WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005800080001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 16, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Secret
WEEKLY SUMMARY
G-PTVCY Ant, --
State Dept. review completed
Secret
46
16 June 1967
No. 0294/67
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005800080001-2
SECRET
(Information as of noon EDT, 15 June 1967)
VIETNAM
Communist forces in the delta broke the lull in the
ground war in South Vietnam this week, but the main
enemy threat continues to be in the northern prov-
inces. On the political front in Saigon, Chief of
State Thieu officially confirmed his candidacy for
the presidency. Cambodia announced this week that
it would raise the status of the missions of both
Hanoi and the Liberation Front in Phnom Penh.
CHINESE ARMY DIRECTED TO RESTORE ORDER
There is little indication that the army is using its
new authority, possibly because some leaders such as
Defense Minister Lin Piao are more concerned with
spreading the Cultural Revolution than with ending
continuing disorder.
SOUTH KOREAN REGIME TARNISHED BY ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS
The size of its victory in last week's elections may
increase factional tensions within the governing
party, and blatant irregularities are stirring strong
student protests.
Europe
SOVIET MOVES IN MIDDLE EAST SITUATION
Moscow is escalating its diplomatic and verbal sup-
port for the Arabs and airlifting military supplies
to Egypt and Algeria. It wants to avoid a military
confrontation with the West and is determined that
the cease-fire be maintained.
SECRET
Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 Jun 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005800080001-2
SECRET
EAST EUROPEANS EXCEPT RUMANIA FOLLOW MOSCOW ON MID-EAST
All the Communist states, except Rumania, that had
relations with Israel have broken them. In a joint
condemnation of Israel, Tito for the first time since
1948 aligned Yugoslavia with the Soviet bloc in a
formal declaration.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Europe's Six have agreed in principle on the composi-
tion of a single Commission to replace the separate
executives of the European Economic Community, EURATOM,
and the Coal-Steel Community. Britain's bid to join
is still under study and will probably be discussed
again when the EEC Council meets on 26 June.
SOVIETS MAKE ANOTHER TRY FOR VENUS
Venus 4, launched on 12 June, will reach the planet
in mid-October. Its specific mission is not known.
Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 17
AFTERMATH OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR
The Arab states, radical and moderate, are engaged in
an anxious assessment of where their governments stand
in the wake of last week's military debacle. Several
of them seem threatened, to varying degrees, with in-
creasing instability. Israel is trying to assure its
military gains by putting up a generally obdurate
political front to the world, but it will face prob-
lems in administering the territory it occupies.
THE MIDDLE EAST OIL SITUATION
Some order is being restored in Middle East oil. pro-
duction and distribution, but threats of sabotage, the
refusal of Arab countries to supply British or Ameri-
can consumers, and closure of the Suez Canal and Arab
pipelines hamper early normalization of oil trade.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
SECRET
POLITICAL UNREST THREATENS IN SENEGAL
President Senghor's once incontestably strong polit-
ical position has weakened markedly over the past
year, as economic difficulties, internal political
feuding, and religious tensions mount.
NEW PRESIDENT IN SOMALI REPUBLIC
President-elect Abdirascid has not made known his
plans for the future, but his election on 10 June
could presage an anti-Western trend in Somalia and
increased tensions in the Horn of Africa.
Western Hemisphere
THE GUERRILLA SITUATION IN COLOMBIA
The guerrilla bands have increased their membership
and their efficiency, in spite of the government's
counterinsurgent efforts since 1962. If the guer-
rilla leaders coordinate their activities and over-
come other organizational deficiencies, they could
pose a serious security threat to the government.
SECRET
Page iii WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 Jun 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005800080001-2
SECRET
ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT SWAYING TOWARD LIBERALIZATION
Economy Minister Krieger Vasena's successes in sta-
bilization and denationalization programs appear to
have won the support of President Ongania despite
objections from cabinet conservatives.
ECUADOR: ELECTIONS AND CABINET CHANGES
In one of the most important contests, Assad Bucaram,
a strong critic of Interim President Arosemena, was
elected mayor of Guayaquil. Cabinet changes follow-
ing completion of the new constitution include the
appointment of Arosemena's chief adviser at Punta del
Este as foreign minister.
BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC POLICY CAUSES CONCERN
The decision to increase coffee support prices seems
likely to have repercussions throughout the Brazilian
economy and could jeopardize the vital stabilization
program.
SECRET
Page iv WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 Jun 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005800080001-2
Nave SECRET
FAR EAST
There was a lull in major military ground action
throughout South Vietnam last week. On the political
front, Chief of State Thieu finally announced his can-
didacy for the presidency in the September elections.
Relations between the Provisional National Assembly
and the ruling Directorate were subjected to new
strains when the latter rejected a controversial ar-
ticle in the presidential election law recently
adopted by the Assembly.
A new directive by the Peking leadership giving
local military commands responsibility for restoring
order signals another swing of the pendulum in China's
internal struggle. This order by the party central
committee and. military affairs committee resembles a
mandate to the military in late January which resulted
in only a short-lived suppression of militant pro-Mao
forces. Although mob violence is increasing through-
out the country, local commanders probably will act
cautiously in executing this directive in view of the
strong criticism of repressive moves against "true
revolutionaries" last February and the subsequent re-
surgence of pro-Maoist forces.
Student demonstrations against irregularities
in South Korea's National Assembly elections of
8 June have generated the most serious violence in
Seoul and other major cities since protests against
the treaty with Japan in 1965. The government has
moved additional troops into Seoul and may be forced
to impose martial law if the demonstrations continue
to grow.
Hanoi and the Viet Cong Liberation Front, sec-
onded by Moscow and Peking, have moved to improve
their relations with Cambodia by declaring their rec-
ognition of Cambodia's territorial integrity within
its "present borders." Chief of State Sihanouk has
stated that the North Vietnamese mission in Phnom
Penh will be upgraded to an embassy and that the
Liberation Front will be accorded diplomatic status.
SECRET
Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 Jun 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
SECRET
VIETNAM
Military Situation in
South Vietnam
Except for isolated instances
of heavy fighting between allied
and Communist forces in the Me-
kong Delta and in War Zone "D"
north of Saigon, the ground war
in South Vietnam has remained
at a relatively low level.
Sporadic contact between US
Marines and North Vietnamese Army
(NVA) regulars in northernmost I
Corps continues, amid indications
that NVA main force units are ap-
parently reoccupying previously
held positions in the southern
portion of the Demilitarized Zone
(DMZ) and in adjacent areas of
Quang Tri Province.
Although NVA regulars are cap-
able of attacking in the DMZ/north-
ern Quang Tri Province area with
a force equivalent to three divi-
sions, the immediate outlook is
that the Communists will continue
resupply and reinforcement activi-
ties while harassing and ambush-
ing US Marine and South Vietnam-
ese forces in battalion-size for-
mations.
The Communists are also con-
tinuing to reinforce the Northern
Front command, which is responsi-
ble for enemy operations in lower
Quang Tri Province and in all of
adjacent Thua Thien Province. Re-
cent prisoner interrogations in-
dicate that North Vietnamese in-
filtrators are being utilized to
upgrade Northern Front support
companies to battalion-size units.
These forces pose a division-size
threat to the Hue/Quang Tri city
area, but battalion-size attacks
against South Vietnamese district
headquarters coupled with harass-
ments and attacks against strategic
outposts between the two provin-
cial capitals appear to be the
most probable enemy course of ac-
tion.
In the central highlands,
there are signs that some ele-
ments of the Communists' B-3 Front
military command may have with-
drawn to Cambodia to reorganize
and resupply, possibly in prepara-
tion for an anticipated summer of-
fensive against allied positions
in western Pleiku Province. There
has been little contact this week
between the US 4th Infantry Divi-
sion (Operation FRANCIS MARION)
and NVA main force units, and
abandoned enemy bivouac sites
have been discovered. On 10 June,
however, Viet Cong units executed
a heavy mortar attack against
three US military installations
and a Revolutionary Development
training center in Pleiku city.
More than 125 mortar shells
struck the allied targets, re-
sulting in nearly 150 casual-
ties.
SECRET
Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA- RDP79-00927A005800080001-2
`Hal Lang )
r
Glo Linh
Dona Ha
i.am oor+
Turcn
nuc
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
SECRET
Presidential Politics
In Saigon
After weeks of maneuvering,
Chief of State Thieu officially
announced his presidential candi-
dacy on 14 June. Although he
did not name his running mate,
he followed Premier Ky's lead
and said that he would choose
a civilian. A Thieu-Ky race
will cause some strains among
the military. Both candidates
claim, however, that military
unity and stability will not be
affected.
Ky apparently believes that
Thieu's lack of support among
the military will preclude any
serious split. According to Ky,
Thieu has lost the respect of
all four corps commanders and
has incurred the marked opposi-
tion of other general officers.
Although Ky may hold an ex-
aggerated view of the extent to
which support for Thieu is wan-
ing, his basic assessment is
shared by III Corps commander
General Le Nguyen Khang, and
possibly by Thieu himself. Ac-
cording to Khang, Thieu has the
firm backing of only Directorate
Secretary General Pham Xuan
Chieu, minister for planning
General Dang Van Quang, and
Fifth Division commander Gen-
eral Pham Quoc Thuan.
Thieu himself apparently
is not very sanguine about his
chances of winning, but is de-
Cambodian-Vietnamese Relations
Hanoi has finally achieved
full diplomatic recognition from
Cambodia, not only for North Viet-
nam but for the South Vietnamese
Liberation Front. In return
Hanoi and the front have agreed
to recognize the "present bor-
ders" between South Vietnam and
Cambodia. Both Hanoi and Cam-
bodia apparently feel they have
accomplished a major objective.
These same issues have been un-
der discussion for more than two
years and had been the subject
of two unsuccessful conferences--
one in Peking in late 1964 and
another in Phnom Penh in 1966.
The Cambodian gesture is par-
ticularly important for the Lib-
eration Front which not only gains
another foreign post abroad, but
will be accorded "diplomatic
status" in Phnom Penh, according
to Cambodian Chief of State Si-
hanouk. Most Front offices
abroad, even in Communist capi-
tals, are accredited only to un-
official popular organizations
and have only semidiplomatic
status.
SECRET
Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
*AW SECRET
There is little indication
that the Communists have made any
real commitments or concessions
on actual delimitation of the Cam-
bodian border, but apparently their
statements suit Sihanouk's present
purposes. He has secured simi-
lar "recognition" of his borders
from both Moscow and Peking in re-
cent days, indicating that in spite
of his recent domestic campaign
against the Cambodian leftists, he
believes that internationally he
has more to gain from the Commu-
nists than from the West or an un-
responsive South Vietnam.
CHINESE ARMY DIRECTED TO RESTORE ORDER
Communist China's Army was
given a mandate on 6 June by the
central committee and the military
affairs committee to restore or-
der in troubled areas. Although
the order seemed to be clear-cut,
it did not spell out its local
application, and reports of dis-
orders continue to be received,
with little indication that the
army is exercising its new au-
thority. This suggests that some
elements in the country's lead-
ership are more concerned with
pushing the revolution, and thus
are blocking the directive. It
may only be, however, that local
commanders are moving cautiously
until the situation clarifies.
commands to assume full responsi-
bility for maintaining law and
order. Noting that fighting and
destruction of state and personal
property had become major prob-
lems, the seven-point directive
ordered the army to handle all
violations severely and to arrest
troublemakers.
The order is similar to an in-
effective one issued on 14 May by
the Peking Municipal Revolutionary
committee and signed by Minister
of Public Security Hsieh Fu-chih,
authorizing the local garrison
command to sto all violence in
the capital.
The long overdue directive,
reported through posters, un-
equivocally ordered local military
SECRET
Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
SECRET
the past month when Red Guards
have broken into public offices
to steal documents, no attempt
has been made to stop them.
The nationwide directive of
6 June is being similarly ignored.
According to posters displayed
in Peking in recent days,
COMMUNIST CHINA: Scenes of Disorder Since 6 June Directive
JAMMU
AND
KASHMIR
,_- m di-,e
on several occasions in
MONGOLIA
;
u mem ~
UPIt}R''~
bloody clashes between Red Guards
and local "conservative forces"
are still taking place almost
daily in some areas. From 6 to
8 June, for example, hundreds of
pro-Mao revolutionaries were al-
legedly beaten up and killed in
Chung-king. On 7,8, and 9 June,
forces led by party leaders in
Huai-ning, Anhwei Province,
r ~HENSi
Fr r f ;;t A N i-.-
t
NQRTH
VIETNAA
SECRET
Page 6
I K WIANGTUNG
SOUTH
KOREA
hanghd,
Han rh,u~1
C EKIA?NG
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
V.n ch'.1, IT aiy(ia YEl L!)W
/F ~ ,. ~` sinan 1 SEA
H g
aL aut~C1
AUTONOMOUS REGION
Lheng hot
?ON N
EAST
CHINA
SEA
PHILIPPINES
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
reportedly attacked a group of
pro-Mao revolutionary rebels,
killing or injuring 150.
Local military commanders
probably would be very reluctant
to interfere in such conflicts,
merely on the authority of the
broad 6 June directive, and would
be unlikely to act except on ex-
plicit instructions from above on
handling individual conflicts.
The army had been given a similar
broad mandate in February, but
in March and April came under
heavy criticism for having sup-
pressed "true revolutionaries" and
several commanders were dismissed
as a result. The situation is
further complicated by the fact
that the chief "troublemakers"
involved in recent clashes usually
have been supported by powerful
Red Guard groups in Peking appar-
ently backed by elements in the
leadership.
Since these militant leaders,
particularly Mao and Defense Min-
ister Lin Piao, seem to be rela-
tively unconcerned over the cost
of disorder, and determined to
sustain the momentum of the Cul-
tural Revolution and its instru-
ment, the Red Guard movement, the
SECRET
Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY
turmoil doubtless will continue.
Lin Piao is reported to have said
in a 30 March speech that "only
by having disorder is it possi-
ble to distinguish the black ele-
ments.... In all revolutions
there will be some damage. The
seriousness of this must not be
exaggerated."
Lin Piao, who has been identi-
fied with radical policies through-
out the Cultural Revolution, has
been given unusually heavy propa-
ganda attention since early May
in an attempt to build up his pub-
lic image as the chief voice, af-
ter Mao, in determining policy.
On two occasions, 23 May and 9
June, Lin headed gatherings of
the leadership in the absence of
Mao; these were Lin's first solo
performances of this kind. His
name figures prominently in two
documents which have been pub-
lished in book form and widely
circulated since late May, for
use side by side with Mao's quota-
tions and works. One is a letter
from Lin to the military affairs
committee dated 22 March 1966 and
the other a summary of a February
1966 "forum on literature and
art in the armed forces" which
he is said to have "entrusted"
to Madame Mao.
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
SECRET
SOUTH KOREAN REGIME TARNISHED BY ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS
The overwhelming victory of
President Pak Chong-hui's Demo-
cratic Republican Party (DRP) in
the 8 June South Korean National
Assembly elections has turned out
to be a mixed blessing for the re-
gime.
Although the DRP's capture
of 130 of the 175 seats in the as-
sembly represented a clear reaf-
firmation of public support for
Pak's policies, the size of the
victory and the many irregularities
that accompanied it have created
new problems. Election practices
have aroused strong student
protest demonstrations. For the
first time since the rioting of
1964-65, the government has had
to use the police to quell student.
demonstrators, who are demanding
new election. The army's Capital
Security Command has been alerted.
Within the regime, the size
of the victory threatens to ag-
gravate factional tensions. Em-
boldened by the party's success,
hard-core elements who helped to
deliver the vote are likely to put
new pressure on Pak for a greater
voice in policy decisions and the
selection of high administration
officials. A party council has
charged that "excessive support"
by the executive branch of the gov-
ernment in the elections caused the
present difficulties. This appears
to be an attempt by the hard core
to save itself and get rid of its
rivals by making government offi-
cials scopegoats.
The election also could work
a setback for the development of
an orderly and constitutional op-
position. The defeated parties,
embittered by the conduct of the
election, will be under strong
pressure to revert to inflammatory
and obstructionist tactics to make
their voices heard. The main oppo-
sition group, the New Democratic
Party, has decided on an assembly
boycott and is demanding new elec-
tions. Some of the administra-
tion's most outspoken critics are
among the opposition winners.
The government is aware of
the immediate dangers and is ac-
ting against some of its own fol-
lowers in order to reduce public
indignation. It has arrested 46
DRP members, including one as-
semblyman-elect, and charged them
SECRET
Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
SECRET
EUROPE
The Middle East situation continues to occupy
the attention of Europe. The USSR has stepped up
its diplomatic and verbal support for the Arabs and
begun an airlift of military supplies to Egypt and
Algeria.
Presently, the USSR's major effort is being
made at the UN. The call by the Soviets for an
emergency session of the General Assembly is an
obvious effort to use that forum as a more resonant
sounding board for drumming up support for them-
selves as well as for the Arabs. The Soviets find
themselves snarled in procedural difficulties, how-
ever, and their hasty maneuver has raised suspicions
on the part of many delegations over the wisdom and
utility of such a course.
Paris has agreed to a General Assembly meet-
ing but has stipulated that any question requiring
action would have to be submitted to the Security
Council. The French are still hoping for quadri-
partite action to settle the crisis, and in the
council the main participants would
four major owers.
All East European regimes except Rumania have
closed ranks with Moscow in support of the Arab
countries and have broken off relations with Is-
rael. Yugoslavia, joining with the bloc for the
first time in almost 20 years, signed the joint
statement condemning Israel issued at the Commu-
nist "summit meeting" in Moscow on 9 June.
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
SECRET
SOVIET MOVES IN MIDDLE EAST SITUATION
Moscow is escalating its diplo- I military alert or of any redeploy-
matic and verbal support for the
Arabs. Its objective is to meet
Arab demands for more resolute ac-
tion and keep pressure on Israel to
hold the cease-fire. The Soviets'
aim throughout the Mid-East conflict
has been to avoid a military con-
frontation with the West. Therefore,
they are determined that the cease-
fire be maintained.
Soviet diplomatic efforts to
regain favor with the Arabs have
thus far been little more than ges-
tures, reflecting the weakness of
the Soviet, as well as the Arab,
position. The hasty convocation on
9 June of the Communist "summit
meeting," however, presaged an in-
tensified bid to fortify the Soviet
image with the Arabs. This meeting
produced a statement vowing that
the bloc nations would "do every-
thing necessary" to rebuff Israel's
aggression if its forces did not re-
turn to the "truce line." The
statement, however, contained no
specific commitments and--with the
exception of breaking relations
with Israel--there has been no evi-
dence that any concrete action in
support of the Arabs was planned.
Apart from continued military
transport flights to the middle
East, the operations of Soviet
ground and air units are generally
normal. There is no evidence of a
Page 10
ments of ground or air combat units.
Although the Soviet naval squadron
in the Mediterranean could not op-
erate for long against the US Sixth
Fleet, Soviet warships are appar-
ently shifting their center of op-
erations eastward. Several Soviet
warships are now operating between
C rus and Syria
The primary pur-
pose this maneuver, however, is
more psychological and political
than military.
The USSR is continuing its large
airlift of military supplies to Egypt
and Algeria.
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005800080001-2
Presently, the USSR's major po-
litical effort to enhance its influ-
ence among Arab states and attempt
to reverse Israel's military gains
is being made at the United Nations.
UN Ambassador Fedorenko is making
every effort to get a special ses-
sion of the General Assembly to dis-
cuss the Arab-Israeli problem. So-
viet officials are indicating that
the primary purpose of such a ses-
sion would be to treat the subject
of "Israeli aggression" and the
withdrawal from occupied territory
to armistice lines.
The Soviet initiative has raised
many procedural issues. An emergency
session necessarily involves the
"Uniting for Peace" resolution and a
request for such a session must be
endorsed by either a majority of the
Security Council or by a majority of
the UN members. The Soviets presum-
ably chose to proceed in this way in
order to get an immediate assembly
meeting and to get around the re-
strictions the UN Charter imposes on
parallel consideration of issues by
both the council and assembly. Ac-
cording to Article 12, the assembly
can make no recommendations while
the council is considering a matter
unless the council so requests, and
only the Uniting for Peace resolu-
tion--which the Soviets have always
opposed--permits the assembly to
take any action on threats to inter-
national peace that would be binding
on members. The Soviets claim, how-
ever, that they are not acting under
that resolution since they "would
not request the UN to use troops for
peacekeeping."
The initial reaction to the So-
viet maneuver is less than enthusi-
astic. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have
recommended that the Arabs oppose an
emergency session. Some Europeans
are considering abstaining on the
Soviet request. Although there are
few states that will publicly op-
pose the session, many doubt its
usefulness. The Africans see the
session as largely a forum for So-
viet propaganda. The Latin Ameri-
cans believe they should devote
their efforts to avoiding or defeat-
ing a harsh resolution. Many dele-
gates have speculated that the So-
viets merely wanted the assembly as
a pretext for a high-level peace
conference.
If the assembly meets, the de-
bate is likely to be long and bitter.
The Soviets will be hard put to
round up the necessary two- thirds
vote required for a substantive res-
olution on an "important question."
Some countries which would be will-
ing to recommend that Israeli troops
withdraw to armistice lines would
not support the condemnation of Is-
rael. One counterproposal which
might be made to the Soviet resolu-
tion would be an assembly recommen-25X1
dation that the secretary general
send a personal representative to
the area.
SECRET
Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
SECRET
EAST EUROPEANS EXCEPT RUMANIA FOLLOW MOSCOW ON MID-EAST
All East European regimes
except Rumania closed ranks with
Moscow in support of the Arab
countries in the Middle East
crisis. Yugoslavia, joining with
the bloc for the first time in
almost 20 years, also signed the
joint statement condemning Israel
issued by the 9 June Communist
"summi-t meeting" in Moscow.
Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia
severed relations with Israel im-
mediately after the Soviets took
this action; Hungary and Poland
delayed their decision but re-
luctantly fell into line two days
later. Yugoslavia, probably to
avoid any association with the
Soviet lead, took an additional
day to make its break announce-
ment. Rumania has given no in-
dication that it plans any break
in relations. Neither East Ger-
many nor Albania has relations
with Israel.
In signing the joint state-
ment in Moscow, Tito for the
first time since his break with
Stalin in 1948 aligned Yugoslavia
with the Soviet bloc in a formal
declaration. His close associa-
tion with Nasir in the nonaligned
movement and his personal concern
that "imperialistic" forces are
gaining sway in the world prob-
ably prompted this decision.
Tito was also reflecting his ir-
ritation with Washington over
what he considers its reneging on
support for Yugoslavia's internal
reforms and over the recent bombings
by emigr6s of Belgrade's missions
in the US.
Tito's position reportedly
has drawn criticism from other
leaders in Belgrade. Some of them
probably fear that he has sacri-
ficed a portion of Yugoslavia's
hard-won independence and is risk-
ing Belgrade's good relations with
the Western world, particularly
the United States. In the past,
subordinates have been able to
damp down Tito's more radical pol-
icy swings, and they may be able
to do so in this case. In any
event, Tito himself probably will
take the first opportunity to re-
gain his balance between East and
West, as he has often done in the
past.
Rumania, as has become common,
differed with its Communist allies
and refused to sign the 9 June con-
demnation of Israel. In a declara-
tion of its own on 1.0 June, Bucha-
rest tended to favor the Arabs
but also called for direct nego-
tiations between them and the Is-
raelis. As the week progressed,
however, Bucharest appeared to be
increasingly concerned by Israeli
statements on possible territorial
annexations. The Rumanians prob-
ably fear the protracted Israeli
intransigence on a withdrawal set-
tlement could make Bucharest's
"neutral" position progressively
more difficult to maintain .F
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
SECRET
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
After two years of delay,
largely occasioned by France's
battle against community "supra-
nationalism," the six members of
the European communities seem
finally to have decided on the
14 individuals who will make up
the communities' first combined
Commission. This body will re-
place the separate executives of
the European Economic Community
(EEC), EURATOM, and the Coal-Steel
Community (ECSC). The new Com-
mission--on which agreement has
been reached in principle--looks
stronger than might have been
expected in view of the French
attitude and despite the depar-
ture of two of the more effective
commissioners--EEC President Hall-
stein and Vice President Marjolin.
The nominations will not be
formally agreed on until the treaty
merging the three executives goes
into effect on 1 July and some
changes are still possible--De
Gaulle, for example, has not yet
personally approved the French
members--:but it is virtually cer-
tain that Jean Rey of Belgium will
head the new body.. Rey has had
long experience with the communi-
ties, is a strong advocate of
European political unity, and
most recently demonstrated his
ability in representing the EEC
during the Kennedy Round negotia-
tions. Rey's nomination was as-
sured after Italian Treasury Min-
ister Colombo--whom the Six had
first agreed to support--declined
to serve.
The new Commission, by bring-
ing together responsibilities now
vested in the separate executives,
will be in a better position to
take initiatives on a wide variety
of economic problems requiring
community action--notably, poli-
cies on energy and transportation.
It might also help EURATOM and
the ECSC, both of which have
lacked effective leadership. How-
ever, a shakedown period will un-
doubtedly be needed to sort out
responsibilities and merge the
staffs of the three executives.
The French are alluding to the
difficulties inherent in this
process as precluding any early
Commission role in dealing with
the British bid for community
membership. Commission studies
on the effects of UK entry, how-
ever, are already in an advanced
stage.
The EEC Council last week
acknowledged the British, Irish,
and Danish applications for mem-
bership. The Six are expected
to take up the question again
when the Council meets on 26
June, but this meeting may not
settle the issue of whether the
community proceeds to ponder by
itself on the UK's "eligibility"
and the effects of its entry--
as the French presumably want--
or whether London will be invited
to participate in some way in an
early stage of the debate. if
the Council requests the Commis-
sion to submit findings, the Com-
mission could--as part of its
deliberations--undertake its own
discussions with the British.
London is concerned over the de-
lays in the start of the negotia-
tions and is trying, through
SECRET
Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
FULL-SCALE MODEL OF VENUS 3 EXHIBITED AT THE RECENT
PARIS AIR SHOW 66900 6-67 CIA
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
SECRET
contacts with the Five, to force
the pace of the Council's deliber-
ations, but it is apparently re-
luctant to establish contacts
first through the Commission.
Prime Minister Wilson will
visit Paris on 19 June. There
have been no hints of what line
he will take with De Gaulle,
but he will probably restate
Britain's acceptance of the com-
munity treaties and try to mini-
mize the UK's economic difficul-
ties--which could not be aggra-
vated by the Middle East crisis.
London's diplomatic activities
in support of its membership bid
may be stepped up in Bonn, since
West Germany assumes the presi-
dency of the EEC Council after 1
SOVIETS MAKE ANOTHER TRY FOR VENUS
Venus 4, launched on 12
June, is the first Soviet deep
space probe in more than 18 months.
According to Soviet announcements,
the 2,400--pound scientific ve-
hicle is on course for Venus and
is functioning normally. There
is no indication of its specific
mission, however.
Like the USSR's earlier deep
space probes, Venus 4 was first
placed in a low parking orbit.
After making nearly a full revo-
lution of the earth, the space-
craft was put into a trajectory
toward Venus, and it will reach
the planet: in mid-October.
Since its beginnings some
six years ago, the USSR's Venus
program has been plagued by space-
craft failures.
able for such launches.
If the Soviets follow their
previous practice, they will try
one or two more Venus probes
during the next three weeks while
the relative positions of the
Earth and Venus are still favor-
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 Jun 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
SECRET
SECRET
Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 Jun 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
%ftw SECRET
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
With the suspension of fighting in the Arab-
Israeli war, each side is concentrating on improv-
ing its negotiating position. The Israelis appear
to have displayed varying degrees of obduracy in
their demands, either out of calculation or be-
cause of internal disagreement or both. The Arabs,
with Communist support, apparently hope to reduce
their losses by presenting themselves as the ag-
grieved party in international forums.
The war, and the Arab military debacle, are
having political repercussions throughout the Mid-
dle East. The Israeli rout of radical Arab forces
has almost certainly encourage the royalist side
in the Yemen war, and there have been reports of
growing instability in many Arab states, notably
in Libya and even in Egypt itself. Farther afield,
Mrs. Gandhi's vigorous championing of the Arabs
has given further ammunition to her critics in-
side India.
SECRET
Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 Jun 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
SECRET
AFTERMATH OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR
The Arab states, radical and
moderate, are engaged in an anx-
ious assessment of where their
governments stand, internationally
and domestically, in the wake of
the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jorda-
nian military defeat. On the Is-
raeli side, Tel Aviv is trying
to assure its military gains by
putting up a generally obdurate
political front to the world;
differences among the numerous
press releases describing Israeli
peace aims may reflect varying
degrees of "hawkishness" among
Arab Summit
The principal radical Arab
maneuver apparently will be to
convene an Arab summit meeting.
The Algerians, with President
Boumediene as spokesman, have
been given the lead in this. Nasir
feels, probably rightly, that this
is not the moment for him to try
to stand openly as the maximum
leader. His present pose, re-
flected in his "resignation" and
reinstatement by popular demand
last weekend, is one of manfully
shouldering the blame for the
disaster and temporarily stepping
behind the curtain.
The over-all purpose of the
summit referred to by Nasir in
his "resignation" announcement
is to show the "imperialists"
that it is the whole "Arab nation"
and not just Gamal Abd al-Nasir
who is their enemy. Thus, if the
summit is to be successful, it
must assemble practically all the
Arab states, moderate as well as
radical, and at the same time en-
sure that all subscribe to a
strongly anti-Western line which
Nasir and/or Boumediene lay down.
This may be more easily conceived
than done; the best achieved so
far appears to be an Arab foreign
ministers' meeting in Kuwait sched-
uled for 17 June.
Much will depend on how
strongly and what kinds and quan-
tities of Soviet support are forth-
coming for the radical Arabs (see
article on page 10). But much
also will depend on how "moderate"
the so-called moderates--such as
Saudi Arabia, Libya, Jordan, Leba-
non, Iraq, and peripheral Morocco
and Sudan--calculate they can af-
ford to be at this :juncture. Na-
sir's propaganda and subversive ap-
paratus throughout the Arab world
is doing its best to keep up a
viciously anti-Western agitation
making moderation as difficult as
possible, and it has muted the in-
cipient anti-Soviet statements
that appeared even in the Egyptian
press earlier this week.
Internal Repercussions
In Arab States
Moderate Arab leaders them-
selves, in addition to looking
hopefully for some gesture from
the West which they could cite to
justify a line less blatantly hos-
tile than Nasir's, are taking
stock of their internal situa-
tions.
SECRET
Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005800080001-2
UU V Ik 11 1
T=ipoli LEN
MEDITERRANEAN
Sidon, j ") DAMASCUS
Haifa((''`T'26e {~
Tthi rial\
ISRAEL[
Gaza
JEZ j -3 ' vBir Lahfan6 1
IANA1. Romani pi'Awja
?
Al Qantas Gebel Libni, Abu
l
h
Great
Fzyid Bitter
Lake
.waygi
a
REM ILi1 R1ZED
ZONE
Port Taufiq An ? Nakhl
S I N A
Nablus
? z
)Jerus
Eila
D \ f
R E P U B L` I\C
(E G Y P T)
4U CJ O O O
Sharm ash-Shaykh
Hurghada
4?
RED
Areas reported occupied by Israe
SECRET
?Rafid
Nawa
"'~ .Maxkh Miskin
AMMAN
SAUDI
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005800080001-2
 Ago,
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
SECRET
Jordan's King Husayn, the
top moderate until he betook him-
self for protection into the Na-
sirist camp on the eve of hostili-
ties, has come through the ordeal
so far in much better shape than
expected. The "heroic" stand of
the small Jordanian Army compares
favorably with the ineptitude
demonstrated by the Egyptians, and
Husayn currently has at least a
ripple of popularity going for
him.
From Lebanon, however, ten-
sions between Christians and Mus-
lims are reported so acute that
the government dares not make any
significant move for fear of a
new civil war. In Saudi Arabia,
King Faysal's government is try-
ing to ride out a stron current
of basic xenophobia
(For oil developments in
Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the
Middle East, see next article.)
Some regimes almost cer-
tainly see themselves threatened
with more or less imminent over-
throw. In Libya, where, in the
crisis atmosphere, the civilian
government in effect handed over
authority to the security forces,
there is a question. whether it
can get it back or control the
situation even if it does. The
Sudan's internal situation, un-
easy before hostilities, has be-
come more so as the general area
tensions have sharpened.
The radical states, of course,
are not immune to these problems,
but they have been better so far
at concealing them from outside
observation. Recriminations over
the defeat must be rumbling around
the Egyptian politico-military
structure. Both Marshal Amir, sec-
ond to Nasir in the hierarchy, and
War Minister Shams ad-din Badran
have been retired or withdrawn from
the scene, and a new army commander
appointed. It remains to be seen,
however, whether significant fis-
sures or merely repairable cracks
appear in the Egyptian military.
No dissident leadership can be
expected from the civilian National
Assembly, which faithfully called
on Nasir to withdraw his "decision"
to go back to the "ranks of the
public."
The Syrian Government's situ-
ation is even more obscure. It
may be that government administra-
tion in Syria at the moment is
largely ad hoc. The Baath military
regime, however, remains formally
in charge of the apparatus and evi-
dently controls the propaganda ma-
chinery.
Another, although at this stage
considerably less significant, fac-
tor in the Arabs' calculations is
their military posture. At the
moment, however, the Arabs are in
no condition to continue the strug-
gle militarily, whatever the popu-
lar sentiment or the exhortations
of the Algerians. They depend
utterly on the USSR for re-equip-
ment and additional spares.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005800080001-2
SECRET
Israel's Situation
Israel's problems are just
beginning, too. Tel Aviv has
started to administer the occu-
pied territories--a good deal of
propaganda has already begun on
how friendly Israeli troops are
helping repair damage to Arab
buildings in West Jordan, for ex-
ample--and to take stock of cap-
tured military equipment. The
regular Israeli national weather
forecasts now include Sinai, and
Sharm ash-Shaykh is reportedly
referred to as "Solomon's Bay."
More seriously, the basic
Israeli contention that the Arabs
must now recognize Israel's ex-
istence is being put forward in a
variety of diplomatic and propa-
ganda forms. Prime Minister
Eshkol told the Israeli parliament
on 12 June that his government
would not. agree "to revert to the
situation which existed until a
week ago." Predictably, defense
minister General Dayan has taken
a harder, more specific line in
his press interviews than have
other top members of the govern-
ment.
A clearer picture of what
the Israelis expect or really want
to get out of the situation may
emerge when the full nature of
the international pressure and
the real occupation costs to Is-
rael are known.
Other Asian Attitudes
The postwar situation also
continues to be the focus of at-
tention among governments more or
less intimately involved with one
side or the other in the past.
The Iranian Government is trying
to strike a balance among its
hatred of Nasir, its ties with Is-
rael, and its desire to avoid al-
ienating the moderate Arab States.
The Iranian ress blasts Nasir for
the debacle
same time, Tehran
aid to Jordan and
At the
has sent medical
Iraq.
The Indian Government, in pub-
lic statements and in maneuvering
at the UN, has strongly supported
the Arab cause. Even within the
Congress Party, however, there is
mounting opposition to what is
termed Mrs. Gandhi's "bankrupt
diplomacy" on the issue. New Del-
hi's official attitude has been
heavily influenced by its hope to
retain Arab goodwill in the face
of India's perennial dispute with
Muslim Pakistan over Kashmir, by
its traditional ties with the UAR,
and, in all probability, by its
reliance on the USSR--the Arab
champion of the moment--for mili-
tary e ui ment.
SECRET
Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005800080001-2
 IdEk
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
SECRET
THE MIDDLE EAST OIL SITUATION
Some order is being
re-
alternate
stored in Middle East oil
pro-
European
duction and distribution,
but
awaiting
threats of sabotage, the
re-
moves in
fusal by Arab countries to sup-
ply British or American con-
sumers, and closure of the Suez
Canal and Arab pipelines hamper
early normalization of oil trade.
The principal Arab oil-pro-
ducing countries have resumed at
least limited operations. Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait are producing
and shipping to destinations
other than the US and UK. Other
Arab producers in the Persian
Gulf sheikdoms are also shipping
oil. Iraq's fields remain closed
down. Labor dissidence keeps
Libyan fields closed. Iran, the
major non-Arab producer, did not
interrupt production, but its
output has been reduced by tech-
nical difficulties occasioned by
factors not related to the war.
Uncertainty over these de-
velopments, unwillingness to risk
being added to the Arab embargo
list, or being committed this
early to cooperative ventures,
seem to have influenced the
OECD's oil committee to delay
instituting any emergency pro-
grams. There have been no seri-
ous efforts to invest quickly in
mit formulation of emergency
supply procedures.
It remains uncertain when
the Suez Canal will be reopened
Arab consumers also have
some problems.
Jordan has not yet indi-
ca e any shortage, although its
supplies are delivered via the
tapline from Saudi Arabia, which
remains closed. Most of Egypt's
domestic production comes from
areas of the Sinai now under Is-
raeli control.
SECRET
Page 22 WEEKLY SUMMARY
oil sources. West
consumers may also be
the outcome of legal
the US which would per-
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
? wl~ SECRET
POLITICAL UNREST THREATENS IN SENEGAL
Senegalese President Senghor's
political position appears to be
weakening. Senghor, a pro-French,
Catholic intellectual, has ruled
Senegal's overwhelmingly Muslim
population since before independ-
ence in 1960. He has done so by
astutely balancing a multitude of
locally based traditional polit-
ical factions, by cultivating im-
portant Muslim leaders, and by
manipulating the dominant party,
the Senegalese Progressive Union
(UPS). Over the years, however,
he has made so many enemies that
he may no longer be able to count
on sure support from any quarter.
Signals of serious political
unrest have recently become in-
creasingly conspicuous. There
was a near-successful assassi-
nation attempt on Senghor on
22 March.
On the local level, politi-
cal feuds have erupted into vio-
lence, with some loss of life, in
at least three scattered areas as
the traditional factions jockey
for position in the selection of
UPS candidates for the national
elections scheduled for next Feb-
ruary. The tensions are unusually
severe because of the 1966 merger
into the UPS--at Senghor's insist-
ence--of the leading opposition
party, whose supporters now must
be accommodated at the local level.
Even more important is the
unhappiness of powerful Muslim eco-
nomic interests. A proposed urban
renewal program in Dakar recently
caused a lengthy and bitter con-
frontation between Muslim land-
lords and Senghor, who eventually
had to back down considerably. The
general decline of the country's
economy, last year's drought, and
the upcoming end of the French pea-
nut subsidy (which must be sus-
pended under Common Market regu-
lations) have combined to reduce
the income of the powerful Muslim
brotherhoods and their peasant
followers. Government mismanage-
ment of peanut marketing arrange-
ments and of price controls on
food staples has aggravated the
Muslim discontent.
For the first time, the leader
of one of the two largest brother-
hoods this year omitted a tradi-
tional holiday speech in favor of
the government. This spring,prayers
for Senghor's demise were reg-
ularly offered in Senegalese
mosques. The President's position
of strict neutrality in the recent
Middle East crisis will probably
further alienate his Muslim con-
stituents.
Under the circumstances, there 25X1
could be a move against Senghor
either by fanatic individuals or
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
SECRET F=="
NEW PRESIDENT IN SOMALI REPUBLIC
Former prime minister Abdi-
rascid Ali Schermarke, generally
considered a slight underdog in
Somalia's second presidential
election, showed unexpected
strength in the National Assembly
and was chosen on the third bal-
lot for a six-year term over in-
cumbent Aden Abdullah Osman.
Tribal splits, opportunism on the
part of individual deputies, and
a reported last-minute switch of
allegiance by two government fig-
ures apparently were the key fac-
tors in Abdirascid's victory.
Another was the inability of Pres-
ident Aden's supporters to unite
his dominant but faction-ridden
party, the Somali Youth League
(SYL), behind him.
The long-term implications
of Abdirascid's victory are not
yet clear, but his election may
presage an anti-Western trend in
Somalia. As prime minister, Abdi-
rascid in the early years of his
regime was considered pro-Western,
but he subsequently paid court to
Communist countries and received
covert financial support from
them. In 1963 he was instrumental
in Somalia's acceptance of a siz-
able Soviet economic and military
assistance program which has en-
SECRET
Page 26 WEEKLY SUMMARY
abled the USSR to (lain substan-
tial influence in the country.
Abdirascid's tenure as pres-
ident may also portend new ten-
sions and troubles for the Horn
of Africa. In and out of office
he was a militant supporter of
Somalia's irredentist claims on
Somali-inhabited territories in
neighboring Kenya, Ethiopia, and
French Somaliland.
Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, a
northern politician who was instru-
mental in lining up parliamentary
support for Abdirascid, is expected
to be named prime minister after
Abdirascid assumes office on
7 July. Egal is considered con-
servative and pro-Western, and he may
lend some balance to the new gov-
ernment. Egal, however, faces a
difficult chore in putting to-
gether a cabinet acceptable to
the National Assembly. The posi-
tion of the new prime minister
and the direction in which his gov-
ernment moves will also depend on
whether Abdirascid chooses to re-
main above partisan politics, as
President Aden did, or to assume
a more direct role in formulating
government policy.
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
~ftw SECRET
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
The Middle East crisis remained the principal
preoccupation of most countries of the Western Hemis-
phere last week. Local Communist propaganda efforts
and talks with Brazilian and Argentine authorities by
a special UAR envoy notwithstanding, sentiment con-
tinues overwhelmingly favorable to Israel.
Brazil is taking the lead among those Latin
American governments urging that peace be restored
and has proposed that a special international con-
ference be called to work out a permanent settlement
of the conflict. Brazil's ambitious Foreign Minister
Magalhaes Pinto evidently sees such a conference--in
which Brazil wants to participate--as a boost both
for his country's great-power aspirations and for
his own presidential hopes.
In Bolivia, a state of siege declared on 7 June
continues in force in the wake of agitation by the
country's volatile tin miners and students and of
general political unrest stemmin from the unsolved
guerrilla problem.
Most o Bo ivia s neighbors, in-
c u ing Peru, Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, are
increasingly concerned over Bolivia's guerrilla prob-
lem, and military leaders of the latter three have even
been discussing creation of a joint antiguerrilla
command.
Last week's execution of 19 military officers
in Haiti was probably another of Duvalier's periodic
object lessons to those who might be tempted to con-
spire against him. The move could backfire, however,
if some of his previously loyal military aides begin
to have doubts about their own security. Elsewhere
in the Caribbean, political unrest worsened in the
British-associated state of St. Kitts - Nevis - An-
guilla and martial law was declared on St. Kitts on
12 June because of turmoil over Anguilla's desire to
break politically with the central government and re-
turn to direct British rule.
SECRET
Page 27 WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 Jun 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
SECRET
THE GUERRILLA SITUATION IN COLOMBIA
The sporadic nature of guer-
rilla activity in Colombia ap-
pears to stem from organi-
zational weaknesses
Gov-
ernment victories in several re-
cent clashes have not so far
seriously weakened the guerrilla
movement and government officials
warn that any expansion of guer-
rilla activities could create a
serious security threat.
25X1
25X1
Ith 25X1
rillas seem to be hampered 2bX1
by t eir 25X1
own weaknesses. ere is little
coordination between the two guer-
rilla organizations because of
ideological and personality dif-
ferences. PCC control of the
Guerrillas of the Army of
National Liberation (ELN), an in-
dependent pro-Castro movement, op-
erate in two fronts in the Depart-
ment of Santander. Units of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC), which is con-
nected with the Communist Party
of Colombia (PCC), operate prin-
cipally in the departments of
Quindio, Valle del Cauca, Tolima,
and Huila. The ELN has a force
of about 200 men, and there are
about 500 in the FARC.
G
~
~
l %~
ECUADOR
?-??~?~
Page 29
4
SECRET
PERU /
!."iAl
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
SECRET
guerrillas is apparently loose and
weak. Many PCC leaders are not
wholeheartedly in favor of guer-
rilla war, and the FARC guerril-
las sometimes appear to be more
interested in controlling small
"enclaves" than in offensive op-
erations aimed at overthrowing
the government. Neither guerrilla
organization seems to be capable
of forming a strategic plan or
program or of organizing a so-
phisticated military campaign.
Both, however, have been highly
effective in individual operations.
The present insurgency must
be distinguished from traditional
banditry and non-Communist guer-
rilla warfare which have plagued
the Colombian countryside since
1948. The latter have diminished
in recent years, but insurgency
has increased in scope and serious-
ness. If the guerrillas overcome
their organizational weaknesses
they could pose serious problems
of government control of the coun-
tryside, put a severe drain on
the government's limited finan-
cial resources, and weaken pub-
lic confidence in the government.
ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT SWAYING TOWARD LIBERALIZATION
The successes of Economy Min-
ister Krieger Vasena's stabiliza-
tion and denationalization programs
appear to be swaying Argentine
President Ongania toward more
liberal policies. In reaction to
this trend three conservative
cabinet officers resigned last
week after an unsuccessful strug-
gle to defeat the new petroleum
law, which will grant exploita-
tion concessions to foreign oil
firms-.
Among the "nationalist" min-
isters who resigned was the secre-
tary of the National Development
Council (CONADE), Isidoro Marin.
The vacant posts have been
filled by men more sympathetic to
Krieger Vasena's ideas, but sev-
eral other important cabinet posts
are still held by conservatives.
Some military officers also con-
tinue to oppose the economy min-
ister on grounds of national se-
curity. It is unlikely, however,
that they will be able to re-
verse the new economic plans,
which have won increasing approval
from foreign investors and may
return Argentina to self-suffi-
ciency in oil production for the
first time since 1962.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 Jun 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
SECRET
ECUADOR: ELECTIONS AND CABINET CHANGES
Provincial and municipal elec-
tions were held throughout Ecua-
dor on 11 June for the first time
since 1962. Nearly one million
voters turned out to elect the
mayors and the provincial and
municipal. councils that will gov-
ern for the next four years. In-
complete returns indicate general
support for center-left candi-
dates.
In the important contest for
mayor of Guayaquil, Ecuador's
largest city, Assad Bucaram was
victorious in a field of five,
as expected. He received nearly
60 percent of the total vote,
more than twice that of his
closest rival, Pedro Menendez Gil-
bert of the National Velasquista
Federation (FNV). Bucaram was
the candidate of a coalition com-
prising the Concentration of Pop-
ular Forces (CFP)--his own highly
personalistic political party--
and the :Ecuadorean Liberal Party
(PL). The CFP-PL coalition also
won five of the eleven seats on
the Guayaquil municipal council,
and at least four of the nine
vacancies on the Guayas (Guaya-
quil) Provincial council.
Bucaram's margin of victory
is impressive in light of the num-
ber of candidates running against
him, and. he will probably be
pushed by his followers to seek
the presidency in the general
elections scheduled for next June.
He has been severely critical of
Interim President Otto Arosemena,
and his victory presages a period
of strained relations between
Guayaquil and the national gov-
ernment.,
a political independent but backed
by the FNV, won the mayoralty race
in an upset over his Conservative
Party opponent. Castillo waged
{ an energetic last-minute campaign
appealing primarily to the lower
classes. The Conservatives, how-
ever, appear to have captured a
majority of the seats on the Quito
municipal council.
In other developments, all
cabinet members submitted their
resignations on 10 June to allow
Arosemena to reorganize his gov-
ernment now that the constituent
assembly has finished its work on
the new constitution and has ad-
journed. Arosemena has rejected
the resignations of all but three.
Julio Prado Vallejo, a jour-
nalist for one of Ecuador's lead-
ing newspapers, has been appointed
minister of foreign relations.
1is newspaper
co umn has contained frequent at-
tacks on the United States, US
investments, and the Alliance for
Progress.
In the other two appointments,
Aurelio Davila Cajas, director
of the Conservative Party, has
SECRET
Page 31 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 Awhk
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
SECRET
been designated minister of pub-
lic health, and Rafael Franco, a
nonentity, has been given the
agriculture portfolio. The cabi-
net is now composed mostly of
rightists, a change Arosemena
agreed to make some months ago
in exchange for support of a bill
extending his term of office un-
Se tember 1968.
BRAZILIAN
ECONOMIC POLICY CAUSES CONCERN
The new Brazilian Government's
tendency to evade difficult eco-
nomic decisions appears to be lead-
ing to some relaxation of the sta-
bilization program.
President Costa e Silva has
apparently bowed to pressure from
powerful coffee interests in for-
mulating Brazil's coffee policy
for the 1967-68 crop year. Coffee
last year accounted for 44 percent
of Brazil's total exports of $1.7
billion, and the coffee policy is
a key factor in the over-all gov-
ernment economic program.
Growers have been urging the
government to increase the basic
coffee support price, which has
been held down in recent years in
an effort to discourage production
and encourage diversification into
other crops. The newly announced
program increases support prices
28 percent immediately and 11.5
percent more on 1 January 1968.
In making this decision, the Pres-
ident apparently overrode the ad-
vice of his economic ministers and.
technicians who had called for one
15-percent increase for the entire
year.
The support price increase
will have repercussions through-
out the Brazilian economy. It
seems sure to halt the program of
reducing coffee production and di-
versifying crops, and to bring
windfall profits to exporters who
have withheld stock from past
crops. Also, there will probably
be reduction of the export price
of Brazilian coffee. As no de-
mand increase is expected and Bra-
zil was already competitive in the
world coffee market, this will
probably not increase sales sig-
nificantly and may well result in
reduced foreign exchange earn-
ings. In the long term reduced
Brazilian prices can have a sig-
nificant impact on the world mar-
ket, driving down the price re-
ceived by all coffee producing
countries.
Several other important eco-
nomic policy decisions are expected
in the near future. If Costa e
Silva continues to take the line
of least resistance and bows again
to other powerful pressure groups,
the entire stabilization program
could be slowed down significantly.
SECRET
Page 32 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
 w
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080001-2