WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT THE ILL-STARRED NINTH WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006500070002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 19, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
The Ill-Starred Ninth World Youth Festival
Secret
N? 36
19 July 1968
No. 0029/68A
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THE ILL-STARRED NINTH WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL
The twice-postponed Ninth World Youth Festival
scheduled to open on 28 July in Sofia, Bulgaria, seems
foredoomed to fall short of its objectives. Forced
to cancel the festival in Algeria in 1965 and Ghana
in 1966 by the downfall of those governments, festival
organizers abandoned their attempts to minimize the
event's Communist associations and have returned it
to the comparatively sheltered haven of Eastern Europe.
Havana was rejected as the site, over bitter Cuban
protests, because the Soviets were afraid that Castro
would use the festival to promote his type of revolu-
tion.
World Youth Festivals have become expensive, hard-
to-regulate, logistic nightmares with marginal propaganda
value. As a result, the ninth festival, which may draw
30,000 participants, probably will be the last of its
kind. Coming as it does in the midst of student revolt
throughout the world, previous arguments on the cost
effectiveness of the festival undoubtedly have been
superseded by the problem of handling a potentially
explosive gathering of restless youth. Ideological
and nationalistic disputes are sure to flare in pri-
vate discussions and may spill into the main proceed-
ings, an outcome that would interrupt the focus of the
conference on the noncontroversial topic for festival
participants of Vietnam and embarrass the Communist
sponsors. This prospect is causing extreme anxiety
among the festival's organizers who have come to rec-
ognize the unpredictable nature of their creation.
Background
World Youth Festivals (WYF)
have been the most spectacular
of the Communist propaganda ef-
forts directed at youth, and at-
tract the largest number of non-
Communist participants. Their
objective is to create an atmos-
phere of international support
for Soviet policies and to con-
vert uncommitted youth and stu-
dents to the Communist way of
thinking by portraying Western
countries as imperialist aggres-
sors and Communist countries,
particularly the Soviet Union,
as the leading supporters of
"oppressed people's."
The first six festivals
were held in the Soviet Union
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Site of Ninth World Youth Festival
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and Eastern European capitals,
beginning with Prague in 1947
and ending in Moscow in 1957.
In an effort to blur the image
of a Communist-controlled af-
fair, the seventh (1959) and
eighth (1962) festivals were held
in Vienna and. Helsinki respec-
tively. The changes of venue
created serious difficulties
for festival organizers. In
those cities the organizers had
no support from the host govern-
ments and were unable fully to
control mass rallies in the face
of organized "counterpropaganda"
efforts by non-Communist youth.
At Helsinki, full-scale riots
erupted when thousands of Fin-
land's younger generation stoned
festival buses. The sponsors had
to face a free press and critical
public, and a number of Communist
delegates used their brief expo-
sure to the free world to defect.
The public antagonism the
seventh and eighth festivals en-
countered dampened the spirits
of participants and left con-
siderable doubt as to whether
a ninth festival was in the best
interests of the cause. The
exorbitant costs of previous
events have far outweighed the
marginal propaganda gains and
have discouraged many former
festival supporters. Neverthe-
less, in late 1964, festival
organizers decided that another
festival would be held in Algiers
in July 1965.
Cuba had lobbied extensively
to have Havana chosen as the site,
but Algiers was selected because
its government was non-Communist
and cooperative, and its location
favored the participation of
A Soviet nuclear test blast the day before the
Helsinki Festival ended initiated anti-bomb
appeals against both the East and West.
Festival delegates carrying these banners,
however, were forcibly restrained from
marching in the closing parade by festival
officials. 91375 7-68
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large delegations from Africa
and Asia. Cuba was promised that
Havana would be the site of the
tenth festival. All plans, how-
ever, were upset by the ouster of
President Ben Bella a few weeks
before the opening date. Festival
directors left Algiers complain-
ing of the open hostility of the
new Algerian Government and an-
nounced that the event had been
postponed for a year.
The search for a new site
was complicated because many po-
tential host governments did not
want to provoke the new Algerian
regime. Growing ideological dif-
ferences between the Soviet Union
and Cuba led Moscow to shy away
from Havana in favor of Cairo, but
President Nasir flatly refused "to
turn Cairo into an arena for Sino-
Soviet gladiators." Finally,
Ghana's President Nkrumah offered
the hospitality of Accra, and the
affair was to open in July 1966.
When Nkrumah was deposed in Febru-
ary 1966 festival arrangers, by
now somewhat desperate, fell back
on Bulgaria, the only safe Com-
munist country which had never
hosted a WYF, because it offered
"definite political guarantees."
Sponsorship and Attendance
The festivals are nominally
sponsored and organized by the
International Preparatory Commit-
tee (IPC). Despite its seemingly
representative appearance, this
committee is in fact a front for
the Soviet-dominated World Federa-
tion of Democratic Youth (WFDY)
and the International Union of
Students (IUS).
On the national level, if
the political climate permits,
a local Communist party or front
group will usually organize a
National Preparatory Committee
(NPC), which will appear to be,
and in some cases actually is,
a reasonable representation of
the country's youth organizations.
Usually Communists retain con-
trol of the various NPCs in order
to ensure control of the composi-
tion of the delegation. According
to Bulgarian information media,
NPCs have been set up in more
than 90 countries to plan for
the ninth festival. National
delegations at Sofia will vary
in size from thousands of offi-
cial Bulgarian delegates to small
groups of students residing in
Communist Europe but ostensibly
representing small or distant
countries, including some hostile
to Communism.
International Preparatory Headquarters in Sofia
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According to an IPC announce-
ment last March, 148 countries
have been invited to send dele-
gations to the Sofia festival and
120 have accepted. Various esti-
mates place the number expected
as high as 30,000, which would
make it one of the largest. There
will be between 15,000-20,000
foreign delegates, 3,000-4,000
Bulgarian delegates and the re-
mainder will be "observers and
tourists."
According to Bulgarian infor-
mation media, a number of special
A portion of "Festival City" under construction
in Sofia to house festival delegates.
91378 7-68
guests have been invited, includ-
ing Joan Baez, Avery Brundage,
Cassius Clay, the Beatles, and
the Rolling Stones. Bulgarian
sources insist, with no little
pride, that the two entertainment
groups definitely have agreed to
perform at the festival.
According to the Soviet youth
organ Komsomolskaya Pravda, the
organization of the American dele-
gation is in the hands of the Du-
bois Clubs. In addition to the
Dubois Clubs, youth from the Stu-
dents for a Democratic Society,
the Student Mobilization Commit-
tee for Ending the War in Vietnam,
and the Congress of Racial Equal-
ity will make up the major part
of the American delegation. A
"well-known Californian young
people's theater," managed by Luis
Valdes, and "many Negro athletes
who are boycotting the Olympic
games" will also attend, accord-
ing to the Soviet press release.
The official program strongly sug-
gests that US military deserters
also will be present.
Program
The program of the ninth
festival is heavily weighted
toward political matters and will
focus on Vietnam. The second day
of the festival, 29 July, has been
declared the "Day of Solidarity of
Youth with the Heroic Struggle of
the People and Youth of Vietnam
Against the Aggression of Ameri-
can Imperialism." This session
clearly is intended to set the
tone of the festival. Events of
that day will include meetings be-
tween young Vietnamese and young
Americans; blood donations for
the Vietnamese people; confer-
ences on various Vietnamese
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problems; and gift presentations
to the Vietnamese people. Festi-
val directors apparently hope to
use the momentum generated by the
Vietnam day to introduce such
other issues as European security
and the need for increasing the
Soviet presence in the Middle
East. Every attempt will be made
to avoid issues on which the So-
viets are vulnerable to criti-
cism, such as the crackdown on
intellectuals in the USSR.
The festival's cultural pro-
gram will be divided into two
categories; first, concerts, re-
citals, and performances for the
delegates; second, competition
between delegations in folk sing-
ing and dancing, athletics, in-
strumental performances, and
"political songs." Even this
part will have its political man-
ifestations, however, as winners
of the various events will be
awarded souvenirs made from
parts of US military aircraft
shot down over North Vietnam.
The main events will be held in
Vasil Levski Stadium which is
being renovated and will accommo-
date 75,000 persons.
Available financial reports
of earlier festivals indicate
that the staging of these events
has cost between $10 million and
$50 million. These reports are
probably not reliable. Some ob-
servers estimated the cost of
the 1957 Moscow Festival at $100
million. Participants pay an
enrollment fee and a fixed sum
toward their travel and accommo-
dation expenses, although these
are often waived for delegates
from poor, developing countries.
National committees raise money
through bazaars, rallies, cul-
tural and sporting events held
before and during a festival, but
they always fall short of require-
ments, and the Soviet Union and
its allies pump funds into festi-
val channels.
Rumors that Moscow is no
longer willing to pick up such
huge tabs has led to speculation
that the Ninth WYF will be the
last of its kind. Many countries
reportedly favor smaller regional
gatherings rather than world-wide
festivals. Rumania and Yugoslavia
reportedly have indicated that
they want to reduce their partici-
pation and share of expenses
toward the Sofia Festival. Polish
youth groups submitted documents
to the IPC in early may declaring
the World Youth Festival an obso-
lete form of political initiative
which should be replaced by a
less costly and more efficient
program.
Sofia's sports stadiums including the Vasil Levski
Stadium (top) where a majority of the Festival's
events will take place. 91376 7-68
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Ideological Divergencies
The Sofia festival comes at
a time of considerable restive-
ness and ferment among European
youth and could incur large ideo-
logical as well as financial costs
for the Communist regimes. The
Bulgarian foreign minister has ex-
pressed his concern that Sofia
will be hosting the festival at
a time when the restlessness of
youth and the disarray within the
Communist movement are apparent
everywhere. The influence of the
non-Communist visitors upon East-
ern Europe's sheltered young peo-
ple at a time when they are grop-
ing for new forms of political ex-
pression and criticizing oppres-
sive measures in their own coun-
tries could be significant. At
this juncture even the bringing
together of Czechoslovak youth
with their Eastern European con-
temporaries is enough to cause
anxiety within the Communist re-
gimes.
This fear has been exposed
in the 10 July issue of Mlada
Fronta, a Czechoslovak youth mag-
azine. The article, entitled
"Are We Trusted," notes that the
Czechoslovak delegation has been
billeted with delegations from
Western countries in contrast to
previous festivals when it shared
quarters with young people from
socialist states. The article
speculates that this innovation
was prompted by a fear that dis-
cussions between socialist youth
might become "too lively."
The Soviets reportedly fear
that intra-Communist controver-
sies, especially the Czechoslovak
situation, could replace Vietnam
as the main theme of the festival.
The Bulgarian press has al-
ready called for vigilance lest
some "unwelcome developments" take
place during the festival. In an
article published in the 13 May
issue of Bulgaria's main party
daily Rabotnichesko Delo, Petur
Mladenov, a Bulgarian Komsomol
secretary, warned against "the
role of a Trojan horse which might
be played by some right-wing ex-
tremists of the international
youth movement." Reflecting what
appear to be widespread misgivings
about the festival, Mladenov also
cautioned that "efforts might be
initiated by some left-wing ex-
tremist elements to split the co-
hesion of international youth."
Other voices have been pre-
dicting the possibility of a
bitter ideological struggle at
the festival. On 19 May the
Bulgarian youth daily, Narodna
Mladezh, carried an interview
by the then Soviet Komsomol
leader Sergei Pavlov. He re-
ferred to those antifestival
forces which "tried to put a
spoke in the wheel of the Vienna
and Helsinki festivals" and
warned of groups going to Sofia
"in the role of using the festi-
val to advocate their political
concepts." He predicted a
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"bitter ideological struggle"
at the festival and observed
that "it is necessary to prepare
for the struggle in all serious-
ness."
One of the purposes of these
and other press items of similar
tone may be to establish the
groundwork-for explaining any
catastrophes at the festival or
even a last-minute cancellation
should the organizers sense that
control was slipping out of their
hands.
Against this background an
Italian proposal for serious dis-
cussions of European student prob-
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brought virtually all of the
festival planners to their feet.
portant and intends to try to get
this phenomenon explored at the
festival.
siders the student movement im-
the Italian Communist Party con-
National Conflicts
Conflicts of national in-
terest also threaten to disrupt
the festival. Moroccan and Tuni-
sian representatives announced at
an organizational meeting in War-
saw in May that their delegations
would walk out if any Israelis at-
tended. Three Israeli youth
groups, one of them Communist,
are not being allowed to attend
the festival because they support
their country against the Arabs.
Festival organizers are frantically
trying to assemble an Israeli
group which will be acceptable
to all delegates, in order to
avoid accusations of anti-Semi-
tism from some of the Western Euro-
pean delegations. If an Israeli
delegation does attend the festi-
val it will probably be composed
of members associated with the fac-
tion within the Communist Party of
Israel that does not support Tel
Aviv's position in the Middle East
conflict.
Cuba is still incensed that
Havana was not chosen as the site
and has announced that its youth
organizations will boycott the
Sofia meetincr_
erences witn oscow over "the
principle of armed struggle as
means for Communist take-overs"
were behind the rejection. Cuba
may plan a "counterfestival" this
summer. Havana supposedly already
has recruited 1,000 students from
those who participated in pro-
tests at European universities
to come to Cuba for a stay of a
month and a half. The students,
who will be paying their own way,
will engage in agricultural work
in the morning and political
studies in the afternoon.
Other national enmities could
encumber many aspects of the So-
fia Festival as they have during
other Communist international fo-
rums. The Seventh General Assembly
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of WFDY which was held in Sofia
in June 1966 was repeatedly dis-
rupted by Indian-Pakistani, Arab-
Israeli, Somali-Ethiopian and
Sino-Soviet antagonisms. The IPC
has not received an official re-
sponse from China and Albania
regarding their participation at
the fes-tival, but if they do not
attend their cases will undoubt-
edly be argued by proxy.
tasteful could be counterproductive.
Some delegates appear intent on ex-
amining the phenomenon of student
unrest and other explosive "genera-
tion gap" topics, not only in
private discussions but as part
of the official agenda. As in
such cases in the past these top-
ics probably will not make the
agenda but may be relegated to the
back burner in a small "study
group" which is easier to control.
Conclusion
The return of the festival
to a safe Communist country is a
humiliating retreat. It also
revives the festival's close
identification with Communism,
which the organizers have tried
so hard to avoid. After the em-
barrassing foreclosures in Al-
giers and Accra, the Sofia Festi-
val probably is meant to be a
final face-saving jamboree.
Considering the common
denominator of dissent among
today's younger generation, the
outcome of the festival is un-
predictable. The discord at the
festivals in Vienna and Helsinki
produced something less than the
image of complete "peace, friend-
ship, and solidarity," the of-
ficial slogan of the ninth festi-
val. Strong-arm tactics designed
to associate all festival activities
with Vietnam in order to avoid sub-
jects which the Soviets find dis-
The festival probably will
endorse the Soviet line on Vietnam
and on European political issues.
These "achievements in solidarity"
will be used to paper over ideo-
logical divergencies which are
virtually certain to erupt at the
festival. These disputes, plus
nationality clashes, will deal a
telling blow to the fragile facade
of unity. It is difficult to
imagine how the objective of WYFs
(to convert youth to the Soviet
approach to Communism) can be ad-
vanced in this atmosphere.
For all these reasons, and
despite defensive propaganda de-
nials, the dinosaurian species of
WYF will probably soon be extinct.
It will most likely be replaced
by smaller regional gatherings
which will be less expensive and
easier to control, but harder to
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coordinate and with even less im-
pact on the worlds' youth.
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