Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 17, 2006
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 28, 1968
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP79-00927A006500040001-8.pdf1.47 MB
Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A006501Sfbt DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY State Dept. review completed Secret _ 4.5 28 June 1968 No. 0026/68 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006500040001 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 Approved For Release 2007/03SE P f DP79-00927A006500040001-8 (Information as of noon EDT, 27 June 1968) VIETNAM Prime Minister Huong ran into new difficulties during the week as his various opponents probed for weak points in his fledgling government. Both militant and moderate factions of the Buddhist movement issued statements calling for a cease-fire. The lull in the ground war continued as the enemy concentrated on re- deploying his troops, possibly in preparation for large-scale action later this summer. NORTH KOREA STEPS UP INFILTRATION OF THE SOUTH Pyongyang's annual campaign to infiltrate agents into the South has apparently begun. NEW THAI CONSTITUTION INCREASES POLITICAL ACTIVITY The new Thai constitution will almost certainly usher in a period of heightened political activity, but it is not likely to result soon in major changes in the government. Page 1 Europe WESTERN ALLIES PONDER MOVES ON BERLIN SITUATION The NATO conferees in Reykjavik affirmed their sup- port of free access to Berlin while the Allies con- tinued their limited countermeasures and Secretary Rusk underlined US concern by meeting in Bonn with West German Chancellor Kiesinger and Berlin Mayor Schuetz. SECRET Approved For1f asie 200-M C9 P79-00927AMM00040001-8 Approved For Release 2007/WRvtRDP79-00927A006500040001-8 NATO MINISTERS MEET AT REYKJAVIK The semiannual NATO ministerial meeting, held at Reykjavik on 24-25 June, was highlighted by discus- sions of security in the Mediterranean and the pos- sibility of East-West mutual force reductions. SOVIET TROOPS ENTER CZECHOSLOVAKIA FOR PACT EXERCISE The Czechoslovak Government is still trying to play down the size and significance of Soviet participa- tion in the current Warsaw Pact exercise, but the official statements are unlikely to eliminate all doubts and fears among the people. CZECHOSLOVAKS CONCENTRATE ON DOMESTIC PROBLEMS The most significant action of the National Assembly was the enactment of a constitutional law preparing the way for a Czech-Slovak federation, but a contin- uing coolness in relations with the USSR was reflected in comments by key party officials. YUGOSLAVIA AND THE USSR INCREASE MILITARY CONTACTS The arrival in Belgrade on 24 June of the commander of the Soviet Air Force may presage closer military cooperation between Yugoslavia and the USSR, and is another reflection of the gradual step up in military contacts since last summer. MOSCOW TURNS WARY EYE ON "NEW LEFT" Student assaults on the political order in some West European countries have drawn unsympathetic responses from Soviet leaders and have led them to take further measures to tighten discipline over Soviet youth. GAULLISTS IN STRONG POSITION FOR SECOND FRENCH VOTE The French voter chose stability and order in the first round of the parliamentary elections and gave the Gaullists not only a six-percent increase in the popular vote but also an unprecedented number of first-ballot victories. SECRET Approved PogReiease 2Q Z1aM-8U P79-Q%9 j7 Q0&?00040001-8 Approved For Release 2007/03/gk(J E DP79-00927A006500040001-8 Middle East - Africa TANZANIA'S NYERERE WHEELS AND DEALS President Nyerere's ventures in international diplo- macy during the past fortnight will probably yield additional Communist aid for Tanzania and will fur- ther dilute Western influence within the country. NEW SOVIET ECONOMIC AID FOR IRAN Moscow is busily soaking up Iran's anticipated reve- nues from the sale of natural gas with economic de- velopment projects and arms contracts. NASIR OFFERS "ELECTIONS" TO STEM DISSENT IN EGYPT The election campaign currently under way in Egypt is another of Nasir's efforts to dampen internal discontent, and will bring about no diminution in Nasir's control of the state machinery. Western Hemisphere BRAZILIAN STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS PLAGUE GOVERNMENT Demonstrations and protests have taken place in almost every major city, and dangerous countercurrents may be building up in the military. SECRET Approved For ?a1e200'1U31O C9AADR$9-0092-*QQ 50@Q40001-8 Approved For Release 200719WCRRJ-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 UNEASY POSTELECTORAL SITUATION IN ECUADOR Delay in confirming Jose Maria Velasco's victory in the presidential election on 2 June has aggravated long-standing political strains in Ecuador. Mean- while, persistent student and labor agitation has created serious tensions in the Pacific coast port of Guayaquil. STUDENT DISCONTENT INCREASING IN URUGUAY Deteriorating economic conditions have engendered serious, sometimes violent protests by students and organized labor. PANAMANIAN PRESIDENT BACKS DOWN ON SHIPPING DECREE The furor over Panama's controversial shipping decree subsided when President Robles in essence rescinded the measure last weekend. Meanwhile, the vote-count- ing to determine the make-up of the National Assembly remains stalled. SECRET Approved rpg~Lielggse 4W 07gtj,-WP79-02O692j700og00040001-8 Approved For Release 20075/A-RDP79-00927A006500040001-8 In Saigon, tension within the military establishment appears to be easing as Vice President Ky withdraws further into the background.. Uncertainty over how to play the sensitive peace issue is further blurring the political picture in Saigon. Huong created a brief furor in the legislature by merely suggesting that the National Liberation Front may at one time have had some genuine Vietnamese nationalists in it. On the other hand, both the militant and the moderate Buddhists began a cau- tious probe for the limits of tolerance on the issue by calling for an early cease-fire. Even though. the government is tacitly allowing more open discussion of possible terms for a settlement, Saigon politicians are likely to pursue the subject with considerable circumspection, at least until the course of the Paris talks becomes clearer. North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris broke no new ground on the central issue of a bombing halt during the tenth session on Wednesday. They did, however, use the occasion to dwell at some length on the National Liberation Front's program for South Vietnam. Extraneous to the business currently at hand in the talks, the North Vietnamese may have chosen to interject this political issue at least in part with an eye toward playing on the sensitivities of the South Vietnamese. North Korea's seizure last week of a small South Korean motor reconnaissance boat gives Pyongyang a propaganda bonanza at a time when it is pulling out all the stops in its annual observance of the start of the Korean war. The North Koreans have linked the incident to the Pueblo affair to bolster their charges of US - South Korean aggression. In the meantime, North Korea's annual campaign to infiltrate agents into the South-both through the Demilitarized Zone and by sea-appears to have begun. In Thailand, the newly promulgated constitution, nine years in the writing, will usher in a period of activity by long-suppressed civilian politicians. It will not significantly affect the ruling military oligarchy's control over the country, however. SECRET Approved IFWqReliase 2I7 StI P79-bo9-6ThOd 00040001-8 Approved For Release 2007gk4' fA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 oNG i1 ~KIE:N HOA. PH U t.O N f' \ tJiJi: \N1NH i ~ ON ( (\'" ~' T H U A.N ; E, N H THIAN III CORPS SOUTH VIETNAM C'~;i Nr- NAM f\i Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02JECk?~fDP79-00927A006500040001-8 VIETNAM Prime Minister Huong encoun- tered new difficulties last week as his opponents probed for op- portunities to embarrass him in what seems to be a developing cam- paign to unseat his fledgling gov- ernment. In the Upper House repre- sentatives of the Revolutionary Dai Viet Party, bitter over Huong's failure to offer a key cabinet post to party chairman Ha Thuc Ky have been leading the attack on Foreign Affairs Minister Tran Chanh Thanh, whom they consider to be the cabinet's "jugular vein." The Dai Viets, however, are reportedly planning to broaden their attack to include both Huong and newly appointed Saigon Mayor Nhieu. The party is said to be organizing a "shadow cabinet" in the expectation that it will be called upon to form the govern- ment in the next go-round. Another possible pretender to Huong's mantle, former deputy premier Tran Van Tuyen, is also maneuvering to bring down the government. Tuyen claims that Huong's performance in his brief second tenure as prime minister has already been too shaky for his cabinet to be entrusted with the vital questions of war and peace. Tuyen has recently been advocating talks with the Na- tional Liberation Front as both a "political reality" and as a means of gaining time for non- Communist political development under some form of coexistence. The unfavorable reaction to Huong's appointment of Colonel Nhieu as mayor of Saigon led to considerable speculation that the prime minister might resign. Re- ports surfaced, but were not of- ficially confirmed, that Defense Minister Vy had threatened to resign to back up his allegations of corruption in Nhieu's past, and because Interior Minister Khiem had announced the mayor's appointment while Vy's charges were still under study by Huong and Thieu. Even though Huong was upset by the controversy, there has been no confirmation that he in fact offered his resignation. The prime minister provoked a raucous display of shouting and desk pounding in the Lower House on 24 June when, in an attempt to chronicle the development of the National Liberation Front, he said that a number of nationalists joined the Viet Minh in 1945 and even assisted later in the forma- tion of the National Liberation Front. After the furor subsided, Huong added that the Front had since become a thoroughgoing in- strument of the Communists, and he later sought to set the record straight in the semiofficial Vietnam Press by emphasizing that his position was "not to recog- nize, not to negotiate, and not to have a coalition with the so- called 'National Liberation Front.'" On the other side of the peace issue, several organiza- tions in Saigon have issued state- ments at least partially at vari- ance with the official government position. A recently formed labor organization petitioned President SECRET Approved Fd eaae 20070B1O? GIrD4RDP79-00927 O 65OO040001-8 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006500040001-8 SECRET Thieu for an end to what it de- scribed as careless and indis- criminate allied air and artillery strikes in Saigon and the country- side. On 22 June, the militant Buddhist faction published a statement calling for an immediate cease-fire, and castigating both sides for the indiscriminate shell- ing and bombing of Saigon. The next day, the moderate Buddhists also issued a statment calling for peace, but a spokesman made it clear that the onus was on North Vietnam for not matching allied de-escalation. The War in the South The lull in the fighting continued as the enemy concen- trated on redeployment of his forces, possibly in preparation for renewed large-scale fighting. In Quang Tri Province, Com- munist harassment of Khe Sanh and other allied bases eased. No firm evidence is available to ex- plain the enemy's apparent abandon- ment of its objectives in western Kontum Province. Captured docu- ments indicate that in one case a planned Communist assault on an allied fire support base was called off because heavy losses incurred by the unit assigned the mission. Pressure in the Saigon area also eased during the week, and the populace has enjoyed a five- day surcease from rocket attacks. Nevertheless, there continue to be indications of an early inten- sification of the enemy's campaign against the capital. Despite the current lull throughout the country, all indications--including captured documents and prisoner interro- gations--point to a period of intensified enemy action. Units in some areas will probably not be fully prepared until late July or early August, which would largely rule out a countrywide offensive until that time. Rather than wait, the Communists may choose to stagger their operations. Analysis of present indicators suggests that the enemy may have another go at Saigon in about a week, may venture major action in I Corps by mid or late July, and may not be ready for resumed ac- tivity in the highlands before sometime in August. SECRET Approved FPoar Release 2W9RT/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006500040001-8 g KLY SUMMARY 28 Jun 68 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 SECRET NORTH KOREA STEPS UP INFILTRATION OF THE SOUTH 25X1 25X1 25X1 Pyongyang's annual campaign to infiltrate agents into the South has apparently begun. Unlike incidents earlier this year in which North Korean forces deliberately attacked US and South Korean units along the Demilita- rized zone, groups of infiltrators since the beginning of June have attempted to avoid contact with security forces and have only fired after their presence was detected. Supplies picked up after these incidents suggest that the in- filtrators were agents being sent on intelligence-collection or sabotage missions. The North Koreans are ap- parently also stepping up mari- time infiltration, which normally accounts for about 70 percent of all agents dispatched to South A tightening of South Korean security in response to the at- tempted North Korean attack on the presidential residence last January appears to be hampering the operations of the infiltra- tors. The South Koreans are par- ticularly concerned over the pos- sibility of terrorist incidents during the period between the anniversaries of the start of the Korean war on 25 June and the armistice on 27 July. A curfew was ordered for Seoul on the evening of 25 June and over 200,000 police, reservists, and troops checked homes, hotels, and other places where North Korean agents could be hiding. SECRET Approved ForPRegleease 200 p / 7~ SDRPY9-00927gA006n00040001-8 Approved For Release 2007/gWt7k RDP79-00927A006500040001-8 NEW THAI CONSTITUTION INCREASES POLITICAL ACTIVITY The new Thai constitution will almost certainly usher in a period of heightened political activity, but it is not likely to result soon in major changes in the government. Nine years in the writing, the constitution promulgated by King Phumiphon on 20 June is an expression of the military oli- garchy's desire to accommodate pressure for political change while maintaining itself in power. The constitution provides for an independent executive, chosen by the King with what will undoubt- edly prove to be the close super- vision of the present leaders, and a bicameral legislature having carefully circumscribed powers. The upper house, which will have a de facto veto over legislation, will be chosen by the King. The constitution provides for lower house elections within eight months, and the government has recently announced the forma- tion of an as yet unnamed politi- cal party with Prime Minister Thanom at its head. Although progress in organizing the govern- ment party has been slow, the fragmented nature of the opposi- tion and the considerable power at the disposal of the government should permit it to control the lower house with little diffi- culty. Leftist politicians almost immediately attempted to use the new constitution to challenge existing laws curtailing civil liberties. Apparently acting in concert with student leaders, the politicians managed to stage a large and well-organized student demonstration on 21 June to back up their demands for legal reforms. The demonstration, the first in Bangkok since the 1957 coup, sur- prised Thai authorities, who have long taken student docility for granted, but they managed to con- trol it adroitly. The demonstration will al- most certainly be viewed by some ruling elements as a confirmation of their worst fears, and it will increase the resolve of the mili- tary establishment to monitor carefully the liberalizing process. Deputy Prime Minister Praphat, long a foe of political change, has stated that martial law will remain in effect despite promul- gation. Prime Minister Thanom, who characteristically blamed the student outbreak on "outsiders," has indicated that the government will take steps to ensure there is no recurrence. Even if the government is successful in keeping opposition elements under wraps, the resump- tion of open political activity will raise a number of domestic problems embarrassing to the leadership. Bangkok's relations 25X1 with the US and the large number of US military personnel in Thai- land are almost certain to be- come political issues. SECRET Approved'FgrRekase 2I tO-tu )P79-QQ9 WOO?00040001-8 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 SECRET SECRET Approvedif jelgse 29A7E/PRT5 F 9P79-092A0060040001 -8 Approved For Release 2007/OJ,WO RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 Foreign Minister Gromyko told the USSR's Supreme Soviet on 28 June Chat Moscow was prepared to "exchange views" on the limitation of offensive and defensive strategic weapons. This statement--the most affirm- ative response the Soviets have yet given publicly to the US offer to discuss a limitation on strategic weapons-leaves much to be examined further. It seems to mark, however, the end of a long period of hesitation in Moscow, during which the chief issue was not what to discuss, but whether. Electoral developments were the center of interest during the week in France and Italy. In France, the Gaullists won an impressive victory in the first round of balloting on 23 June. A repeat win in the run-off ballot on .30 June would be an even greater indication of De Gaulle's political virtuosity as well as a demand for stability and order. The postelection situation in Italy, where a weak center-left coalition emerged, is unresolved. The new government may last until the autumn, but continued labor and student unrest appears likely to test its staying power. Virtually all custom duties on trade between the six members of the European Economic Community are to be eliminated on 1 July. Satisfac- tion over reaching this long-sought goal will be flawed, however, by the "emergency" protectionist measures announced by France this week, alleg- edly to be in effect through 1 January 1969. Despite the sense of betrayal this action has caused among France's partners, it seems unlikely that the commission will use its potentially far-reaching powers to gain support among the Five for insisting on a reversal. SECRET Approved else 2y8UZMBM7S:U RDP79-M92 AOQ%500040001-8 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 SECRET WESTERN ALLIES PONDER MOVES ON BERLIN SITUATION The Western focus on the Ber- lin problem this week turned to the semiannual NATO foreign min- isters meeting in Reykjavik. The conferees affirmed their support of free access to Berlin, and agreed that the Soviet Union must ultimately be held responsible for the recent East German re- strictions. To underline US con- cern, Secretary Rusk flew to Bonn on 26 June for a luncheon meeting with Chancellor Kiesinger and Ber- lin Mayor Schuetz. The West continued limited countermeasures. Following dis- cussions in the North Atlantic Council on 20 June, travel re- strictions, including fees, were imposed on East German travel to NATO countries. At the same time, an American and a British airline reached tentative agreement on running a West German - subsidized air-shuttle service between Han- nover and Berlin beginning 1 Au- gust. Last weekend, under the decision to limit East German travel to West Germany, Bavarian police turned back several hun- dred East Germans wishing to at- tend a memorial meeting in Munich. The West German announcement on 24 June that the Bundestag will hold two "work weeks" in West Berlin this fall is being read by Pankow and Moscow as a new challenge, and may provide the justification for further har- assments at that time. Autobahn traffic has mean- while adjusted to the East German visa and fee requirements, and no unusual tie-ups have been reported, but the imposition this week of scheduled East German hikes in daily visitation fees and currency conversion minimums will provide new headaches. British, Austrian, and Swedish officials in Berlin complain that the East German visa requirements are causing diffi- culties for their nationals living in East Germany, who were accus- tomed to unrestricted access to West Berlin and West Germany. Morale in West Berlin seems to be taking a beating. Although there is a sense of resignation, Berlin officials fear that many workers and youths will leave the city, and business leaders are worried about obtaining new in- vestment. So far, however, most Berliners appear to be more criti- cal of Bonn than of Washington for what they see as a lack of force- ful countermeasures. SECRET Approved FPoaR el18se VRFR?P7S~ WP79-09~27A00665$0040001-8 Approved For Release 2007/03/9 (fi~ff P79-00927AO06500040001-8 NATO MINISTERS MEET AT REYKJAVIK The semiannual NATO minis- terial meeting, held at Reykja- vik on 24-25 June, was high- lighted by discussions of security in the Mediterranean and the pos- sibility of East-West mutual force reductions. All 15 ministers agreed to direct NATO Secretary General Brosio to maintain a watch over Alliance security interests in the Mediterranean. As antici- pated, the French refused to "as- sociate" with military policy de- cisions regarding the Mediter- ranean. The Fourteen outlined no specific proposals, preferring a simple call for actions designed to enhance NATO surveillance ac- tivities in the area. To demonstrate the Alli- ance's commitment to detente as well as to defense, the ministers attached an eight-paragraph decla- ration on mutual force reductions to the communique. For reasons of "principle and procedure"-- that is, their opposition to statements implying negotiations via blocs--the French declined to associate with four of the para- graphs. The Fourteen pledged to make "all necessary preparations for discussions" on mutual force reductions with the Soviet bloc; emphasis was placed on the need for such reductions to be "re- ciprocal and balanced in scope and timing." The coupling of defense and detente in the communique carried to fruition the "two pillar" con- cept of NATO outlined in the Harmel report on the future tasks of the Alliance, which was issued by the ministers last December. The Four- teen also demonstrated a strong desire to make policy decisions involving action rather than ad- ditional studies. They were able to overcome French intransigence through circumvention--acting as the Defense Planning Committee in which France is not represented-- and by using language designed to give evidence of Alliance soli- darity. Secretary Rusk found "less disarray and more determina- tion at this meeting than in any NATO ministerial in recent years." Scandinavian anti-NATO ele- ments, opponents of the Greek re- gime, and Africans from Portuguese Angola combined in efforts to dis- rupt the ministerial conference. The ministers were subjected to only slight harassment by posters and verbal abuse. Police broke up an attempted sit-in by arrest- ing 20 demonstrators. SECRET Approved F 3elelalse 20 1RJ/P? :R 1 ~79-00Z927JA006500040001-8 Approved For Release 2007/03107,,CA-RDP79-OO927AOO65OOO4OOO1-8 SOVIET TROOPS ENTER CZECHOSLOVAKIA FOR PACT EXERCISE The Czechoslovak Government is still trying to play down the size and significance of Soviet participation in the current, widely publicized and hastily scheduled Warsaw Pact exercise. Some Soviet combat troops, armor, and tactical aircraft moved into Czechoslovakia during the week to take part. Prague claims that the combat forces will be used only in small numbers as "marker" units--that is, to represent larger, probably divi- sion-level formations. Neverthe- less, the Soviet military presence will serve as a reminder to the Czechoslovak populace of the facts of Soviet military power and the binding nature of Czechoslovakia's ties with the Warsaw Pact. Early in the week, Prague announced that a Soviet tank unit had taken up a position in the western part of the country. Another Prague announcement stated that motorized rifle units also had moved into Czechoslova- kia, but this statement failed to give the nationality of these units, which are presumed to be Soviet. Prague has been releasing daily announcements that are in- tended to counter any popular in- terpretation of the military moves as a Soviet attempt to in- terfere in Czechoslovak affairs. Czechoslovak officials have stated that all foreign troops will leave the country at the conclusion of the exercise, which is expected to be no later than 30 June. In view of the fact that Soviet participation in the exercise is apparently more ex- tensive than Prague had initially let on, the official statements are unlikely to eliminate all doubts and fears among the popu- lace. SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 Page 12 WEEKLY SUMMARY 28 Jun 6 Approved For Release 2007/030C~I*4fDP79-00927A006500040001-8 CZECHOSLOVAKS CONCENTRATE ON DOMESTIC PROBLEMS The Dubcek regime's at- tention this week was primarily focused on solving domestic prob- lems, but the coolness in Czech- oslovak-Soviet relations was once again reflected in commentaries by key party officials. The most significant action of the National Assembly was the enactment of a constitutional law preparing the way for establish- ment of a Czech-Slovak federation, which will give Slovakia the autonomy it has long sought. The law established a Czech national council, to be composed of Czech members of the assembly and other leading personalities, that will work with the existing Slovak council in preparing a joint proposal on federalization. The assembly thus side-stepped the problem of working out an ac- ceptable federal arrangement in the assembly itself, where Czechs could outvote Slovaks if a di- visive issue were involved. The assembly also enacted a rehabilitation law providing for review of past criminal sentences as well as monetary compensation for persons who were unjustly imprisoned or whose property was seized. In addition, after a stormy debate, the existing press law was amended to abolish censorship of the press, radio, and televi- sion. According to the minister of culture and information, cen- sorship is sweepingly defined as "any intervention by a state body against freedom of speech and illustration, and their dissemina- tion." A new and presumably more liberal press law will be pro- posed after the party congress in September. Reporting on his recent trip to the USSR, assembly chairman Smrkovsky noted that the Soviets "were of slightly different opin- ion" concerning the role of the press, even after listening to the Czechoslovak arguments. Smrkovsky, who had earlier come under fire by Czechoslovak news media for some of his comments in the Soviet Union, added that many problems remain between the two countries, but that Moscow "tol- erates" Czechoslovak views and developments. Moscow, however, is still taking a critical view of Czechoslovak liberals. The Soviet press last week continued its antiliberal polemics and prominently featured a "letters to the editor" campaign illustra- ting its support of conservative elements in Czechoslovakia. Earlier in the week, party secretary Cisar replied to the criticism the Soviets recently made of him in Pravda. Cisar's comments, although made in low-key fashion, suggest that the Czech- oslovaks will not accept public criticism of leading party of- ficials without replying. More- over, the regime continued to move against appointees of ex- party chief Novotny by dismissing four deputy ministers of the interior. SECRET Approved FofNjealS 2007 RIY q,Q PRP-009Rqqp5q~040001-8 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 SECRET YUGOSLAVIA AND THE USSR INCREASE MILITARY CONTACTS The arrival in Belgrade on 24 June of Marshal Vershinin, commander of the Soviet Air Force, may presage closer military co- operation between Yugoslavia and the USSR. It is certainly an- other reflection of the gradual step-up in military contacts be- tween Yugoslavia and the Warsaw Pact nations since last summer. The commander in chief of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, aboard a guided-missile cruiser, visited Yugoslavia last January. Last August, for the first time, Yugoslav observers attended Warsaw Pact exercises in Bulgaria. Yugoslav Defense Ministry delegations also visited Moscow last February, for the 50th anniversary of the Red Army, and were in East Germany last month. Such exchanges follow several years during which Moscow has been the sole source of modern heavy armaments for the Yugoslavs, supplying MIG-21 aircraft, mis- sile-armed patrol boats, and tanks. Yugoslavia's air defense net appears effective only against NATO's southern flank and does not seem to cover all air ap- proaches from Eastern Europe. Al- though there is no evidence that the Yugoslavs plan to plug their air defense system into that of the Warsaw Pact, Vershinin might raise this possibility during his visit. A precedent already ex- ists for the exchange of defense information between Belgrade and 25X1 25X1 If the Yugoslavs should link up with the Pact air defense sys- tem, a new dimension would be added to their defense policy but Yugoslavia's basic posture as an independent state would not be changed. Tito does not intend to join the Warsaw Pact and he remains opposed to attending the Moscow-sponsored International Communist Conference. Belgrade is intent on expanding Yugosla- via's economic ties with the West and is insistent on pressing Yugo- slavia's role as a leader of the 25X1 nonaligned nations. SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY 28 Jun 68 Approved For Release 2007/03/0 EFjA-R 79-00927AO06500040001-8 MOSCOW TURNS WARY EYE ON "NEW LEFT" Student assaults on the po- litical order in some West Euro- pean countries have drawn unsym- pathetic responses from Soviet leaders and have led them to take further measures to tighten dis- cipline over Soviet youth. Party Secretary Demichev, speaking to a social science con- ference on 19 June, lashed out at "revisionist ideologists" abroad who try to replace the class struggle in capitalist so- ciety with the struggle between generations and who proclaim young people to be the only true revolutionary force of our time. Earlier, a critique of the "New Left" doctrine of Herbert Marcuse had appeared in Pravda. Corres- pondent Yury Zhukov hurled the epithet "werewolves" at Marcuse's followers, including the leader of the French radical students, Cohn-Bendit. Such outbursts display the traditional Communist antipathy toward revolutionary movements not of the working class. More- over, the consequences that stu- dent agitation could have on Com- munist rule have been made plain to Soviet leaders by events in Eastern Europe. A Czechoslovak students' proposal to create an organization free of any ties with the Communist Party received a sharp rebuke from a Soviet educa- tion official. Even allowing for some over- reaction on the part of a regime that tends to abhor the unconven- tional, Soviet leaders apparently judge that the ideological apathy and generational antagonisms of Soviet youth incline them to re- spond in unwelcome ways to the example of their peers in Europe. Youth and teacher conferences throughout the Soviet Union have made the younger generation the focal point of current efforts to shore up ideological defenses. The campaign reinforces other evi- dence indicating that Soviet stu- dents are following European events with interest, especially by listening to foreign radio- broadcasts. Official dissatisfaction with the training of the young, as well as Kremlin infighting, probably were responsible for recent changes in the leadership of the Soviet youth organization, the Komsomol. At the plenum of the Komsomol central committee on 12 June, first secretary Pavlov--long considered a proteg4 of the politburo's "lonesome end," Aleksandr Shele- pin--was released from his posi- tion, as were four other members of the central committee bureau. The politburo apparently dictated the replacement of Pavlov by a provincial party secretary from outside the Komsomol in order to strengthen its control over the organization. There are no firm signs as yet that this shake-up will be accompanied by any change in the regime's traditional policy of reliance on ideological indoctrina- tion for youth. The aim of in- stilling "a purposeful, ordered system of views" that Demichev set for the social scientists, however, represents the authori- tarian approach that has in the past worked to alienate students from party leadership both at home and abroad. 25X1 SECRET Approved F ulteleals5e 200W$A07 :P 1R?79-009?7 Q06%0040001-8 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 SECRET GAULLISTS IN STRONG POSITION FOR SECOND FRENCH VOTE The French voter chose sta- bility and order in the first round of the parliamentary elec- tions and gave the Gaullists not only a six-percent increase in the popular vote but also an un- precedented number of first-bal- lot victories. Both the Commu- nists and the Federation of the Left, apparently unable to over- come the voter's fear of changes that the left might make, dropped over two percent from their 1967 showing. The center, which dropped 2.5 percent, was unable to buck the powerful trend toward a polarization between left and right. Apart from the Gaullists, only the small, extreme-left Uni- fied Socialist Party made gains, almost doubling its percentage. Although polls and other in- dicators pointed to gains for the government and its allies on the first ballot, even the Gaullists appeared surprised by the magni- tude of their victory. By winning 152 seats on the first round, as opposed to only 68 in 1967, the Gaullists and the allied Inde- pendent Republicans now need only 92 additional seats for a major- ity. Opposition candidates man- aged to win only 14 seats. The Gaullists are taking no chances that overconfidence, which cost them seats after a favorable first-round election showing in 1967, will again mar their prospects for a second-round victory. Gaullist leaders are ex- horting the public to return to the polls and De Gaulle himself will make a final radio-TV appeal tomorrow. A high abstention rate would hurt the Gaullists because voters of the left are usually more disciplined and therefore more likely to come to the polls in any event. Run-offs will take place on 30 June in the districts where no candidate received an absolute majority on the first round, ap- proximately two thirds of the total. The federation and the Communists applied their prior agreement to withdraw in favor of the best-placed candidate and the regular Gaullists and Independent Republicans followed the same pol- icy. The center withdrew all of its sure losers in districts where the withdrawal would probably pre- vent the election of a Communist. In keeping with this policy, former centrist presidential can- didate Jean Lecanuet withdrew in favor of a Gaullist candidate. A Gaullist will oppose a Com- munist or federation candidate in about 70 percent of the remaining districts. In such straight left- right confrontations in 1967 the Gaullists fared badly, particu- larly at the hands of the feder- ation. In another 14 districts, Gaullists will face centrists and they will battle the Unified So- cialist Party in another three districts. Triangular contests will take place in 55 districts among Gaullists and their allies, centrists, and leftists or Commu- nists . SI-CRET Approved-Fogr Releease 20Rf 7L/PR/P7. MYP79-999 00500040001-8 Approved For Release 2007fi4-RDP79-00927A006500040001-8 The recent pattern of daily exchanges of fire across the Israeli- Jordanian cease-fire line continues, and the possibility of a major confron- tation in the northern sector remains high. UN emissary Jarring, who has been trying to get the Arabs and Israelis together in New York for the past month, has gone home to Sweden for a vacation, and will return to New York in mid-July. Egyptian President Nasir is scheduled to leave on 4 July for a visit to Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. This will be his first visit to Moscow since 1965. Meanwhile, the first stage of the electoral process to "reform" the country's only political organization begins this week, culminating in the election of a national party congress in July. Other visitors to the USSR include the Somali army chief of staff, who is currently in Moscow as a follow-up to the recent visit there of the Somali minister of defense. In addition, a Pakistani military delegation led by the commander in chief of the army left Karachi for Moscow yester- day, presumably to discuss specifics of a Soviet arms supply arrangement. Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives met in Nicosia early this week for the first of a series of twice-weekly intercommunal talks. Both exuded optimism for the future but urged against the expectation of a speedy solution to the island's problems. The military regime in Greece will publish its draft of the proposed constitution within the next few days, thereby initiating the "second phase" of its plan for the constitution; the third phase, the referendum, is still slated for 1 September. In Nigeria, the civil war grinds on as the secessionist Biafrans con- tinue their vigorous resistance to the much stronger federal forces. Both sides remain unmoved by the efforts of mediators to arrange a resumption of peace talks. There is increasing evidence that influential left-wing elements in Sierra Leone are getting support and encouragement for their anti- Western propaganda campaign from Communist embassies in Freetown. Prime Min- ister Stevens has virtually eliminated the "national" character of the new government by arresting almost all the leaders of the former ruling party who had joined his coalition. SECRET Approved PerjRelease 2GQWW ?O7 S P79-M2M09500040001-8 Approved For Release 2007/0 UC1A-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 TANZANIA'S NYERERE WHEELS AND DEALS President Nyerere's ventures in international diplomacy during the past fortnight will probably yield additional Communist aid for Tanzania and will remove more Western advisers from his govern- ment. In terms of the relative influence of East and West, Nye- rere is rapidly approaching the equilibrium he has long sought, but it remains to be seen whether true nonalignment can be pre- served. Nyerere returned on 26 June from a triumphant eight-day state visit to Peking and Pyongyang, where the elite of both capitals gave his high-level delegation a rousing, red-carpet welcome. He was accompanied by his three min- isters of state and his chiefs of the armed forces, police, and in- telligence, virtually all those responsible for Tanzania's secu- rity. for Tanzania's security forces, including jet fighters, as well as military assistance for Biafra and the southern African liber- ation movements. Despite the lavish attentions of China's top leaders, Nyerere maintained a consistently moderate tone in his speeches and avoided all op- portunities to denigrate the West. London announced on 20 June that it will halt all aid to Tan- zania in reprisal for the annul- ment of a preindependence agree- ment whereby Dar es Salaam has been paying some $2.8 million a year in pensions to British co- lonial civil servants. Tanzania also reneged on the repayment of $15.6 million in UK loans cover- ing these pensions. Henceforth, it will pay retirement benefits only for service performed since independence. Although the talks in Peking undoubtedly covered economic aid, such as the Tan-Zam railroad and the purchase of Chinese locomo- tives, the Tanzanians appeared to put greater emphasis on mili- tary matters than during Nyerere's last trip there in February 1965. The delegation visited army and air force installations around Peking. The Tanzanians have been seeking additional Chinese aid London has provided little or no capital development aid to Tanzania since 1965 when diplo- matic relations were broken, but its technical assistance has amounted to about $4 million an- nually and has supported nearly 700 UK nationals throughout the Tanzanian civil service, includ- ing 180 in the education field. London apparently intends now to bring home about two thirds of them as their contracts expire, SECRET Approved F%~Fel ase fq*0 U APP79-q2Q 23AO06100040001-8 Approved For Release 2007/0g/E?~.RDP79-00927A006500040001-8 allowing the rest to stay on at Tanzanian expense. The departure of the British technicians, who numbered 1,200 in 1965, will throw a further strain on Tanzania's understaffed civil service, but it is in line with Nyerere's continuing efforts to reduce Western influence in his administration, particularly in the educational system. Over the past 18 months, as Western teachers have been phased out of the pri- mary and secondary schools, the US Peace Corps contingent has been halved and now the 110 British Volunteers are to be withdrawn. A Tanzanian drive to recruit tech- nical advisers from small European nations has met only partial suc- cess. Scandanavia has supplied some and East Germany has sent about 40 secondary school teachers. To help fill the void, Nyerere had reportedly intended to ask Peking to supply some Chinese personnel for his civil service. Tanzania is again looking to the USSR for help after years of fruitless aid discussions. Recently, a minister flew to Mos- cow to seek aid in building and staffing a technical university that will absorb the small, USAID- assisted technical college in Dar es Salaam. A Soviet Air Force mission arrived in Dar es Salaam about 16 June to survey existing air facilities in re- sponse to a request for air de- fense assistance. Tanzania's armed forces commander had toured air force installations in the USSR in May. The small Tanzanian 25X1 Air Force is now being trained and equipped by Canada for re- connaissance and logistical sup- port missions, but Dar es Salaam is determined to ac uire modern let ficrhters. SECRET Approved ForIR as1e 200f b Y C9 ftWW9-00914(18306640001-8 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 SECRET NEW SOVIET ECONOMIC AID FOR IRAN Moscow's role in Iran's eco- nomic development continues to grow. With the recent agreement for about $200 million in new credits, total Soviet economic aid has reached almost $550 mil- lion. Although the bulk of fi- nancing for Iran's fourth devel- opment plan is largely under- written by oil revenues from the West, Soviet credits now repre- sent about six percent of total planned investment. Repayment of these credits, as in the case of earlier Soviet credits, will be accomplished through deliveries of natural gas. Gas deliveries to the USSR during 1970-85 will provide Iran with over $1 billion in purchasing power, almost three fourths of which now has been earmarked for Soviet economic aid projects and the purchase of $110 million worth of military equipment. The new Soviet credits are to be used for such projects as port development on the Caspian Sea, renovation and electrifica- tion of the Soviet-Iranian rail link, and construction of lead and zinc smelting plants. Mos- cow also agreed to double the capacity of the 600,000-ton So- viet-financed steel plant now under construction at Isfahan. Iran may be holding off the allocation of the remaining $350 million that will accrue from natural gas exports with an eye to future military purchases from the USSR. The Soviets already are providing wheeled vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and antiaircraft guns under an arms agreement of January 1967.1 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY 28 Jun 68 Approved For Release 2007/0 /07 GIA RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 NASIR OFFERS "ELECTIONS" TO STEM DISSENT IN EGYPT Nasir is continuing his ef- forts to dampen internal unrest by keeping the country busy with widely publicized political changes. The labor and student riots that rocked the Egyptian regime in February led Nasir to promise the country a vague program of political reforms, one of which was the reformation of Egypt's only legal political organization, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). The first step in this program began this week with some 180,000 candidates running for election to 7,584 local ASU committees. The process is to continue through- out the next month at progres- sively higher levels until a 2,000-member ASU national congress is elected and convened on 23 July, the anniversary of the seizure of power in 1952 by the current ruling group. Nasir has attempted to bill this process as the "re-creation" of the ASU in a more representa- tive and democratic form, but the essentials for truly free elec- tions are lacking. Only those Egyptians who are approve members of the ASU can participate in the electoral process, thus eliminating those who hold significantly dif- ferent views from the regime. Many Egyptians probably see this as just another regime ef- fort to create the impression of democracy where it does not in fact exist. Nasir's previous promises to create "democratic" political bodies have not materi- alized. In any event, the elec- tions will not reduce Nasir's personal control over the state machinery. SECRET Approved Fop Lpapt 20QW @,7,7: X79-009?~A@Q 50, 40001-8 Approved For Release 2007/Q3p RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 SECRET Approver? Release 20 DEM 7suCH& QP79-PQ947A0qU00040001-8 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 SECRET Student unrest continued to dominate the news from Latin America last week. For the most part the demonstrations are still aimed at legiti- mate grievances, but in a few countries the violence is now directed at the "downfall of the dictatorships" and at US policies. In some cases, it is coming under Communist influence, and charges of police brutality are also being heard. The most serious student disorders have occurred in Brazil. Leader- ship of the demonstrations has been increasingly well organized, and has been taken over principally by dissident Communists who are more radical than orthodox party members. Divisions are likely to occur within the military-whose support is essential to the government-on the handling of the continuing political turmoil. Student and labor agitation continued throughout the week in Uru- guay as well. President Pacheco seems to be taking firmer action against relatively quiet the past week, but plan to join in labor demonstrations scheduled for 28 June. Elections were in the news as well. The make-up of the 42-man National Assembly in Panama is still undecided. In Ecuador, President- elect Jose Maria Velasco has still not been officially proclaimed the winner of the national elections on 2 June. A congressional by-election will be held in Chile on 7 July. A loss by the Christian Democratic candidate would be interpreted in Chile as further indication of popular dissatisfac- tion with the Frei government. 25X1 Antigovernment student demonstrations also erupted in Cocha- am a, Bolivia, on 25 June. The US Consulate was stoned and the offices of the Peace Corps were slightly damaged. Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau's personal style of campaigning and his strong stand against granting greater autonomy to the provincial gov- ernment of French-speaking Quebec carried the Liberal Party to a decisive victory in the parliamentary elections on 25 June. Trudeau can be ex- pected to move fairly fast in seeking a reconciliation with Quebec and in implementing his proposed review of Canada's foreign and defense com- mitments, including the possibility of recognizing Communist China. SECRET Approvedp1JeRe se 2$)Q j07S WP79-GG92r7M Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 SECRET BRAZILIAN STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS PLAGUE GOVERNMENT The Costa e Silva administra- tion has been plagued by a spread- ing wave of student disorders that erupted into violence on 21 June in Rio de Janeiro. Demonstrations and protests have taken place in almost every major city, and dan- gerous countercurrents may be build- ing up in the military. A powerful bomb explosion on 26 June extensively damaged the new Second Army headquarters in Sao Paulo, killing one soldier and injuring four others. The job was clearly done by professionals who may also have been involved in the theft of rifles from an army hospi- tal a week earlier. Sao Paulo military leaders are reported to be furious. Military and police in that city have exercised consider- able restraint in dealing with the continuing disorders, but they are now likely to crack down sharply. Sao Paulo citizens are worried and increasingly hostile to violence-- much of which has been perpetrated by students. In contrast to Sao Paulo, sup- port for students in Rio de Janeiro has broadened, principally because of exaggerated and indiscriminate police violence. A "March for Liberty Against Repression" on 26 June had quite extensive labor backing and included some clergy, teachers, and intellectuals among the 10,000 to 12,000 students. The large crowd carried banners denounc- ing the "dictatorship," demanding the release of arrested students, and voicing solidarity with stu- dent demands for reform of the out- moded educational system. A mob attacked the US Embassy on 21 June and broke numerous windows before being driven off by police, but anti-US placards were not much in evidence during the march on 26 June, although anti-US leaflets were distributed and some student speeches were larded with anti- US remarks that were well applauded. President Costa e Silva and Education Minister Dutra have again promised educational reforms, but their lackluster statements are unlikely to conciliate the students. Leadership of the student demon- strations has been increasingly well organized and has been taken over principally by members of the dissident Communist Party, a group more radical than the orthodox Communists. Student demonstrations, no matter how well organized and wide- spread, are not likely by them- selves to bring down the Costa e Silva government. They may, how- ever, cause divisions within the military--whose support is essen- tial to the government--on the handling of the continuing politi- cal turmoil. F_ I SECRET Approved F - ele se 2QRJ/R23P7SU WP79-OOg92JAOO650004OOO1-8 Approved For Release 2007/gWEItPFf-RDP79-00927A006500040001-8 UNEASY POSTELECTORAL SITUATION IN ECUADOR Delay in confirming Jose Maria Velasco's victory in the presidential election on 2 June has aggravated long-standing po- litical strains in Ecuador. Mean- while, persistent student and labor agitation has created se- rious tensions in the Pacific coast port of Guayaquil. The official count of votes by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has been dogged by discoveries of voting irregularities, violent demonstrations, and the resigna- tion of a majority of its members. Velasco's fear that his opponents could use the tribunal to over- turn his narrow victory seems to have been unfounded. Some coali- tions formed during the campaign are breaking up as various groups seek favorable deals for the new congress and administration. Several of his recent opponents are now courting Velasco. Extremist senator-elect and. former president Carlos Julio Arosemena is again emerging as a key figure in Ecuadorean poli- tics. In addi- 25X1 ___~ personally tion, Arosemena is exacerbating labor and student agitation, which has been serious enough to necessitate calling out troops to aid the police in Guayaquil. He is also serving as legal adviser to a new labor group whose hard-line Communist leader has called for a general strike to protest alleged violent treatment of strikers by security forces. Top military commanders had declared that they would accept the results of the elec- tion but appear to be increasingly concerned over the turbulence that has followed Velasco's re- emergence in Ecuadorean politics. SECRET Approved P Rele2Se MOW && sC P79-0992M D6W0040001-8 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 SECRET STUDENT DISCONTENT INCREASING IN URUGUAY Deteriorating economic con- ditions have engendered serious, sometimes violent protests by Uruguayan students and organized labor. Since 6 June, high school and university students have clashed repeatedly with Monte- video police, and on 13 June President Pacheco was forced to invoke emergency security meas- ures. Student violence has sub- sided at least temporarily, but the underlying problems that pre- cipitated the unrest and agita- tion have not been alleviated. Unemployment in the under-35 age group, for example, is nearly 20 percent as compared with 12 per- cent for the population as a whole. a key role in the recent protests, there is no evidence that Com- munist Party leaders directed the ensuing violence. On the con- trary, several attempted unsuc- cessfully to reduce student agi- tation. President Pacheco intends to take firmer action against labor leaders and other agitators responsible for the wave of dis- orders. On 24 June, he sent army and navy units to occupy the gov- ernment bank and "mobilized" bank workers to force them back to work. Congress is expected to approve the state of siege soon The Communist Party has ex- ploited the discontent and has dominated the student movement for many years. In the univer- sity, Communist youth have won and used the student seats on the administrative council to in- fluence policies and to discredit faculty members who oppose them. Although students have par- ticipated in numerous pro-Com- munist demonstrations and rallies, only a few fought with police or committed other acts of violence until recently. It now appears, however, that the number of student militants is increasing and that more students are being attracted to such radical left- wing groups as the pro-Cuban Revo- lutionary Movement, which is more extreme than the Communists. Although Communist-oriented stu- dent organizations have played It is not clear how effective Pacheco's measures will be. Mili- tary intervention is unprecedented and could precipitate renewed violence. Some of the military officers, particularly the right- wing, are already irritated with radical intransigence. With their support, Pacheco may bypass Con- gress and attempt to rule by de- cree even though there is no con- stitutional provision for such action. If the government cannot soon gain the confidence of the public in its ability to alleviate the chaotic economic conditions, punitive measures against labor and student agitators will only accelerate the erosion of its authority. SECRET Approved or Re se 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 age e WEEKLY SUMMARY 28 Jun 68 Approved For Release 20077 6k.LCIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 PANAMANIAN PRESIDENT BACKS DOWN ON SHIPPING DECREE President Robles has for all practical purposes rescinded a decree issued on 18 June that would have permitted ships flying the Panamanian flag to trade with Communist countries, including Cuba. The measure, which was op- posed by some cabinet members and drew heavy criticism from the mass media of president-elect Arias, was "suspended," ostensibly because other members of the Or- ganization of American States had not been consulted "as re- quired by international agree- ment." Most observers conclude that this is little more than a face-saving gesture that allows the government to withdraw grace- fully from an awkward situation. The principal authors of the decree were the ministers of government and finance, both of whom are staunch supporters of defeated presidential candidate Samudio. Meanwhile, the vote-counting for assembly seats in the impor- tant provinces of Panama and Colon remains stalled as Arias maneuvers to rig the outcome so that his coalition will have complete control of the legisla- SECRET Approved Re?else 2 $f797~ f P79-0F 27~M6 80040001-8 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 sdmed For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8 Secret Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8