WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005900030001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 7, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
NAVY review(s) completed.
State Department review completed
Secret
53
7 July 1967
No. 0297/67
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SECRET
C O N T E N T S
(Information as of noon EDT, 6 July 1967)
Far East
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
VIETNAM
Although Premier Ky has accepted second place on a
military ticket, he maintains that if the Thieu-Ky
ticket is elected, his authority in the new govern-
ment will be extensive. Military action in South
Vietnam was concentrated just south of the DMZ where
the Communists exerted heavy pressure on US Marine
positions near Con Thien
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
The political side effects of the "Cultural Revolu-
tion" have compounded Peking's foreign affairs prob-
lems. Chinese diplomats returning to their posts
after reindoctrination courses have displayed an ar-
rogance which has provoked violent anti-Chinese reac-
tions.
Europe
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
9
COHESION OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP SHAKEN BY MIDDLE EAST CRISIS 10
Differences in Moscow over Middle East Policy have
led to the downfall of at least one fairly high of-
ficial, and there are reports that others--also out
of sympathy with the Politburo line--will meet the
same fate.
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EAST GERMAN-CHINESE RELATIONS FURTHER STRAINED
East German-Chinese relations, already cool, will
probably worsen as a result of Chinese charges that
the East Germans were responsible for the recent auto-
mobile accident which killed four Chinese Embassy of-
ficials in the GDR.
DEVELOPMENTS IN ADEN
With security problems in Aden eased considerably,
London is continuing to seek the cooperation of dis-
sident leaders for the formation of a transitional
government more broadly based than the present one
before independence on 9 January 1968.
25X1
Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS
Recent cease-fire violations carry no indication of an
intent to resume full-scale hostilities. Israel con-
siders the cease-fire violations as Egyptian propaganda
ploys useful in the UN and in refurbishing its military
image. Soviet press articles suggest that Moscow is
pressing Nasir to be more cooperative with Israel about
a compromise on transit rights.
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UN ASSEMBLY UNABLE TO AGREE ON MIDEAST
The General Assembly, unable to develop a two-thirds
majority on any specific resolution on the Mideast,
has recessed until 12 July. In the interim, attempts
will be made to come up with a less contentious re-
solution, possibly calling for strict observance of
the cease-fire and requesting that an emissary of U
Thant be sent to the area.
NIGERIAN NAVY BLOCKADE GIVING BIAFRA TROUBLE
The blockade is stopping most imports of manufactured
goods, as well as the export of foreign exchange earn-
ing produce. Federal leader Gowon may now feel that
a military move at this time would be premature.
MOBUTU FACED WITH MUTINY AFTER TSHOMBE KIDNAPING
The mutinies which broke out in Bukavu and Kisangani
on 5 July, apparently in reaction to the Mobutu re-
gime's kidnaping of former Premier Tshombe, are the
most serious threat yet to the regime.
Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
REACTION TO PANAMA CANAL TREATIES
President Robles' efforts to enlist support for rati-
fication appear to be having some success. The Com-
munists and Arnulfo Arias' United Front are critical,
but the unexpected and unexplained departure of Arias
for Europe may be a device to gain international at-
tention for an antitreaty campaign.
ACTIVITY ON THE CHILEAN LEFT
The Socialist Party may split formally as a result of
personal and tactical differences. The leftist lead-
ership of the Radical Party, which has been collaborat-
ing with the Socialists, was confirmed at its recent
convention.
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POLITICAL WRANGLING AND ECONOMIC STAGNATION IN URUGUAY 30
Cabinet changes resulting from a dispute over economic
policy has antagonized the most powerful faction of
the ruling party, whose votes are needed to enact
legislation proposed by the administration.
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FAR EAST
The South Vietnamese presidential contest has
been radically altered by Premier Ky's reluctant
agreement to run for vice president on the military
ticket headed by Chief of State Thieu. This sudden
realignment resulted from three days of stormy dis-
cussions among senior military commanders. Ky evi-
dently was obliged to yield to the overriding de-
sire of the military leaders to forestall a split
which would endanger military control of a future
South Vietnamese Government.
If the Thieu-Ky ticket holds together, it will
have the best prospects of winning the 3 September
elections. A critical period lies ahead, however,
in view of the mutual antagonism which has developed
between Thieu and Ky in recent months.
Hanoi was quick to exploit the new alignment,
charging that Ky had displeased the US by his cam-
paign tactics and that Ambassador Bunker played a
key role in forcing his withdrawal as a presidential
candidate.
On the military front, North Vietnamese forces
increased pressure on US Marine positions south of
the Demilitarized Zone. There were other indications
that the Communists are preparing to resume an offen-
sive in this area in an effort to tie down US forces
and harden the military stalemate.
Peking is maintaining pressure against Burma al-
though order has been restored in Rangoon after last
week's anti-Chinese riots. In addition to demanding
a public Burmese apology, the Chinese after many
years of silence on the subject, now are proclaiming
their support for the Burmese Communist Party's strug-
gle against the "reactionary" Ne Win regime. This
propaganda may be backed up by small-scale material 25X1
and financial support for the Burmese Communists,
but it is unlikely that Peking contemplates a radi-
cal shift toward all-out support for the weak and
divided local Communist forces.
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VIETNAM
The Presidential Race
The complexion of South
Vietnam's presidential contest
was radically altered last week
just before the deadline for
filing applications. The race
still has four major contenders,
Chief of State Thieu, Tran Van
Huong, Phan Khac Suu, and exiled
General "Big" Minh. Altogether
17 candidates were finally ap-
proved by the Provisional Na-
tional Assembly.
The most significant develop-
ment was the emergence of an all-
military ticket headed by Chief
of State Thieu with Premier Ky as
vice president. This unexpected
alliance was the culmination of
three days of emotion-charged
marathon discussions by the Mili-
tary Directorate and the Armed
Forces Council, the supreme mil-
itary authority composed of about
50 senior officers.
Ky maintains that he with-
drew his candidacy and agreed to
join Thieu not because of pres-
sure from the other generals but
in order to end the risk of a
permanent split within the mili-
tary establishment. Throughout
the discussions Thieu apparently
remained adamant on staying in the
25X1 race, threatening at one point to
resign from the army.
the Military Direc-
torate decided that both men
should run on the same ticket in
order to end the dispute. After
considerable prompting, Ky report-
edly agreed to take the second
place in deference to Thieu's
seniority.
Just how the two would share
the presidential responsibilities
will probably depend on whether
Thieu can assert himself as presi-
dent. If Thieu is as reticent a
president as he has been Chief of
State, Ky probably will step into
the resulting vacuum. Ky's deci-
sion to step down--whether as a
selfless act in the interest of
military unity or in response to
pressure from the other military
officers--may have enhanced his
esteem within the military es-
tablishment. Moreover, due to his
dog-in-the-manger attitude,
Thieu's stock seems to have
dropped proportionately. What
appears on the surface to have
been a triumph for Thieu may ac-
tually be only a Pyrrhic victory.
Thieu may become the elected pres-
ident but Ky's power in government
may be extensive.
The successful eleventh-hour
effort by General Duong Van "Big"
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Minh, in exile in Bangkok, to file
his candidacy through his col-
leagues in Saigon adds to the com-
plexity of the presidential elec-
tion. Since Minh has been barred
from returning to Saigon by the
Military Directorate, he will
have to run in absentia. A popu-
lar figure among Buddhists and
among southerners, Minh is al-
most unanimously distrusted by
the military leadership, and
even Phan Khac Suu does not wel-
come his candidacy.
The Military Situation
In the South
An increase in the pace of
the ground action just south of
the DMZ this week tended to con-
firm indications that North Viet-
nam is building up its forces
to the level that existed prior
to the massive US - South Viet-
namese sweep of the area last
May.
A major engagement between
US Marines and North Vietnamese
(NVA) troops took place near Con
Thien in northeastern Quang Tri
Province early in the week after
a US patrol located an enemy force
in well-prepared positions. The
subsequent heavy action took
place within a triangle formed
by the American installations at
Con Thien, Dong Ha, and Gio Linh.
In addition, the Communists con-
tinued their artillery, mortar,
and rocket attacks against US
installations and allied field
positions in the area.
To date, American casualties
as the result of this series of
battles total 106 killed, 290
wounded, and another 5 missing.
Communist losses total 223 killed.
Earlier this year, before
the joint US - South Vietnamese
sweep of Communist positions in
the southeastern portion of the
DMZ, there were strong indications
that the Communist Command Center
in this area was preparing for an
over-all offensive against friendly
forces in northern Quang Tri Prov-
ince including an assault against
Con Thien. Present enemy troop
deployments suggest the Communists
may be going ahead with their
earlier planned assault on Con
Thien.
To the south in Quang Nam
Province
have revealed the movement of 25X1
enemy units into the province for
possible future operations near
Da Nang. Although Communist main-
force units have not previously
operated extensively in this prov-
ince, strategic allied bases and
vital supply routes in the coastal
flatlands may be the enemy objec-
tive in the near future.
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(WORTH
VIETNAM
Vinh Linh
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Hanoi Diplomats Return-
ing Home
The return of a number of
North Vietnamese ambassadors to
Hanoi suggests that the DRV may
be recalling its diplomats for
consultations and instructions.
Such briefing sessions have been
held in the past, sometimes at the
conclusion of important party cen-
tral committee plenums. Many DRV
diplomats, for example, returned
home in early 1966 for briefings,
probably in connection with the
important 12th central committee
meeting which laid down new pol-
icy guidelines on the war in South
Vietnam.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
The political side effects
of the "Cultural Revolution" have
compounded Peking's problems in
foreign affairs. The Chinese Com-
munists, already virtually without
friends abroad, have just added
Rangoon to a growing list of un-
sympathetic foreign capitals.
Chinese diplomatic officials re-
turning to their posts abroad af-
ter "revolutionary" reindoctrina-
tion courses have displayed an
arrogance which has provoked
violent anti-Chinese demonstra-
tions in more than half a dozen
countries.
The Chinese response--re-
flecting the dominance of "rev-
olutionary" elements in the For-
eign Ministry--has been to attack
foreign embassies in Peking.
Around-the-clock demonstrations,
harassment of foreign diplomats,
and massive antiforeign rallies
have become standard procedure
in the Chinese Communist capital.
the Chinese repeated earlier de-
mands that Rangoon publicly
apologize and agree to prevent
the recurrence of anti-Chinese in-
cidents.
In a move designed to impress
the Overseas Chinese, Peking asked
Rangoon on 4 July to permit Chi-
nese aircraft to take Chinese na-
tionals injured in the riots back
to China for medical treatment.
For the first time in many
years, Peking's propaganda is pro-
claiming support for the Burmese
Communist party's struggle
against the "reactionary" Ne Win
regime. It is unlikely, however,
that the Chinese will adopt a
policy of strong political and
material support for the weak and
divided Communist forces in
Burma.
Hong Kong
Sino-Burmese Relations
The latest of these "crises"
has brought Peking's relations
with Burma to the lowest point
in nearly a decade. During the
past week, Peking maintained its
pressure against Burma after anti-
Chinese riots in Rangoon. Dem-
onstrations were staged outside
the Burmese Embassy in Peking and
In Hong Kong the Chinese
appear to be settling down for
a prolonged struggle. A 5 July
People's Daily editorial clearly
implied that the colony is in
for a long period of popular
unrest and harassment. The Chi-
nese have continued to ignore a
British request for additional
water this summer, although the
current situation is not criti-
cal. The Chinese last month
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 7 Jul 67
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Kuei-yang
NORTH
VIETNAM
SECRET
,Nan ning
1 Han gc:ho
NORTHS
)KOREA`
SOUTH
KOREA
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SF'CRFT
satisfied the terms of the cur-
rent contract and are not obli-
gated to supply more until Oc-
tober.
On 3 July the Communists ended
the ineffectual four-day food strike
in Hong Kong, and Peking resumed food
shipments to the colony. The limited
success of recent strikes in Hong
Kong has been due largely to the
lack of enthusiasm among merchants
and workers who have been coerced
into cooperation by Communist
elements. The Hong Kong govern-
ment recently enacted legislation
which provides heavy penalties
for this sort of intimidation.
SHCRM'
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EUROPE
The handling of the Middle East crisis by the
Soviet collective leadership has elicited a certain
amount of criticism in the party. Dissent has al-
ready cost the job of one fairly important official,
and others may meet the same fate. Brezhnev's speech
at the Frunze military academy in effect defending
the regime's policies suggests that some public guid-
ance on the issues in question was thought to be ad-
visable, if not unavoidable.
Premier Kosygin's recent stop-overs in Paris un-
derlined Moscow's interest in preserving the semblance
of a "special" Franco-Soviet relationship in spite of
the USSR's emphasis on close consultations with the
US during the Middle East crisis. Premier Pompidou's
trip to the USSR this week will wear a somewhat similar
aspect, but was actually arranged some time ago, and
will be primarily protocolary in character. 25X6
European economic officials are meeting in Rot-
terdam to consider ways of dealing with the reduction
of oil supplies from the Middle East. The shortage
of tankers rather than shortage of oil is the current
problem. Signs that the Arab embargo is weakening will
diminish the sense of urgency which, in Europe, has 25X1
never been great. The oil emergency, however, has
pointed up Europe's continuing vulnerability to external
pressure and may lead to reconsideration of national
oil policies, especially in West Germany.
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COHESION OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP SHAKEN BY MIDDLE EAST CRISIS
Differences in Moscow over
Middle East policy have led to
the downfall of at least one
fairly high official and there
are reports that others--also out
of sympathy with the Politburo
line--will meet the same fate.
The three chief exponents of So-
viet policy in the recent crisis--
Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny--
seem, however, to have pulled to-
gether during the recent crisis
although Kosygin's tactics in the
US were probably carefully moni-
tored from Moscow.
The ideologically militant
Moscow City party boss, Nikolay
Yegorychev, was fired from his
post because in a speech at the
20 June session of the central
committee he apparently criticized
the Politburo's restraint in
handling the Middle East crisis.
In the past Yegorychev appears
to have been a spokesman for the
neo-Stalinists loosely grouped
around Politburo member Shelepin.
This group favors tighter
domestic controls and opposes moves
toward detente with the West on
the grounds that it will lead to
the ideological disarmament of
Communist forces. The leaders of
this group have been politically
hard-pressed for the past year but
they represent an important seg-
ment of opinion within party cir-
cles. The Middle East crisis may
have acted as a catalyst in bring-
Page 10
ing these long-standing differences
within the leadership closer to the
surface. In a speech given earlier
this week Brezhnev struck a slightly
defensive note in explaining the
Soviet position concerning the Mid-
dle East, as though he was attempt-
ing to disarm critics of both the
left and right.
In the past Brezhnev appeared
more responsive to the views of
this militant minority, but in the
crisis he firmly joined Kosygin and
Podgorny in accepting the need to
contain the situation. The basic
rivalry, however, between Brezhnev
and Kosygin remains.
Yegorychev was replaced on
27 June by candidate member of the
Politburo Viktor Grishin, who is
by contrast more temperate in his
public utterances and appears gen-
erally to be more moderate in his
views.
One year ago Yegorychev ap-
peared slated to move up into one
of the top ruling party bodies.
He was in the forefront of the move
at the 23rd Party Congress to re-
habilitate Stalin. Yegorychev pro-
posed the resurrection of Stalin's
title, General Secretary, for
Brezhnev at the congress and in
April was given the high honor
usually reserved for a party sec-
retary, of delivering the Lenin
Day address.
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By late summer 1966 the situa-
tion had changed. The push to re-
instate Stalin formally and pub-
lically had been checked and a
move to break up the group that
constituted Shelepin's support
appeared to be in the making,
probably at Brezhnev's instiga-
tion. In September a close
Brezhnev associate, Shchelokov,
rather than Shelepin's protege
Tikunov, was chosen to head the
new USSR Ministry for Maintenance
of Public Order. This was one
of the first clear signs that a
move was afoot to cut off Shele-
pin from his former state secu-
rity/policy power base. The re-
moval of Semichastny on 19 May
from the KGB post would seem to
have accomplished the job.
There now are persistent
rumors that other officials who
came up through the Komsomol or-
ganization under Shelepin are
slated for removal. Those men-
tioned include Mesyatsev, chair-
man of the Radio and Television
Committee, and Romanovsky, Chair-
man of the Committee on Cultural
Relations with Foreign Countries.
Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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EAST GERMAN - CHINESE RELATIONS FURTHER STRAINED
East German - Chinese rela-
tions, already cool, will prob-
ably worsen as a result of the
Chinese charges that the East Ger-
mans were responsible for an auto-
mobile accident which killed four
Chinese Embassy officials in the
GDR on 27 June.
According to the official
East German version, the accident
occurred when the Chinese, at-
tempting to pass on a wet, steep
road, collided with an oncoming
truck. The East German press was
quick to point out that the Chi-
nese were at fault and subse-
quently played up the fact that
medical experts did everything
possible to aid the injured.
Despite these East German
attempts to preclude charges of
foul play or negligence, the Chi-
nese Embassy in East Berlin on
29 June put up wall posters which
denounced "German Nazi murderers"
and called for vengeance. Embassy
officials using bullhorns re-
peated these charges when Pankow-
sponsored demonstrators gathered
outside the embassy. There have
also been unconfirmed reports that
"Red Guards" besieged the East
German Embassy in Peking and de-
nounced the Germans on 29 and 30
June.
As of 5 July the Ulbricht
regime had yet to react offi-
cially to these Chinese attacks,
but Pankow's increasingly criti-
cal view of Peking undoubtedly
will be strengthened as a result
of the Chinese tirades. The East
Germans have been increasingly
critical of Peking for the past
eighteen months and especially
since the "cultural revolution"
began. Regime spokesmen, includ-
ing Ulbricht and his heir pre-
sumptive Erich Honecker, have de-
nounced the "Mao group" for its
alleged attacks against the Chi-
nese Communist Party, its exces-
sive nationalism, and its cult
of personality. Other more sweep-
ing denunciations of the entire
Chinese leadership, ideology, tac-
tics, and internal and foreign
policies have also been made.
State relations have also de-
teriorated, largely as a result
of China's continued anti-Soviet
policies and because of Chinese
mistreatment of East German dip-
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DEVELOPMENTS IN ADEN
The security situation in
Aden eased considerably this week
when British troops reoccupied
the nationalist-held Crater dis-
trict, virtually without blood-
shed. London is continuing to
seek the cooperation of dissident
leaders in order to form a tran-
sitional government more broadly
based than the present one before
independence is granted on 9 Jan-
uary 1968.
Before the Arab-Israeli war
London believed Cairo might urge
leaders of the Egyptian-backed
Front for the Liberation of Oc-
cupied South Yemen (FLOSY) to
join in transitional government.
British officials still are trying
to persuade FLOSY representatives,
but London's present bad standing
in Egypt may make that project
more difficult. London's hopes
now center on the rival National
Liberation Front (NLF) which seems
currently to be on top in the
FLOSY-NLF feud.
The fact that the British
move into Crater was unopposed
hints at some prior British-NLF
contact. At the least, it is
evidence of cooperation by the
South Arabian Army and police,
whose support will be vital to
any transitional government.
London had feared that a British
military move into Crater would
spark a mutiny in the badly
split South Arabian Army. London
may now hope that the newly
selected Prime Minister of South
Arabia, Adeni moderate Hussain
Ali Bayyumi, who may have NLF
ties, can form a transitional
government including nationalist
leaders, some members of the
present federal government and
some army notables. The British
may release NLF members now in
custody, in a bid for NLF coop-
eration.
The odds still are against
the formation of a viable South
Arabian government and an orderly
withdrawal by the British. Never-
theless, the apparently success-
ful conclusion of the Crater af-
fair buys Britain time to keep
trying and is a sorely needed
psychological boost to its posi-
tion in the colony,
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 7 Jul 67
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
The UN General Assembly, having failed to
adopt either of the proposed resolutions on the
Middle East, has adjourned until 12 July while ef-
forts are made to devise a less contentious resolu-
tion. Meanwhile, Israelis and Egyptians clashed on
three successive days this week in the Suez Canal
area, but there appears to be little likelihood
of a resumption of full-scale hostilities. Israel's
"municipal fusion" of the two sectors of Jerusalem,
and Defense Minister Dayan's announcement that the
Gaza Strip is to become part of Israel, increase
the pressure on the Arab states to ne otiate a
settlement.
The security situation in Aden has improved
somewhat. The British, apparently after prior
negotiations with the National Liberation Front
(NLF)--one of the two Aden nationalist groups--have
retaken the rebellious Crater district. A new
prime minister has been appointed who is known to
have ties with the NLF, and it is possible that a
transitional government including some nationalists
can be set up before independence on 9 January 1968.
In the Congo, this week's mutiny by white
mercenaries and Katangan troops removes large areas
of the eastern part of the country from even the
tenuous control recently established by the Mobutu
regime. Mobutu may find it almost impossible to
counterattack with the forces available to him,
particularly since the mutineers may have seized
two of the government's fighter aircraft. The
mutiny may delay Mobutu's apparent plan to execute
former premier Tshombd.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS
There seems to be no danger
of a resumption of full-scale
hostilities, despite clashes on
1, 2, and 3 July between Israeli
and Egyptian forces in the Suez
Canal area, and Israel's shooting
down an Egyptian fighter over the
Sinai Peninsula on 4 July. The
Israelis reportedly do not regard
the incidents as serious, believ-
ing the Egyptian actions were
primarily a ploy aimed at influ-
encing the debate in the UN by
underscoring the continuing in-
stability of the area. Periodic
hostilities might also help re-
furbish Egypt's military image,
and persuade the Egyptian public
that sacrifice and austerity are
still in order.
Israel's "municipal fusion"
of the Jordanian and Israeli sec-
tors of Jerusalem, as well as De-
fense Minister Dayan's announce-
ment on 5 July that steps will be
taken to turn the Gaza Strip into
a part of Israel, increase the
pressure on the Arab States to
negotiate a settlement. Israel
now is confronting the Arabs with
the prospect of permanently losing
the occupied territories if there
is no agreement to discuss the
future status of these areas.
The Israeli Government on
2 July announced it will allow
residents of Jordan's West Bank
to return to their homes, setting
10 August as the deadline. Re-
turnees will have to supply proof
of prior residence in the area
and convince authorities that
they are not security risks. The
number of refugees who fled to
the East Bank probably is at least
125,000.
In Libya, the King's replace-
ment of Husayn Maziq by Abd al-
Qadir al-Badri as prime minister
was apparently prompted by Maziq's
unwillingness to take effective
action during the crisis. Badri
has had little education,
has been out-
spokenly anti-American and anti-
British in the past, but his
appointment is being regarded as
a stopgap measure not lasting
longer than a few months. Badri
was probably picked because he is
loyal to the King, has not been
involved in dealing with the
Americans on the military base
issue, and is readily expendable
should he also mishandle the sit-
uation. He probably has the
King's backing to deal firmly
with opposition activities.
The new government's first
policy statement announced the
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resumption of oil exports to
"friendly states" but the ban on
shipments to the US and the UK
continues. In spite of a wide-
spread strike following the an-
nouncement, shipments reportedly
commenced on schedule. The gov-
ernment apparently decided to
take firm action against the
strike organizers, 15 of whom
were reported to have been ar-
rested.
Soviet Military
Aid Shipments
Current Soviet military aid
deliveries by sea to the Middle
East fall considerably short of
the major sealift which would
be required to rebuild rapidly
Arab military inventories to
the level they were before hos-
tilities. There has been no ap-
preciable increase in Soviet mili-
tary shipments during the past
week.
The Soviet Position
The communique dealing with
President Podgorny's visit to Sy-
ria was nearly identical with the
one treating his trip to Cairo, and
neither was particularly precise or
informative. The communique's
failure to mention "imperialist
aggression" as a cause of hos-
tilities suggests that Podgorny's
visit was intended to calm Syrian
extremism as well as continue ef-
forts to rebuild the Syrian Army.
Several Soviet press articles
may be indicative of the line that
Moscow is taking in its private
sessions with Arab leaders. An
official silence is being main-
tained regarding the legal status
of the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf 25X1
of Aqaba. An article in the So-
viet Army newspaper Red Star, how-
ever, suggests that the UAR would
have no right to close the Strait
if Israeli "threats" were removed.
This article--in addition to vari-
ous statements by Soviet officials--
implies that Moscow is encouraging
Nasir to be more forthcoming on
a possible compromise with Israel
relating to the question of transit.
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Life
An article
Abroad on
in
30
the
June
Soviet
charges
weekly
that
the
real cause
of
the
UAR military
setback was the "defeatism of
some of the generals and senior
officials." This charge supports
Moscow's intention to fix ulti-
mate blame for the military de-
feat on Cairo's failure to carry
out a socialist revolution. It
also implicitly warns Nasir that
a major shuffle is in order among
the military leadership./
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UN ASSEMBLY UNABLE TO AGREE ON MIDEAST
The General Assembly, con-
cerned over its failure to adopt
any general resolution on the Mid-
east by the required two thirds
majority, has recessed until
12 July. In the interim, efforts
will be made to devise a less
contentious resolution, possibly
urging scrupulous observance of
the cease-fire and requesting U
Thant to appoint a personal rep-
resentative to the Mideast.
Within a short time, the Arab-
Israeli problem is likely to be
taken up again by the Security
Council.
In the Assembly's debate, no
reconciliation between opposing
sides was possible. The Arab
states, the USSR, France, and
some nonaligned countries sup-
ported the Yugoslav resolution
concentrating almost exclusively
on a withdrawal of Israeli forces.
The Latin Americans, the US, and
most West Europeans believed that
constructive steps toward a set-
tlement had to accompany with-
drawal. This approach was re-
flected in the Latin American
resolution presented on 30 June
after a Danish-coordinated effort
failed to get off the ground.
The Latin American resolution
successfully blocked the adoption
of the Yugoslav motion and thereby
caused a diplomatic defeat for the
USSR, which had called the special
session to punish Israel.
The Soviet resolution condemn-
ing Israel as the aggressor, pre-
sented at the opening of the ses-
sion, was defeated soundly. The
US resolution lacked broad support
and was withdrawn. The Assembly
gave overwhelming endorsement, how-
ever, to a Pakistani motion call-
ing for Israel to rescind its ac-
tions to unify Jerusalem, and to
a Swedish proposal for UN aid to
the refugees and war victims.
Feeling was widespread among
the delegations that the Assembly's
inability to agree on a major
resolution was not a satisfactory
denouement for the special session.
Assembly President Pazhwak, who had
previously tried without success
to get the Yugoslav and Latin Amer-
ican sides to iron out their dif-
ferences, approached the Swedish
and Finnish delegations on 4 July
to see if they would offer a sub-
stitute resolution. This prompted
Swedish representative Astrom to
suggest to the Assembly the next
day that a further attempt be made
to agree on an endorsement of the
cease-fire and the naming of a
UN emissary to deal with the Mid-
east governments in an effort at
a settlement. Pazhwak then an-
nounced the recess until 12 July.
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NIGERIAN NAVY BLOCKADE GIVING BIAFRA TROUBLE
Governor Ojukwu of seces-
sionist "Biafra" is under increas-
ing pressure to break the Nigerian
Navy's surprisingly effective
blockade of his ports. He also
needs to demonstrate his regime's
de facto control in order to get
international recognition, which
still has not been given.
Ojukwu maintains effective
internal control in the former
Eastern Region, but the federal
naval blockade is stopping most
imports of manufactured goods,
as well as the export of foreign
exchange earning produce. Ojukwu
has apparently arranged for
charter shipments of needed re-
placement equipment--probably
including arms--that should arrive
in Nigerian waters early this
month. On 2 July a reportedly
empty cargo ship was hit by gun-
fire from a Nigerian patrol boat
after leaving Bonny; presumably
the ship had unloaded in the
Biafran port. This, however, is
apparently the only cargo ship
to have made it into port since
regular patrols were instituted
by the federal navy in early
June.
Ojukwu has managed to
acquire at least one B-26--a US
World War II bomber--and may
have more, although it is not
clear whether any of them are
armed or fitted for a bombing
mission. He may intend to use
such aircraft, which reportedly
will be flown by mercenary pi-
lots, against the Nigerian Navy.
Federal leader Gowon, ap-
parently impelled by reports of
Ojukwu's bomber acquisition, has
urgently requested military equip-
ment, including jet fighters, from
both the US and UK. He is ap-
parently considering equipment
from East European sources if
Western sources are denied. Gowon
seems anxious to acquire the ad-
ditional arms before embarking
on an attack to put down Ojukwu's
rebellion. Moreover, he may feel
that federal sanctions are begin-
ning to have the desired effect
on Biafra, and that a military
move at this time would be pre-
mature.
The disposition of the
important oil revenues from
Biafran production, now due and
claimed by both Gowon and Ojukwu,
remains basically unresolved.
Because of Ojukwu's threat to
move against its oil installa-
tions, Shell-British Petroleum
(BP), the major producer, decided
to give Ojukwu a token $700,000
out of some $15 million now due,
leaving for a later day the ques-
tion of who would get the major
portion. Gowon responded by
including oil tankers in his
naval blockade of Biafran ports,
thus cutting off the flow of oil.
Ojukwu, who has so far refrained
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from bragging about the Shell-BP
payment, now may have to take some
action to force payment to him of
the rest of the money due.
Ojukwu also seems bent on
trying to relieve the pressure on
him by provoking unrest elsewhere
in Nigeria. The two severe bomb
explosions that rocked Lagos on
NIGERIA
,?i::ur n/' NW Fh'A
FERNANDO PO
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Page 25 WEEKLY SUMMARY
the night of 2 July were report-
edly part of a terrorist campaign
that is to continue. Instead of
the intended military targets,
however, two gas stations were
blown up and several civilians
killed. As a result, there has
been a renewal of unauthorized
civilian reprisals agains the
Ibos remaining in Lagos.
-'-'~ New State bound-
ary decreed by
Gowon
s Boundary of
former Region
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MOBUTU FACED WITH MUTINY AFTER TSHOMBE KIDNAPING
The mutinies which broke out
in Bukavu and Kisangani on 5 July
are the most serious threat yet
to the tenuous stability of the
Mobutu regime.
The rebelling white merce-
naries and Katangan troops--most
of whom were at one time loyal
to former premier Tshombe--may
have been reacting to the kidnap-
_ng of Tshombe by agents of the
Congolese Government and to the
Mobutu regime's subsequent threats
to have him extradited from Al-
geria and executed. The fighting
may stymie Mobutu's apparent in-
tention to hang Tshombe immediately.
Tshombe, if he gets into Congolese
hands, may become a bargaining
point with the mutineers.
The Congolese apparently had
been planning to kidnap Tshombe
for some time. Tshombe's March
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 7 Jul 67
1967 trial in absentia for treason
may have been part of the plot
since Tshombe now can be executed
not because of political charges
but because he was convicted of
criminal actions. A Congolese
delegation departed for Algiers
early this week to present extra-
dition papers and bring Tshombe
back to the Congo.
possible.
It is not known why Tshombe
was traveling around the Spanish
islands from which he was kid-
naped. The Congolese may have
believed he was beginning his
much-advertised coup to oust Mo-
butu and return to power himself.
Recent sabotage in Katanga blamed
on Tshombe sympathizers may have
confirmed the suspicion that a
move by Tshombe was imminent. In
any case, the mutiny will almost
certainly stiffen the government's
resolve to root out real and
imagined subversives as soon as
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Domestic political concerns made most of the head-
lines in Latin America last week, and the most pressing
anxieties of the moment for several regimes were at least
temporarily or superficially relieved. Mexico held ex-
ceptionally quiet off-year elections on 2 July. Ten-
sions eased off a bit in Bolivia, where President Bar-
rientos appears to have weathered for the moment the
attacks of his disunited political, labor, and student
opposition. Much of the turmoil within Uruguay's ruling
Colorado Party seems to have subsided too, but the quar-
rel over economic policy that precipitated a cabinet
reshuffle remains unresolved.
such a meeting might accomplish.
Haitian dictator Duvalier, meanwhile, is continu-
ing his latest campaign against all suspected dissidents.
He has put through a law that in effect decrees the death
penalty for most of the 95 persons now in asylum in
various Latin American embassies in Port-au-Prince.
the
oya y o is ie mi nary an secure y ai es oes25X6
not appear to be wavering yet.
On the international front, Latin American dip- 25X6
lomats worked feverishly if unsuccessfully to obtain
UN General Assembly passage of their compromise reso-
lution on the Middle East crisis. In view of the de-
feat of this effort, Brazil may revive its proposal
for a separate peace conference outside the UN to deal
with the entire range of Arab-Israeli problems.
Hemispheric leaders still seem more united on
how to handle the Middle East crisis than they do on
how to cope with Venezuela's pending formal complaint
of Cuban aggression. Some of the area's foreign min-
isters are showing increasing reluctance to attend the
next round of OAS talks in Washington on this subject
next month, since there is wide disagreement over what
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REACTION TO PANAMA CANAL TREATIES
President Robles moved swiftly
last week to enlist support for the
draft canal treaties as the first
faint rumblings of opposition criti-
cism began to be heard.
Robles' willingness to negotiate
and draft the treaties in English
is evidence of a sellout of na-
tional 25X1
sovereignty.
Arias departed on 1 July
for a trip to Europe, including a
One unexpected gain for Robles
has been a shift in attitude by two
prominent ultranationalist officials
who have generally been skeptical
about prospects for US-Panamanian
agreement. Ernesto Castillero Pi-
mentel, Foreign Ministry director
of the special negotiating mission,
and Manuel Mendez Guardia, legal ad-
viser to the Foreign Relations Coun-
cil, reportedly believe the treaties
are good and will be ratified. Ca-
stillero has some influence among
university students and may be an
asset to Robles in efforts to head
off opposition by the volatile stu-
dent sector.
Some opposition has come from
the United Front--a group of politi-
cal malcontents and ultranational-
ists headed by Arnulfo Arias--which
claims that the new treaties merely
revise rather than abrogate the 1903
treaty. The Front also charges that
possible stop in New York. He has
offered no explanation for this un-
expected departure, but he may use
his stay abroad as a device to gain
international attention for an an-
titreaty campaign.
The Communist party has report-
edly called for agitation and propa-
ganda against the draft treaties
with the ultimate aim of preventing
ratification. Its claim to have
copies of the treaties is supported
by its attack against specific pro-
visions on: the establishment of
a joint canal authority with major-
ity US representation; retention of
US military bases; and compensation
of $14 million rather than the $80
million sought by Panamanian nego-
tiators.
Although Communists, ultrana-
tionalists, and other opposition
groups can be counted on to rail
against the treaties, there is no
indication at present that they
could mount disturbances that could
not be controlled by the government.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 7 Jul 67
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ACTIVITY ON THE CHILEAN LEFT
Developments within Chile's
Socialist and Radical parties at
meetings held late in June may
weaken President Frei's leftist
opposition in the long run, but
will do nothing to ease his im-
mediate difficulties with the
Senate.
The Radical Party convention
on 28 June confirmed the power of
the leftist group that favors
greater cooperation with the Com-
munist-Socialist Popular Action
Front (FRAP). Collaboration be-
tween FRAP and the Radicals on
most important issues since last
December has already stymied the
administration's reform programs.
Some moderate Radicals may leave
the party in protest, but most
moderates are expected to stay on
and fight for representation on
the slate of candidates to be
presented in the 1969 congressional
elections.
The Socialist Party central
committee meeting, held on 24-25
June, resulted in a walkout by
former party secretary general
Senator Raul Ampuero that may
split the party. Ampuero, who
harbors presidential ambitions,
has long been involved in a riv-
alry with Secretary General Ani-
ceto Rodriguez and Senate Presi-
dent Salvador Allende, the pres-
ent leaders of the party. Am-
puero favors emphasizing labor
development, and opposes coopera-
tion with the Radical party.
Allende and Rodriguez, with
an eye to the 1970 presidential
campaign, are courting the Radi-
cals. After a fistfight between
Ampuero and a Socialist deputy
over organizing next autumn's
party convention, the party sus-
pended Ampuero and several con-
gressmen who support him.
Ampuero may try to reorganize
his Popular Socialist Party,
which existed from 1948 to 1952
and then joined with a smaller
group to form the Socialist Party.
The Communist Party (PCCh) fears
that division among the Socialists
will weaken FRAP, but has made no
move so far to intervene.
Frei's legislative program
will continue to have trouble in
the Senate in the near future, as
the PR and FRAP increase their
cooperation. A formal split in
the Socialist Party, however,
could strengthen his party's
chances in the 1970 presidential
election.
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POLITICAL WRANGLING AND ECONOMIC STAGNATION IN URUGUAY
President Gestido's prospects
for dealing with Uruguay's basic
economic problems have been dimmed
by his handling of a factional
dispute within his Colorado Party.
The immediate controversy
centered on an "economic emergency"
bill designed to deal with the
country's economic stagnation. Key
elements of the bill removed in
the process of coordinating with
the six Colorado factions repre-
sented in Congress, and criticism
of the watered down remainder by
Jorge Batlle, the leader of the
most powerful faction, provoked
the finance minister into resign-
ing. In retaliation, Gestido dis-
missed two of Batlle's supporters
from the cabinet, and filled all
three vacancies with representa-
tives of the smaller factions.
support is needed to get laws pro-
posed by the administration through
Congress.
The cabinet changes will also
complicate Uruguay's dealings with
the International Monetary Fund.
One of the points at issue in the
old cabinet and with the IMF was
how much federal control was
needed to revive the economy. The
new finance minister is torn be-
tween his own predilection for
comprehensive controls and the
Fund's proposals which would leave
prices and exchange rates respon-
sive to market conditions. An
IMF team which came to Uruguay
about two weeks ago to negotiate
a stand-by agreement has now left
in disgust and it is doubtful that
an agreement will be reached for
some time, if ever.
The cabinet changes appear
to have resulted in a defeat for
those forces within the adminis-
tration that favored limiting gov-
ernment interference in the econ-
omy. Two key posts, including
the ministry of finance, have been
filled by men known for their left-
ist and nationalist tendencies and
for their preference for economic
control and "statism." Moreover,
the cabinet changes have antago-
nized Batlle legislators whose
The Communists are planning
to provoke major strikes this
month in the hopes of destroying
public confidence in the govern-
ment. Labor unrest and a rising
cost of living, plus growing dis-
illusionment with government in-
action and intraparty wrangling,
may combine to give the Commu-
nists one of their greatest labor
successes in some time. 25X1
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