WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006200020001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 22, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
ARCHIVAL RECORD
PLEASE RETU ' TO
AGENCY ARCHIVES
1 IaIuiL
f 51
!ai ig}> 0 22 December 1967
RETURN E TEJI No. 0321/67
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(Information as of noon EST, 21 December 1967)
VIETNAM
Communist military activity remained at a relatively
low level throughout South Vietnam during the past
week. Meanwhile, in its first test of strength with
the National Assembly, the Thieu government failed
to get full approval of its partial mobilization
decree.
COMMUNISTS STEP UP MILITARY ACTIVITY IN LAOS
The Communists have launched their annual dry-season
offensive, and there are tenuous signs that a more
wide-ranging effort may be made this year.
TENTATIVE STEPS TOWARD REBUILDING CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
Moderate leaders appear to be cautiously pushing meas-
ures to restore the battered party apparatus, but the
attempts are being opposed by Red Guards and their
radical backers.
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Europe
USSR REVAMPS CULTURAL ADMINISTRATION
There are rumors that the positions of a number of
high-level officials may ultimately be affected, and
associates of politburo member Shelepin appear to be
the prime targets.
RUMANIAN-SOVIET DIFFERENCES REMAIN UNRESOLVED
Apparently the only point of agreement reached during
Rumanian leader Ceausescu's Moscow visit was that a
Soviet party and government delegation would visit
Rumania next year.
TURKS HINDER SOVIET BLACK SEA FLEET
The USSR recently has been testing Ankara's resolve
to enforce the 1936 Montreux Convention governing
the passage of warships through the Bosporus and
Dardanellles, but the Turks have remained both cau-
tious and fair in administering their responsibil-
ities.
STRIFE-TORN CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY ;!MEETS
The Czechoslovak party central committee is trying
to deal with the recently intensified confrontation
between liberals and conservatives in the party
leadership.
DENMARK FACES NEW ELECTIONS
Prime Minister Krag's political future and the for-
tunes of his Social Democratic Party are at stake in
special elections set for 23 January.
EAST GERMANS SEEK REASSURANCES FROM THEIR ALLIES
East German Foreign Minister Otto Winzer visited
three Eastern European countries last week, appar-
ently to seek renewed pledges of support for his
regime's hard-line policy toward West Germany.
FRANCE BLOCKS EUROPEAN COMMUNITY NEGOTIATIONS WITH BRITISH 17
French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville's action
in killing prospects for early Community negotiations
with Britain has outraged not only the Five but Euro-
pean public opinion generally.
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FUTURE OF GREEK MONARCHY IN DOUBT
Continuing efforts to bring about some agreement that
would allow King Constantine to return to his throne
had failed as of 21 December.
ALGERIAN COUP ATTEMPT FAILS
The swift crushing of an attempted revolt and wide-
spread pledges of support for his regime seem likely
to prop Boumediene up for the time being, but pre-
vailing dissatisfaction with his rule could spawn new
coup attempts.
CONFLICT IN YEMEN DRAGS ON
The royalist pressure in Yemen a p p e a r s ened
NEW DAHOMEY MILITARY REGIME TO FACE EARLY TESTS
The new government faces continuing labor problems
and a desperate financial crisis.
Western Hemisphere
POSSIBLE RENEWAL OF GUERRILLA TERRORISM IN GUATEMALA
Two fires in Guatemala City and train derailments in
the west may presage a renewal of Communist terrorist
activity.
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CHILEAN SENATORIAL BY-ELECTION STILL UNDECIDED
The closeness of the vote on 17 December indicates a
protest against the Frei government; the strong show-
ing by the conservative National Party casts some
doubt on the widespread belief that the Chilean elec-
torate is moving leftwards.
NEW REGIME IN URUGUAY
The new President is acting with firmness and deci-
sion, and has obtained the active support of the most
powerful faction of his Colorado Party.
ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT SPARKS RUMORS IN HAITI
Relative political ca:Lm prevails, however, and avail-
able information suggests that President Duvalier is
still in firm control,
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FAR EAST
Communist military activity in South Vietnam
remained at a relatively low level but there was
further evidence of plans for a major Communist of-
fensive in the heavily populated coastal area of
central South Vietnam. The National Liberation
Front's seventh anniversary was the occasion for
renewed assurances of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
resolve to continue fighting until "final victory."
Premier Chou En-lai publicly promised "more effective"
Chinese support but confined himself to the standard
description of China's role as a "dependable rear"
for the Vietnamese people's struggle.
Communist forces in Laos have launched their
annual dry-season offensive, with some signs of a
more sustained and wide-ranging campaign this year.
Unconfirmed reports tell of North Vietnamese troops
moving into northern Laos. In reaction to an at-
tack by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces on
a government base in southern Laos, Premier Souvanna
Phouma again denounced the presence of the North
Vietnamese as a flagrant violation of the Geneva
accords.
In China, there were further indications of
the success of militant Maoists in frustrating ef-
forts by the moderates to restore order and begin
rebuilding the shattered party apparatus. Measures
announced last fall to reopen schools, which had
been closed since June 1966, have largely broken
down. There seems to be little prospect that clashes
between rival student factions can be ended as
long as the conflict within the top leadership re-
mains unresolved.
Australian leaders have given public and private
assurances that Prime Minister Holt's death will not
affect the government's commitment in Vietnam. With
no clear "heir apparent," however, the present com-
petition for the premiership will not be settled
until a Liberal Party caucus chooses a new leader
on 9 January. 25XI
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VIETNAM
Communist-initiated military
activity remained at a relatively
low level throughout South Viet-
nam during the past week. The
few significant encounters in re-
cent days resulted mainly from US
and South Vietnamese sweep opera-
tions, some of which penetrated
deep into sensitive Communist base
areas and caused a considerable
number of enemy casualties.
Despite the low level of ac-
tivity, there are new indications
that the Communists are planning
to intensify their military ef-
forts in various sections of the
country. Extensive repositioning
and maneuvering of enemy combat
units point to a renewal of
offensive activity in the near
future.
be focal points of impending at-
tacks.
Political Developments
in South Vietnam
In its first test of strength
with the National Assembly, the
Thieu government failed to get
approval of its partial mobili-
zation decree. On 18 December,
Defense Minister Nguyen Van Vy
went before each house of the
assembly to defend the decree.
Although Vy's presentation was
well received, according to sev-
eral senators, the Upper House
the following day resoundingly
rebuffed the government, largely
on the basis of allegations that
the decree is unconstitutional.
The Lower House also may not
approve Vy's defense of the mobil-
ization decree. Because of the
generally progovernment Democratic
Bloc, however, the government has
more leverage in the Lower House
and could stave off a rejection.
Documents recently captured
in Quang Nam Province outlined a
plan in which one regiment of the
North Vietnamese 2nd Division
would conduct a diversionary at-
tack near Que Son to draw allied
reaction forces into the area from
nearby strongpoints. This regi-
ment would then withdraw and join
forces with the division's other
two subordinate regiments to at-
tack the remaining allied forces
to the south. Because of the
heavy casualties suffered by the
2nd Division in recent months,
however, there is some doubt this
plan can be put into effect.
suggest that the
province and its capital city may
in any case, the Thieu admin-
istration apparently plans to im-
plement its decree on 1 January
with or without National Assembly
approval, thus risking further
difficulties in its relations
with the legislature. Vy indi-
cated during the interpellation,
however, that if the assembly
passed a mobilization law of its
own, the government would carry
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On 19 December, the govern-
ment brought to trial in a mili-
tary court 26 persons involved in
the 1966 Buddhist "struggle" move-
ment, which was centered in. I
Corps. Prominent among the de-
fendants are the former mayor of
Da Nang, Dr. Nguyen Van Man, and
a former area commander, Colonel
Dam Quang Yeu. Conviction and
heavy sentences may bring about
another confrontation between the
government and the militant. Bud-
dhists. There are also indications
that the Viet Cong are formulating
plans to exploit the issue by at-
tempting to stimulate mass protests.
President Thieu has indicated
that if the "strugglers" are con-
victed, he may exercise clemency..
Sentiment against the trial is
running high in the National As-
sembly, however, and both houses
have formed committees to look
into the matter of amnesty for po-
litical prisoners.
Bui Quang San, a member of
the Lower House from Quang Nam
Province, was assassinated by two
unknown persons on 117 December.
Government spokesmen have claimed
that the Viet Cong were responsible
for San's death, but there is
some possibility that he was killed
as the result of his involvement
in a political squabble within the
Vietnamese Nationalist Party
(VNQDD).
NFLSV Anniversary Celebrated
The Liberation Front's pre-
tension of being the sole repre-
sentative of the South Vietnamese
people received strong endorse-
ment from its Communist allies
this week in propaganda accompany-
ing the celebration of the Front"s
seventh anniversary on 20 Decem-
ber. The North Vietnamese
stressed their own and the Front"s
resolve to struggle until "final
victory," pointing to the success
already achieved in the current
winter-spring campaign as evi-
dence that the Communists have
the military initiative.
In their propaganda on the
anniversary, Moscow and Peking
stressed the significance of the
Front's new political program
but, in doing so also pointed up
their differing views on the con-
flict. Soviet statements took
Moscow's usual line that the
program will be particularly im-
portant in solving the Vietnam-
ese problem. The Chinese, on
the other hand, only rarely refer
to the program and this time
chose to emphasize that portion
having a militant and uncompro-
mising tone. In its over-all
treatment of the anniversary, Pe-
king repeated. its strong but
carefully worded offers of en-
couragement and support to the
Vietnamese as long as they con-
tinue to fight. 7- 1
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LAOS
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`ETNAM
L#o Ngam('
BOLOVENS
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COMMUNISTS STEP UP MILITARY ACTIVITY IN LAOS
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The Communists have launched
their annual dry-season offensive
in Laos, and there are tenuous
signs that a more wide-ranging
effort may be made this year.
The most significant Com-
munist activity has occurred near
the northern edge of the Bolovens
Plateau in southern Laos. On
11 December, two battalions of
Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese
troops overran a government base
camp at Lao Ngam, inflicting
heavy casualties on the camp's
defenders. The following day,
an important government guerrilla
outpost a few miles to the north
was captured by the enemy. Al-
though Lao Ngam was subsequently
reoccupied, the attack represents
an important setback to the
government's long-range security
and development programs in this
rich, rice-growing area.
The Communists are now
threatening the provincial capi-
tal of Saravane,
Saravane
is only lightly defended by gov-
ernment troops, and its tactical
importance is minimal, but its
loss would be a severe psychologi-
cal blow to the government.
The recent enemy actions
appear to be a resumption of
the campaign launched in late
July to counter the government's
increased presence around the rim
of the Bolovens. The Communists
are almost certainly aware that
stepped-up intelligence and harass-
ment operations are being mounted
from some of these advanced bases,
and their attacks are designed to
thwart government encroachment
into the infiltration corridor.
The Communists also want to push
government troops from the Bolovens,
but it is unlikely they are willing
to sustain the losses such an
undertaking would entail.
At any rate, the region's
military commander will probably
try to use the Communist threat
to the plateau to persuade the
general staff in Vientiane that
the recent deployment of southern-
based troops to northern Laos has
left the south in a precarious
military position.
In the north, the Communists
are continuing their campaign
against government-supported
guerrilla outposts south and west
of Samneua. They may be planning
to isolate Phou Pha Thi, an impor-
tant staging base for government
guerrilla and air operations in
the area. Such bases have fre-
quently changed hands during
past offensives, and it is un-
likely that the Communists can
hold any of them for long in the
face of air support for govern-
ment troops.
This season, the Communists
will probably also attempt to
counter recent government gains
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in the north, and there are un-
confirmed reports that as many
as 3,000 North Vietnamese troops
are moving into Laos along Route
7. A likely spot for a Communist
thrust would be in the Muong Ngan
Valley, an important rice-produc-
ing area recently brought under
government control. A continued
government presence in this area
would weaken the enemy's south-
ern defense of the Plaine des
Jarres. The Communists are also
continuing to move troops and
supplies into northern Luang
Prabang Province, suggesting
that another push against gov-
ernment positions at Nam Bac
ma be in the offing.
TENTATIVE STEPS TOWARD REBUILDING CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
Moderate leaders in Peking
appear to be cautiously pushing
measures to restore the battered
party apparatus, but the rising
level of political tension through-
nut China suggests that these at-
tempts are being hotly opposed by
Red Guards and their radical back-
ers in Peking.
Recent speeches by moderate
party leaders have stated that a
party congress will be held next
summer to reconstitute the central
committee. If held, this would be
a major step toward stabilizing
the political structure. Broad-
c-asts from Peking and several
provincial radios have been stress-
ing the need to rebuild and stream-
line the party along lines sug-
gested by Mao Tse-tung. Several
broadcasts have urged militant
"revolutionaries" to minimize at-
tacks on party cadres, presumably
to facilitate the rebuilding proc-
ess.
This program, however, may
be more an expression of the hopes
of the moderate members of the re-
gime than a blueprint for action.
Peking faces enormous problems
in re-establishing the party or-
ganization, which has been all
but dismantled during the Cultural
Revolution. In many provinces
there is evidence that political
factions are clashing over the
question of who is to exercise
authority. Red Guard newspapers
indicate that. militants are still
suspicious of. former party offi-
cials and will try to block any ef-
fort to reinstate a majority in
positions of authority. Despite the
facade of unity displayed by leaders
in Peking since September, it is
likely that they are deeply split
over the same! issue.
Until the leaders in Peking
can resolve their own disagree-
ments, it is unlikely that much
progress will.. be made toward re-
storing order and stability any-
where. Since. September, a variety
of moderate programs have been
pushed but all have run into
trouble. For example, the re-
gime's efforts last fall to re-
open schools--closed since June
1966--have largely broken down.
Outside of the schools, the
civil disorders created by the
Cultural Revolution remain at a
high level almost everywhere and
are growing worse in several prov-
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EUROPE
A reorganization of the USSR's cultural and
propaganda apparatus appears likely to erode
further the second-level support of politburo mem-
ber Alexander Shelepin. It was rumored in Moscow
that the positions of a number of high-level of-
ficials may ultimately be affected.
Meanwhile, the Soviet security and intelli-
gence organization, the KGB, celebrated its 50th
anniversary with a meeting in Moscow of top security
officials from all of the Communist countries ex-
cept China and Albania. The anniversary articles
and speeches have been heavily weighted on the domes-
tic security side of the KGB's function.
The Soviets and their East European allies fol-
lowed up their recent series of bilateral meetings
with a gathering of foreign ministers or their
deputies in Warsaw this week.
T e Soviets probably ar-
range is session to
uck up some of the reluctant
supporters of the Arab cause and to brief their
friends on the Soviet role in Yemen.
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The East European regimes' differences on
the scope and purposes of an. international Communist
conference have become evident in the past week. In
clarifying their positions before the consultative
meeting to be held in Budapest in February, Hungarian
and Czechoslovak party papers have suggested that
each party should have the right to decide for it-
self whether conference decisions would be adopted
as national policies. The East Germans, on the other
hand, contend that decisions taken at an international
conference must be binding on all participants.
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USSR REVAMPS CULTURAL ADMINISTRATION
A reorganization of govern-
mental committees concerned with
culture and propaganda is appar-
ently under way in Moscow. Rumors
suggest that the positions of a
number of high-level officials
may ultimately be affected, and
associates of politburo member
Shelepin appear to be the prime
targets.
The committee for cultural
relations with foreign countries,
headed by Romanovsky, is being
abolished and its functions dis-
tributed among the ministries of
culture, higher education, and
foreign affairs. Soviet officials
claim that this reorganization is
the cause of the current delay in
the negotiations for an extension
of the exchange program with the
US and that a formal announcement
on the committee's abolition is
expected shortly. At least three
other committees--those for pub-
lishing, radio-television, and
cinematography--may also be dis-
solved. According to one report,
however, the radio-television com-
mittee is to be split rather than
abolished.
According to Soviet officials,
the proposed changes are intended
to enhance efficiency and reduce
costs. An at least equally im-
portant motive, however, appears
to be the determination of the
politburo majority to break up the
group of second-level officials
linked with Shelepin. Romanovsky
and. Mesyatsev, head of the radio-
television committee, as well as
Mikhailov, chief of the publishing
committee, were all at one time
closely associated with Shelepin
in the Komsomol (youth: organiza-
tion.
There have also been hints
that the shake-up in the cultural
and. ideological field will reach
the top ranks of the party. One
report cites unspecified Soviet
sources to the effect that Demi-
chev, a former Khrushchev protege,
may lose his post on the secretar-
iat where he is responsible for
party supervision of propaganda,
education, and the arts. Accord-
ing to these sources, he will be
named to head the expanded Min-
istry of Culture--a significant
step down. Demichev is a candi-
date member of the politburo and
has been cited by Soviet sources
as a Shelepin supporter.
The removal of these support-
ers of Shelepin, who has generally
been though to favor a hard line
on cultural matters, does not seem
to mean any easing of policy in
this area. In fact, two groups of
young intellectuals in Moscow and
Leningrad reportedly have been or
will soon be brought to trial.
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RUMANIAN-SOVIET DIFFERENCES REMAIN UNRESOLVED
Little if any progress
toward lessening Rumanian-Soviet
frictions flowed from the offi-
cial visit of Rumania's party
boss and chief of state Nicolae
Ceausescu, to Moscow on 14 and 15
December.
The Rumanians' refusal to
commit themselves wholly to sup-
port the Soviet positions on Viet-
nam and West Germany was apparent
from the communique. It omitted
mention of other issues on which
Bucharest and Moscow differ, such
as the Middle East situation and
the Communist parties' consulta-
tive meeting scheduled for next
February in Budapest.
In accepting the Soviet in-
vitation to visit Moscow, Ceau-
sescu presumably sought to gain
acceptance for Rumania's position
on the implementation of bilateral
economic agreements, one of the
major issues believed to be di-
viding Bucharest and Moscow.
The communique noted, however,
that each side merely "exchanged
opinions" on this matter, an in-
dication that no agreement was
reached.
Bucharest and Moscow could
only agree on one point: to send
a Soviet: party and government
delegation on an official visit
to Rumania in 1968. Although the
timing of the visit was not spec-
ified, it may come about soon
inasmuch as February is the dead-
line for negotiating a new So-
viet-Rumanian friendship treaty
unless the present one is auto-
matically renewed. It is also
the month of the Budapest con-
sultative meeting, which the Ru-
manians have not yet decided
whether or not to attend.
Ceausescu went to the USSR
with the Rumanian party's full
endorsement for his independent
policies. A few days earlier,
he had had himself named chief
of state. Other elements in the
pre-Moscow build-up of Ceausescu
included important party and
parliamentary sessions and a meet-
ing with chiefs of Rumanian dip-
lomatic missions. At all of
these gatherings, Ceausescu set
forth the basic principles of
Rumania's foreign policy, which
he was later to act upon with the
Russians.
The party and parliamentary
meetings approved internal reforms
designed to improve the operation
of the Rumanian economy and hence
strengthen its independent posi-
tion in the Communist world. The
regime also approved a realignment
of territorial administrations,
which it claims is designed to
enhance efficiency. It will, in
addition, strengthen Ceausescu's
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hold over middle and lower party
and state echelons.
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TURKS HINDER SOVIET BLACK SEA FLEET
Soviet naval ships have re-
cently been testing Ankara's re-
solve to enforce the regulations
governing passage through the
Turkish straits. Moscow--or any
of the other signatories--can
denounce the 1936 Montreux Con-
vention governing the passage of
warships through the Bosporus
and Dardanelles if it believes
Ankara is not properly carrying
out its duties. Turkey has been
very careful in its administra-
tion of the straits and has over-
looked some recent Soviet in-
fringements.
Soviet naval operations in
the Mediterranean are being
hindered by stricter Turkish en-
forcement of the provisions of
the convention. The prospect of
having to force the straits in
time of war in order to get the
Black Sea Fleet into the Mediter-
ranean has led Soviet planners
to base most of their first-line
units, such as ballistic missile
and nuclear submarines, in the
Northern Fleet, from where they
can move unimpeded to operating
areas.
The Soviet Navy has been
able to deploy 20 to 30 warships
to the Mediterranean during the
past seven months by drawing sub-
marines and a large number of war-
ships from the Northern and Bal-
tic fleets. Black Sea - based
auxillary vessels, however, pro-
vide oil, provisions, and re-
pairs to the Soviet Mediterranean
squadron.
The USSR and other maritime
nations considered revising some
of the more limiting provisions
of the convention just after
World War II. Moscow sought
joint Soviet-Turkish defense of
the straits; the Western powers
wanted a guarantee that there
would be no suspension of inno-
cent passage for ships of any
flag. In the end, however, An-
kara's NATO allies decided to
maintain the status quo, which,
while restricting their own na-
val operations, also severely
limits the passage of Soviet
Black Sea Fleet warships through
the straits.
Three provisions in the
Montreux Convention are most
troublesome to the Soviet Navy.
Article 12 sharply limits the
transit of Soviet submarines.
Units built or purchased outside
the Black Sea may enter only
"for the purpose of rejoining
their base." Black Sea - based
submarines cannot exit unless
they are going to a shipyard in
another area for repairs. Under
Article 13, Ankara must be given
at least eight days notice before
a warship enters the straits.
Finally, all submarines must
transit during daylight, and all
other warships must start their
transit before dark.
The Soviets have adhered
in principle to these restric-
tions. The few Black Sea -
based submarines that have operated
in the Mediterranean subsequently
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entered the Baltic--ostensibly
for repairs--and then made a
second short deployment in the
Mediterranean before re-entering
the Black Sea.
Moscow recently tested An-
ka.ra's resolve by attempting to
send two submarines through the
straits at night. The Turks per-
mitted the first unit to pass
but threatened to halt the second
at Istanbul.
Prior to this time, several So-
viet warships that have made il-
legal night transits were not
challenged by the Turks.
Moscow continues to whittle
away at the restriction on prior
notification. On several occas-
sions, Ankara has apparently re-
ceived information through diplo-
matic channels only a couple of
days before the date of transit.
Turkey could call the Soviets on
this violation at any time, re-
fusing transit to the Soviet
ship until the stipulated eight-
day period has elapsed, but it
has not yet done so. Moscow has
used the ploy--at least during
the Middle East crisis last sum-
mer--of every week or so declar-
ing its intention to send out a
cruiser and two destroyers; the
ships were not sent, but could
have been if the USSR had needed
to augment the Mediterranean
s uadron on short notice.
STRIFE-TORN CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY MEETS
The Czechoslovak Communist
Party central committee met this
week to deal with the recently
intensified confrontation between
liberals and conservatives in the
party leadership.
No reliable reports are
available yet on the proceedings
of this meeting which was report-
edly set originally for 13 De-
cember. The postponement followed
Brezhnev's sudden visit to Prague
on 8 and 9 December, and had led
to speculation concerning pos-
sible high-level personnel changes
affecting even party boss Novotny.
ugges e owever, a the
coral committee meeting would.
produce an accommodation of views
rather than any basic changes.
In the past, this sort of incon-
clusive compromise has enabled
the regime to muddle through.
F7 I
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DENMARK FACES NEW ELECTIONS
Prime Minister Krag's politi-
cal future and the fortunes of his
Social Democratic Party are at
stake in special elections set for
23 January. The government was
brought down last week when it
lost a vote on a measure to freeze
wages following Denmark's recent
devaluation.
The Social Democrats, a mi-
nority in Parliament, had depended
on the support of the leftist So-
cialist People's Party (SPP) on
domestic issues. SPP chairman Ak-
sel Larsen, a staunch advocate of
cooperation with the Social Demo-
crats, lost control of an extreme
left-wing group in his party's
parliamentary delegation and these
negative votes were responsible for
toppling the government.
for votes in the center and the
right.
Public opinion polls taken
before the government fell indicate
that the non-Socialist parties
stand a good chance to gain a ma-
jority of the 179 seats in Parlia-
ment. They will have difficulty,
however, in agreeing among them-
selves on a government program.
The new government will have
to deal with Denmark's increasing
economic difficulties in the wake
of devaluation. Inflationary pres-
sures have intensified, further
threatening Denmark's competitive
position in world markets. At
the same time, export demand in
Denmark's major markets is stag-
nant, a problem over which Denmark
has no control.
After a special party congress
on 16 and 17 December, the six SPP
rebels broke away and formed a new
party--the Leftist Socialist--which
will compete in the forthcoming
election if it can secure the
16,000 signatures necessary to get
on the ballot. With the small Com-
munist Party also in the race, the
vote on the left will be split
among four parties, while five non-
Socialist parties will be competing
In view of the difficulties
facing the country, there is
likely to be considerable senti-
ment among the Social Democrats
in favor of going into opposition
in order to allow the party a res-
pite from the responsibility of
governing. In this event, Krag
might relinquish the party leader- 25X1
ship to parliamentary spokesman
Per Haekkerup, a leader of the So-
cial Democratic right wing.
25X1
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'LAST GERMANS SEEK REASSURANCES FROM THEIR ALLIES
East German Foreign Min-
ister Otto Winzer visited three
Eastern European countries last
week, apparently to seek re-
newed pledges of support for
his regime's hard-line policy
toward West Germany.
Winzer first. visited Yugo-
slavia, arriving on 1.1 December.
Although the East. Germans pre-
sumably did not think they
cou:Ld dissuade Belgrade from
resuming relations with Bonn,
they may have sought. reassurances
that East Germany's interests
would not suffer as a result.
When he returned to Berlin,
Winzer told a news conference
only that his talks with Yugo-
slav leaders on questions of
bilateral relations and European
security had been conducted in
the spirit of "firm, friendly
relations."
On 13 December, Winzer flew
to Budapest for talks with
Hungary's foreign minister.
Again here, questions of Euro-
pean security were discussed,
with Winzer probably pointing
out that such security is partly
contingent on Hungary's con-
tinuing to resist Bonn's entice-
ments. In Prague the next day,
Winzer conferred with the Czech-
oslovak foreign minister and
apparently repeated his Budapest
performance.
or Prague.
While Winzer was thus
occupied, party boss Walter
Ulbricht headed a high-level
delegation to Moscow which
stopped briefly in Warsaw
on 10 December and again on
the way home three clays later.
The Moscow communique endorsed
East German intransigence toward
Bonn and an even stronger re-
affirmation was issued in an
article by the Polish deputy
foreign minister. There is
nothing to indicate,, however,
that such a commitment was ob-
tained from either Budapest
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FRANCE BLOCKS EUROPEAN COMMUNITY NEGOTIATIONS WITH BRITISH
At this week's Council of
Ministers meeting, French Foreign
Minister Couve de Murville killed
prospects for early Community
negotiations with Britain on its
bid for full membership. In
doing do, he outraged not only
the Five, but European public
opinion generally. Whether or
not such. sentiment will be trans-
lated into effective pressure
on Paris depends in large part
on the outcome of domestic de-
bates within each of the Five.
Basically, they must choose be-
tween going forward with Com-
munity programs or sacrificing
such progress for the sake of
dramatizing the larger questions
at stake for Europe's future in
accepting the French veto.
The seven-point communique
issued after the Council session
puts the Five on record as favor-
ing immediate negotiations with
Britain; the French held that
enlargement "would deeply modify
the nature and methods of opera-
tion of the Communities" and that
the UK's economic recovery "must
be completed in order for the
British application to be con-
sidered." The agreement to
disagree, however, explicitly
leaves the membership requests
of the UK, Denmark, Ireland, and
Norway on the Council's agenda--
thus permitting Britain to con-
tinue to press the Community as
opportunities arise.
As if to underline this
point, Foreign Secretary Brown
proposed in Parliament on 20
December that Britain now "enter
consultations with the five
Community members who support the
Commission's view that negotia-
tions should be started at an
early stage." He said that the
links between Britain and these
countries should be forged "as
strongly as possible." London
apparently intends to capitalize
on the Five's resentment of
what Brown termed Paris' "false
views of the future of our con-
tinent of Europe." London may
try to undertake with each or
several of the Five various
"integrating" technological proj-
ects. At the same time, how-
ever, the British will have to
guard themselves against allega-
tions that such stop-gap proposals
run counter to the spirit of the
Community treaties. Domestically,
the British Government's problem
is to prevent a sense.of frus-
tration from undercutting its
tactic of maintaining the of-
fensive.
Commission president Rey
has deplored the present situa-
tion, and during the Council
session on 19 December he warned
of the possibility of a stand-
still in Community activity,
with each member blocking pro-
posals it did not like. Following
the Council meeting, the agri-
cultural ministers of the
Netherlands and Luxembourg--in
reprisal for the French stand
on the UK question--called for
a suspension of an agricultural
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meeting that had been running con-
currently. Subsequently, Belgian
and Dutch representatives announced
they would attend a meeting of
social affairs ministers only as
"silent partners."
The French are taking the
line that the stagnation in com-
munity affairs resulting from
such tactics will only be tem-
porary. Nevertheless, it is the
kind of situation that could
still develop into a serious
SECRET
split. Foreign Minister Luns has
told the Dutch Parliament that
the Five, "individually and.
jointly," would begin consulta-
tions with Britain. Whether this
implies a specific commitment
from others of the Five--in par-
ticular, Bonn--is not yet known.
In the present atmosphere, how--
ever, Bonn might be subjected to
considerable pressures from its
partners to at least avoid ap-
pearing too eager to smooth
things over with De Gaulle.
I
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Coups, countercoups, and rumors of impending
coups dominated the area this week.
King Constantine of Greece remains in Rome
where he fled after the failure of his countercoup.
His recent statement to the press leaves the quest-
tion of his return to Athens up in the air, although
the junta has left open the possibility of an even-
tual compromise.
Rumors of an officer-inspired coup in Sudan
are cropping up. It is too early at this stage to
predict its success or even its eventuality.
In Algeria, forces loyal to Boumediene have
put down an attempted revolt of dissident army units.
Boumediene's success in crushing the revolt may en-
courage him to move with more confidence against
other disgruntled elements.
In Dahomey, the eight-man military regime that
replaced President Soglo on 17 December is weak and
unstable. It faces continuing labor unrest and a
serious financial crisis.
Political instability still troubles several
of India's states. In West Bengal, the ousted united
front coalition is winding up a week-long civil dis-
obedience campaign that has failed to arouse mass
support. The non-Congress coalitions of Bihar and
Uttar Pradesh moved ever closer to the brink of
collapse.
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FUTURE OF GREEK MONARCHY IN DOUBT
Continuing efforts to bring
about, some agreement that would
allow King Constantine to return
to his throne had failed as of
21 December.
Ever since the King arrived
in Rome late last week, following
his abortive attempt to oust the
military junta, emissaries have
shuttled between the parties.
The -junta, apparently mindful of
the adverse foreign reaction and
the need for an aura of legiti-
macy,, says the throne is still
Constantine's if he wants to re-
turn., Constantine's statement on
20 December set forth only one
cond:Ltion--a firm timetable for
re-establishment of parliamentary
democracy--and may be acceptable
to junta moderates. His reference
to "deviations" by the junta fol-
lowing the coup on 21 April, how-
ever, will not sit well in Athens,
especially with junta extremists
who reportedly would be pleased
if he stayed in exile..
In Athens, the circumstances
surrounding the failure of the
King's coup attempt appear to
have left the populace in a state
of confusion and bewilderment.
It is probable, however, that the
people are fully aware of the
extent of the junta's control
and are resigned to a long period
of rule by the colonels.
The junta, meanwhile, has
reaffirmed its intention to carry
out its revolution, to continue
its alliance with the West, to
move toward resumption of con-
stitutional government, and to
preserve the institution of the
monarchy. It has seized upon
the King's withdrawal to extend
its control of government opera-
tions. The regime has also re-
moved or retired government of-
ficials and military officers it
believed were in sympathy with
the King, and additional purges
may continue after completion of
the "investigation" of those in-
volved with the King. Apparently
confident of their positions, coup
leaders Papadopoulos, Pattakos,
and Makarezos also have resigned
their military commissions to
become civilian ministers.
Events in Greece have so far
had no noticeable effect on the
Cyprus situation. The withdrawal
of the Greek troops apparently is
continuing, and there has been no
reaction from Ankara that would in-
dicate it expected any substantive
change in its agreement with Athens
over the removal of the troops. The
Turkish Air Force has nearly re-
turned to its pre-crisis status,
but there have been no indications
of any significant standdown in
the ground forces. Debate in the
UN Security Council over the
proposed extension of the UN peace
force mandate has been postponed
twice since its originally sched-
uled date of 15 December. Some
action will be necessary by 26 De-
cember, however, when the current
mandate expires.
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ALGERIAN COUP ATTEMPT FAILS
Boumediene's swift crushing
of an attempted revolt, followed
by widespread pledges of support
for his regime, seem likely to
prop him up for the time being,
but prevailing dissatisfaction
with his rule could spawn new
coup attempts.
On 14 December, Chief of
Staff Tahar Z'Biri attempted to
lead several armored units toward
the capital from a base about
150 miles southwest of Algiers.
Police and gendarmerie reportedly
bore the brunt of responsibility
for stopping the advance, but
armored cars, and possibly some
tanks, were strafed by the Al-
gerian Air Force, with a sub-
stantial. number of military and
civilian casualties. Some para-
troops may also have been engaged.
Press reports that 4,000 dissi-
dents were involved are not sub-
stantiated. Z'Biri and his sub-
ordinate commanders--all rela-
tives--are said to have withdrawn
to the snow-bound mountains south
of Algiers.
Z'Biri, whose main follow-
ing was believed to be centered
in eastern Algeria, apparently
counted on the support of Major
Said Abid, commander of the First
Military Region, in whose juris-
diction he launched his attempt
and whose headquarters separated
the armored column from its ob-
jective. Abid shared many of
Z'Biri's parochial views and his
loyalty to Boumediene was question-
able, but he had reportedly been
attempting to negotiate the dif-
ferences between Boumediene and
Z'Biri. Abid, however, is credited
by the.regime with tipping off
Boumediene that Z'Biri had launched
a revolt. Abid's death at his
headquarters on 15 December--of-
ficially labeled a suicide by the
regime--leaves his true role in
doubt.
Although Z'Biri had been dis-
gruntled over his declining in-
fluence, his revolt attempt prob-
ably was sparked by Boumediene's
action earlier this month in dis-
missing the five-member secretar-
iat controlling the country's only
party, the National Liberation
Front (FLN)--at least two of the
five were Z'Biri's cronies. Bou-
mediene chose Ahmed Kaid, the
energetic minister of finance and
one of his closest supporters, to
revamp completely the stagnating
FLN.
When addressing party cadre
oh 12 December, Boumediene had
indicated that the thorough house-
cleaning of the party was the es-
sential base for an extensive
reorganization throughout all gov-
ernmental levels, implying that
this could also include the general
staff. This was a direct threat to
the position of Z'Biri and those
who shared his suspicion of the
French-trained officers and the
educated elite who have become
prominent within the administration.
rying out his 1965 coup.
In abandoning the principle
of consensus--which apparently was
Z'Biri's chief complaint--and in
moving ruthlessly to quash Z'Biri
and his supporters, Boumediene is
resorting to the tactics employed
by Ben Bella, tactics that were
Boumediene's justification for car-
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CONFLICT IN YEMEN DRAGS ON
The royalist pressure around
-.,.,o- 1-r hauTP clac-kened.
Nonpartisan tribal rivalries un-
doubtedly may be blamed for some
of the fighting.
25X1
After the setback to their
attack last week on the capital
city of Sana, the royalist forces
do not yet appear to have re-
gained their originial momentum.
The republicans reportedly have
gained control over the two air-
fields outside Sana, and daily
flights of supplies are once
more coming in. Saria is occa-
sionally harassed by mortar
rounds and bazooka explosions,
but control of the important
heights overlooking the city now
appears to be in republican
hands.
Elsewhere in the country, it
is difficult to assess any given
area as being dominated by either
the royalists or the republicans.
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Qizan
tad
:Hajjal
YEMEN
Paved road
Road or
track
f Airfield
15 30 45
Miles
Yemen his no stablished
boundc`ries iri\the east,
Al Bayda
PEOPLES= REPII LI C
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NEW DAHOMEY MILITARY REGIME TO FACE EARLY TESTS
Dahomey's new government,
formed by young officers who
ousted the two-year-old regime
of General Soglo, is :likely to be
weak and unstable. Its first
tests will come soon, as con-
tinuing labor problems and a des-
perate financial crisis demand
solution.
Key army elements, ordered
into Cotonou last week because a
paralyzing strike was in progress,
placed Soglo and other senior
officers under house arrest on
17 December, just as the labor
troubles appeared to be easing.
A hastily created Revolutionary
Military Committee, dominated by
little-known junior officers,
named a. new government and prom-
ised. a new constitution and a
return to civilian rule within
six months. Major Maurice Kouan-
dete, a general staff officer who
emerged as a central figure in
the coup, has been named head of
government and minister of de-
fense, foreign affairs, and in-
formation.
None of the eight young of-
ficers in the new government has
had previous political experience
or a particularly distinguished
military career. The refusal of
the widely respected. Emile Zinsou
to continue as foreign minister
handed the new regime its first
setback and left the cabinet with
only one, rather undistinguished,
civilian member. In addition, re-
gional differences that lie be-
25X1
neath the surface seem bound to
cause tension within the new gov-
ernment.
Among the serious problems
facing the new regime is continu-
ing labor dissatisfaction. A
threatened strike, evidently backed
by leftist elements, has been at
least temporarily averted by the
institution of study commissions
to examine ways to meet labor de-
mands. The government will be
hard pressed to find alternate
sources of revenue, however, if
the workers' demand for the re-
scinding of the 25-percent tax. on
wages is met.
The regime already faces an
early financial crisis. The treas-
ury is depleted, and unless France
remits funds promised to Soglo
during his state visit to Paris
last month, the government will
soon be in dire financial straits.
France was clearly displeased by
the ouster of Soglo at this time
and is withholding recognition of
the new regime.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Political and economic activity has slowed to
a virtual halt in most Latin American capitals as
the holiday season approaches.
The council of the OAS, in a closed meeting in
mid-December, decided to wait until 12 February to
hold the fifth ballot in the deadlocked election
for a new secretary general. A preliminary meeting
is scheduled for the end of January, when the coun-
cil presumably will attempt to determine whether any
of the three contenders can muster a 12-vote major-
ity. If not, it will consider alternative solutions
to break the protracted impasse. The election maneu-
vering, plus four recent incidents of questionable
conduct on the part of staff members, has lowered
the prestige of the OAS.
Political waters in the Dominican Republic and
Haiti continued to be roiled last week. The chief of
the Dominican armed forces is once again threatening
to resign because of the efforts of inveterate in-
triguer Colonel Neit Nivar Seijas to extend his per-
sonal influence. In Santo Domingo, an attempted
march on the presidental palace by disgruntled city
employees was broken up by police, but not before
sporadic shooting broke out. In neighboring Haiti,
the attempted assassination of a high-level regime
official on 7 December is expected to provoke harsh
retaliation against those whom President Duvalier
considers responsible--or has chosen as scapegoats.
In Panama City on 16 December, Arnulfo Arias
accepted the nomination of the opposition National
Union (NU) coalition as its presidential candidate
next May. In his acceptance speech, the twice-de-
posed former president made it clear that, if
elected, he will try to put his personal stamp on
a canal settlement.
The Salvadoran-Honduran border dispute moved
to center stage on the diplomatic front this week.
A prisoner exchange before the Christmas holiday
would mark the first substantial progress toward
solution of this long-standing border dispute.
I
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POSSIBLE RENEWAL OF GUERRILLA TERRORISM IN GUATEMALA
Recent terrorist incidents
The next day, two trains of
attributed to the Communist
the International
Railways
of
Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) may
Central
America (IRCA) were de-
presage a renewal. of Communist
railed near Tecun
Oman on
the
25X1
terrorism after several months
western
border. A:though IRCA
of relative quiet.
has experienced labor problems
recently,
believes that the derailings were
On
cember,
the evening of 14 De-
two large fires started
part of
junction
a sabotage plan in con-
with the arson in the
25X1
almost
simultaneously in the
capital.
downtown section of Guatemala
City. Although there is no
proof that the fires were set
by the FAR, a series of false
alarms in other sections of
the city point to the possibility
that the perpetrators were trying
to confuse security forces. An
incendiary bomb was discovered
at a third store. Total damage
from the fires has been estimated
at $3 million.
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GUATEMALA
BRITISH
HONDURAS
ABTA HERAPAZ - t _ IZA
U-c
TRADITION, I
pP..:1 GUERRJLLA AREAz
f 3 t
E4
Tecun
mg ~
Guafemala C
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CHILEAN SENATORIAL BY-ELECTION STILL UNDECIDED
A recount will be necessary
to determine the result of the
senatorial by-election held on
17 December in a south-central
agricultural district of Chile.
The closeness of the election,
however, indicates a protest vote
against the Frei government in a
district: that suffers from high
unemployment and low agricultural
prices.
The preliminary count showed
Christian Democratic (PDC) candi-
date Jorge Lavandero a winner by
11 votes. A later count, how-
ever, gave the Communist-supported
Alberto Baltra 58,225 votes to
Lavandero's 58.,205; Huerta, the
candidate of the conservative
National Party (PN), received
36,102. The votes will be re-
counted, and the electoral tri-
bunal will determine whether more
than 2,000 votes should have been
declared invalid. Final certi-
fied results may not be available
until February.
The PN made a surprisingly
strong showing, increasing its
total by nearly 40 percent over
the municipal elections last
April. The PN's success brings
into question the assumption by
many politicians that the Chilean
electorate is moving inexorably
to the left. Small businessmen
and independent farmers, disen-
chanted with the government but
leary of the leftist Baltra, ap-
pear to have voted heavily in
favor of the PN.
Baltra is a member of the
Radical Party, which last summer
came under the control of a left-
ist group committed to coopera-
tion with the Communists and
Socialists. The Communists played
a very important role in Baltra's
campaign, and his strong showing
will encourage closer cooperation
between the two parties. The
Socialists, much less enthusias-
tic about the Radicals, appar-
ently were successful in getting
their members to abstain.
The PDC ran an unenthusi-
astic and disorganized campaign.
The leftist leadership of the
party may, in fact, have hoped
for a large Baltra victory to
strengthen their position in
pushing President Frei to in-
crease state intervention in
the economy. Frei himself, pre-
occupied with his legislative
program, may have thought that
a mid-term by-election simply
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volvement on his part.
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NEW REGIME IN URUGUAY
Newly installed President
Jorge Pacheco Areco is exercis-
ing firm and active leadership.
He has already announced his
intention to continue his
predecessor's austere economic
policies, and he has moved
forcefully to curtail the
disruptive activities of the
extreme left.
His way is being made less
difficult by the active support
of Jorge Batlle, the leader of
the largest faction of the
divided, ruling Colorado Party.
Batlle and Pacheco generally
share the same political out-
look. Batlle is a firm advo-
cate of economic reform and
has been closely coordinating
his ideas with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) representa-
tives who are in Uruguay to
negotiate a standby agreement.
He can be expected to support
Pacheco as the President strug-
gles to implement the kind of
belt-tightening measures the
IMF will require.
Batlle's support, although
dictated in part by conviction,
may also be designed to further
his own presidential ambitions.
Pacheco cannot legally succeed
himself, but an endorsement
from him in 1971 might improve
Batlle's prospects.
Even with Batlle's support,
the Colorado Party's legisla-
tive majority is slim. If other
restive factions defect, Pacheco
will have to look for votes among
members of the opposition Blanco
Party. Uruguayan legislators
have frequently crossed party
lines in past votes, however, and
this pattern is likely
con-
tinue.
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 '0001k 40IN
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ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT SPARKS RUMORS IN HAITI
Relative political calm pre-
vails in Haiti despite the at-
tempted assassination of a high-
level government official.
Elois Maitre, second in
command of President: Duvalier's
notorious Ton Ton Macoutes, was
tommygunned by unknown assail-
ants on the evening on 7 Decem-
ber while awaiting an incoming
flight at the airport. Follow-
ing the attack, speculation has
been rife in Port-au-Prince,
with most Haitians viewing the
shooting as a result of a con-
flict between elements within
the Duvalier regime and perhaps
indicative of a potential anti-
government plot,.
The shooting, which also
could have resulted from a
grudge by some of maitre's many
enemies, is the first in several
years involving a trusted Duval-
ier associate and is the first
public incident of consequence
since late September when peas-
ants in northern Haiti took part
in antigovernment demonstrations.
In view of Maitre's prom-
inence, Duvalier is expected
to move soon against those whom
he considers responsible--or
has chosen as scapegoats. His
uncharacteristic silence since
the attack has led some Haitians
to believe the report that
"palace insiders" may have been
involved.
Rumor-conscious Haitians
are always quick to construe
any incident as signaling_the
imminent demise of the Duvalier
regime. Available information
suggests, however, that Duvalier
is as firmly in co:ztrol as ever.
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 Approved For FLw'rase 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A9t200020001-3
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200020001-3