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ARAB TERRITORIES UNDER ISRAELI OCCUPATION

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79-00927A006000070004-7
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
9
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 27, 2006
Sequence Number: 
4
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 6, 1967
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79-00927A006000070004-7.pdf418.46 KB
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Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AOQ 0 0070004-7 Secret No Foreign Dissem DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE MEEKLY SUMMARY Special Report Arab Territories Under Israeli Occupation Secret N2 38 6 October 1967 No. 0310/67A Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06000070004-7 Approved,,Wo,r Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79-Qdf7A006000070004-7 Secret r.it ttorts ,iit hit{rttit'iiit'itt.N to tti: t uriIliit 1titciL n(1iee V%("C'k- iit-~. i~.att ti in tiu (MICt of (,t=rut -I it Title I( I,. 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U `10 i' UHF 1t,;N (;u\ - i, V il:L'ls. 11, marked with sp(cific Clisseminatiou controls in IIIlattt~r ttliiI till, pi o. i.~lotl> of Du [1) 1 i, the (to(uinent must be I,t=1(lle(1 within till trainework of thi limitation so imposed. Secret Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06000070004-7 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0660000070004-7 SECRET No Foreign Dissem ARAB TERRITORIES UNDER ISRAELI OCCUPATION Four months after the Arab-Israeli war, Israel remains in control of some 26,000 square miles of Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian territory. Although sizable economic and security problems are presented by the more than one million Arabs living in these areas, Arab resistance has thus far been chiefly non- violent in nature. In any case, Israel has sufficient resources, especially in the form of contributions from abroad, to support the additional financial de- mands as well as adequate security forces to main- tain control over the occupied territories for the foreseeable future. Background Approximately 1,150,000 Arab civilians were estimated to be in Israeli-occupied areas of Jordan, Syria, and Egypt on 1 Sep- tember 1967. Prior to the war, the population of these areas was about 1.6 million. As a result of the mass exo- dus of Arabs to Jordan's East Bank fewer than 750,000 remain of the approximately 930,000 persons who resided on the West Bank prior to 5 June. An Israeli census in the occupied areas in September listed only 667,000 persons, including 120,000 refugees from the 1948 war in the West Bank area. The Israelis, however, have a vested interest in proving the number of 1948 refugees is less than that carried by the UN because compen- sation for refugees might be a part of any peace settlement. Over 14,000 refugees were repatri- ated to the West Bank in August, but they were more than offset by the Arabs who crossed and who con- tinue to cross--at an estimated 300 per day--to the East Bank. Of the more than 400,000 in the Gaza Strip and the 50,000 in Sinai when the war started, only 35,000 were able to cross the Suez Canal ahead of the Israelis. Gaza residents continue to go to east Jordan through Israel and the West Bank, however, with more than 4,000 crossing before 1 Sep- tember. In the area of Syria now controlled by Israel, only about 6,000 Druzes and 250 others re- main of the estimated 115,000 there prior to 5 June. The most authoritative re- port probably is the one made by a special representative of UN Secretary General Thant following an on-the-spot investigation into conditions of the civilian popu- lation and prisoners of war. After investigating Syrian charges that the Israelis had made "systematic efforts to expel the SECRET Page 1 SPECIAL REPORT Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06000070004-7 ApprovedAPbr Release 29 /?1a1R7j' CIA-RDP79- No Foreign Dissem BEIRUT?' SYRIA At Qunaytirah 9e')Jeruselem ,Port Said Gaza 1 I Hebron JORDAN GAZA n .: ~~ X11 arRir !CAIRO Suez %Port Tauflq .. _ ' _ - `rte ..1 .. ?~. (E G Y P T) Area occupied by Israel J N I T E D D A R A B R E P U B L I C DAMASCUS SAUDI ARABIA 68140 10-67 SECRET SPECIAL REPORT Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06000070004-7 Approved For Releas 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A0 6W0070004-7 SECRET No Foreign Dissem entire original population" from the occupied portion of Syria, the UN special representative con- cluded that whatever the policy of the Israeli Government may have been as regards the population, it seemed clear that "certain ac- tions authorized or allowed by local military commanders were an important cause of flight." In regard to similar charges concerning the civilian popula- tion on the West Bank, the special representative stated that al- though there was no indication that persons had been physically forced to cross to the East Bank, there had been reports of acts of intimidation by the Israeli armed forces and of Israeli attempts-- using loudspeakers--to suggest to the population that "they might be better off on the East Bank." The representative concluded, however, that the main factor in the exodus from the West Bank had clearly been the inevitable impact of hostilities and military oc- cupation as such, particularly when no measures of reassurance were taken. Administration of Occupied Areas Israeli policy in regard to the administration of occupied areas is formulated at the cabi- net level. Implementation of this policy is supervised by a joint coordination committee com- posed of representatives of the Ministry of Defense and the office of the premier's adviser on Arab affairs, and headed by Colonel Shlomo Gazit, Defense Minister Dayan's aide for the occupied areas. The military government of the occupied areas is the re- sponsibility of the chief of the Israel Defense Forces General Staff, Itzhak Rabin. Rabin's three area commanders, in turn are responsible for the actual admin- istration of the Golan heights in Syria, the Jordanian West Bank, and the former Egyptian territo- ries. The primary mission of these officers, according to the Israe- lis, is the "normalization of life" in the areas under their command. Contrary to a UN General As- sembly resolution, the Old City of Jerusalem has, for all intents and purposes, been incorporated into the state of Israel. The members of the former municipal council of the Old City, which has been dissolved by the Israe- lis, have refused even to discuss meeting in a combined council un- der Israeli rule inasmuch as this might be construed as recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Old City. In the remainder of the West Bank, however, the Israelis have to a large extent used the admin- istrative structure established by the Jordanians. Local mu- nicipal councils have continued to administer essential serv- ices, such as health, utili- ties, and public welfare. In cases where the local council has been unable to cope with a prob- lem, the Israeli military governor has provided whatever assistance is necessary. In this connection, some hospital patients have been evacuated from the West Bank to Israel, fuel has been sent from Israel to the West Bank, and SECRET Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A006000070004-7 Approved 1 Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79-0:lld7A006000070004-7 SECRET' No Foreign Dissem local road construction and works projects for the unemployed that had been started before the war are now continuing with Israeli assistance. Israeli officials are more closely involved in the adminis- tration of occupied Eqyptian and Syrian territories, including the Gaza Strip, because many of the Egyptian administrators were re- patriated to Egypt by the Israelis in early September and because, with the exception of the Druze villagers near Mount Hermon, the area of Syria occupied by the Is- raelis is almost uninhabited. Israeli financial experts feel that the burden of support- ing the occupied territories over the next year is manageable. Tak- ing into account the reduced level of remittances formerly provided to West Bank Arabs by relatives abroad and the merchandise Is- rael supplies to the West Bank, it is estimated that the foreign exchange cost to Israel of the West Bank alone will be $20 mil- lion annually, although income from tourism could reduce this figure substantially. The problem of marketing the excess of West Bank agricultural products, es- pecially abundant during July and August, was eased by allowing the export of as many as 400 truck- loads per day to East Jordan. Large Israeli expenditures on the West Bank may serve as an anti- recession device for Israel. In any case, the additional demands imposed by the occupied areas will not seriously tax Israel's more than adequate financial resources, which have been considerably strengthened by donations from the Jewish community abroad. Arab Resistance and Israeli Reaction The Israeli occupation is viewed by Arab residents of the occupied areas with varying de- grees of dislike. In all the oc- cupied areas, however, Arab re- sistance has in general been non- violent in nature and has mostly taken the form of civil disobe- dience. West Bank Arabs engaging in civil disobedience are by and large members of an urban minor- ity who before the war comprised only 25 to 30 percent of the West Bankers, and are even less numerous now as more townsmen than villagers have fled. In the weeks immediately after the Is- raeli occupation, the first signs of opposition were the appearance of leaflets threatening reprisals against those Arabs who were co- operating with the Israeli author- ities, and the refusal of some Arab officials to resume their positions under the Israelis. The first real indication of large- scale resistance to Israeli rule was an almost 100-percent effec- tive strike in Jerusalem on 7 Au- gust by Arabs protesting the "uni- fication" of the old and new cit- ies. Subsequent attempts to bring about general strikes on 21 August and 19 September, however, met with only partial success. The most serious resistance has been the failure of most West Bank teachers to report for the S EC R I 'I' Page 4 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06000070004-7 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0660000070004-7 SECRET No Foreign Dissem opening of the fall school term. As a result, schools on the West Bank, especially in the north, were still closed three weeks after the school year was scheduled to start. The teachers charge that Israeli educational authorities have deleted religious passages and phrases from textbooks; the Israelis counter that they have banned or altered only textbooks containing anti-Jewish material. The teachers' action, however, probably stems primarily from a desire to demonstrate a more general dissatisfaction with the Israeli presence in the area. Israeli authorities from the first have demonstrated their readiness to act against uncoop- erative elements, including those who periodically refuse to coop- erate with the occupying author- ities. In recent weeks, they have adopted an increasingly harder line toward those advocat- ing resistance. On 31 July, four prominent West Bank political figures--including Anwar al-Khatib, former governor of the Jerusalem district--were identified as sign- ers of a petition calling for non- cooperation with Israeli author- ities. ,Arrested for "obstructing law and order," they have been exiled to towns in Israel for three months. In early September, the Is- raeli commander of West Bank forces issued an order prohibit- ing oral or written attempts to influence public opinion that might harm or disturb safety and order. Violators are subject to a large fine and ten years im- prisonment. Persons communica- ting with the enemy in any way are liable to five years impris- onment. On 23 September, the president and acting chief jus- tice of the High Muslim Court in Jerusalem was deported to the East Bank on charges of inciting noncooperation with Israeli au- thorities. By moving against the spiritual leader of the West Bank Arabs, the Israelis have indicated that they are willing to adopt extreme measures in dealing with dissidence. Residents of the occupied territories have become increas- ingly tense as time passes with- out any movement toward ending the Israeli occupation or settling the political future of the West Bank. a high vv.Lume of violent inci- dents as local Arabs become in- creasingly annoyed by the petty irritations of life under occupa- tion by members of an essentially alien culture. Israeli authorities state that a rash of incidents in early September was the work of Pales- tinian terrorists based in Syria rather than an indication of in- digenous sentiment. Nonetheless, some measure of aid and assistance must have been given to the ter- rorists by the indigenous popula- tion. Israeli reaction to these acts of violence has been swift and harsh, including the demoli- tion of houses belonging to people suspected of aiding the saboteurs. Israeli officials have stated that the captured terrorists will be tried by military courts which SECRET SPECIAL REPORT 6 Oct 67 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06000070004-7 Approved-%r Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79-(J27A006000070004-7 SECRET No Foreign Dissem will have authority to mete out the death penalty. Israeli Views on the Future Of the Occupied Territories Israeli authorities have not made an official policy statement with respect to the eventual status of the occupied territories, pre- sumably because they do not want to jeopardize any eventual nego- tiations with the Arabs. Indi- vidual Israeli views, including those of cabinet members, vary widely--except with regard to the status of the Old City of Jeru- salem, which almost all Israelis insist must remain under Israeli control. Some Israelis have argued that Tel Aviv should propose to King Husayn the return of most of the West Bank in exchange for a peace treaty. Others have suggested that the West Bank be- come an independent state feder- ated with Israel. Hard liners, such as Labor Minister Allon, have stated that the West Bank and the Syrian heights should be incorporated into Israel. The establishment in late September of Israeli settlements on the West Bank and on the Syrian heights is probably intended pri- marily as a warning to the Arabs that in the absence of any prog- ress toward negotiations, Israel may move toward permanent posses- sion of the areas. Outlook Meanwhile, as the frustration of the Arabs in the occupied ter- ritories increases, acts of vio- lence seem likely to increase against both the Israelis and the Arabs cooperating with them. Is- raeli security forces, however, are capable of suppressing any dissident elements and of main- taining order. (SECRET NO FOR- EIGN DISSEM) SECRE'I' Page 6 SPECIAL REPORT 6 Oct 67 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06000070004-7 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A00600Q070004-7 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06000070004-7