WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006100090001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 8, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
Secret
47
8 December 1967
No. 0.319/67
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(Information as of noon EST, 7 December 1967)
VIETNAM
Recent developments in the area surrounding Khe Sanh
in western Quang Tri Province suggest that the Com-
munists may be preparing for another major offensive.
The recent friction generated over the attempted
resignation of Police Director Loan and the convic-
tion of some generals that the new government is
inefficient and vulnerable to Communist infiltra-
tion appears to have eased for the moment.
DISORDERS PLAGUE CHINA DESPITE APPEALS FOR CALM
Clashes between rival Red Guard factions continue
from widely scattered parts of China.
Present Peking policy, however, appears to be to
attempt to limit disturbances as much as possible
while appealing for order and discipline--an approach
that so far has been ineffective.
THAI ARMY INCREASES COUNTERINSURGENCY ROLE
The army intends to assert its authority over all
counterinsurgency operations by assuming the direc-
tion of civilian as well as military programs.
JAPANESE MERCHANT FLEET TO ENTER THE NUCLEAR AGE
After more than ten years of study of nuclear reac-
tor and hull designs, authorization has been given
to build Japan's first nuclear-powered ship.
SUHARTO REGIME SEEKS NEW SOLUTIONS TO OLD PROBLEMS
The Suharto regime is considering new approaches to
some of Indonesia's intractable political and eco-
nomic problems.
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COST OF FRENCH NUCLEAR PROGRAMS TO REMAIN HIGH IN 1968 13
Costs will almost equal the $1.4 billion spent this
year. These programs have cost about $8.1 billion
since 1946.
SOVIETS ACTIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
They are missing no opportunities to make points with
the Arab states by means of economic and military aid.
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CZECHOSLOVAK REGIME MAY UNDERGO SHAKE-UP
A party central committee plenum is scheduled
to meet shortly to discuss serious domestic
;problems and there are widespread rumors of
forthcoming personnel changes in the party and
government.
POLISH TEMPERS AROUSED BY INCREASES IN MEAT PRICES
Demonstrations against the price rises have
subsided but there is still much dissatisfaction.
Page
Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 19
WAR THREAT ON CYPRUS APPEARS OVER, BUT PROBLEMS REMAIN 20
The danger of war in the latest Cyprus crisis ap-
pears to be over, but the governments of Cyprus
and Turkey are still in fundamental disagreement
over future arrangements for internal security.
GOVERNMENT FORMED IN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF SOUTH YEMEN 21
The new government is headed by the leader of the
National Liberation Front. Its first days have
been quiet, the rival opposition front having as
yet made no move to initiate new fighting.
FEDERAL MIGS ACTIVE IN NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR
The civil war remains largely stalemated on the
ground, but the federal government's superior air
power is helping to tighten the noose around seces-
sionist Biafra.
NEW REBUBLICAN REGIME IN YEMEN IN TROUBLE
The recently installed republican regime is fac-
ing mounting military pressure from the royalists,
although it is receiving some assistance from its
Soviet and Egyptian allies.
CONGO (KINSHASA) FACES POSTCRISIS DAYS
With the mercenary crisis in the Congo nearly over,
the government is reassessing its position and
formulating new policies.
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GHANA'S JUNTA FACING WINTER OF DISCONTENT
Ghana's National Liberation Council, still grap-
pling with the economic and political mess left
by Nkrumah, is entering a new and more difficult
phase of its transitional rule.
Western Hemisphere
Page
URUGUAY'S NEW PRESIDENT FACES OLD PROBLEMS
Former Vice President Jorge Pacheco Areco has
succeeded to the presidency following the sudden
death of President Oscar D. Gestido.
PERUVIAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK UNFAVORABLE
The Belaunde administration and the opposition-
controlled Congress are again at odds, this time
over the best way to handle economic problems,
particularly the financing of the 1968 budget
now before Congress.
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FAR EAST
Military activity in South Vietnam remained
at a relatively low level last week but there were
indications that Communist forces are preparing a
new offensive in northwestern Quang Tri Province
near the Demilitarized Zone. There was further evi-
dence of closer coordination between Viet Cong and
North Vietnamese operations, with Viet Cong harass-
ing attacks at widely scattered points aimed at
relieving allied pressure on Communist main force
units.
With the approach of holiday truce periods,
Soviet spokesmen have renewed efforts to persuade
the US to prolong the projected bombing pause.
They have privately intimated that Hanoi would
promptly agree to talks if the US refrained from
setting a terminal date for the pause. The North
Vietnamese, however, have not joined this effort
and there is no indication that the Soviets are
acting at Hanoi's behest.
Cambodia's heightened concern that the war
might spread into its territory was evident in
Phnom Penh's reaction to President Thieu's state-
ment reserving the right to pursue Communist forces
into Cambodia. A Cambodian statement denounced
Thieu's warning as an attempt to "bring the war
into Cambodia on false pretexts" and again denied
that there are Communist forces on Cambodian ter-
ritory.
Disorder continues to spread in China against
a background of vacillation in Peking and at least
covert encouragement of radical Red Guard groups
by militant Maoists. In foreign affairs, the Chinese
are trying to force Hong Kong authorities to ease
their harassment of local Communists by stalling on
granting exit visas to British diplomatic person-
nel in Peking. When the Chinese relaxed restric-
tions on the British mission in late November, they
had implied that normal procedure in issuing visas
would be restored. Despite this attempt to put
pressure on the Hong Kong government, the Chinese
Foreign Ministry has professed a desire to normal-
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'VIETNAM
Recent developments in the
area surrounding Khe Sanh in
western Quang Tri Province sug-
gest that the Communists may be
preparing for another major of-
fensive.
US reconnaissance patrols
staging from the US Marine gar-
rison at Khe Sanh have encoun-
tered numerous small enemy forces
in the mountains northwest of
their base. Additionally, the
Special Forces camp at Lang Vei
and other nearby friendly field
positions have been repeatedly
attacked. by mortar and recoil-
less rifle fire in recent weeks.
This increase in Communist-ini-
tiated activity may be a prelude
to a large-scale offensive.
Heavy monsoon rains have
disrupted overland allied supply
lines and have limited the tacti-
cal movements of Long range recon-
naissance patrols. Route 9--the
only access road into Khe Sanh and
Lang Vei from supply points to
the east--is presently closed to
vehicular traffic and will not be
reopened until the current mon-
soon rains taper off in January.
The movement of men and materiel
is now limited to airlifts when
weather permits.
In the Mekong Delta, US
troops and South Vietnamese Ma-
rives achieved a significant
tactical victory over the Viet
Cong 502nd local force battalion
early this week. About six miles
east of Sa Dec some 235 enemy
soldiers were killed in a fierce
day-long battle. Forty-one South
Vietnamese and 13 Americans were
killed.
The engagement resulted from
an allied probe deep into Viet
Cong - controlled territory--the
first in this particular area
since 1961. US military offi-
cials credited the strong lead-
ership and aggressiveness of the
South Vietnamese Marines with
turning what threatened to be
a costly ambush into a success-
ful encounter that cut deeply
into the strength of the enemy
unit.
Politics in South Vietnam
The recent friction gen-
erated over the attempted
resignation of Police Director
Loan and the conviction of some
generals that the new government
is inefficient and vulnerable
to Communist infiltration ap-
pears to have eased for h
moment.
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The moderating influence
so far exerted by Vice President
Ky, who reportedly headed off
a more serious crisis by persuad-
ing Loan to withdraw his resigna-
tion and by asking the other gen-
erals to give the government a
chance, may have a stabilizing
effect.
The government has announced
that some 20 leaders of the 1966
Buddhist struggle movement, which
centered in Hue and Da Nang, will
be brought to trial on 19 Decem-
ber. The 20 include several army
officers and Nguyen Van Man, the
former mayor of Da Nang. The
trial is likely to raise a furor
among opposition elements, par-
ticularly the militant Buddhists
and opposition deputies in the
Lower House.
The Lower House has joined
with the Upper House in calling
for a review of the government's
mobilization decree. Both houses
have claimed that the decree's
promulgation was unconstitutional
because it lacked legislative ap-
proval and have invited govern-
ment representatives to appear
before them to defend it.
Soviets Press for
Bombing Ha t.
Soviet diplomats on several
occasions during the past week
indicated unofficially that an
indefinite cessation of the bomb-
ing of North Vietnam at this
time would lead to talks with
Hanoi. These reports appear to
be the beginning of a campaign
to persuade the US to extend any
projected pause in the bombing
of North Vietnam during the
holidays. They are similar to
Soviet efforts conducted prior
to the Christmas truce period
last year. Further Soviet ap-
proaches along this line are
expected although there is no
indication that Moscow is acting
at Hanoi's behest. 25X1
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DISORDERS PLAGUE CHINA DESPITE APPEALS FOR CALM
Clashes between rival Red
Guard factions continue to be
reported from widely scattered
parts of China.
In eastern China, clashes
continue in Kwangtung, Chekiang
Kiangsu and Fukien provinces,
and Red Guard factionalism also
appears to be causing trouble
in Anhwei and Hunan.
In the city of Canton II
I I serious
fighting is on e in ase.
I Ia barrage of
new posters nave appeared in
the streets and that hundreds
of army men from the north are
being brought into the city--
presumably to control Red Guard
factional fighting.
the Canton Trade
Fair wi be forced to shut down
before the official 15 December
closin date.
little business nas
been transacted. A violent fight
broke out at Canton's main rail
station on 2 December. This is
the first incident at the sta-
tion since it was put under heavy
army guard in September.
In many instances the mili-
tary still appears willing to
break up disturbances once they
have occurred. Neither the army
nor Peking, however, seems willing
to take the really decisive step
to suppress the Red Guards who
are instigating the disorder.
Present policy appears to be to
attempt to limit disturbances
as much as possible while appeal-
ing for order and discipline--
an approach that so far has been
ineffective. This policy can at
best yield only gradual and par-
tial dividends for the proponents
of moderation who are now formu-
lating the regime's propaganda
line.
Militant Red Guards appear
to read Peking's vacillation as
a sign that militant leaders
in Peking still retain consider-
able strength. In these circum-
stances militant Red Guards con-
tinue to attempt to settle scores
with conservative, locally or-
iented Red Guard groups and to
launch somewhat muted propaganda
attacks on provincial and local
"persons in authority," which
generally means local military
figures. The radical Red Guards
do not appear to be receiving
overt support in these maneuvers
from militant leaders in Peking,
but they may be getting a degree
of covert encouragement.
I Red Guard 25X1
newspapers suggest a the radi-
cals are attempting to justify
their intransigence and continued
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activity by claiming that the
ultimate authority--Mao himself--
is sanctioning their actions. The
papers publish selective excerpts
from the Chairman's most recent.
"instructions" purporting to
show that he tolerates and en-
courages continued Red Guard at-
tacks on the "authorities." The
regime's central propaganda media
made use of these same "instruc-
tions" in mid-October to give
the impression that last autumn's
turn toward moderation had Mao's
full backing.
The official press and radio
continues to stress moderation
and restraint. In the past week,
propaganda has particularly em-
phasized the central role of the
Communist Party, using laudatory
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terms that have been conspicuously
absent from official propaganda
for the past year. The most ex-
plicit of these comments--a
Shanghai newspaper editorial of
3 December--specifically stated
that it "would be an extremely
grievous mistake" to direct "rev-
olutionary" activity against
ordinary party members. The
propaganda stresses the impor-
tance of "party-building," but
in present circumstances there
is little prospect of a recon-
struction of the party machinery
which was almost totally wrecked
by the Cultural Revolution. The
current propaganda line is prob-
ably an indication of the future
hopes of the moderate camp rather
than a call for immediate action
to rebuild the party. 25X1
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THAI ARMY INCREASES COUNTERINSURGENCY ROLE
The Thai Army is moving to
extend its control over counter-
insurgency operations in north-
east Thailand.
The army was given full
authority for the government's
countersubversion effort last
October, when Deputy Prime Minis-
ter Praphat announced that martial
law would be implemented in the
northeast. The army's jurisdiction
over nonmilitary aspects of the
counterinsurgency program, how-
ever, was left open to discussion.
It appears that army leaders are
anxious to assert at least nominal
authority over rural development
programs, although they will prob-
ably continue to leave the day-
to-day direction to the civilians.
The deputy chief of staff, for
example, maintains that the army
will refrain from excessive in-
terference in order not to dis-
rupt US aid.
In any case, the army in-
tends to adopt tougher tactics
against the insurgents. The
northeast army commander has
stated that security forces are
under orders to shoot on sight
all suspects found in certain
contested areas. He also said
that the powers of arrest would
be extended to all government
officials and that they should
ignore legal restraints in deal-
ing with "Communist suspects."
In the past, civilian officials
have used legal niceties as an
excuse for inaction.
There are continuing signs
that the government's accelerated
effort in the northeast is be-
ginning to pay off. Insurgent
activity during October reached
its lowest level in the north-
east in over a year. Despite
minor inroads into previously
unaffected areas, the insurgents
have made no major gains in 1967,
and apparently have had little
success in improving their weak
or anization in the villages.
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JAPANESE MERCHANT FLEET TO ENTER THE NUCLEAR AGE
Prime Minister Sato's re-
cent authorization for construc-
tion of Japan's first nuclear-
powered ship follows more than
ten years of study of nuclear
reactor and hull designs by the
Japanese. The 8,300-gross-ton
special purpose freighter was
conceived as an oceanographic
research ship, but recent reports
indicate that it will be used
instead to transport materials
used in Japanese nuclear programs.
Construction is scheduled to be-
gin late next year, and the ship
will be built entirely in Japan.
Japan has a well-developed
program for the peaceful use of
nuclear energy and probably is
capable of developing a marine
propulsion system. Nuclear-
fueled electric power plants in
Japan have been plagued by dif-
ficulties, however, and design
problems in the even more exact-
ing area of marine propulsion
could cause postponement of the
1972 completion date projected
for the nuclear freighter.
The $30-million Japanese
venture, conceived and financed
jointly by government and indus-
try, is an experimental project
aimed at developing nuclear pro-
pulsion technology. Like other
countries entering the nuclear
propulsion field, the Japanese
expect their current efforts to
put them in a good position to
cash in on the anticipated de-
mand for nuclear merchant ships
once construction and fuel costs
are reduced to a competitive
level.
Nuclear energy is still too
expensive to compete with con-
ventional power for merchant
ship propulsion. Nuclear-powered
surface ship development: is lag-
ging behind the nuclear submarine
programs under way in the US,
USSR, France, and UK. The US
Navy has the only four nuclear-
powered warships afloat. The
icebreaker Lenin, the USSR's only
nuclear-powered surface ship,
has been inactive for two years.
The Italian Navy will enter the
nuclear age with the Enrico Fermi,
an auxiliary support ship now
being designed. It is scheduled
to be completed in 1972.
The USS Savannah presently
is the only nuclear-powered mer-
chant ship. West Germany is
building a nuclear freighter,
the Otto Hahn, which probably
will begin sea trials next year.
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SUHARTO REGIME SEEKS NEW SOLUTIONS TO OLD PROBLEMS
The Suharto regime is con-
sidering new approaches to some
of Indonesia's intractable po-
litical and economic problems.
Acting President Suharto is
said to be deeply concerned by
the legislative impasse in parlia--
ment where the traditionalist
National Party (PNI) and the
Moslem Nahdatul Ulama (NU) usually
block bills supported by the army
and the various student and in-
tellectual action fronts.
The most recent example is
the draft election law which has
been so altered in committee by
PNI and NU representatives that
parliamentary leaders--foreseeing
deadlock on the floor--indefinitely
postponed further consideration
of the bill. Failure to pass an
election law not only defers elec-
tions probably until 1970 but
indicates the extent of parlia-
ment's legislative paralysis.
.Consequently a drive for
parliamentary reorganization has
been undertaken by the action
fronts and some army elements, ap-
parently with Suharto's tacit ap-
proval. They suggest parliament's
self-dissolution and a new mem-
bership appointed by Suharto.
Since the present parliament is
itself appointed and provisional,
government elements claim that
the proposed change would not be
unconstitutional. It is too early
to tell, however, whether the
scheme has much prospect of suc-
cess.
The rice shortage which has
resulted in spiraling prices has
forced the government to respond
to mounting criticism and face
up to the long-standing but po-
litically sensitive issue of cor-
ruption. Suharto has now author-
ized an impressive task force,
headed by the attorney general and
assisted by the justice minister
and the four armed services com-
manders, to "eliminate corrup-
tion." Although the task force
may prosecute a few lower level
figures and perhaps one cabinet
minister, high ranking army of--
ficers are unlikely to be removed
from office. They may be induced,
however, to curtail their illegal
activities.
The government has not been
totally remiss on the corruption
issue and before establishing the 25X6
task force had been taking steps
against irregularities. For example,
Major Gen. Ibnu Sutowo,
director general for
oil and natural gas, reportedly has
been forced to turn oil revenues
into the Bank of Indonesia rather
than conduct independent operations
as had been his practice for some
years.
Violence in rural West Kali-
mantan since early November by the
Dayak tribal group has caused severe
economic disruption in that area
and created a serious refugee prob-
lem in the cities. Initially tar-
geted against the Chinese, vio-
lence later was turned on Indonesian
village officials. Although the
violence has now been largely
stopped, its political overtones are
a reminder of Indonesia's ethnic
diversity and the abiding problem of
barel submerged separatist tendencies.
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Moscow is still much occupied with the Arab
world. What appeared in the beginning to be a
limited Soviet move to build credit with the new
regime in Yemen is now taking on the aspects of a
deeper and perhaps risky commitment to prop up the
beleaguered republicans.
The Soviets have also shown the flag again in
Cairo. They flew in ten long-range bombers for
what Moscow says is a brief visit. It was the first
appearance of these planes in a non-Communist coun-
try. Moscow also promised Syria more aid.
In his opening address to the national party
conference, Rumanian party chief Ceausescu again
expressed differences with Moscow and indirectly
accused the Russians of putting economic pressure
on Rumania. Ceausescu had himself named president
of the state and will continue as party chief.
The East German regime announced on 1 December
that it will draft a new constitution, a move which
it believes will strengthen its claims to sovereignty.
In a major policy speech, party boss Ulbricht
seemed to rule out the possibility for negotiations
with Bonn on humanitarian or administrative ques-
tions unless his regime was granted recognition.
In Spain, student demonstrations against the
regime continued and police severity in dispers-
ing demonstrators has led to a student strike.
Agitation may continue on and off until the Christ-
mas holidays, but the police should be able to
keep things from etting out of hand.
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COST OF FRENCH NUCLEAR PROGRAMS TO REMAIN HIGH IN 1968
French expenditures for
civil and military nuclear pro-
grams next year are likely to to-
tal nearly $1.4 billion, only
slightly less than in 1967. The
recently adopted budget shows a
small cut in the military's nu-
clear activities funds, but ac-
cording to the armed services
minister the exact calculation
of the cost of atomic armament
cannot be determined from one
part of the military budget.
There will be some shifting
of funds within the French nu-
clear program in 1968 because of
the completion last year of at
least two major projects--the
Pierrelatte gaseous diffusion
plant and the Pacific test center.
Appropriations for "functioning
and maintenance" for this test
center are scheduled to rise next
year as are funds for "tactical
atomic arms." These increases
will offset to some extent the
reduction in capital construction
costs now envisaged for 1968.
Total expenditures on the
French nuclear program from its
inception early in 1946 to the
end of 1967 are about $8.1 bil-
lion. About half of this sum
has been spent during 1965-67.
The French armed forces have
provided about 45 percent; of the
total amount expended on nuclear
programs but their share of the
total comes to about 70 percent
when their part in projects es-
sential to both military and ci-
vilian activities is taken into
consideration. The military part
of the nuclear program includes
only facilities and activities
related to the production of nu-
clear weapons and to the develop-
ment of a nuclear propulsion
system for submarines. The first
nuclear submarine is expected to
be operational in 1970.
In addition to the military
portion of the program, the
French have undertaken an ambi-
tious program for the development
of nuclear electric power. Of-
ficials have stated that at
least one 500 megawatt electric
nuclear power station will be
built annually during 1968-70.
These stations will be tied to
reactors fueled with natural
uranium unless enriched uranium
for nonmilitary uses becomes
available from the Pierrelatte
installations.
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SOVIETS ACTIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The Soviets are missing no
opportunities to make points with
the Arab states by means of eco-
nomic and military aid. Syrian
and Yemeni delegations were re-
cently in Moscow, a Soviet eco-
nomic group is in Iraq, and one
is scheduled to visit Jordan. A
large Egyptian economic and in-
dustrial delegation will be in
Moscow later this month. In an
unprecedented gesture, ten Soviet
long-range bombers flew to Cairo
for a six-day visit--the first
ceremonial flight of these air-
craft to other than a Warsaw Pact
nation.
The Yemeni delegation in
Moscow was probably working out
the specifics of new military
assistance and discussing the use
of unobligated Soviet economic
credits extended in 1964.
Despite differences with
Syria over a political settlement
in the Middle East, Moscow re-
newed its promise to provide ad-
ditional military and economic
aid. Syria's chief of staff was
with the Syrian delegation and
the Soviet defense minister joined
with Soviet foreign aid experts
in the discussions, suggesting
that the entire aid program was
reviewed. The communique that
followed noted that the three top
Soviets, Brezhnev, Kosygin, and
Podgorny, had accepted an invi-
tation to visit Damascus at an
unspecified time.
While the deputy chairman of
the State Committee for Foreign
Economic Relations was meeting
with the Syrian delegation, Com-
mittee Chairman Skachkov arrived
in Baghdad to review the progress
of the Soviet economic aid pro-
gram for Iraq. His visit coin-
cided with that of a Soviet
petroleum delegation which was
holding talks with the Iraq Na-
tional Oil Company about possible
assistance in oil exploration.
When Skachkov completes his
business in Iraq, he may go to
Jordan to continue discussions
on a Soviet economic aid offer
made to King Husayn during his
visit to Moscow in October.
A Soviet delegation recently
spent two weeks in Lebanon in-
vestigating possible participa-
tion in development projects,
but returned to Moscow with no
agreements.
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SECRET
CZECHOSLOVAK REGIME MAY UNDERGO SHAKE-UP
There are widespread rumors
in Prague of forthcoming person-
nel changes in the party and gov-
ernment. There are even sugges-
tions that Novotny may step down
from one of his posts as presi-
dent or party boss.
The party has been hamstrung
by indecision resulting from
basic disagreements between lib-
eral and conservative elements
in the leadership. This has
prevented any effective response
to such problems as the poor re-
sults of the economic reforms,
dissidence within the intellectual
community, and the growing dis-
affection of Czechoslovak youth.
The party central committee
is scheduled to meet soon and
may consider it necessary to act
on these problems, particularly
unrest among youth. University
students have threatened a mass
demonstration in downtown Prague
on 15 December unless the regime
responds to their complaints. The
students are incensed over police
brutality during a demonstration
on 31 October and by the cavalier
handling of various other griev-
ances. Novotny apparently be-
lieves that the problem is serious.
He recently appointed Premier
Lenart to investigate the stud-
ent's charges. This may draw
the students' anger away from
Novotny, but it could undercut
the security forces and add to the
confusion.
It is unlikely that Novotny
will be ousted at the plenum.
He may, however, present. the plenum
with one or more "scapegoats."
In the past when faced with serious
problems, he has shifted various
key officials to show that he is
still in command. This tactic,
in the present circumstances,
would also buy time to work out
new policies which would be ac-
ceptable to the different factions.
One move that Novotny might
make would be to demote Jiri Hen-
drych, the regime's ideologist
and the number two man in the
party. Hendrych's hard-line views 25X1
have made him many enemies within
the party and he is even mores
o ular than Novotny.
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121.1
POLISH TEMPERS AROUSED BY INCREASES IN MEAT PRICES
The Polish party central
committee's decision last month
to increase meat prices from six
to 33 percent was sound economic-
ally, but may have been a politi-
cal mistake. Demands for meat
have been growing with no pros-
pect; of meeting them. The in-
creases, averaging 17 percent,
were the first major anti-infla-
tionary measure in nearly a
decade. Many of the regime's
economists believed it was over-
due.
From a political point of
view, however, the decision was
risky. It affects most of the
people and could trigger a re-
action to a number of accumulated
frustrations of political, eco-
nomic, and social origin. The
party leadership was aware of
this, and apparently hesitated
for several days--if not weeks--
before it acted. When the re-
gime saw, however, that even
rumors of an impending rise in
meat prices were enough to set
off demonstrations in numerous
factories, it put the new prices
into effect. There were more
demonstrations after the new
prices were announced, but after
a short time the outbursts sub-
sided.
Spokesmen for the regime,
however, have clearly been on
the defensive. Poznan's party
first secretary in his speech to
the central committee charged
anti-Communists with using the
rise in meat prices as the basis
for a campaign to undermine the
confidence of the people in the
party. For their part, the
party rank-and-file share in the
popular discontent.
Even though the central com-
mittee's speedy adoption of the
measure suggests broad agreement
with it, many of the committee
members may seek to soften its
impact once confronted with pres-
sures from the localities where
they live and work.
Furthermore, it is not clear
that the regime will be able to
contain popular dissent without:
offering some palliatives. In
the meantime, one of the party's
contending factions might at-
tempt to exploit public dissatis-
faction for its own political
ends. If so, the regime could
be faced with the prospect of
having to make a basic decision
on whether to try to satisfy 017
to suppress the public's expecta-
tions. 25X1
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
The problems in the area continue to fester
and any attempts to cure them will involve pro-
tracted negotiations.
The withdrawal of Greek mainland troops from
Cyprus will result in increasing trouble for both
Athens and Ankara in handling the Turkish Cypriot
community. Makarios, too, will be harder to keep
in line. The UN Security Council is scheduled to
discuss the Cyprus problem in mid-December.
The royalists in Yemen have besieged Sana,
the capital of the new republican regime.
republican morale
is low as a result o royalist advances. Mili-
tary pressures have stalemated efforts to nego-
tiate a viable government.
Continued terrorist activity in the West
Bank and Israel leaves open the possibility of
further Israeli reprisals against Jordan.
Aggressive Israeli air patrols along the cease-
fire line with Egypt will not be inhibited by
the loss of an Israeli plane on 1 December to
Egyptian antiaircraft fire.
In India the highly emotional language issue
has flared up again. Several northern cities are
in the throes of student agitation against a gov-
ernment-sponsored bill that would ensure continued
use of English as an associate official language.
The political crisis in West Bengal is still un-
resolved, but the violence in Calcutta has sub-
sided considerably.
In Africa, the planned Belgian airlift of
the mercenaries detained in Rwanda is likely to
arouse an explosive Congolese reaction. Mobutu
apparently still hopes to get reparations.
The OAU mission to Nigeria has been unable
to contact secessionist Biafra, and the civil war
is at a standoff on the ground but active in
the air. F77 I
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WAR THREAT ON CYPRUS APPEARS OVER, BUT PROBLEMS REMAIN
The danger of war in the
latest Cyprus crisis appears to
be over, but the basic problems
which have plagued the island
since 1960 remain unresolved.
Discussions on a broadened UN pa-
cification role in Cyprus are ex-
pected to begin in the UN Secu-
rity Council soon.
The governments of Cyprus
and Turkey, however, are still
in fundamental disagreement over
future arrangements for internal
security, and the problem of ver-
ifying Greek troop withdrawals
from the island could cause a
new dispute between Athens and
Ankara.
Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus
have accepted UN Secretary Gen-
eral Thant's appeal of 3 Decem-
ber calling for expeditious with-
drawal from Cyprus of Greek and
Turkish troops in excess of their
legal contingents. Thant also
suggested an enlarged mandate
for the UN force, giving it the
function of supervising disarma-
ment and devising measures to
safeguard internal security. The
present mandate for a UN presence
on Cyprus expires on 26 December.
Although Athens has not com-
pleted a schedule for the with-
drawal of its troops from Cyprus,
a Greek ship is on its way to
the island, and plans call for
the removal of one battalion of
500-600 men as soon as possible.
The Greek Government says it can-
not accept UN supervision of the
troop withdrawal as asked by An-
kara. The Turkish Government
has called for the exercise of
"the greatest vigilance" in this
matter, but the Greeks say that
withdrawal will be made in broad
daylight and can be easily ob-
served without impugning Greek
good faith.
Turkey has prepared plans
for a relaxation of the military
alert, but first wants to see
the Greek withdrawal actually
start. In any case, the relaxa-
tion will not immediately affect
the build-up of ground forces in
southern Turkey; the attitude of
the Greek Cypriots on short-term
pacification measures will have
a strong bearing on when these
forces will begin dismantling.
In his reply to Thant's ap-
peal, Cypriot President Makarios
made it clear that he favors
withdrawal of the Greek and Turk-
ish legal contingents as well as
the illegal forces, and that he
will insist on effective guaran-
tees against military interven-
tion in Cyprus. Ankara is not
likely to give up its right of
intervention, or to remove its
650-man contingent--both of which
it believes are essential for
the protection of the Turkish
Cypriots. Turkey also insists
that disarmament on the island
should include "all forces
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constituted after 1963," which
would include the Greek Cypriot
National Guard. Makarios, who
relies heavily on the National
Guard to maintain his control
over the Turkish Cypriot enclaves,
is not likely to agree to such
a demand.
Essentially, the problem
revolves around the Turkish Gov-
ernment's determination to pro-
tect the rights of the Turkish
Cypriots, and Makarios' goal of
eliminating the Turkish Cypriot
enclaves. It is this deadlock
which will have to be broken before
any permanent solution to the Cy-
prus situation can be found.
GOVERNMENT FORMED IN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF SOUTH YEMEN
The General Command of the
National Liberation Front (NLF)
has announced the formation of a
new government in South Yemen
with Qahtan al-Shaabi, leader of
the NLF, serving as president
for a two-year term. The General
Command also defined itself as
the country's legislative author-
ity pending preparation of a pro-
visional constitution.
Al-Shaabi, who is acting as
prime minister and supreme com-
mander of the armed forces as
well as president, heads a 12-
man cabinet. The son of a former
sultan of a small area which was
forced into Lahej state, al-Shaabi
served in the government of that
state before founding the NLF in
1963. At least six of the remain-
ing cabinet members belong to
the NLF General Command,
The ministers of interior
and of culture and national guid-
ance seem to have distinguished
themselves primarily as leading
NLF terrorists. The ministers
of justice and of education, in
contrast, are well qualified in
their fields. Two of the cabinet
members are almost entirely un-
known.
The first days of the new
government have been quiet.
There has been none of the loot-
ing anticipated in areas formerly
occupied by British troops and
civilians. Semiuniformed
"people's guards" are for the
most part confining their activ-
ities to back streets, where they
are effectively keeping order.
The rival Front for the Libera-
tion of Occupied South Yemen has
as yet made no move
to initiate
25X1
military operations
British departure
after
despite
the
ear-
lier threats.
I
I-
of these, the minister o economy,
commerce, and planning, is Qahtan
al-Shaabi's cousin and second in
command of the NLF. The new min-
ister of foreign affairs is also
chairman of the NLF political
committee.
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FEDERAL MIGS ACTIVE IN NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR
The civil war remains
largely stalemated on the ground,
but the federal government's
superior air power is helping
to tighten the noose around se-
cessionist Biafra. There has
been no progress toward peace
SOUTHEASTERN NIGERIA
negotiations. The federal gov-
ernment has indicated it will
get most of its arms from Brit-
ain in the future.
Federal MIGs based at Cala-
bar-and Makurdi have raided the
? Airfield
O 2,5 5,0 7
STATUTE MILES
$Qnta Isabel
EQUATORIAL I ~
FE RN A N DO PD
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Biafran airfield at Port Har-
court regularly since late
November. They reportedly
have knocked out at least one
of Ojukwu's two B-25s and his
executive jet and inflicted
other serious damage, including
setting fire to oil tanks, to
this last major point of entry
for military supplies. The MIGs
have bombed and strafed other
Biafran towns and also shot
down a helicopter that may have
been carrying some senior Bia-
fran officers. The Biafrans
scored their first kill of the
air war with ground fire, but
their claims that a MIG was
downed has not been confirmed.
On the ground, federal
forces in the southeast at Cala-
bar are continuing to push
slowly north and west toward
Ikot Okporo. At Bonny the Bia-
frans again landed a sizable
force on the island but
thus
far are restricted to a swampy
corner. To the north in the
Enugu area, there is a virtual
stalemate. Federal troops have
been unable to break out, and
strenuous Biafran efforts to
retake Enugu have failed. At
Asaba, the federal commander
has finally decided to give up
on mounting an assault directly
across the Niger River because
of the strong Biafran defenses
at Onitsha.
Lagos has decided to return
to a reliance on the UK for most
of its military equipment needs.
In turn the UK has agreed to
supply most of what the federal
government wants, including
newer armored cars, artillery,
and lar e quantities of ammuni-
tion.
The UK decision to support
wholeheartedly the federal gov-
ernment is also reflected in the
recent payment to Lagos by Shell-
British Petroleum of over $20
million in 1967 oil royalties.
These were not legally due un-
til after the end of the year,
and the company had previously
put off paying them.
Ghana's General Ankrah,
who was directed by the OAU
consultative mission to Lagos
to reach Ojukwu by radio tele-
phone, thus far has been unable
to do so. There was some evi-
dence that Ojukwu was avoiding
this contact. Prospects that
Ankrah will be able to persuade
the Biafrans to come to terms
are virtually nil.
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SECRET
NEW REPUBLICAN REGIME IN YEMEN IN TROUBLE
25X1
25X1
25X1
itary pressure from the royalists,
although it is receiving some as-
sistance from its Soviet and Egyp-
The recently installed repub-
lican regime is facing mounting mil--
25X1 rep scan morale is low as a
result of recent royalist advances.
The
royalists are sai to be in fre-
quent contact with a number of
senior republican army officers and
cabinet members, in an attempt to 25X1
work out an acceptable compromise
so that the royalists can enter
Sana peacefully.
CONGO (KINSHASA) FACES POSTCRISIS DAYS
The five-month-long mercenary
crisis in the Congo is nearly over.
Although over 100 white mercenaries
are still in Rwanda, Congolese of-
ficials appear generally unconcerned
about them. All the Katangan troops
who evacuated to Rwanda with the
mercenaries have been airlifted
back to the Congo.
Military units are being re-
turned to their precrisis duty
stations and the US C-130 operation
is being terminated; the last plane
is scheduled to leave the Congo this
weekend. As if to prove the govern-
ment's disinterest in past matters,
President Mobutu left Kinshasa for
a four-week junket up the Congo
River and to several neighboring
countries.
There are several major prob-
lems, however, to which Congolese
officials will be--or should be--
turning their attention. One is
the reconstruction of the eastern
Congo. Much of the east still has
not emerged from the bush since
the 1964-65 "simba" rebellion and
requires major medical and social
assistance. Now Bukava and much
of Kivu Province are in a similar
condition.
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Secondly, there remains the
problem of what to do about the
military. Top Congolese officials
have often admitted that the Con-
golese Army (ANC) needs reorgani-
zation and retraining. A major
purge of top-ranking officers
would be a good beginning. In
the past Mobutu has been reluctant
to meddle with the military, and
the ANC victory in Bukavu may
make the task even more difficult.
Mobutu's regime emerged from
the crisis much stronger than at
any time to date. This new sta-
ture comes more from popular
apathy, however, than from an in-
crease in the regime's prestige
or popularity. Many tribes are
unhappy with the regime, but
there were no local uprisings
while the government was preoc-
cupied with the mercenaries. Nor
was any mercenary group really
successful in winning local peo-
ple to its side. Hence the re-
gime now has more confidence in
its own survivability. Realiz-
ing that it can count on at least
nonbelligerence from the people,
the government has the opportun-
ity to devote more time to con-
structive nation-building and
less to placating the population.
Bolstered by its triumph over
the mercenaries, its increased
image in Africa as a result of
the successful African summit
meeting in September, and its
new-found self confidence, the
Mobutu regime now may be more dy-
namic--by Congolese standards--
in both domestic and foreign poli-
cies. Mobutu can be expected to
take the more unpopular steps
necessary to ensure success of
his economic reform and to keep
party activists in line.
Some changes in foreign pol-
icy may be forthcoming. Congo-
lese relations with Belgium prob-
ably will be more realistic. The
government now espouses friend-
ship and security for expatri-
ates in the country. 25X1
he mucli- 25X1
discussed re-establishment of
diplomatic relations with the
USSR is in the offing. Yet,
Mobutu still remains close to
Western countries in general.
He is especially appreciative
of US assistance in particular,
and his pro-Western stance is
likel to remain strong.
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SECRET
GHANA'S JUNTA FACING WINTER OF DISCONTENT
Ghana's National Liberation
Council (NLC), still grappling
with the economic and political
mess left by Nkrumah, is enter-
ing a new and more difficult
phase of its transitional rule.
The basically conservative
military-police junta, now al-
most two years old, is confronted
with major decisions on restora-
tion of civilian rule, mounting
criticism of its economic pol-
icies, and restive politicians.
Moreover, some members of the
intellectual community are be-
coming increasingly disaffected
with the regime. Junta members
now appear unsure of how to pro-
ceed, and increased frictions
have developed among the junta's
most influential members.
Although NLC-appointed com-
missions have drawn up a draft
constitution, the junta has yet
to consider it. Moreover, com-
mission proposals for disen-
franchising former officials of
Nkrumah's party have aroused con-
siderable disagreement within the
junta. Brigadier Afrifa, the
junta's impetuous maverick, has
publicly taken issue with NLC
Chairman Ankrah on the latter ques-
tion, embarrassing the NLC as a
whole.
One of the NLC's fundamental
economic policies of encouraging
private foreign investment is cur-
rently under heavy press attack.
Many literate Ghanaians believe
that the terms of an agreement
negotiated with a US pharmaceuti-
cal firm are a "sellout" to US
commercial interests. Some of
their criticism has taken on broader
anti-US dimensions. NLC members,
apparently having assumed that a
national consensus existed on the
junta's economic rehabilitation
policies, have been shaken by the
widespread criticism and are con-
cerned that the furor may endanger
the over-all economic stabiliza-
tion program.
Although political parties are
proscribed, several identifiable
political groupings are now jockey-
ing for position in anticipation
that the wraps will soon be taken
off. They can be expected to
step up their criticism of the
NLC's slow progress and to assert
that a government run by civilians
would be more capable of handling
Ghana's massive problems. All of
the groups are organizationally
weak and must overcome deep-rooted
public cynicism toward politicians.
Nevertheless, it will be increas-
ingly difficult for the junta to
ignore these forces. as its popu-
larity wanes.
The strains among the junta's
leaders pose the most immediate
threat to the NLC's stability and
reconstruction efforts. NLC Vice
Chairman Harlley, alarmed at the
growing influence of Ankrah, re-
cently induced other junta members
to push through a plan to curtail
Ankrah's widespread power in na-
tional defense.
The NLC has also reportedly
reprimanded Afrifa for his in-
temperate public pronouncements, such
as his charge that Ghana is facing
a breakdown of national unity.
In addition, Afrifa's and Ankrah's
penchant for engaging in politics
on the side is apparently raising
the hackles of some junta members.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
The Organization of American States will meet
again in mid-December in an attempt to decide how
to break the stalemate in the election of a new
secretary general.
There is considerable evidence that several
member nations favor the selection of a compromise
candidate. Some of those mentioned are: Sanz de
Santa Maria, the Colombian chairman of the Inter-
American Committee of the Alliance for Progress; :11-
mar Penna Marinho, the Brazilian ambassador to the
OAS; and Felipe Herrera, the Chilean who presently
heads the Inter-American Development Bank. Some
members are still committed to support one of the
three original contenders--Eduardo Ritter of Panama,
who led on the last ballot with ten votes, Galo Plaza
of Ecuador, and Marcos Falcon Briceno of Venezuela.
The possible withdrawal of the Venezuelan candidate
would not necessarily assure his five votes en bloc
to either of the others.
In any event, the prolonged delay in reaching
a solution, the diplomatic pressure by the govern-
ments involved
have hurt the prestige of the regional organiza-
tion. In addition, the electioneering is likely
to lead to some lasting diplomatic resentments,
whatever the outcome.
The aura of potential revolutionary activity
that followed the Latin American Solidarity Organiza-
tion Conference in late summer has been dimmed by
the death of Ernesto "Che" Guevara and the destruc-
tion of the Bolivian insurgency. This setback has
been compounded by serious guerrilla losses in
Venezuela, Guatemala, and Nicaragua; by inactivity
in Colombia; and by the smothering of a fledgling
group by security forces in Brazil. Although Cuban-
supported groups still have the capability to
cause some trouble--particularly in Colombia and
Venezuela--there is reason to believe that Castro
is re-examining his revolutionary strategy. If
this is true, the guerrillas may be relatively
inactive for a while.
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URUGUAY'S NEW PRESIDENT FACES OLD PROBLEMS
Former vice president Jorge
Pacheco Areco became the president
of Uruguay on 6 December following
the sudden death of President Oscar
D. Gestiido. His assumption of of-
fice was automatic and he will serve
until March 1971--the end of Ges-
tido's term.
Prior to being elected vice
president a year ago, Pacheco had
not had a particularly noteworthy
career. His political rise was
generally attributed to luck--being
in the right place at the right
time. Nevertheless, his perform-
ance as vice president caused many
observers to suspect that they had
underestimated his abilities. From
the beginning days of their associa-
tion, Gestido had made an effort to
build up Pacheco's image, had in-
cluded him in all top meetings, and
had frequently turned over to him
the difficult task of getting agree-
ment on policy and appointments
from the ruling Colorado Party's
many factions.
The new vice president is Al-
berto Abdala, a clever professional
politician. He is a member of young
Jorge Battle's List 15, the most
powerful faction of the Colorado
Party, but relations between them
have been strained in the past by
Abdala's strong presidential ambi-
tions.
ficulty obtaining congressional
support for these measures. Pa-
checo favors the new policies, but
because of the changed political
situation may be less able to combat
the inevitable attempts to water
down the program.
Another immediate problem will
be a power struggle within the
Colorado Party. Jorge Battle will
see Gestido's death as opening the
door for him to take over the party
and "run" the new President and
his government. Pacheco lacks Ges-
tido's political prestige, and harm-
ful intraparty fights could develop.
After he settles into office,
however, Pacheco should be able to 25X1
cope with the intricacies of Uru-
guayan politics at least as well as
his predecessor.
The transfer of power to the
47-year-old Pacheco comes at a
particularly critical time. The ad-
ministration recently inaugurated
a controversial program of economic
austerity designed to end the coun-
try's economic stagnation, and
Gestido was expected to have dif-
SF,CR111'
Jorge Pacheco Areco
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