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December 20, 2016
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November 24, 1967
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Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006100070001-9 Secret DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Secret 52 State Dept. review completed 24 November 1967 No. 0317/67 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006100070001-9 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/ d%_q P79-00927A006100070001-9 (Information as of noon EST, 22 November 1967) VIETNAM The third week of fighting in the area surrounding the US strongpoint at Dak To resulted in a large number of friendly casualties as Communist main force units renewed their vigorous efforts to pin down American troops in southwestern Kontum Prov- ince. CHINESE COMMUNIST POLITICS MARKING TIME The political situation appeared to remain on dead center last week, with little sign of movement either toward increased efforts to repair ravages caused by the Cultural Revolution or toward gear- ing up "revolutionary" activity again. THAILAND SEEKS TO CONTROL CHINESE IRREGULARS The Thai Government has become increasingly embar- rassed over the presence of Chinese Nationalist forces in northern Thailand and hopes to curb their activities. PRESIDENT'S PARTY GAINS IN PHILIPPINE ELECTIONS The Nacionalista Party of President Marcos has won sweeping victories in the recent off-year elections which should strengthen Marcos' prospects for re- election in 1969. Europe Page 1 SECRET Approved Forte@aje 200// o, cL 79-00PJ7~R~6160p070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006100070001-9 SECRE 1' DEVALUATION MAY FAIL TO SOLVE BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC WOES Prime Minister Wilson's government will be able to ride out the immediate storm over sterling's de- valuation, but the longer term prospects are less promising. z{UNGARY LOOKS TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE The Kadar regime is getting out of step with its allies, Poland and East Germany in particular, in seeking to expand its relations with Western Europe. CRISIS OVER CYPRUS Although Cyprus itself was generally quiet, the danger of a violent confrontation between Greece and Turkey remained serious. As of mid-week, how- ever, both countries were apparently still willing to give diplomatic efforts a chance. ARAB-ISRAELI TENSION INCREASES In response to continued terrorism, Israel's poli- cies are reflecting a new, harder line toward Jordan and the West Bank. ALGERIAN LEADERSHIP DISPUTE CONTINUES Boumediene's attempt to reorganize the cabinet has provoked adament opposition from Chief of Staff Z'Biri, but the former guerrilla leader appears un- willing to set off an actual revolt. NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR PLODS ALONG Federal military commanders are moving slowly and carefully in the face of stubborn resistance by the secessionist Biafrans. STABILITY TENUOUS IN FORMER FRENCH EQUATORIAL AFRICA 23 The recent airlift of French combat troops to the Central African Republic highlights the concern of both the local governments and France over the stability of the four successor countries to the old French colonial federation. ' SEC SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006100070001-9 Page ii WEEKLY SUMMARY 24 Nov 67 Middle East ---Africa Approved For Release 2007/03/0$ dk-R&79-00927A006100070001-9 COMMUNIST CHINA RENEWS EFFORTS IN AFRICA Peking is moving ahead again in various African countries with foreign policy programs that had largely been held in abeyance by the disruptive pressures of the Cultural Revolution. Western Hemisphere GUERRILLA DEFEAT GAINS RESPITE FOR BOLIVIAN PRESIDENT The Bolivian Government's success against the guer- rillas--which culminated in the death of Che Guevara and most of his followers--has temporarily strength- ened the Barrientos regime at the expense of the opposition parties. PERU'S BELAUNDE TRIES TO WIN WIDER SUPPORT President Belaunde has named a new prime minister in a belated effort to win support from the opposi- tion-controlled Congress and the business community for his administration's proposals to cope with the current economic problems. CHILEAN ELECTIONEERING STIRS POLITICAL SCENE The senatorial by-election on 17 December probably will be used by all political parties as a testing ground for the 1969 congressional and 1970 presi- dential elections. RIGHT-WING PARTY GAINS STRENGTH IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC A growing movement favoring the return of exiled General Wessin y Wessin and unfounded allegations that US support is shifting from Balaguer to Wessin have created an uneasy political situation. SECRET Approved For Relbase"ib07MWYCPAUi%ffi-0092fA v10b370001-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100070001-9 SECRET FAR EAST The Communist campaign in the Dak To area of South Vietnam's central highlands, now in its third week, has developed into the most intensive and prolonged fighting since the Ia Drang Valley battle two years ago. This major operation and extensive Communist military preparations throughout the central highlands appear intended to demonstrate the Communists' determination and capacity to outlast the allied forces and to inflict heavy casualties on them. The National Liberation Front stole the march on Saigon by announcing 72-hour truces during the Christmas and New Year holidays and a seven-day lull during the lunar new year in late January. In Saigon, President Thieu and National Assem- bly leaders are still preoccupied with organizing the new government. The continuing problems caused by tensions between Thieu and Vice President Ky were reflected in Prime Minister Loc's private complaint about the confusion created by conflict- ing directives issued by the two leaders. The week brought no significant signs of a break in the apparent standoff between militant Maoists and moderate fo rces in Peking. The pr es- ence of many provincial military leaders in Pe king in the past month sugge sts that high-level con fer- ences h ave been taking place, but the conflict ing lines i n Peking's propa ganda would seem to ind icate that ma jor issues remai n unresolved. At least some of the violence th at continues to spread in China p robably has been encouraged by militant Mao- ists in an attempt to i nfluence the political bal- ance within the top leadership. Recent elections in the Philippines recorded sweeping victories for President Marcos' Nacional- ista Party. Although the President's prospects for re-election in 1969 have been strengthened, it remains to be seen whether he will be able to trans- late the election gains into greater party disci- pline and progress on economic reforms long re- sisted by the Senate. 25X1 SECRET ApproveLlE Release Qgg-k$~/Qk ~DP2?:P- 7#906100070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006100070001-9 SECRET r IE)ANE Mu Gib Pass At. 23 ! CORPS r $pttipi Z o n e e Iv rcoRPS i s O SON 68739 11-67 CIA Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006100070001-9 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03"C%I/~DP79-00927A006100070001-9 VIETNAM The third week of fighting I Elements of the NVA 24th strongpoint at Dak To resulted in a large number of friendly casualties as Communist main force units renewed their vigorous ef- forts to pin down American troops in southwestern Kontum Province. Heavy fighting developed when US patrols encountered ele- ments of several North Vietnam- ese Army (NVA) regiments--the 32nd, 66th, and 174th--in the hills southwest of Dak To. The current Communist tactics have been to engage American units and then withdraw to well-pre- pared defensive positions in favorable terrain where they can concentrate maximum firepower. This confirms that one of the primary goals of the Com- munist forces in the current winter-spring campaign is to pin down and destroy major allied units in the central highlands. The heavy jungle canopy, the lack of landing zones for helicopters, and the steepness of the moun- tains make American troop move- ment and supply efforts in this area the most difficult yet faced in South Vietnam. The Communists' apparent intention to wage a long campaign is reflected in the dis- covery of many enemy caches of ammunition, the presence of an extensive series of bunkers and other well-constructed defensive positions, and the presence of as many as 8,000 enemy troops in the area. Regiment have now spread the battle area north and east of Dak To, while other enemy units are ap- parently expanding their efforts 25X1 to engage and tie down friendly forces as far south as central Darlac Province. ex- tensive preparations are presently under way by the North Vietnamese .units throughout the central high- lands in an effort to extend allied forces on a wider front. All of the Communist forces are under the control of the B-3 Front, the over-all command authority in the western highlands. As the campaign progresses, an increase can be expected in attacks on US Special Forces camps and other remote outposts, in ambushes staged against allied supply convoys along strategic Routes 14 and 19, as well as in mortar and rocket attacks on vital allied installations in Pleiku and Darlac provinces. Activity in the Laos Panhandle Reports from the Laos pan- handle indicate that Hanoi has re- sumed large supply shipments to South Vietnam followinc7 the end of the rainy season. Through the first 18 days of November, at least 195 trucks were observed moving south on Route 23 just south of the Mu Gia Pass. On Route 912, the second road from North SECRET Approved For'e`~ease 200Y 5i 'Y & %- H9-009~+AM61(?070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/0,fLFj ft- f P79-00927A006100070001-9 Vietnam into Laos, over 300 trucks were spotted by aerial observers in late October. It is also clear from photography that heavy stockpiling has been going on in the Mu Gia Pass area since at least September in an- ticipation of dry weather. Politics in South Vietnam President Thieu has re- portedly begun organizing his personal office staff. The key position in the office of the presidency will be that of secre- tary general, and it appears that Nguyen Van Huong, a close adviser and the manager of Thieu's presi- dential campaign, is slated for the post. Thieu's present mili-? tary and administrative staff will be retained, but apparently will. come under Huonq's supervision. Several specialized advisory coun- cils will also be attached to the President's office. The two houses of the Na- tional Assembly continue to move ahead with their internal. organiza tion. In the upper house, work is proceeding slowly on internal rules. Members have voted, how- ever, to allow formation of blocs with a minimum membership of 15, as opposed to the original pro- posals that would have allowed the formation of only two blocs in the 60-man body. In the lower house, validation of the member- ship is almost completed and dis- cussion of internal rules may soon begin. The lower house has devoted considerable discussion to the plight of 17 students who were drafted for demonstrating against the election, and has agreed to create a ten-man com- mittee to discuss the matter fur- ther with the government. The principal officers of this com- mittee are outspoken opponents of the government, who may hope to embarrass it over an issue in- herited from the previous military regime. On 18 November, the Commu- nists ordered their military forces to observe a cessation of all military attacks for 72 hours during both the Christmas and New Year holidays and a seven-day lull during the lunar new year (Tet). This action steals the march on President Thieu's informal proposal of a few weeks ago for 24-hour SECRET Approved For At1st 2007 6&Y=4MI k9-0092-AAW6s106070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100070001-9 SECIRET cease-fire periods at Christ- mas and New Year, and only 48 hours for Tet. The Viet Cong an- nouncement also makes the Christ- mas and New Year cease-fire periods 24 hours longer than the corre- sponding periods they called for last year. Hanoi's Air Defenses North Vietnamese air defense units were unusually successful in downing 18 US aircraft in in- tensive operations in the Hanoi/ Haiphong area between 16 and 20 November. The effectiveness of the Communist defense appears to have been the result of a more vigorous application of established tactics rather than of any new weapons or procedures. An exceptionally high level of surface-to-air missile and anti- aircraft artillery (AAA) fire was reported. Although many of the missiles were fired at random, they nonetheless accounted for ten of the US losses while the usually more effective AAA downed only two planes. Hanoi's MIG force, estimated to consist of only about eight air- craft still operating from bases in North Vietnam, shot down four US planes during this period. Un- known causes claimed two addi- tional aircraft. SECRET Approved fthl lease 20 Q6 S 79-OOSUAEIW00070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100070001-9 SL CRE1. CHINESE COMMUNIST POLITICS MAR The political situation ap- peared to remain on dead center last week, with little sign of movement either toward increased efforts to repair ravages caused by the Cultural Revolution or to- ward gearing up "revolutionary" activity again. Regime propaganda continued to feature "moderate" themes such as the importance of educa- tion and the need to make use of the experience of "old cadres," but these themes were played in a lower key than similar pro- nouncements made in September and October. Moreover, they are cur- rently linked to such "revolu- tionary" Maoist concepts as the overriding necessity to maintain close contacts with the "masses"-- normally a euphemism for the Red Guards. The tone of this low- keyed propaganda suggests that a stand-off between proponents of pragmatism and of all-out revolu- tionary fervor now exists in Pe- king. Current and future policies have probably been the subject of acrimonious discussion in Pe- king for most of the past month. I I not only all im- portant leaders at the center but many of the leading military ING TIME figures from the provinces were present in the capital to mark the anniversary of the Russian Revolution. Nearly all of these leaders showed up for a rally of army "activists" on 14 November. High-level conferences involv- ing the military almost cer- tainly took place in the inter- vening week, and the cautious tone of current propaganda sug- gests that controversy continues in meetings that may still be under way. Violence and attendant dis- ruptions continue to increase throughout China. Although the number and seriousness of these dislocations still remains well below that of last summer, trouble seems to be spreading fairly rapidly. In east China, clashes ap- pear on the upswing in Fukien, Chekiang, Hunan, and Kiangsu provinces. In Canton, tensions among rival Red Guard groups continue to cause disturbances despite a strong military pres- ence attempting to maintain or- der during the Canton Trade Fair. At least part of these troubles can probably be attributed to covert encouragement b Maoist militants in Peking. S EC RE7' Approved Forj apse 200(: 79-0098 1QQ070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/0?Epft-~9P79-00927A006100070001-9 THAILAND SEEKS TO CONTROL CHINESE IRREGULARS The Thai Government has be- come increasingly embarrassed over the presence of Chinese Na- tionalist forces in northern Thai- land and hopes to curb their ac- tivities. Bangkok underlined its concern last month by ordering the Chinese to leave the country within four months. The leaders of two of the three major Chinese National- ist groups in Thailand reportedly agreed to the deadline. 5 0 MILES The irregulars--now number- ing upwards of 1,800--have been operating in the Burma-Thai-Lao border area since 1949, ostensibly to conduct intelligence and low- level military operations against China. The Taiwan government at one time was deeply involved in these activities, but in recent years has provided only limited logistical support. Most of the irregulars' time has been spent running opium and maintaining a secure base of operations. The Thais have consistently closed SECRET 25X1 Approved FPO ` ?eleise 201 0 8 :UA M1?79-OQQ27AgOfb1.P0070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/0 /~~IAjRDP79-00927A006100070001-9 their eyes to the Chinese use of remote mountainous areas in north- ern Thailand for training and supply activities, primarily be- cause a major Thai military effort would be necessary to force the Chinese out. The events leading to the recent ouster order from Bangkok began last August when a large Chinese group withdrew into Thai- land after a battle with local tribal groups and a Lao Army unit in neighboring Laos. The Thais subsequently moved a regimental combat team up to the border to block the entry of a second Chi- nese group, which reportedly in- tended to cross the border from Burma. Bangkok regarded the crossing of the frontier last Au- gust as particularly blatant. Moreover, there may be re- percussions affecting Thailand's relations with Burma. A large number of Burmese recruits ac- companied the Chinese force and this may have added to Bangkok's conviction it was necessary to make at least a token effort to effect a withdrawal of the Chi- nese. The Thais, however, are anxious to avoid a showdown over the issue. Inasmuch as the Chi- nese irregulars will probably make a gesture toward acceding to the Thai demands, it is likely that Bangkok will quietly return to its previous policy of acqui- 25X1 escing in a discreet Chinese Nationalist presence. SECRET Approved Fow eage 200-ft=BY COA R?9-00927AO 61?O070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/01 ,h F79-00927A006100070001-9 PRESIDENT'S PARTY GAINS IN PHILIPPINE ELECTIONS The Nacionalista Party of President Marcos has won sweeping victories in the recent off-year elections, an unexpected achieve- ment that should strengthen Mar- cos' prospects for re-election in 1969. Nacionalista candidates have captured six of the eight Senate seats being contested, as well as over two thirds of the na- tion's governorships, mayoral- ties, and other local offices. A pro-administration independent and a Liberal took the remaining two Senate seats. Liberal Benigno Aquino's outstanding showing was a major setback for the administration. Aquino, a former governor, is a vigorous opponent of Marcos and is now regarded as future presi- dential material. His victory is being challenged in the Su- preme Court on technical grounds. Marcos also failed to block the re-election of the incumbent Liberal mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, whose political stock in trade has been baiting the US. His opponent had been personally chosen and vigorously supported by the President. Marcos will now have nominal control of the Senate, but the progress of his economic programs will depend in part on his abil- ity to enforce party discipline. Philippine politicians frequently cross party lines for personal advancement, and a defection of several Nacionalistas last Janu- ary threw control of the Senate to the Liberals. It also re- mains to be seen whether Marcos will have any greater success in overcoming the Senate's long- standing opposition to economic reforms. The Nacionalistas' impres- sive gains in the provinces may well prove more significant than the senatorial victories. Marcos' increased local control will give him greater leverage in im- plementing development projects and in mustering support for the 1969 presidential elections. Marcos spent far more effort campaigning for provincial can- didates than for the Senate hope- fuls, who are elected at large. Election day was generally peaceful after the widespread violence of the campaigns. The Election Commission, however, has come under severe criticism for inefficient voter registra- tion. Possibly ten percent of the electorate was disenfran- chised in the general confusion of drawing up new voter lists. F_ I SECRET Approved For I Sdse92007/0W IASkb~&)%Y0092iA066-Y00-'0710001-9 Approved For Release 200Z 0 3 Q ~ A-RDP79-00927AO06100070001-9 SECRET. ApprovecPFgeRele a 20Wi3I0&tjM DP7923092A0?8100070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/0SWKRDP79-00927A006100070001-9 EUROPE Public confidence in Prime Minister Wilson's government declined further with the decision to devalue sterling. All wings of the Labor Party rallied round, however, and there was no immediate danger that the government would fall. The outlook for the longer term is cloudy. The consequences of sterling's devaluation in- evitably became involved in discussions among the Six on Britain's bid for membership in the European Communities. Early in the week, France turned down a proposal by the other members to invite Britain to participate in Community consideration of the impact of devaluation. Further word on the subject may be forthcoming when President De Gaulle holds his press conference on 27 November. On the draft nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT), meanwhile, the Community is increasingly preoccupied with eventual negotiations with the IAEA to find a mutually acceptable solution for applying safeguards. The Germans, in particular, seem more concerned than ever lest the NPT foreclose the maintenance of EURATOM's own safeguard system. In addition, several countries are now raising the question of whether a failure to reach an agreement between EURATOM and the IAEA would oblige the US, as a signatory of the NPT, to suspend the delivery of nuclear materials on which the Community depends. There is more evidence that Yugoslav-Rumanian relations are recovering from the estrangement of last summer caused by Belgrade's cooperation with Moscow in support of the Arabs. Yugoslav Premier Spiljak visited Bucharest last week and Serbian party secretary Doronjski had been there earlier. Spiljak met with Rumanian Premier Maurer and party chief Ceausescu in what was described as a "warm 25X1 and comradely atmosphere." The two regimes prob- ably wanted to coordinate their views on a world SECRET Approved Page Release 9&/10OU' R DPi6-ON 7Ma06100070001-9 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100070001-9 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100070001-9 SECRET DEVALUATION MAY FAIL TO SOLVE BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC WOES Prime Minister Wilson's gov- ernment will be able to ride out the immediate political storm but it has suffered a serious loss of confidence from the decision to devalue the pound and increase restrictions on the UK economy. The instinct to rally 'round in time of trouble and in the face of partisan attack by the opposi- tion has served to keep the large Labor majority in Parliament in line, as has the unpalatable al- ternative of a general election in which many Laborites would lose their seats. New elections are not required before 1971. The longer term outlook may be different. Party unity is fragile, and many Laborites are bitter about the new deflationary measures--with their prospects for further unemployment and further deprivations for most Britons-- that accompanied devaluation. If the economic picture is not con- siderably brighter next spring, the government may face a serious revolt within the party. The government's public image has suffered in recent months be- cause of nagging economic problems and a series of political set- backs and blunders. The confes- sion that the past three years of economic sacrifice have been in vain and that even greater sacri- fices lie ahead was the crowning blow. Even if the new policy in time produces a substantial im- provement in Britain's economic condition, the leadership may not be able to restore public confi- dence in its ability to govern effectively. On the positive side, the government's action will probably accomplish the immediate economic objective of ending pressure on sterling and cause a reflow of funds into the UK. The decision by all major countries to hold the present value of their cur- rencies will eliminate most of the speculation about a further devaluation in the near future. The rise in the UK bank rate to eight percent should attract sub- stantial amounts of short-term capital to London. The prospects are less prom- ising, however, that the new measures will accomplish the changes necessary to effect a lasting surplus in the balance of payments. The devaluation, by making British goods cheaper in foreign markets, should be a considerable aid to British ex- ports, but the program of domestic restrictions may be insufficient to prevent the gains of devalua- tion from being eaten up by in- flationary wage and price in- creases. To restrain rises in wages and prices, the government will rely on the type of voluntary cooperation it has gotten during its deflationary program of the past 16 months. The public's shattered confidence in the gov- ernment, however, could lead to a breakdown in this cooperation. The leaders of Britain's two largest trade unions have already said they will press for some major wage increases. SECRET 25X1 25X1 Approved Fgra %leaj 200 : qL4dW9-00937A@,O61P 070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/ff,CIA-RQP79-00927AO06100070001-9 HUNGARY LOOKS TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE Hungary is renewing its search for ways to expand relations with Western Europe--and West Germany in particular--perhaps even at the expense of its ties to Poland and East Germany. To this end, the Kadar re- gime apparently had decided to explore the possibilities for movement toward Western Europe in- herent in the so-far amorphous Communist proposals for new Euro- pean collective security arrange- ments. Not surprisingly, in view of the regime's dependence on good relations with the USSR, Hungarian leaders first cautiously unveiled their ideas in Moscow. Speaking on 4 November at the 50th anniversary celebrations, Hungarian party boss Kadar empha- sized that it was a state's pre- rogative to work out a foreign policy consonant with its national interests as a preliminary to coordination of policy among the world's Communist parties. when he stopped short of endors- ing the permanent division of Germany. Moreover,he flatly con- tradicted Gomulka and other East- ern European leaders who have as- serted that a West German renun- ciation of the use of force as an instrument of policy would be valueless. Fock called instead for acceptance without conditions of such small steps toward solu- tion of complex European security problems. Publication of Fock's arti- cle in Pravda does not necessar- ily imply Soviet endorsement. The absence, however, of specific adverse Soviet pressure--such as apparently was applied on Hungary last spring immediately after Rumania established diplomatic relations with the Federal Repub- lic--will encourage the Hungarian leadership to continue to explore its new path toward a reconcili- ation with Western Europe. Kadar was probably clearing the way for an article by Hungar- ian Premier Fock, which was pub- lished in Pravda on 16 November. Fock's thesis that "the German question is the main question of European security," was by itself unexceptionable and was couched in standard anti - West German propaganda terms. Fock also stayed in step with other East Europeans when he expressed sup- port for the "invaluable existence" of East Germany. He parted company with at least Poland's Gomulka, however, Fock's article drew an imme- diate reaction from the East Ger- mans who, along with the Poles, probably believe that their long- term security interests are threatened. On 16 November, the day the article was published, East German Foreign Minister Winzer said that an East-West German agreement is an "indispen- sable precondition" for any ef- fective renunciation-of-force arrangements. On the next day, Winzer flew to Moscow, possibly to review the East German and Hungarian positions with the So- 25X1 SECRET Approved Fc aleake 2007MBIM~ 6WRW79-00927AgQA,6100070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100070001-9 SECRET SECRIEiT Approved Forj)Relea~g 2007 9 QL6 : Pyly- 79-009 7I9o61g~070001-9 age R Approved For Release 2007/0W .,RDP79-00927A006100070001-9 MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA Troubles in the area reached a critical stage this week with the confrontation between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and serious incidents along the cease-fire line between Israel and Jordan. Diplomatic efforts were continuing to avert armed conflict over Cyprus as of noon on 22 Novem- ber, but both Greek and Turkish armed forces re- mained in a high state of readiness. The recent clashes between Israeli and Jorda- nian forces will make it more difficult for Jordan to prevent terrorists from infiltrating Israel and the West Bank. Increased terrorism will almost certainly bring new Israeli retaliation. The body politic of India broke out this week in a rash of state political crises. The most serious was in populous West Bengal, where the radical-left Communists, who were the most powerful force in a coalition government that was dismissed by the governor, are bent on vio- lent protest. On the other side of the country, the non-Congress governments of neighboring Pun- jab and Haryana states also folded, and mid-term elections may eventually be necessary. With regard to Congo (Kinshasa), neither the mercenaries nor the Katangans have yet been evacu- ated from Rwanda despite the Organization for African Unity's efforts. When the International Red Cross pulled out of the operation to airlift the Katangans to Zambia, the Congolese Government produced plans to return them to safe haven in the Congo; the Katangan reaction, however, is still uncertain. The Nigerian civil war plods along, as the OAU consultative mission gathers in Lagos in an effort to halt the hostilitie s, E 25X1 SECRET Approved ffflkel~lse 2I6 gNP74-`bO YAb96100070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/0319:6 pP79-00927A006100070001-9 CRISIS OVER CYPRUS Cyprus itself was generally quiet as of noon on 22 November, but the danger of a violent con- frontation between Greece and Turkey remained serious. Tensions have mounted during the past week, following the out- break of fighting on 15 November between the Greek Cypriot National Guard and Turkish Cypriots in the Ayios Theodoros - Kophinou area on the island. prepared to land troops on Cyprus if the Greek Government does not remove it: "illegal" forces from the islanc.. Another of Ankara's demands hz.s already been met-- the removz.1 of Greek General Grivas, the commander of Cypriot armed forces anc the individual largely responsib:.e for the extent of the 15 November fighting. Although Grivas probably will not return to the is:.and, his absence has not calmed the high state of emotion and military preparedness in Turkey. Ankara, working through third parties, has insisted that it is Term!; for quieting the crisis, which Ankara has apparently agreed SECRET Approved For Feelgase1O07/031 7131ASRDR9400927M 00070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/QQ'R(j)P DP79-00927AO06100070001-9 to, go beyond the removal of troops, although they do call for evacuation of those in ex- cess of the number allowed under the London-Zurich agreements of 1959, which provided the basis for Cypriot independence from the British in 1960. The terms would also include an enlarged and improved mandate for the UN peace force, the payment of an indemnity for the Turkish Cypriot losses in the fighting, and security arrangements for the Turkish Cypriot populace inde- pendent of Greek Cypriot authority. Ankara at the same time would be called upon to reaffirm the in- violability and integrity of the Cyprus Republic. Athens recognizes the serious- ness of the situation, but is try- ing to avoid reacting diplomati- cally to the Turkish terms until tensions have calmed. It has in- sisted that a quieter atmosphere was necessary before any thought could be given to the question of troop removal. Foreign Minister Pipinelis said that a Turkish ultimatum to remove Greek troops could only end in disaster. Athens has not yet answered the Turkish note of 17 November, which it re- gards as an unmenacing protest of the Ayios Theodoros incident, only hinting at the question of troop removal. There have been some additional shooting and bombing incidents on the island, but generally the situ- ation there has been calm. Most of the shootings have been initiated by the Turkish Cypriots, probably in the hope of gaining direct support from Ankara, which reportedly recog- nizes this danger of deliberate provocation. Perhaps to bolster the morale of its island brethren, Ankara has continued to send fighter and reconnaisance aircraft over the island throughout the week. As of mid-week, it appeared that both sides were still willing to give di-lomatic efforts a chance. 25X1 SECRET Approved Foi eas61200fl 6Y- dW P'#9-009'Z7A 1b6070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100070001-9 SECRET ARAB-ISRAELI TENSION INCREASES Israeli policies toward Jor- dan and the West Bank are reflect- ing a new and harder line in re- sponse to continued terrorism. In an exchange on 20 November be- tween Israeli and Jordanian forces, Israeli shellfire hit an Arab refugee camp and killed 14 Jordanians and wounded 28, mostly refugees. Jordanian Government to continue its policy of attempting to pre- vent Syria.i-supported terrorists from crossing Jordan and enter- ing the West Bank and Israel. The Israelis have apparently departed from their previous pol- icy of escalating to heavier weapons only after the other side has done so. On 21 November, the Israelis used planes against Jor- danian positions for the first time since the June war. In early November, the Is- raelis leveled a Jordanian town on the West Bank which, prior to the June war, had a population of 1.0,000. The Israelis claimed the town was destroyed because it might provide a possible hid- ing place for terrorists. The Jordanians claim that the destruc- tion of the town and other homes and buildings in the southern portion of the West Bank is unre- lated to terrorism and is an ef- fort by the Israelis to occupy and exploit fertile lands. In any case, the destruction of their homes will discourage the refugees from returning, even if the area is eventually returned to Jorda- nian control. 25X1 The Arab states have become increasing_.y fearful of an Is- raeli stril:e at Jordan and/or Syria. Much of this Arab fear, however, hies been generated by Israeli. troop rotations. In- creased terrorism in the absence of any Jordanian effort to re- strict the movement of infiltra- tors across. its land, however, would almoEt certainly result in an Israeli retaliatory strike. Although tt.ere is no indication at this time that an Israeli ac- tion is imminent, the Israelis are capablE of mobilizing suffi- cient forcES to mount a retalia- 25X1 tory strikE with little or no warning. This harder Israeli line may have made it impossible for the SECRET Approved Fo1 eagd 20071 / i QjA 1R 9-00 g7A91OQ070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/031 j-~DP79-00927A006100070001-9 ALGERIAN LEADERSHIP DISPUTE CONTINUES The dispute between Revolu- tionary Council President Bou- mediene and council member and chief of staff Colonel Tahar Z'Biri probably will continue unresolved for some time. The dispute broke into the open over a long-rumored cabinet reorganization. Boumediene ap- parently planned to eliminate Z'Biri's mouthpiece, the left- wing minister of labor, and the minister of agriculture. In turn, Z'Biri has demanded the ouster of some of Boumediene's henchmen and a meeting of the whole Revolutionary Council, in in which he stands a better chance of mustering a majority vote than does Boumediene. Al- though Boumediene is prepared to compromise, Z'Biri remains ada- mant but apparently unwilling to set off a revolt. The quarrel is rooted in the antipathy between the Algerian guerrillas--Z'Biri is their symbol--who fought the revolu- tion within the country and those in the military who--with Bou- mediene--sat out the revolution outside the country. After five- and-a-half years of independence, the former guerrillas have found their power progressively reduced in favor of the small, educated elite around Boumediene. Z'Biri's present support in- cludes not only the former guer- rillas within the army and the National Liberation Front (FLN), but also a heterogeneous coali- tion of other malcontents: labor leaders, leftists and Com- munists, and some strong mili- tary elements. More socialisti- cally oriented, they seek a greater role for organized labor in government. They accuse Bou- mediene of having scuttled self- management in industry and of letting it die out in agricul- ture. They also disagree with the regime's policy of allocat- ing oil and gas revenues to in- dustry rather than agriculture. On the other hand, Bou- mediene and his close advisers-- Foreign Minister Bouteflika, In- terior Minister Medeghri, Fi- nance Minister Kaid, and FLN chief Belkacem--are faced with overwhelming economic problems and generally place pragmatism first and ideology second. They have come to rely more and more on technicians as they strive to put Algeria on its feet. Another irritant is that Bou- mediene holds Z'Biri responsible for having miscalculated Egyp- tian and Syrian capabilities last June, which led to Algeria's die-hard policy toward Israel, and its resulting embarrassing diplomatic isolation. Z'Biri--if he did decide on open revolt--probably could count on some support from re- gional military commanders in eastern Algeria. Boumediene's position is basically stronger, however, bolstered by gendarmerie, police, an efficient intelligence network, and long experience in overcoming challenges to his au- thority. Among the military, Bou- mediene enjoys considerable pres- tige, but not overwhelming loyalty, modernization. 125X1 SECRET Approved Ford eas212007/O3 6L?XCIAL4UM9-00922A1OO6106070001-9 Approved For Release 200710Wr6k"DP79-00927AO06100070001-9 NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR PLODS ALONG Federal military commanders are moving slowly and carefully in the face of stubborn resistance by the secessionist Biafrans. Al- though hurting, the rebels are dog- gedly sticking to their fight for independence. Several recent Biafran attempts to regain their capital, Enugu, failed, but until the Enugu area is secured, federal forces probably will not try to thrust deeper into densely populated Ibo tribal lands. A federal column from the north is SECRET Approved FcYJWea e20071Q3h@6Y Q$ P?9-0092TAm66100070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/Q~ CfDP79-00927AO06100070001-9 nearing the Enugu-Abaliki road at Nkalagu to relieve Biafran pressure, which so far has denied federal use of the En.ugu airfield. Federal forces on other fronts have also found the going slow. One group, previously thwarted in its attempt to cross the Niger River to Onitsha, has received nu- merous reinforcements of men and ar- tillery in preparation for another try. In the southeastern area, federal troops have moved north of Calabar toward a crossing point on the Cross River, but Biafran units apparently still are blocking the main road north to Cameroon and Ikom, where federal troops have had skirmishes with Biafrans recently. Ojukwu's regime shows no sign of giving up the fight. Recent speeches by Ojukwu and other top leaders exhort the Ibos to greater efforts and reiterate Biafran terms for peace negotiations--full sover- eignty for the former Eastern Re- gion. Federal forces, in addition to a steady stream of small arms and ammunition from a number of sources, have received three MO-VI - class Soviet patrol boats, a part of last summer's deal with the USSR. STABILITY TENUOUS IN FORMER FRENCH EQUATORIAL AFRICA The recent airlift of a com- Erratic President Bokassa of pany of French combat troops to the CAR is presently in one of his Bangui--capital of the Central Af- periodic nervous moods, and the air- rican Republic (CAR) and geographic lift to Bangui on 10 November was center of former French Equatorial in direct response to his request Africa--highlights the concern of for French troops earlier this both the local governments and France fall. What prompted the request over the stability of the four suc- is not altogether clear, although cessor countries to the old colonial rumors of impending antigovernment federation. activity have been heard in Bangui. SECRET Approved Forl#ea&&200W83M5 (M BP79-00927AO0.6100070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/0/6 DP79-00927A006100070001-9 Bokassa has been increasingly criti- cal of Finance Minister Banza, the only person capable of ousting him. At present, uneasiness is more prevalent in Gabon, where there are signs of renewed worry over the problem of succession to ailing President Mba, who has been in a Paris clinic for over a year. Youthful Vice President Bongo, groomed to succeed to the presi- dency, has failed thus far to achieve the status and degree of acceptance of Mba. The French are anxious to preserve their dominant influence in Gabon, their primary source of uranium ore, but appar- ently hope to avoid a repetition of their direct intervention in 1964 that squelched an anti-Mba coup deemed inimical to French interests. In Chad, the two-year-old Mus- lim rebellion continues in the coun- try's eastern provinces, and Presi- dent Tombalbaye seems increasingly depressed over his inability to solve the nation's pressing eco- nomic problems. Events in Congo (Brazzaville) 25X1 continue to be shrouded in ob- scurity and extremist rhetoric, but the deployment of French com- bat troops to Bangui could have a sobering effect on the freewheel- ing radical elements that oppose President Massamba-Debat. Mas- samba appears to be responsible for whatever moderation persists in Brazzaville, and he seems to have become increasingly accept- able to the French. France maintains defense agree- ments with all four countries and has maintenance-of-order accords with Gabon, Chad, and Congo, un- der which French troops may be called in to quell internal dis- orders. The airlift to Bangui is a relatively low-cost preven- tive measure that gives reassur- ance to the governments of the 25X1 area and food for thou ht to o- tential coup makers. SECRET Approved $ Mel;fise 20O/166~t19VlWP79-009 00 7100070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/CftFl ft-9P79-00927AO06100070001-9 COMMUNIST CHINA RENEWS EFFORTS IN AFRICA With the easing of the disrup- tive pressures of the Cultural Revolution on Chinese foreign af- fairs, Peking is turning its at- tention to policy programs, largely held in abeyance for many months, affecting various African coun- tries. Red Guard "supervision" of foreign policy matters began to wane in late August, and since that time the Chinese have stepped up exchanges of delegations and have offered increased economic and military assistance to several African states. The greatest potential Chinese commitment has been made to Tanzania and Zambia for assistance in constructing the Tan-Zam railroad. In an agree- ment signed in Peking on 5 Sep- tember, the Chinese undertook to assist the project, esti- mated by Western sources to cost about $400 million and to require from four to eight years to build. Although all parties have given heavy prop- aganda coverage to the agree- ment, the Chinese probably have retained the option of reconsidering their participa- tion following initial surveys. Peking's relations with Mali, which contains the larg- est Chinese aid mission in Af- rica, have improved apprecia- bly. the Chinese are 25X1 increasing their economic aid ef- forts in Mali. Following a Sino- Malian aid agreement in August, a new group of 87 Chinese tech- nicians arrived in Mali to join SECRET Approved For gasi 51007I 6fib?~'tUA 9 009 A I 6670001-9 Approved For Release 2007/03"6 4 DP79-00927A006100070001-9 the estimated 1,300 Chinese aid technicians already in the country. The Chinese also reportedly promised substantial financial aid to the Congo (Brazzaville) when Prime Minister Noumazalay visited Peking in early October. A Chi- nese mission is expected to arrive in Brazzaville in the near future to examine possible new projects. Since 1964, Peking has extended about $25 million in credits to the Congo and currently has ap- proximately 300 aid personnel there. SECRET Page 26 WEEKLY L% Approved For Release 2007/03/06: IA-RDP19-0042 U`l86070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006100070001-9 SECRET WESTERN HEMISPHERE Labor problems are plaguing several Latin Amer- ican countries, in some cases more for political than for economic reasons. In Chile, the unions dominated by Communists and Socialists scheduled a general strike on 23 No- vember to protest the government's wage readjustment policies. Brazil faces a similar situation. Illegal strikes, although usually of little individual sig- nificance, are becoming more numerous. More often than in the past, they are directed against govern- ment wage laws rather than against economic inequi- ties. In Ecuador, where political motives are mixed with legitimate labor grievances, the Arosemena ad- ministration has recently taken a firmer stand against Communist-led strikes. Economic motivation is clearer in Guatemala, where railroad employees who have not been paid re- cently are threatening the US owners and staff with physical violence. The labor picture in Peru is quiet at present, but the expiration of many con- tracts in December could lead to union demands for wage increases to compensate for recent price in- creases. In Uruguay, labor unions are dominated by Com- munists, but the leaders have difficulty organizing a strike on purely political issues. Agitation on economic issues is usually successful, and most workers, squeezed between rising prices and stable salaries, probably will respond to any strike call. In the diplomatic sphere, maneuvering on the part of several candidates for the post of secre- tary general of the OAS prevented any from getting the necessary two-thirds vote on the first two bal- lots--the Panamanian and Venezuelan candidates get- ting the largest vote each time. A simple majority will elect a candidate now, with the next ballot coming on 27 November. Brazilian and Argentine diplomats at home and at the UN were very active in attempting to get a resolution on the Middle East before the Security Council. SECRET Approved FlwgRelease 209MMIB sC 4R P792609TAW 100070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100070001-9 SECRET GUERRILLA DEFEAT GAINS RESPITE FOR BO_IVIAN PRESIDENT The Bolivian Government's success against the guerrillas- which culminated in the death of Che Guevara and most of his followers--has temporarily strengthened the Barrientos re- gime at the expense of the op- position parties. Since the outbreak of hos- tilities in early March, the dis- parate and often antagonistic op- position groups had been united in their attack on the govern- ment's handling of the guerrilla threat, in the belief that the insurgency would lead to a loss of presidential prestige. The government's success now has thrown the opposition off bal- ance and has exposed again dif- ferences within the Parties over future policy. The Movement of the Revolu- tionary Left (MNR), the party of former president Paz, papered over its internal differences in early June, but now seems once more divided. A number of more militant leaders have writ- ten an extremist document, "The National Revolution Against the North American Occupation," which more moderate elements have denounced. The Bolivian Socialist Falange (F;3B) was already split between militants and those who favor cooperation with the armed forces. I: now faces the pros- pect of a :-evolt from the mid- dle group, increasingly discon- tented with the party's inabil- ity to adolat a coherent line leading toward eventual attain- ment of power. Although the government's position his been temporarily strengthened by these develop- ments, the: ,e are signals of danger ahead. The President is more than ever beholden to the armed :orces, not only be- cause of their regained pres- tige but a:.so because of the government s loss of control over some political forces. Four of thc! seven, university student federations have elected Communist =.eaders during the past four rionths, a record for leftist hegemony in the trouble- some education sector. Also, the governrent's efforts last year to enure the election of a sympathetic leader in a major labor confederation seem to have been r.egated in recent union elections. As a.iesult, Barrientos may have to yield to military pres- sures in a number of important S E C R I+:" i' Approved For, Rgelea~g 2007WQ,33/06 : CIIA-RDDP79-0092~7AO06100070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/0&;:j pf'79-00927A006100070001-9 areas, perhaps even to the ex- tent of allowing increased mil- itary representation in the gov- ernment. The military can be expected to be less patient than previously in handling a sometimes truculent opposition, whether in street demonstrations or in Congress, and may even press for the exercise of uncon- stitutional powers. An even greater danger, how- ever, lies in the possibility that the armed forces--enjoying their first civilian popularity in some time--may seek to con- solidate their position by cater- ing to the resurgent wave of na- tionalism. This may pose serious problems for the US, particularly in relation to private and gov- ernment investments in Bolivia. PERU'S BELAUNDE TRIES TO WIN WIDER SUPPORT President Belaunde has named a new prime minister in a belated effort to win support from the opposition-controlled Congress and the business com- munity for his administration's proposals to cope with the cur- rent economic problems. Dr. Raul Ferrero Rebagliat_L, an expert on international and constitutional law, succeeds to the post held by Edgardo Seoane since 7 September. Until his appointment, Ferrero was a member of the International Court of Justice. Although the appointment has been greeted with mild ap- proval by the Congress and the business community, influential leaders of the President's own party have expressed disappoint- ment at the choice. Former prime minister Seoane, reportedly quite bitter over Ferrero's selection, returns to his pre- vious position as secretary general of the governing Popular Action (AP) party. Seoane's control of the party machinery and his command of the loyalties of the majority of local AP organizations will give him leverage to oppose ad- ministration programs that he believes would compromise the party's campaign promises of SECRET Approved For Rpefegase~b07/O P A-i - 0927'A" 0di0& 0001-9 Approved For Release 2007/031p 90P79-00927A006100070001-9 1963. Such opposition could rapidly develop when the new prime minister attempts to reach an agreement with congressional leaders on 1968 budget and tax measures. Some party leaders, in view of the anticipated op- position, are already predict- ing that the new cabinet will not last long. Belaunde faces some diffi- cult weeks ahead. The Congress, which will convene in special session on 25 November, is ex- pected to be even less willing than in the past to allow new taxes without an agreement by the administration to make sharp cuts in expenditures. The cost of living continues to inch upward, threatening another round of strikes and wage demands by workers in December, when many wage contracts are up for renewal. If bus fares go up, following an expected rise in gasoline prices, unrest will increase even more. SECRET In a political maneuver to stem the decline in his prestige, Belaunde has moved against the International Petroleum Company (IPC). The government has an- nounced it will take IPC--a sub- sidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey--to court to collect ad- ditional taxes owed by the com- pany as well as all the company's profits for the last 15 years. IPC officials are gravely concerned cver the effect of this action on the company's future operations. They have indicated that they might shut down the oil fields, which produce nearly 80 percent of Peru's petroleum needs, rather than submit to unfair and excessive taxation. Such action could provoke a confron- tation between the government and the IPC which could dis- courage future US investments Approved Fc ea3O 2007M3X16 P79-009 7 W1?Q070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/gI, (9 ff P79-00927AO06100070001-9 CHILEAN ELECTIONEERING STIRS POLITICAL SCENE A senatorial by-election in Chile on 17 December prob- ably will be used by all politi- cal parties as a testing ground for the 1969 congressional and 1970 presidential elections. Although the seat in ques- tion is in an agricultural dis- trict where local problems are the predominant interest, the opposition will probably cam- paign primarily on national is- sues. If it wins, it can then claim that by defeating the candidate of President Frei's Christian Democratic Party (PDC), it has demonstrated Frei's loss of popularity during his three years in office. The left-wing leadership of the Radical Party (PR) will be trying to prove that its pol- icy of cooperation with the Com- munists and Socialists is paying important dividends. The PR has nominated Alberto Blatra, president of the Chilean-Soviet Cultural Institute, and has ob- tained formal support from the Communist Party. The Socialists, always less enthusiastic than the Communists about cooperating with the PR, have as yet made no formal declaration of support. They will not run their own candidate, however, and certainly will in no way hamper Baltra's campaign. . In an attempt to minimize the national implications of the election, the PDC has nomi- nated one of the area's most popular politicians, Jorge Lav-_ andero. Despite the PDC's de- cision to run a local man rather than a national figure, the gov- ernment is certain to be watch ing the results closely, and members of the administration probably will campaign for Lavandero. Two relatively small parties are also contesting the election. The conservative National Party has not yet named its candidate, and is running only to keep its name before the voters. PADENA, a small leftist party, has en- tered the race, but its candi- date may withdraw in favor of Lavandero. One of the most important issues is certain to be the gov- ernment's wage-price policy for 1968, although this program will have less effect in an agri- cultural area than in other parts of the country. The pro- gram, which calls for part of the 1968 wage readjustment to be paid in bonds of a govern- ment fund, has sparked opposi- tion from all political and eco- nomic sectors. Lavandero's close association with the Frei administration may be a severe handicap if he is forced to cam- paign primarily on a platform of support for the wage-price policy. SECRET Approved ForJV@ase ?f 07/QM/ ?.yCI 7~-009274A%109970001-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100070001-9 SEC:R ET RIGHT-WING PARTY GAINS STRENGTH IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC The growing strength of the right-wing Democratic Quisqueyan Party (PQD), which is promoting exiled General Wessin y Wessin as its 1970 presidential. candidate, is creating an uneasy political situation in the Dominican Repub- lic. The PQD recently applied for recognition as a political party, a move that could pave the way for Wessin's return from exile in Miami, Florida. President Balaguer had stated last July that he would permit Wessin to return if sufficient popular support for such a move developed, and he recently ac- knowledged Wessin's eligibility to participate in forthcoming elections. He has made no move to lift the ban on the general's re-entry into the country, how- ever. Balaquer reportedly be- lieves that Wessin's return at this time would create divisions in the armed forces, on which his government so heavily depends. Wessin, who led the counter- revolt against the rebel forces that precipitated the civil war of 1965, became a symbol for the rightists and was "voluntarily" retired and exiled to the US in September 1965 by provisional president Garcia Godov. It ap- pears that he is fast becoming a rallying point for disaffected political z.nd business elements who for a variety of reasons see him as a potential instrument for upsetting what they consider to be an unsatisfactory status quo. There is rE:ason to believe that Wessin sti=.1 commands some loy- alty in thE~ armed forces, partic- ularly at _.ower levels, but the number of r.is followers is be- lieved to le small. Unfour.ded rumors of a less- than-posit.ve US attitude toward Balaguer hz.ve added to the Wes- sinista cor.troversy. Such alle- gations have gained wide currency among rumormongers and have led to charges by otherwise, responsi- ble elements that US support is shifting tc Wessin. There are indications that Wessin and his supporters are planning same major move on 1 De- cember. St.ch an action, unless authorized by the government, could lead to a confrontation be- tween the Ealaguer regime and Wessin's fcllowers. So far, pro- Wessin civilian and military ele- ments are rot united. Neverthe- less, the Potential clearly exists for alliances that could pose serious prcblems for the Balaguer government. SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100070001-9 Page 32 WEEKLY SUMMARY 24 ;4ov 67 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100070001-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100070001-9 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100070001-9