WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005900040001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 14, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Department review completed
Secret
_~ 52
14 July 1967
No. 0298/67
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SECRET
FAR EAST
South Vietnam's Provisional National Assembly
will meet on 17 July to examine complaints which
have been filed against eight presidential slates,
including the Thieu-Ky ticket, that of General Minh,
and of Au Truong Thanh, the self-styled "peace can-
didate." The assembly is unlikely to disqualify
Thieu and Ky, but the outcome is uncertain in re-
spect to General Minh. The government has laid
the groundwork for the disqualification of Au Tru-
ong Thanh by charging him with a long history of
pro-Communist activities. His name has also been
linked to a group of alleged pro - Viet Cong intel-
lectuals who were recently arrested in Saigon.
The intensity of the fighting between North
Vietnamese forces and US Marines near the DMZ in
northeastern Quang Tri slackened off after the
heavy contacts last weekend, but intense enemy mil-
itary bombardment of allied positions is continu-
ing. In the central highlands, where signs of
preparations for an offensive are noted, the Commu-
nists initiated several attacks against US patrols.
The death of General Nguyen Chi Thanh, North
Vietnamese politburo member and top leader of the
Communist structure in the South, was announced by
Hanoi on 7 July. Thanh was a hard liner in the
Communist leadership, and the choice of his suc-
cessor might provide a clue to the relative strength
of the moderate and militant factions in Hanoi.
Following last weekend's border incident, the
Communists in Hong Kong have intensified their ef-
forts to stir up mass disorders in the colony, in-
cluding the use of terrorism. The British on 12 July
for the first time in the current crisis employed
army troops against local Communists. In Burma, al-
though anti-Chinese rioting has subsided, Peking is
maintaining diplomatic pressures which the Rangoon
regime continues to resist. China's internal tur-
moil, meanwhile a preading.
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la Drd49'=~.
Valley Q
CAMBODIA .~ V~~TA~A'M
FRANCIS MARION
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VIETNAM
Heavy North Vietnamese Army
(NVA) casualties resulting from
a series of sharp encounters with
allied forces could temporarily
slow down Communist offensive
operations in northeastern Quang
Tri Province.
More than 550 Communist
troops were killed near Con Thien
during almost continuous contact
on 8-9 July with US Marines of
Operation BUFFALO, supported by
well-coordinated allied air and
artillery attacks. Since the
fighting in the eastern DMZ area
was stepped up on 2 July more
than 1,100 Communist soldiers
have been killed, in contrast to
US losses of 159 killed and 884
wounded.
The frequency and intensity
of contacts has declined in recent
days, but there continued to be
unusually heavy concentrations of
Communist artillery, mortar, and
rocket fire directed upon allied
installations and positions in
the Con Thien - Dong Ha - Gio
Linh triangle area during the
week. Large caliber rocket and
artillery fire caused an increas-
ing amount of damage to allied
positions. There are unverified
reports that Soviet-built 152-mm.
artillery was used for the first
time.
Stepped-up bombardments of
Gio-Linh have brought about
virtual suspension of civil gov-
ernment functions and caused the
relocation of the district head-
quarters in another area. The
US long-range 175-mm. artillery
has been moved from Gio Linh
southward to new positions near
Dong Ha and Camp Carroll,
In the central highlands,
there are signs that NVA forces
subordinate to the Communist
B-3 Front are increasing their
military activity in western
Kontum and Pleiku provinces.
Near Dak To, in western
Kontum Province, elements of the
173rd Airborne Brigade, partici-
pating in the sweep operation
GREELEY, suffered 75 casualties
as a result of a sharp two-and-
one-half-hour battle on 10 July,
The attacking enemy force, a
well-disciplined and well-armed
unit, was probably subordinate
to the NVA 24th Regiment which
conducted a similar attack
against US troops in the same
area in late June,
Farther south in southwestern
Pleiku Province, infantrymen of
the US 4th Division, participat-
ing in border-surveillance opera-
tion FRANCIS MARION, were attacked
on 12 July by a Communist force--
almost certainly comprised of
units of the NVA lst Division.
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DRV Politburo Member Dies
On 7 July Hanoi reported
the death of politburo member
Nguyen Chi Thanh. This is the
first case of attrition within
the inner circle of the North,
Vietnamese leadership since the
Communists took control of the
DRV in 1954. Thanh was recog-
nized as one of the party's most
outspoken militants and was a
close ally of Party First Secre-
tary Le Duan. He had been direct-
ing the war in the South for at
least the past two-and-one-half
years.
Any one of several North
Vietnamese general officers al-
ready in the South could be chosen
to replace Thanh in his military
role, but it will take another
politburo member to assume his
political functions. Although
several other politbura members
have had experience in the South,
Hanoi may choose to divide up
Thanh's responsibilities among
several men.
Thanh's death could also
pose even larger problems for
the 11-man politburo--believed
to be evenly divided between
militants and moderates with Ho
Chi Minh standing above both
groups as final arbiter. Ho's
age and health add to the uncer-
tainty. If Ho should become
incapacitated a strugg]_e for
power could ensue between the
militants and moderates, led by
Le Duan and Pham Van Dong re-
spectively. It would be impor-
tant to each faction to fill the
opening caused by Thanh's death
to strengthen its own weight in
the politburo before Ho passes
on. The politburo could be ex-
panded by one or more members
and those chosen may provide some
hint as to the relative strengths
of the two factions and their
supporters.
Election Developments in Saigon
Election officials have
begun final processing of candi-
dates for South Vietnam's
presidential and senatorial elec-
tions on 3 September. The Pro-
visional National Assembly will
meet on 17 July to examine com-
plaints which have been offi-
cially filed against potential
candidates.
Complaints have been filed
against eight slates, including
those of Generals Thieu and Ky,
retired General Duong Van Minh,
and civilian Au Truong Thanh,
former economy minister in Ky's
cabinet. The complaint against
Chief of State Thieu and Premier
Ky--that both should be dis-
qualified because they have not
resigned their official posi-
tions--is not likely to be heeded,
but those against Thanh .and Minh
will probably arouse considerable
debate in the assembly.
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Thanh is accused of having
Communist connections; Minh is
regarded as a threat to national
security by the generals who
filed the complaint against him;
and Minh's running mate, Tran
Ngoc Lieng, is charged with being
ineligible because of his former
French citizenship. The assembly's
actions on these charges cannot
be predicted with any certainty,
but it is more likely to dis-
qualify Thanh than to accede to
the generals' wishes by eliminat-
ing Minh's ticket.
A total of 60 senate slates,
including 600 candidates and 78
alternates, are under review by
the Central Election Council, with
.final approval or disapproval of
the slates to be made ]~ 22 July.
It is possible that as many as
one third of the lists will either
voluntarily withdraw or be elim-
inated before 3 September, when
voters will elect six of the ten-
man slates. Four slates have al-
ready dropped out because their
dossiers were incomplete.
Some government officials
regard the large number of slates
as excessive. Premier Ky told an
American observer on 2 July that
he believes the senate will be a
disorganized, ineffective body
because the voters have no mean-
ingful list from which to choose
qualified candidates. According to
Ky, Foreign Minister Tran Van Do
and Deputy Premier Nguyen Luu Vien
have commented that the number of
slates demonstrates the fallacy
of expecting democracy to work
effectively in Vietnam today.
Ky, however, apparently in- 25X1
tends to do his best to try to
influence the senate's composi-
tion.
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COMMUNIST PRESSURE CONTINUES IN HONG KONG
Mounting terrorist activity
and new efforts to stir up mass
disorder in Hong Kong indicate that
the. Communists are determined to
keep pressure on the colony's au-
thorities. Peking's behavior sug-
gests-, however,- that the Chinese
Communists are not seeking a show-
down with the British at this time.
The fire fight between Huong
Kong police and Chinese Communist
militia at the border village of
Sha Tau Kok on 8 July is the most
serious incident thus far. Five
police officers were killed and at
least eleven were wo-unded when
they attempted to turn back a mob
of Chinese demonstrators which had
crossed the frontier. Order was
restored only after a battalion
of Gurkhas were moved into the
area.
Chinese Army officers were
observed inspecting the area on
6 July and, while the clash was
in progress, a Chinese Army bat-
talion was moved up piecemeal
to the frontier. .Peking's reac-
tion and other circumstances sur-
rounding the incident strongly sug-
gest, however, that it was planned
and executed by Chinese Communist
authorities at-the provincial
25X1 level or below without ex licit
orders from Peking.
e ac o orgar~i zation
in e riots which subsequently
occurred in a further indication
that the local Communists were
not forewarned.
Peking's 9 July official pro-
test was guarded, contained no
threat of reprisal, and generally
indicated that the Chinese did
not intend to build on h
dent.
Frustrated over the failure
of their strike tactics, the Com-
munists in Hong Kong are now step-
ping up hit-and-run terrorist ac-
tivity, probably intended as a new
test of British resolution in
coping with the situation. In a
raid on 12 July against a Commu-
nist center, army troops were em-
ployed against the Hong Kong Com-
munists for the first time in
the current crisis.
The strikes and public disor-
ders have not as yet inflicted
serious damage to the Hong Kong
economy, but business has been
hurt. Key government and banking
officials contend that a long
period of calm will be required
before local Chinese businessmen
will undertake major new invest-
ment. The Communists could at-
tempt to put further pressure on
the economy by trying to tie
up harbor facilities.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 14 Jul 67
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BREAKUP OF SUBVERSIVE.NET HAVING REPERCUSSIONS FOR SOUTH KOREA
South Korean heavy-handed
tactics in exposing and breaking
up a widespread Communist espio-
nage ring have caused criticism
abroad and could intensify the
political infighting within the
regime at home.
Students are predominant in
the ring which also involves
South Korean professors and jour-
nalists in Seoul as well as in
Europe and the US. The members
apparently came under Communist
influence while abroad and some
were given training in Moscow and
Pyongyang. They were given the
mission of indoctrinating South
Korean youth with Communist ideol-
ogy, thus providing a base for
the eventual Communization of
South Korea. The clumsy tactics
used by South Korea's CIA to
persuade many of the accused to
return to Korea has generated a
storm of public criticism and of-
ficial concern in West Germany
and France.
West German press stories
asserting that a number of missing
Koreans have been kidnaped and
forcibly returned home by South
Korean agents have resulted in
public protests by the leaders of
all three major German political
parties. West German authorities
have privately indicated to US
officials that they are not satis-
fied with the explanation given
by the South Korean Embassy. Bann
has demanded the recall of three
South Korean. embassy officials
and may yet demand an official
apology from Seoul.
Page 7
Seoul may be in for greater
trouble in France, where an offi-
cial investigation is also under
way. Relations have been cool
since 1965 when Paris objected to
Seoul's decision to send troops
to Vietnam, and have suffered
recently when France agreed to
allow Pyongyang to establish a
trade delegation in Paris. They
could deteriorate further, if Paris
concludes that French sovereignty
has been violated by Korean ac-
tions in France.
In Seoul, enemies within the
regime of the CIA director are
likely to use the embarrassment
caused to the nation to try to
force his removal. He and other
high officials, including the
prime minister, have been attacked
by the chairman of the government.
party, Kim Chong-pil, for irregu-
larities in the recent national
elections. The CIA chief may be
planning to parry the attack by
linking some of Kim's group to
the Communist espionage ring;
North Korean propaganda is_
linking the breaking of the espio-
nage ring to the recent upsurge
in violent clashes }~e~kween South
.~- . .
Korean security fo~ce~-and armed
Communist agents as symptoms of
discontent in the South. These
agent incidents are portrayed as
reflecting a growing indigenous
movement against the Pak Chong-hui
government and the arrests as
cover for an effort by Pak and the
US to sup ress this rowin dis-
content
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DISORDER IPISIDE COMMU[~JIST CHI~JA
Violence and disorder appear
to be spreading in China, while the
regime is still unaccountably re-
luctant to use force to end the
fighting. The political goals of
contending forces--composed mostly
of student Red Guards, workers, and
peasants--remain as obscure as ever.
The west China province of
Szechwan, and Hupeh and Honan in cen-
tral China have been in a state of
political turmoil since the frenzy
of the C-ultural Revolution was re-
newed in April. In recent weeks
outbreaks of fighting have also been
reported, for the first time in the
current phase of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, from many cities in east, north,
and northeast China.
25X1
A serious breakdown in law and
order ma have taken lace in some
cities.
An announcement by Peking on
11 July that college students-are
to return to their institutions to
"resume classes and make revolution"
could be an effort to curb militant
Red Guard organizations which have
been responsible for much of the
fighting in the provinces. Red
Guard detachments from universities
in the capital have been the prime
movers in campaigns conducted against
local party and military leaders in
several provinces. There is no
evidence yet, however, that these
detachments are being called back
or restrained in any way.
The disorderly activities of
these and other militant groups con-
tinue to disrupt industrial produc-
tion and rail traffic. In early
July, a Peking poster described a
fight between Red Guards and workers
at the Anshan steel mill--the largest
in China--and another poster quoted
Minister of Public Security Hsieh
Fu-chih as saying that industrial
production "declined further" in
April and May.
In the present emotional atmos-
phere, a claim made by the New China
News Agency on 7 July that the sum-
mer harvest was ten percent larger
than in 1966 probably is not mean-
ingful. The claim was issued as
evidence of the effectiveness of
Mao's thought and the Cultural Rev-
olution. It is doubtful, moreover,
that Peking has good crop statistics
for all of China.
Nevertheless, since weather has
been reasonably good, an improvement
on the poor 1966 crop is probable.
The regime may, however, have diffi-
culty in procuring and distributing
the harvest--whatever its size--be
cause of growing indiscipline among
peasants, and trans ort and trade
workers.
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Violent Clashes Reported Since Mid-June 1967
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Page 10 WEEKLY SUMI~~RY
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EUROPE
Premier Pompidou's five-day visit to the Soviet
Union this week maintained the momentum of high-leve_
exchanges between Paris and Moscow, thus preserving
the image of a "special" Franco-Soviet relationship.
There are no indications, however, that either side
was forthcoming on the major issues--the nonprolifer-
ation treaty and European security.
The communique issued at the visit's end was
concerned primarily with efforts of both sides to
broaden bilateral relations, stressing that the
Franco-Soviet detente not only has a positive influ-
ence on the political situation in Europe but also
serves as a model for relations between other na-
tions on the continent.
The Soviet hierarchy dealt a further blow to
the career of Aleksander Shelepin, once considered
a leading candidate for future party leadership.
His appointment as the chief of the Soviet trade
union organization all but completes his political
neutralization, a process which has been under way
for many months. During this period a number of
his political allies, including the former KGB
chief, have been transferred to relatively power-
less positions. There is no evidence that Shele-
pin's demotion stems directly from differences
over Middle East policy, as was the case with the
recently fired Moscow party chief.
In Bonn, Chancellor Kiesinger has won his
colleagues' reluctant approval of an austerity
program that provides for cuts in defense spend-
ing and in social welfare outlays. Just how the
defense cuts will be implemented evidently has
not been decided, but a study now being made is
expected to recommend a reduction in troo levels
and delavs in new nrocurement_
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HIGH SOVIET LEADER DEMOTED
The appointment of politburo
member Aleksander Shelepin as head
of the Soviet trade unions marks
a further setback for him. This
move all but completes his politi-
cal neutralization, a process
that began in late 1965. It ap-
parently was brought on by the
combination of policy differences
between Shelepin and a majority
within the politburo on a wide
range of issues and the long-stand-
ing rivalry between Shelepin and.
party boss Brezhnev.
There is no evidence that
Shelepin's demotion stems directly
from the split between "hawks"
and "doves" over Middle East pol-
icy, as was the case in the recent
firing of Moscow party chief
Nikolay Yegorychev, a "hawk."
He is believed, however, to
hold views similar to those re-
portedly expressed by Yegorychev
at the June plenum of the central
committee, and differences within
the politburo over the proper
course of action during or as a
follow-up to the crisis may well
have speeded up the move against
Shelepin.
During the first year after
Khrushchev's ouster there were re-
ports that Shelepin was challenging
Brezhnev for the party leadership.
Since late 1965, however, Shelepin
has been transferred to progres-
sively less important assignments.
The last year and a half have been
marked by Shelepin's giving up his
deputy premiership, the dissolution
of his powerful committee of party
and state control, the passing
over of several of his proteges
for important posts, the removal
of a number of his closest allies
from pivotal positions, and the
whittling down of his position in
the secretariat--the party?s ex-
ecutive arm. Shelepin will al-
most certainly lose his position
in the secretariat, and, although
he will probably remain, at least
for a time, on the policy-making
politburo, his influence on the
formulation of national policy will
be reduced because his new duties
will keep him occupied with every-
day labor problems.
The demotion of Shelepin, fol-
lows the removal of two of his
closest allies--KGB chief Semi-
chastny and Moscow party boss
Yegorychev--and their replacement
by men generally more moderate in
outlook. This attack on the
Shelepin group, in turn, would ap-
pear to weaken the position of
other hard-line elements in the
party. The views of these other
hard liners, however, still cannot
be ignored by the politburo. More-
over, the regime has been signal-
ing those who would take advantage
of the reverses suffered by the
Shelepin group to press for more
"liberal" domestic policies that
the time is for such
activities.
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WEST GERMAN AUSTERITY PROGRAM MAY FORESHADOW DEFENSE CUTS
The Bonn coalition govern-
ment has developed a financial
plan designed to keep its budget
in balance over the next four
years. In the process it has
given notice that West Germany
will probably reduce its defense
establishment.
In several long cabinet ses-
sions on 4, 5, and 6 July, Chan-
cellor Kiesinger apparently over-
rode objections though not with-
out a struggle which could por-
tend further trouble. Kiesinger
had earlier underscored the im-
portance of the budget planning
sessions both for the government
and for his own political future
by postponing his scheduled visit
to Washington.
Defense Minister Schroeder
waged a hard but losing fight
against cuts in defense spending.
According to a cabinet announce-
ment on 7 July, reductions in de-
fense spending will range from
$500 million in 1968 to a high of
$640 million in 1970.
Just how the defense cuts
will be implemented evidently has
not been decided. A reduction in
troop levels and delays in new
procurement are expected to be
prime recammen~lations of a study
Schroeder is to undertake. Ini-
tial press reports of a probably
40-60,000-man reduction have been
attributed to Defense Ministry
sources trying to generate oppo-
sition to the defense cuts.
In the traditionally heavy
social welfare programs, family
allowances were reduced and most
benefits to war victims and refu-
gees were frozen at present levels.
A wide range of tax relief meas-
ures were dropped from government
plans, and business and personal
taxes were raised.
Kiesinger admits that his pro-
gram will be politically painful.
At present, he has the backing of
his cabinet and the approval of
both the Christian Democratic and
Social Democratic forces in the
Bundestag. Parliamentary action
awaits the autumn Bundestag ses-
sion, and pressures to restore
cuts, especially in the sensitive
area of social welfare, are likely
to mount during the summer.
Kiesinger's hardest task may
be to win the understanding of Ger-
many's NATO allies, who are al-
ready pointing out that any German
troop cuts should be subject to
NATO review. The German press
anticipates renewed pressures in
the US and Britain for a reassess-
ment of allied troop levels in
West Germany. Bonn may still be
hopeful that a reduction of West-
ern forces could bring reciprocal
cuts by the USSR and its East Euro-
pean allies. In a recent public
statement, Foreign Minister Brandt
seemed to invite a Soviet response
by referring to mutual troop re-
ductions as a
pean detente.
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COMMUNIST PETROLEUM EXPORTS TO THE FREE WORLD
The USSR's and Eastern Eu-
rope's petroleum sales to non-
communist countries probably will
reach a record high in 1967,
about 50 million tons. Sales in
1966 were nearly 46 million tons,
valued at about $570 million.
The Soviets apparently are taking
advantage of the Middle East
crisis by making additional crude
oil available to their customers
in Western Europe. The Soviets
have not yet attempted to compete
with Arab countries by using the
crisis to gain new customers in
the West. The Soviet ability to
sell oil in Europe is small, be-
COMMUNIST EXPORTS OF PETROLEUM
TO THE FREE WORLD
1955-67
Page 15
cause of limited availability,
compared to West Europe's needs.
The value of the sales to the
USSR is important, however, be-
cause of the hard currency value.
Larger quantities of Soviet
oil were reportedly sold to West
Germany, Italy, Spain, and Swit-
zerland, and a representative
from the Soviet Ministry of Pe-
troleum is scheduled to arrive
ir_ Vienna shortly to discuss an
increase in deliveries beyond
the current 750,000-ton contract.
Several British companies have
requested a review of Britain's
embargo on Soviet oil. London
is unlikely to relax its embargo
on crude but may add such products
as naphtha to the list of permit-
ted Soviet imports.
Last year, an estimated 74
percent of the USSR's and Eastern
Europe's petroleum exports went
to Western Europe, meeting about
eight percent of its requirements,
about the same proportion as in
1964 and 1965. There was a slight
decline last year in the amounts
exported to the less-developed
countries. Brazil, Greece, India,
the UAR, and Ceylon were the prin-
cipal buyers. Imports continued
to meet a high percentage of needs
in Iceland (99 percent), Finland
(83 percent), Ghana (76 percent),
and Afghanistan (75 percent). Ex-
cept for Finland, however, the
quantities of oil imported were
not large. Of the 46 million tons
of petroleum exported from the
USSR and Eastern Europe in 1966,
SEGRLT
WEEKLY SUMMARY 14 Jul 67
Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79-~0927A005900040001-5
 Approved F release 2007~b%~1~4-RDP79-009005900040001-5
the USSR accounted for 39 million,
or all of the crude ail--about 24
million tons--and 15 million tons of
petroleum products. A rising trend
in the share of crude oil in total
exports probably will persist for
at least two or three more years,
as additions to Soviet refining
capacity will continue to lag be-
hind the annual increases in out-
put of crude oil. Petroleum ex-
ports have been a major source
of foreign exchange for the USSR,
an estimated $480 million in 1966,
and have helped pay for modern
equipment and technology for in-
dustrial development.
The USSR's prices for petro-
leum to Western Europe, in general,
are comparable to world market
prices. The value of Soviet ex-
ports has not increased as rapidly
as the volume during the past few
years because prices have declined
gradually and because the share of
crude oil in total exports has
risen. Shortages caused by the
Middle East crisis, however, could
change this picture.
S~;CRLT
25X:1
Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY 14 Jul 67
 Approved For ReT~dse 2007/03/~~DP79-00927A0~6d00040001-5
MIDDLE EAST -AFRICA
In the aftermath of the hostilities, the
radical and moderate Arab states are still at
odds over whether to move toward negotiations
with Israel. Algeria and Syria are the firmest
opponents, while King Husayn of Jordan continues
to urge same sort of an Arab-Israeli under-
standing. Husayn may, after having exhausted
all means of getting unified Arab action, de-
cide to go it alone and come to terms with Is-
rael, thus inviting renewed enmity of the radi-
cal Arabs.
The weak coalition government in India's
West Bengal still totters along. The local Con-
gress Party claims it has enough votes to topple
the government but hesitates to force a vote of
no confidence because such action could cause
widespread popular unrest and unify the warring
Communist factions. New Delhi does not want to
intervene for the same reasons.
In Africa, the war between secessionist
Biafra and the federal government in Nigeria
continues. The federal forces have met with
unexpected stiffness from the Biafran Army.
Northeast Congo (Kinshasa) remains in
some disorder in the wake of last week's mutiny
of foreign mercenaries. The mutiny has severely
strained the Congo's tenuous stability. If the
European technicians carry out their threat to
leave, the subsequent shutdown of the copper
mines would have a devastatin of
economy.
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Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY 14 Jul 67
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a
 ~~,,~~,, SECRET ~
Approved for Release 2007/03/07 :CIA-RDP79-00927A005900040001-5
Suez Canal Area
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SECRET'
 Approved For R_ elease 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AOg5900040001-5
~ SECRET ~~
DEVELOPMENTS CENTERING ON THE MIDDLE EAST
Arab States - Israel
Radical and moderate Arab
leaders remain divided after a
series of meetings in Cairo .and
Damascus over whether to move
toward a settlement with Israel.
Continuing clashes between Egypt-
ian and Israeli forces, meanwhile,
still do not appear to presage a
resumption of major hostilities.
Algeria and Syria are thefirm-
est opponents of any show of moder-
ation. Boumediene, Nasir, and King
Husayn met in Cairo on 10-11 July
but evidently were unable to reach
an accord. Boumediene's talks
later in Damascus with Syrian
leaders ended with a statement in-
dicating the two governments are
intent upon resisting any pressure
to compromise.
Nasir, Boumediene, Syrian
President Atassi, and other Syrian
Baath officials and Iraqi President
Arif met again.n Cairo on 13 July.
Sudanese Premier Mahjoub reportedly
may join them on 14 July. King
Husayn, who met earlier in the
week with Nasir and Boumediene,
clearly was not to be at this
latest conference.
'scale summit. They fear Husayn
;and other moderates would form
:the majority. Egypt and Iraq had
favored such a conference but now
are unlikely to support it with
much vigor in the face of Algerian
and Syrian opposition.
Husayn probably will have to
.decide whether he can move toward
a unilateral settlement with the
Israelis without bringing the hos-
tility of the radical Arabs to an
intolerable level.
The clash between Egyptian
and Israeli forces along the Suez
Canal on 8 July was the largest
of several engagements since the
8 June cease-fire. Egyptian artil-
lery apparently opened fire on
Israeli positions at Ras al Ushsh,
where a number of less serious in-
cidents occurred the previous week.
The resulting battle ranged from
Port Said and Port Fuad at the
northern end of the canal south
to Qantara, and involved aircraft,
tanks, and heavy artillery. The
Israelis announced their casualties
were five killed and 31 wounded.
The number of Egyptian casualties
is not known; a MIG-21 was shot
down.
Husayn's hasty mission
stenpmed from his failure to pro-
mote an Arab summit meeting to
formulate a unified and relatively
moderate Arab position on steps
toward a settlement with Israel.
The Algerians reportedly have
strong misgivings about a full-
The Israelis claim their anti-
aircraft shot down an Egyptian SU-7
over Sinai on 11 July and that they de-
stroyed two Egyptian torpedo boats
in a naval engagement near Al Arish
.the following day.
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 ApprovedFor Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A005900040001-5
SECRET
Soviet Activity
United Nations
Soviet naval forces in the
Mediterranean have been showing
the flag in the Middle East to
demonstrate Moscow's support of
the Arab states. Eleven warships
put into Alexandria and Port Said
an 10 July for a week's visit.
The Soviet admiral commanding the
Mediterranean fleet announced that
his ships were ready to cooperate
with the Egyptian armed forces to
repel any aggression." The Soviets
took no action, however, when two
Egyptian torpedo boats were sunk
by the Israelis the next day.
The airlift of military
equipment, which now appears to
have ended, probably consisted
primarily of fighter aircraft de-
liveries. Egyptian, Syrian, and
Iraqi inventor-ies of fighter air-
craft probably now approach the
prewar level of 365, 80, and 89
respectively.
At the General Assembly
which r-e convened this week, at-
tention focused on Jerusalem. UN
members were dismayed at Israel's
refusal to comply with the Assembly
resolution calling on Tel Aviv to
rescind all measures which would
alter the status of Jerusalem.
Pakistan has introduced a new reso-
lution--which has a good chance
of being passed--which deplores
the failure of Israel to cooperate,
calls again on Israel to rescind
all measures, asks the Secretary
General to inform the Assembly and
the Security Council on the situa-
tion, and requests that the Coun-
cil take all necessary measures
to implement the resolution on
Jerusalem.
Most delegations would like
the Assembly to end on a "posi-
tive" note, but realize the
diffic-ulty of bridging the gap
between the unsuccessful Yugo-
slav and Latin American resolu-
tions of last week. Attempts
at drafting a compromise are
nonetheless still being made.
The Spanish delegate in particu-
lar has been pushing a proposal
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Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY
 Approved For Ruse 2007/03~~/~'~DP79-00927A0~900040001-5
which calls for Israeli with-
drawal, asks all parties to re-
frain from the use of force,
and requests the appointment of
a special representative of the
Secretary General. Despite the
delegates's vigorous campaigning,
however, a number of members re-
main opposed.d
Another compromise developed
by the Mexican delegation in con-
sultation with the nonaligned and
Latin American groups declares that
peace in the Middle East must be
made for all time, upholds the
principle that the territorial
conquest by war was inadmissable
and that therefore Israeli with-
drawal "is expected," declares
that the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Middle East states
must allow them freedom from
threats of belligerency, and re-
quests the Security Council to
continue examining the situation.
The proposal reflects continuing
dissension in the ranks of the
Latin American bloc which was a
key element in the defeat of the.
Yugoslav resolution last wPAk_
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Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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 Approved ~ Release 2~~7~/~ CIA-RDP79-OA005900040001-5
MERCENARY REBELLION IN THE CONGO
The mutiny of foreign mercenar-
ies and some Katangan troops in
Congo (Kinshasa) has caused consid-
erable havoc in the northeastern
sec-tor-. The rebels held part of
Kisangani (formerly Stanleyville)
until 12 July, when they broke out
and headed southeast by truck. Bu-
kavu has been the scene of much
disorder since the Congolese Army
(ANC) returned. Racial incidents
have somewhat diminished elsewhere
in the country, but tensions are
still high.
The mutinies on 5 July were
led by approximately 150 white mer-
cenaries, who were restive because
they had not been .paid for several
months and hearing rumors that the
government planned to disband their
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Ki.angani
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ANGOLA
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When the rebellion broke out,
Mobutu declared a state of emer-
gency, closed all borders, re-
scinded civil liberties, and urged
citizens to keep "foreigners" un-
der surveillance. Antiwhite sen-
timent rose throughout the country.
In Lubumbashi (formerly Elisabeth-
ville) ANC troops killed nine
Europeans on 6 July, and in Bukavu
at least 11 people were murdered
after the ANC recaptured the city.
There was harassment of Europeans
and wide-scale looting in other
areas.
The mutiny has severely
strained the Congo's tenuous sta-
bility. If European technicians,
particularly the Belgians, carry
out their threat to leave, they
could force a shutdown of the Ka-
tanga copper mines and cause a
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
SECRET
;Sonyolal~,~ '.-'Luluobourg 7 ,Mbuj M yi, ~
i
devastatin effect to the Con o's
economy.
units. They apparently needed only
the news of former premier Tshombe's
kidnaping to spark their mutiny.
With assistance from disaffected
Katangan units of the ANC they
quickly took Bukavu and much of
Kisangani including the airport.
On 7 July, however, the rebels
at Bukavu withdrew from the city
and proceeded toward Kisangani.
Congolese units at Kisangani pushed
the rebels there back to the airport
and its environs. One planeload of
wounded mercenaries--including the
commander--escaped and flew to safe
haven in Rhodesia. The remaining
rebels broke through ANC lines on
12 July and may be headed either
south toward Katanga or southeast
toward Bukavu. They may still hold
white hostages, including some
-1Americans.
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__,._._..,,,.1 ,
 Approved For Rbi~ase 2007/03/~C'4~~~P79-00927A~900040001-5
FEDERAL INVASION OF BIAFRA ENCOUNTERING STIFF RESISTANCE
Nigerian federal military
forces have made only a little
headway in their week-old drive
to regain control of Biafra,-the
secessionist Eastern Region.
Contrary to federal expectations,
Biafran resistance to superior
federal firepower has been stub-
born, and both sides have report-
edly suffered numerous casualties.
On 7 July, Maj. Gen. Gowon
ordered federal troops along the
northern border of Biafra to be-
gin a full-scale attack along two
main routes toward Enugu. Probes
Scene of Nigerian Civil War
across the border had begun on
6 July.
Fighting has thus far been
confined to the Nsukka and Ogoja
areas. In the Nsukka area about
four battalions of federal forces,
supported by artillery and armored
cars, have captured and destroyed
at least two Ibo villages just
inside the border. Federal forces
reportedly may also be on the
verge of capturing the key junc-
tion at Nsukka and its related
road network.
,..r....