WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006100050001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 9, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
Secret
52
9 November 1967
No. 0315/67
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C O N T E N T S
(Information as of noon EST, 8 November 1967)
Far East
VIETNAM
The Communists' current offensive at Loc Ninh ap-
pears to be the initial thrust of their anticipated
"winter-spring" campaign.
PEKING EXPERIENCES DIFFICULTIES IN RESTORING ORDER
Although Peking's propaganda continues to stress
the importance of getting students to return to the
classroom, there are a number of indications that
the central authorities are having trouble convinc-
ing militant Red Guards to abandon violence.
CAMBODIA'S RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA ARE EASING
Sihanouk has responded favorably to Peking's latest
overture, but a real reconciliation will depend on
a cessation of Communist activity in Cambodia.
PHILIPPINE SENATE AND LOCAL ELECTIONS NEAR
Eight Senate seats and all 63 provincial governor-
ships are to be decided in the election on 14 Novem-
ber, and President Marcos looks to the results as an
indication of his chances for re-election in 1969.
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Europe
USSR'S ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS REACH CLIMAX
The celebration of the 50th anniversary of the So-
viet Union was primarily a panegyric to past Soviet
attainments, but the presentations also exuded great
confidence in the future. Five missiles were un-
veiled in the Moscow parade on 7 November.
THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY: THE NEXT PHASE
The North Atlantic Council has given the green light
to the US to negotiate a safeguards article for the
treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, but
protracted negotiations are still in store.
YUGOSLAV "EXPOSE" OF CIA REFLECTS PARTY DISSENSION
Both supporters and opponents of Yugoslavia's eco-
nomic and party reforms have used a press expose of
alleged Central Intelligence Agency activities as a
device to advance their conflicting views.
Middle East ?- Africa
MERCENARIES LEAVE THE CONGO (KINSHASA)
The mercenaries and Katangans fled Bukavu on 5 No-
vember and are now awaiting evacuation from Rwanda.
In Katanga, meanwhile, the new group of mercenaries
who invaded on 1 November seems to be running into
some difficulties and may have returned to Angola.
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COUP IN YEMEN IMPROVES CHANCES FOR RECONCILIATION
The bloodless coup that took place in republican
Yemen on 5 November brought to power a group that
enjoys wide tribal support and thus improves the
country's long-range chances of achieving an end
to the civil war.
EGYPT MOVES TO EASE CRITICAL PETROLEUM SHORTAGE
Taking steps to replace supplies of refined petro-
leum products previously obtained from its Suez
refineries, Cairo is negotiating for Egyptian crude
oil to be refined at a British company's plant in
Aden.
SOUTH'ARABIAN ARMY CHOOSES SIDES
A bloody battle last week in Aden ensured the Na-
tional Liberation Front (NLF) the support of the
South Arabian Army. The strength of the army and
the pro-NLF police force should enable the NLF to
rule South Arabia when the British depart late this
month.
Western Hemisphere
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FAR EAST
Hanoi appears to be making a vigorous
effort to counter the inauguration of the new
South Vietnamese Government with a major show
of strength.
North Vietnamese propaganda is portray-
ing last week's attacks at Loc Ninh as retalia-
tion for intensified US air strikes in the
Hanoi area and as the opening of a "winter-
spring" campaign. Repeated Communist assaults
on Loc Ninh, at the cost of nearly 1,000 troops
killed in action, suggest an attempt to es-
tablish another "front" in the northern III
Corps area adjacent to Cambodia, similar to the
one in the Demilitarized Zone area, as well as
to score a psychological victory. Increased
Communist military pressure in III Corps, the
Mekong Delta, and the western highlands has
been accompanied by a tough restatement of
Hanoi's position on negotiations by North Viet-
namese party first secretary Le Duan in Moscow.
In China, for the first time since the
shift to a moderate course two months ago, there
are signs that militant Maoists in Peking are
attempting to mount a counterattack. Recent
articles in party and army journals have praised
Lin Piao, appealed for army loyalty to Mao's
thought, and implied that the military has been
treating Red Guards too harshly. The extremists
apparently are trying to capitalize on Red Guard
resistance to army efforts to enforce orders to
reopen schools and suppress violence.
Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk has signaled
his desire to maintain at least a facade of
cordial relations with Peking despite his recent
criticism of Chinese propaganda activities. In
response to a conciliatcry message from Premier
Chou En-lai, Sihanouk declared his willingness
to terminate anti-Peking propaganda and accept
a "complete reconciliation." He hedged this
position, however, by warning that such a re-
conciliation will depend on a cessation of Com-
munist activity in Cambodia.
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T H A I L A N D
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VIETNAM
The much-heralded Communist
"winter-spring" campaign is ap-
parently under way in the III and
IV Corps areas. Moreover, exten-
sive enemy battle preparations in
the western highlands indicate
a new offensive may soon begin
there.
to the area south of the Demilitar-
ized Zone (DMZ). The terrain, with
its thick stands of rubber trees and
dense jungle, is favorable to
enemy operations. Furthermore,
Cambodia, just a few miles to
the north, offers a nearby sanc-
tuary for rest and resupply.
There are signs that ele-
ments of the Communist B-3 Front--
the over-all command authority
in Kontum, Pleiku, and Darlac prov-
inces--are preparing to attack
US and South Vietnamese instal-
lations throughout the area. Sev-
eral sharp skirmishes and enemy
mortar attacks have already oc-
curred in normally calm Darlac
and in the Dak To area of Kontum.
The Communists have at least
four regiments in Kontum, in ad-
dition to the headquarters and as-
sociated support elements of the
B-3 Front and the North Vietnamese
1st Division. A recent defector
claimed a major attack was to have
begun on 28 October--coincident
with the Loc Ninh offensive--but
a "failure in coordinated artil-
lery" forced postponement. This
"artillery" could include large-
caliber rockets that may be used
in a large-scale, well-coordinated
assault on allied positions.
The Communist offensive ac-
tivity in northern III Corps has
resulted in extensive enemy losses
since the present
phase
began
on
28 October,
with
nearly
1,000
men
reportedly
killed
thus
far.
it
is possible, however, that the
Communists hope to establish a
"second front" in this sector,
which is similar in many respects
The Communist intention would
be to draw in and tie down substan-
tial allied forces in a long, in-
conclusive campaign. Already,
five US Army battalions totaling
some 4,000 men--in addition to
South Vietnamese reinforcements--
have been deployed to the Loc
Ninh - Song Be area.
This week's activity in the
northern III Corps area included
several large-scale enemy assaults
on the recently reinforced allied
defensive positions. One encoun-
ter between South Vietnamese and
Communist forces near Song Be
on 5 November resulted in high
friendly casualties, caused in part
by the enemy enjoying the tacti-
cal advantage of prepared positions.
In the battle, 96 South Vietnamese
were killed, 36 were wounded, and
56 weapons were lost.
Throughout the Mekong Delta
provinces of IV Corps there has been
a sharp increase in enemy attacks
against friendly night defensive po-
sitions as well as against lightly
defended base camps and remote dis-
trict towns. The attacks inflicted
heavy casualties on at least one
ARVN unit and almost totally de-
stroyed a Revolutionary Develop-
ment team. Such casualties have
little effect on allied troop
strength, but the psychological
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impact on the local populace is
considerable because the enemy ac-
Lions create doubt as to the abil-
ity of allied forces to establish
and maintain adequate security.
South Vietnam's new govern-
ment is getting under way slowly.
The failure so far to appoint and
announce the full cabinet may give
rise to speculation that internal
difficulties are already besetting
the regime. The lower house, in-
active since its inauguration on
31 October, still has to complete
the validation of the election of
its members. This process may
be complicated by the disqualifi-
cation of one winner in Kien
Giang Province on charges of an
election law violation.
Even though the house has
not met, there is already talk
of the formation of at least one
political bloc. A former asso-
ciate of Vice President Ky is tak-
ing credit for the election of
some 31 members of the house and
is referring to them as the "Demo-
cratic Bloc." His one attempt to
get some 28 of these members to
commit themselves to a formal po-
litical grouping was a failure,
however, largely because the rep-
resentatives themselves probably
have decided to wait and see how
alliances shape up when the assem-
bly convenes.
Evidence continues to accumu-
late indicating dissatisfaction in
the ranks of the Buddhist church
over the manner in which the lead-
ers of the militant and moderate
factions are handling the current
crisis over the charter. Senti-
ment appears to be growing to by-
pass both Thich Tri Quang and
Thich Tam Chau in efforts to reach
present split in the Buddhist
church can be healed only if the
extremists in both factions are
bypassec. and more moderate ele-
ments allowed to work out a solu-
tion.
OnE! possible indicator of a
less rigid posture on the part
of the militants is their reported
order to the clergy to cease self-
immolations, to continue nonvio-
lent struggle activities, and to
protest directly to President
Thieu about government interfer-
ence in the internal affairs of
the Buddhist church.
The Soviet Anniversary
Statements by Vietnamese Com-
munist spokesmen in both Moscow
and Hanoi on the 50th anniversary
of the Soviet revolution have been
replete with praise for the USSR
and the importance of Soviet as-
sistance to the Vietnamese revolu-
tion. ?arty First Secretary Le
Duan, s'2eaking before the Supreme
Soviet on 3 November, spelled out
Hanoi's toughest terms for talks
with the US and for a settlement
of the gar.
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Ridiculing what he termed
"profuse talk about false peace,"
he restated Hanoi's demand that
the "four points" and the program
of the Liberation Front serve as
the basis for settlement. He
added, moreover, that if the US
wants talks with the North Viet-
namese it must "definitively and
unconditionally" end the bombings
of the DRV.
Le Duan also provided Hanoi's
major pronouncement on the anniver-
sary in an article in the party
daily urging socialist unity in
the most specific language used
recently by any Vietnamese Commu-
nist spokesman.
While the over-all thrust of
the article was probably pleasing
to the Soviets, Le Duan also
stressed the necessity of revolu-
tionary violence as an ingredient
of national liberation movements.
In keeping with Hanoi's continuing
efforts to stay neutral in the
Sino-Soviet dispute, Le Duan
seemed mainly concerned with re-
minding both Peking and Moscow 25X1
that their differences must not
be allowed to undermine the Com-
munist effort in Vietnam.
PEKING EXPERIENCES DIFFICULTIES IN RESTORING ORDER
Although Peking's propaganda
continues to stress the importance
of getting students to return to
the classroom, there are a number
of indications that the central
authorities are having trouble
convincing militant Red Guards to
abandon violence, return to their
homes, and unite with their more
conservative, locally oriented
rivals. Tensions between opposing
Red Guard organizations remain
high in many areas, and clashes
between rival groups appear to
have increased recently. The
level of violence, however, is
still far below that of last sum-
mer.
Passions aroused in the
course of the Cultural Revolution
have not yet cooled, and the mil-
itants, apparently fearful of be-
ing "swallowed up" by their more
conservative rivals, are probably
attempting to retain some organi-
zational autonomy. Peking's con-
tinued exhortations to the Red
Guards to join in "revolutionary
great alliances" and to return to
school strongly suggest that the
central authorities are having
trouble in getting the young mili-
tants to follow these instructions.
The regime continues to pub-
licize the opening of schools
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throughout the country, but scat-
tered reports indicate that some
schools, at least, will. not be
open for awhile. Moreover, clashes
:between rival Red Guards have
taken place within the newly
opened schools.
The army remains the princi-
pal instrument of the Peking au-
thorities in enforcing their will.
Military patrols are continuing to
keep order in most cities and in
some places these patrols have
recently been beefed up.
much of the recent trouble
probably results from local re-
sistance to Peking's attempts to
restrict and circumscribe militant
Red Guard activity. The militants
have been steadily losing ground
during the two months in which the
trend toward moderation has domi-
nated the Chinese political-land-
scape, and they have been appeal-
ing to Peking to reverse decisions
detrimental to their position.
There are now signs that the
militant Maoists in Peking may be
attempting to repair the damage
done to their position by exploit-
ing the unhappiness of the radical
Red Guard in order to get the Cul-
tural Revolution back in high gear.
On 2 November, the army's acting
chief of staff published a long ar-
ticle that attacked his discred-
ited predecessor, Lo Jui-ching,
called on the army to be loyal to
the thought of Mao Tse-tung, and
lavishly lauded Lin Piao, Mao's
radical heir. Lo was first at-
tacked by name in early August at
the height of last summer's radi-
cal campaign.
A People's Daily editorial on
7 November claimed that mass move-
ments served to "inspire and edu-
cate" the army, and called on the
military not to "divorce itself
from the masses." This line im-
plies that the army has been treat-
ing the Red. Guards too harshly--
an, accusation that was frequently
raised last. spring and summer when
radical policies were in the as-
cendancy. Finally, a Liberation
Army Dail editorial of 6 November
warned military personnel not to
"blindly obey orders" when those
orders conflict with the thought
of Mao. This line was also used
to exhort. Red Guards last spring,
following the pause in Cultural
Revolution activity during Feb-
ruary and March.
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CAMBODIA'S RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA ARE EASING
Prince Sihanouk has responded
favorably to Peking's latest ef-
fort to ease relations with Cam-
bodia.
Sihanouk announced on 1 No-
vember that he had received a
message from Premier Chou En-lai
calling for "re-establishment of
sincere friendship" between the
two countries. According to Si-
hanouk, Chou acknowledged Siha-
nouk's leadership of the Cambo-
dian people and reaffirmed China's
adherence to the "Bandung prin-
ciple" of nonintervention in Cam-
bodia's internal affairs. Siha-
nouk has charged repeatedly over
the past several months that Chi-
na's propaganda activities in
Cambodia amounted to a repudiation
of these "principles."
The Chinese premier's mes-
sage, which played effectively on
Sihanouk's personal regard for
Chou, appears to be a more artful
version of one Chou sent in mid-
September which caused Sihanouk
to reverse a decision to withdraw
Cambodian diplomatic personnel
from Peking.
In response to the latest
message, Sihanouk stated his
willingness to terminate anti-
Peking propaganda and accept a
"complete reconciliation." Sub-
sequently, he also called off a
referendum he had previously
scheduled for early next year.
The referendum was intended as
a vote of confidence in Siha-
nouk's government and, as such,
would have been embarrassing for
the pro-Peking leftists who have
called for a change in Sihanouk's
policies.
dial relations.
The Prince has also stated,
however, that a real reconcilia-
tion will depend entirely on a
cessation of Communist activity
in Cambodia. Thus, continued
dissemination of Communist propa-
ganda throughout the country, and
a reported renewal of small-
scale Communist dissident activ-
ity, could prove to be persist-
ent irritants in his relations
with China. Nevertheless, al-
though Sihanouk recently again
voiced his suspicion that Peking
will continue discreet support
of Cambodia's pro-Communists,
his response to Chou's letter
underlines his desire to main-
tain at least a facade of cor-
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PHILIPPINE: SENATE AND LOCAL ELECTIONS NEAR
The Philippine off-year elec-
tion on 14 November is being
viewed, particularly by President
Marcos, as a barometer for the
1969 presidential elections. With
this in mind, Marcos, who hopes
to run again in 1969, has cam-
paigned personally and vigorously
for the Nacionalista Party candi-
dates attempting to gain the eight
out of 24 national senatorial
seats that are being contested.
In addition, all 63 provincial
governorships and some 1,400 mu-
nicipal and village posts are up
for grabs.
The Nacionalista Party ap-
pears to have only a slight edge
in the senatorial elections, but
seems likely to improve its posi-
tion in the provincial contests..
Whatever the outcome, Philippine-
US relations will remain un-
changed and President Marcos will
continue to have serious diffi-
culties in pushing his legislative
programs. Although the Nacion-
alista Party is now in theoretical
control of the Senate---it holds 12
seats as compared with the nine
held by the major opposition Lib-
eral Party--party designations
are virtually meaningless because
Philippine politicians often cross
party lines. The Senate is in
fact now controlled by a coalition
of four Nacionalistas, nine Lib-
erals, and three independents.
In the current campaign,
issues have varied from the per-
formance of the Marcos adminis-
tration--emphasized by the sena-
torial candidates--to purely local
matters highlighted in the prov-
inces. Opposition to the Phil-
ippines' 2,000-man noncombat force
in Vietnam has been raised by Lib-
eral Party candidates but appears
to have elicited little interest.
Local elections in the Phil-
ippines traditionally inspire
more violence than national ones,
and the present campaign is no
exception. Although this is not
the bloodiest in Philippine his-
tory, 38 electioneering deaths had
been recorded by late October.
The pro-Communist Huks, who
are attempting to broaden their
political base in central Luzon,
have accounted for some of the
violence. They have injected
themselves into local campaigns
with offers of support, threats
of coercion, and--in some in-
stances--open terrorism. They
are said to be supporting can-
didates from the gubernatorial
to the village level and, in
their strongholds, to actually
have selected local nominees.
They support any candidates who
offer them present protection
and the prospect of increased
influence in the local govern-
ment. Currently, increased Huk
activity does not appear to
reflect any significant increase
in their still modest numeri-
cal strength.
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EUROPE
In Moscow and throughout the USSR, the Soviet
public had four days of holiday speech-making and
festivities as the jubilee celebration reached a
climax. Not unexpectedly, the central motif of
the official rites--capped by Brezhnev's keynote
speech on 3 November and the Red Square parade
on 7 November--was the USSR's defensive might
and readiness.
Yet for all the advance preparations and
publicity, the occasion turned out to be as flat
and colorless as the "collective leadership" it-
self. It remained for the Cubans, obviously put
out by Moscow's none too subtle admonitions against
Castro's revolutionary buccaneering, to introduce
a little interest by insulting the Soviets on
their 50th birthday.
While Polish party bigwigs were in Moscow,
Foreign Minister Rapacki was again trying to drum
up Western European interest in plans for a future
European security system. He brought up the sub-
ject on a visit to Belgium from 2 to 5 November
and will discuss it with Norway's foreign minister
who is due in Warsaw this week.
In Bonn, meanwhile, it became clear that
Foreign Minister Brandt has decided to press for
an early resumption of diplomatic relations with
Yugoslavia, a decision that will be applauded in
Belgrade. The Yugoslavs, at the same time, have
agreed to the opening of an East German consulate
in Zagreb, a reassuring gesture for Ulbricht that 25X1
Belgrade still adheres to the doctrine of two
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USSR'S ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS REACH CLIMAX
For all of the preparation
and foreign visitors, the cele-
bration of the 50th anniversary
of the Soviet Union was primarily
a panegyric to past Soviet at-
tainments. Although the presenta-
tions exuded great confidence in
the future, there was no indica-
tion of how Moscow intends to
deal with any of the domestic or
foreign problems it faces.
The top three Soviet leaders
seemed to play a larger than
usual role in the proceedings,
and party General Secretary Brezh-?
nev clearly was more prominent
than Premier Kosygin or President
Podgorny. Brezhnev's formulations
on the key domestic issues--in-
cluding the question of division
of investment resources between
industry and agriculture--came
down on middle ground. His major
speech was studded with references
to the party's collective wisdom.
east." In renewing the Soviet
pledge of support to the Vietnamese
Communists, he repeated the Soviet
claim that Peking's failure to co-
operate with other Communist states
in aiding the Vietnamese had hin-
dered their war effort. He also
complained of the damage done to
socialist unity by the "chauvin-
istic and great-power course" of
the Mao regime, at which point the
two Chinese Embassy officials at-
tending--Peking sent no delega-
tion--walked out.
Brezhnev aimed a less direct
blow at such Communist mavericks
as Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Cuba.
All three of these states were prob-
ably the intended targets of a
remark critical of "nationalist
insularity," but Cuba seemed singled
out by his observation that "Marx-
ist-Leninists have always under-
stood that socialism cannot be
transplanted from one country to
another by means of armed force."
The feeling of apprehension
that something might occur to mar
the celebration seemed to continue
throughout the week. Some pro-
vocative act by China appeared to
be in the forefront of Moscow's
thinking.
This preoccupation with the
Chinese emerged clearly in Brezh-
nev's keynote speech. In a pas-
sage on defense, Brezhnev claimed
the USSR's armed forces were pre-
pared to counter any threat "from
wherever it might come--the north
or the south, the west or the
Following the death last month
of Che Guevara--whom the Soviets
properly eulogized--the Soviet press
printed articles by two leading
Latin American Communists criti-
cizing Fidel Castro's extremist pol-
icies, which Guevara's antics in
Bolivia seemed to typify. The ar-
ticles probably accounted for the
low level of the Cuban delegation
sent to Moscow for the celebrations.
The Cuban reaction to the fur-
ther provocation by Brezhnev appears
to have been the subsequent failure
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of the Cuban ambassador to ac-
company the diplomatic corps in a
courtesy call on President Pod-
gorny on 6 November. The tensions
between Moscow and Havana have
thus become more apparent, but
have as yet had no visible effect
on the patron-client relationship
between the two.
Another rift in Communist
solidarity was also displayed when
Brezhnev made a brief statement
in support of a new international
meeting of Communist parties, a
contentious issue of several
year's standing. Several key
parties, and particularly the
Chinese, view this as an unwel-
come effort by the Soviet to as-
sert their supremacy and as an
essentially anti-Chinese move.
Brezhnev was seconded by several
party leaders attending the an-
niversary celebrations, but regu-
lar opponents--such as Yugoslavia
and Rumania--remained silent. A
full-scale meeting does not appear
imminent, but some further word
on preparations--which the Soviets
have previously said must be care-
fully arranged--may emerge from
the present gathering in Moscow.
Brezhnev made few references
to the US. His harshest remark.
came, predictably enough, in con-
nection with Vietnam, where he
likened US military actions to
those of "fascist monsters." He
also gave the ritual characteriza-
tion of the US as the leader of
Communism's imperialist foes, but
nothing he said seemed to fore-
shadow any change in the Soviet at-
titude tcward matters of mutual
Soviet-US interest.
New Military Hardware
Unveiled
In the Moscow parade on 7 No-
vember, the Soviets unveiled five
missiles including an ICBM that
was probably the widely deployed
S5-9. A Soviet commentator said
the ICBM missile used a "new and
highly efficient" propellant, but
gave no details.
A naval missile in the parade
was described by the Soviets as
underwater launched. It was too
big to be launched from a submarine,
however. A two-stage, solid-pro-
pellant medium- or intermediate-
range missile on a trailer may have
been the missile carried in the
Scamp mobile transporter-launcher,
which it followed in the parade. A
short-range missile that was shown
possibly was the 450-mile-range
SS-12.
Ano-:her new system consisted
of three antiaircraft missiles
mounted on a tracked vehicle. The
missiles were described as being
effective at extremely low alti-
tudes and probably will be used in
support of ground forces. Other
new equipment included a tracked
combat vehicle carrying personnel
and mounting an antitank missile
and a conventional gun.
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h veiled in 7 November Parade
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THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY: THE NEXT PHASE
The North Atlantic Council
(NAC) has given the green light
to the US to negotiate a safe-
guards article for the treaty to
prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons (NPT), but protracted ne-
gotiations are still in store be-
fore the treaty is ready for sign-
ing.
At the NAC meeting on 31 Oc-
tober, the allies agreed the US
should work out a safeguards ar-
ticle with the USSR which would
take into account the principles
drawn up by the EURATOM members,
excluding France. One of these
principles is that safeguards
shall apply only to the use of
natural uranium and fissionable
material. Another is that EURATOM
itself shall have a role in nego-
tiating a safeguards arrangement
with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) to cover
EURATOM's members. Finally, the
IAEA shall only verify, and not
duplicate, EURATOM's safeguards
system.
While the West Europeans have
been considering their position
on safeguards, a number of other
countries have raised problems
and have proposed amendments to
the treaty. Although their objec-
tions have focused mainly on the
treaty's discrimination between
states with nuclear weapons and
those without, other issues that
have been raised include the peace-
ful uses of nuclear energy, the
absence of disarmament obligations
for the nuclear powers, and secu-
rity assurances for nonnuclear
states.
Mexico, Brazil, Egypt, and
Rumania have proposed amendments
that reflect these concerns.
The Mexican amendments would make
it a duty of nuclear states to
undertake disarmament measures
and to contribute to the develop-
ment of peaceful uses of nuclear
energy in nonnuclear countries.
Brazil wants a treaty that will
permit a nonnuclear nation to
conduct nuclear explosions for
peaceful purposes. Rumania's
amendments are in the same vein
and may have been put forth as
much to make a point of Bucha-
rest's independence of Moscow as
for any other purpose.
An Egyptian proposal would
have the nuclear states pledge
not to use nuclear weapons against
countries that have no nuclear
weapons deployed in their terri-
tory. India, reflecting its spe-
cial concern with China, wants
specific security assurances; to
meet these, the US and USSR are
beginning negotiations on an
agreement separate from the NPT,
possibly in the form of a UN res-
olution.
Given the numerous problems
still to be dealt with, it appears
unlikely that the Geneva disarma-
ment conference will be able to
present an agreed draft treaty
to the current session of the UN
General Assembly. The Geneva
group, however, could forward the
US-USSR draft along with the var-
ious amendments for preliminary
consideration by the assembly.
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YUGOSLAV "EXPOSE" OF CIA REFLECTS PARTY DISSENSION
Both supporters and oppo-
nents of Yugoslavia's economic
and party reforms have used a
press expose of alleged Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) ac-
tivities as a device to con-
tinue their quarrel over the
future of the reform program.
The expose, carried by the
country's leading daily, Borba,
was nominally instigated by
secret police and party ele-
ments, who professed to be em-
barassed by the inability of
the police to prevent the re-
cent escape from Yugoslavia of
a Nazi war criminal. The real
impetus for the series of arti-
cles, however, came from oppo-
nents of the economic reform
who are attempting to brand it
as harmful to national security
and its backers as subversive.
These hard liners have been
gaining some influence in re-
cent weeks by playing on Tito's
professed fears of an "imperi-
alist" threat to Yugoslavia.
Before the first article
appeared in print, however,
proreform elements, which in-
clude leading party and govern-
ment officials, succeeded in
turning the bias of the series
against their opponents. The
first article, appearing on 31
October, was mild in its treat-
ment of CIA and scathing in its
attack on the antireform ele-
ments. They were identified
as supporters of ousted secu-
rity boss and former party sec-
retary Aleksandar Rankovic.
Borba granted that foreign in-
tel gence services were active
in Yugoslavia, but charged that
their activities had been delib-
erately exaggerated to discredit
both the reforms and last year's
curtailment of the secret police.
The article, for example, de-
nounced conservative-inspired
rumors that the late Boris Kraj-
ger, a primary architect of the
economic reform, had grown rich
on CIA money.
Subsequent articles, appear-
ing through 4 November, dealt
blandly with alleged CIA informa-
tion-gathering efforts, but com-
plained about the activities of
foreign military attaches and
called for increased vigilance on
the part of all Yugoslavs.
In the final analysis, the
effect of the expose may be to
turn public and official opinion
against the hard liners who ini-
tiated it. They are now accused
in the press of creating dissen-
sion and undermining public con-
fidence in regime policies. Tito
himself apparently has grown con-
cerned about their efforts to
hamstring his reforms and may be
preparing to act against them.
(some of 25X1
the opponents of the reform may 25X1
lose their party positions at a
plenum tentatively scheduled for
mid-November. 25X1
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Several perennial problems in the area have
taken a new twist, but no real solution to them
is in sight as yet.
As expressed publicly by King Husayn, the
Arab attitude toward a peace settlement with Is-
rael seems to have become somewhat more flexible.
The Arabs now accept the concepts of "nonbel-
ligerency" and freedom of navigation through the
Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran, and ac-
knowledge Israel's right to exist. They continue
to insist, however, that this entails a reciprocal
Israeli acceptance of responsibility for the refu-
gees, involving either repatriation or compensa-
tion. Even if some proposal succeeds in the UN,
implementation is likely to be a long drawn out
process.
The bloodless coup in Yemen probably improves
the country's long-range chances of putting an end
to the civil war. Although the new leaders are
strongly republican and firmly opposed to the royal
family, their own tribal affiliations may enable
them to deal with tribes that form the bulk of
royalist forces and thus pave the way for a general
agreement.
Schramme and his mercenaries have fled the
Congo and are in the process of being evacuated
from Rwanda. Mobutu, however, is lemanding their
extradition to stand trial. The mercenary thrust
from Angola seems to have run out of steam.
In the Nigerian civil war, the federal army
is making more thorough preparations before re-
newing the offensive in the face of strong Biafran
resistance. Biafran leader Ojukwu may be taking
advantage of the relative lull in the fighting
to conclude deals for arms and mercenaries, whose
arrival in Biafra could prolong the conflict.
The prospects for peace talks under British auspices
and for the arrival of the oft-postponed OAU mis-
sion are now dimmer than ever.
On 11 November the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia
will celebrate its second anniversary, happy in the
fact that it has survived the imposition of sanc-
tions.
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MERCENARIES LEAVE THE CONGO (KINSHASA)
The mercenaries and Katangans
led by Lt. Colonel Jean Schramme,
who had been in Bukavu since early
August, have fled the city and are
encamped under Rwandan Army guard
a few miles inside Rwanda.
The mercenaries had been un-
der attack by the Congolese Na-
tional Army (ANC) since 28 October.
The ANC apparently kept up a steady
barrage of fire and gradually
whittled away at the mercenary
force. With their ranks depleted
and their ammunition and supplies
running low, the mercenaries left
Bukavu to the "triumphant" ANC.
GABON
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'KINSHASA
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68580 11-67
Rwandan President Kayibanda
is now faced with the problem of
getting them out of his country.
The International Red Cross an-
nounced that several countries,
including the US, Belgium, France,
Canada, and Zambia, have agreed to
supply planes for airlifting both
the mercenaries and Katangans out
of Rwanda. The mercenaries are to
be returned to their home countries--
primarily Belgium and France; the
Katangans are to be flown to Zambia.
Problems arose when Congolese au-
thorities demanded that the merce-
naries be extradited to the Congo
to stand trial. It seems probable,
however, that if the mercenaries
can be quickly removed from the
scene, Congolese President Mobutu
will bellow a bit, but will accept
the inevitable.
The mercenaries who invaded
Katanga on 1 November seem to have
disappeared and may have gone back
to Angola. The invasion apparently
was only a small diversionary raid
designed to create confusion and
draw ANC troops toward Katanga.
Several accounts report that mer-
cenary leader Bob Denard is in
charge of the operation, but his
presence inside the Congolese bor-
ders has not been confirmed.
The ANC claims to have had
several encounters with the mer-
cenaries, the most recent being
near Kisenga on 6 November. At
any rate,the rail line between Lu-
bumbaszi and the Angolan border is
now completely open. If the mer-
cenaries are still in the area,
they are not making their presence
----J known. I
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COUP IN YEMEN
IMPROVES CHANCES FOR RECONCILIATION
The bloodless coup that took
place in republican Yemen on 5
November improves the country's
long-range chances of achieving
an end to the civil war.
A group of exiled leaders--
recently released from a year's
detention in Cairo, where they
had been held because of their
anti-Egyptian policies--over-
threw the regime of unpopular
President Sallal, who was en
route to Moscow. The provisional
head of state is now ex-premier
al-Iryani, chairman of a three-
man presidential council that
also-includes Ahmad Numan--a
former prime minister dismissed
by Sallal in 1965 for his anti-
Egyptian tendencies--and Mu-
hammad Ali Uthman, previously
vice premier in Sallal's cabinet.
The new prime minister of a 16-
man cabinet is Muhsin al-Aini,
a former Yemeni ambassador to
the US.. The coup had almost
unanimous support in the capital,
and its leaders, unlike the
Sallal regime, enjoy wide tribal
support.
Five of the new Yemeni
leaders are members of the Yemen
Revolutionary Front (YRF), a
group founded to work for the
withdrawal of Egyptian armed
forces from Yemen. Although ded-
icated to the preservation of
the republic, and firmly opposed
to the royal family of Hamid al-
Din, the YRF aimed at the achieve-
ment of national reconciliation
with the royalists.
The new regime has already
announced its determination to
seek an end to the five-year-old
civil war. It has emphasized,
however, that the republicans and
royalists should talk without any
mediator--a reference to a three-
nation peace committee established
by the Khartoum summit conference
to mediate the civil war. Al-
though initial statements by the
new regime emphasized the debt
of gratitude that Yemen owes to
Egypt, the group can be expected
to resist any form of Egyptian
interference in Yemeni internal
affairs.
There is no indication that
the Egyptians were informed of the
plot in advance, but Egypt no longer
has either troops or diplomatic
representatives in the Yemeni cap-
ital. The authoritative Cairo
newspaper, Al-Ahram, reports that
Egypt considers the coup a purely
domestic Yemeni affair, and other
Egyptian press commentary applauds
the new cabinet as representative
of all Yemeni republican groups.
The new regime's tribal sup-
port will give some cohesion to
the disintegrating republic while
Egyptian troops are being with-
drawn. In addition, this support
may enable the regime to deal
with the other branches of the
same tribes who form the bulk of
the royalists forces, and thus
pave the way for a national re-
conciliation.
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EGYPT MOVES TO EASE CRITICAL PETROLEUM SHORTAGE
Egypt is taking steps to re-
place supplies of refined petro-
leum products previously obtained
from its Suez refineries. An ar-
rangement apparently is being con-
cluded with the British Petroleum
Company under which some Egyptian
crude oil from the El Murgan
field--current production runs
about 320,000 tons per month--
will be shipped by tanker to the
British refinery at Aden for
processing and the products then
returned to Egypt.
Only relatively minor ad-
justments are needed to enable
the Aden refinery to handle the
Egyptian crude oil. Three tank-
ers, including a 50,000-ton So-
viet tanker, have already ar-
rived at Aden with Egyptian crude
and are only waiting for the nod
from London to begin unloading.
Egypt's supply problem will ex-
tend at least to the first quarter
of 1968.
Domestic refining capacity
now in operation consists only of
a refinery at Alexandria, which
can produce about 125,000 tons of
refined products a month--about a
quarter of Egypt's domestic con-
sumption. The refinery now oper-
ates wholly on imported crude,
with Soviet supplies--now averag-
ing about: 70,000 tons a month--
being supplemented by Algerian
crude.
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SOUTH ARABIAN ARMY CHOOSES SIDES
The South Arabian Army has
declared its support for the Na-
tional Liberation Front (NLF).
Despite the overwhelming
NFL sympathies of the army, it
had acted up to now as a pacify-
ing force in the bloody fighting
between the NLF and its rival,
the Front for the Liberation of
Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY).
By not taking sides, the army
had hoped to stave off a politi-
cal split among its officers and
to maintain the unity of the
army as a force in South Arabian
politics.
SAUDI,, ARABIA-., MUSCAT
~,~~ ' 'AND
HED_ -/~ OMAN
SEA .w
K.
/ YEMEN AswPoP
.' _.~tr..~
ETHIOPIA
1
'A (1
V1
1. AQRABI
2
HAUSHABI
3. ALAWI
4. MAFLAHI
S. SHAM
6. UPPER YAFA
7. AUDHALI
8. DATHINAH
T.;;fi,A I
o ao
MILES
Approximate limit of local influence
- `Boundary recognized by the U.K.
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Then last weekend the fierc-
est fighting of the civil war
broke out in Aden between the
NLF and FLOSY, developing into
what one leader described as "a
war of total extermination." It
appeared that the NLF was winning
the war by ruthless fighting and
by the wholesale removal of an
estimated 800 residents to deten-
tion in the neighboring state.
In five days of fighting, some
100 Arabs were reported dead and
over 300 wounded.
At this point, the army
announced that it was stepping
SOUTH ARABIA
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in on the side of the NLF. It
requested that the NLF and the
British negotiate for immediate
independence. The local command
of the NLF has asked its leaders,
who are negotiating the formation
of a unified government with
FLOSY in Cairo, to break off
talks and come home. The prepon-
derance of support for the NLF,
which now controls most of the
towns of the hill states, the
army, and the South Arabian po-
lice, as well as the greater part
of Aden, make it likely that the
NLF will be able to achieve vic-
tory and form a government before
the British evacuation late this
month.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Elections are scheduled, or at least antici-
pated, in several Latin American countries in the
next 12 months, and pre--election maneuvering is
affecting present political activity.
Peruvians are holding a by-election on 12
November to fill the congressional seat from
Lima Departnent, which has more than 40 percent
of the total electorate. The seat had been held
by President Belaunde's Popular Action Party,
but current reporting gives the opposition APRA
a 50-50 chance of winning it this time. The out-
come of the vote should indicate the effect of
continuing political and economic crises on the
President's popularity.
A similar by-election in Chile on 17 De-
cember may produce a jolt for President Frei.
At stake is a Senate seat formerly held by Frei's
Christian Democratic Party. If the leftists--
Communists, Socialists, Radicals, and Social
Democrats--succeed in uniting behind one candi-
date, they could bring off a victory that would
leave Frei's party with only 12 out of the 45 seats
in the Senate.
Accion Democratica, the governing party in
Venezuela, is so split by rivalry among its po-
tential presidential candidates for the election
in December 1968 that one of the other parties
may well win.
In Panama, potential presidential candidates
currently holding public office must resign by
12 November if they are to run in next May's elec-
tion. This puts immediate pressure on Finance
Minister Samudio, President Robles' choice. Second
Vice President Arango, who is being backed by
four dissident parties in the government coali-
tion, is not in the category requiring resignation
six months prior to the election.
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