WEEKLY SUMMARY
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79-00927A006400020002-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
32
Document Creation Date:
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 24, 2008
Sequence Number:
2
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 12, 1968
Content Type:
SUMMARY
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Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A006400020002-0
Secret
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
44
RETURN TO ARCHIVES (t RECORDS L N Eh 12 April 1968
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE No . 001-5/0
Joe Box ._ . 25X1
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(Information as of noon EST, 11 April 1968)
VIETNAM
Hanoi has followed up its announced willingness to
meet US officials for preliminary talks with prop-
aganda designed to show there has been no change
in its terms for a negotiated settlement. Moscow,
though surprised by Hanoi's positive response, is
proclaiming its support. Peking has attacked Pres-
ident Johnson and ignored Hanoi's move. The South
Vietnamese are apprehensive over the possibility of
US-DRV contacts.
Page
1
Europe
FRANCE REJECTS SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR SPACE COOPERATION
Moscow's latest effort to expand Franco-Soviet space
cooperation, a proposal to set up a global communica-
tions system using satellites built jointly by the
two countries, has been rebuffed by Paris.
SECRET
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MOSCOW CALLS FOR BLOC UNITY AND DISCIPLINE AT HOME
Moscow's preoccupation with developments within and
among the East European nations and the impact of
those developments on the Soviet Union dominated the
USSR INCREASING HELICOPTER SALES TO THE WEST
The USSR is finding Western markets increasingly re-
ceptive to its helicopters, which formerly sold pri-
marily in connection with military aid pacts. Pro-
spective purchasers now include public agencies in
the underdeveloped countries and private business
corporations in Western industrial countries.
NEW CZECHOSLOVAK REGIME TO SLOW POLITICAL CHANGES
The keynotes in the party's immediate -future will be
moderation and stabilization.
CZECH LEADERS PUSH ECONOMIC REFORMS
The new Czech regime is proceeding cautiously but
resolutely with its economic reform program. In
time, it may attract some of the foreign aid and in-
vestment it needs to overcome its heritage of severe
economic problems.
POLISH PARTY STRUGGLE CONTINUES
At the present time, no single faction appears to
command a majority within the party, but the con-
tinuing struggle is already producing major changes
in top government posts and will lead to subsequent
shifts in the upper reaches of the party.
ISRAEL TOUGHENS REPRISAL TACTICS AGAINST JORDAN
Israel has apparently adopted a policy of immediate
retaliation for terrorist acts, even as pressure in-
creases in Jordan for the regime to adopt a more
militant posture toward Israel.
SNCRE`I`
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Western Hemisphere
POLITICAL TENSION STILL SIMMERING IN BRAZIL
The student disorders that swept the nation last
week have subsided, but criticism of the government
continues.
PANAMA OPPOSITION CANDIDATE FACES TOUGH ELECTION FIGHT
Opposition presidential candidate Arnulfo Arias has
a difficult path ahead of him because the Robles
government is firmly entrenched in a position to
determine the outcome of the elections and has the
solid support of the National Guard.
HONDURAN OPPOSITION PULLS OUT OF GOVERNMENT
Fraud and violence during recent elections will prob-
ably end preliminary steps toward cooperation between
the opposition and the government, and Honduras seems
likely to suffer more political instability than it
has for the past four years.
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FAR EAST
Hanoi is carefully preparing its case for de-
manding a complete cessation of US bombing and
"other acts of war" in the projected "contact" with
US representatives. The relative lull in Communist
military action in South Vietnam, particularly the
failure to offer significant resistance to US forces
that relieved the siege of ]:he Sanh and reoccupied
the Lang Vei Special Forces camp, suggests that Hanoi
may be seeking to convey an impression of restraint
in anticipation of talks.
The North Vietnamese have also attempted to in-
crease the US incentive to halt the bombing com-
pletely by publicly declaring that peace negotia-
tions could begin immediately if the US took this
action. Hanoi appears to be ready to open the pre-
liminary talks promptly, but its rejection of Ge-
neva as the site for a meeting apparently reflects
a determination to avoid any suggestion that the
talks will deal with a political settlement.
The North Vietnamese regime is taking steps
to avert any relaxation or exaggerated hopes among
its own people and the Viet Cong forces. Hanoi's
domestic propaganda has stressed that its terms for
a settlement remain unchanged and has predicted
another bitter round of fighting as the war enters
a new stage. There has been no decline in the
heavy infiltration of Northern troops into South
Vietnam.
The Chinese Communists cautiously waited until
two days after Hanoi declared its willingness to
contact US representatives before breaking their
silence on the projected talks. A Peking broadcast
avoided comment on Hanoi's offer and directed its
fire at President Johnson's address. Despite this
implied warning regarding US intentions, there is
no indication that the Chinese have made any seri-
ous attempt to derail preliminary US - North Viet-
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C ki I N A
N 0 R T H C H I N A
( L A O S
?Quang Trl
Khe Sanh Baiti aM -Mug
DAO PHU QUOC
(Vietnam)
50Mdes
~,) R U 5C Kilometers
V l 25X1
90250 4-68 CIA
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VIETNAM
Following up its agreement
of 3 April to meet with US offi-
cials, Hanoi moved quickly to ex-
plain to its own people and to
its principal foreign allies that
these "contacts" will have a
very limited purpose. The North
Vietnamese have said the meetings
are to be bilateral and at the
ambassadorial level, and they ini-
tially indicated a clear prefer-
ence for Phnom Penh as the site.
Hanoi's propaganda stridently
insists that the proposed meet-
ings are only for the purpose of
discussing a full US cessation of
the bombings. In addition, the
foreign minister told a CBS cor-
respondent that the preliminary
talks could also be used to dis-
cuss the "time, place, and date
of the formal talks." In its
propaganda, Hanoi remains uncom-
promising and employs the usual
verbal ambiguities. References
to the crucial issue of recipro-
cal North Vietnamese restraint,
for example, are carefully phrased,
pointing out that Hanoi has al-
ways refused to consider recipro-
city in the past. There has been
no reference, however, as to what
they will do in the future.
Other North Vietnamese com-
mentary depicts "business as
usual" on the war front. There
are almost daily charges of ex-
tensive bomb damage to populated
Pacre 3
areas south of the 20th parallel,
accompanied by complaints of
reconnaissance overflights above
this line, and exaggerated ac-
counts of the level of fighting
in the South. -The US has been ac-
cused of one deliberate violation
of the bombing restriction, but
this has been played in low key.
Most of the propaganda seems
designed to convince Communists
in the South that they are not be-
ing abandoned and to steel the
North Vietnamese population for
continuing heavy burdens of the
war effort. One commentary pre-
dicted that the war had entered
a new phase and that extremely
bitter fighting could be expected.
Hanoi appears anxious to demon-
strate that it is acting from a
position of strength and that its
flexibility in establishing con-
tact with the US is no indica-
tion of any backtracking on its
terms for a negotiated settlement.
Soviets Surprised and Pleased
Hanoi's response to Presi-
dEent Johnson's speech of 31 March
caught the Soviet leaders by sur-
prise. Moscow's propaganda indi-
cated that the Russians assumed
there would be no positive re-
sponse, suggesting that the North
Vietnamese deemed it neither nec-
essary nor desirable to solicit
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Soviet advice before making their
move.
There is little doubt, how-
ever, that the USSR welcomes the
recent sequence of events. After
the fact, the Soviet Government on
5 April accorded Hanoi's posi-
tion "full support." Neverthe-
less, Soviet leaders are probably
not overly optimistic. The only
comment by a high official has been
an exceptionally harsh one deliv-
ered by trade union leader Shelepin
in Moscow on 8 April. The Soviet
press, however, subsequently de-
leted his most severe criticism.
Soviet press and radio comment
continues to show cautious approval
of the recent developments, while
placing the onus on the US to
make further moves toward de-es-
calation.
Peking Fails to Comment
Communist China has not yet
commented publicly on Hanoi's
statement of 3 April, but has at-
tacked President Johnson's pro-
posal as another "big fraud."
Saigon is Apprehensive
The South Vietnamese appear
to be increasingly concerned that
the US will not make an effort to
protect their interests in forth-
coming contacts with North Vietnam.
These fears have been expressed
by various political groups as
well as by several prominent in-
dividuals in the National Assem-
bly. Both houses of the assembly
have adopted resolutions demand-
ing that the South Vietnamese be
given a decision-making role and
rejecting a coalition government.
To express South Vietnam's deter-
mination to fight on alone if neces-
sary, the Thieu government this
week presented to the assembly a
plan for general mobilization to
go into effect as early as May.
The assembly had earlier indicated
its support for such a measure.
President Thieu and Vice
President Ky appear to be working
better together in the face of
the "crisis," although there are
still apparently underlying fric-
tions. Ky, for the moment, is
busy with his People's Army, the
SI~"('I I :"1'
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new civilian defense organiza-
tion, and is reported to be
pleased with Thieu's public dele-
gation of these duties to him.
The Ground War
The letup in large-scale Com-
munist military activity through-
out most of South Vietnam con-
tinued this week.
Major new allied spoiling
operations are under way against
enemy forces in several strategic
areas of the country. In the far
northwestern sector, an 18-bat-
talion allied force has linked up
with the long-besieged Khe Sanh
garrison and has begun offensive
thrusts outward in all directions
from the base. The scattered re-
sistance so far offered by ele-
ments of the NVA 304th Division
tends to confirm the withdrawal
of significant enemy concentra-
tions from the area and the enemy's
intention to avoid making an all-
out stand in western Quang Tri
Province.
Meanwhile, in the coastal
areas of the northern provinces,
US Army troops sweeping the area
between Quang Tri city and
Hue failed to make signifi-
cant contact with NVA main
force units in the area.
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_J-the Communists are currently
stressing efforts "to ensure ade-
quate replacement personnel and
materials to carry on large-
scale operations during the sum-
mer and fall of 1968." In the
interim, the enemy is maintaining
pressures against selected allied
military targets and lines of
communications while conducting
small-unit actions and attacks
against remote outposts.
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EUROPE
Political changes continued to reverberate
during the week in both Czechoslovakia and Poland,
inspiring fresh anxieties elsewhere in Eastern
Europe and in the Soviet Union.
In Moscow, these developments and their dis-
turbing impact inside the USSR were the main con-
cern at a plenum meeting of the party central com-
mittee. The Bulgarians and East Germans also con-
tinued to exhibit stress symptoms that pressures
for "liberalization" might be generated in their
countries.
The situation in Poland showed no signs of
settling down. On the contrary, factional tur-
bulence increased, bringing a government shakeup
and widespread purges at the middle and lower
levels of the party. New outbreaks of public un-
rest may occur.
In Prague, the new government appeared to be
seeking to slow the pace of political change. The
composition of the new party and government leader-
ships reflects a nice balance between conservatives
and liberals, which will probably tend to promote
stability.
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FRANCE REJECTS SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR SPACE COOPERATION
Paris apparently has re-
buffed Moscow's latest effort to
expand Franco-Soviet cooperation
in the communications satellite
field.
t e Soviets proposed
setting up a global communica-
tions system using satellites
built jointly by the two coun-
tries. The first satellite would
have been launched in about two
years.
e rejected because of the op-
position of Maurice Schumann,
minister of state of scientific
the French Government hereafter
will restrict its cooperation
with the USSR in the telecommuni-
cations field to the continua-
tion of test transmissions via
Molniya satellites.
Moscow made two similar,
though less concrete, proposals
to the French in 1966, and Paris
then cited its commitment to the
International Telecommunications
Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT)
as the reason for declining. As
a member of INTELSAT, France has
agreed not to make commercial use
of any other system. The USSR
is not a member.
a full review of future
space cooperation with the USSR
is now under way at the ministe-
rial level. There are indications
that restrictions on space co-
operation with the Soviets will
be extended beyond the telecom-
munications field. Soviet sci-
entists have been permitted to
make visits to Kerguelen Island,
in the southern Indian Ocean,
as part of joint space studies.
The French, however, are refus-
ing Soviet requests for long-
term or semipermanent research
facilities there. The French
also have turned down a Soviet
bid to set up and use a communi-
cations station in French Guiana
during Soviet manned space flights.
Paris reportedly is reluctant to
allow any Soviet presence in
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MOSCOW CALLS FOR BLOC UNITY AND DISCIPLINE AT HOME
Moscow's preoccupation with
developments within and among
the East European nations and the
impact of those developments on
the Soviet Union dominated the
central committee meeting that
ended on 10 April.
General Secretary Brezhnev,
who has been in the forefront of
recent Soviet efforts to counteract
the waning solidarity of the War-
saw Pact states, presented the
main report at the two-day meet-
ing. His report has not yet been
made public and may never be. A
statement issued in the name of
the central committee at the end of
the meeting, however, no doubt pre-
sents the broad gist of the report.
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WEEKLY SUMgARY 12 Apr 68
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The statement struck a harsh
note in tracing bloc disunity to
"subversive" Western activities.
To meet the danger, the statement
indicated, Moscow would do "every-
thing necessary" to strengthen
the political, economic, and mili-
tary unity of the Communist coun-
tries. The importance of the
Dresden meeting of 23 March,
where proposals to "improve" the
joint command of the Warsaw Pact
forces and to increase economic
cooperation were broached, was
particularly stressed.
The statement, in reviewing
Soviet positions on other current
international questions, made
only a brief reference to Viet-
nam. It pledged further aid to
Hanoi, but took note of recent
peace moves by saying that this
aid would be given "in the name
of the earliest peace in Vietnam."
Moscow appears determined to
improve domestic defenses against
"alien" influences. The state-
ment called for greater party
vigilance in the cultural field
to head off the infiltration of
such influences, which have reg-
ularly been blamed over recent
months for the continuing intel-
lectual dissent. The list of
speakers in the debate on Brezh-
nev's report also showed this
concern to maintain ideological
discipline at home. In addition
to the provincial party bosses
who normally speak at party
plenums, this week's meeting was
addressed by several officials
from the cultural, ideological, and
propaganda fields, including the
chief editor of Pravda, the min-
ister of culture, the secretary
of the board of the USSR Writers'
Union, and the director of the
Marxism-Leninism Institute.
The meeting approved the ap-
pointment of 40-year-old Konstantin
Katushev, a fast-rising party tech-
nocrat from the industrial prov-
ince of Gorky, to the central
party secretariat. Katushev ap-
pears to owe his rapid advance
in the party hierarchy primarily
to the influence of senior party
secretary Kirilenko, who has
supervised party affairs in the
Russian Republic and has had a
hand in overseeing industrial
management. The new secretary
has probably also been given a
leg up by Brezhnev, who personally
presided over his installation as
the party boss of Gorky Oblast
just over two years ago.
The removal last year of
Yury Andropov and Aleksandr Shel-
epin left vacancies in the secre-
tariat for specialists in party
relations within the bloc and
in consumer goods production.
There have also been indications
since February that party secre-
tary Suslov has been forced--per-
haps for reasons of ill health--
to yield some of his functions as
Brezhnev's second-in-command to
Kirilenko. If there has been a
general reshuffling of -secretarial
portfolios, Katushev may take on
some of Kirilenko's responsibili-
ties.
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KA-26 HOODLUM
MI-4 HOUND
MI-l0 HARKE
MI-8 HIP
MI-6 HOOK 25X1
c14 '12Ii'I'
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USSR INCREASING HELICOPTER SALES TO THE WEST
The USSR is finding Western
markets increasingly receptive
to its helicopters which formerly
sold primarily in connection with
military aid pacts. Prospective
purchasers now include public
agencies in the underdeveloped,
countries and private business
corporations in Western indus-
trial countries.
The USSR has exported more
than 400 helicopters to non-Com-
munist countries. A substantial
proportion of these has been the
MI-4 Hound utility helicopter,
which has been shipped to at
least 17 free world countries.
A few of these 12-passenger air-
craft continue to be exported,
although production of the MI-4
is believed to have ended in 1967.
During the past year, the
Soviets have been offering instead
the larger MI-8 Hip helicopter
as an all-purpose utility machine.
Deliveries of the MI-8 have al-
ready been made to Egypt, Cuba,
and Afghanistan.
The Soviets are meeting no
competition in their efforts to
sell the MI-6 Hook, the world's
largest operational helicopter.
This aircraft, which can carry
65 troops or almost nine tons
of cargo, has been exported to
Egypt, Indonesia, and Pakistan
for use as a troop transport.
The MI-10 Harke "flying crane,"
which can lift more than 16 tons
was developed from the MI-6. It
has been demonstrated in Western
Europe and has attracted some
interest from oil companies.
In addition, the Soviet sales
effort is becoming more polished.
In the campaign to push sales of
the new KA-26 Hoodlum multipur-
pose helicopter, glossy brochures
with overlays depicting the air-
craft's versatility have been
distributed to aircraft dealers.
This helicopter comes in several
models including passenger, cargo,
and agricultural versions. Sev-
eral countries have already shown
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NEW CZECHOSLOVAK REGIME TO SLOW POLITICAL CHANGES
The keynotes in the party's
immediate future will be modera-
tion and stabilization.
Although each member of the
new party presidium and secre-
tariat is probably committed in
some degree to Dubcek's reform
program, there appears to be a
balance between persons with
conservative records and genuine
reformers. Cernik and Kolder
in particular, may exert a re-
straining influence on others
like Smrkovsky and Spacek, who
advocate a far more liberal
course. The secretariat has a
similar balance. There is no
guarantee, however, that any
of the present leaders will act
as they have in the past--they
have already been severely crit-
icized by unsatisfied progres-
sives and scandalized conserva-
tives.
The new government, appointed
on 8 April, probably will proceed
with due deliberation in im-
plementing the "action" program.
Many of the ministers, headed
by Premier Cernik, were selected
because of their records as com-
petent technicians in the pre-
vious government. In addition
to Cernik, formerly conserva-
tive members of the new govern-
ment include deputy premiers
Strougal and Hamouz and ministers
Krejci and Machacova. Reform-
minded ministers probably will
coalesce around Deputy Premier
Ota Sik, a long-time advocate
of radical reforms. Moreover,
if the government appears to be
dragging its feet on reforms,
Josef Smrovsky, the determined
liberal leader of parliament,
can be expected to call it to
task.
The key ministries of In-
terior, Foreign Affairs, and De-
fense have been entrusted to men
presumably loyal to Dubcek. There
are six Slovaks, including deputy
premiers Husak and Colotka, but
the Slovaks are still underrep-
resented relative to their num-
bers in the over-all population.
The non-Communist Socialist and
People's parties are again rep-
resented by the justice and health
ministers, respectively. In keep-
ing with the party's decision to
prevent concentration of power
by separating party and govern-
ment posts, only Cernik has dual
functions.
Dubcek has endorsed a con-
troversial call for holding a
party congress before the sched-
uled date of 1970 so that the
party might assess the results
of the new "action" program. Pre-
liminary reports on this docu-
ment indicate that the Czecho-
slovak reform will be among the
most liberal ever attempted
any Communist government.
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0r,utcr, )L
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
GOVERNMENT
Appointed 8 April 1968
u ?
?
Alexander Dubcek
Frantisek Barbirek
Vasil Bilak
Oldrich Cernik
Peter Colotka
?
Drahomir Kolder
Frantisek Hamouz
Gustav Ilusak
Ota Sik
D?
Frantisek Kriegel
Jan Piller
Lubomir Strougal
[> ?
Emil Rigo
Josef Smrkovsky
P ? Josef Spacek
Oldrich Svestka
Josef Boruvka
Martin Dzur
Miroslav Galuska
Jiri Hajek
Julius Hantus
Vladimir Kadlec
? Josef Krejci
Bohuslav Kucera
? Bozena Machacova
Josef Pavel
Oldrich Pavlovsky
? Frantisek Penc
Stanislav Razl
Frantisek Rehak
? Bohumil Sucharda
Josef Trokan
Vaclav Vales
Vladislav Vlcek
Miloslav Hruskovic
? Josef Koreak
Frantisek Vlasak
Vaclav Hula
Michal Stancel
Agriculture and Food
National Defense
Culture and Information
Foreign Affairs
Forestry and Water Economy
Education
Heavy Industry
Justice
Consumer Goods Industry
Interior
Internal Trade
Mining
Chemical Industry
Transportation
Finance
Building Industry
Foreign Trade
Health
Minister-Chairman, State
Commission for Technology
Minister-Chairman, Central
Power Administration
Minister-Chairman, State
Planning Commission
Minister Without Portfolio
Minister Without Portfolio
PARTY
Elected 4 April 1968
? Antonin Kapck
Josef Lenart
? Martin Vaculik
? Alexander Dubcek
? Cestmir Cisar
Alois Indra
? Drahomir Kolder
Josef Lenart
? Stefan Sadovsky
Vaclav Slavik
Oldrich Volenik
Zdenck Mlynar
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CZECH LEADERS PUSH ECONOMIC REFORMS
The new Czech regime is pro-
ceeding cautiously but resolutely
with its economic reform program.
In time it may be able to attract
some of the foreign aid and in-
vestment it needs to overcome its
heritage of severe economic prob-
lems.
Priorities are now being es-
tablished under an "economic ac-
tion program." Priority measures
will include a redirection of in-
vestments to force a shift in em-
phasis from heavy industry to
consumer-oriented sectors, par-
ticularly agriculture, housing,
and services. Enterprise man-
agers are to give added incentives
in the form of increased respon-
sibilities. They are to see that
workers are paid primarily accord-
ing to the results of their work.
Enterprises soon will be per-
mitted to enter into some form of mar-
ket competition in an effort to im-
prove efficiency and labor disci-
pline, according to Premier Cer-
nik. Cernik has stated that a
basic re-evaluation of planning
and marketing functions is neces-
sary.
Regime leaders realize that
the deficiencies these measures
are intended to remedy are deep-
seated, and that it will take time
to increase efficiency in the use
of resources and to raise stand-
ards of quality.
The process could be speeded
up with large-scale foreign eco-
nomic aid, and the Czechs are
looking for credits both from
Communist countries and from the
West. The former evidently re-
sponded unfavorably when such re-
quests were made at the recent
Dresden Conference. Czechoslo-
vakia is likely, however, to ob-
tain short-term credits from the
USSR to tide it over its immediate
balance-of-payments problems.
Premier Cernik and Finance
Minister Sucharda recently spoke
of the desirability of obtaining
new technology with Western cred-
its, and Prague probably will
seek aid from international organ-
izations and Western business
firms. The new regime apparently
hopes to open a substantial line
of credit by reactivating Czecho-
slovakia's membership in the In-
ternational Monetary Fund, and
Czech economists have urged an
approach to the World Bank for
long-term credit.
Assistance from international
sources would avoid the political
implications of accepting major
commitments from individual West-
ern governments. In this connec-
tion, loan offers from France and
West Germany to the Novotny regime
in 1967 reportedly were turned
down, the former because it was
tied to purchases from France
only and the latter because of
the political conditions it en-
tailed.
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POLISH PARTY STRUGGLE CONTINUES
The factional struggle
within the Polish Communist Party
is producing major changes in top
government posts, which will lead
to subsequent shifts in the up-
per reaches of the party.
The nomination by parliament
on 10 April of Defense Minister
Marian Spychalski to replace
Edward Ochab in the ceremonial
post of head of state probably
signals a further weakening of
party leader Gomulka's position.
Spychalski has been Gomulka's
staunchest ally in the party po-
litburo, in which he probably
will remain for the time being.
As defense minister, however, he
has been unable to control the
political attitudes of some na-
tionalistic elements within the
officer corps which opposed both
Gomulka's pro-Soviet stand dur-
ing the Middle East crisis of
last summer and the violent re-
pression of recent student demon-
strations.
The new defense chief is a
45-year-old deputy defense minis-
ter, Chief of Staff Major General
Wojciech Jaruzelski, a profes-
sionally competent officer who is
strongly pro-Soviet. Jaruzelski
has no known record of political
commitments to party factions,
and probably will be loyal to
whomever emerges on top from the
current political strife. His ap-
pointment, however, indicates that
hard-line party elements, led by
Interior Minister Moczar, were un-
able to place their own man, Dep-
uty Defense Minister Korczynski,
in this key post.
Gomulka made no attempt to
provide leadership during the
scheduled 9-10 April session of
parliament, although he partic-
ipated in the meetings and may
have been active behind the
scenes. The prolonged and inde-
cisive character of the parlia-
mentary meetings and the rampant
speculation in Warsaw over other
expected government shifts in-
di_cate that crucial decisions
have not yet been reached. No
single faction--including
Moczar's chauvinistic hard-line
group, provincial party leader
Gierek's reformist elements, or
Gomulka's old guard--now appears
to command a majority within the
party. For the time being, the
struggle between these groups
will continue to be felt through
purges of the lower and middle
levels of the party and state ap-
paratus.
The mounting public witch-
hunt against Jews and liberals is
also part of the factional jock-
eying for power, and is designed
in part to influence the selec-
tion of delegates to the party
congress scheduled for later this
year. A prolonged factional
struggle may thus be in the off-
ing. At the same time, the hard
liners' use of the police appara-
tus and their control over vir-
tually all public media are creat-
ing an atmosphere of tension and
fear. If such an atmosphere is
sustained for long, it could
cause renewed public unrest.
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
King Husayn's weekend visit to Cairo produced
no public indications of any breakthrough in the
Arab-Israeli impasse, nor in Husayn's increasingly
difficult situation. With domestic opposition to
Husayn's cautious policies growing and coalescing,
Israel tightened the screws on the King by announc-
ing a policy of immediate retaliation for Arab ter-
rorist acts. The announcement followed an Israeli
foray in "hot pursuit" of terrorists,
Southern Yemen President al-Shaabi's public
speeches are fraying the taut truce between the
army command and the country's more radical revo-
lutionaries. The army leaders are bristling over
al-Shaabi's growing favoritism toward the extrem-
ists but have not yet tried another push against
them.
Fighting slowed in Nigeria as Federal forces
regrouped and resupplied following their recent
victories. The Biafrans spent the week preparing
new defensive positions. Third-party efforts to
bring the two sides together for peace talks are
continuing, but neither side has modified its terms.
In Rhodesia, the regime's own constitutional
commission has recommended a, new constitution that
would eventually make Africans eligible for half
the seats in the legislature while guaranteeing the
other half to the white minority. Neither the Afri-
can nationalists nor the white ultra-extremists
will regard this provision as an acceptable compro-
mise.
Students in Ethiopia continue to be restive,
and precautionary security measures are in effect
throughout Addis Ababa.
Tensions are rising again in Sierra Leone.
Militant adherents of the proscribed former oppo-
sition party now appear convinced that the ruling
junta has reneged on its prom.' ~Se of an earl re-
turn to civilian overnment
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ISRAEL TOUGHENS REPRISAL TACTICS AGAINST JORDAN
Israel appears to have
adopted a policy of retaliating
immediately and without warning
against terrorist acts.
The first manifestation of
this tactic occurred on 8 April
when a small Israeli unit in
"hot pursuit" of terrorists
crossed the Jordan River south
of the Dead Sea. The Israelis
claim to have killed some sabo-
teurs and to have destroyed a
house at a commando base six
miles inside Jordan while avoid-
ing contact with Jordanian forces.
An Israeli military spokesman
subsequently stated that future
terrorist forays risk similar
reprisals. On the same day, Is-
raeli artillery shelled Jordanian
positions north of the Dead Sea
following a mining incident in
which three Israelis were killed.
Meanwhile, pressures are
continuing in Jordan for the re-
gime to take a more militant
posture toward Israel. The be-
lief is increasing within the
army and among the populace that
Jordan should seek arms assistance
from the USSR and at the same time
offer practical support to the
terrorist raiders. King Husayn
is now apparently trying to col-
lect promises of support from
other Arab countries in the event
of more Israeli reprisal raids.
under Husayn. The major aim of
this group, composed largely of
radicals--Baathists, Nasirists,
and Communists--is a coalition
government that would follow a
program of active and total re-
sistance to any Israeli occupa-
tion of Jordanian territory, in-
Political opposition in Jor-
dan is hardening, although there
is as yet no unified opposition
group. At this time, some op-
ponents of the regime are plan-
ning in terms of a new government
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
The pre-election crisis in Panama has eased,
but political activity there and in several other
countries still centers on past and coming elec-
toral contests.
Arnulfo Arias' hopes for the Panamanian pres-
idency have suffered further setbacks following the
National Guard's effective use of. force to support
the Robles government. The Supreme Court-annulled
the National Assembly's conviction of President
Robles on impeachment charges, and Robles secured
control over the electoral tribunal in charge of
arrangements for the elections on 12 May. In his
appeal for votes, Arias now is calling for renego-
tiation of the canal treaties, and Panamanian-US
relations may receive more attention before elec-
tion day.
Political tensions remain high in Honduras
following the Lopez government's sweep of munici-
pal elections on 31 March. In protest against the
government's intimidation of the voters, the oppo-
sition Liberal Party has called on its few elected
members to withdraw from their posts. In the Do-
minican Republic, most opposition forces are boy-
cotting the municipal elections scheduled for
16 May and prospects are dim for any meaningful
contests. Ecuador's presidential campaign, with
two months to go, continues to be marred by vio-
lence. In contrast, the Bahamian elections on
10 April were both hard-fought and peaceful. Pre-
mier Pindling's government won a much enlarged ma-
jority--29 of the 38 seats in the House of Assembly.
Brazil's student disturbances have tapered off
but some leading churchmen have spoken up in sup-
port of the students and have condemned the govern-
ment's performance. The Costa e Silva administra-
tion this week took its first step aimed at muz-
zling oppos:itionist Carlos Lacerda, whose vitupera-
tive criticisms have kept its nerves on edge.
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POLITICAL TENSION STILL SIMMERING IN BRAZIL
The student disorders that
swept the nation last week have
subsided, but political tension
continues in Brazil.
Some leading Catholic church-
men have severely criticized not
only the government's handling of
the student disturbances, but also
its entire performance since the
1964 revolution. This sweeping
condemnation--written by the
vicar general of Rio de Janeiro--
underscores church dissatisfaction
with the current situation and
seems sure to increase tension
between the government and
church. Moreover, it will prob-
ably encourage some of the more
radical priests to step up their
support for extremist student
groups.
The government has been re-
luctant to dispute openly with
the church over past criticism
and probably will try to paper
over the current incident. The
new manifesto, however, may result
in increased pressure from the
military for some government regu-
lation of the activities and pro-
nouncements of the more militant
priests.
Meanwhile, the government has
finally made the first move aimed
at muzzling fiery opposition
leader Carlos Lacerda. On 5 April,
the government banned any activ-
ity by Lacerda's "Broad Front"
political movement and prohibited
press publicity for it. The
edict reiterated the legal meas-
ures available to deal with po-
litical activity by proscribed
politicians--such as former presi-
dents Goulart and Kubitschek, who
are Lacerda's partners in the
front. It also served notice
that the administration is will-
ing to resort to arbitrary meas-
ures when it deems them necessary.
The edict is a clear warning
to Lacerda that, if he continues
his vituperative criticism of the
administration, he risks incurring
sterner measures. The edict is
not likely to silence Lacerda,
however, and may instead help his
cause if it makes him an opposi-
tion rallying point. He may well
choose to challenge the legality
of the edict in the courts, which
have often found against the gov-
ernment. The edict's wording is
vague, moreover, and can be in-
terpreted to allow Lacerda to
continue activity in his own name,
in a renamed front group, or under
the aegis of the legal opposition
party.
So far, President Costa e
Silva's only follow-up has been
a restatement of the legality of
the government's actions, its de-
sire to consider "valid" student
complaints, and its respect for
the press. He ascribed the recent
disorders to a "vast plan by ex-
tremists who want to overthrow
the government," and said that he
had ordered military intervention
only to stop "excesses" by civilian
police. His words are not likely
to soothe his critics on either 25X1
the right or the left unless the
government acts to alleviate le-
gitimate popular grievances.
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SECRE'T'
PANAMA OPPOSITION CANDIDATE FACES TOUGH ELECTION FIGHT
The opposition National Union
(NU) has abandoned its efforts to
install rival "president" Delvalle
as chief executive and is concen-
trating its attention on the pres-
idential elections scheduled for
12 May. The Supreme Court ruling
on 4 April, which nullified the
National Assembly's impeachment
and conviction of President
Robles, was a major setback for
NU presidential candidate Arnulfo
Arias and the four former govern-
ment parties backing him.
The Arias camp was dealt an-
other blow almost simultaneously
when a pro-Arias magistrate on the
three-member electoral tribunal
was bought off by Robles' govern-
ment minister and resigned. This
action effectively shifted control
of the tribunal to the govern-
ment--now in a position to manip-
ulate the election outcome--be-
cause the alternate magistrate is
a cousin of President Robles.
Adding to Arias' troubles are
the strains within his fragile
alliance. Some of his colleagues,
now concerned over their prospects
for victory, are searching for
some alternative to remaining in
the Arias camp. Arias, on the
other hand, claims that he will
continue to recognize Delvalle as
the legal president and will pur-
sue his fight for election--alone
if necessary. Privately, he ac-
cused the other NU parties of try-
ing to undermine him, noting
that his wealthy allies had met
him only half way in the aborted
effort to foment a general
strike.
In a brief televised speech
on 8 April--his first since the
high court threw out Robles' im-
peachment--Arias called for his
followers to use the ballot "to
rescue the fatherland from the
hands of the corrupt and trai-
torous." In a sudden shift of
tactics, Arias urged the people
to demonstrate their repudiation
of the draft canal treaties ne-
gotiated by Robles with the US.
Having failed in all other ef-
forts to draw support, Arias may
now intend to whip up emotions
on the canal issue.
He has a difficult path
ahead of him, with the govern-
ment firmly entrenched in a po-
sition to determine the outcome
of the elections. The apathy
displayed by most Panamanians
during the crisis is likely to
work to his disadvantage. More-
over, National Guard Commandant
Vallarino can be expected to use
every means at his disposal to
ensure a government victory at
the polls. In any case, even if
the NU wins the election, the
National Guard is still deter-
mined to prevent Arias''as-sump-
tion of the presidency.
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HONDURAN OPPOSITION PULLS OUT OF GOVERNMENT
The fraud and violence dur-
ing the municipal elections on
31 March will probably end pre-
liminary steps toward cooperation
between the opposition Liberal
Party and the government. As a
result, Honduras seems likely to
suffer more political instability
than it has for the past four
years.
The ruling Nationalist
Party won 240 of the 280 munici-
palities--a victory so obviously
rigged that is has embarrassed
some Nationalist leaders.
Intimidation and fraud are
not new in Honduran elections,
and there is ample evidence that
both were widespread this year,
perhaps even more so than usual.
At least 15 persons were killed
and scores were injured during
the balloting. Nationalist Party
goon squads, organized and funded
by Vice President and Minister
of the Presidency Ricardo Zuniga,
were much in evidence in rural
areas. In addition, the Nation-
alists used pork barrel tactics,
offering rewards to towns that
supported the government and
threatening to deny civic improve-
ments to those remaining loyal to
the Liberals.
Liberal leaders---angered at
President Lopez for not heeding
their ultimatum that he void the
elections and dismiss Zuniga--
have notified the electoral coun-
cil that they are withdrawing all
party members from municipal,
departmental, and national elec-
toral boards. Liberal winners
in municipal elections have been
ordered not to take their posts
and deputies have been told to
retire from the Congress.
Zuniga, who has admitted to
US officials that he masterminded
the fraud, has stated that a
total annulment of the elections
is unrealistic. He has implied
that the Nationalists are willing
to call new elections in several
cities and that he is prepared
al: least to talk to the opposi-
ton about some sort of accommo-
dation, but this is not likely
to satisfy the Liberals.
In any case, even if the few
Liberals now in office can be
persuaded to follow party orders
and give up their lucrative posts,
the functioning of the government
will not be undermined. Threats
of a general protest strike could
bring some conciliatory gesture
from President Lopez, but the
Liberals lack the military sup-
port they would need to extract
any real concessions from the
government.
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