WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT THE INDIAN - PAKISTANI ARMS RACE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005800040003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 19, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
The Indian-Pakistani Arms Race
Secret
N2 45
19 May 1967
No. 0290/67B
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THE INDIAN-PAKISTANI ARMS RACE
Since the end of the September War of 1965,
both India and Pakistan have significantly in-
creased their fighting strength. New units have
been added to the order of battle, and both nations
have obtained or ordered more military equipment
from abroad. Most combat losses of the war were
made up long ago, and the emphasis now may be shift-
ing from expansion to modernization.
Despite Pakistani gains--probably temporary--
in a few areas such as fighter aircraft, India has
generally been able to maintain its superiority in
forces likely to be used in any Indo-Pakistani war.
India not only has further increased its absolute
strength more than Pakistan, but appears more capable
of continuing the expansion and modernization.
Until relations between the two states improve
substantially, it is unlikely that their arms race--
a manifestation of deeply ingrained political prob-
lems--will be halted or even significantly slowed.
Each country is aware of and probably exaggerates
the other's military build-up, giving new impetus to
the race. Only a shortage of funds and the difficulty
of getting arms abroad appear to be limiting factors.
The September War
The September War led both
Rawalpindi and New Delhi to con-
clude that their armed forces were
inadequate. By mid-September
1965, the entire Pakistani Army--
except for one weak, isolated
division in East Pakistan--had
been committed to battle. India,
however, still had two divisions--
the 9th and the 14th--available
to reinforce the troops then
threatening to break the Pakistani
lines in the Punjab in two places.
An additional seven Indian divi-
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sions deployed. against what the
Pakistanis viewed as a largely
imaginary Chinese threat, and a
division engaged in suppressing a
tribal rebellion in the Nagaland
portion of eastern India conceiv-
ably also could have been thrown
into the war.
With the Pakistani Army
stretched to the breaking point in
West Pakistan, with East Pakistan
all but defenseless, and with ten
Indian divisions still uncommitted,
it was obvious in Rawalpindi that
Pakistan needed a larger army.
SECRET
SPECIAL REPORT 19 May 67
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The military situation looked
quite different from New Delhi's
viewpoint. Indian forces had
successfully contained Pakistani
infiltrators in Kashmir, had
stopped a Pakistani attack in the
southern part of that state, and
had driven a short way into the
Pakistani Punjab. A Chinese Com-
munist move, however, in eastern
Kashmir--where India had only one
division--could turn these limited,
costly victories into a major
disaster.
In Eastern India, only the
six divisions normally deployed
against: China would be available
to meet: an attack from the north.
The 9th Division, normally avail-
able as a reserve, had to watch
enemy forces in East Pakistan,
and the other potential reserve
divisions in central and southern
India had already moved toward the
Punjab. Reports of increased
Pakistani aid to the rebels in
Nagaland indicated that New Delhi
might have to send more troops
to that troubled state. With
increased Chinese patrolling on
the border and a steady stream of
official Chinese protests, it was
obvious to India that it had too
few troops to meet all its commit-
ments.
Shortages and Supply
When fighting ended on 22
September 1965, the first task
facing both sides was the replace-
ment of combat losses. Although
India had suffered more casualties
and possibly had lost more equip-
ment, its larger military estab-
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lishment was better able to absorb
the losses, and it had greater
reserves of equipment and spare
parts. Moreover, India's armament
industry--although small--was able
to supply some of the army's needs,
particularly ammunition, and the
USSR, which had become India's
major source of arms, continued
military shipments.
Pakistan faced much more
serious problems. Rawalpindi had
relied almost exclusively on US
military aid, and in early Septem-
ber the US not only halted the aid
program, but also banned the sale
of military supplies to the sub-
continent. Most other Western na-
tions followed suit, although some
relaxed their bans in the winter
and spring of 1966. Muslim na-
tions--particularly Iran, Turkey,
and, before the October 1965 coup,
Indonesia--have given Pakistan
limited help, and Iranian purchases
in Western Europe have helped re-
lieve critical shortages of spare
parts and ammunition. For much of
its new equipment, however, Pak-
istan turned to Communist China,
the only nation apparently both
able and willing to provide sub-
stantial quantities in a short
time.
19 May 67
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