INDIA'S TROUBLED EASTERN REGION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006600090004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
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• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
India's Troubled Eastern Region
Secret
N2 37
26 July 1968
No. 0039/68A
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Eastern India, the scene of the protracted Naga
rebellion and more recently of the Mizo uprising, is
now threatened by tribal unrest in the hills south
of the Assam Valley and on the plain along the Brah-
maputra River. Tribes in the hill districts are
demanding an autonomous state while plains tribes,
spurred on by New Delhi's willingness to consider
the hill tribe demands, are beginning to agitate
for their own autonomous areas. Communal problems
add to the tension in the Assam Valley.
With some 70,000 troops and paramilitary per-
sonnel already tied down by the Naga and Mizo
rebellions, the Indian Government wants to avoid
further serious unrest. The eastern region is
virtually surrounded by East Pakistan to the west
and south, Burma on the east and China and Bhutan
to the north. It is tied to the main part of India
only by a narrow 50-mile border with the northern
neck of West Bengal. Evidence that China is inter-
ested in the rebellions, and is providing modest
arms and training assistance to at least the Nagas,
increases Indian concern over security in the area.
The Indian Government has considered various
schemes to satisfy the tribes and mute the unrest.
New Delhi's proposals, however, always fall short
of the minimum demands of the tribes. The central
government, confronted by pressures from separatist
interests elsewhere in India, cannot afford the
precedent of acceding to the independence demands
of the Nagas and Mizos, nor even to petitions for
new autonomous states. Fractionization of the
eastern region into a group of separate political
units would also complicate India's defense of the
area.
The Naga Rebellion
Most of the Nagas live in
extreme isolation along mountain
ridges in Nagaland state and in
the bordering regions of Assam
and the Union Territory of Manipur.
Much of the area is wild jungle,
among the most impenetrable in
the world. The Nagas have tradi-
tionally lived in fortified vil-
lages connected by winding jungle
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trails, practicing a system of
shifting agriculture on the
mountain slopes and going forth
on periodic hunting and warring
expeditions.
Open Naga rebellion against
the Indian Government was launched
in 1956. It came after a decade
of intermittent negotiations dur-
ing which the Indians not only
rejected a Naga claim to independ-
ence but seemed to be steadily
infringing on the substantial
autonomy that the Nagas had en-
joyed under the British. Several
thousand Naga guerrillas took up
arms and engaged in a campaign
of raids, ambushes, kidnapings,
murder, and sabotage which was
eventually to tie down some
50,000 Indian troops and paramili-
tary personnel.
Despite differences among
Naga tribes and a tradition of
intertribal warfare, Naga leaders
were able to organize a disciplined
political movement that cut across
tribal lines. To reinforce their
demands for independence, an
underground "Federal Government
of Nagaland" was established,
consisting of a 100-member legis-
lature, a 15-member council of
ministers, and a system of local
government based largely on tra-
ditional tribal lines of authority.
The guerrillas were organized
into a Department of Home Guards,
which was to include a 500-man
division from each of the 12 main
tribes.
As the revolt continued to
fester, New Delhi gradually became
more conciliatory, partly in order
Page 3
to strengthen the position of
the more moderate Nagas, who viewed
independence as impractical and
were willing to settle for greater
autonomy within the Indian Union.
Finally in 1962 New Delhi agreed
to a proposal by Naga moder-
ates--members of the Naga Peoples'
Convention (NPC)--to make Nagaland
a separate Indian state with
substantially greater autonomy
than that accorded other states
in the Indian Union. In the state
elections in January 1964, the
NPC won 33 of 46 Legislative
Assembly seats and formed the
first state government.
This largely autonomous state
did not satisfy the underground
and the rebellion persisted, but
in September 1964 the rebel
"Federal Government" reluctantly
agreed to a temporary cease-fire
and an Indian Government offer
of direct negotiations. Guerrilla
strength may have declined by this
time to around 3,000, and the
underground was also attracted by
New Delhi's willingness to talk
with "Federal Government" repre-
sentatives, by-passing the state
government.
Talks between New Delhi and
the underground Nagas have taken
place intermittently since the
most recent session in October
1967. Although Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi took a personal hand
in the negotiations in early 1966,
no substantive agreements have
yet been reached. The "Federal
Government" has continued to in-
sist on independence while New
Delhi will not discuss any ar-
rangement that would place the
Naga region outside the Indian
Union.
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Naga from Soma Area
Southern Khasi-Jointia hills--the
highest rainfoll in the world
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Since the formation of the
state government, New Delhi has
tried to strengthen the position
of the moderates by pumping de-
velopment funds into the area.
Road building, which helps the
Indian security forces, has held
a priority, but schools, clinics,
and a power network have also
been constructed. The develop-
ment expenditure is one of the
highest per capita for any state
in India. The cease-fire has
generally been honored throughout
the state; the occasional clashes
between security forces and the
Nagas occur mainly in. northern
Manipur.
The Nagas have exploited the
cease-fire to rebuild the strength
of their Home Guard units. 0
aga forces
numbered roughly 9, y early
1968, a threefold increase over
their strength in mid-1964. At
the same time, the Naga "Federal
Government" has sought outside
support for its cause and has re-
ceived arms and training assist-
ance from the Pakistanis and more
recently from Communist China.
Help from Pakistan was pro-
vided during the 1962-65 period
but probably ended by early 1966
when cooperation between Indian
and Burmese army patrols made
the Naga route down the India-
Burma border to the Chittagong
Hill Tracts much more hazardous.
Naga
contact with China dates trom
December 1966 when the first
group of approximately 200 tribes-
men went across northern Burma
to obtain arms and training in
Yunnan.
Page 5
a. recent clash south of Kohima,
the Nagaland capital, the Indian
Army discovered the Nagas in
possession of Chinese-made small
arms and mortars, as well as
radio sets, diaries, and other
materials that the Indians be-
lieve show the Nagas were in
China.
The discovery of Chinese
arms caused New Delhi to fire
off a protest to Peking charging
it with "aiding," "abetting,"
and "training subversive elements
in Nagaland." Although India is
annoyed over Chinese meddling in
what is already a prolonged
rebellion, it is not expected
that the Chinese will furnish
more than small-scale arms and
training assistance, which China
can provide at little expense
to itself.
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The clash near Kohima was
the most serious between the
security forces and Nagas since
the institution of the cease-fire,
and the first of major propor-
tions to take place within Naga-
land. New Delhi and the "Fed-
eral Government" each threatened
to terminate the cease-fire-
the Nagas on grounds that the
Indian Army had launched the at-
tack, which it did, and the In-
dians because importation of
the foreign arms found at Kohima
was proscribed by the cease-fire
agreement. The cease-fire: was
finally extended, however, but
for only one month--to 31 July--
the shortest renewal since its
institution..
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Meanwhile, the unity of the
underground Nagas has become
seriously strained. A split de-
veloped last summer when Kaito
Sema, the commander in chief of
the army, broke with the "Fed-
eral Government" and went off
to his tribal area with about
3,000 Sema troops and a large
stock of Naga arms and ammuni-
tion. The "Federal Government"
vice president resigned shortly
after, and in early 1968 the
Tuensang district unit (one of
five districts in the "Federal
Government") seceded and estab-
lished the "independent state of
Honking." The president of the
"Federal Government" meanwhile
had responded to the crisis by
setting aside the underground
parliament and imposing "presi-
dential rule."
Tribal enmities may be be-
hind the split, inasmuch as lead-
ers siding with Kaito are largely
Semas from central Nagaland, while
those now leading the "Federal
Government" are Angamis or Tang-
khuls, tribes from southern Naga-
land and northern Manipur. Os-
tensibly, however, the issue is
whether to continue negotiations
with New Delhi or to revert to
all-out guerrilla warfare. Kaito
and others who back negotiations
also attack the "Federal Govern-
ment" for accepting Chinese assist-
ance and for undermining the Nagas'
democratic institutions.
New negotiations, however,
do not seem to be an immediate
prospect. If the Naga groups that
New Delhi believes are still in
China return, the militant ele-
ment among the Nagas, which re-
portedly has the support of a
majority of the rebels, may in-
crease the tempo of the rebellion.
Meanwhile New Delhi is increasing
its border surveillance and has
announced that it will attack any
Naga group "known" to be in pos-
session of Chinese arms.
The Mizo Rebellion
The revolt in the remote
Mizo hills, now in its third year,
continues to tie down some 20,000
Indian troops and paramilitary
personnel and shows no sign of
abatement. Like the Nagas, the
Mizo militants launched their
rebellion in order to win inde-
pendence, maintaining that their
"excluded area" status under the
British entitled them to choose
their political alignment when the
British departed. The Mizo rebels
have offered several times to
negotiate with New Delhi but have
been ignored, the Indian Govern-
ment refusing to negotiate until
the demand for independence is
dropped.
The Mizo region was quiet
for the first decade after Indian
independence. Mizo leaders for
the most part cooperated with
the Assam government administra-
tion and worked within constitu-
tional legislative machinery
that included district councils
set up to give the tribes control
over limited aspects of their af-
fairs. Partly because of the es-
pecially strong missionary influ-
ence--over 90 percent of the Mizos
are Christians--Minos are, in
general, less hostile to outside
influence than the Nagas.
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Increasing disenchantment
with the government of Assam pre-
ceded the outbreak of rebellion.
Assam authorities badly mishandled
a serious famine in 1959-60, des-
pite warnings of disaster from
Mizo leaders, and while the ef-
fects of this were still fresh,
the Assam government introduced
legislation declaring Assamese
the state's official language.
Probably encouraged by con-
cessions being forced on New
Delhi by the more militant Nagas--
Nagaland was by then a separate
state--formerly moderate Mizo
leaders formed a Mizo National
Front (MNF) with the avowed ob-
jective of complete independence.
They first confined their cam-
paign to nonviolent agitation
but received no response from
New Delhi. In March 1966,
shortly after Prime Minister
Gandhi started her talks with
Naga underground leaders, the
MNF suddenly launched a surpris-
ingly well coordinated armed at-
tack that captured all major
administrative centers in the
Mizo Hills and besieged the can-
tonments of the local Indian
forces. The Mizos were well
armed and disciplined. Many of
them were drawn from the 10,000
Mizos who had served with the
Indian armed forces..
The reinforcements dispatched
by. New Delhi quickly chased the
rebels from the major adminis-
trative centers, however, and
helicopters and bombers were em-
ployed in an attempt to pin down
the rebels in their jungle hide-
outs. Later, the government be-
gan systematically to move Mizos
out of their jungle villages and
into "progressive protected
villages" along the north-south
Silchar-Aijal-Lungleh route,
where they could be guarded by
security forces.
Mizo guerrillas have not
again threatened major adminis-
trative centers, but the Indian
Army has been unable to curtail
sporadic ambushes and harassment
raids against its forces. The
rebels can move at will through
most of the heavily jungled and
mountainous area, apparently with
the support of the population
remaining in the remote and
isolated villages. New Delhi con-
cedes that no more than 35 per-
cent of the villagers have been
concentrated in the "protected
villages." Both New Delhi and
the loyal Mizos who serve on the
district council--members of the
Mizo Union--admit that security
in the region is insufficient
to permit new elections for the
district council.
The MNF received small arms
and training support from East
Pakistan before the start of
the rebellion. Periodic reports
of Pakistani support continue,
but it is likely that East Pak-
istan is now mainly useful to
the rebels as a safe refuge.
Indian allegations about Pakistani
training camps, which were fre-
quent in late 1966 and 1967, have
.not been made in recent months,
although it is possible that
Mizos still pick up guns and
ammunition on visits into East
:Pakistan. The president of the
MNF is still in East Pakistan.
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New Delhi has been atten-
tive to signs that the Mizos are
in contact with the Nagas or are
receiving assistance from the
Chinese. Thus far, there is no
evidence of a link-up with the
Nagas, although the Mizos do
seem to have been joined by Kuki
tribesmen, who live in Manipur
and are closely related to the
Chins across the border in Burma.
Mixed Mizo-Kuki contingents have
been identified in clashes north
of Imphal, the Manipur capital,
and also farther west near the
Silchar-Aijal road. The Mizos
have reportedly promised the
Kukis an autonomous district in
an independent state of Mizoram;
this could conflict with Naga
interests, however, because the
Kukis inhabit parts of northern
and eastern Manipur that the
Nagas envisage as part of an in-
dependent Nagaland.
Until recently there was
no evidence of Chinese contact
with the Mizos, although China's
propaganda has supported both
the Naga and Mizo independence
struggles. In June, however, a
group of Mizos was intercepted
by security forces along the
Mizo Hills - Burma border.
C the group--th
first izo contingent sighted
in this area for some time--was
preparing to cross Burma to China.
Other Tribal Dissidence in Assam
Hill tribe unrest in the
Garo and Khasi-Jaintia hill dis-
tricts is also a reaction to
domination by the Hindu popula-
tion that controls the state
government in Assam. The Garo,
Khasi, and Jaintia tribes, like
the Nagas and Mizos, are Tibeto-
Burman in origin and in their
isolated hill villages have been
historically insulated from dom-
inant subcontinent influences.
The moderate-led All Party
Hill Leaders Conference (APHLC)
which represents tribes in this
region, demands a largely auto-
nomous state separate from Assam
in all matters except for those
where a single administration
would be mutually beneficial,
such as control of river waters.
The Assam government's intro-
duction of Assamese as the state
language was the initial APHLC
grievance, but the moderates'
demand for autonomy has been
spurred by economic problems in
the region and large-scale un-
employment among young people,
which they attribute to neglect
by state authorities.
Wishing to avoid another
uprising of the Naga or Mizo
type, New Delhi has been nego-
tiating with the APHLC for more
than two years. These talks,
which once looked promising,
seem to have foundered over
APHLC insistence that the new sub-
state have responsibility for
internal law and order. Also,
some members of the Indian cab-
inet oppose the creation of sub-
states that are virtually sep-
arate new states, arguing that
this will dangerously fragment
the region and set a precedent
for meeting similar pressures
elsewhere. Although negotiations
have not been broken off, the
APHLC was disturbed over New
Delhi's failure to reach a solution
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during the last parliamen-
tary session, as promised by
Home Minister Y. B. Chavan in
talks held late last year.
Moreover, demands from the
Assam Valley plains tribes com-
plicate New Delhi's handling of
hill district proposals, espe-
cially so because the plains
tribes' demands seem to have de-
veloped as a result of New Delhi's
willingness to negotiate with the
APHLC. The Koches of western
Assam and northern Bengal and the
Kacharis (or Bodos) of western
and central Assam have both formed
organizations in the last year
and a half, as have the Ahoms,
a Shan tribe that occupies the
upper Assam Valley. All three
peoples at different times in
history dominated significant
parts of the Assam Valley and
they regard the Indian population,
now in the majority, as latecom-
ers or intruders.
The three organizations have
been under moderate leadership
but the Plains Tribe Council, rep-
resenting the Kacharis, may be
stepping up its agitation. To
further its demand for "full
autonomy" for the tribal belt
running along the northern fron-
tiers of Goalpara, Kamrup, Darrang,
and Lakhimpur districts, it boy-
cotted a recent parliamentary
by-election in the Kokrajhar
area. Clashes between pickets
and police resulted in 500 ar-
rests, after which some 4,000
Bodo tribesmen stormed a Kokrajhar
police station. A curfew was
imposed in the area for several
days.
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Adding to New Delhi's con-
cern is communal unrest in the
Assam Valley, especially between
long-resident Assamese and more
.recent immigrants who dominate
the economy and who have been
the main beneficiaries of new
economic opportunities afforded
by India's development effort
in Assam. This surfaced on Re-
public Day last January when
Marwari businessmen, immigrants
from Rajasthan, were the targets
of large-scale rioting, destruc-
tion, and looting.
Also close to the surface
are pressures resulting from large-
scale immigration from East Paki-
stan, which continues at a reduced
pace even today. Assam had the
largest population increase of
any Indian state in the 1951-61
period. The predominantly Hindu
immigrants bring heavy competition
for Assam's scarce jobs, but a
Special problem is their incur-
sions into protected tribal land,
especially in the plains areas.
Although the land is sometimes
illegally sold to the immigrants
by poor plains tribesmen the As-
sam government's inability to con-
trol the incursions is a main
grievance of the Plains Tribe
Council.
Hindu-Muslim rioting is a
further danger, inasmuch as 25
percent of Assam's population is
Muslim. The Jan Sangh, a mili-
tant Hindu-supremist party, has
announced an intensified organi-
zational effort among Assam's
Hindus, hoping to capitalize on
the Hindus' concern over New
Delhi's alleged sympathy to hill
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the Assam government from the
picture and provide time for
working out a solution.
Blanket reorganization ideas
founder, however, on continu-
ing disagreement between New
Delhi and the tribes as to what
represents permissible autonomy.
The APHLC, for example, shows
little interest in blanket
schemes unless internal police
,power is vested in the autono-
mous substate. The Assam gov-
ernment, which has been dragged
along very reluctantly on the
APHLC negotiations, is unlikely
to support proposals that even
further reduce its area of author-
ity. The imposition of "Presi-
dent's Rule" would be difficult
at a time when it has already
been employed across much of
northern India during the last
year. And in the case of Assam,
it would mean displacing a stable
Congress government.
New Delhi will more likely
try to temporize, hoping that
somehow a workable solution will
eventually emerge. The Naga and
Mizo rebellions use up resources
that India can ill-afford, but
the rebellions are isolated on
the eastern fringes of the country
and do not directly affect secur-
ity in the main part of India.
There is no evidence yet that
the Nagas and Mizo-Kukis are co-
operating in such a way as to
change the current fractured
nature of the rebellions or that
they are in contact with other
hill tribes. Despite the per-
sistence of the rebellions, there
have been no dramatic Indian set-
backs that would suggest the
situation is deteriorating fur-
ther.
Reports of Chinese assist-
ance to the Nagas excited the
Indian press for a few days but
no pressure has yet developed for
an all-out military solution to
the Naga or Mizo problem or even
for increasing the current mili-
tary presence. Military leaders
wish to maintain the cease-fire
with the Nagas because they believe
that the impossible terrain and
the rebels' demonstrated fight-
ing ability and mobility fore-
close a military solution with-
out excessive bloodshed. New
Delhi probably finds security
problems in eastern India less
pressing now, as continuing in-
ternal problems in China mini-
mize the threat of another in-
vasion.
Nevertheless, New Delhi's
attitude could change if there
were evidence of increased
and concerted Chinese assistance
to the Nagas or Mizos or if open
rebellion spread to other parts
of eastern India. Menacing ac-
tivity by China in the border
regions would also put pres-
sure on India for clear action.
But existing divisions in New
Delhi over policies for the east-
ern -region suggest that a serious
strain would develop in the gov-
ernment if it were forced to de-
cide between more resolute mili-
tary pressure on the rebels or
significant political concessions.
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