WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006600100001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 27, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
~,o j CO DS CF TER
I'ITMEDIATELY AFTER
JOB ?~
S-3
Secret
43'
State Dept. review completed
27 September 1968
No. 0040/68
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(Information as of noon EDT, 26 September 1968)
Europe
MOSCOW LOSING PATIENCE WITH CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERS
Moscow's forebearance with the stubborn Czechoslovaks
may be coming to an end, and the Soviets could be on
the verge of a move against liberal Czechoslovak
leaders.
SOVIET PEOPLE QUESTION INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia appears to
have had a broad impact on the Soviet population.
Reactions have varied, but the regime's inability to
justify its policy in cogent and consistent terms has
led many people to feel uncertain about their lead-
ers' actions.
BALKAN COMMUNIST REGIMES ADJUST TO NEW REALITIES
The Rumanian and Yugoslav regimes, uneasy about So-
viet plans for the Balkans, have moved to adjust
their policies to meet the new realities of Moscow's
enlarged presence in Eastern Europe. The Bulgarians,
however, seem to have found new confidence in their
own hard-line policies.
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USSR SUSTAINS TENSIONS IN BONN AND BERLIN
Soviet propaganda attacks are sustaining West
tensions already heightened by the Czechoslova
crisis. The tone seems more menacing in the w
the Soviet invasion, but the content suggests
rily an effort to justify that move.
erman
ke of
brima-
DECLINING BIRTH RATE AROUSES SOVIET CONCERN
The falling birth rate of the 1960s is not lily to
be reversed in the near future, and the regim may
be forced to reconsider policies that encouraged the
decline.
Far East
VIETNAM
Communist attempts to mount offensive operations in
several target areas were again largely frustt ated
last week by allied spoiling actions. In the polit-
ical war, both Saigon and the Communists are aking
steps to strengthen their positions in the co ntry-
side.
PHILIPPINES MOVES TO EASE RENEWED TENSION OVER SA AH
Philippine President Marcos, apparently alarm d by
Malaysia's strong response to Philippine legi lation
referring to Manila's sovereignty over Sabah, has
sought to halt further escalation of the dispte.
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DISAGREEMENTS IN PEKING HAMPER FOREIGN MINISTRY
Efforts to improve China's image abroad are proceed-
ing despite continuing political turmoil and policy
differences in Peking.
Middle East -- Africa
MOUNTING CASUALTIES MAY PROVOKE ISRAELI RETALIATION
Border incidents resulting in many casualties con-
tinue to plague the Israelis. Tel Aviv has shown un-
usual restraint to date, but retaliatory strikes can-
not be ruled out.
TUNISIA SENTENCES STUDENT AGITATORS
The Bourguiba regime has cracked down hard on dissi-
dents among university students and faculty by meting
out relatively long prison sentences to the ring-
leaders of disorders that occurred last March.
NIGERIAN FEDERAL TROOPS CLOSE IN
Federal military forces are continuing to move on
the Biafran capital of Umuahia, but are sustaining
heavy casualties in strong Biafran counterattacks.
There are indications that some Biafrans are begin-
ning to think of surrendering, although Ojukwu shows
no signs of giving up.
RHODESIA LEAVES DOOR AJAR FOR NEGOTIATIONS
Smith's constitutional proposals--passed despite the
strong opposition of his party's right wing--are in-
tended to keep open the possibility of a negotiated
settlement with Britain.
WIDESPREAD LABOR UNREST IN INDIA
A series of disruptive local and national strikes
have erupted in recent months, and little improvement
in the situation seems likely in the near future.
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SECRF 9' I
Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
HONDURAN GENERAL STRIKE BROKEN
The Honduran Government has successfully broke the
general strike prompted by new taxes endorsed t the
Central American summit meeting in July, but tle
strike may slow approval of the tax mea-sure in other
Central American nations.
URUGUAY MOVES AGAINST AGITATORS
President Pacheco has closed the schools, imposed
restraints on the press, and expelled three members
of the Soviet Embassy.
VIOLENCE GROWS IN MEXICAN STUDENT CRISIS
The hard positions on both sides, evident in he
almost daily violence between students and police,
have dimmed prospects for quieting the distur ances
before the Olympics start on 12 October.
POLITICAL TENSIONS RISING IN PERU
Dissatisfaction over the government's recent ettle-
ment with the US-owned International Petroleum Com-
Pany is giving rise rumors of military plo ting
I
GUATEMALAN MILITARY GROWING RESTIVE
There is no evidence of coup plotting thus fa
a move in that direction is increasingly like
, but
Y.
SECR1:'I"
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The unpleasant realities of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia and
of Moscow's enlarged presence in Eastern Europe became more evident this
week to many Europeans, both East and West.
The Soviets and their allies remained dissatisfied with the Prague regime
as it continued to go its own way and failed to reimpose limits on Czechoslo-
vak political behavior. Moscow, apparently close to losing its patience,
seemed on the verge of using its military presence to oust top Czechoslovak
liberals, impose a conservative regime, and repress any dissident opposition
forces.
In the Balkans, the Rumanians and the Yugoslavs remain uneasy about
Soviet plans for the area while the Bulgarians seem to have gained a new
sense of confidence with the return of Larder Soviet policies.
Soviet Marshal Yakubovsky, commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact,
was on tour this past week, consulting with defense ministers and other
leaders in Sofia, East Berlin, and Warsaw. The purpose of his trip possibly is
to make general soundings prior to another Moscow-Prague confrontation.
West German and West Berlin nerves, already taut because of the
Czechoslovak crisis, have been further tightened by what they consider to be
menacing Soviet and East German propaganda, threatening to West Berlin
and to West German access to the city. Chancellor Kiesinger seems certain to
focus on this problem during his talks this weekend with President de Gaulle.
By late this week, 37 Communist delegations had arrived in Budapest for
the third preparatory committee meeting of the World Communist Con-
ference, only two less delegations than attended the second conference in
June. Reportedly scheduled to begin 30 September, the meeting will almost
certainly decide if the World Conference-planned for November and appar-
ently still being pushed by Moscow-should be postponed, as proposed by
several West European parties.
As Portuguese leader Salazar lingered in a coma, all reports indicated
that President Thomaz has decided to name a former cabinet member,
Professor Marcelo Caetano, as the prince minister's successor. This choice
reassures those who want the authoritarian system to continue, but does not
rule out some eventual liberalization of internal political and economic
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Moscow LOSING PATIENCE WITH CZECHOSLOVAK
Moscow's forbearance with
the stubborn Czechoslovaks may
be coming to an end, and the So-
viets could be on the verge of
a move against liberal Czecho-
slovak leaders.
On 25 September, the Soviet
Union implicitly charged Czecho-
slovakia's leadership with act-
ing in direct contradiction to
the Moscow agreement of 26 Au-
gust and with supporting coun-
terrevolutionary elements in
the country. TASS, the official
Soviet news agency, issued a
statement sharply critical of
the Dubcek regime for failing
to remove from control of the
news media the "same people"
who before and after the invasion
have been attacking the Commu-
nist Party, the Communist system,
and the USSR and its allies.
TASS implied that nothing was
being done to control the anti-
Communist "underground," which
it claimed was perpetrating acts
of terror and subversion, and
was circulating illegal litera-
ture. The statement charged that
the "truth" about such antiso-
cialist activities had not yet
been told to the Czechoslovak
people.
Publication of the TASS
broadside climaxed a rising
crescendo of Soviet press cri-
ticism, and coincided with the
repositioning of Soviet troops
and armored cars in downtown
Prague. It also came a few
hours after the East German
party's main daily, Neues
Deutschland, re:
attacks on Czecl
chief Dubcek, a]]
was not really i
a "Social Democ3
German sense."
had for some dal
charges of dupl:
of Czechoslovak
From their
the Soviets have
concern. The Di
been daily tryii
viets to their
interference in
while at the sai
been proceeding
courses unaccep
Thus, while som
as former forei
have resigned,
of their depart
coupled with ne
of pro-Soviet o
Moreover,
accede to Sovie
Kuznetsov's urg
the government.
dent Svoboda iE
threatened to r
the entire lead
insists on suct
party presidium
ommended the re
those--even at
no longer enjoy
of the people.
duals are old i
Prague ha
poned some eco
in a manner cl
put the onus o
SEC RE' 1
Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY
umed personal
oslovak party
leging that he
Communist but
at in the West
The Polish press
s been printing
city on the part
leaders.
point of view,
good reason for
~bcek regime has
ig to hold the So-
>romise of non-
domestic affairs,
ie time it has
on a number of
:able to Moscow.
liberals, such
In minister Hajek,
:he announcement
ire has been
is of the ouster
_ficials.
Prague has yet to
t special envoy
ings to revamp
Indeed, Presi-
said to have
esign, along with
ership, if Moscow
changes. The
has instead rec-
signation of all
lower levels--who
the confidence
Many such indivi-
riends of Moscow.
temporarily post-
omic reforms, but
any designed to
the Soviets.
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Czechoslovak economists are
stoutly defending the government's
decision to proceed with other
aspects of the economic reforms--
including the controversial work-
ers' councils--in the face of
attacks from Moscow. As planned
before the invasion, non-Commu-
nists are to share in the manage-
ment of social, economic, and
"other processes," despite in-
sistent demands from the oc-
cupiers for restoration of
the Communist Party's control.
Revised party statutes, which
emphasize "democratization"--
now synonymous to counter rev-
olution in the Soviet lexicon--
will remain largely valid.
Censorship is ineffective
and Premier Cernik has even de-
fended the news media, adding
that the government will not
punish anyone for his political
views. In addition, the Czecho-
slovak population seems intent
on erecting a growing shield of
acclaim to protect Dubcek from
Soviet ire. Towns are being re-
named in his honor, "Dubcek fan
clubs" are springing up, and
])ubcek pins are prominently worn.
Nevertheless, the Soviets 25X1
have withdrawn one of the three
division's that moved into Czecho-
slovakia from Hungary.
SOVIET PEOPLE QUESTION INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
The USSR's intervention in
Czechoslovakia appears to have
had a broad impact on the Soviet
population. Reactions have var-
ied, but the regime's inability
to justify its policy in cogent
and consistent terms has led many
people to feel uncertain about
their leaders' actions.
The liberal intelligentsia
have been the most critical of
the invasion. Many liberals
viewed the Czechoslovak example
of reform as the future hope of
Communism. Nationally minded ele-
ments among the Ukrainians, Balts,
and other Western-oriented minori-
ties, believing that their own
hopes for greater independence
from Moscow hinged on the success
of the Czechoslovak experiment,
have undoubtedly been similarly
discouraged. Already bearing the
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 Sep 68
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brunt of an ideological crackdown
begun last spring, however, these
groups have made only weak at-
tempts to demonstrate their dis-
approval. When they have done so,
authorities have responded quickly
with arrests and trials that ef-
fectively kept the protest move-
ment-from growing.
There is some evidence of
support for the intervention,
especially within the USSR's work-
ing class. Propaganda themes on
the West German menace, the danger
of losing Czechoslovakia to the
West, and the Czechoslovak's in-
gratitude for Soviet sacrifices
have found a response among some
elements of the Soviet population.
Many people nevertheless are
confused by shifts in the official
line. One group of workers in
Moscow, for example, would not be-
lieve that Dubcek--portrayed by
Pravda after the invasion as a
traitor--was taking part in the
Kremlin talks until they were
shown a favorable new reference
to him in Pravda. During a
month's travel around the Soviet
Union, a British journalist found
not one person who appeared con-
vinced by the regime's propaganda.
The average Russian was able to
recognize that the Soviet press
was not giving the full story.
Similarly, an American studying
in Moscow found Soviet students
ill-informed and, in their con-
fusion, suspicious that their gov-
ernment was guil y of something
reprehensible.
Popular ske ticism is prob-
ably reinforced y the jamming of
foreign broadcas s in Russian,
which was abrupt y resumed after
the invasion. T e jamming has
not been entirel effective, how-
ever, and even t e Soviet news
media have been forced to report
some of the Czec oslovak people's
opposition to th
those who are ob
able to learn ab
Czechoslovakia a
criticism voice
Rumania, and th
nist parties.
The seemin
of Soviet actio
any clear, high
of policy are p
est causes of p
top Soviet lead
jar address, pu
lished, on Czec
July. The news
the leadership'
ing repeatedly
doctrination of
the masses, but
specific line.
organized from
tee to the fact
unanimous appro
April report an
apreement, the
elaborate ritua
invasion or the
agreement.
invasion. Thus,
ervant have been
ut conditions in
well as the
by Yugoslavia,
Western Commu-
inconsistencies
s and the lack of
level exposition
obably the great-
pular unease. No
r has given a ma-
lished or unpub-
oslovakia since
apers indicate
concern by call-
or improved in-
party members and
do not define a
Although meetings
he Central Commit-
ry level gave
al to Brezhnev's
to the Bratislava
has been no such
to endorse the
subsequent Moscow
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BALKAN COMMUNIST REGIMES ADJUST TO NEW REALITIES
The regime of Rumanian leader
Ceausescu seemed more relaxed last
week despite rumors of possible
Soviet military intervention. The
Yugoslavs, even as they try to
divine Soviet intentions, are ex-
changing polemics with Moscow,
while the Bulgarians sustain their
strong support of Soviet policies.
The Rumanians are seeking to
work out a new relationship with
the Warsaw Five, with Ceausescu
hoping to follow a policy of con-
ciliating his allies while adher-
ing to his own national Communist
course. The Rumanian press con-
tinues to refrain from criticizing
the Warsaw Five. It is publishing
only brief factual reports on
Czechoslovakia, and is stressing
Bucharest's long-standing policy
of "friendship with all."
The Rumanians undoubtedly are
influenced by reports of a Soviet
military build-up near the Ruma-
nian border. Thus Bucharest's re-
cent efforts to call attention to
the danger of Soviet intervention
probably are in part a pre-emptive
tactic against the Russians.
At the same time, the Ceau-
sescu regime recently announced
the posthumous rehabilitation of
the arch-Stalinist Vasile Luca.
Several national Communists, most
of whom appear to be Jews and eth-
nic Hungarians, also were reha-
bilitated. Luca's reinstatement
can be considered a gesture to
Moscow, while the others seem de-
signed to supplement Ceausescu's
drive for closer party and na-
tional unity. He carried forward
the drive this week on a speech-
making tour through western Tran-
sylvania.
Yugoslav leaders are preoc-
cupied with determining the USSR's
future intentions. They are espe-
cially apprehensive about Bulgar-
ian threats toward Macedonia and
possible Soviet economic repris-
als. Belgrade is already look-
ing for further means to diversify
its foreign trade. Deputy Premier
Kiro Gligorov will arrive in the
US on 27 September to discuss the
expansion of bilateral trade.
Meanwhile, Yugoslav military
forces remain on alert, and the
.Population has been warned to
guard against attempts to split
them along nationality lines.
Bulgarian party boss Todor
Zhivkov went to Moscow on 16 Sep-
tember and concluded an economic
aid agreement of considerable ad-
vantage to Bulgaria. Three days
:Later, Soviet Marshal Yakubovsky,
Warsaw Pact commander in chief,
visited Sofia and later East Ber-
:Lin and Warsaw, ostensibly to
discuss "strengthening the War-
saw Pact." His visit aroused new
apprehensions among Bulgaria's
Balkan neighbors. Sofia has of-
ficially denied, however, that
S C
oviet troops are stationed in
Bulgaria and there is no evidence
that Bulgarian troops have moved
toward the Yu os 1 ian
borders. 25X1
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i
USSR SUSTAINS TENSIONS IN BONN AND BER.IN
Soviet propaganda attacks
are sustaining West German ten-
sions already heightened by the
Czechoslovak crisis. Izvestia
has now warned against Bonn s-"en-
croachments" on West Berlin and
has repeated--in the face of Al-
lied counterarguments -Moscow's
claim that the UN charter and
Potsdam agreements empower the
Soviets to intervene in German
affairs. The Soviet press has
stressed the danger of a resur-
gent German militarism, but the
charges included no specific
threats and did not go beyond the
position Moscow set forth in a
memo to Bonn last July.
The tone of Moscow's propa-
ganda seems more menacing in the
wake of the Soviet intervention
in Czechoslovakia, but the con-
tent suggests an effort to jus-
tify that move. Soviet propa-
gandists continue to portray the
invasion as a defensive move
necessitated by sinister NATO de-
signs and by the threat of West
German "militarism and neo-Na-
zism." Moscow probably hopes to
divert attention from the Czech-
oslovak issue, and perhaps also
to help forestall the strengthen-
ing of NATO called for by Bonn.
Privately, Soviet diplomats
have given assurances in the West
that Moscow contemplates no moves
against West Berlin. A Soviet
Embassy officer in Berlin report-
edly told a West
recently that Mo
beyond propagand
sponding to Bund
meetings in the
tober or to the
vember.
Moscow has t
that such demons
ties with Berlin
but the Russian {
that only a plen
Bundestag would
tolerance level.
is not now under
added that propa
would include th
access--the mode
West German offi
to avoid East Ge
and would be "su
a permanent effe
rale," suggestin
be strident inde
None of the
however, preclud
East Germans, wh
timate that they
unspecified acti
Berlin. The mee
lin this week be
leader Ulbricht
Yakubovsky, chie
Pact, probably f
situation, but B
have been discus
Both the So
Germans will be
SEC RE]'
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Berlin official
cow would not go
attacks in re-
stag committee
ity late in Oc-
hristian Demo-
in early No-
arned in the past
rations of Bonn's
are "provocative,
fficial indicated
ry session of the
xceed Moscow's
Such a meeting
consideration. He
anda attacks
question of air
of travel most
ials use in order
man harassment--
ficient to leave
t on Berlin mo-
that they would
d.
Soviet assurances,
s action by the
continue to in-
will take some
in against West
.ing in East Ber-
ween East German
nd Soviet Marshal
' of the Warsaw
cused on the Czech
rlin could well
ed.
iets and East
rovided with an-
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other target for at least a prop-
aganda barrage if the Berlin
branch of the National Democratic
Party, the "neo-Nazi" group es-
pecially odious to the Communists,
holds its party congress in the
city as planned on 18-19 October.
The Allies are taking up the mat-
ter with the West Berlin Senat,
hoping it will ban such a meeting
so that direct Allied action is
not required.
The West Germans are con-
cerned over Communist intentions,
but they are not contemplating any
major concessions. Bonn leaders
do not plan to cancel any of the
meetings scheduled for the Bunde-
stag committees and the Christian
Democrats, but they share Allied
reservations about allowing the
National Democrats to meet in West
Berlin.
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DECLINING BIRTH RATE AROUSES SOVIET CON
After relatively little
change in the 1950s, the Soviet
birth rate fell by almost one
third during 1960-67. This down-
ward trend is not likely to be
reversed in the near future,
and the regime may be forced to
reconsider policies that en-
couraged the decline.
The Soviet birth rate drop-
ped from 24.9 per thousand popu-
lation in 1960 to 17.4 in 1967.
This decline, combined with a
small increase in the death
rate, produced the lowest rate
of population increase in the
post - World War II period. The
Soviet birth rate had exceeded
that of the US in 1960, but
since 1963 has remained below
the US rate.
The most important cause
of this decline is a trend to-
ward fewer children per family.
In the Soviet Ui
mainly from urb
employment anion.
shortage of hou,
care facilities
shortage of con
government, more
permits abortio
has made divorc
tain. In addit
been a drop in
women in prime
ages (20-34 yea
the low birth r
War II.
The low bi
to continue wel
decade. The nu
the prime child
will remain at
level until the
over, the main
the drop in fer
urbanization an
of employment a
even intensify
future.
Soviet demo
result, are con
future supply o
the Soviet Unio:
share of world
-spite certain a
short run--less
care, education
facilities, for
declining birth
that in the lon
persons will be
ing age. After
ber of people j
SECRET
ion, this results
nization, greater
women, the
ing and child
and a general
umer goods. The
over, freely
s, and since 1965
s easier to ob-
on, there has
he number of
hild-bearing
-s), a result of
.tes during World
th rate is likely
into the next
ber of women in
bearing ages
bout the current
mid-1970s. More-
nfluences on
ility, such as
the high rate
gong women, may
n the near
graphers, as a
erned about the
manpower and
's decreasing
opulation. De-
vantages in the
strain on child
1, and housing
example--the
rate means
er run fewer
reaching work-
1980, the num-
oining the labor
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force will be increasingly offset
by those reaching retirement
age.
If the birth rate continues
to decline, the USSR may have
difficulties meeting its rising
civilian and military manpower
requirements. Faced with a
serious manpower problem in the
early 1960s, the regime reduced
the size of the armed forces and
the number of full-time students,
and encouraged housewives to take
jobs. Today, with a smaller
army, increased emphasis on edu-
cation, and a higher percentage
of women already employed, the
regime would find it more diffi-
SECRET
Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY
cult and costly to mobilize new
sources of manpower. The largest
potential source for industrial
and urban needs is the agricul-
tural labor force, but large in-
vestments in farm mechanization
would be required.
So far, Soviet leaders have
not publicly voiced concern over
the economic implications of
the decline in the birth rate.
-if the decline continues, how-
ever, the regime might resort
to changes in its policies af-
fecting marriage, birth control,
and the employment of women.
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Allied ground operations and B-5:! attacks in South Vietnam continued
to keep Communist forces off balance and to exact a heavy toll of enemy
casualties and weapons losses. Even where Communist main force units
managed to get themselves set for major ground assaults, they were beaten
off, for the most part with heavy losses.
The enemy's inability thus far in this campaign to deal heavy blows to
urban centers and allied military positions has been partially offset by his
apparent continuing success in extending political control in large areas of
the countryside. There is a growing body of evidence that so-called "libera-
tion" or "revolutionary" administrations are being widely established,
mostly at the village level. The Communists have also significantly stepped
up their assassination program against government officials in the country-
side.
The extension of the Communist ,iolitical apparatus is aimed not only
at helping mobilize resources for the current war effort, but also at strength-
ening the Communist position in the negotiation and implementation of any
peace settlement.
In China, Chou En-lai seems to be :making new moves to consolidate his
authority over foreign nolicv_ his exclusive preserve before the Cultural
ere will probably continue to be occasional aberrations, however, stimu-
lated by militant Maoists in Peking, until the Cultural Revolution runs its
course.
After the latest flareup, both Malaysia and the Philippines seem anxious
to prevent further escalation of the Sabah dispute. A major stumbling block
to the resumption of a dialogue is Malaysia's refusal to discuss further the
Philippines' claim to Sabah. Another factor that will make it difficult to
keep tensions within bounds is the tendency of leaders of both countries to
play politics with the issue Malaysia both have national
elections next year.
SECRET,
Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 Sep 68
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 Approved For Releas* 14Qj /Q3708 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06600100001-0
VIETNAM
That phase of the current
Communist offensive calling for
large-unit attacks on allied
strongpoints and urban centers
continues to flounder in the
face of allied spoiling opera-
tions and stiff defensive actions.
The Communists, however, demon-
strated that they remain near the
urban centers of the country by
~NORTN VIETNAM
Demiflarized Zone
"Rockpile= f~=G1O Linh
i
T
#
r
'Quang
1.. Hue*
PHNOM
PENH
CAMBODIA
Incrrrased enemy
pressure
f.4
?J'H`~ *SAIGON
Nha
25X1 SOUTH VIETNAM
staging a series of rocket and
mortar attacks throughout all
four corps last week.
Enemy main force units, how-
ever, took heavy casualties in
several ground engagements along
the north-central coast from Da
Nang to Binh Dinh Province. The
impact of such casualties was re-
flected in a captured notebook
that detailed the failure of the
North Vietnamese 21st Regiment
to draw defenders away from Da
Nang. Battalion-sized or larger
North Vietnamese units also lost
heavily during unsuccessful as-
saults against allied targets of
secondary importance in Tay Ninh
Province, northwest of Saigon.
Although the North Vietnam-
ese have the equivalent of three
divisions in the Demilitarized
Zone area, allied spoiling opera-
tions have effectively stymied
their efforts to get in position
for an offensive, dealing them
heavy losses in terms of both
personnel and supplies. In the
eastern Demilitarized Zone area,
for example, South Vietnamese
Army forces this week reportedly
killed more than 100 members of
the North Vietnamese 27th and
138th regiments, raising collec-
tive casualties to these regi-
ments in the Gio Linh sector to
350 killed since 13 September.
Meanwhile, along the west-
ern anchor of the Demilitarized
Zone, the discovery this week of
a mass grave with more than 200
enemy bodies provided further evi-
dence of the effectiveness of
SECRET
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 Sep 68
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 Approved For Release 2007/03/08SI4fP1379-00927A006600100001-0
B-52 strikes in disrupting planned
activity by the North Vietnamese
320th Division near the allied
strong point at the "Rockpile."
Moreover, in the past two
weeks alone, the allies have cap-
tured more than 1,000 weapons and
136 tons of munitions during sweep
operations along the formerly
neutral buffer zone--enough to
equip an enemy regiment for sev-
eral months.
Allied spoiling operations
have also undercut the enemy's
capability to mount a sustained
offensive along the northern
coastal plains from Hue to Quang
Tri city.
In addition, the damaging
effects of recent heavy rains
and flooding from Typhoon Bess
have made the enemy's already
critical rice shortage still
worse as well as causing wide-
spread sickness among his troops
and destroying many of his forti-
fications.
In the III Corps area,
major elements of three Commu-
nist divisions have been gen-
erally unsuccessful in their
campaign to weaken Saigon's de-
fenses by forcing large-scale
allied deployments to secondary
targets under siege in the out-
lying provinces. The increased
enemy presence in Tay Ninh and
Phuoc Long provinces, however,
has worsened the security situa-
tion there and further eroded
the pacification programs. The
Page 15
Communists this week made their
first rocket attack in more than