THE POPULAR FRONT IN CHILE AS A COMMUNIST PATH TO POWER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006600010003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 2, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0660O 10003-8
Secret
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
The Popular Front in Chile as a Communist Path to Power
Secret
N? 43
2 August 1968
No. 0031/68A
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THE POPULAR FRONT IN CHILE AS A COMMUNIST PATH TO POWER
In mid-May the Communist Party of Chile and the
Radical Party issued a joint statement calling for
unity of all leftist "progressive forces." Although
the statement was in response to what the Communists
claimed was a threat of an imminent military coup,
many political observers saw in it the beginnings of
a resurrected Popular Front similar to that which
existed in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The Com-
munists and Radicals were careful to explain that
their joint statement did not constitute a formal
alliance. Chilean politicians are experts at the
art of compromise, however, and it is not impossible
that a broad leftist grouping could emerge after the
congressional elections next. March give evidence of
the relative strengths of the various parties.
Historical Background
The founding of the Chilean
Popular Front in 1936 was in
large part due to the organiza-
tional efforts of a Peruvian Com-
munist, Eudocio Ravines, who had
been sent to Chile from Moscow
by the Comintern. Ravines and
his European colleagues encouraged
the Chilean Communists to end
their political isolation and to
take a more active part in the
political life of the country.
By 1936, the Communists had
joined a bloc that has been formed
by other leftist parties the pre-
ceding year. At about the same
time, this leftist bloc was joined
by the Radicals, an opportunistic
party that saw in this grouping
a means of breaking the rightist
monopoly of Chilean politics.
The Popular Front first
demonstrated its strength in the
congressional elections in 1937,
electing 10 of 25 senators and
66 of 146 deputies. In the 1938
presidential race, the Communists
were instrumental in assuring
the nomination by the Front of
the Radical Pedro Aguirre Cerda
rather than the Socialist Marma-
duke Grove, who had led a coup
in 1932 establishing a "Socialist
Republic" that lasted 12 days. Al-
though Communist support was also
"There are social sectors, there are countries
which have real party politics, a democratic life,
real civil liberties. In such places one adopts the
Popular Front, to attract the left wingers and the
leftist groups, good or bad, sincere or not. Tempt
them, each through his particular weakness....
Help them to get what they want; put pressure,
first with offers, later with threats. Compromise
them if you can, so that they can't get away."
Mao Tse-Tung
to Eudocio Ravines,
Moscow, 1935
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important in Aguirre's subsequent
victory, the party decided not
to participate in the government,
thus retaining freedom to criti-
cize the administration while
claiming credit for its success.
Political differences placed
severe strains on the Popular
Front during World War II, and
the fragile unity that was
achieved in 1941 was almost com-
pletely destroyed in a dispute
over a candidate for the special
presidential election held after
Aguirre's resignation and sub-
sequent death. The Communists
favored a leftist Radical, Gabriel
Gonzalez Videla, but in the end
they and most of the other left-
ist parties supported another
Radical, Juan Antonio Rios, who
was elected.
A Socialist split in 1944
enabled the Communists to in-
crease their popular following.
In 1946, the Communists again
supported Gonzalez Videla, and
after his victory accepted three
portfolios in his cabinet--Com-
munications and Public Works,
Agriculture, and Lands and Coloni-
zation.
The three ministers were
ousted early in 1947 because of
the party's involvement in labor
agitation, and in 1948 a new"Law
for the Defense of Democracy"
outlawed the party and removed
Communists from the voting rolls.
The party retained its organiza-
tion, however, and its members
in Congress were permitted to
serve out their terms. The Com-
munists continued to make gains
among the workers while cooperat-
ing with other leftist parties
in a variety of formal and in-
formal coalitions.
Popular Action Front, 1956-1968
The most important leftist
political group to develop in re-
cent years is the Popular Action
Front (FRAP), which was established
in 1956. FRAP was formed when
the Popular Socialist and Popular
Democratic parties merged with
the People's National Front,
which consisted of the Chilean
Democratic, the Socialist, and
the Labor parties, as well as
the Communists, who were still
officially outlawed. The Law
for the Defense of Democracy was
repealed in 1958 and since then
the Communists have participated
fully in Chilean politics.
Since 1956 the various minor
parties have disappeared and FRAP
is now essentially a coalition
of the Communist and Socialist
parties. This collaboration has
been strained because the Social-
ists are much less enthusiastic
about participating in elections
than are the Communists. The
Socialists have maintained close
ties with Cuba and in general
take a much harder line toward
the government and are more will-
ing to use violent means to at-
tain power.
Since December 1966, FRAP
has cooperated informally with
the Radical Party, both in elect-
ing pro-Castro Socialist Senator
Salvador Allende president of the
Senate and in three legislative
by-elections. This cooperation
cost FRAP the support of about
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one third of the Socialist Party,
which split from the main party
last summer under the leadership
of Senator Raul Ampuero. Ampuero
and his followers, now officially
organized as the Popular Social-
ist Union (USP), oppose coopera-
tion with the "bourgeois" Radical
Party.
FRAP served the Communist
Party as a political vehicle
while the party was still pro-
scribed. Since the party's le-
galization in 1958 FRAP has been
a useful electoral device to se-
cure votes that would not nor-
mally go to an overtly Communist
candidate. In view of continuing
strains between the Communists
and the Socialists, however, its
viability in the future will de-
pend in large part on how well
the parties do in the congres-
sional elections next March.
The Radical Party
The Radical Party has become
known in Chilean politics as the
"spoon" or patronage party. It
was not noted for its ideological
rigidity, but rather was willing
to adopt whatever political line
appeared to promise the greatest
rewards at any given time. In
general, it has spoken for and
worked for the benefit of the
growing Chilean middle class.
The three Radical presidents
who held office from 1938 to 1952
were said to have been elected
by the left to rule with the
right. Since 1966, however, the
party has begun to move to a
leftist ideological position that
in some ways has restricted the
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freedom of action it had enjoyed
for so long.
The party's informal coopera-
tion with FRAP has permitted it
to claim credit for victories in
two important by-elections and
for "protecting" the interests
of the workers against President
Frei's stabilization policies.
At the same time, however, this
cooperation has alienated some
important sources of funds and
support. In addition, there has
been some evidence that moderates
are making a slight comeback
within the party leadership. If
the leadership could get FRAP
support for a Radical presiden-
tial candidate in 1970--even a
member of the leftist faction--
the party probably would coalesce
behind him. Support for a Com-
munist or a Socialist might be
more difficult to sell to the
membership, however.
The Left Wing of the PDC
A potentially important
factor in any broad leftist
g::ouping is the extreme left
wing of President Frei's Chris-
t :Lan Democratic Party (PDC).
This group is impatient with the
pace of the government's reform
program and is firmly committed
to the "noncapitalistic way" of
economic development. On many
occasions it takes positions
closer to those of the Communist
Party than of President Frei.
The leading contender for
the PDC presidential nomination
is Radomiro Tomic, who recently
returned from three years as
Chilean ambassador to the US.
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Tomic visualizes himself as the
leader of a broad leftist front
that would include Communists
and other leftist parties. The
Communists, however, have said
they could never support Tomic
but have hinted that they might
support a leftist Christian Dem-
ocrat such as former party presi-
dent Gumucio.
from the disorganized group of
the early 1930s. Today it is
probably the best organized party
in Chile and undoubtedly the best
disciplined. It has an accepted
role in the Chilean political
structure and usually is quick
to condemn terrorist bombings
carried out by extremist splinter
groups.
The extreme leftists con-
trolled the leadership of the
PDC from July 1967 to January
1968. At that time, strong
personal intervention by Presi-
dent Frei returned control of
the party to moderates, who have
shown considerably more political
acumen recently than they had
evidenced earlier. The national
leadership organized a strong
campaign for a congressional by-
election in July, in which the PDC
candidate scored an expected
yet impressive victory.
There has been some specula-
tion that the extreme left wing
of the PDC might support a FRAP-
sponsored presidential candidate
if the PDC itself nominated a
moderate. The party leadership
has ousted some of the extreme
leftists and is exerting pressure
for conformity on those still in
the party. In any event, the ex-
treme leftist group is not large
enough numerically to be very
important in the coming elections.
Its ouster from the party would
probably make a PDC candidate
more appealing to the more moder-
ate independent voter.
The Communist Party Today
The present Chilean Commu-
nist Party (PCCh) is a far cry
The present Communist leader-
ship sees a good chance of elect-
ing a Communist-supported pres-
ident in 1970 and will take
no action that might jeopardize
this goal. In May, when dis-
content in the military over
low pay generated coup rumors,
the Communists stridently de-
nounced any action to bring down
Frei, fearing that the first act
of a military government would
be to proscribe the party. In
contrast, the Socialists and
some extremist groups were say-
ing privately that some sort of
antigovernment action was neces-
sary to provide the conditions
for a subsequent revolutionary
take-over. The Communists also
feared that if they were pro-
scribed, the Socialists and other
leftist parties would make great
gains at their expense.
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The PCCh is a strong backer
of Moscow in the present polemic
within the world Communist move-
ment as to the efficacy of armed
as opposed to peaceful revolu-
tion. It is significant that
when the remnants of "Che"
Guevara's guerrilla group escaped
to Chile from Bolivia, it was a
Socialist rather than a Communist
leader who arranged for their
repatriation. The PCCh can be
expected to pull out all the
stops between now and 1970 to
vindicate its opposition to
violence.
The PCCh finds itself at
present in an extremely flexible
position. It is being wooed by
several political factions, and
even has hinted that it might
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run its own presidential candi-
date in 1970. The Radical Party
leadership is trying to cement
its relations with the Commu-
nists. The Socialist Party op-
poses close cooperation with the
Radicals, but is unwilling to
break its long-standing collab-
oration with the Communists.
The extreme left wing of the PDC,
despite its recent setbacks,
continues to advocate collab-
oration with all progressive
leftist forces. It is one of
the ironies of the Communists'
present position that, although
they can translate their sup-
port of a Radical or a Socialist
into a substantial voter turn-
out, members of other parties
may be more likely to abstain
than to vote for a Communist,
regardless of party polic
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