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December 20, 2016
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April 13, 2006
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November 9, 1967
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Approved Felease 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-009006'86gre1-1 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY State Dept. review completed Secret 52 9 November 1967 No. 0315/67 Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006100050001-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100050001-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100050001-1 Approved For e1ease 2007/03/D ~EW- P79-00927 49 6100050001-1 JL1 _L C O N T E N T S (Information as of noon EST, 8 November 1967) Far East VIETNAM The Communists' current offensive at Loc Ninh ap- pears to be the initial thrust of their anticipated "winter-spring" campaign. PEKING EXPERIENCES DIFFICULTIES IN RESTORING ORDER Although Peking's propaganda continues to stress the importance of getting students to return to the classroom, there are a number of indications that the central authorities are having trouble convinc- ing militant Red Guards to abandon violence. CAMBODIA'S RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA ARE EASING Sihanouk has responded favorably to Peking's latest overture, but a real reconciliation will depend on a cessation of Communist activity in Cambodia. PHILIPPINE SENATE AND LOCAL ELECTIONS NEAR Eight Senate seats and all 63 provincial governor- ships are to be decided in the election on 14 Novem- ber, and President Marcos looks to the results as an indication of his chances for re-election in 1969. SECRET Page 1 Approved Forsie 200749y C $R?9-00927A096j00560901-1 406" ow Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100050001-1 SECRET Europe USSR'S ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS REACH CLIMAX The celebration of the 50th anniversary of the So- viet Union was primarily a panegyric to past Soviet attainments, but the presentations also exuded great confidence in the future. Five missiles were un- veiled in the Moscow parade on 7 November. THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY: THE NEXT PHASE The North Atlantic Council has given the green light to the US to negotiate a safeguards article for the treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, but protracted negotiations are still in store. YUGOSLAV "EXPOSE" OF CIA REFLECTS PARTY DISSENSION Both supporters and opponents of Yugoslavia's eco- nomic and party reforms have used a press expose of alleged Central Intelligence Agency activities as a device to advance their conflicting views. Middle East ?- Africa MERCENARIES LEAVE THE CONGO (KINSHASA) The mercenaries and Katangans fled Bukavu on 5 No- vember and are now awaiting evacuation from Rwanda. In Katanga, meanwhile, the new group of mercenaries who invaded on 1 November seems to be running into some difficulties and may have returned to Angola. S E(,, R 1 {.1" Approved Fors "a~cj 200): Gfi79-00927 ggV0q050001-1 Approved For's4ease 2007/03ft FfDP79-009274"Df66100050001-1 COUP IN YEMEN IMPROVES CHANCES FOR RECONCILIATION The bloodless coup that took place in republican Yemen on 5 November brought to power a group that enjoys wide tribal support and thus improves the country's long-range chances of achieving an end to the civil war. EGYPT MOVES TO EASE CRITICAL PETROLEUM SHORTAGE Taking steps to replace supplies of refined petro- leum products previously obtained from its Suez refineries, Cairo is negotiating for Egyptian crude oil to be refined at a British company's plant in Aden. SOUTH'ARABIAN ARMY CHOOSES SIDES A bloody battle last week in Aden ensured the Na- tional Liberation Front (NLF) the support of the South Arabian Army. The strength of the army and the pro-NLF police force should enable the NLF to rule South Arabia when the British depart late this month. Western Hemisphere SECRET Approved Fo'R&as*J20 A08: X79-00927A0q6JW5@901-1 Approved Felease 2007jp, M RTA-RDP79-00929006100050001-1 FAR EAST Hanoi appears to be making a vigorous effort to counter the inauguration of the new South Vietnamese Government with a major show of strength. North Vietnamese propaganda is portray- ing last week's attacks at Loc Ninh as retalia- tion for intensified US air strikes in the Hanoi area and as the opening of a "winter- spring" campaign. Repeated Communist assaults on Loc Ninh, at the cost of nearly 1,000 troops killed in action, suggest an attempt to es- tablish another "front" in the northern III Corps area adjacent to Cambodia, similar to the one in the Demilitarized Zone area, as well as to score a psychological victory. Increased Communist military pressure in III Corps, the Mekong Delta, and the western highlands has been accompanied by a tough restatement of Hanoi's position on negotiations by North Viet- namese party first secretary Le Duan in Moscow. In China, for the first time since the shift to a moderate course two months ago, there are signs that militant Maoists in Peking are attempting to mount a counterattack. Recent articles in party and army journals have praised Lin Piao, appealed for army loyalty to Mao's thought, and implied that the military has been treating Red Guards too harshly. The extremists apparently are trying to capitalize on Red Guard resistance to army efforts to enforce orders to reopen schools and suppress violence. Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk has signaled his desire to maintain at least a facade of cordial relations with Peking despite his recent criticism of Chinese propaganda activities. In response to a conciliatcry message from Premier Chou En-lai, Sihanouk declared his willingness to terminate anti-Peking propaganda and accept a "complete reconciliation." He hedged this position, however, by warning that such a re- conciliation will depend on a cessation of Com- munist activity in Cambodia. SECRET Approved of PRele1ase 2 6 J'169' 6P79-0%99?X0667100050001-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100050001-1 SECRET T H A I L A N D P SrI 5Q'. _ ., 1 Q ; QMites Q ;rQ Q Kit peter HUANw MLAM O ong Be 66590 11-67 Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006100050001-1 SECRET Approved Foi' elease 2007/03/09: CIA-RDP79-0092MW06100050001-1 SECRET VIETNAM The much-heralded Communist "winter-spring" campaign is ap- parently under way in the III and IV Corps areas. Moreover, exten- sive enemy battle preparations in the western highlands indicate a new offensive may soon begin there. to the area south of the Demilitar- ized Zone (DMZ). The terrain, with its thick stands of rubber trees and dense jungle, is favorable to enemy operations. Furthermore, Cambodia, just a few miles to the north, offers a nearby sanc- tuary for rest and resupply. There are signs that ele- ments of the Communist B-3 Front-- the over-all command authority in Kontum, Pleiku, and Darlac prov- inces--are preparing to attack US and South Vietnamese instal- lations throughout the area. Sev- eral sharp skirmishes and enemy mortar attacks have already oc- curred in normally calm Darlac and in the Dak To area of Kontum. The Communists have at least four regiments in Kontum, in ad- dition to the headquarters and as- sociated support elements of the B-3 Front and the North Vietnamese 1st Division. A recent defector claimed a major attack was to have begun on 28 October--coincident with the Loc Ninh offensive--but a "failure in coordinated artil- lery" forced postponement. This "artillery" could include large- caliber rockets that may be used in a large-scale, well-coordinated assault on allied positions. The Communist offensive ac- tivity in northern III Corps has resulted in extensive enemy losses since the present phase began on 28 October, with nearly 1,000 men reportedly killed thus far. it is possible, however, that the Communists hope to establish a "second front" in this sector, which is similar in many respects The Communist intention would be to draw in and tie down substan- tial allied forces in a long, in- conclusive campaign. Already, five US Army battalions totaling some 4,000 men--in addition to South Vietnamese reinforcements-- have been deployed to the Loc Ninh - Song Be area. This week's activity in the northern III Corps area included several large-scale enemy assaults on the recently reinforced allied defensive positions. One encoun- ter between South Vietnamese and Communist forces near Song Be on 5 November resulted in high friendly casualties, caused in part by the enemy enjoying the tacti- cal advantage of prepared positions. In the battle, 96 South Vietnamese were killed, 36 were wounded, and 56 weapons were lost. Throughout the Mekong Delta provinces of IV Corps there has been a sharp increase in enemy attacks against friendly night defensive po- sitions as well as against lightly defended base camps and remote dis- trict towns. The attacks inflicted heavy casualties on at least one ARVN unit and almost totally de- stroyed a Revolutionary Develop- ment team. Such casualties have little effect on allied troop strength, but the psychological SECRET Approved Rel6ase 2GO 1 M$UW&j PP79-00%2 pp66g0050001-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-00927A6100050001-1 SECJRE1' impact on the local populace is considerable because the enemy ac- Lions create doubt as to the abil- ity of allied forces to establish and maintain adequate security. South Vietnam's new govern- ment is getting under way slowly. The failure so far to appoint and announce the full cabinet may give rise to speculation that internal difficulties are already besetting the regime. The lower house, in- active since its inauguration on 31 October, still has to complete the validation of the election of its members. This process may be complicated by the disqualifi- cation of one winner in Kien Giang Province on charges of an election law violation. Even though the house has not met, there is already talk of the formation of at least one political bloc. A former asso- ciate of Vice President Ky is tak- ing credit for the election of some 31 members of the house and is referring to them as the "Demo- cratic Bloc." His one attempt to get some 28 of these members to commit themselves to a formal po- litical grouping was a failure, however, largely because the rep- resentatives themselves probably have decided to wait and see how alliances shape up when the assem- bly convenes. Evidence continues to accumu- late indicating dissatisfaction in the ranks of the Buddhist church over the manner in which the lead- ers of the militant and moderate factions are handling the current crisis over the charter. Senti- ment appears to be growing to by- pass both Thich Tri Quang and Thich Tam Chau in efforts to reach present split in the Buddhist church can be healed only if the extremists in both factions are bypassec. and more moderate ele- ments allowed to work out a solu- tion. OnE! possible indicator of a less rigid posture on the part of the militants is their reported order to the clergy to cease self- immolations, to continue nonvio- lent struggle activities, and to protest directly to President Thieu about government interfer- ence in the internal affairs of the Buddhist church. The Soviet Anniversary Statements by Vietnamese Com- munist spokesmen in both Moscow and Hanoi on the 50th anniversary of the Soviet revolution have been replete with praise for the USSR and the importance of Soviet as- sistance to the Vietnamese revolu- tion. ?arty First Secretary Le Duan, s'2eaking before the Supreme Soviet on 3 November, spelled out Hanoi's toughest terms for talks with the US and for a settlement of the gar. SECRET Approved For Releas4e 20 ~JjLQ? :J f ~79-00927~(sa.80p0001-1 Approved FoR lease 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-009206100050001-1 SECRET Ridiculing what he termed "profuse talk about false peace," he restated Hanoi's demand that the "four points" and the program of the Liberation Front serve as the basis for settlement. He added, moreover, that if the US wants talks with the North Viet- namese it must "definitively and unconditionally" end the bombings of the DRV. Le Duan also provided Hanoi's major pronouncement on the anniver- sary in an article in the party daily urging socialist unity in the most specific language used recently by any Vietnamese Commu- nist spokesman. While the over-all thrust of the article was probably pleasing to the Soviets, Le Duan also stressed the necessity of revolu- tionary violence as an ingredient of national liberation movements. In keeping with Hanoi's continuing efforts to stay neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute, Le Duan seemed mainly concerned with re- minding both Peking and Moscow 25X1 that their differences must not be allowed to undermine the Com- munist effort in Vietnam. PEKING EXPERIENCES DIFFICULTIES IN RESTORING ORDER Although Peking's propaganda continues to stress the importance of getting students to return to the classroom, there are a number of indications that the central authorities are having trouble convincing militant Red Guards to abandon violence, return to their homes, and unite with their more conservative, locally oriented rivals. Tensions between opposing Red Guard organizations remain high in many areas, and clashes between rival groups appear to have increased recently. The level of violence, however, is still far below that of last sum- mer. Passions aroused in the course of the Cultural Revolution have not yet cooled, and the mil- itants, apparently fearful of be- ing "swallowed up" by their more conservative rivals, are probably attempting to retain some organi- zational autonomy. Peking's con- tinued exhortations to the Red Guards to join in "revolutionary great alliances" and to return to school strongly suggest that the central authorities are having trouble in getting the young mili- tants to follow these instructions. The regime continues to pub- licize the opening of schools SECRET Approved FQ Reelegse 2O~ Lf9 SCIAA--RDP79-OO927A 0066V0 0050001-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100050001-1 SEC:RE 1' throughout the country, but scat- tered reports indicate that some schools, at least, will. not be open for awhile. Moreover, clashes :between rival Red Guards have taken place within the newly opened schools. The army remains the princi- pal instrument of the Peking au- thorities in enforcing their will. Military patrols are continuing to keep order in most cities and in some places these patrols have recently been beefed up. much of the recent trouble probably results from local re- sistance to Peking's attempts to restrict and circumscribe militant Red Guard activity. The militants have been steadily losing ground during the two months in which the trend toward moderation has domi- nated the Chinese political-land- scape, and they have been appeal- ing to Peking to reverse decisions detrimental to their position. There are now signs that the militant Maoists in Peking may be attempting to repair the damage done to their position by exploit- ing the unhappiness of the radical Red Guard in order to get the Cul- tural Revolution back in high gear. On 2 November, the army's acting chief of staff published a long ar- ticle that attacked his discred- ited predecessor, Lo Jui-ching, called on the army to be loyal to the thought of Mao Tse-tung, and lavishly lauded Lin Piao, Mao's radical heir. Lo was first at- tacked by name in early August at the height of last summer's radi- cal campaign. A People's Daily editorial on 7 November claimed that mass move- ments served to "inspire and edu- cate" the army, and called on the military not to "divorce itself from the masses." This line im- plies that the army has been treat- ing the Red. Guards too harshly-- an, accusation that was frequently raised last. spring and summer when radical policies were in the as- cendancy. Finally, a Liberation Army Dail editorial of 6 November warned military personnel not to "blindly obey orders" when those orders conflict with the thought of Mao. This line was also used to exhort. Red Guards last spring, following the pause in Cultural Revolution activity during Feb- ruary and March. SEC:RE; l' Approved FooraRele6ase 2Q Q 99 -~C R P79-00927A009 Nov 61000 60001-1 g Approved For,~elease 2007/9k .RDP79-0092 006100050001-1 CAMBODIA'S RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA ARE EASING Prince Sihanouk has responded favorably to Peking's latest ef- fort to ease relations with Cam- bodia. Sihanouk announced on 1 No- vember that he had received a message from Premier Chou En-lai calling for "re-establishment of sincere friendship" between the two countries. According to Si- hanouk, Chou acknowledged Siha- nouk's leadership of the Cambo- dian people and reaffirmed China's adherence to the "Bandung prin- ciple" of nonintervention in Cam- bodia's internal affairs. Siha- nouk has charged repeatedly over the past several months that Chi- na's propaganda activities in Cambodia amounted to a repudiation of these "principles." The Chinese premier's mes- sage, which played effectively on Sihanouk's personal regard for Chou, appears to be a more artful version of one Chou sent in mid- September which caused Sihanouk to reverse a decision to withdraw Cambodian diplomatic personnel from Peking. In response to the latest message, Sihanouk stated his willingness to terminate anti- Peking propaganda and accept a "complete reconciliation." Sub- sequently, he also called off a referendum he had previously scheduled for early next year. The referendum was intended as a vote of confidence in Siha- nouk's government and, as such, would have been embarrassing for the pro-Peking leftists who have called for a change in Sihanouk's policies. dial relations. The Prince has also stated, however, that a real reconcilia- tion will depend entirely on a cessation of Communist activity in Cambodia. Thus, continued dissemination of Communist propa- ganda throughout the country, and a reported renewal of small- scale Communist dissident activ- ity, could prove to be persist- ent irritants in his relations with China. Nevertheless, al- though Sihanouk recently again voiced his suspicion that Peking will continue discreet support of Cambodia's pro-Communists, his response to Chou's letter underlines his desire to main- tain at least a facade of cor- SECRET Approved I~WoRe 266f/bbl69~ Lftk~lft5P79-00927iGU8i1'D0050001-1 Approved For Fase 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-00927A100050001-1 SECRET PHILIPPINE: SENATE AND LOCAL ELECTIONS NEAR The Philippine off-year elec- tion on 14 November is being viewed, particularly by President Marcos, as a barometer for the 1969 presidential elections. With this in mind, Marcos, who hopes to run again in 1969, has cam- paigned personally and vigorously for the Nacionalista Party candi- dates attempting to gain the eight out of 24 national senatorial seats that are being contested. In addition, all 63 provincial governorships and some 1,400 mu- nicipal and village posts are up for grabs. The Nacionalista Party ap- pears to have only a slight edge in the senatorial elections, but seems likely to improve its posi- tion in the provincial contests.. Whatever the outcome, Philippine- US relations will remain un- changed and President Marcos will continue to have serious diffi- culties in pushing his legislative programs. Although the Nacion- alista Party is now in theoretical control of the Senate---it holds 12 seats as compared with the nine held by the major opposition Lib- eral Party--party designations are virtually meaningless because Philippine politicians often cross party lines. The Senate is in fact now controlled by a coalition of four Nacionalistas, nine Lib- erals, and three independents. In the current campaign, issues have varied from the per- formance of the Marcos adminis- tration--emphasized by the sena- torial candidates--to purely local matters highlighted in the prov- inces. Opposition to the Phil- ippines' 2,000-man noncombat force in Vietnam has been raised by Lib- eral Party candidates but appears to have elicited little interest. Local elections in the Phil- ippines traditionally inspire more violence than national ones, and the present campaign is no exception. Although this is not the bloodiest in Philippine his- tory, 38 electioneering deaths had been recorded by late October. The pro-Communist Huks, who are attempting to broaden their political base in central Luzon, have accounted for some of the violence. They have injected themselves into local campaigns with offers of support, threats of coercion, and--in some in- stances--open terrorism. They are said to be supporting can- didates from the gubernatorial to the village level and, in their strongholds, to actually have selected local nominees. They support any candidates who offer them present protection and the prospect of increased influence in the local govern- ment. Currently, increased Huk activity does not appear to reflect any significant increase in their still modest numeri- cal strength. SECRE'T' Approved FF,9 4 eleaase 20 ,q9 S9&~W79-0082%QPE0190050001-1 Approved Fo elease 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-0092 AO06100050001-1 SECRET EUROPE In Moscow and throughout the USSR, the Soviet public had four days of holiday speech-making and festivities as the jubilee celebration reached a climax. Not unexpectedly, the central motif of the official rites--capped by Brezhnev's keynote speech on 3 November and the Red Square parade on 7 November--was the USSR's defensive might and readiness. Yet for all the advance preparations and publicity, the occasion turned out to be as flat and colorless as the "collective leadership" it- self. It remained for the Cubans, obviously put out by Moscow's none too subtle admonitions against Castro's revolutionary buccaneering, to introduce a little interest by insulting the Soviets on their 50th birthday. While Polish party bigwigs were in Moscow, Foreign Minister Rapacki was again trying to drum up Western European interest in plans for a future European security system. He brought up the sub- ject on a visit to Belgium from 2 to 5 November and will discuss it with Norway's foreign minister who is due in Warsaw this week. In Bonn, meanwhile, it became clear that Foreign Minister Brandt has decided to press for an early resumption of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, a decision that will be applauded in Belgrade. The Yugoslavs, at the same time, have agreed to the opening of an East German consulate in Zagreb, a reassuring gesture for Ulbricht that 25X1 Belgrade still adheres to the doctrine of two SECRET Approved FRelease 20 lIM9s lROP79-0092VM0@1)00050001-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100050001-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100050001-1 Approved For4jelease 2007/03/ft DP79-0092WO6100050001-1 USSR'S ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS REACH CLIMAX For all of the preparation and foreign visitors, the cele- bration of the 50th anniversary of the Soviet Union was primarily a panegyric to past Soviet at- tainments. Although the presenta- tions exuded great confidence in the future, there was no indica- tion of how Moscow intends to deal with any of the domestic or foreign problems it faces. The top three Soviet leaders seemed to play a larger than usual role in the proceedings, and party General Secretary Brezh-? nev clearly was more prominent than Premier Kosygin or President Podgorny. Brezhnev's formulations on the key domestic issues--in- cluding the question of division of investment resources between industry and agriculture--came down on middle ground. His major speech was studded with references to the party's collective wisdom. east." In renewing the Soviet pledge of support to the Vietnamese Communists, he repeated the Soviet claim that Peking's failure to co- operate with other Communist states in aiding the Vietnamese had hin- dered their war effort. He also complained of the damage done to socialist unity by the "chauvin- istic and great-power course" of the Mao regime, at which point the two Chinese Embassy officials at- tending--Peking sent no delega- tion--walked out. Brezhnev aimed a less direct blow at such Communist mavericks as Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Cuba. All three of these states were prob- ably the intended targets of a remark critical of "nationalist insularity," but Cuba seemed singled out by his observation that "Marx- ist-Leninists have always under- stood that socialism cannot be transplanted from one country to another by means of armed force." The feeling of apprehension that something might occur to mar the celebration seemed to continue throughout the week. Some pro- vocative act by China appeared to be in the forefront of Moscow's thinking. This preoccupation with the Chinese emerged clearly in Brezh- nev's keynote speech. In a pas- sage on defense, Brezhnev claimed the USSR's armed forces were pre- pared to counter any threat "from wherever it might come--the north or the south, the west or the Following the death last month of Che Guevara--whom the Soviets properly eulogized--the Soviet press printed articles by two leading Latin American Communists criti- cizing Fidel Castro's extremist pol- icies, which Guevara's antics in Bolivia seemed to typify. The ar- ticles probably accounted for the low level of the Cuban delegation sent to Moscow for the celebrations. The Cuban reaction to the fur- ther provocation by Brezhnev appears to have been the subsequent failure SECRET Approved For"IQ lase 200 9b W: el9-00927Abi#1 06. 0001-1 Approved For eTease 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-009276100050001-1 ;SECRET of the Cuban ambassador to ac- company the diplomatic corps in a courtesy call on President Pod- gorny on 6 November. The tensions between Moscow and Havana have thus become more apparent, but have as yet had no visible effect on the patron-client relationship between the two. Another rift in Communist solidarity was also displayed when Brezhnev made a brief statement in support of a new international meeting of Communist parties, a contentious issue of several year's standing. Several key parties, and particularly the Chinese, view this as an unwel- come effort by the Soviet to as- sert their supremacy and as an essentially anti-Chinese move. Brezhnev was seconded by several party leaders attending the an- niversary celebrations, but regu- lar opponents--such as Yugoslavia and Rumania--remained silent. A full-scale meeting does not appear imminent, but some further word on preparations--which the Soviets have previously said must be care- fully arranged--may emerge from the present gathering in Moscow. Brezhnev made few references to the US. His harshest remark. came, predictably enough, in con- nection with Vietnam, where he likened US military actions to those of "fascist monsters." He also gave the ritual characteriza- tion of the US as the leader of Communism's imperialist foes, but nothing he said seemed to fore- shadow any change in the Soviet at- titude tcward matters of mutual Soviet-US interest. New Military Hardware Unveiled In the Moscow parade on 7 No- vember, the Soviets unveiled five missiles including an ICBM that was probably the widely deployed S5-9. A Soviet commentator said the ICBM missile used a "new and highly efficient" propellant, but gave no details. A naval missile in the parade was described by the Soviets as underwater launched. It was too big to be launched from a submarine, however. A two-stage, solid-pro- pellant medium- or intermediate- range missile on a trailer may have been the missile carried in the Scamp mobile transporter-launcher, which it followed in the parade. A short-range missile that was shown possibly was the 450-mile-range SS-12. Ano-:her new system consisted of three antiaircraft missiles mounted on a tracked vehicle. The missiles were described as being effective at extremely low alti- tudes and probably will be used in support of ground forces. Other new equipment included a tracked combat vehicle carrying personnel and mounting an antitank missile and a conventional gun. SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006100050001-1 Page 12 WEEKLY SUMMARY 9 Nov SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100050001-1 Soviet Weapons Systems h veiled in 7 November Parade now Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100050001-1 S l+',C RE1' Approved For F3 ase 200 / /0 IA-RDP79-00927AQ06100050001-1 THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY: THE NEXT PHASE The North Atlantic Council (NAC) has given the green light to the US to negotiate a safe- guards article for the treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons (NPT), but protracted ne- gotiations are still in store be- fore the treaty is ready for sign- ing. At the NAC meeting on 31 Oc- tober, the allies agreed the US should work out a safeguards ar- ticle with the USSR which would take into account the principles drawn up by the EURATOM members, excluding France. One of these principles is that safeguards shall apply only to the use of natural uranium and fissionable material. Another is that EURATOM itself shall have a role in nego- tiating a safeguards arrangement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to cover EURATOM's members. Finally, the IAEA shall only verify, and not duplicate, EURATOM's safeguards system. While the West Europeans have been considering their position on safeguards, a number of other countries have raised problems and have proposed amendments to the treaty. Although their objec- tions have focused mainly on the treaty's discrimination between states with nuclear weapons and those without, other issues that have been raised include the peace- ful uses of nuclear energy, the absence of disarmament obligations for the nuclear powers, and secu- rity assurances for nonnuclear states. Mexico, Brazil, Egypt, and Rumania have proposed amendments that reflect these concerns. The Mexican amendments would make it a duty of nuclear states to undertake disarmament measures and to contribute to the develop- ment of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in nonnuclear countries. Brazil wants a treaty that will permit a nonnuclear nation to conduct nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Rumania's amendments are in the same vein and may have been put forth as much to make a point of Bucha- rest's independence of Moscow as for any other purpose. An Egyptian proposal would have the nuclear states pledge not to use nuclear weapons against countries that have no nuclear weapons deployed in their terri- tory. India, reflecting its spe- cial concern with China, wants specific security assurances; to meet these, the US and USSR are beginning negotiations on an agreement separate from the NPT, possibly in the form of a UN res- olution. Given the numerous problems still to be dealt with, it appears unlikely that the Geneva disarma- ment conference will be able to present an agreed draft treaty to the current session of the UN General Assembly. The Geneva group, however, could forward the US-USSR draft along with the var- ious amendments for preliminary consideration by the assembly. 25X1 SECRET Approve l FRR'ease b6Yfol8/($. JMMRDP79-069 0OtI00050001-1 Approved Foraelease 200710W 9dk"DP79-0092x 06100050001-1 YUGOSLAV "EXPOSE" OF CIA REFLECTS PARTY DISSENSION Both supporters and oppo- nents of Yugoslavia's economic and party reforms have used a press expose of alleged Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ac- tivities as a device to con- tinue their quarrel over the future of the reform program. The expose, carried by the country's leading daily, Borba, was nominally instigated by secret police and party ele- ments, who professed to be em- barassed by the inability of the police to prevent the re- cent escape from Yugoslavia of a Nazi war criminal. The real impetus for the series of arti- cles, however, came from oppo- nents of the economic reform who are attempting to brand it as harmful to national security and its backers as subversive. These hard liners have been gaining some influence in re- cent weeks by playing on Tito's professed fears of an "imperi- alist" threat to Yugoslavia. Before the first article appeared in print, however, proreform elements, which in- clude leading party and govern- ment officials, succeeded in turning the bias of the series against their opponents. The first article, appearing on 31 October, was mild in its treat- ment of CIA and scathing in its attack on the antireform ele- ments. They were identified as supporters of ousted secu- rity boss and former party sec- retary Aleksandar Rankovic. Borba granted that foreign in- tel gence services were active in Yugoslavia, but charged that their activities had been delib- erately exaggerated to discredit both the reforms and last year's curtailment of the secret police. The article, for example, de- nounced conservative-inspired rumors that the late Boris Kraj- ger, a primary architect of the economic reform, had grown rich on CIA money. Subsequent articles, appear- ing through 4 November, dealt blandly with alleged CIA informa- tion-gathering efforts, but com- plained about the activities of foreign military attaches and called for increased vigilance on the part of all Yugoslavs. In the final analysis, the effect of the expose may be to turn public and official opinion against the hard liners who ini- tiated it. They are now accused in the press of creating dissen- sion and undermining public con- fidence in regime policies. Tito himself apparently has grown con- cerned about their efforts to hamstring his reforms and may be preparing to act against them. (some of 25X1 the opponents of the reform may 25X1 lose their party positions at a plenum tentatively scheduled for mid-November. 25X1 SECRET Approved F&eR IeA~ 200Y ': CM4WM9-0092WW1(f0b50001-1 Approved For Feease 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-00927100050001-1 SECRET SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100050001-1 Tage 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY 9 Nov 67 Approved For?Release 2007/W, klVJ RDP79-009206100050001-1 MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA Several perennial problems in the area have taken a new twist, but no real solution to them is in sight as yet. As expressed publicly by King Husayn, the Arab attitude toward a peace settlement with Is- rael seems to have become somewhat more flexible. The Arabs now accept the concepts of "nonbel- ligerency" and freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran, and ac- knowledge Israel's right to exist. They continue to insist, however, that this entails a reciprocal Israeli acceptance of responsibility for the refu- gees, involving either repatriation or compensa- tion. Even if some proposal succeeds in the UN, implementation is likely to be a long drawn out process. The bloodless coup in Yemen probably improves the country's long-range chances of putting an end to the civil war. Although the new leaders are strongly republican and firmly opposed to the royal family, their own tribal affiliations may enable them to deal with tribes that form the bulk of royalist forces and thus pave the way for a general agreement. Schramme and his mercenaries have fled the Congo and are in the process of being evacuated from Rwanda. Mobutu, however, is lemanding their extradition to stand trial. The mercenary thrust from Angola seems to have run out of steam. In the Nigerian civil war, the federal army is making more thorough preparations before re- newing the offensive in the face of strong Biafran resistance. Biafran leader Ojukwu may be taking advantage of the relative lull in the fighting to conclude deals for arms and mercenaries, whose arrival in Biafra could prolong the conflict. The prospects for peace talks under British auspices and for the arrival of the oft-postponed OAU mis- sion are now dimmer than ever. On 11 November the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia will celebrate its second anniversary, happy in the fact that it has survived the imposition of sanc- tions. SECRET Approved Re eleals% 2016-T1O9 6 79-00927AA'O61t0050001-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100050001-1 SECRET MERCENARIES LEAVE THE CONGO (KINSHASA) The mercenaries and Katangans led by Lt. Colonel Jean Schramme, who had been in Bukavu since early August, have fled the city and are encamped under Rwandan Army guard a few miles inside Rwanda. The mercenaries had been un- der attack by the Congolese Na- tional Army (ANC) since 28 October. The ANC apparently kept up a steady barrage of fire and gradually whittled away at the mercenary force. With their ranks depleted and their ammunition and supplies running low, the mercenaries left Bukavu to the "triumphant" ANC. GABON I 'KINSHASA 1.. BWA A Bukovu 4 fSUBUNoi P~.. .. K, enga 68580 11-67 Rwandan President Kayibanda is now faced with the problem of getting them out of his country. The International Red Cross an- nounced that several countries, including the US, Belgium, France, Canada, and Zambia, have agreed to supply planes for airlifting both the mercenaries and Katangans out of Rwanda. The mercenaries are to be returned to their home countries-- primarily Belgium and France; the Katangans are to be flown to Zambia. Problems arose when Congolese au- thorities demanded that the merce- naries be extradited to the Congo to stand trial. It seems probable, however, that if the mercenaries can be quickly removed from the scene, Congolese President Mobutu will bellow a bit, but will accept the inevitable. The mercenaries who invaded Katanga on 1 November seem to have disappeared and may have gone back to Angola. The invasion apparently was only a small diversionary raid designed to create confusion and draw ANC troops toward Katanga. Several accounts report that mer- cenary leader Bob Denard is in charge of the operation, but his presence inside the Congolese bor- ders has not been confirmed. The ANC claims to have had several encounters with the mer- cenaries, the most recent being near Kisenga on 6 November. At any rate,the rail line between Lu- bumbaszi and the Angolan border is now completely open. If the mer- cenaries are still in the area, they are not making their presence ----J known. I 25X1 SECRET Approved for Release 2%VEQKL 09 : CIAA---RDP79-0099 7Ao0061600050001-1 7 Approved For.$elease 2007/034TCIQ;,DP79-0092?06100050001-1 COUP IN YEMEN IMPROVES CHANCES FOR RECONCILIATION The bloodless coup that took place in republican Yemen on 5 November improves the country's long-range chances of achieving an end to the civil war. A group of exiled leaders-- recently released from a year's detention in Cairo, where they had been held because of their anti-Egyptian policies--over- threw the regime of unpopular President Sallal, who was en route to Moscow. The provisional head of state is now ex-premier al-Iryani, chairman of a three- man presidential council that also-includes Ahmad Numan--a former prime minister dismissed by Sallal in 1965 for his anti- Egyptian tendencies--and Mu- hammad Ali Uthman, previously vice premier in Sallal's cabinet. The new prime minister of a 16- man cabinet is Muhsin al-Aini, a former Yemeni ambassador to the US.. The coup had almost unanimous support in the capital, and its leaders, unlike the Sallal regime, enjoy wide tribal support. Five of the new Yemeni leaders are members of the Yemen Revolutionary Front (YRF), a group founded to work for the withdrawal of Egyptian armed forces from Yemen. Although ded- icated to the preservation of the republic, and firmly opposed to the royal family of Hamid al- Din, the YRF aimed at the achieve- ment of national reconciliation with the royalists. The new regime has already announced its determination to seek an end to the five-year-old civil war. It has emphasized, however, that the republicans and royalists should talk without any mediator--a reference to a three- nation peace committee established by the Khartoum summit conference to mediate the civil war. Al- though initial statements by the new regime emphasized the debt of gratitude that Yemen owes to Egypt, the group can be expected to resist any form of Egyptian interference in Yemeni internal affairs. There is no indication that the Egyptians were informed of the plot in advance, but Egypt no longer has either troops or diplomatic representatives in the Yemeni cap- ital. The authoritative Cairo newspaper, Al-Ahram, reports that Egypt considers the coup a purely domestic Yemeni affair, and other Egyptian press commentary applauds the new cabinet as representative of all Yemeni republican groups. The new regime's tribal sup- port will give some cohesion to the disintegrating republic while Egyptian troops are being with- drawn. In addition, this support may enable the regime to deal with the other branches of the same tribes who form the bulk of the royalists forces, and thus pave the way for a national re- conciliation. SECRET Approved For ReI ase2007 ,YCMARDM-00927/i0O tO0b50001-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-009271 6100050001-1 SECRET EGYPT MOVES TO EASE CRITICAL PETROLEUM SHORTAGE Egypt is taking steps to re- place supplies of refined petro- leum products previously obtained from its Suez refineries. An ar- rangement apparently is being con- cluded with the British Petroleum Company under which some Egyptian crude oil from the El Murgan field--current production runs about 320,000 tons per month-- will be shipped by tanker to the British refinery at Aden for processing and the products then returned to Egypt. Only relatively minor ad- justments are needed to enable the Aden refinery to handle the Egyptian crude oil. Three tank- ers, including a 50,000-ton So- viet tanker, have already ar- rived at Aden with Egyptian crude and are only waiting for the nod from London to begin unloading. Egypt's supply problem will ex- tend at least to the first quarter of 1968. Domestic refining capacity now in operation consists only of a refinery at Alexandria, which can produce about 125,000 tons of refined products a month--about a quarter of Egypt's domestic con- sumption. The refinery now oper- ates wholly on imported crude, with Soviet supplies--now averag- ing about: 70,000 tons a month-- being supplemented by Algerian crude. SEC_,RE'I' Approved Fqa Ieese 2Q 7 19 SQWAW79-00927AQP64990~9001-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100050001-1 SECRET SOUTH ARABIAN ARMY CHOOSES SIDES The South Arabian Army has declared its support for the Na- tional Liberation Front (NLF). Despite the overwhelming NFL sympathies of the army, it had acted up to now as a pacify- ing force in the bloody fighting between the NLF and its rival, the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY). By not taking sides, the army had hoped to stave off a politi- cal split among its officers and to maintain the unity of the army as a force in South Arabian politics. SAUDI,, ARABIA-., MUSCAT ~,~~ ' 'AND HED_ -/~ OMAN SEA .w K. / YEMEN AswPoP .' _.~tr..~ ETHIOPIA 1 'A (1 V1 1. AQRABI 2 HAUSHABI 3. ALAWI 4. MAFLAHI S. SHAM 6. UPPER YAFA 7. AUDHALI 8. DATHINAH T.;;fi,A I o ao MILES Approximate limit of local influence - `Boundary recognized by the U.K. SECRET Then last weekend the fierc- est fighting of the civil war broke out in Aden between the NLF and FLOSY, developing into what one leader described as "a war of total extermination." It appeared that the NLF was winning the war by ruthless fighting and by the wholesale removal of an estimated 800 residents to deten- tion in the neighboring state. In five days of fighting, some 100 Arabs were reported dead and over 300 wounded. At this point, the army announced that it was stepping SOUTH ARABIA Approved ForPF cease 200Y/3/09}t: GIA-RDP 9-G0927A00b10 '50%Z1-1 Approved For I Jease 2007/SEC IZ CIT RDP79-00927! 6100050001-1 3/09 : E in on the side of the NLF. It requested that the NLF and the British negotiate for immediate independence. The local command of the NLF has asked its leaders, who are negotiating the formation of a unified government with FLOSY in Cairo, to break off talks and come home. The prepon- derance of support for the NLF, which now controls most of the towns of the hill states, the army, and the South Arabian po- lice, as well as the greater part of Aden, make it likely that the NLF will be able to achieve vic- tory and form a government before the British evacuation late this month. SECRET Approved F aReleise 2 M3M 5 79-00927A08fr1i00Ub0001-1 Approved ForJelease 2007/9R(VRDP79-0092FA006100050001-1 WESTERN HEMISPHERE Elections are scheduled, or at least antici- pated, in several Latin American countries in the next 12 months, and pre--election maneuvering is affecting present political activity. Peruvians are holding a by-election on 12 November to fill the congressional seat from Lima Departnent, which has more than 40 percent of the total electorate. The seat had been held by President Belaunde's Popular Action Party, but current reporting gives the opposition APRA a 50-50 chance of winning it this time. The out- come of the vote should indicate the effect of continuing political and economic crises on the President's popularity. A similar by-election in Chile on 17 De- cember may produce a jolt for President Frei. At stake is a Senate seat formerly held by Frei's Christian Democratic Party. If the leftists-- Communists, Socialists, Radicals, and Social Democrats--succeed in uniting behind one candi- date, they could bring off a victory that would leave Frei's party with only 12 out of the 45 seats in the Senate. Accion Democratica, the governing party in Venezuela, is so split by rivalry among its po- tential presidential candidates for the election in December 1968 that one of the other parties may well win. In Panama, potential presidential candidates currently holding public office must resign by 12 November if they are to run in next May's elec- tion. This puts immediate pressure on Finance Minister Samudio, President Robles' choice. Second Vice President Arango, who is being backed by four dissident parties in the government coali- tion, is not in the category requiring resignation six months prior to the election. SECRET Approved F8PWe1ea3J 20dffOb4 : U 79-009227 %6060050001-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100050001-1 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100050001-1 Se Agro ed For e1"ease 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-00927A 6100050001-1 Secret Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100050001-1