WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CIA-RDP79-00927A006400020002-0
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RIPPUB
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S
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32
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December 21, 2016
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October 24, 2008
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2
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Publication Date: 
April 12, 1968
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SUMMARY
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Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A006400020002-0 Secret 25X1 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY State Dept. review completed Secret 44 RETURN TO ARCHIVES (t RECORDS L N Eh 12 April 1968 IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE No . 001-5/0 Joe Box ._ . 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A006400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 SECRET (Information as of noon EST, 11 April 1968) VIETNAM Hanoi has followed up its announced willingness to meet US officials for preliminary talks with prop- aganda designed to show there has been no change in its terms for a negotiated settlement. Moscow, though surprised by Hanoi's positive response, is proclaiming its support. Peking has attacked Pres- ident Johnson and ignored Hanoi's move. The South Vietnamese are apprehensive over the possibility of US-DRV contacts. Page 1 Europe FRANCE REJECTS SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR SPACE COOPERATION Moscow's latest effort to expand Franco-Soviet space cooperation, a proposal to set up a global communica- tions system using satellites built jointly by the two countries, has been rebuffed by Paris. SECRET Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY l2 Apr 68 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 SECRET MOSCOW CALLS FOR BLOC UNITY AND DISCIPLINE AT HOME Moscow's preoccupation with developments within and among the East European nations and the impact of those developments on the Soviet Union dominated the USSR INCREASING HELICOPTER SALES TO THE WEST The USSR is finding Western markets increasingly re- ceptive to its helicopters, which formerly sold pri- marily in connection with military aid pacts. Pro- spective purchasers now include public agencies in the underdeveloped countries and private business corporations in Western industrial countries. NEW CZECHOSLOVAK REGIME TO SLOW POLITICAL CHANGES The keynotes in the party's immediate -future will be moderation and stabilization. CZECH LEADERS PUSH ECONOMIC REFORMS The new Czech regime is proceeding cautiously but resolutely with its economic reform program. In time, it may attract some of the foreign aid and in- vestment it needs to overcome its heritage of severe economic problems. POLISH PARTY STRUGGLE CONTINUES At the present time, no single faction appears to command a majority within the party, but the con- tinuing struggle is already producing major changes in top government posts and will lead to subsequent shifts in the upper reaches of the party. ISRAEL TOUGHENS REPRISAL TACTICS AGAINST JORDAN Israel has apparently adopted a policy of immediate retaliation for terrorist acts, even as pressure in- creases in Jordan for the regime to adopt a more militant posture toward Israel. SNCRE`I` Page ii WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 Apr 68 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A006400020002-0 SECRET Western Hemisphere POLITICAL TENSION STILL SIMMERING IN BRAZIL The student disorders that swept the nation last week have subsided, but criticism of the government continues. PANAMA OPPOSITION CANDIDATE FACES TOUGH ELECTION FIGHT Opposition presidential candidate Arnulfo Arias has a difficult path ahead of him because the Robles government is firmly entrenched in a position to determine the outcome of the elections and has the solid support of the National Guard. HONDURAN OPPOSITION PULLS OUT OF GOVERNMENT Fraud and violence during recent elections will prob- ably end preliminary steps toward cooperation between the opposition and the government, and Honduras seems likely to suffer more political instability than it has for the past four years. SECRET Page iii WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 Apr 68 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A006400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 SECRET FAR EAST Hanoi is carefully preparing its case for de- manding a complete cessation of US bombing and "other acts of war" in the projected "contact" with US representatives. The relative lull in Communist military action in South Vietnam, particularly the failure to offer significant resistance to US forces that relieved the siege of ]:he Sanh and reoccupied the Lang Vei Special Forces camp, suggests that Hanoi may be seeking to convey an impression of restraint in anticipation of talks. The North Vietnamese have also attempted to in- crease the US incentive to halt the bombing com- pletely by publicly declaring that peace negotia- tions could begin immediately if the US took this action. Hanoi appears to be ready to open the pre- liminary talks promptly, but its rejection of Ge- neva as the site for a meeting apparently reflects a determination to avoid any suggestion that the talks will deal with a political settlement. The North Vietnamese regime is taking steps to avert any relaxation or exaggerated hopes among its own people and the Viet Cong forces. Hanoi's domestic propaganda has stressed that its terms for a settlement remain unchanged and has predicted another bitter round of fighting as the war enters a new stage. There has been no decline in the heavy infiltration of Northern troops into South Vietnam. The Chinese Communists cautiously waited until two days after Hanoi declared its willingness to contact US representatives before breaking their silence on the projected talks. A Peking broadcast avoided comment on Hanoi's offer and directed its fire at President Johnson's address. Despite this implied warning regarding US intentions, there is no indication that the Chinese have made any seri- ous attempt to derail preliminary US - North Viet- SECRET Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 Apr 68 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 C ki I N A N 0 R T H C H I N A ( L A O S ?Quang Trl Khe Sanh Baiti aM -Mug DAO PHU QUOC (Vietnam) 50Mdes ~,) R U 5C Kilometers V l 25X1 90250 4-68 CIA SECRET Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 SECRET VIETNAM Following up its agreement of 3 April to meet with US offi- cials, Hanoi moved quickly to ex- plain to its own people and to its principal foreign allies that these "contacts" will have a very limited purpose. The North Vietnamese have said the meetings are to be bilateral and at the ambassadorial level, and they ini- tially indicated a clear prefer- ence for Phnom Penh as the site. Hanoi's propaganda stridently insists that the proposed meet- ings are only for the purpose of discussing a full US cessation of the bombings. In addition, the foreign minister told a CBS cor- respondent that the preliminary talks could also be used to dis- cuss the "time, place, and date of the formal talks." In its propaganda, Hanoi remains uncom- promising and employs the usual verbal ambiguities. References to the crucial issue of recipro- cal North Vietnamese restraint, for example, are carefully phrased, pointing out that Hanoi has al- ways refused to consider recipro- city in the past. There has been no reference, however, as to what they will do in the future. Other North Vietnamese com- mentary depicts "business as usual" on the war front. There are almost daily charges of ex- tensive bomb damage to populated Pacre 3 areas south of the 20th parallel, accompanied by complaints of reconnaissance overflights above this line, and exaggerated ac- counts of the level of fighting in the South. -The US has been ac- cused of one deliberate violation of the bombing restriction, but this has been played in low key. Most of the propaganda seems designed to convince Communists in the South that they are not be- ing abandoned and to steel the North Vietnamese population for continuing heavy burdens of the war effort. One commentary pre- dicted that the war had entered a new phase and that extremely bitter fighting could be expected. Hanoi appears anxious to demon- strate that it is acting from a position of strength and that its flexibility in establishing con- tact with the US is no indica- tion of any backtracking on its terms for a negotiated settlement. Soviets Surprised and Pleased Hanoi's response to Presi- dEent Johnson's speech of 31 March caught the Soviet leaders by sur- prise. Moscow's propaganda indi- cated that the Russians assumed there would be no positive re- sponse, suggesting that the North Vietnamese deemed it neither nec- essary nor desirable to solicit SECRET WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 Apr 68 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 SECRET Soviet advice before making their move. There is little doubt, how- ever, that the USSR welcomes the recent sequence of events. After the fact, the Soviet Government on 5 April accorded Hanoi's posi- tion "full support." Neverthe- less, Soviet leaders are probably not overly optimistic. The only comment by a high official has been an exceptionally harsh one deliv- ered by trade union leader Shelepin in Moscow on 8 April. The Soviet press, however, subsequently de- leted his most severe criticism. Soviet press and radio comment continues to show cautious approval of the recent developments, while placing the onus on the US to make further moves toward de-es- calation. Peking Fails to Comment Communist China has not yet commented publicly on Hanoi's statement of 3 April, but has at- tacked President Johnson's pro- posal as another "big fraud." Saigon is Apprehensive The South Vietnamese appear to be increasingly concerned that the US will not make an effort to protect their interests in forth- coming contacts with North Vietnam. These fears have been expressed by various political groups as well as by several prominent in- dividuals in the National Assem- bly. Both houses of the assembly have adopted resolutions demand- ing that the South Vietnamese be given a decision-making role and rejecting a coalition government. To express South Vietnam's deter- mination to fight on alone if neces- sary, the Thieu government this week presented to the assembly a plan for general mobilization to go into effect as early as May. The assembly had earlier indicated its support for such a measure. President Thieu and Vice President Ky appear to be working better together in the face of the "crisis," although there are still apparently underlying fric- tions. Ky, for the moment, is busy with his People's Army, the SI~"('I I :"1' Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 Apr 68 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 SECRET new civilian defense organiza- tion, and is reported to be pleased with Thieu's public dele- gation of these duties to him. The Ground War The letup in large-scale Com- munist military activity through- out most of South Vietnam con- tinued this week. Major new allied spoiling operations are under way against enemy forces in several strategic areas of the country. In the far northwestern sector, an 18-bat- talion allied force has linked up with the long-besieged Khe Sanh garrison and has begun offensive thrusts outward in all directions from the base. The scattered re- sistance so far offered by ele- ments of the NVA 304th Division tends to confirm the withdrawal of significant enemy concentra- tions from the area and the enemy's intention to avoid making an all- out stand in western Quang Tri Province. Meanwhile, in the coastal areas of the northern provinces, US Army troops sweeping the area between Quang Tri city and Hue failed to make signifi- cant contact with NVA main force units in the area. 25X1 _J-the Communists are currently stressing efforts "to ensure ade- quate replacement personnel and materials to carry on large- scale operations during the sum- mer and fall of 1968." In the interim, the enemy is maintaining pressures against selected allied military targets and lines of communications while conducting small-unit actions and attacks against remote outposts. SECRET Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 Apr 68 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 SECRET EUROPE Political changes continued to reverberate during the week in both Czechoslovakia and Poland, inspiring fresh anxieties elsewhere in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. In Moscow, these developments and their dis- turbing impact inside the USSR were the main con- cern at a plenum meeting of the party central com- mittee. The Bulgarians and East Germans also con- tinued to exhibit stress symptoms that pressures for "liberalization" might be generated in their countries. The situation in Poland showed no signs of settling down. On the contrary, factional tur- bulence increased, bringing a government shakeup and widespread purges at the middle and lower levels of the party. New outbreaks of public un- rest may occur. In Prague, the new government appeared to be seeking to slow the pace of political change. The composition of the new party and government leader- ships reflects a nice balance between conservatives and liberals, which will probably tend to promote stability. SECRET Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 Apr 68 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 S }+.C; RE'1' FRANCE REJECTS SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR SPACE COOPERATION Paris apparently has re- buffed Moscow's latest effort to expand Franco-Soviet cooperation in the communications satellite field. t e Soviets proposed setting up a global communica- tions system using satellites built jointly by the two coun- tries. The first satellite would have been launched in about two years. e rejected because of the op- position of Maurice Schumann, minister of state of scientific the French Government hereafter will restrict its cooperation with the USSR in the telecommuni- cations field to the continua- tion of test transmissions via Molniya satellites. Moscow made two similar, though less concrete, proposals to the French in 1966, and Paris then cited its commitment to the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT) as the reason for declining. As a member of INTELSAT, France has agreed not to make commercial use of any other system. The USSR is not a member. a full review of future space cooperation with the USSR is now under way at the ministe- rial level. There are indications that restrictions on space co- operation with the Soviets will be extended beyond the telecom- munications field. Soviet sci- entists have been permitted to make visits to Kerguelen Island, in the southern Indian Ocean, as part of joint space studies. The French, however, are refus- ing Soviet requests for long- term or semipermanent research facilities there. The French also have turned down a Soviet bid to set up and use a communi- cations station in French Guiana during Soviet manned space flights. Paris reportedly is reluctant to allow any Soviet presence in SEC;RE'I` Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 Apr 68 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 SECRET MOSCOW CALLS FOR BLOC UNITY AND DISCIPLINE AT HOME Moscow's preoccupation with developments within and among the East European nations and the impact of those developments on the Soviet Union dominated the central committee meeting that ended on 10 April. General Secretary Brezhnev, who has been in the forefront of recent Soviet efforts to counteract the waning solidarity of the War- saw Pact states, presented the main report at the two-day meet- ing. His report has not yet been made public and may never be. A statement issued in the name of the central committee at the end of the meeting, however, no doubt pre- sents the broad gist of the report. SECRET WEEKLY SUMgARY 12 Apr 68 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 SECRET The statement struck a harsh note in tracing bloc disunity to "subversive" Western activities. To meet the danger, the statement indicated, Moscow would do "every- thing necessary" to strengthen the political, economic, and mili- tary unity of the Communist coun- tries. The importance of the Dresden meeting of 23 March, where proposals to "improve" the joint command of the Warsaw Pact forces and to increase economic cooperation were broached, was particularly stressed. The statement, in reviewing Soviet positions on other current international questions, made only a brief reference to Viet- nam. It pledged further aid to Hanoi, but took note of recent peace moves by saying that this aid would be given "in the name of the earliest peace in Vietnam." Moscow appears determined to improve domestic defenses against "alien" influences. The state- ment called for greater party vigilance in the cultural field to head off the infiltration of such influences, which have reg- ularly been blamed over recent months for the continuing intel- lectual dissent. The list of speakers in the debate on Brezh- nev's report also showed this concern to maintain ideological discipline at home. In addition to the provincial party bosses who normally speak at party plenums, this week's meeting was addressed by several officials from the cultural, ideological, and propaganda fields, including the chief editor of Pravda, the min- ister of culture, the secretary of the board of the USSR Writers' Union, and the director of the Marxism-Leninism Institute. The meeting approved the ap- pointment of 40-year-old Konstantin Katushev, a fast-rising party tech- nocrat from the industrial prov- ince of Gorky, to the central party secretariat. Katushev ap- pears to owe his rapid advance in the party hierarchy primarily to the influence of senior party secretary Kirilenko, who has supervised party affairs in the Russian Republic and has had a hand in overseeing industrial management. The new secretary has probably also been given a leg up by Brezhnev, who personally presided over his installation as the party boss of Gorky Oblast just over two years ago. The removal last year of Yury Andropov and Aleksandr Shel- epin left vacancies in the secre- tariat for specialists in party relations within the bloc and in consumer goods production. There have also been indications since February that party secre- tary Suslov has been forced--per- haps for reasons of ill health-- to yield some of his functions as Brezhnev's second-in-command to Kirilenko. If there has been a general reshuffling of -secretarial portfolios, Katushev may take on some of Kirilenko's responsibili- ties. SECRET Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 Apr 68 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A006400020002-0 KA-26 HOODLUM MI-4 HOUND MI-l0 HARKE MI-8 HIP MI-6 HOOK 25X1 c14 '12Ii'I' Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A006400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 SECRET USSR INCREASING HELICOPTER SALES TO THE WEST The USSR is finding Western markets increasingly receptive to its helicopters which formerly sold primarily in connection with military aid pacts. Prospective purchasers now include public agencies in the underdeveloped, countries and private business corporations in Western indus- trial countries. The USSR has exported more than 400 helicopters to non-Com- munist countries. A substantial proportion of these has been the MI-4 Hound utility helicopter, which has been shipped to at least 17 free world countries. A few of these 12-passenger air- craft continue to be exported, although production of the MI-4 is believed to have ended in 1967. During the past year, the Soviets have been offering instead the larger MI-8 Hip helicopter as an all-purpose utility machine. Deliveries of the MI-8 have al- ready been made to Egypt, Cuba, and Afghanistan. The Soviets are meeting no competition in their efforts to sell the MI-6 Hook, the world's largest operational helicopter. This aircraft, which can carry 65 troops or almost nine tons of cargo, has been exported to Egypt, Indonesia, and Pakistan for use as a troop transport. The MI-10 Harke "flying crane," which can lift more than 16 tons was developed from the MI-6. It has been demonstrated in Western Europe and has attracted some interest from oil companies. In addition, the Soviet sales effort is becoming more polished. In the campaign to push sales of the new KA-26 Hoodlum multipur- pose helicopter, glossy brochures with overlays depicting the air- craft's versatility have been distributed to aircraft dealers. This helicopter comes in several models including passenger, cargo, and agricultural versions. Sev- eral countries have already shown SECRET Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 Apr 68 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 SECRET NEW CZECHOSLOVAK REGIME TO SLOW POLITICAL CHANGES The keynotes in the party's immediate future will be modera- tion and stabilization. Although each member of the new party presidium and secre- tariat is probably committed in some degree to Dubcek's reform program, there appears to be a balance between persons with conservative records and genuine reformers. Cernik and Kolder in particular, may exert a re- straining influence on others like Smrkovsky and Spacek, who advocate a far more liberal course. The secretariat has a similar balance. There is no guarantee, however, that any of the present leaders will act as they have in the past--they have already been severely crit- icized by unsatisfied progres- sives and scandalized conserva- tives. The new government, appointed on 8 April, probably will proceed with due deliberation in im- plementing the "action" program. Many of the ministers, headed by Premier Cernik, were selected because of their records as com- petent technicians in the pre- vious government. In addition to Cernik, formerly conserva- tive members of the new govern- ment include deputy premiers Strougal and Hamouz and ministers Krejci and Machacova. Reform- minded ministers probably will coalesce around Deputy Premier Ota Sik, a long-time advocate of radical reforms. Moreover, if the government appears to be dragging its feet on reforms, Josef Smrovsky, the determined liberal leader of parliament, can be expected to call it to task. The key ministries of In- terior, Foreign Affairs, and De- fense have been entrusted to men presumably loyal to Dubcek. There are six Slovaks, including deputy premiers Husak and Colotka, but the Slovaks are still underrep- resented relative to their num- bers in the over-all population. The non-Communist Socialist and People's parties are again rep- resented by the justice and health ministers, respectively. In keep- ing with the party's decision to prevent concentration of power by separating party and govern- ment posts, only Cernik has dual functions. Dubcek has endorsed a con- troversial call for holding a party congress before the sched- uled date of 1970 so that the party might assess the results of the new "action" program. Pre- liminary reports on this docu- ment indicate that the Czecho- slovak reform will be among the most liberal ever attempted any Communist government. SECRII:"I* Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 Apr 68 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 0r,utcr, )L CZECHOSLOVAKIA GOVERNMENT Appointed 8 April 1968 u ? ? Alexander Dubcek Frantisek Barbirek Vasil Bilak Oldrich Cernik Peter Colotka ? Drahomir Kolder Frantisek Hamouz Gustav Ilusak Ota Sik D? Frantisek Kriegel Jan Piller Lubomir Strougal [> ? Emil Rigo Josef Smrkovsky P ? Josef Spacek Oldrich Svestka Josef Boruvka Martin Dzur Miroslav Galuska Jiri Hajek Julius Hantus Vladimir Kadlec ? Josef Krejci Bohuslav Kucera ? Bozena Machacova Josef Pavel Oldrich Pavlovsky ? Frantisek Penc Stanislav Razl Frantisek Rehak ? Bohumil Sucharda Josef Trokan Vaclav Vales Vladislav Vlcek Miloslav Hruskovic ? Josef Koreak Frantisek Vlasak Vaclav Hula Michal Stancel Agriculture and Food National Defense Culture and Information Foreign Affairs Forestry and Water Economy Education Heavy Industry Justice Consumer Goods Industry Interior Internal Trade Mining Chemical Industry Transportation Finance Building Industry Foreign Trade Health Minister-Chairman, State Commission for Technology Minister-Chairman, Central Power Administration Minister-Chairman, State Planning Commission Minister Without Portfolio Minister Without Portfolio PARTY Elected 4 April 1968 ? Antonin Kapck Josef Lenart ? Martin Vaculik ? Alexander Dubcek ? Cestmir Cisar Alois Indra ? Drahomir Kolder Josef Lenart ? Stefan Sadovsky Vaclav Slavik Oldrich Volenik Zdenck Mlynar Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A006400020002-0 SECRET CZECH LEADERS PUSH ECONOMIC REFORMS The new Czech regime is pro- ceeding cautiously but resolutely with its economic reform program. In time it may be able to attract some of the foreign aid and in- vestment it needs to overcome its heritage of severe economic prob- lems. Priorities are now being es- tablished under an "economic ac- tion program." Priority measures will include a redirection of in- vestments to force a shift in em- phasis from heavy industry to consumer-oriented sectors, par- ticularly agriculture, housing, and services. Enterprise man- agers are to give added incentives in the form of increased respon- sibilities. They are to see that workers are paid primarily accord- ing to the results of their work. Enterprises soon will be per- mitted to enter into some form of mar- ket competition in an effort to im- prove efficiency and labor disci- pline, according to Premier Cer- nik. Cernik has stated that a basic re-evaluation of planning and marketing functions is neces- sary. Regime leaders realize that the deficiencies these measures are intended to remedy are deep- seated, and that it will take time to increase efficiency in the use of resources and to raise stand- ards of quality. The process could be speeded up with large-scale foreign eco- nomic aid, and the Czechs are looking for credits both from Communist countries and from the West. The former evidently re- sponded unfavorably when such re- quests were made at the recent Dresden Conference. Czechoslo- vakia is likely, however, to ob- tain short-term credits from the USSR to tide it over its immediate balance-of-payments problems. Premier Cernik and Finance Minister Sucharda recently spoke of the desirability of obtaining new technology with Western cred- its, and Prague probably will seek aid from international organ- izations and Western business firms. The new regime apparently hopes to open a substantial line of credit by reactivating Czecho- slovakia's membership in the In- ternational Monetary Fund, and Czech economists have urged an approach to the World Bank for long-term credit. Assistance from international sources would avoid the political implications of accepting major commitments from individual West- ern governments. In this connec- tion, loan offers from France and West Germany to the Novotny regime in 1967 reportedly were turned down, the former because it was tied to purchases from France only and the latter because of the political conditions it en- tailed. SECRET Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 Apr 68 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A006400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 SECRET POLISH PARTY STRUGGLE CONTINUES The factional struggle within the Polish Communist Party is producing major changes in top government posts, which will lead to subsequent shifts in the up- per reaches of the party. The nomination by parliament on 10 April of Defense Minister Marian Spychalski to replace Edward Ochab in the ceremonial post of head of state probably signals a further weakening of party leader Gomulka's position. Spychalski has been Gomulka's staunchest ally in the party po- litburo, in which he probably will remain for the time being. As defense minister, however, he has been unable to control the political attitudes of some na- tionalistic elements within the officer corps which opposed both Gomulka's pro-Soviet stand dur- ing the Middle East crisis of last summer and the violent re- pression of recent student demon- strations. The new defense chief is a 45-year-old deputy defense minis- ter, Chief of Staff Major General Wojciech Jaruzelski, a profes- sionally competent officer who is strongly pro-Soviet. Jaruzelski has no known record of political commitments to party factions, and probably will be loyal to whomever emerges on top from the current political strife. His ap- pointment, however, indicates that hard-line party elements, led by Interior Minister Moczar, were un- able to place their own man, Dep- uty Defense Minister Korczynski, in this key post. Gomulka made no attempt to provide leadership during the scheduled 9-10 April session of parliament, although he partic- ipated in the meetings and may have been active behind the scenes. The prolonged and inde- cisive character of the parlia- mentary meetings and the rampant speculation in Warsaw over other expected government shifts in- di_cate that crucial decisions have not yet been reached. No single faction--including Moczar's chauvinistic hard-line group, provincial party leader Gierek's reformist elements, or Gomulka's old guard--now appears to command a majority within the party. For the time being, the struggle between these groups will continue to be felt through purges of the lower and middle levels of the party and state ap- paratus. The mounting public witch- hunt against Jews and liberals is also part of the factional jock- eying for power, and is designed in part to influence the selec- tion of delegates to the party congress scheduled for later this year. A prolonged factional struggle may thus be in the off- ing. At the same time, the hard liners' use of the police appara- tus and their control over vir- tually all public media are creat- ing an atmosphere of tension and fear. If such an atmosphere is sustained for long, it could cause renewed public unrest. SECRET 12 Apr 68 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 SVV:CRF; (' SECRET Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 Apr 68 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 SECRET MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA King Husayn's weekend visit to Cairo produced no public indications of any breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli impasse, nor in Husayn's increasingly difficult situation. With domestic opposition to Husayn's cautious policies growing and coalescing, Israel tightened the screws on the King by announc- ing a policy of immediate retaliation for Arab ter- rorist acts. The announcement followed an Israeli foray in "hot pursuit" of terrorists, Southern Yemen President al-Shaabi's public speeches are fraying the taut truce between the army command and the country's more radical revo- lutionaries. The army leaders are bristling over al-Shaabi's growing favoritism toward the extrem- ists but have not yet tried another push against them. Fighting slowed in Nigeria as Federal forces regrouped and resupplied following their recent victories. The Biafrans spent the week preparing new defensive positions. Third-party efforts to bring the two sides together for peace talks are continuing, but neither side has modified its terms. In Rhodesia, the regime's own constitutional commission has recommended a, new constitution that would eventually make Africans eligible for half the seats in the legislature while guaranteeing the other half to the white minority. Neither the Afri- can nationalists nor the white ultra-extremists will regard this provision as an acceptable compro- mise. Students in Ethiopia continue to be restive, and precautionary security measures are in effect throughout Addis Ababa. Tensions are rising again in Sierra Leone. Militant adherents of the proscribed former oppo- sition party now appear convinced that the ruling junta has reneged on its prom.' ~Se of an earl re- turn to civilian overnment SECRET Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 Apr 68 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A006400020002-0 SECRET ISRAEL TOUGHENS REPRISAL TACTICS AGAINST JORDAN Israel appears to have adopted a policy of retaliating immediately and without warning against terrorist acts. The first manifestation of this tactic occurred on 8 April when a small Israeli unit in "hot pursuit" of terrorists crossed the Jordan River south of the Dead Sea. The Israelis claim to have killed some sabo- teurs and to have destroyed a house at a commando base six miles inside Jordan while avoid- ing contact with Jordanian forces. An Israeli military spokesman subsequently stated that future terrorist forays risk similar reprisals. On the same day, Is- raeli artillery shelled Jordanian positions north of the Dead Sea following a mining incident in which three Israelis were killed. Meanwhile, pressures are continuing in Jordan for the re- gime to take a more militant posture toward Israel. The be- lief is increasing within the army and among the populace that Jordan should seek arms assistance from the USSR and at the same time offer practical support to the terrorist raiders. King Husayn is now apparently trying to col- lect promises of support from other Arab countries in the event of more Israeli reprisal raids. under Husayn. The major aim of this group, composed largely of radicals--Baathists, Nasirists, and Communists--is a coalition government that would follow a program of active and total re- sistance to any Israeli occupa- tion of Jordanian territory, in- Political opposition in Jor- dan is hardening, although there is as yet no unified opposition group. At this time, some op- ponents of the regime are plan- ning in terms of a new government SECRET Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY 12.Apr 68 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A006400020002-0 25X1 2 Al Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 SECRET WESTERN HEMISPHERE The pre-election crisis in Panama has eased, but political activity there and in several other countries still centers on past and coming elec- toral contests. Arnulfo Arias' hopes for the Panamanian pres- idency have suffered further setbacks following the National Guard's effective use of. force to support the Robles government. The Supreme Court-annulled the National Assembly's conviction of President Robles on impeachment charges, and Robles secured control over the electoral tribunal in charge of arrangements for the elections on 12 May. In his appeal for votes, Arias now is calling for renego- tiation of the canal treaties, and Panamanian-US relations may receive more attention before elec- tion day. Political tensions remain high in Honduras following the Lopez government's sweep of munici- pal elections on 31 March. In protest against the government's intimidation of the voters, the oppo- sition Liberal Party has called on its few elected members to withdraw from their posts. In the Do- minican Republic, most opposition forces are boy- cotting the municipal elections scheduled for 16 May and prospects are dim for any meaningful contests. Ecuador's presidential campaign, with two months to go, continues to be marred by vio- lence. In contrast, the Bahamian elections on 10 April were both hard-fought and peaceful. Pre- mier Pindling's government won a much enlarged ma- jority--29 of the 38 seats in the House of Assembly. Brazil's student disturbances have tapered off but some leading churchmen have spoken up in sup- port of the students and have condemned the govern- ment's performance. The Costa e Silva administra- tion this week took its first step aimed at muz- zling oppos:itionist Carlos Lacerda, whose vitupera- tive criticisms have kept its nerves on edge. SECRET Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 Apr 68 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 SECRET POLITICAL TENSION STILL SIMMERING IN BRAZIL The student disorders that swept the nation last week have subsided, but political tension continues in Brazil. Some leading Catholic church- men have severely criticized not only the government's handling of the student disturbances, but also its entire performance since the 1964 revolution. This sweeping condemnation--written by the vicar general of Rio de Janeiro-- underscores church dissatisfaction with the current situation and seems sure to increase tension between the government and church. Moreover, it will prob- ably encourage some of the more radical priests to step up their support for extremist student groups. The government has been re- luctant to dispute openly with the church over past criticism and probably will try to paper over the current incident. The new manifesto, however, may result in increased pressure from the military for some government regu- lation of the activities and pro- nouncements of the more militant priests. Meanwhile, the government has finally made the first move aimed at muzzling fiery opposition leader Carlos Lacerda. On 5 April, the government banned any activ- ity by Lacerda's "Broad Front" political movement and prohibited press publicity for it. The edict reiterated the legal meas- ures available to deal with po- litical activity by proscribed politicians--such as former presi- dents Goulart and Kubitschek, who are Lacerda's partners in the front. It also served notice that the administration is will- ing to resort to arbitrary meas- ures when it deems them necessary. The edict is a clear warning to Lacerda that, if he continues his vituperative criticism of the administration, he risks incurring sterner measures. The edict is not likely to silence Lacerda, however, and may instead help his cause if it makes him an opposi- tion rallying point. He may well choose to challenge the legality of the edict in the courts, which have often found against the gov- ernment. The edict's wording is vague, moreover, and can be in- terpreted to allow Lacerda to continue activity in his own name, in a renamed front group, or under the aegis of the legal opposition party. So far, President Costa e Silva's only follow-up has been a restatement of the legality of the government's actions, its de- sire to consider "valid" student complaints, and its respect for the press. He ascribed the recent disorders to a "vast plan by ex- tremists who want to overthrow the government," and said that he had ordered military intervention only to stop "excesses" by civilian police. His words are not likely to soothe his critics on either 25X1 the right or the left unless the government acts to alleviate le- gitimate popular grievances. SECRET Page 23 WEEKLY SUM14ARY 12 Apr 68 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 SECRE'T' PANAMA OPPOSITION CANDIDATE FACES TOUGH ELECTION FIGHT The opposition National Union (NU) has abandoned its efforts to install rival "president" Delvalle as chief executive and is concen- trating its attention on the pres- idential elections scheduled for 12 May. The Supreme Court ruling on 4 April, which nullified the National Assembly's impeachment and conviction of President Robles, was a major setback for NU presidential candidate Arnulfo Arias and the four former govern- ment parties backing him. The Arias camp was dealt an- other blow almost simultaneously when a pro-Arias magistrate on the three-member electoral tribunal was bought off by Robles' govern- ment minister and resigned. This action effectively shifted control of the tribunal to the govern- ment--now in a position to manip- ulate the election outcome--be- cause the alternate magistrate is a cousin of President Robles. Adding to Arias' troubles are the strains within his fragile alliance. Some of his colleagues, now concerned over their prospects for victory, are searching for some alternative to remaining in the Arias camp. Arias, on the other hand, claims that he will continue to recognize Delvalle as the legal president and will pur- sue his fight for election--alone if necessary. Privately, he ac- cused the other NU parties of try- ing to undermine him, noting that his wealthy allies had met him only half way in the aborted effort to foment a general strike. In a brief televised speech on 8 April--his first since the high court threw out Robles' im- peachment--Arias called for his followers to use the ballot "to rescue the fatherland from the hands of the corrupt and trai- torous." In a sudden shift of tactics, Arias urged the people to demonstrate their repudiation of the draft canal treaties ne- gotiated by Robles with the US. Having failed in all other ef- forts to draw support, Arias may now intend to whip up emotions on the canal issue. He has a difficult path ahead of him, with the govern- ment firmly entrenched in a po- sition to determine the outcome of the elections. The apathy displayed by most Panamanians during the crisis is likely to work to his disadvantage. More- over, National Guard Commandant Vallarino can be expected to use every means at his disposal to ensure a government victory at the polls. In any case, even if the NU wins the election, the National Guard is still deter- mined to prevent Arias''as-sump- tion of the presidency. SECIRI'I' Page 24 WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 Apr 68 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 SECRET HONDURAN OPPOSITION PULLS OUT OF GOVERNMENT The fraud and violence dur- ing the municipal elections on 31 March will probably end pre- liminary steps toward cooperation between the opposition Liberal Party and the government. As a result, Honduras seems likely to suffer more political instability than it has for the past four years. The ruling Nationalist Party won 240 of the 280 munici- palities--a victory so obviously rigged that is has embarrassed some Nationalist leaders. Intimidation and fraud are not new in Honduran elections, and there is ample evidence that both were widespread this year, perhaps even more so than usual. At least 15 persons were killed and scores were injured during the balloting. Nationalist Party goon squads, organized and funded by Vice President and Minister of the Presidency Ricardo Zuniga, were much in evidence in rural areas. In addition, the Nation- alists used pork barrel tactics, offering rewards to towns that supported the government and threatening to deny civic improve- ments to those remaining loyal to the Liberals. Liberal leaders---angered at President Lopez for not heeding their ultimatum that he void the elections and dismiss Zuniga-- have notified the electoral coun- cil that they are withdrawing all party members from municipal, departmental, and national elec- toral boards. Liberal winners in municipal elections have been ordered not to take their posts and deputies have been told to retire from the Congress. Zuniga, who has admitted to US officials that he masterminded the fraud, has stated that a total annulment of the elections is unrealistic. He has implied that the Nationalists are willing to call new elections in several cities and that he is prepared al: least to talk to the opposi- ton about some sort of accommo- dation, but this is not likely to satisfy the Liberals. In any case, even if the few Liberals now in office can be persuaded to follow party orders and give up their lucrative posts, the functioning of the government will not be undermined. Threats of a general protest strike could bring some conciliatory gesture from President Lopez, but the Liberals lack the military sup- port they would need to extract any real concessions from the government. SECRET Page 25 WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 Apr 68 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2008/10/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06400020002-0