WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT FRICTIONS IN THE MAGHREB

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79-00927A005800080002-1
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RIPPUB
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S
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12
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December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 8, 2008
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2
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Publication Date: 
June 16, 1967
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REPORT
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Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080002-1 Secret DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Special Report Frictions in the Maghreb State Dept. review completed Secret N2 42 I1. l1 u- 16 June 1967 ARCHIv.Es, 0294/67A 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080002-1 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080002-1 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080002-1 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080002-1 SECRET PCR U GALc C 2 ) 400 Statute Miles _ r.3rf Ira CANARY ISLANDS Sidi Ifni Santa ?Cruz SPANISH/ SAHARA ,t villa Cisneros / .i3 ssau I YT/ U ~ fi N EA G lJ i N EA LakeChadj SECRET Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP79-00927A005800080002-1 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080002-1 SECRET FRICTIONS IN THE MAGHREB The problems and frictions that have developed among the three former French-ruled North African territories of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia have for the moment been beclouded by the cry for Arab unity in the Arab-Israeli confrontation. The issues have not disappeared, however, and the aftermath of the hostilities may in fact heighten them. Although in- tellectuals in all three countries continue to toy with the idea of Maghreb unity or federation, the problems that have persisted since independence in their relationships with each other, with their Arab and African neighbors, and with the Western powers preclude the development of any meaningful collabora- tion among them. Background A deceptive aura of unity based on common heritage and mutual interests and goals surrounds the Maghreb--Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. All are Arab and Muslim in language and tradition, with a veneer of French culture and phi- losophy; all are emerging nations, striving to develop their back- ward--largely agricultural-- economies and eliminate illiteracy, poverty, and disease. All are bound closely to France, their former colonial master, all have sentimental ties with other Arab states, and all seek to expand horizons in Europe and the Western Hemisphere. The three are also ambitious for recognition not only as leaders in Africa but in the whole underdeveloped world as well. Yet the members of the Maghreb do not sing the same tune, as is evident in their divergent means of expressing "full support" of Arab solidarity in the present Arab-Israeli confrontation. In fact, each assiduously undercuts the others to promote its own interests while at the same time giving lip service to the concept of Maghreb unity. Early Attempts at Unified Action Long before the first two of the French-ruled North African countries recovered independence-- Morocco on 2 March and Tunisia on 20 March 1956--North Africans collaborated to scheme about throw- ing off French control. The earliest of these councils probably were "bull sessions" of Moroccan, Al- gerian, and Tunisian students, principally in Paris but also in Cairo and other centers. After World War II, when Egypt gave sanc- tuary to Abdelkrim, the legendary SECRET Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080002-1 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080002-1 SECRET N4W hero of the Rif rebellion of the 1920s, Cairo became the site for hatching North African intrigues. But Abdelkrim failed to supply the dynamic leadership needed to mold the individual nationalist groups into an organization capa- ble of producing union and action, and the nationalist politicians in Cairo soon fell to bickering among themselves. In April 1958, although Algeria was not yet free, an attempt was made to lay the foun- dations for a Maghreb union or federation. Under the auspices of the Moroccan Istiqlal Party, representatives of Istiglal, the Tunisian Neo-Destour Party, and the Algerian National Libera- tion Front (FLN) met in Tangier, Morocco. A Mauritanian observer also attended this meeting. Later on, Libyan representatives were invited to participate in Maghrebian meetings. The hard core, however, remains the three former French-held areas. At Tangier, the Moroccans committed themselves to provide assistance to the FLN more on a par with what the Tunisians were already supplying, while the FLN postponed its plan to establish a provisional government. All agreed to exert every possible pressure to prevent France from marketing Saharan crude oil. This apparent harmony was disrupted less than five months later when the Algerians launched their provisional government in Cairo without the courtesy of notifying their Moroccan and Tu- nesian partners in advance. Sub- sequently, while the Algerians were still fighting the French, Tunisian President Bourguiba angered the Algerians when he permitted France to construct a pipeline across Tunisian territory in order to move Saharan crude oil from Edjeleh to the Mediterranean. The growing number of Algerian refugees in both Morocco and Tu- nesia also were constant sources of friction, as were the free- wheeling activities of Algerian troops based in both border areas. Both Rabat and, particularly, Tunis began to regard their armed rebel guests as threats to their own regimes. Algerian Independence When Algeria achieved inde- pendence in July 1962 and the Algerian refugees and troops had departed Morocco and Tunisia, new irritants prevented the develop- ment of harmonious relationships among the three governments. Mo- rocco had remained a conservative monarchy, Tunisia had become a moderate socialist republic. Both, however, were alarmed at the de- velopment of a radically revolu- tionary-socialist regime in Al- geria. King Hassan and President Bourguiba, having supported mod- erates such as Ferhat Abbas, the first head of the Provisional Al- gerian Government, came to dis- trust the erratic and flamboyant Algerian President Ben Bella and his growing group of leftist and Marxist advisers. The feeling was mutual: Ben Bella blamed the Moroccans for "betraying" him in 1956, thereby permitting the French to capture SECRET SPECIAL REPORT 16 Jun 67 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080002-1 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP79-00927A005800080002-1 SECRET and imprison him and some other Algerian leaders. Moreover, he sharply resented Bourguiba's ef- forts to counsel and guide him in the intricacies of establishing a new government. There was also some bureaucratic dislocation in Tunis and Rabat occasioned by the withdrawal of experienced Algerian personnel who had been working in the Tunisian and Moroccan civil service in order to become the nucleus of an independent Alge- rian civil service. Ben Bella also quickly moved close to Nasir, who was constantly feuding with Bourguiba and had small regard for Hassan in particu- lar and the Moroccans in general. In an effort to gain ground with Algiers, which already was planning a grandiose reception for Nasir, Hassan craftily managed to upstage the Egyptian leader and be the first chief of state given a state reception by independent Algeria. Having been caught off balance, Ben Bella was in an embarrassing position vis-a-vis Nasir and in the long run, Hassan's ploy redounded to his own disadvantage. Meanwhile, Hassan--who fancied himself a protege of De Gaulle, while the blunt and undiplomatic Bourguiba was in the French Presi- dent's disfavor--soon was acutely aware that French relations with Algeria were to be, in De Gaulle's mind, the model for a relationship which would appeal to other under- developed areas. Both Tunisia and Morocco found French assistance to them curtailed while that to Algeria seemed to them surpris- ingly generous. Moreover, when Algeria nationalized French farm- lands, both Hassan and Bourguiba were under strong domestic pres- sure to do likewise. After capit- ulating to this pressure, however, their governments fell into new difficulties with France whereas Algerian-French relations were not seriously affected by Algiers' land seizures. Algeria remains the favorite son in French eyes to this day. Border Problems Border problems continue to be a main irritant in Maghreb re- lations. On gaining independence both Morocco and Tunisia claimed territory that France was continu- ing to administer as part of Al- geria. Pressed by nationalist extremists who demanded large areas of southwestern Algeria as well as all of Mauritania and Spanish Sahara, the Moroccan Gov- ernment soon after Algerian inde- pendence broached this subject to Algeria, citing a commitment of Ferhat Abbas to negotiate Moroccan claims after Algerian independence. Ben Bella categorically refused to discuss the question, claiming that Algeria's borders were not subject to negotiation and citing a provision in the charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to support this thesis. Although Tunisia's claims were ex- tremely minor compared with those of Morocco, the Algerians also would make no concessions to Tunis. Numerous border incidents-- illegal crossings, banditry, move- ments of migrant workers, and sea- sonal migrations of nomadic tribes and their herds--caused many prob- lems for all three governments. SECRET Page 4 SPECIAL REPORT Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP79-00927A005800080002-1 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP79-00927A005800080002-1 "WI SECRET Tempers in Algiers and Rabat rose in mid-October 1963 when an Algerian patrol clashed with a Mo- roccan auxiliary unit at a Saharan waterhole they had been sharing. The conflict quickly escalated, and the Moroccan Army--benefiting from air support while the few Algerian MIGs, loaned by Nasir, were stranded at a French-con- trolled field near Bechar-- clearly outfought the Algerian troops. A cease-fire, supervised by Mali and Ethiopia, was arranged on 1 November and the two forces were separated by a narrow buffer zone that each continues to keep under close surveillance lest the other occupy its strong points. The seven-member OAU commission es- tablished to determine the re- sponsibility for the outbreak of the conflict and to recommend a settlement of the border dispute has served mainly to mark time. Having already met in 11 ses- sions, usually at the request of the Moroccans, it hears arguments counterarguments, and rebuttals with little likelihood of reach- ing a decision. This Algerian military "defeat" is sometimes cited as justification for the subsequent Algerian arms build- up and sustains Moroccan sus- picions that one day Algeria in- tends to "get even." 25X1 Moroccan policy with regard to Spanish Sahara--Rabat has publicly supported independence for the area as contributed to Morocco's isolation from its neighbors. Consultations among Spain, Mauritania, and Algeria have led Morocco to suspect that it is being surrounded by a Madrid- Nouakchott-Algiers axis. 25X1 Tunisian territorial claims center on a wedge of desert along Tunisia's southwestern border. This issue became acute after a Tunisian-Italian drilling team in 1964 discovered exploitable quanti- ties of oil very close to the dis- puted area. Some weeks ago, an Algerian company also had an oil strike within a few miles of the Tunisian well. Ru- mors o clashes between drilling 25X1 personnel and of the concentra- tion of troops on both sides of the border are probably exaggerated. A joint Algerian-Tunisian military team has visited the area to di- rect the placement of border mark- ers in the vicinity of oil drill- ing operations. Tunisia has not, however, abandoned its demand for the negotiation of the undefined portion of its southwestern border. Maghrebian Dissidents Another issue contributing to Maghrebian tension in the sanc- tuary each of the three countries gives to antiregime dissidents from the others. Since Algerian independence, Moroccan and Tunisian dissidents have gravitated to Algiers, where they have found some encouragement SECRET Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP79-00927A005800080002-1 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080002-1 SECRET and assistance for their effort to undermine the two moderate re- gimes. Ben Bella refused to ex- tradite three or four Tunisians who fled to Algeria after the dis- covery late in 1962 of a plot against Bourguiba's life. Al- geria also openly encouraged the activities of a handful of Yous- sefists--supporters of Bourguiba's murdered rival, Salah ben Youssef. Before the overthrow of Ben Bella two years ago, Algeria not only had established training camps, but had armed and equipped some 200 Moroccan military defectors. The Algerians also encouraged the Moroccan left-wing opposition, the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), granting asylum and dip- lomatic facilities to UNFP leader Mehdi ben Barka--who was under a Moroccan death sentence--and other Moroccan leftist refugees. Rabat angered Bou- mediene last 'January when the Mo- roccan Government facilitated, if not sponsored, a state funeral for Algerian oppositionist Mohamed Khider and openly conferred then and later with other Algerian exiles. Soviet Arms Build-up in Algeria Both Morocco and Tunisia have been increasingly alarmed as their larger neighbor Algeria continues to build up its inven- tory of sophisticated Soviet weapons. Bourguiba particularly, fearing that Nasir will. quickly overrun Libya when the present aged Libyan ruler dies, views himself as wedged in between an antagonistic Algeria and a hos- tile Egypt. Hassan, as his re- lations with France deteriorated following the disappearance in Paris of Mehdi ben Barka, has found himself isolated.. Both Bourguiba and Hassan therefore have moved closer to the US and have pressed for mil- itary assistance above and be- yond existing US programs. They ditional weapons in Europe. For their part, Morocco and Tunisia have irritated Algiers by receiving Algerian op osition leaders Although the Algerian threat has impelled the Moroccan and Tu- nisian governments to collaborate to a degree, certain basic diver- gencies between these two SECRET Page 6 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080002-1 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080002-1 *000~ *400 SECRET pro-Western moderates will con- tinue to prevent the development of a truly warm relationship. In 1960, Morocco resented the fact that Tunisia recognized Mauritanian independence, and relations between Rabat and Tunis were virtually nonexist- ent. for several years thereafter. Hassan, moreover, is constantly offended by Bourguiba's patroniz- ing and undiplomatic methods. Bourguiba, in turn, has vainly sought staunch Moroccan support for his attempts to develop an alignment of moderate Arab gov- ernments as a counterforce to the Arab radicals, for Hassan sees himself instead as a mediator in the quarrels between the two groups. Boumediene, for his part, denies any aggressive intention toward his neighbors and claims that the modern arms Algeria has acquired are merely to protect its extended frontiers. Neverthe- less, he has made it clear that he would retaliate with force were Morocco or Tunisia to at- tempt to wrest disputed terri- tory from Algeria. Algeria also chose to misinterpret Hassan's appeal on 28 February 1967 to the UN secretary general to take steps toward a reduction of arma- ments in the Maghreb, countering that the OAU was already attempt- ing to resolve Morocco's terri- torial dispute with Algeria. Relations With the US Both Morocco's growing friendship with the US and Tu- nisia's special relationship as a recipient of a long-term commit- ment for American economic assist- ance cause additional frictions in the Maghreb. Many Algerian of- ficials assume that American capi- talism seeks the destruction of all socialism, particularly Al- geria's revolutionary brand. Fear- ful of a US-backed Moroccan-Tu- nisian encirclement, they give credence to rumors of the consum- mation of alliances and the es- tablishment of military bases in Morocco and Tunisia. When a Florida shipbuilding firm was negotiating with the Tu- nisians to establish a ship re- pair facility near Bizerte, the Algerian Government readily be- lieved that Tunisia was provid- ing a base for the Sixth Fleet despite repeated denials by Amer- ican and Tunisian officials. The Algerians also assumed, when a contract was signed for the construction of an interna- tional airport at the site of the former US base at Nouasseur, Morocco, that the US was reac- tivating the installation. The Algerians also resent the fact that the US has not pressed large-scale development projects on them and they make unfavorable comparisons between American aid to Algeria--even though immediately after inde- pendence the US fed up to half of the Algerian population for many months--with American as- sistance to Moroccan and Tuni- sian industry. SECRET Page 7 SPECIAL REPORT Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080002-1 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP79-00927A005800080002-1 SECRET Attitudes Toward Arab-Israeli Conflict In the early days of the present Arab-Israeli confronta- tion, all three Maghreb govern- ments pledged full support to Nasir, and Tunisia, which formally broke with Cairo in October 1966 after 18 months of de facto rup- ture, resumed relations. There was a sharp divergence, however, in the degree and amount of sup- port each gave to the Arab cause. Algeria, as a brother pro- gressive socialist regime, pledged "all-out" assistance to Nasir and, if necessary, a "fight to the death." Algiers sent troops and jet aircraft, and quickly fol- lowed Nasir in breaking relations with the US; however, at least some Algerian officials are skepti- cal of Nasir's charges that the US aided Israel and were prepared to accept US denials. The Al- gerians reacted to early Egyp- tian reverses by characterizing the Egyptian soldiers as cowards and were eager for Algerian troops to avenge Arab honor. Subsequently, they have indicated some disillusionment with the lack of Soviet support for the Arabs. Although King Hassan sent troops to Egypt immediately fol- lowing the outbreak of hostili- ties, there are indications that this was not a wholehearted com- mitment and that he probably preferred they not be engaged in battle. The Moroccan foreign minister has assured the Ameri- can Embassy that Morocco will not break relations with the US. Moroccan authorities have taken precautions to prevent public dis- order of any kind, but especially against the US, UK, or the Moroc- can Jewish minority. Rabat also labeled a's "interference"' in Mo- roccan internal affairs an Al- gerian radiobroadcast urging Mo- roccans to sabotage the "'Ameri- can bases at Kenitra and Nouas- seur." Bourguiba offered troops to Nasir, but did not send them out of the country. He went through the motions of expressing soli- darity with the Arabs and denounc- ing Israel--indeed, he could have done no less in the face of the strong popular emotion generated by the outbreak of hostilities. He has privately reiterated his friendship for the US, however, and stated that he would not break relations. Outlook The three governments did collaborate to some extent dur- ing the Arab-Israeli crisis--Al- geria offered transit facilities to Moroccan troops, and Tunis provided transit stops for both Moroccan and Algerian planes and troops--but the prospects for a really amicable relationship seem slight so long as the po- litical orientations of the three diverge so sharply and the mili- tary disparity remains so pro- found. The Israeli military vic- tory and the posthostilities pe- riod of recrimination seem cer- tain to add to the existing fric- tions. SECRET Page 8 SPECIAL REPORT Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP79-00927A005800080002-1 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP79-00927A005800080002-1 SECRET Some small progress may con- tinue in purely administrative and economic spheres, such as the technical committees now working on standardizing postal and customs procedures. In addi- tion, some lip service probably will still be rendered by all three to the concept of Maghrebian unity. But larger economic proj- ects such as a proposed Maghrebian airline and the joint development of basic industries and resources seem likely to founder on basic political incompatibility. SECRET Page 9 SPECIAL REPORT Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP79-00927A005800080002-1 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080002-1 NEW Secret Secret Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800080002-1