WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005900020001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 30, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
NAVY review(s)
completed.
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(Information as of noon EDT, 29 June 1967)
Page
VIETNAM
Communist forces inflicted heavy casualties on US
Marines in the central highlands this week and
continued to maneuver in the area of the Demili-
tarized Zone and Quang Tri Province. The South
Vietnamese presidential campaign is shaping up as
a four-way race between two military officers and
two experienced civilian national leaders.
PEKING CAUTIOUS ON INVOLVING ARMY IN POLITICAL TURMOIL
Violent clashes continue to disrupt industrial pro-
duction and rail transport, and Red Guard propaganda
attacks continue against high-level officials.
ANTI-CHINESE RIOTS IN BURMA
The unprecedented demonstrations at both countries'
embassies and against ethnic Chinese in Rangoon have
brought Sino-Burmese relations to their lowest point
and may pose a serious test for the Ne Win regime's
traditional neutralist policy.
NORTH KOREANS EXPANDING AGENT ACTIVITY
Well-armed teams now operating in the south appear to
be preparing for future guerrilla operations. The
northerners are also increasingly aggressive in the
Demilitarized Zone this year.
Europe
s~cRr~r
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NONPROLIFERATION TREATY NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE AT GENEVA
Recognition of the dangers which could have arisen
had the Arabs or Israelis had nuclear weapons has
added impetus to the effort to get a nonproliferation
treaty (NPT), and the recent US-Soviet summit has
raised hopes. Moscow is expected to agree soon to
tabling a revised NPT draft worked out by the US and
Soviet delegations at Geneva, but the problems on
safeguards and amendment procedures remain unresolved.
SOVIET SUBMARINE SUPPORT OPERATION OFF WEST AFRICA
A group of Soviet ships has been operating south of
the Cape Verde Islands since April, possibly in a
test of a floating support force for submarines.
Middle East - Africa
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS
Attention remains focused on the continuing UN ef-
forts to resolve the latest Arab-Israeli crisis. The
Communist states, despite their public harangues
against Israel, appear to be taking a more realistic
view of the situation in their private statements.
The Arabs, however, still insist they will not nego-
tiate with Israel, the Suez Canal has not been re-
opened, and the Arab ban on oil shipments to the
UK and US has not been lifted.
SITUATION IN ADEN DETERIORATES FURTHER
If the continuing disorder leads the British to pull
out of the South Arabian Federation ahead of sched-
ule, it is almost certain to come eventually under
the control of pro-Egyptian Arab nationalists..
NIGERIA'S GOWON MARKING TIME IN CONFRONTATION WITH "BIAFRA" 19
Gowon's anticipated military strike against the break-
away Eastern region--"Biafra"--could come at any time,
but he probably still hopes to end the secession by
economic sanctions.
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Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
VIOLENCE IN BOLIVIA
Bloody clashes between tin miners and the army
on
24
and 26 June, plus the continuing inability of
government to eliminate a band of guerrillas,
leading to an increasingly unstable situation.
the
are
LATIN AMERICA SEEKS ARMS IN EUROPE
Major South American countries are showing an interest
in replacing their outmoded military equipment with
European arms as a result of a cutback in US arms
sales. Peru's possible purchase of French supersonic
jets could establish a new trend in Latin American
air forces.
LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION TO MEET IN CUBA 23
The Cuban-sponsored Latin American Solidarity Organi-
zation Conference next month may shape the future path
of Latin American Communism and will certainly cause
friction between pro-Castro and pro-Soviet Communists.
srcRL~~
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FAR EAST
There were further signs this week that the Ky-
Thieu rivalry in South Vietnam's presidential race
is causing unrest and concern among senior military
officers. Military action during the week was con-
fined mainly to Communist mortar attacks on US in-
stallations. Meanwhile, there are reports from North
Vietnam that Ho Chi Minh, who has not appeared in
public for three months, is ill.
The outbreak of violent demonstrations against
ethnic Chinese in Rangoon may foreshadow a signif-
icant turning point in Sino-Burmese relations, which
have been relatively uneventful since the border
agreement of 1960. These incidents pose a serious
test for the Ne Win regime's traditional neutralist
policy of avoiding trouble with China. Although the
Burmese Government probably gave at least tacit en-
couragement to the demonstrators, it apparently was
surprised by the extent of the violence against the
Chinese population and was forced to impose martial
law to bring the rioting under control. Peking has
lodged a strong protest, charging that the Burmese
Government instigated an attack on the Chinese Em-
bassy.
Within China, the Peking leadership apparently
remains reluctant to inject the army into the po-
litical turmoil despite the formal central committee
directive in early June ordering the military to
restore order. The Liberation Army Journal has
warned the army against intervening in'- factional
disputes between pro-Maoist groups. The Red Guards
are continuing their attacks on high government and
military officials. Although it is impossible to
measure the economic costs of political chaos, evi-
dence continues to mount on cutbacks in industrial
production and closures of factories.
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VIETNAM
Communist troops have in-
flicted heavy casualties on US
forces in South Vietnam's central
highlands in recent days and con-
tinue to maneuver in the area of
the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and
adjacent Quang Tri Province.
In the highlands of Kontum
Province near Dak To, US troops
of Operation GREELEY continued
to press their major spoiling
campaign following a heavy en-
gagement with Communist troops on
22 and 23 June. This battle, in
which a US company-size patrol
was surrounded by a battalion-
size force, res-ulted in Ameri-
can casualties of 80 killed and
34 wounded. The Communists lost
at least 106 killed. Captured
enemy documents indicate that
Communist forces in this area may
be attempting to divert allied
forces from the more strategic
area of western Pleiku Province
where enemy offensive military
action has also increased. In
this highlands area, the Commu-
nists remain capable of mounting
a coordinated, large-scale cam-
paign, and as the rainy season
sets in the long-heralded summer
offensive may still be launched.
Communist forces have kept
up their attacks against allied
positions in northernmost Quang
Tri Province, indicating that
they are rebuilding and reoccupy-
ing positions destroyed by al-
lied operations last month. The
attacks may also be in prepara-
tion for a resumption of offensive
operations farther south. In ad-
dition to the now almost regular
shelling of US installations in
the northeastern part of the prov-
ince, including the heavy artillery
position at Gio Linh, five US Ma-
rine field positions near Khe Sanh
in western Quang Tri were struck
by heavy mortar fire early on 27
June.
South Vietnamese Politics
On the eve of the 30 June
deadline for filing candidacies
for South Vietnam's presidential
election, all four of the lead-
ing contenders--Premier Ky,
Chief of State Thieu, and civil-
ians Tran Van Huong and Phan
Khac Suu--intend to run. All
have selected southern civilians
as their vice-presidential run-
ning mates.
The presence of four strong
candidates, however, will con-
tinue to offer a strong induce-
ment for arranging private deals.
An alliance between any two of the
four probably would significantly
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v"t_r N A M
Gio Linh
,.;: si
DopB Fie
~... ,
Phon6 Dlen
GREELEY
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improve the chances of the
beneficiary. In the two months
before the election, Thieu, Huong,
and Suu still might take some pro-
test action, such as mutually with-
drawing from the race, if they
agree that Ky's election tactics
are sufficiently unfair and their
own chances are sufficiently dark.
Ky has taken a number of
steps to tone down his campaign
in reaction to the groundswell
of criticism from both the
foreign press and domestic po-
litical circles. He made some
points by announcing the gov-
ernment's intent to provide equal
campaign facilities to all candi-
dates--actually a requirement of
the electoral regulations. More
significantly, he has stripped
Police Director Loan of one of
his security posts while at the
same time relaxing government
pressure on Saigon's newspapers.
Reaction to press censorship
had reached such proportions that
the joint military-civilian advisory
co-uncil and the Provisional National
Assembly both attacked it and for-
eign correspondents refused to ask
Ky questions at a recent press con-
ference. Despite Ky's sudden aware-
ness of the increasing ill will
over his campaign methods, it re-
mains to be seen whether his ac-
tions will result in an actual re-
laxation of government pressure on
his behalf.
North Vietnam's SAMs
Evidence of dissatisfaction
with some aspects of Soviet air
defense equipment was set forth
in an article in the June issue
of the army journal by the North
Vietnamese Chief of Staff. Al-
though essentially a propaganda
document designed to bolster
morale and confidence among the
rank-and-file of air defense
units, the article stressed the
importance and effectiveness
of antiaircraft artillery
and other equipment less sophisti-
cated than the Soviet-supplied
missiles and jet aircraft. The
article made extravagant claims
for Vietnamese contributions to
Communist doctrines of "peoples
wars" and appears to reflect
Hanoi's obsession with demon-
strating its independence from
foreign domination in the face
of massive inputs of assistance.
The Vietnamese recently publicly
disparaged certain Chinese polit-
ical practices in a similar vein.
SECRl7'
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PEKING CAUTIOUS ON INVOLVING ARMY IN POLITICAL TURMOIL
Violent clashes disrupting
industrial production and rail
transport continue to be reported
from many areas of China. Early
in June the central committee is-
sued a directive ordering the army
to take stern measures to stop
the disorder, but later pronounce-
ments indicate that Peking remains
extremely reluctant to involve
the army in the political turmoil.
On 27 June an editorial in
the Liberation Army Journal told
the army that when factional dis-
putes between various pro-Maoist
groups take place it "must not
support either side and must not
attack either side." Last week
Red Flag had said that most par-
ticipants in current conflicts
are basically pro-Maoist. The
27 June army editorial stated
that all too often when the army
had tried to intervene it had
backed the wrong group by mistake.
This unwillingness to give
clearcut signals to the army is a
good measure of the confusion
which pervades the leadership in
Peking. Other signs are the con-
tinuing propaganda attacks by
powerful Red Guard organizations
on high officials who nevertheless
continue to perform their jobs.
These include Foreign Minister
Chen Yi, Finance Minister Li Hsien-
nien, top military officials Yeh
Chien-ying and Hsiao Hua, and
Wang En-mao, the controversial
commander of the western frontier
region Sinkiang.
Chen Yi continues to make
occasional foreign policy state-
ments and on 24 June appeared
with Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao
at a reception for visiting Zambian
officials. Nevertheless he has
drawn heavy Red Guard fire con-
tinuously for three months. A
foreign diplomat has reported
that the Foreign Office official
assigned to escort a recent diplo-
matic tour outside Peking spent
much of his time exulting in the
fact that Chen Yi's influence had
waned.
Li Hsien-nien, Yeh Chien-ying,
and Hsiao Hua have not been so
heavily criticized, but their po-
sitions too may be insecure. Ac-
cording to a poster report, Hsiao
Hua, a key member of the Military
Affairs Committee and head of
the army's political apparatus,
was personally censured by Lin
Piao in May.
Evidence of losses in indus-
trial production from the Cultural
Revolution is accumulating. Peo-
lp e's Daily on 14 June felt com-
pelled to inveigh against meetings
during working hours, clamor from
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competing loudspeaker systems,
and other distractions at factories
and to order workers to stop wast-
ing raw materials and holding
"costly celebrations."
SECRET
25X1
A wall poster
claims that 33 factories were
closed in Kiangsi's capital, Nan-
chang. No major facility is known
to have shut down, however. 25X1
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ANTI-CHINESE RIOTS IN BURMA
Relations between Communist
China and Burma have fallen to
their lowest point as a result
of the anti-Chinese mob violence
in Rangoon over the past week.
The unprecedented demonstrations
at both countries' embassies and
against ethnic Chinese in Rangoon
may foreshadow a significant turn-
ing point in Sino-Burmese rela-
tions, which have remained correct
if uneventful in recent years.
These incidents pose a
serious test for the Ne Win re-
gime's traditional neutralist
policy, a feature of which has
been the avoidance of difficulty
with Communist China. Although
the Burmese Government was appa-
rently surprised at the extent
of the violence against the Chi-
nese population, it probably gave
tacit encouragement to the demon-
strators in the earl sta es of
the disturbances.
Burma's government-controlled
press last week had played up
a demonstration by Chinese stu-
dents protesting a ban on wearing
Mao Tse-tung lapel buttons. It
was these protest rallies at
state-run schools in Rangoon
which apparently touched off the
large-scale disturbances. Chinese
Embassy officials, several of
whom have recently returned from
reindoctrination courses in China,
were reportedly handing out the
Mao buttons and encouraging the
Chinese student demonstrators.
It is doubtful, however, that
Chinese diplomats had any inten-
tion of provoking a major crisis.
As violence spread and sev-
eral dozen Chinese residents were
killed, Burmese security forces
began to take more decisive ac-
tion. In defiance of a hastily
imposed ban on demonstrations,
a mob of several thousand stormed
the Chinese Embassy compound on 28
June. One Chinese technician
was killed, and eyewitnesses claim
several Burmese were shot. The
regime imposed martial law that
night in troubled areas.
Although the Ne Win govern-
ment probably hopes to avoid a
serious crisis in its relations
with China, Peking clearly in-
tends to hold the Burmese author-
ities responsible for the riots.
A Chinese Foreign Ministry note
of 28 June charged that the Bur-
mese Government "instigated" mob
action and demanded that Rangoon
ensure the safety of Chinese na-
tionals and diplomats. Almost
immediately the Chinese stepped
up diplomatic pressure on the
Burmese by a massive demonstra-
tion before the Burmese Embassy
in Peking. Replete with loud-
speakers and effigies of Ne Win,
it was reminiscent of demonstra-
tions which placed other embassies
under a virtual state of siege
earlier this years. 25X1
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NORTH KOREANS EXPANDING AGENT ACTIVITY
North Korea is stepping up
the infiltration of armed agent
teams into South Korea and is
showing increasing aggressiveness
in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
Several recent incidents in-
dicate that perhaps as many as
60 men in nine teams are operating
in remote eastern and southern
areas of the country.
Some 10., 000 South Korean
military and civilian security
forces are trying to track down
and destroy the teams. Since the
first of June, twelve agents have
been killed and one captured at
the cost to the government of
13 killed and 21 injured.
In addition, Pyongyang has
sharply stepped up armed recon-
naissance and probing activities
in the DMZ area. Over 200 inci-
dents involving United Nations
Command troops and North Korean
personnel have occurred so far
this year, compared with 44 in
all of 1966, 55 in 1965, and 32
in 1964. The North Koreans have
lost about 47 killed in this
year's incidents, the South Ko-
reans eight, and the US three.
There has been nothing in
either statements by North Korean
leaders or Pyongyang's propaganda
suggesting any intent to open a
"second front" to divert attention
from the Vietnam war. It is
possible, however, that one of
Pyongyang's aims may be to dis-
courage further deployment of South
Korean troops to Vietnam, as well
as to demonstrate general support
for Hanoi. The still largely
hostile attitude of the South
Korean people toward the North
Korean Communists militates against
any early success of a new Commu-
nist uerrilla effort.
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EUROPE
Premier Kosygin's trip to Cuba, following his
stay in the US, was made at Soviet initiative. It
had both protocol and substantive purposes, the
latter doubtless concerned largely with a discus-
sion of Cuba's militancy in Latin .America over
which Moscow and Havana continue to differ. Kosygin
was also scheduled to make a courtesy call on Presi-
dent de Gaulle en route back to Moscow.
There was new hope in Geneva for progress on
a nonproliferation treaty following the Johnson-
Kosygin and Rusk-Gromyko talks. Anew US-USSR
draft may soon be submitted to the Disarmament
Committee but the safeguards issue and the provi-
sions for amending the treaty have not yet been
resolved to the satisfaction of a number of key
countries, Germany in particular.
Western Europe has so far been unable to
agree on how to deal with a potential ail emer-
gency. France, with large stocks in hand and
with shipments again moving from Iraq, sees no
need for concerted action. Germany is couermit
on Libya, its major source of supply, to p
a resumption of shipments. The Oil Committee of
the 21-nation Organization for Economic Develop-
ment is to meet again on 30 June to consider
further whether the conditions of an oil emergency
exist and how to cope with it.
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NONPROLIFERATION TREATY NEGOTIATTONS CONTINUE AT GENEVA
Moscow is expected to agree
soon to the tabling at the Eight-
een Nation Disarmament Committee
meeting in Geneva of a revised
draft nonproliferation treaty
(NPT) worked out by the US and
Soviet delegations. Recognition
of the dangers which could have
arisen had the Arabs or Israelis
possessed nuclear weapons has
added impetus to the effort to
get a treaty. In addition, the
Johnson-Kosygin and Rusk-Gromyko
talks on the subject have raised
hopes at Geneva.
The revised draft leaves
blank the controversial Article
III on safeguards. For Article
IV, which sets forth the means
of amending the treaty, two pro-
posals have been referred to Mos-
cow. The first would allow amend-
ment by a majority of the signa-
tory states; any such amendment
would not be binding on a state
which declined to accept it, and
any of the nuclear states could
veto it outright.. The second
proposal would make binding on all
signatory states any change ac-
cepted by a majority but would
give veto rights to all 30 nations
on the Board of Governors of the
International Atomic Energy Au-
thority (IAEA) at the time of the
vote. Only the nuclear states
have permanent seats on the board.'
When the NATO foreign minis-
ters at their 14 June meeting
approved tabling the revised NPT
draft of Geneva, West Germany's
Brandt initially demurred, and
Bonn still has doubts about sev-
eral aspects of the treaty. In
a demarche delivered last week
Page 10
the Germans insisted the US stick
to the essence of the Article III
safeguards clause previously
agreed to by the NATO allies and
cautioned against accepting, even
for negotiating purposes, any
Soviet proposal without full con-
sultation with the allies. The
German note also reiterated oppo-
sition to the second alternative
amendment clause for Article IV
and stated that even the first is
unsatisfactory because it gives
a veto only to the nuclear powers.
The safeguards issue still
focuses on the roles of EURATOM
and the IAEA, and two compromise
proposals have been raised. One
would have Article III refer
neither to verification of EURATOM
safeguards by IAEA nor to any
specific transition period in
which safeguard arrangements would
be worked out between the two
agencies, but the EURATOM coun-
tries would withhold final ratifi-
cation until there is a IAEA-
EURATOM agreement. IAEA officials
and the Soviets are very cool to
thl5.
The other proposal would
have each nonnuclear party to
the NPT undertake to conclude
within three years' time "bilat-
eral or multilateral" agreements
with IAEA. The term "multilateral
could apply only to EURATOM, but
the omission of any specific ref-
erence to EURATOM might make this
resolution acceptable to all con-
cerned. EURATOM officials, how-
ever, are objecting to the three-
year time limit on grounds that
it would give all the bar ainin
power to the IAEA.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 Jun 67
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SOVIET SUBMARINE SUPPORT OPERATION OFF WEST AFRICA
A group of Soviet ships
operating south of the Cape Verde
Islands since April may be testing
the feasibility of a floating
support force for submarines to
extend their time at sea. The
group has included at least one
nuclear and two diesel submarines,
a submarine tender, a missile sup-
port ship, a hydrographic ship,
and at least one tanker.
The surface ships have
operated south of the Cape Verde
Islands, but the operating areas
of the submarines are not known.
The nuclear-powered, E-class
cruise-missile unit was tied
alongside the sub tender for ten
days in late May and early June,
an unusually long period possibly
occasioned by mechanical problems.
The two F-class, diesel subma-
rines were sighted replenishing
alongside the tender on 24 June.
Soviet support ships have
operated with submarines in the
past, but this is the first time
a large group of ships has oper-
ated for so long a period this
far from home waters.
The Soviets have good reason
to improve their submarine support
capability. Their missile sub-
marines operating in the Atlantic
are based in the Northern Fleet,
over two weeks cruising time
from potential missile launch
stations off the US coast. The
use of a group of? support ships
closer to operating areas allows
replenishment and minor repairs
at sea with little loss in time
on station.
E-class cruise missile sub tied
alongside Ugra-class tender
off west coast of Africa
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The area south of the Cape
Verde Islands is not the best
location to support submarines
operating in the central Atlantic
or off the US east coast. ~
it
is
wi
in
su marine range of US
transit routes across the Atlantic.
sNCR~~.~~
It is too early to determine
if the Soviets will attempt to
maintain a submarine support group
in this area. The present activ-
ity may be only a test of capa-
bilities for operations elsewhere.
Page 12 WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 Jun 67
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
The Egyptians seem to have finally realized
that the Arabs' constant proclamations about "driv-
ing the Israelis into the sea" have boomeranged, and
that their case against Israel has been weakened in
the eyes of the world. Nasir, himself, is plagued
by divisive factions within his regime and burgeoning
economic problems, especially the shortage of food.
The governments in the Maghreb, like their brothers
in the Arab world, are trying to salvage what they
can from the debacle, and are particularly sensitive
to the strong public antipathy toward Israel and the
US.
Israel continues to consolidate its gains. This
week Tel Aviv paved the way far the formal annexa-
tion of the Old City of Jerusalem. The Israelis also
are holding out for private negotiations with the
Arabs, who refuse to meet them unless they withdraw
all their forces from Arab lands.
The critical security situation in Aden may
lead the British to pull out before independence--
herld ensuesanddSouthfArabialwould$fallntocprotEgYP-
wou
tian nationalists.
In Africa, the head of the federal government in
Nigeria still hopes that economic sanctions will
force the independent Republic ?ontinueatheir build-up
the federation. Federal troop
in the strategic area north of Biafra. Payment of
oil revenues remains a thorny problem.
In another tense area, Guinean ForeCoast1Govern-
detained by the .Ivory
Beavogui is being an because
ment, after his plane was diverted to Abidj ?
of bad weather. Beavogui enjoyed similar "hospitality
in Ghana last year.
In the Congo, President Mobutu's drastic mone-
tary reform may stimulate discontent which will test
the shaky political structure he has established.
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~~^^,, SECRET
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS
The attention of the Arab
world remains focused on New York,
where the United Nations organiza-
tion continues its efforts to
resolve the latest Arab-Tsraeli
crisis. The Arabs still insist
they will not negotiate with Is-
rael, the Suez Canal has not been
reopened, and the Arab ban on oil
shipments to the UK and the US
continues.
Israel, meanwhile, is con-
solidating its gains, This week
it paved the way for the formal
annexation of the Old City of
Jerusalem. The municipal bound-
aries have been extended by the
Israeli Knesset (parliament) to
include several villages in the
suburbs and about five miles
northward to take in the Qalan-
diyah Airfield. Israeli currency
has been made legal tender in the
newly expanded Jerusalem.
Situation at the UN
Various delegations in the
United Nations General Assembly
have been at work this past week
preparing and canvassing support
for alternate resolutions to
those submitted by the US and
the USSR. Acting for a group
of nonaligned countries, the
Yugoslav representative on 28
June proposed a resolution--co-
authored with his Indian col-
league--calling for uncondi-
tional withdrawal of Israeli
forces from occupied Arab ter-
ritories. This resolution might
obtain the requisite two-thirds
vote if it did not meet strong
competition.
Western delegates, therefore,
planned to offer a resolution on
29 June which would give a promi-
nent place to withdrawal but would
link it with an end to the state
of war and to a third-party effort
to negotiate between the states
concerned. Denmark's Hans Tabor
coordinated the new effort with 16
countries including the US, UK,
Canada, Japan, the Philippines,
and several Latin American, West-
ern European, and African states.
While most of them are iri agree-
ment with Tabor's approach of con-
ditional withdrawal, Mexico has
continued to insist on withdrawal
as a prerequisite to further steps.
The Arab states are seeking
sponsors for a separate resolution
on Jerusalem, apposing the Tsraeli
incorporation action, and Peru is
drafting a resolution in favor of
internationalizing the city.
Nasir remains
very much at
the helm in Egypt,
although his
freedom of action m
ay be cir-
cumscribed by pressures
within
his regime,
the growing
acknowl-
edgement of
defeat, and
increas-
ing economic
problems.
The
basic division into pro-Western
and pro-Eastern factions has be-
come sharper. The Egyptians,
moreover, apparently have come
to realize that the Arabs' per-
sistent declarations prior to
hostilities of their determina-
tion to "drive the Israelis into
the sea" have boomeranged in the
present situation, greatly
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weakening their case against Is-
rael in the eyes of the world.
Egypt's neighbor to the
south, Sudan, reportedly has
sent a delegation to Moscow to
negotiate for arms, despite ob-
jections of the Sudanese mili-
tary who prefer Western arms.
The Jordanian Government
is swamped with an estimated
100,000 refugees who had fled
to the East Bank of the Jordan
River since the fighting began
on 5 June. They continue to cross
over but at a lower rate than
last week. Facilities for their
care remain inadequate. On the
West Bank the International Red
Cross has reached agreement with
its Israeli equivalent for aid
to the refugees. Israeli authori-
ties had earlier refused to allow
the Red Cross to operate there.
Although Lebanon did not
become actively involved in the
war, the aftermath is severe
there. The country's economy has
been hard hit by the disruption
of tourism and transit trade,
and uncertainty in financial and
business circles. The danger of
Muslim-Christian strife appears
to have subsided, but the poten-
tial is still there.
As elsewhere in the Arab world,
the governments in the Maghreb seem
to be concentrating on shoring up
their positions at home where an-
tipathy toward Israel and the US re-
mains strong. Characteristically,
their chants about Arab unity are
being submerged by traditional in-
tra-Maghrebian distrust. The Moroc-
can Government, expressing fears
that Algeria may take out its anger
over the Arab debacle by attacking
Morocco, is renewing its efforts
to get mare modern arms. Stringent
security measures continue in
Morocco, and a few anti-Jewish
incidents have occurred.
Algeria, still feeling be-
trayed by Nasir and faced with pub-
lic lassitude toward such "war"
measures as a nonredeemable bond
drive, has toned down its pro-Arab
propaganda.
The Tunisian Government has
moved quickly to counteract popular
support for Nasir while striving
to play a constructive role in set-
tling the crisis in the Arab world.
President Bourguiba, despite his
dislike for Nasir, can be ex-
pected to go as far as necessary
to show Arab solidarity and pre-
vent any widening of the gap be-
tween his government's policy and
public opinion. He has replaced
his security chief for failing to
anticipate and counter more ef-
fectively the destructive demon-
strations against the US and UK
on 5 June..
Oil Situation
Libya now is the only Arab
country banning all production and
export of oil, although a press
campaign currently under way is
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laying the ground work for an
announcement that exports ex-
cept to the US and UK will be
resumed. Iraq, an earlier hold-
out, has permitted the Iraqi
Petroleum Company (IPC) to re-
sume sales to France and Turkey
only. Syria, however, had in-
dicated before the latest Iraqi
decision that it would not per-
mit use of the IPC pipeline
through Syria to the eastern
Mediterranean until Israeli
forces were withdrawn. Alter-
nately, Iraqi oil could be ex-
ported through Basra on the
Persian Gulf.
Lack of transport has kept
production in Saudi Arabia, Ku-
wait, and the Neutral Zone be-
low prewar levels. The shortage
of tankers also is reflected in
sharply rising charter rates
which, since mid-May, have nearly
quadrupled. The increase has
been even greater for ships which
normally move oil through the
Suez Canal. Major oil companies,
recognizing that the canal prob-
ably will be closed for at least
another two months, have begun
chartering tankers--in many cases
for two consecutive voyages--
with initial loading as late as
September.
The Soviets do not appear
to be pushing POL sales to Euro-
pean markets at the expense of
the Arab producers, although
they have agreed to increase de-
liveries being made under agree-
ments antedatin the war.
The Soviet Position
Soviet officials have indi-
cated a more realistic view of
the Arab-Israeli situation in
private conversations than Premier
Kosygin showed at his UN press
conference. Moscow seems to have
no illusions regarding the suc-
cess of its efforts to get through
a General Assembly resolution con-
demning Israel as the "aggressor."
It probably would settle for a
resolution simply calling for
withdrawal of Israeli forces in
hopes of preparing the way for in-
direct talks between Arabs and Is-
raelis.
The Soviets continue to avoid
taking a public stand on direct
Arab-Israeli talks or even on
access to the Suez Canal and the
Gulf of Aqaba--which would be the
primary topics at such discus-
sions. Privately, they have en-
couraged the Egyptians to begin
thinking about these questions.
Soviet Army Chief of Staff
Zakharov has not yet returned from
the trip he made to Cairo to make
personal damage assessments. The
communique on President Podgorny's
visit to Cairo was deliberately
vague, and the Egyptian press has
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acknowledged that he and Nasir
disagreed on a number of major
points. One editorial concludes
that Egyptian friendship with
the USSR should not conceal the
fact that the battle is an Arab
one and "its burden falls mainly
on our shoulders."
East European Attitudes
Except for "neutralist" Ru-
mania, the East European regimes
continue their strong public
support for the Arabs. The
Czechs on 26 June sent Party Sec-
retary Koucky to Cairo and a
Foreign Ministry official to Da-
mascus to discuss arrangements
for additional aid.
A Bulgarian offi-
cial, moreover, has stated that
the "socialist"countries do not
favor Egyptian control of the
Strait of Tiran but prefer an in-
ternational convention regulating
the use of the Suez Canal, the
Gulf of Aqaba, the Turkish straits,
the Panama Canal, and other in-
ternational waterwa s. 25X1
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SITUATION IN ADEN DETERIORATES FURTHER
The security situation in
Aden continued to deteriorate
during the week, This threatens
to increase pressure within the
British Government to pull out of
South Arabia even before the
scheduled British departure next
January. The result would prob-
ably be anarchy followed by an
eventual take-over by pro-Egyptian
Arab nationalists.
The latest trouble began
when Arab troops in the newly
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formed South Arabian Army (SAA)
mutinied on 20 June following the
suspension of four of their of-
ficers. This dispute was sparked
by personal and tribal rivalries,
but the explosion that followed
reflected the intensity of anti-
British feeling and of Arab
xenophobia fanned by the war with
Israel. The rebellious SAA units
gave up the same day but, with
troops divided about 50-50 for
and against the federal government,
army dissidence could recur at
any time,
When British troops were
sent to quell the army rebellion,
police in Crater joined local
nationalists and terrorists in
taking over this populous district,
where they are attempting to es-
tablish an independent Arab so-
cialist state. The Egyptian-
backed Front for the Liberation
of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY)
is apparently in charge in Crater,
but reports persist of continuing
conflict there and elsewhere be-
tween FLOSY and rival nationalist
groups. The kidnaping of the
FLOSY mayor of Aden, presumably
by members of the National Libera-
tion Front (NLF), may lead to a
bloodbath between the two organi-
zations.
The British have not used
military force to reoccupy the
Crater district because they
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believe the resulting loss of ci-
vilian life would further alienate
the local population, and might
cost Britain the loyalty of the
entire SAA. The failure to re-
take Crater and the continuing
withdrawal--according to a pre-
arranged schedule--of nearly all
British forces from other parts
of the South Arabian Federation
may be interpreted as a sign of
weakness and encourage the ter-
rorists to take further initia-
tives. Terrorism--some of it
directed against US interests--
has been stepped up in other
parts of Aden.
On 19 June Britain had an-
nounced that South Arabia would
be granted formal independence on
9 January 1968 with limited Brit-
ish military assistance and pro-
tection. The outbreak of violence
the following day has cast further
doubt, however, on the viability
of the federation government. The
nationalists continue to regard
it as the tool of reactionar sul-
tans.
US officials in Aden believe t at
Britain may not even come through
with the promised $28-million
postindependence defense assist-
ance for the reason that it would
be strengthening an army which
inevitably will come under ro-
E tian control. 25X1
NIGERIA'S GOWON MARKING TIME IN CONFRONTATION WITH "BIAFRA"
Despite persistent reports
of an imminent attack by federal
forces on Nigeria's breakaway
Eastern Region, Maj. Gen. Gowon
apparently remains reluctant to
give the go-ahead until all pos-
sible preparations have been
completed. He probably is still
hoping economic sanctions will
force the self-styled ~tepub-
lic of Biafra back into the
federation.
a further substantial build-up
Page 19
of federal troops in the area
north of Biafra. Total federal
strength there has probably
reached 6,000-7,000 troops,
about half of them recently re-
called veterans and newly trained
recruits.
The timing of a federal
attack appears to depend on sev-
eral factors. One is Gowon's
desire to assemble all the man-
power and equipment he can, in-
cluding aircraft and more ar-
mored vehicles. Despite recent
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rebuffs, he is still pressing
his search--possibly even in
the USSR--for the desired items.
His apparent preference to have
them in hand before attacking
might quickly be overriden by
other considerations, however.
One is the question of how
the oil companies, notably Shell-
BP, handle the conflicting claims
of Gowon and Biafran Governor
Ojukwu on the next revenue pay-
ment from oil operations in Bia-
Another factor bearing on
Gowon's plans to attack is that
of international recognition of
Ojukwu's regime. No country has
recognized Biafra yet, but if
Gowon believed such a move were
imminent he might try to head it
off by attacking at once. Sev-
eral African countries are con-
cerned over the prospect of
further bloodshed in Nigeria, and
the crisis there will probably be
discussed at a meeting of several
East African heads of state sched-
uled for earl July.
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WESTERN HEP~ISPHERE
Domestic political and economic concerns re-
gained center stage in several countries of the
hemisphere last week despite the continued very
active Latin American participation in the UN dis-
cussions of the Middle East crisis.
The Robles government in Panama is making a
concerted effort to win domestic support for the
three new draft treaties on the Panama Canal that
were announced by Presidents Johnson and Robles on
26 June. So far, Panamanians have reacted little
to the news that two and a half years of negotia-
tions have been successfully concluded, but inten-
sive comment and politicking for and against the
treaties can be expected when their provisions are
made public in a few weeks.
Mexico is preparing for what in the past has
been a quiet, routine off-year election of the
lower house of the federal congress and a number
of state governors. Public unhappiness with the
candidate tapped by the powerful national ruling
party to be the next governor of Sonora led to an
abortive revolt, however, and as a consequence, the
2 July elections could produce new fireworks there
or strengthen pressures for a change in Mexico's
traditional one-party rule.
In Bolivia, the Barrientos government was
faced with yet another acute problem last week when
extremist-led tin miners picked a bloody fight with
government forces. The miners and their student
allies are still sullen and restless, and their re-
belliousness may again flare up and cause further
serious political and economic losses for the gov-
ernment.
Normally placid Uruguay also experienced a po-
litical crisis when wrangling over economic policy
produced a sharp factional battle within the ruling
Colorado Party. The ensuing cabinet shake-up and
the ruffled feelings that accompanied it probably
hurt the Gestido government's chances of timely po-
litical su port for a badly needed overhaul o.f the
economy.
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VIOLENCE IN BOLIVIA
Weeks of unrest at the major
Bolivian tin mining complexes of
Huanuni and Catavi - Siglo Veinte
erupted into bloody clashes be-
tween miners and the army on 24
June.
The miners, drunk from a
day's festivities and egged on by
extremists who hoped to provoke
government reaction, attacked
police posts at Siglo Veinte on
the night of 23 June. Army and
police units moved into Huanuni
and Catavi early the next morni.nq_.
The army encountered serious re-
sistance at Catavi, where troops
used arrested miners and students
as human shields against attacks-.
Three soldiers and about 21
miners were killed, and scores
of miners were injured.
The army withdrew on 25 June
but returned the following day
after a miner was killed in one
of the sporadic clashes with the
police. The government may pro-
long the occupation to prevent a
recurrence of the trouble. Other
groups plan work stoppages and
sympathy demonstrations in other
parts of the country, but so far
the violence has been confined to
one area. Even if the clashes
stop soon, however, the deteri-
orating financial situation in
the mining industry is depressing
the economy, which is bound to
produce further political problems
for the government.
President Barrientos has
ordered the troops to rule with
an iron hand, apparently in the
hopes of averting charges that
his government is incapable of
maintaining order. Barrientos
links the violence in the mines
with the guerrilla movement. In
a broadcast, on 26 June, he
claimed that the violence was
part of a "revolutionary plan
designed and financed by the
Peking-Havana axis that could
have led to a civil war."
Meanwhile, the hard-pressed
government is continuing to suffer
losses inflicted by the pro-Com-
munist guerrilla band active in
the Southeast. An army support
unit suffered three dead and two
wounded in a clash with guerrillas
on 26 June.
The government has yet to dem-
onstrate that it has control over the
situation in the mines, and this
show of weakness is encouraging op-
positionists to step up their polit-
ical attacks against the Barrientos
administration.
LATIN A(~ERICA SEEKS ARMS IN EUROPE
Major South American nations,
frustrated by their inability to
buy modern US military equipment
to replace worn-out tanks, air-
craft, ships, and small arms, are
showing increasing interest in
European suppliers. One result
could be a sharp decline in the
preponderant US influence that
has characterized Latin American
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defense planning and development
since World War II.
Peru and Brazil in particu-
lar have objected to the US em-
bargo on sales of supersonic jets
before fiscal 1970. The Peruvian
Air Force is on the verge of sign-
ing a contract with France for
16 Mirage 5 fighters, a simpli-
fied version of the Mirage III
used by the Israeli Air Force.
The Mirage 5 is designed to use
short, unsurfaced runways and its
maintenance is relatively un-
complicated. It is faster and
more versatile than the US F-5,
the aircraft most in demand by
the Latin air forces, and is not
much more expensive. If Peru
acquires the French jet, several
other nations--including Argen-
tina, Brazil, Chile, and Venezu-
ela--probably will seek similar
equipment.
Peru is also investigating
the European market for tanks and
destroyers, and Argentina recently
sent an army general on a similar
mission. Both Britain and France
seem interested in supplying this
equipment, and Spain has report-
edly offered to sell ships. Al-
though Latin American naval of-
ficers have often expressed their
preference for US equipment, they
are no longer willing to main-
tain outmoded destroyers on loan
from the US and prefer to channel
their limited funds into acqui-
sition of newer ships.
In the past, the Latin Amer-
ican military have used threats
of third-country purchases pri-
marily as a bargaining point for
dealing with the US. With the
cutback in US defense sales to
Latin America, however, they seem
to be serious in seeking deals
with Europe. They also seem to
be prepared to accept military
training and technical missions
from Euro can su liers.
LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION TO MEET IN CUBA
The first Latin American Sol-
idarity Organization (LASO) con-
ference, scheduled to convene in
Havana on 28 July, will probably
focus on shifting the path of
Latin American Communism away from
urban proletarianism toward rural
guerrilla insurgency. Regardless
of the outcome,-the proceedings
will almost certainly exacerbate
tensions between Castroite mili-
tants and the pro-Soviet Commu-
nists who prefer to concentrate
on legal action, at least for the
present. This issue was probably
a point of contention during So-
viet Premier Kosygin's discussions
with Fidel Castro this week.
LASO was founded by 27 mili-
tant Latin American delegations
immediately after the Tri-Con-
tinent Conference in January 1966
in order to "coordinate the strug-
gle against US imperialism. In
August 1966 an organizing commit-
tee consisting of representatives
from Cuba, Brazil, Colombia, Guy-
ana, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Uru-
guay, and Venezuela met to plan
for the 1967 conference. In Oc-
tober this committee issued a draft
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agenda, inspired by Castro's mili-
tant foreign policy, which called
for discussion of a common strategy
of armed insurrection for all La-
tin American revolutionary move-
ments. It also issued a call for
the creation of national LASO com-
mittees in the various Latin Amer-
ican countries.
The formation of these com-
mittees, which will send delegates
to the July conference, appears to
be causing great problems. Thus
far, the only ones officially es-
tablished outside Cuba are in
Chile and Colombia.
In a dispute over formation
of the Chilean committee, the So-
cialist Party claimed that its
less militant Communist coalition
partner had no right to partici-
pate in LASO because of its sub-
ordination to Soviet interests
and consequent failure to support
national liberation movements.
The Communists denied these
charges, and insisted that they
were opposing inclusion of pro-
Peking Communists and other mili-
tants only because they wanted to
exclude "adventurers." Despite
what must have been strong Com-
munist objections, the committee
is heavily weighted in favor of
the Socialists. The delegation
it has named includes such Castro
admirers as perennial presiden-
tial hopeful and Senate president
Salvador Allende and a recent
visitor to Havana, Senator and
Socialist Party Secretary General
Aniceto Rodriguez.
The Colombian national com-
mittee, like the Chilean, con-
tains some orthodox Communist
Party members, but includes a
heavy complement from the insur-
gent Army of National Liberation
and the extremist Worker-Student-
Peasant Movement.
The obvious pro-Castro tone
of the preparations has reportedly
caused the orthodox Venezuelan
Communist Party to decide against
sending a delegation--apparently
leaving the field open to the pro-
Castro Armed Forces of National
Liberation and other guerrilla
groups. The Uruguayan Socialist
Party, on the other hand, has ac-
cused the Communist-controlled
Leftist Liberation Front of ex-
cluding it and other extremists
from representation.
Whatever the outcome of these
arguments, it is becoming increas-
ingly clear--from the organizing
committee's provocative declara-
tions and Castro's stated dissat-
isfaction with Latin American
pro-Soviet Communist Parties--
that the hemisphere is going to
witness an open ideological strug-
gle between Castroite insurgents
and orthodox Communists. The
Cuban leader has apparently be-
come completely convinced that
his revolution, beginning with
a small guerrilla nucleus and ac-
complished without Soviet or Chi-
nese assistance, is the only
valid course for others to fol-
low to achieve national libera-
tion. Thus, the July LASO con-
ference will be used as a forum
to appeal to Latin Americans to
band together in "red beret"
groups in order to begin a true
revolutionary struggle.
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