WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005800070002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Secret
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
53
9 June 1967
No. 0293/67
v1! F lar!? C
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(Information as of noon EDT, 8 June 1967)
Page
1
VIETNAM 2
Recent allied military operations in the northern
half of South Vietnam have probably disrupted the
Communists' plans for a summer offensive. In Saigon,
Chief of State Thieu and Premier Ky are actively
organizing their campaigns for the presidency. New
frictions between Hanoi and Peking are suggested by
Hanoi's publication of an indirect but sharp per-
sonal attack on Mao Tse-tung.
DISORDER SPREADS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Mob violence is increasing in the provinces and has
disrupted service on at least one major rail line.
Most of the military establishment appears to be
standing aside, possibly because top leaders in Pe-
king are divided on using force to end the trouble.
CHINA'S CASH HOLDINGS HIGH
An improved foreign exchange position and increasing
export surpluses are permitting China to place its
first cash purchases of wheat.
HONG KONG GOVERNMENT SUPPRESSES COMMUNIST-LED UNREST
The month-old agitation against British authorities
appears to have lost much of its momentum because of
the government's effective measures.
INSURGENTS STILL ACTIVE IN THAILAND
Although the pace of insurgency in the northeast has
slackened somewhat, the Communist guerrillas appear
to be making modest gains in several other areas.
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Europe
WESTERN EUROPEAN REACTION TO THE MIDEAST CRISIS
Popular feeling in Western Europe during the Arab-
Israeli crisis and conflict has been strongly sym-
pathetic with Israel. The governments of Western
Europe, nonetheless, have generally followed a cau-
tious policy, trying to avoid formally taking sides,.
EFFECTS OF ARAB OIL CUTOFF IN WESTERN EUROPE
Except for the UK, consumers in Western Europe could
weather with relatively little hardship any politi-
cally inspired oil embargo by Arab countries.
SOVIETS DISPLAY SPACE WORKHORSE AT PARIS
Observation of the Soviets' basic space launch system
provided new information on hardware and handling,
but did not change assessments of the booster's capa-
bilities.
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Middle East - Africa
THE WAR IN THE NEAR EAST
In swift military action against its Arab neighbors
this week, Israel has gained a hold on the immediate
cause of the current crisis--the Strait of Tiran--
and achieved a number of other objectives of long
standing. Whether its hopes of toppling Nasir are
fulfilled remains to be seen, but his regime will be
shaken, as will those in other Arab states. Western
interests in the Arab world have been seriously dam-
aged, but Moscow's position there has also been hurt.
EFFECTS OF SUEZ CANAL CLOSURE
Any prolonged closure of the canal will be disruptive
to world trade and particularly to oil shipments.
Egypt will lose about 20 percent of its foreign ex-
change earnings.
GREEK MILITARY REGIME CONCENTRATING ON REFORMS
While arrests and detentions keep political activity
at a standstill, a review of the constitution is under
way, the shake-up of key civil service officials con-
tinues, and newly appointed local administrations are
studying rural development needs.
NIGERIANS MOVING CLOSER TO MILITARY SHOWDOWN
Both Nigeria's federal government and the breakaway
Eastern Region, which since 30 May has called itself
the "Republic of Biafra," are gearing up for an early
military test. Although the timing of such a show-
down cannot be predicted, federal leader Gowan now
appears too committed to back away.
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ge iii WEEKLY SUMMARY 9 Jun 67
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Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 29
VENEZUELA VERSUS CUBA
The Council of the Organization of American States
has agreed to call a Meeting of Foreign Ministers,
but the OAS is not expected to take strong action
against Cuba. The unexplained slowdown of guerrilla
activities in Venezuela continues. The Venezuelan
port workers, meanwhile, have begun their boycott of
ships of nations trading with Cuba.
BOLIVIAN ARMY REASSESSING COUNTERINSURGENCY PROGRAM 31
I Communist parties in other
Latin American countries seem to be taking steps to
aid the Bolivian insurgents.
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FAR EAST
Spoiling operations by allied forces in South
Vietnam may have disrupted or postponed Communist
plans for a country-wide "summer campaign." North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong propaganda, however, main-
tains a confident tone, claiming that Communist
forces frustrated the 1966-67 allied dry-season of-
fensive and that the Communists retain the initia-
tive on the battlefield.
In an unprecedented move suggesting new friction
between Hanoi and Peking, a North Vietnamese party
journal has published an indirect attack on Mao Tse-
tung. This open display of displeasure with Peking
probably was intended as a warning against Chinese
interference in Hanoi's domestic affairs or attempts
to dictate war policy.
In Saigon, Premier Ky and Chief of State Thieu
are pressing efforts to organize broad support for
their presidential bids. Their rivalry was reflected
in last week's National Assembly debates on election
laws.
Violence and chaos in China appear to be ap-
proaching the level of last winter, and interruptions
in east China rail traffic are again being reported.
There are further indications of a decline in Pe-
king's control in many areas. The regime's failure
to invoke military force to restore order appears
to reflect sharp division within the top leadership.
The Chinese Communists took advantage of the
Middle East conflict to stage new demonstrations
against the British and to charge the USSR with be-
ing the "number one accomplice" of the US in sup-
porting Israeli "aggression."
In Thailand, the rate of armed encounters be-
tween Communist insurgents and government forces in
the northeast has diminished since the record level
in March. The Communists, however, continue to make
modest gains in several other a
the Thai-Ma 1 ava i an 1- r-rd-, - - - - r- J
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VIETNAM
Recent allied military ac-
tions in the northern half of
South Vietnam have probably dis-
rupted Communist plans for a
"summer campaign" in this area.
The second and final
phase, of Operation UNION--con-
cluded last week in the coastal
flatlands of Quang Tin Province--
was the latest and most success-
ful example in recent weeks of
allied counterthrusts against con-
tinuing pressure in the country's
five northernmost provinces. US
Marines killed some 1,500 Com-
munist troops--many of them prob-
ably from the North Vietnamese
Army (NVA) 2nd Division--and al-
most certainly thwarted any im-
mediate offensive against supply
lines and bases in the coastal
areas between Da Nang and Chu Lai.
During scattered fighting
just south of the Demilitarized
Zone (DMZ), US Marines destroyed
a series of elaborate enemy bunker-
and tunnel complexes from which
Communist mortars and rockets
could strike at the Marine base
at Con Thien and the US 175-mm.
artillery positions at Camp Car-
roll. Near Dong Ha, South Viet-
namese Army battalions reported
killing 150 troops of the 708th
Viet Cong Battalion.
In the central highlands,
contact with Communist forces
and enemy mortar barrages against
American field positions have
decreased significantly in the
past few weeks following inten-
sified pressure by elements of
the US 4th Infantry Division op-
erating in western Pleiku Prov-
ince. Enemy forces in this area
are probably in need of reorgani-
zation and resupply. One recent
captive claimed that the NVA 32nd
Regiment, currently in northwest-
ern Pleiku, suffered "heavy cas-
ualties" as the result of allied
artillery and B-52 bombardments.
Other units in this area may have
been similarly affected.
Despite this series of mili-
tary reverses, the Communist main
force units appear to be continu-
ing preparations for offensive
activity. A high level of enemy
movement through Laos to South
Vietnam persists.
NVA main force units, more-
over, are reoccupying previously
held positions in the DMZ south
of the Ben Hai River, and several
regiments of the NVA 325th Divi-
sion have been noted active in
the mountains of western Quang
Tri Province north of Khe Sanh.
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9 Jun 67
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Thlen
fCamL~
P Gio Linh
VIETNAM
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Politics in Saigon
Both Premier Ky and Chief
of State Thieu are attempting to
line up support for their presi-
dential candidacies by developing
campaign organizations.
backing for Thieu. Thus far he
has met with spokes-r-
9 roups
e seven include elements of the
Catholics, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao,
VNQDD, and the old Can Lao Party
of the Diem era. Thieu also in-
tends to direct particular efforts
toward winning over the four corps
commanders, in the hope that they
can influence the civilian popu-
lace in their areas.
Sino - North Vietnamese Relations
Hanoi has published an indi-
rect but sharp personal attack on
Mao Tse-tung in the Vietnamese Com-
munist party theoretical journal,
Hoc Tap. The article, which ap-
peared about three weeks ago, sug-
gests that new frictions may have
developed between Peking and Hanoi.
Thieu, who still has not an-
nounced his candidacy, has des-
ignated one of his principal ad-
visers, Nguyen Van Huong, as his
contact with leaders of various
political factions. Huong, a
former Dai Viet Party member, has
begun meeting with representa-
tives of these factions to assess
The article, written by one
of the editors of Hoc Tap on the
occasion of Ho Chi Minh's birth-
day, makes invidious comparisons
between Ho's policies and the
practices of "a certain leader"
who acts in accordance with his
"subjective views" and ignores
party councils. The article is
also critical of the use of Red
Guards as a weapon against the
regular party apparatus and of
the deification of Mao.
Although Vietnamese distaste
for the excesses of the Chinese
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Cultural Revolution has been ap-
parent for some time, Hanoi has
never made such an open display
of its disapproval. The nature
of the trouble is not clear, but
it is possible that the Vietnamese
have been severely provoked by
some recent Chinese action--per-
haps Chinese meddling in Hanoi's
domestic affairs or attempts to
dictate the course of the Viet-
namese war or peace efforts.
Hanoi, for example, is continu-
ing to offer to talk with the US
in exchange for a bombing cessa-
tion, despite Chinese criticism
of this policy.
It is too early to determine
whether Hanoi intends to press
this attack further or whether it
was acne-shot affair. No other
attacks of this nature have been
detected in the Vietnamese press.
Peking has thus far taken no
notice of the article in public
and may have decided to overlook
it. Furthermore, there are no signs
that Chinese support for the Viet-
rupted.
DISORDER SPREADS IN COMMUNIST CHINA 25X1
Mob violence is increasing
in the provinces and has disrupted
service on at least one major rail
line. The military establishment
as a whole appears to be standing
on the sidelines. The reasons for
this are unclear, but it could re-
flect divisions among top leaders
which are blocking a decision to
put an end to the trouble by force.
Although most Red Guard pos-
ter reports of violence appear to
be exaggerated, and circulated
for the political purpose of dis-
crediting local leaders
is-
or er an poilticai tension are
widespread. These sources reveal
L-i important transport services
nave broken down in the past month
and that the local administrative
apparatus is virtually paralyzed
in some areas.
Major trouble is evident at
Hsu-chou astride the rail line
linking Shanghai and Peking.
Posters reported that on 31 May
and 1 June rioters, instigated
by local troops, injured 1,000
people, blew up 21 rail locomo-
tives, and jailed 400 Red Guards.
According to other posters,
regular troops based at Chin-hua,
200 miles southwest of Shanghai,
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JAMMU
AND
KASHMIR
_._ in J7.Pute)
H .fai NanhnHG~io
Mang-hai
AN HANEI
Ha h "t~ 1
C H I.V A
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Chin-hUa 1
'ONOMOUS REGION HUPEH
N G T U NC:
tianton
KONG
? MPMI.) )U'K') PHILIPPINES
Kue.Vang
KvYEIOW
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HUNAI
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attacked railway workers there on
28 May and beat up soldiers from
three local military schools sent
out to rescue the workers.
25X1
At Ping-hsiang, major rail
center in Kiangsi Province to the
west, posters report that public
security officials brutally sup-
pressed Red Guards during clashes
from 27 to 31 May.
Peking itself continues to be
the scene of sporadic battles be-
tween revolutionary groups. On 30
May, Red Guards from such powerful
schools as Peking Aviation Insti-
tute and. Peking University report-
edly ignored an army security
guard and invaded the offices of
the State Planning Commisssion,
beating sever commission "revo-
1utinnaries."
South of Peking, in Cheng-
chou, Honan-?-reportedly the scene
of almost daily clashes during the
past two months--posters report
that troops from the Honan Military
District (HMD) instigated a clash
with :Red Guards on 26 May that
left more than 1,000 of them in-
jured. On 30 May, the HMD used
troops from a military school to
beat up an army investigation team
sent to its headquarters; most of
the team members are reported 25x1
missing. Still farther south
in the major Yangtze River or
of Wu-ha
Ithe transporta-
tion system as teen disrupted,
and say that the local adminis-
tration is virtually paralyzed.
Chaos and disorder
have continued in Szechwan, where
a central committee directive is- 25X1
sued on 7 May ordered that the
party and military leadership of
the province be reorganize
In Sinkiang, posters call for
the overthrow of provincial mili-
tary and party head Wang En-mao,
who has been under attack by mili-
tant Red Guards for suppressing
their activities last year. Most
recently Wang is charged with aid-
ing conservative forces in break-
ing up Red Guard rallies in the
provincial capital on 25 and 26
Ma
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Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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CHINA'S CASH HOLDINGS HIGH
An improved foreign exchange
position and increasing export
surpluses are permitting China
to place its first cash purchases
of wheat.
A recent contract with Aus-
tralia for 1.5 million tons of
wheat for delivery in the second
half of 1967 specifies at Peking's
request an option to pay the $100--
million price in cash. Wheat con-
tracts normally call for China to
pay 10 percent down and the bal-
ance 18 months after delivery.
China has always been reluc-
tant to take on heavy debt obli-
gations and has liquidated its
debts as quickly as possible. It
has earned one of the best credit
reputations in the world. These
new payments will serve to
strengthen that reputation de-
spite Peking's domestic and in-
ternational political problems.
China's. foreign exchange reserve
grew about $50 million in 1966
to a maximum of $550 million,
and Peking probably expects fur-
ther. improvement this year. Its
export surplus with the free world
last year totaled some $15 million
against a import surplus of $90
million in 1965.
Fragmentary trade returns
for early 1967 from seven of
Page 8
China's major trading partners--
including Japan, West Germany.
France, and the UK--su.ggest that
exports have continued. to grow
more rapidly than imports. Ma-
chinery and equipment imports in
1967, however, can be expected
to increase as deliveries con-
tinue on whole industrial plants
purchased from the free world in
1965. Trade agreements concluded
in late 1966 and early 1967 do
not indicate substantial changes
in China's over-all trade this
year, and contracts concluded
at this spring's Canton fair re-
mained at the levels of previous
spring fairs.
China's financial outlook
may not continue to be this fa-
vorable, however. The weight of
repayments on Western credits for
plants bought in 1965 is increas-
ing and remittances of hard cur-
rency from Overseas Chinese
dropped off some 20 percent in
1966. Moreover, propaganda at-
tacks on Hong Kong, China's larg-
est source of foreign exchange
earnings--about $550 million in
1966--may shake business confi-
dence in the colony and cause a
downturn in Peking's earnings.
In addition, if the Cultural Rev-
olution continues at its present
pace, the resulting decline in
productive activity will gradu-
ally impair Chinese export capa-
bilities .
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HONG KONG GOVERNMENT SUPPRESSES CO
British authorities in Hong
Kong are increasing pressure on
Communist labor agitators in an
effort to quell sporadic strikes,
and the month-old agitation ap-
pears to have lost much of its
momentum.
Although the Communists con-
tinued to call one-day strikes in
some government-run industries
last week, only about a third of
the workers left the 'ob
The government's stringent
new measures against strike lead-
ers---suspension from their jobs
UNIST-LED UNREST
and disciplinary action--probably
will have a salutary effect on
other workers. The government
has outlawed the display of in-
flammatory posters and used police
to remove them from public trans-
portation vehicles.
Peking is continuing its
propaganda attacks on the British,
but at a greatly reduced level.
The relative vagueness of the Chi-
nese statements suggests that Pe-
king is not prepared to take any
significant action against the
colony at this time. The Chinese
Communists will probably continue
their propaganda support for left-
ists in Hong Kong, however, in
An Pffnrt tn keen UP issue alive.
I 25X1
INSURGENTS STILL ACTIVE IN THAILAND
Armed clashes between Commu-
nist insurgents and government
forces in northeast Thailand have
slackened somewhat since March's
near record level but the insur-
gent movement still appears to be
making modest gains in several
other areas of Thailand.
Communist-initiated armed
encounters in April were less than
half of the one-per-day average
maintained in the northeast during
March. The number of government-
initiated encounters was also down
sharply, suggesting that the over-
all decline in fighting may have
resulted partly from less aggres-
sive government patrolling. The
insurgents, however, maintained a
high level of armed propaganda
meetings and assassinations of
government informants and offi-
cials.
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THAILAND
Nakhbn
t Retchasima
PHNOM PENHI
`oPhuket?"
GULF OF
lakhon
hanom
PTO TROOPS AT BElONG CAMP
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The insurgents evidently are
spreading their activities into
previously unaffected areas in the
northeast. They staged their
first armed propaganda meeting in
Ubon Ratchathani Province in April
and greatly expanded propaganda
and. terrorism in Kalasin and Udon
Thani (Udorn) provinces. The
Communists probably are trying
to counter a six-month-old govern-
ment security program by moving
some assets into peripheral areas.
At the same time, in their strong-
holds in Nakhon Phanom and Sakon
Nakhon provinces, the insurgents
have maintained pressure against
Bangkok's effort to build an ef-
fective local defense force.
Two recent skirmishes be-
tween security elements and Meo
tribesmen in the north are further
evidence of increased Communist
activity in the isolated moun-
tainous area along the Laotian
border. The skirmishes follow
reports that some Meo villages
have been brought under Communist
control by trained party workers
returning from North Vietnam. The
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Communists have capitalized on
long-standing animosity between
the tribal people and Thai au-
thorities, although their influ-
ence in the area is still limited.
In southern Thailand, there
is mounting evidence that the
strength of the Communist Terror-
ist Organization (CTO)--Malayan
Communist guerrillas driven into
Thailand during the Malayan
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Page 12 WEEKLY SUMMARY 9 Jun 67 1
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EUROPE
The focus of attention in both Eastern and West-
ern Europe remains fixed on the Arab-Israeli war.
The Soviets have been exerting strong pressure
on the Arabs to bring about a cease-fire in order to
prevent further deterioration in the situation which
might lead to a military confrontation with the West.
As a result, Moscow's relations with Egypt and Syria
have been severely damaged. Soviet propaganda has
consistently supported the Arabs, although not their
charges that US and British planes aided Israel.
Moscow has in the past few days provided token
materiel to Egypt, but it has made no military ges-
tures of support comparable to those it made in
1956. The Soviet naval presence in the Mediter-
ranean is slightly above normal
No Soviet ship as come closer an
200 miles from the area of hostilities.
Except for Rumania, the East European countries
too have given major propaganda support to the Arabs,
condemning "Israeli aggression" and blaming the crisis
on the "US and other imperialist" powers. Like the
USSR, however, they have stopped short of supporting
Arab accusations of US and British involvement.
Popular sympathy in Western Europe has been
strongly pro-Israeli, although the governments have
cautiously avoided taking sides formally. Most have
shown a marked preference for handling the crisis
through the UN. France, however, has put primary
stress on the responsibility of the big powers, pre-
sumably looking ahead to a possible four-power con-
-P--ence in it would insist on a major role.
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WESTERN EUROPEAN REACTION TO THE MID-EAST CRISIS
Popular feeling in Western
Europe during the Arab-Israeli
crisis has been strongly sympa-
thetic with Israel. The govern-
ments, nonetheless, mindful of
the dangers of doing so, are try-
ing to avoid formally taking
sides. Official positions sup-
ported, first, the avoidance of
hostilities, and then their early
termination. Most countries have
shown a marked preference for
handling the crisis within the
UN, although France predictably
has put primary stress on the
responsibility of the big powers.
Typical of the skittish
attitude of the Western European
governments was the lack of en-
thusiasm for the proposed Maritime
Declaration upholding freedom of
navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba.
Objections were made that it would
undermine the UN, and there was
also fear that signatories would
later be obliged to take imple-
menting action. The Dutch were
the strongest supporters of the
Declaration and were also willing
to participate in escort force
planning.
De Gaulle has refused to be
moved by repeated demonstrations
of French popular support for
Israel and has adopted the most
determinedly neutral position in
Europe. One of his major consid-
erations is to retain France's
stock with the Arab states and
the USSR. He is intent on playing
a major role in a possible Four-
Power Conference on the Middle
Page 14
East, and on establishing a basis
for greater influence in the Arab
world subsequently.
Bonn, although endorsing
freedom of navigation as a legal
principle, proclaimed a policy of
strict neutrality when the fight-
ing erupted. It is always con-
cerned that its stand on Middle
East problems may induce the
Arab states to recognize East
Germany. At the same time, the
pro-Israeli German press has crit-
icized the US for "weak policies"
in the Middle East, which encour-
aged the USSR to try to augment
its role there.
The British, because of
their economic problems (see next
article) have probably been more
concerned than other Europeans
about the effect of a cutoff
of Middle East oil. London, con-
sequently, has threaded its way
carefully through the crisis. It
was one of the sponsors of the
Maritime Declaration, but it did
not want to undertake any test of
the Strait of Tiran blockade un-
less a fair number of other coun-
tries participated. After the
outbreak of hostilities, Foreign
Secretary Brown told the House of
Commons that the British concern
was not to take sides, but to en-
sure the return of peace. Egyp-
tian closure of the Suez Canal,
however, roused the wrath of Prime
Minister Wilson, who denounced
Cairo for this action and said
the UK would not put up with
threats to cut off oil supplies.
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Sentiment is growing within
the British Government and else-
where in Europe to use the current
situation to try to obtain an
over-all solution of the Palestine
problem. In his speech to the
French Assembly on 7 June, Foreign
Minister Couve de Murville called
for a "complete program" of in-
ternational cooperation to settle
finally the problems growing out
of the rrpation of the state of
EFFECTS OF ARAB OIL CUTOFF IN WESTERN EUROPE
The countries of Western
Europe, which get about 70 percent
of their oil from the Arab world,
have the most to lose from any
prolonged cutoff of that source
of supply. Except for the UK,
however, none of these countries
is in any immediate danger of an
economic crisis resulting from the
Arabs' threats to deny oil to
those they charge are supporting
Israel in the present hostilities.
There has been no concerted
move in this direction by the
Middle East oil-producing coun-
tries, but they are denying oil
to selected consumers--primarily
the US and Britain. Only Iraq
has closed down its oil operations
altogether. Iran is not partici-
pating in any embargo against US
or West European consumers, but
exports from its Abadan refinery
have been halted by the refusal
of Iraqi pilots to take tankers
through Iraqi territorial waters
to the port of Abadan.
The pinch in Arab oil sup-
plies so far is thus no more than
an inconvenience. A further cut-
back could be more aggravating to
the West Europeans. Their current
stockpiles, however, coupled with
mild rationing and increased im-
ports from non-Arab sources would
permit them to forgo supplies from
Arab producers for six months
with no major econonic damage.
The UK is the most vulnerable
consumer. The need to find a sub-
stitute for Arab oil could ad-
versely affect the British balance
of payments, require London to
implement more stringent defla-
tionary policies, and seek new
financial assistance from the
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SOVIETS DISPLAY SPACE WORKHORSE AT PARIS
Observation of the USSR's
basic space launch system--the
SS-6 ICBM with an upper stage--
at the Paris air show provided
new information on Soviet space
hardware and handling techniques,
but did not change current assess-
ments of the booster's capabili-
ties.
The SS-6 can orbit about
10,000 pounds using the Lunik up-
per stage and 15,000 pounds with
the Venik. The Lunik-equipped
version being displayed at Paris--
designated SL-3--was originally
used in the Soviet lunar program
from 1958 to 1960. Since then,
it has been used for low-resolu-
tion reconnaissance missions and
weather satellites as well as the
six flights;of the one-man Vostok
capsule also on display. The
version equipped with the more
powerful Venik stage--the SL-4--
has been used for high resolution
reconnaissance and the Voskhod
and Soyuz manned programs.
Photography of the rocket
confirms that the SS-6 consists
of four boosters around a central
sustainer core. All five are
fired at launch, and the boosters
are dropped after their propellant
is exhausted. The sustainer con-
tinues burning until its propel-
lant is depleted, at which point
the upper stage fires to boost
the payload into orbit.
The SL-3 launch system ap-
pears to be heavier and to have
more thrust than previously es-
timated, but these two factors
balance out and do not affect es-
timates of the booster's weight-
lifting capability. The config-
uration of the various components
of the launch system is unusual
by US standards but, as a whole,
is a sound design. Each section
of the booster/sustainer combina-
tion has four small nozzles fed
by a single pump rather than one
large nozzle. This design was
probably conceived in the late
1940s, and reflects the Soviet
propensity to exploit existing
technology to the fullest extent
before going to more advanced de-
signs.
Observation of the unloading,
transport, and assembly of the
SL-3 showed that it is ruggedly
built and easy to handle. It also
confirmed previous evidence that
the booster and payload are assem-
bled in a horizontal position be-
fore being moved to the launch
pad. This technique enhances the
flexibility of Soviet space opera-
tions by permitting quick substi-
tution of backup vehicles and in-
creasing the rate of launchings
that can be undertaken from the
availahle launch facilities .T
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Israel's blitz of the Arabs has raised a host
of new problems throughout the Middle East.
It seems certain that US--and to a lesser extent
British and West European--diplomatic and economic
interests in much of the Arab world have been seri-
ously damaged. Seven Arab countries to date have
broken relations with the US, and Arab mobs through-
out the area have descended on assorted American and
British installations.
While Nasir's prestige rose meteorically in the
euphoric Arab/Moslem solidarity just before the shoot-
ing began, his regime itself will be shaken.
I
Problems and reactions varied throughout the
are
Soma is s rnoae
President Aden, facing presidential elec-
tion, took a strong stand in support of his "Arab
brothers." In India, the government's diplomatic
support for the UAR drew a rash of critical edito-
rials and opposition statements, all denouncing the
"abandonment" of India's traditional "nonalignment."
On the fringes of the action, local self-inter-
25x1 ests began to surfacel
The Iraqis were fearful that the re e
would use the opportunity to renew hostilities. And
though Pakistan was still officially--if distantly--
on the side of its Moslem coreligionists, President
Ayub warned his countrymen against becoming emotion-
ally involved in the dispute.
In Nigeria both the federal government and the
breakaway Eastern regime are pushing preparations
for what seems an inevitable, although not necessarily
an imminent, military showdown. In Sierra Leone pres-
sures are building up against the erratic le
the military lunta that took over last March\
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THE WAR IN THE NEAR
The Israeli campaign, which
opened on 5 June with a massive at-
tack on the air facilities of
neighboring Arab states except
Lebanon, appears to be moving on--
if not ahead of--schedule. As of
8 June, Israeli forces in unknown
strength had reached the Suez Canal,
cutting off a substantial Egyptian
force in the Sinai Peninsula, and
had taken over the Sinai side of
the Strait of Tiran following the
withdrawal of the Egyptian force
there. In Jordan, the Israelis had
taken most of the ground west of
the Jordan River, rendering the West
Bank area untenable and destroying
Jordan's military forces in the
process. On the Syrian front, an
Israeli operation to seize the high
ground east of Lake Tiberias seemed
to be opening.
The Israelis thus in four days
had gained a significant military
hold not only on the area of the
immediate cause of the crisis--the
Strait of Tiran--but also on objec-
tives of longer standing. These
include substantial improvement in
Israel's strategic geography, par-
ticularly the broadening of the
narrow coastal strip that enabled
Jordanian artillery to shell Tel
Aviv; the emotion-laden opening to
Jews of the Old City of Jerusalem;
the elimination of the constant
threat of sniping and terrorism
from Syria; and, if the trick can
be turned, the overthrow of Nasir
amid Egypt's military debacle.
EAST
Nasir's Position
The overthrow of Nasir, Israel's
bete noire, still appears the most
difficult achievement. The Cairo re-
gime initially concealed the extent
of its; military defeat: in the air and
in Sinai--indeed, the Egyptian lead-
ers probably are still. unable to
credit the Israelis with the magni-
tude of the air operations and be-
lieve their own propaganda that the
US and UK flew air cover and pro-
vided replacement aircraft. Follow-
ing this propaganda line, the Egyp-
tians now are recalling the Suez
War of!1956 and insisting that their
defeat is a result of overwhelming
Western intervention. The break in
relations with Washington is a move
to support this line.
It remains to be seen whether
Nasir's continued posing as the anti-
Western paladin, plus his efforts to
rally other Arab leaders around him
to share the burden of disaster, will
enable him to pull through domestic-
ally. The atmosphere in Cairo is
reported to be fairly grim, and the
Egyptian radio has begun t emnhasi7p
"loyal to Nasi "
It is questionable, more-
over, w he her any replacement could
take a significantly different polit-
ical line than Nasir has, given the
degree to which popular feelings
against the US and UK have been
aroused.
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Impacts on Other Arab Regimes
The Israelis may well have
lowered the curtain on the one Arab
leader whom, before hostilities,
they wished to see stay in place--
King Husayn of Jordan. With West
Jordan lost, with a stream of ref-
ugees fleeing across the river to-
ward his capital, and with his
army--the real mainstay of his gov-
ernment--shattered Husayn's position
is difficult if not desperate. He
also bears the onus of having been
the first Arab chief of state to
ask for a truce from the Israelis,
even though an Egyptian officer was
in command of Jordan's forces. If
the King goes amid the chaos, some
military officer presumably would
attempt to restore order, but there
is no good indication at the moment
as to who this might be.
The Syrian regime, threatened
by repeated domestic tremors even
before the war, is in an almost
equally dangerous situation. If
the Israelis strike at Syria in
force, the regime could easily go
under; there is already some sugges-
tion that the north Syrian city of
Aleppo, traditionally disaffected
from Damascus, may be out of con-
trol.
Iraq, a reasonably safe dis-
tance from the fighting, went to
the aid of the Jordanians but with-
out much effect. As was the case
20 years ago, Baghdad can afford to
be even more defiant in its propa-
ganda than the Arabs closer to Is-
rael, but the Iraqis are also
anxious to preserve their oil pipe-
lines and the resultant foreign ex-
Page 22
change.
L e e anese Government
is being as quiet as possible.
The euphoria that put pressure
on the Muslim states of North Af-
rica to come to Nasir's aid is dis-
solving, but the Algerians, having
joined the Arab States and the Sudan
in declaring war on Israe
willing to stay by Nasi
Nasir
also evidently hopes that the Al-
gerians will act for him diplo-
matically.
The feeling that last week
swept the Arab world--that at last
the Arabs might be closing in on the
Israelis and their imperialist back-
ers--found expression in attacks on
US and UK diplomatic and commercial
facilities throughout the area and--
by Arab students--even in Bulgaria.
The roster of-countries where US
consulates and embassies have been
attacked so far includes Libya, Tu-
nisia, Lebanon, Pakistan, Algeria,
Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and
Sudan. A mob attack was also made on
Wheelus Base in Libya. The govern-
ments of Yemen, the Sudan, and Iraq
joined Egypt, Syria, and Algeria
in breaking relations with the US
on 6 June, and Mauretania followed
suit the next day.
The governments of the most
significant oil producing states
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SYRIA
SAUDI
ARABIA
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have tried to forestall sabotage of
Western-owned installations by an-
nouncing close-downs or embargoes o
oil shipments to countries assist-
ing Israel. Reports are mixed as
to how effective these actions have
been in practice--or in some cases,
how effective they were intended to
be--and a reliable assessment of
over-all damage to Western oil fa-
cilities in the area has still
to be made. Nonetheless, even non-
Arab oil producers such as Iran,
are under pressure to make gestures
of solidarity. This pressure may
become more insistent if Nasir de-
cides that oil restrictions are his
last important card.
Diplomatic Maneuvering
International diplomacy's at-
tempts to limit the damage have cen-
tered at the UN, at least openly.
Action by the Security Council
was initially delayed by the Soviet
refusal to agree to a simple cease-
fire resolution--put forward by the
US--and by the efforts of the Arabs'
supporters--led by India--to push
through a resolution calling for a
withdrawal of troops to prewar posi-
tions. Israel said it would accept
a cease-fire, but not troop with-
drawal, while the UAR was unyielding
when informed that Western powers
could not accept any resolution that
implicitly legitimized the Egyptian
blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba.
The council
then unanimously passed a simple
cease-fire resolution. The next
day, with the Arabs still adamant
and the Israelis still moving for-
ward, the Soviets requested an im-
mediate meeting of the council and
tabled a second cease-fire resolu-
tion, this one with a deadline of
4:00 p.m. that day.
These Soviet efforts, although
a diplomatic circumvention of the
Arab position, were evidently moti-
vated by a desire to appear to have
taken the lead in getting Israel to
halt its "aggression." The Soviet
maneuver was blunted, not only by
Israel's announcements that it would
accept the cease-fire if the others
did but by the lack of any similar
statement from the UAR. The UAR
delegate insisted that the council
condemn Israel as the aggressor and
call for a withdrawal of troops to
4 June positions.
At the 7 June session, Canada
introduced a resolution that called
for the council president and the
secretary general to take all means
to bring about effective compliance
with the two cease-fire resolutions.
This effort could re-establish some
sort of UN peacekeeping presence in
the area, but it will again bring
to the fore the question of Soviet
and French policies toward the UN,
inasmuch as both Moscow and Paris
have sought to restrict the peace-
keeping powers of the secretary
general.
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The Soviet Position I erating in the Eastern. Mediterranean
Soviet propaganda has predict-
ably supported the Arabs, although
on 7 June--for the first time--
Izvestia published Israeli claims
of military advances across the
Sinai. Previously, the Soviet press
carried only Arab accounts of "vic-
tories." Although there has been
no mention of the Arab charge that
US aircraft were aiding Israel,
Izvestia did report the Arab charge
that British planes were doing so,
although it also quoted a British
denial.
In the face of Arab disgust
with Soviet support for a cease-fire
resolution, Moscow now must turn to
buttressing its position in the Mid-
dle East. The Soviet threat to
break relations with Israel marks
the beginning of such an effort.
There have been no indications
of Soviet military involvement in
the Middle East crisis, even though
the number of Soviet combatants op-
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EFFECTS OF SUEZ CANAL CLOSURE
Uncertainty engendered by
the political and military situa-
tion in the Middle East had al-
ready resulted in a virtual stand-
down of shipping through the Suez
Canal by 7 June, when it was
officially closed by Egypt.
Cairo stated that this was
being done to avoid blockage of
the canal by a ship immobilized
in transit by war damage. Israel,
however, has been circumspect in
its military operations against
the waterway, apparently to avoid
the ill will which maritime na-
tions expressed in 1956 when Egypt
denied the use of the canal for
several months by deliberately
sinking ships in the channel.
Any prolonged closure of the
canal will be disruptive to inter-
national trade and will particu-
larly affect oil shipments. The
current world tanker market, how-
ever, is sufficiently loose to
provide additional tankers neces-
sary to move available oil around
Africa.
By closing the canal, Egypt
will also suffer losses. Canal
revenues total $18 million per
month, about 20 percent of Egyp-
tian foreign exchange earnings.
South African ports, already doing
considerable business servicing
ships which travel around Africa
rather than through the canal,
reportedly are preparing for in-
creased activity.
An average of 60 ships per
day--about evenly divided between
movements north and south--transit
the canal. About 80 percent of the
240 million tons of cargo passing
through it annually moves north;
four fifths of the northbound
cargo and about one half of the
ship movements are concerned with
oil. Other major northbound
cargoes are iron ore from India
and wheat from Australia.
Southbound cargoes include
US wheat shipments for India
which, if diverted around Africa,
would add about $1 million per
month to India's grain bill. Other
cargoes moving south through the
canal are fertilizer for India
and Communist China, Soviet oil
shipments to the Far East, and
Soviet delive
North Vietnam
Page 25
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GREEK MILITARY REGIME CONCENTRATING ON REFORMS
Greece has been quiet in re-
cent weeks as the military regime
devoted its primary effort to
reforming the country's institu-
tions.
A distinguished panel of
jurists and lawyers was appointed
in late May to review the consti-
tution. The review will take six
months, and is to be followed by
a constitutional referendum, but
this will probably not be held
until much later. The coup lead-
ers have made it clear they do
not intend to relinquish power
until the "revolution completes
its tasks." According to Prime
Minister Kollias, however, the
fundamental articles of the con-
stitution will not be touched and
the form of government will con-
tinue as a crowned parliamentary
democracy.
Political activity remains
at a standstill. The regime re-
cently arrested a number of non-
Communist former deputies as part
of its continuing efforts to dis-
credit all political elements.
Most of those arrested were
closely aligned with the impris-
oned Andreas Papandreou and were
accused of attempting to organize
a "patriotic front" opposition
movement.
ing well treated. Interior Min-
ister Pattakos announced that
the possibility of Andreas' de-
portation is being considered re-
gardless of the outcome of his
trial. Pattakos also announced
that by 12 June about half of the
more than 6,000 Communists who
were originally detained will
have been released.
In addition to continuing
the retirement and demotion of
many key civil service officials,
apparently creating chaos in many
ministries, other measures have
been aimed at reforming local ad-
ministrations. Newly appointed
mayors and governors, many of
whom are retired military men,
have been directed to study rural
development needs in order to de-
termine necessary investment ex-
penditures and to further the de-
centralization and financial self-
sufficiency of local administra-
tions.
Despite reports of dissen-
sion among the coup leaders,
there is no clear indication of
any effect on the rea:ime l
Andreas himself is still
imprisoned but is apparently be-
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NIGERIANS MOVING CLOSER TO MILITARY SHOWDOWN
Both Nigeria's federal gov-
ernment and the breakaway Eastern
Region, which since 30 May has
called itself the "Republic of
Biafra," are gearing up for an
early military test. Although the
timing of such a confrontation
cannot be predicted, federal
leader Gowon now appears too
committed to break away.
Gowon's mobilization order
is resulting in the rather rapid
addition of some 3,000 or more
army veterans to the approximately
9,000 troops already under federal
command. At the same time, the
build-up of federal forces con-
tinues in the area immediately
north of the Eastern Region. It
now includes all of two battalions
and most of a third with the bal-
ance on the way, as well as a
reconnaissance squadron, an artil-
lery unit, and various su
elements.
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The Easterners, beginning
with military governor Ojukwu,
evidently expect an attack at any
time. After months of intensive
military preparations, they seem
confident they can defend them-
selves successfully, particularly
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in view of the federal army's
logistical deficiencies and the
impending heavy rains. They might
even try to carry out sabotage or
other operations in the North.
As the two sides move closer
to a military test, Gowon has
succeeded in improving his frail
regime's political position, at
least for the moment. His decree
of 27 May establishing 12 new
states, which triggered the East's
secession, also firmed up the
Northern support on which he
basically depends. Last week he
secured the participation of im-
portant civilians from the West
and the Mid-West, as well as from
the North, in a revised Federal
Executive Council that is supposed
to run the government.
Included among the 12 new
civilian councilmen--one for each
state--is the leader of the res-
tive Yorubas of Western Nigeria,
Chief Awolowo. Prior to Ojukwu's
secession announcement, Awolowo
had threatened to pull the West
out of the Nigerian federation if
the East left. With Northern
troops still in place in the West,
the ambitious Awolowo now has
evidently decided that his and
Yoruba interests would be best
served at this time by what he
probably views as a short-term
tactical alliance with Gowon.
Western Military Governor Adebayo,
who last month boycotted a meeting
of the Supreme Military Council
as part of a Yoruba campaign to
force the removal of the Northern
troops, came to Lagos on 7 June
for top-level talks
Although most general cargo
shippers appear for the present
to be complying with Gowon's
proclaimed blockade of Eastern
Nigeria, this and other federal
economic measures do riot seem
likely to force Ojukwu to capitu-
late. The disposition of the
East's important oil exports has
not yet become a critical issue.
Gowon is permitting tankers, after
being checked at Lagos, to proceed
to the East and Ojukwu has still
not moved to force payment of
taxes and royalties or, Eastern
oil to his regime rather than to
the established federal account
in London. The next quarterly
payments of such monies would
normally be made by the oil com-
panies in July.
The precautionary evacuation
of US dependents from Eastern
Nigeria and peripheral areas has
been completed and a similar full-
scale movement of British women
and children now is under way.
Although Ojukwu has cooperated
fully, he clearly is unhappy over
the exodus, whi
I ,
25X1
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Domestic developments in most countries of the
Western Hemisphere were overshadowed this week by
concern and dismay over the war in the Middle East.
No government in the hemisphere has formally sided
with either the Arab nations or the Israelis, but
pro-Israeli sentiment generally predominates. Bra-
zil and Argentina, as current UN Security Council
members, have been the most active Latin American
governments in working for a cease-fire. In Vene-
zuela, the government is taking precautions against
the possible sabotage of oil installations by pro-
Communist terrorists sympathetic to the Arab cause.
Meanwhile, many governments are still preoc-
cupied over the question of what sort of interna-
tional action--if any--could be effectively raised
against Castro's subversive efforts in Venezuela
and elsewhere. Although the OAS has decided to
hold a foreign ministers' meeting as a result of
Venezuela's request, no date has been set and it
is not yet clear what measures are to be discussed.
Local problems that came to the fore in the
hemisphere this week included such perennial ones
as government confrontations with students in Bo-
livia, Brazil, and Ecuador; a new tiff between
Guyanese Premier Forbes Burnham and his junior co-
alition partner Peter D'Aguiar over a cabinet ap-
pointment; and increasing tensions in Guatemala
because of terrorism--in this instance, right-wing
terrorism against leftists and moderates errone-
ously judged to be "Communists."
One new problem in the area is the take-over of
the tiny British Caribbean island of Anguilla by
local residents demanding more autonomy. British
authorities appear to be in no hurry to help the
central government on the island of St. Kitts re-
assert its authority until it devises a plan to
restore its political credit with the Anguillans.
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VENEZUELA VERSUS CUBA
The Council of the Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS) has
approved Venezuela's request for
a meeting of foreign ministers to
consider action against Cuban
subversion in the hemisphere. At
a special meeting on 5 June, the
OAS Council appointed a nine-mem-
ber committee to recommend a date,
place, and agenda for the meeting.
OAS members voted unanimously
for the meeting, but strong dif-
ferences remain as to what action
the OAS could or should take. Some
countries, including Colombia and
Bolivia, favor strong action
rather than a simple condemna-
tion. Other countries--Brazil,
Chile, and Mexico--may hope that
the whole matter can be swept
under the rug. The Brazilian
and Chilean representatives quali-
fied their affirmative vote by
stating it did not commit them to
any particular course of action.
The Chilean further added that
the matter is of concern to the
United Nations as well as the
US. The Mexican representative
also struck a "cautious note" in
explaining his vote by calling
for a "careful study." Many of
the OAS countries believe their
internal problems and their poli-
cies on world trade are more im-
portant than the threat of Cuban
subversion.
In Venezuela, meanwhile, the
guerrillas are lying low, whether
for tactical reasons or as a re-
sult of their losses. Except for
the ambush of a military truck
convoy in the area east of Caracas
where the Cuban-supported landing
took place on 8 May, there have
been no serious internal security
incidents. The arrest of top
guerrilla leader Americo Martin
on 2 June may prolong this in-
activity, but it probably will
not seriously undercut the guer-
rillas' ability to carry out
offensive operations,.
The Venezuelan port workers
have supported their government's
campaign against Cuba by ordering
a boycott of ships of. countries
trading with Cuba. On 6 June
stevedores at La Guaira, Caracas'
port, refused to unload a Jap-
anese ship. The boycott is to be
"selective" to avoid damaging
Venezuela's economy, but the gov-
ernment, frustrated by its in-
ability to strike back hard at
Cuba, may encourage the port
workers to apply the boycott more
widely.
Former president Romulo Be-
tancourt has echoed the thoughts
of the labor leaders by pointing
out the importance to Cuba of
trade with the United Kingdom,
France, Canada, and Spain and has
stated specifically that those
countries must be made to choose
between Cuba and Venezuela. He
went further, however, than gov-
ernment or labor spokesmen in de-
claring that "if Cuba continues
its policy of aggression" the
time will come when the Caribbean
countries should undertake com-
bined armed action against Cuba.
SECRET
Page 30 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800070002-2
SECRET
BOLIVIAN ARMY REASSESSING COUNTERINSURGENCY PROGRAM
Guerrilla successes have
forced the Bolivian Army Command
to undertake a review of its whole
counterinsurgency program. The
review was precipitated by the
army's poor showing in a clash
on 30-31 May near El Espino, when
guerrillas first engaged and then
eluded an army unit that has been
considered one of the country's
best trained and equipped.
The guerrillas' command of
the zone was further demonstrated
on 2 June when sabotage of a sec-
tion of the vital Santa Cruz -
Yacuiba railroad forced total
suspension of service over the
line. This action, the first
insurgent strike at a strategic
installation, could presage moves
against nonmilitary targets, in-
cluding oil pipelines.
While the army is engaged
in the southeast, the guerrillas
may be preparing for action in
the northeast. Villagers in the
rugged North Yungas Region some
45 miles from La Paz claim that
30-40 "armed and bearded stran-
gers" are undergoing guerrilla war-
Meanwhile, Communist parties
in other Latin American countries
appear to be reaching some de-
cisions on the Bolivian situa-
tion. On 30 May the Communist
Trinidad
North Yung aloe
Iyrurata~
L' n otagasta
66830 6-67 CIA
SECRET
~Y'F3NV~
Page 31 WEEKLY SUMMARY 9 Jun 67
Approved For Release 200
BOLIVIA
21 SALT FLAT
ROAD
RAILROAD
o NATIONAL CAPITAL
0 EPARTAM EN TO
BOUNDARY
1O MILES
190 KILOMETERS
Railroad Incident
Espino
OCH a-AM B A,
l ~ hocln anrba
 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800070002-2
SECRET
parties of Chile and Uruguay is-
sued a joint declaration nn-
Dort for the anprri 1 1 as J
The prospect of foreign sup-
port and the government's inabil-
ity to crush the insurgents could
encourage an expansion of guer-
rilla activity in rural areas or
provoke unrest in urban centers
which would seriously strain the
amTPrnmPnt's limited resources.
SECRET
Page 32 WEEKLY SUMMARY 9 Jun 67
Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800070002-2
 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800070002-2
Q
Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800070002-2
 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800070002-2
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800070002-2