cuba's policies, however,
since few sanctions can be added to those already ap-
plied against Havana in recent years.
BOLIVIAN GUERRILLA SITUATION STILL ACTIVE
Sporadic clashes have occurred since the night of 8-9
May, but-the encounters thus far have resulted in a
standoff.
STRIKES AND VIOLENCE PLAGUE ECUADOREAN GOVERNMENT
The deaths of several demonstrators in clashes precipi-
tated by a railway strike are expected to lead to fur_
ther violence.
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PANAMANIAN NEGOTIATOR CAUTIONS AGAINST HASTE IN TREATY 27
TALKS
The head of the Panamanian negotiating team recently
informed President Robles that the canal treaties
will not be completed by July 1967 as he had hoped
because of the complexity of issues yet to be dis-
cussed.
LEFTIST OPPOSITION TO DOMINICAN PRESIDENT
Recent murders have stiffened the left-of-center
Dominican Revolutionary Party's opposition to Presi-
dent Balaguer. He has named a commission to inves-
tigate the police
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FAR EAST
Peking has invited a direct political con-
frontation with Britain by becoming involved in the
leftist campaign against the Hong Kong Government.
A Chinese Foreign Ministry statement, in effect,
extended the mantle of Chinese protection over
"compatriots" in Hong Kong and insisted on compli-
ance with demands similar to those imposed on the
Portuguese in Macao last winter. Peking warned that
it is determined to "carry the struggle through to
the end." China's direct intervention and London's
initial reaction will make it difficult for either
side to back down. The Chinese seem ready to wage
a prolonged war of nerves to humiliate the British
and weaken their authority in Hong Kong.
The question of how far the Chinese are prepared
to go in disrupting the colony is complicated by new
signs of confusion and apparent stalemate in China's
internal struggle. Peking's pronouncements now
criticize the "anarchic" actions of the same mili-
tant Red Guards who were praised and encouraged in
April. Despite orders to halt demonstrations and
violence, the Red Guards continue to instigate dis-
order in Peking and the provinces, with little effort
apparently being made to curb them.
In the Vietnam conflict, Hanoi's propaganda is
portraying Communist attacks on allied forces south
of the Demilitarized Zone as retaliation for US air
attacks against populous areas in North Vietnam.
Communist forces elsewhere in South Vietnam are
avoiding major contact with allied troops while
stepping up mortar and rocket attacks against al-
lied installations, including two airfields near
Saigon.
Political developments in Saigon were high-
lighted by Premier Ky's formal announcement of his
candidacy for president in the September elections.
He is actively campaigning and meeting with polit-
ical leaders in an effort to organize a "united
anti-Communist front." Chief of State Thieu's in-
tentions remain obscure, but he appears to be holding
the door open for declaring his candidacy.
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VIETNAM
North Vietnamese forces are
continuing their intensive artil-
lery, rocket, and mortar barrages
against US Marine positions near
the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in
northeastern Quang Tri Province..
The attacks have resulted in more
than 500 Marine casualties, in-
cluding at least 75 killed, dur-
ing the past week. Confirmed
enemy killed stands at 200, al-
though over-all enemy losses are
estimated to be considerably
higher.
Artillery fire is being di-
rected both from within and north
of the DMZ. Two new artillery
weapons--85-mm. and 100-mm. field
guns with maximum ranges of 10
and 13 miles--have apparently been
brought into the zone itself. In
addition, photography of 13 May
has disclosed at least eight
130-mm. field guns--with a range
of 17 miles--about eight miles
north of the DMZ. Five of these
field guns were reported subse-
quently destroyed by US air
strikes. There is evidence from
POW interrogations that at
least one battalion and pos-
sibly the entire 84th Artillery
Regiment of the North Vietnamese
Army (NVA) is currently operating
in the central DMZ.
The focal point of current
Communist activity is the US
Marine bastion at Con Thien,
which is roughly two miles below
the DMZ and is the western ter-
minus of a seven-mile-long strip
presently being cleared to impede
infiltration.
In western Quang Tri Province
Communist forces have pulled back
toward Laos from Hill 881 north-
west of Khe Sanh. Although more
than 800 Communist regulars have
been killed in this area since 24
April, they continue to resist US
Marine clearing operations.
Prisoners have confirmed that
the force involved in the recent
fighting near Khe Sanh was the
95 "C" Regiment of the 325th NVA
Division. The division headquarters
and its two other regimental sub-
ordinates--designated 101 "D" and
18 "C"--have been put into the
"possible" category of MACV order
of battle on enemy main force
units in western Quang Tri or the
adjacent sectors of Laos. This
is the third generation of regi-
ments trained by the 325th head-
quarters for infiltration into
South Vietnam since late 1964.
The 5,100-man 325th Division
increases the number of North
Vietnamese division headquarters
in South Vietnam to seven, the
number of regiments to 24, and
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N A
BURMA(''r
0 50 100 150 Miles " IV CORPS
0 50 100 150 Kilometers CON SON
N O R T H' C H I N A
V I E T N A M
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the total number of North Vietnam-
ese regulars to 52,580.
Central Highlands Outlook
A document captured on 3
May outlines the summer rainy
season campaign plan of the B-3
Front, the major Viet Cong/NVA
headquarters command in the cen-
tral highlands provinces of Kon-
tum and Pleiku. In this document
the Front headquarters directs
its recipients to prepare to re-
ceive additional troops from
North Vietnam and to improve
administration, "because the
number of troops from North Viet-
nam is increasing every day."
The document also discloses
that the mission of the B-3 Front
and its five subordinate regiments
is to make a maximum effort to tie
down, disperse, and destroy Ameri-
can troops operating in the high-
lands. This mission was appar-
ently based on the assessment
that some US units would be with-
drawn to reinforce the coastal
areas of II Corps and the heavily
threatened northern provinces--
Quang Tri and Thua Thien.
The importance of the central
highlands to the Communists was
underscored by recent statements
of a North Vietnamese defector
nis s consider the r.ighlands the
"principal strategic" battle-
ground in South Vietnam and, as
such, the number one theater of
operations. He also predicted
that major Communist attacks
would take place there in June.
The current presence of at
least three NVA regiments in west-
ern Pleiku Province, taken to-
gether with the discovery of sup-
ply caches and battalion-size
bivouac sites in the immediate
vicinities of Due Co and Plei Me
Special Forces camps, suggests
that Communist battlefield prep-
arations in this area are near-
ing completion and that large-
scale forays may be imminent.
Air War Over North Vietnam
In the air activity over
North Vietnam, US pilots brought
down a record number of ten North
Vietnamese jet fighter aircraft
on 13 and 14 May, bringing to 32
the number of such planes downed
since the first of the year. In
the past North Vietnam has replaced
lost planes relatively quickly,
maintaining a stable in-country
order of battle of about 60 jet
fighters.
Hanoi Evacuation Moves
25X1
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 May 67
He claimed that the Commu-
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the Vietnamese lead-
ers are undertaking additional
evacuation in Hanoi and Haiphong
in expectation of continued US
bombing of these two areas. In
early May, the Soviet ambassador
passed the story that new ef-
forts under way to evacuate Hanoi
would reduce the city's popula-
tion by another 30 percent. At
the same time the Hanoi govern-
ment conserve diplomatic missions
to converse electricity and in-
crease food stocks. Foreign mis-
sions were not told to evacuate,
however.
The government has also in-
troduced new austerity measures
since air strikes began in the
Hanoi-Haiphong area. Low-level
officials and persons not working
for the government reportedly have
had to accept as much as 25 per-
cent of their May rice ration in
flour, and meat rations have been
reduced. These reports indicate
that, although life in the capi-
tal area has become more diffi-
cult in the past several weeks,
the regime has the situation in
hand and the population is still
orderly and responsive to govern-
ment direction.
Saigon Politics
In Saigon, the Constituent
Assembly's final approval of
election laws has cleared the
stage for a major political con-
test over the presidency of South
Vietnam.
On 12 May Premier Ky finally
declared himself publicly as a
candidate. Although most of the
leading generals had apparently
indicated their support for him
prior to his announcement, he wil
run without the formal endorsement
of the milittary establishment.
Ky is already publicly seek-
ing support, although the law
limits campaigning to the month
preceding the 3 September elec-
tion date. He recently visited
the delta town in which the Hoa
Hao religious sect is predominant,
and he has been a frequent visitor
to Tay Ninh province, center of
the Cao Dai religious sect, where
he has personally handed out land
titles to the peasantry.
Ky's presidential prospects,
however bright on the surface,
may still encounter problems. The
major obstacles confronting him
in the immediate future are the
undeclared intentions of General
Thieu and the candidacy of former
premier Tran Van Huong, who is
widely throught to have the best
chance among the civilian hope-
fuls. Thieu is still weighing
the choices open to him: whether
to defer to Ky and return to a
strictly military role, or to op-
pose Ky by entering the race him-
self or by supporting a civilian.
Thieu told a US correspondent on 25X1
17 May that he is looking into the
possibility of a broad political
front to back his candidacy.
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CONFUSION DEEPENS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Red Guard violence in defi-
ance of new official injunctions
against "anarchy" has further ob-
scured the confused situation in
Communist China.
Militant Red Guards, who
were being praised and encouraged
during April, have again come in
for heavy criticism in regime
pronouncements during the past two
weeks. They have been sternly
ordered not to demonstrate in the
streets, resort to violence, or
cause production losses. Yet,
they have continued to instigate
disorderly situations, both in
Peking and the provinces, and
seemingly little effort has been
made to curb them.
People's Daily on 12 May
criticized Red Guards for their
lack of discipline and "anarchic"
tendencies, a return to a theme
stressed during February when
restoration of law and order was
of paramount concern to leaders
in Peking.
On 9 May,Minister of Public
Security Hsieh Fu-chih reportedly
blamed disorderly revolutionaries
for causing industrial production
to decline in April. An editorial
in the 15 May People's Daily
elaborated on the theme that a
"true revolutionary" is one who
practices economy and stimulates
production.
On 14 May the new Peking
Revolutionary Committee, which is
headed by Hsieh Fu--chih, ordered
Red Guards to stop using violence
to settle their disputes. On 15
May a large parade was held to
support this directive; it over-
shadowed an anti-British demon-
stration being held at the same
time.
poster put up in Peking on 1-5
May accused two men named on 7
May to run a special district in
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Szechwan of being "reactionaries"
responsible for killing and wound-
ing hundreds of Red Guards in
clashes on 13 and 14 May.
In Peking, confused and un-
confirmed poster reports have
described clashes between workers
and Red Guards in a northern
suburb of the capital from 3 to
11 May. Reports of rioting at
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
have been partly confirmed by
foreign newsmen. A Red Guard de-
tachment which has been in the
forefront of the six-week-long
drive against Foreign Minister
Chen Yi broke into the ministry
on 13 May. The guards, who
reportedly occupied the ministry
for many hours, apparently ran-
sacked files in a search for
material which could be used
against Chen Yi. In spite of the
attacks, Chen Yi continues to
perform limited ceremonial duties;
he appeared at a reception given
by the Pakistani ambassador on
CHINESE COMMUNISTS MOUNT CAMPAIGN AGAINST HONG KONG
Peking has mounted a campaign
to humiliate British authorities
in Hong Kong and to extract con-
cessions from them. The Chinese
are probably seeking both to un-
dercut the position of the colonial
government and to expand their own
base of popular support.
Since January, the Chinese
Communist apparatus in Hong Kong
has pursued a much more aggressive
policy in exploiting public griev-
ances and in involving itself in
labor disputes. On 6 May, the
Hong Kong authorities used police
for the first time against leftist
strikers and arrested several of
them. The leftists in the colony
reacted with charges that the Hong
Kong Government had committed
"atrocities" against Chinese
workers and demanded punishment
of those responsible.
Although the local party
apparatus is probably responsible
for the day-to-day conduct of
operations in the colony, the
campaign against the Hong Kong
authorities is almost certainly
under the general direction of
Peking.
Peking directly intervened
in the leftist campaign against
the Hong Kong Government on 15 May.
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The Chinese Foreign Ministry handed
the British charge a statement
demanding that the British imme-
diately accept all the demands of
the leftists, release those ar-
rested in recent disturbances,
punish those responsible for the
arrests, offer apologies and com-
pensation, and guarantee that
similar incidents would not occur
again. Unless these steps are
taken, the statement warned, the
British would be responsible for
all the unspecified "grave" conse-
quences. The contents of the
Foreign Ministry statement are
similar to the Chinese demands on
the Portuguese in Macao last
winter.
Peking has meanwhile begun a
campaign of harassment against
British diplomats reminiscent of
that employed against Soviet and
East European diplomats last Feb-
ruary. Massive demonstrations
were staged outside the British
Embassy in Peking and the residence
of a British diplomat in Shanghai
was sacked, although he and his
family escaped unhurt.
Hong Kong authorities ini-
tially sought to avoid involvement
in the labor disputes, but now
believe that they must take a
harder line to prevent erosion of
their authority. They are encour-
aged in this belief by the view
that a strong line might have
served the Portuguese better in
the Macao dispute. The authorities
already have mobilized the approxi-
mately 13,000 police and reserves
and alerted the British Army gar-
rison of four infantry battalions.
The British Foreign Office
is drafting a statement of sup-
port for the Hong Kong Government.
It voices full approval of the
government's determination to
"settle labor disputes impartially"
while "preserving law and order"
and deliberately ig:zores the Chi-
nese Communist demands.
London anticipates a long
war of nerves and believes Hong
Kong is in for a rough time, but
seems determined not to give in
to Peking. The Foreign Office
hopes that for the time being
there will be no "obvious gaps"
in US naval visits to the colony
which Peking might :interpret as
a concession.
The Chinese Communists earned
an estimated $550 million worth
of foreign exchange in Hong Kong
last year and Peking thus has a
considerable stake in permitting
the colony to stay in business.
The Chinese probably believe,
however, that they can consider-
ably increase political pressure
aimed at extracting damaging con-
cessions from the British without
serious risk to their own economic
interests. More violent demon-
strations are probably in store
for Hong Kong and it is likely
that harassment of British diplo-
mats in China will continue.
Should these steps fail to achieve
results Peking may go on to apply
pressure through curtailment of
food and water supplies from the
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EUROPE
It was a bad week for the British, with Prime
Minister Wilson burned in effigy in Hong Kong, the
South Arabian Federation Government hinting it
might refuse to accept independence without an ex-
tended British defense guarantee, and British air-
line pilots being told to comply with Spain's new
restrictions on flights into Gibraltar. Just while
London is striving to cope with its overseas diffi-
culties, De Gaulle cited those entanglements as one
of many reasons why Britain is not "ready" to join
the European community.
In a continuing effort to impede West Germany's
drive to improve relations with Eastern Europe,
East Germany's Walter Ulbricht arrived in Hungary
on 18 May to sign the third of a series of friendship
and mutual assistance treaties with his European al-
lies. Meanwhile, his premier, Willi Stoph, made a
provocative proposal last week to negotiate with
West German Chancellor Kiesinger. This was another
effort intended in part to impress the Eastern
Europeans that Bonn, not East Berlin, is the main
block to improved German relations and European
detente.
The East Germans were also out this month to
impress the Arabs. Foreign Minister Winzer failed,
however, in his swing through five Arab countries
(see page 15) to persuade any of them to defy West
Germany's Hallstein Doctrine by recognizing the
Ulbricht regime.
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THE KENNEDY ROUND AGREEMENT
The eleventh-hour accord
reached in the Kennedy Round nego-
tiations on 15 May is of major
economic and political importance.
The agreement to reduce
tariffs on industrial items by
approximately a third on the
average is less than the 1962
Trade Expansion Act had envisaged,
but considerably more than had
seemed likely only a year ago.
There are also important compensa-
tions for the failure to achieve
the hoped-for liberalization in
agricultural trade and special
benefits for the developing coun-
tries. The problems of these
countries will receive further
consideration. The major trading
nations have committed themselves
to finance an international food-
aid program, and some progress
has been made toward reducing the
nontariff barriers to trade. Above
all, the mere fact of agreement
has averted a crisis which could
have weakened the international
trading system and perhaps seri-
ously damaged US relations with
the European Economic Community
(EEC).
The refusal of all parties
to accept the consequences of
such a failure largely accounts
for the compromises worked out on
the comparatively few issues which
had been blocking an agreement.
After laborious efforts to work
out with the EEC a combination of
access guarantees and food-aid
commitments to assure a market
for US grains, the US decided in
the end to rely on the food-aid
program, a simple extension of the
International Wheat Agreement, and
its own strongly competitive po-
sition.
On the difficult chemicals
issue--where the EEC has insisted
the US eliminate the protection-
ist American Selling Price (ASP)
valuation procedure---the EEC
agreed to cut its own tariffs
unconditionally by amounts in the
neighborhood of 20 percent, and
by an additional 30 percent when
the ASP is abolished. Other par-
ticipants also made concessions--
notably, the UK in reducing steel
tariffs, and Japan in agreeing to
participate in the food-aid pro-
gram.
What the total trade package--
to be implemented over the next
five years--will mean precisely
for trade volume, trade patterns,
prices, and economic; growth is
impossible to say. While tariffs
will no longer constitute a major
obstacle to trade in general, this
will not be the case for some
sectors, and other restrictive
devices remain or may be devised.
Nevertheless, the continued rapid
growth in trade--particularly
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among the industrialized coun-
tries--will be assured. The gains
will obviously be the greatest in
those trading items in which
tariffs have constituted a sig-
nificant, element in the price.
The political gains of the
Kennedy Round settlement are more
clearcut and immediate. The
agreement preserves the system of
multilateral tariff bargaining
based on the most-favored-nation
principle; a failure to reach an
agreement might have set off
protectionist pressures around
the world.
As it was initially designed
to do, the Kennedy Round has
brought the EEC's common external
tariffs down to more palatable
levels---an important precedent
at a time when there is a trend
toward the development of other
regional trading systems which
are inherently discriminatory.
At the same time, the Kennedy
Round has been a significant fac-
tor in accelerating the internal
development of the EEC, in estab-
lishing it as a commercial entity,
and in strengthening the EEC
Commission as its bargaining
agent.
Finally, while there are
still many details to be mopped
up, this week's agreement will
permit the Kennedy Round partici-
pants to begin focusing on other
world trade problems. Negotiations
on individual trade sectors where
tariffs are still fairly high are
one possibility. Another is a
more systematic attack on non-
tariff barriers which will loom
relatively more important with
the liberalization of trade in
other respects.
Most pressing, however,
will be the need to find further
benefits for the less developed
countries. Additional tariff
concessions may be found for these
countries even before the Kennedy
Round agreements are finally con-
cluded at the end of June, and
some of the participants are now
considering whether the cuts al-
ready agreed on should be made
available to them immediately
rather than scheduled over five
years.
In any case, major attention
seems likely to focus on the US
offer at the Punta del Este con-
ference to consider the possibil-
ity that all the industrialized
countries might participate in a
generalized system of preferences
for the developing countries.
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DE GAULLE'S PRESS CONFERENCE
At his press conference this
week, De Gaulle avoided shutting
the door completely on Britain's
bid to enter the European Eco-
nomic Community but made it clear
that London must bear the burden
of proving its European bona fides
to his satisfaction. By ex-
plicitly rejecting the idea of
a veto and by indicating a will-
ingness to negotiate, De Gaulle
hopes to deflect charges of French
obstructionism.
Since London has demonstrated
its determination to become part
of Europe, De Gaulle had little
hope that the British would be
deterred from entering into ne-
gotiations by his detailed list-
ing of the "formidable" obstacles.
His emphasis on the numerous
problems involved is designed to
discourage the EEC's other Five
from lending any real support to
London.
It is also a clue that his
tactic will be to play for time,
although in the long run he re-
gards British membership as in-
evitable. He made it plain Paris
will seek to exact harsh terms
for British entry. The general
probably believes that, if he
can string out the negotiations
long enough, London will give him
an excuse to shut the door again.
British officials had hoped
De Gaulle would not, make his op-
position so clear this early, but
his position is no surprise. His
statement may strengthen the hand
of pro-Europeans in the govern-
ment who are urging Wilson to keep
his requests for concessions to a
minimum in order to demonstrate
that London is not as De Gaulle
claimed, asking for "exceptional
and prolonged trial periods" or
"essential changes." The long
and difficult negotiations fore-
shadowed by De Gaulle's remarks
may, however, undercut Wilson's
carefully contrived "momentum."
The US Embassy in London thinks
support from the Five is neces-
sary if British public opinion is
to continue favoring the effort
to join at this time.
The press conference took
place against a background of po-
litical agitation in France
touched off by the government's
request for special powers to
decree economic reforms. The
issue is now being debated in
the National Assembly and opposi-
tion forces will shortly introduce
a censure motion.
As a warning to wavering depu-
ties in the majority who might be
tempted to vote for censure, De Gaulle
reminded them that the voters had
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elected the Gaullists under a
single label and expected them
to act as a unit. These remarks
were aimed particularly at Valery
Giscard d'Estaing and his
Gaullist-allied Independent Re-
publicans, who have made no se-
cret of their dissatisfaction
with the government's request.
EAST GERMANY AGAIN REBUFFED IN QUEST FOR RECOGNITION
East Germany's efforts to
score a breakthrough in its long-
standing quest for diplomatic
recognition from a non-Communist
nation were again frustrated dur-
ing Foreign Minister Otto Winzer's
trip this month to five Arab
states.
Winzer had planned a trip
to Cairo last January but post-
poned it because of East Germany's
greater concern at the time about
Bonn's diplomatic offensive in
Eastern Europe. Last month, how-
ever, Arab League secretary Has-
sunah returned from a trip to
Bonn disappointed at the West
Germans' negative attitude to-
ward his principal aims--to get
more aid for Arab governments
and prevent any increase in aid
to Israel.
The East Germans thereupon
hastened to try to exploit what
they believed was Arab disen-
chantment with Bonn and sent
Winzer off to Egypt, Syria,
Lebanon, Algeria, and Iraq.
Before leaving, Winzer pub-
licly excoriated Bonn's use of
its Hallstein Doctrine (which
precludes diplomatic relations
with any non-Communist govern-
ment recognizing East Germany)
to divide and isolate the Arab
states. He also criticized West
German economic and military as-
sistance to Israel, while stress-
ing the common interests of East
Germany and Arab nations. Winzer
undoubtedly repeated these argu-
ments in private to his Arab
hosts. He also offered economic
assistance in return for recogni-
tion.
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Despite these blandishments,
the Arab states refused to budge.
Both the Egyptians and Syrians
said they wanted friendly rela-
tions, but neither agreed to ex-
tend diplomatic recognition.
Lebanon's Foreign Minister Hakim
said that Beirut was not even
considering recognition, and the
Algerians were also cool.
The Arab League will again
consider the German question in
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September, but the same factors
which have deterred Egypt and
Syria, the countries most favor-
ably disposed toward East Germany,
from granting recognition at this
time probably will also apply then.
Pankow's chances of obtaining rec-
ognition from Arab governments
continue to be dependent upon
Arab reactions to Bonn's policies
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
The war of nerves has heightened in the Middle
East. Israel has made it clear that Syria would
suffer a devastating attack if "Israeli blood is
shed" during a Syrian-supported terrorist raid. Egypt
has mobilized its forces and called for the withdrawal
of UN troops in Sinai in a public show of support for
Syria. Iraq has placed its army and air force on
alert, and Jordan and Lebanon have pledged support
for Syria if Israel attacks.
Meanwhile, the Lebanese prime minister has asked
the US to postpone a scheduled visit of the US Sixth
Fleet to "a more suitable date." President Hilu
apparently has knuckled under to pressure from Egypt,
Syria, and local leftist elements to cancel such
visits.
In the Sudan, the Constituent Assembly on 18 May
elected Muhammed Ahmad Mahjoub as prime minister to
replace the capable Sadiq al-Mahdi, who resigned
earlier this week after a vote of no confidence.
Mahjoub was not particularly effective when he was
prime minister in 1965 and 1966.
Major problems are lurking below the surface
calm in Greece. The public is becoming aware of the
potentially serious rivalry between the coup's strong
man, Col. Papadopoulos, and the minister of interior,
General Pattakos. The coup leaders' relationship to
the King remains in some doubt and depends on the
degree to which they will accept his counsel or need
him as a symbol of reassurance to the Greek people.
Major economic problems, such as a balance-of-payments
deficit and imbalance in the agricultural sector,
also face the regime.
The looming fragmentation of Nigeria remains
the most critical problem in Africa. Observers be-
lieve that the crisis could come to a head by the
end of May. In Guinea, Sekou Toure is proceeding
with the expulsion of foreign missionaries, but during
made overtures for renewed US assistance.
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EGYPT CONTINUES HARASSMENT OF ARABIAN PENINSULA
Cairo has "arranged" the
release of the two US prisoners
in Yemen, but continues to bomb
border towns in Saudi Arabia and
conduct heavy air raids against
dissident Yemeni tribes.
The two US AID employees,
who were arrested on 26 May for
an alleged bazooka attack on an
ammunition dump, were taken from
Taiz to Sana on 13 May, released
to the custody of the US Embassy,
and then "forgiven" by President
Sallal on 17 May. They arrived
in Ethiopia the same day. The
Egyptians maintained the fiction
that the matter was between the
US and Yemen, publicly claiming
in the end that they had been
asked by the US to mediate the
dispute.
The preponderant role assumed
by Egyptian personnel in the ar-
rest and investigation of the AID
employees, however--and the com-
plete dominance of the Egyptian
military machine in Yemen--made
it almost impossible for the
Yemeni republican regime to do
anything without at least Egyptian
concurrence. By placing the ap-
parent responsibility on Yemen,
Cairo has been able to wring the
maximum propaganda gain from the
incident while retaining control
of the initiative. Thus, at the
eleventh hour, when it seemed
the prisoners would in fact stand
trial, Egypt could make a show
of stepping in to save the US the
embarrassment of a public trial.
Nasir has accused Saudi
Arabia of being the chief US
stooge in the Arab world. He
believes that Saudi. King Faysal
is already supporting another
royalist campaign in Yemen with
money and weapons. Last week
Egyptian aircraft again started
harassing Saudi Arabian border
towns with light bombing. Al-
though this is intended to break
Saudi morale and to cause Faysal
to withdraw his support of the
royalist cause, it may bring
sufficient popular pressure on
the King to force him to renew
and enlarge his aid.
Within Yemen, Egypt has
launched a campaign against tribal
dissidence, both royalist and
republican, in areas close to
Sana. There are reports of heavy
bombing in the Arhab region some
30 miles north of Sana, following
tribal disturbances against the
Egyptians. The royalists have
once more complained about heavy
casualties due to the use of gas
bombs and incendiaries in these
raids. Egypt now appears to be
eradicating the chief centers of
resistance among the tribes by
methodical bombing forays, against
which the tribesmen have little
defense and which contain almost
no risk for Egyptian personnel.
The lack of hard evidence to prove
publicly Egyptian use of gas in
Yemen last January has probably
encouraged Cairo to step up these
raids to put an early end to the
resistance, confident that few
people will have access to th
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SYRIA AND EGYPT PREPARE FOR EXPECTED ISRAELI ATTACK
The danger of major hostili-
ties between Israel and the Arab
states has become acute as a
result of recent Syrian-supported
terrorist activity in Israel.
Arab fears of a large-scale
reprisal against Syria, which
probably would take the form of
an air strike, rose sharply fol-
lowing public Israeli threats
last week to take such action if
the terrorism did not cease.
Within a few days Syria and
Egypt, who have a joint defense
agreement, put their armed forces
on "full alert." The Egyptians
reinforced their frontier defenses
by moving at least a division
eastward to the Suez Canal area
and smaller units into the Sinai
peninsula. Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon,
and Kuwait announced that they
also were ready to aid Syria.
Israel, for its part, has not
instituted any large-scale
build-up along the Syrian border,
but could quickly do so in the
event of trouble.
the Israeli-Syrian border because
he would virtually be compelled
to take some counteraction, par-
ticularly after having encountered
Arab criticism for his inaction
and silence during the Israeli-
Syrian air battle on 7 April.
Egypt also took steps to
avoid any further charges, such
as Jordan has leveled in the past,
that it was "hiding behind a UN
shield." Cairo asked the UN
Emergency Force (UNEF), stationed
in Egypt along the Israeli frontier
since 1957, to withdraw its troops.
The first request was that the UN
troops congregate in the Gaza
strip "to insure their safety,"
but on 17 May Cairo asked UNEF to
leave the country altogether.
A political dispute between
Cairo and UN headquarters in New
York may be developing over this
issue because U Thant has not
agreed to the Egyptian proposal.
Cairo has said it would not dis-
cuss the matter in the UN.
Cairo gave widespread pub-
licity to its military prepara-
tions in the apparent hope that
this would either deter Israel
from a move against Syria or
stimulate international pressure
which would prevent a conflict.
Nasir presumably is anxious to
discourage another clash along
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The Israelis profess to be
watching the situation "with
calmness" but have indicated that
an Egyptian reoccupation of UN
positions at the entrance of the
Gulf of Aqaba, a vital Israeli
trade route, would create a "com-
pletely impossible situation."
Israel also has announced that it
is taking "appropriate measures"
in the face of Egypt's deployment
of a stronger force in Sinai. The
Israelis have begun a military
build-up in southern Israel in 25X1
response to Egypt's moves.
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NIGERIAN CRISIS CONTINUES
Relations between Nigeria's
federal government and its East-
ern and Western re ions
Low
Tensions between the West's
Yorubas and the Northerners in
the region continue unabated.
Northern soldiers stationed near
Lagos are in an ugly mood because
of Yoruba pressure on them to
leave Lagos and the West. These
and other federal troops in the
West are primarily responsive to
their senior NCOs, over whom re-
sponsible commissioned officers
have only tenuous control. A
near mutiny occurred on 11 May
over the theft of arms and am-
munition.--since recovered--which
aroused fears of a coup plot
against Commander in Chief Gowon,
head of the federal government.
The Northern troops in Iba-
dan are also very much on edge
and reportedly have plans to ter-
rorize local Yorubas to teach
them a lesson. Yoruba political
leaders, however, appear adamant
that the West must govern itself.
The tension between these
two groups has spread to the
Northern Region, where Hausas
are reportedly extorting money
from Yorubas. Substantial num-
bers of Yorubas are now leaving
the North where they have played
a key role in the administration
and economy since the skilled Ibos
were expelled to their native
Eastern Region last year.
Although the West now has
joined the East in pushing for
looser ties among the regions,
Gowon evidently remains determined
to impose a strong central gov-
ernment. He seems convinced--un-
realistically--that he has the
military capability to do so.
Eastern Governor Ojukwu is
continuing to set the stage for
a succession move. A government-
sponsored mass rally in Enugu on
13 May called for a declaration
of a "Republic of Biafra for the
revolutionary peoples of Eastern
Nigeria." The Eastern radio was
instructed on the same day to
start emphasizing the subject of
secession. Also on 13 May,
Ojukwu scheduled for 26 May a
meeting of its Consultative As-
sembly, which reportedly will
formally demand secession. Al-
though Ojukwu still holds out a
faint hope for a loose associa-
tion among the regions, he told
reporters on 16 May "it does
appear that a split is very much
on its way."
The East's unity is not com-
plete, however. Several reports
have confirmed the continuing
existence of old local rivalries
among its predominant Ibos. This
rivalry has apparently extended
into the Eastern army, and a number
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EASTERN j;?_ (CAMEROON
Calabar.
FERNANDO'P0
(SP:)
of senior officers tried to re-
sign because of dissatisfaction
over the favors reportedly being
shown by Ojukwu to Ibos from his
\CHAE
home area. As a result, Ojukwu
has reorganized his defense estab-
lishment to kee it securely under
his control.
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S
0
WESTERN
BeninCity S Enugu
OO
(FE Da 945..) MbWESTERN 0
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Violence, guerrilla activity, and strikes
continued to plague several Latin American countries
this week.
The recent, unsolved murder of three members
of the Dominican Revolutionary Party has added steam
to that party's efforts to coalesce forces opposing
President Balaguer. In Haiti, President Duvalier
has reportedly had one of his Presidential Guard
officers executed.
In Guatemala, Communists and rightists are
squared off against each other in a fight to the
death. Terrorism there has taken over 200 lives
since last summer. The Communists have decided to
send emissaries to Cuba and the USSR to solicit
funds for the revolutionary movement.
Bolivian Communist guerrillas are still frus-
trating attempts to round them up. They are re-
cruiting new members and have even made a pitch
to the rightist Socialist Falange to make common
cause against the government.
By capturing Cuban military personnel who
landed east of Caracas, the Venezuelan Government
has now bolstered the case against Castro it in-
tends to bring to the Organization of American
States and possibly before the United Nations.
Clashes between strikers and government forces
in Ecuador have resulted in three deaths and many
wounded. More may follow, as the labor situation
has not cleared and may get worse.
Rebellious Mexican students at numerous schools
are harassing the government, especially in the
northern state of Sonora where they are gathering
public support in an effort to oust the governor.
In Brazil, the Porto Alegre police had to use force
to oust students from refuge in a church. This
incident may provide the spark for a new outbreak
of student unrest.
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AFTERMATH OF GUERRILLA LANDING IN VENEZUELA
The capture of two Cuban par-
ticipants in the 8 May guerrilla
landing on Venezuela's coast will
enable President Leoni to seek
the strong action he has long
wanted against Havana for meddling
in the affairs of other states.
Leoni is taking the issue to
the organization of American
VENEZUELA
`.
Na, .14:1d,
Antille.
Bravo
Area of Operation
_..s..
States, but he fears that OAS
resolutions will be ineffective
unless accompanied by direct ac-
tion. He has suggested to the
US a demarche to the Soviet Un-
ion and a boycott against ship-
ping lines trading with Cuba.
Leoni has been contemplating
an international denunciation
Landing Area
OcaeACiFSStWMachhUF fVre
BRAZIL "`.
Grenada
(U.K.)
ATLANTIC
OC h'AN
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
GUYANA
0 50 1 30 150 Miles
f T~'Ti
0 50 100 15) Kil-tern
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since the murder of his foreign
minister's brother in March, but
until the capture of Cuban equip-
ment and military personnel he
lacked the proof needed to support
a strong denunciation. Even now,
he has little prospect of chang-
ing Cuban policies, since few
sanctions can be added to the eco-
nomic and diplomatic measures ap-
plied against Havana in recent
years. Cuba was expelled from
the OAS in 1962, all nations but
Mexico had broken relations with
Cuba by :L964, and trade between
Cuba and the OAS countries is
negligible.
Discovery of the landing will
probably intensify the debate
among the Venezuelan Communists
over continuing the armed strug-
gle. The orthodox Communist
Party (PCV) recently announced
that it was de-emphasizing guer-
rilla warfare in favor of legal
political activity. Within the
party, however, there are wide
differences of opinion on how
this policy should be imple-
mented. Some members favor
abandoning armed struggle com-
pletely; others would curtail it
only temporarily to permit a re-
grouping of forces.
BOLIVIAN GUERRILLA SITUATION STILL ACTIVE
Army patrols are continuing
their efforts to locate and en-
gage the guerrillas in Bolivia.
Sporadic clashes have occurred
since the night of 8-9 May, but
the encounters thus far have re-
sulted in a standoff.
When engaged, the guerrillas
quickly extricate themselves and
retire to the relatively safe
sanctuary of the mountainous
jungle terrain nearby. Although
the guerrillas are greatly out-
numbered by the government forces
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in the area, the ill-trained
and badly equipped raw recruits
are at best able only to contain
and harass the guerrilla forces.
The government is not expected
to be able to deal effectively
with the guerrilla threat until
the end of 1967, when the Second
Ranger Battalion becomes combat
ready.
While maintaining a military
stalemate with the government
forces, the guerrillas have been
active on the political front.
The weak political base of the
government and the presence of
armed dissident groups throughout
the country have bred rumors of
coup plotting by various groups.
Such an increase in coup talk
may reflect a change in the mood
of active politicians that could
lead to an actual coup attempt
if the situation deteriorates
STRIKES AND VIOLENCE PLAGUE ECUADOREAN GOVERNMENT
Violence and strikes continue
to plague the government of Ecua-
dor's interim President Otto
Arosemena. Clashes on 11 and 12
May between government forces and
demonstrators marching in support
of striking railroad workers
resulted in three dead and many
wounded.
The disorders--at Duran, near
Guayaquil--were staged mainly by
extremist-led students and work-
ers who were supporting the de-
mands of railway employees for
"overdue wages" and guarantees
of future nondelinquency in wages
as well as social security bene-
fits. Following the clashes
demonstrators attacked the
headquarters of the local police,
whom they blamed for the deaths.
Later the violence shifted to
Guayaquil, where student-led
demonstrators attacked government
buildings.
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The continuing railroad
strike has disrupted services be-
tween Guayaquil and Quito, and
other labor groups are threatening
sympathy strikes. Police and
military officials fear further
violence could result now that
martyrs have been created. There
are rumors of strikes by municipal
employees, students, and mine
workers.
The government's handling
of this situation could be an
issue in the nationwide provin-
cial and municipal elections on
11 June. Major attention will
be focused on the mayoralty
campaign in Guayaquil, Ecuador's
leading financial and commercial
center. Leading the race at
present is an archpolitical foe
of President Arosemena, Assad
Bucaram, who may figure prominently
in the maneuvering for the presi-
dency in 1968. Bucaram has at-
tempted to use the incidents at
Duran and Guayaquil for his own
political advantage.
PANAMANIAN NEGOTIATOR CAUTIONS AGAINST HASTE IN TREATY TALKS
The head of the Panamanian
negotiating team recently informed
President Robles that the canal
treaties will not be completed
by July .1967 as he had hoped be-
cause of the complexity of issues
yet to be discussed.
To ease this blow to Robles'
hopes, treaty negotiator Diogenes
de la Rosa pointed out that Panama
stands to gain by delaying the
negotiations because domestic
and international pressures--es-
pecially those caused by the
Vietnam conflict--will weaken the
US position at the bargaining
table.
De la Rosa also encouraged
Robles to accept opposition leader
Arnulfo Arias' recent call for a
national unity candidate in next
year's elections to keep the
treaty issue from becoming en-
tangled in partisan politics. The
negotiator cautioned that if the
treaties become a "political play-
thing," Panama will be faced with
an extremely dangerous situation
which might jeopardize the ac-
complishments of long months of
negotiation.
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stated in recent speeches that
the two major unresolved problems
in the negotiations were Panamanian
jurisdiction in the Canal Zone
and financial compensation.
As a result of the talk with
De la Rosa, Robles--who shifts
from optimism to pessimism as he
hears the views of his various
advisers--is again preoccupied
LEFTIST OPPOSITION TO DOMINICAN PRESIDENT
The recent murder of three
members of the left-of-center
Dominican Revolutionary Party
(PRD) by unknown assailants
has given renewed impetus to
PRD opposition to President Bala-
guer. In a 15 May pronounce-
ment, the party offered Balaguer
"one last chance" to revise what
it sees as policies that tacitly
encourage political violence and
repression. The PRD has warned
that if he fails to act, it will
launch its long-threatened but
vaguely defined "patriotic move-
ment of resistance to trujilloism
and dictatorship."
There does not appear to
be any consensus within the PRD
over the composition, tactics, or
goals of such a movement. The
party's latest declaration calls
for an alliance of leftists and
anti-Balaguer conservatives and
rightists "regardless of ideology."
This seems to allow for Communist
participation but to reject Commu-
nist suggestions that a "resistance
movement" be composed solely of
those leftists who fought on the
"constitutionalist"' side during
the 1965 revolt.
Meanwhile, Balaguer has
responded to accusations of police
involvement in or laxity toward
terrorism by forming a commission
to examine the forces' conduct.
The composition of the commission--
four of its five members are top
military officers-.-is not likely
to create public confidence in
its objectivity.
Establishment of the commis-
sion, however, does suggest a
recognition by Balaguer that
police performance leaves the
government open to criticism.
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