WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006700010001-9
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Secret
NAVY review
completed.
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
43
4 October 1968
No. 0041/68
6 7- 224 5351
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(Information as of noon EDT, 3 October 1968)
Europe
CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERS GO TO MOSCOW FOR TALKS
Three liberal Czechoslovak leaders went to Moscow
this week for talks on the 26 August agreement.
Before they left they had taken several steps to
comply with Soviet demands. They are providing
living quarters for occupation troops, but have
indicated that they expect most of them to be
withdrawn. There is still Soviet-inspired talk
that Dubcek will be ousted but no signs that an
attempt will be made soon.
DE GAULLE - KIESINGER TALKS ACCOMPLISH LITTLE
Kiesinger promised not to participate in any Com-
mon Market action from which France was excluded
but all he received in return was a lackluster
promise of support in case of aggression and a
threat of French withdrawal from the Common Market
if the British entry were pushed.
SOVIET HELICOPTER CARRIER PERFORMS IN ASW ROLE
The Moskva's impressive array of ASW systems and
its recent activity in the Mediterranean support
earlier indications that the ship will signifi-
cantly improve Soviet antisubmarine capabilities.
SUPERSONIC CONCORDE'S FLIGHT DATE REMAINS SPECULATIVE
The French and British builders predict flight
tests within a month or so but engineers anticipate
a slippage to early 1969. The differences reflect
the continuing development problems that are add-
ing weight to the plane and are increasing its
noise level and fuel consumption.
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THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 7
VIETNAM
The Communists continued to use economy-of-force
tactics during the week, as they have throughout
much of the current phase which began on 18 Au-
gust. North Vietnamese spokesmen again rejected
US insistence on reciprocal restraint in response
to a full bombing halt. General Minh's return
to Saigon from his Bangkok exile now seems set,
although questions of timing and his future role
apparently are unresolved.
PEKING PRESENTS FACADE OF UNITY
Peking's National Day celebrations this week were
used to project a facade of unity and reaffirm
the policies of stabilization that have emerged
since July. In some provinces, however, there
are continuing signs of factional struggle, which
probably in part reflect deep-seated divisions at
the center.
CHINA HAS POOR AGRICULTURAL YEAR
A mediocre performance by the agricultural sector
during 1968 may leave China in short supply of
foodstuffs well into 1969.
BURMESE MILITARY REGIME MAY EASE REINS SLIGHTLY
General Ne Win may be considering more civilian
participation in his military regime and limited
economic changes, but he apparently plans no
dramatic departures from present policies.
Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
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COMMUNISTS ARE CAUTIOUS ABOUT AID TO SOUTHERN YEMEN
The Communist countries, deterred by the chaotic po-
litical and economic situation in Southern Yemen dur-
ing its first year of independence, are moving cau-
tiously in making aid commitments there.
OBOTE KEEPS UGANDA COOL
On the sixth anniversary of Ugandan independence,
President Milton Obote is in firm control. Although
there are the usual rumors of impending coups, there
is little evidence that opposition elements will be
able to organize effectively against the Obote gov-
ernment.
YEMEN'S WARRING LEADERS GROPE FOR TRUCE
Both royalists and republicans have indicated that
they seek a peaceful solution to their six-year-
old war, but ineptitude and internal disunity con-
tinue to obstruct their efforts to achieve it.
Western Hemisphere
MILITARY COUP IN PERU
The Peruvian armed forces, led by army commander
General Juan Velasco, ousted President Belaunde and
took over the reins of government on 3 October.
NEW GOVERNMENT INSTALLED IN PANAMA
President Arnulfo Arias began his third term with a
formidable majority in the legislature and a cabinet
chosen as much for loyalty as for competence.
GUYANA'S ELECTION DATE SECRETLY SET
Prime Minister Burnham is hoping to get a clear ma-
jority in the election he is planning to hold on 16
December. Charges of rigging are already coming in
from all sides.
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CASTRO ACKNOWLEDGES INCREASING OPPOSITION IN CUBA
Fidel Castro's speech on 28 December stating that
sabotage and other acts of opposition to the regime
have increased since last March was his most elabor-
ate acknowledgement of antiregime activity in recent
years.
RENEWED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO
Student violence has reached a level that casts
doubt on the government's ability to keep its do-
mestic crisis from affecting the Olympics.
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Nearly all notable events of the week were related to the occupation of
Czechoslovakia.
On 3 October, a delegation of the Czechoslovak Central Committee
went to Moscow presumably for more discussions on the relationship be-
tween the Czechoslovak authorities and the occupying power. The delega-
tion was led by Dubcek, Prime Minister Cernik, and Slovak party leader
Husak.
Soviet officials have been indicating that Dubcek must eventually be
removed, but no visible crack has yet appeared in the top Czechoslovak
leadership.
The Warsaw Pact commander, Soviet Marshal Yakubovsky, completed
his tour of the capitals of Pact members, leaving Bucharest on 29 September.
The Rumanian press omitted the standard terms such as "friendly" or
"comradely" in describing the discussions Yakubovsky had in Bucharest.
The Albanians have lately ceased their polemics against Yugoslavia and
have sounded out Belgrade on the prospects of improved relations. Tirana,
whose defense minister is heading a delegation visiting Peking, has apparently
decided that it would be safer to have some friends nearer home.
In Poland, a number of shifts involving high-ranking officers in the
Defense Ministry were reported. Some 25 new generals were to be ap-
pointed, presumably to replace others judged unreliable and who are leaving
the ministry for "less exposed" positions.
A meeting of leaders of 58 Communist parties in Budapest adjourned
after only two brief sessions. The group decided to reconvene on 17
November to discuss a new date for an international conference. Scheduling
of the conference has obviously been complicated by the Russian move into
Czechoslovakia.
The North Atlantic Council, recognizing the need for a show of soli-
darity, met in Bonn with all members, including France, present. The
discussions were on what specific steps need be taken to strengthen the
Alliance.
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CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERS GO TO MOSCOW FOR TALKS
Three liberal Czechoslovak
leaders, Alexander Dubcek, Slovak
party chief Gustav Husak, and
Premier Oldrich Cernik, went to
the USSR on 3 October for discus-
sions with Soviet leaders on ful-
filling the Moscow agreement.
The meeting in Moscow had been
scheduled earlier, but was re-
portedly postponed because first
Dubcek and then Brezhnev were ill.
Contention between Prague
and Moscow over the composition
of the delegation also appar-
ently contributed to the post-
ponement. President Svoboda
did not go along. Dubcek un-
doubtedly is aware that the So-
viets consider him a lame duck,
to be replaced at the first op-
portune moment.
The Czechoslovaks have pro-
vided barracks and apartments in
Bohemia and Moravia for those
occupation troops remaining in-
definitely. Prague is also bow-
ing to Soviet pressures to thin
out the corps of foreign cor-
respondents in Czechoslovakia.
Czechoslovak officials
have also cautioned students re-
turning to school to refrain
from activities that might of-
fend the occupation powers. The
newly recognized students' union
has pledged its support to the
Dubcek regime, but its interpre-
tation of "support" may not in-
clude blind submissiveness.
Page 2
Soviet emissary Kuznetsov
returned to Moscow on 26 Sep-
tember after three weeks of con-
sultations with Czechoslovak
leaders. There has been no of-
ficial announcement on the re-
sults of his fact-finding mis-
sion, although he is reported
to have found the situation in
Prague less disturbing than he
had thought before his arrival.
One Czechoslovak official was
optimistic, characterizing the
results of Kuznetsov's stay as
"positive" from Prague's point
of view.
The Soviet leadership--still
seemingly debating its future
moves--is nevertheless dissat-
isfied with the Dubcek regime's
performance since the signing
of the Moscow accord. TASS has
charged that "armed terrorist
groups" are being organized by
the banned Club 231--an associa-
tion of former political prison-
ers--in collusion with "imperial-
ist intelligence services."
In addition, Soviet offi-
cials are still saying that
Dubcek eventually must be re-
moved from power. A Soviet dip-
lomat has predicted that both
Dubcek and National Assembly
President Smrkovsky will be
sacked, but President Svoboda
and Premier Cernik will remain
in office.
There is no indication, how-
ever, that the Soviets will push
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 4 Oct 68
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for Dubcek's ouster soon, nor
that the unity of Czechoslovak
leaders, who have pledged to
stand or fall together, has
been broken.
Czechoslovak conservatives,
meanwhile, may be attempting a
comeback. A group of conserva-
tive parliamentary deputies have
stated publicly that they and
other officials who were dis-
missed after Dubcek took over
should be given appropriate new
appointments based on "ability,
education, and political relia-
bility." This group, probably
encouraged by the return to
Prague from Moscow of pro-So-
viet conservative Alois Indra,
may be trying to sell itself to
the Soviets as the nucleus of
a new regime.
Soviet Marshal Yakubovsky,
chief of the Warsaw Pact forces,
was in Prague on 27 September,
probably to discuss terms for
the withdrawal of some occupa-
tion troops, and possibly the
outline of a status-of-forces
agreement pertaining to the
troops to be stationed indef-
initely in the country.
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DE GAULLE - KIESINGER TALKS ACCOMPLISH LITTLE
The semiannual talks be-
tween President de Gaulle and
Chancellor Kiesinger on 27 and
28 September were friendly in
tone, but led to no agreements
on major problems.
Neither side, in fact, had
expected much to result from the
meeting in Bonn. In recent weeks,
French officials have shown
little willingness to agree with
German views on European secu-
rity or Common Market problems.
Kiesinger, a strong proponent
of Franco-German amity, evidently
was resolved not to annoy De
Gaulle, despite a growing dis-
enchantment in Bonn with France's
attitude toward these problems.
On the security question,
De Gaulle sought to reassure the
Germans with broad statements of
support. He condemned the in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia and
rejected Moscow's claim of a
right to intervene in West Ger-
man affairs. The Germans, how-
ever, could not have been reas-
sured by his frequent observa-
tion that it was "natural" that
Germany and France should see
the Czechoslovak affair differ-
ently. His promise that Paris
would be at Bonn's side in the
event of aggression was some-
thing less than the firm pledge
of support Bonn wanted.
De Gaulle was as unyielding
as ever on Britain's entry into
the Common Market. He told the
Germans that France would with-
draw if the other members per-
sisted in pushing this issue.
He also implicitly warned against
excluding France from any Common
Market activities.
In an apparent concession,
Kiesinger reportedly promised
not to join in any action by the
Common Market countries from
which France was excluded. Senti-
ment has been increasing in Bonn
to push ahead without Paris, if
necessary. At about the same
time the two leaders were meet-
ing, the French in the European
Council were vetoing the German
proposal of Common Market com-
mercial arrangements with Brit-
ain. In view of this situation,
Italy and the Benelux states
will probably go ahead and make
their own proposals for arrange-
ments with Britain in areas not
covered by the Common Market
treaties, hoping at the same time
to bring Bonn with them.
Although a German partici-
pant concluded from De Gaulle's
intransigence that he now is con-
cerned only with domestic af-
fairs, it seems more likely that
he is still reassessing his
foreign policies in light of the
occupation of Czechoslovakia.
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SOVIET HELICOPTER CARRIER PERFORMS IN ASW ROLE
Recent activity of the Soviet
helicopter carrier Moskva supports
earlier indications that the ship
will contribute significantly to
Soviet antisubmarine capabilities.
The Moskva, which entered the
Mediterranean two weeks ago, car-
ries the latest Soviet ASW sys-
tems. Some of these--a missile
system which almost certainly is
for use against submarines, and a
dipping sonar on the new Hormone
ASW helicopter--have never been
seen before by Western observers.
The new missile system is even
larger than the US ASROC, which
can fire a homing torpedo or a
depth charge up to five miles.
In addition to the new ASW heli-
copters, the Moskva is equipped
with ASW rocket launchers, tor-
pedoes, a recently developed vari-
able depth sonar, and, probably,
a high-powered sonar near the bow.
The Moskva also is well
25X1 equipped for air defense.
new type of surface-to-air missile
system are located forward of the
bridge; the missile for the new
system may have a range of about
30 miles.
On its arrival in the Medi-
terranean, the Moskva and two
Kashin-class guided-missile frig-
ates formed a small ASW task
group. The group has been prac-
ticing ASW tactics against Soviet
submarines in the central Mediter-
ranean. Helicopters patrolling
up to ten miles from the carrier
have been observed lowering dip-
ping sonars and dropping sono-
buoys. Night-time flying gives
testimony to the advancement of
Soviet helicopter technology and
to the skill already acquired by
the Moskva's pilots.
The Moskva and its siste
the Leningrad
as the agships for future So-
viet ASW task groups in the Medi-
terranean.
Soviet Helicopter Carrier Moskva
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SUPERSONIC CONCORDE'S FLIGHT DATE REMAINS SPECULATIVE
The builders of the super-
sonic Concorde airliner--British
Aircraft Corporation (BAC) and SUD
Aviation-France--now are predict-
ing that flight tests of Concorde
001 will begin this month or next.
The second Concorde, 002, report-
edly will begin flying in early
1969.
Sales and publicity offi-
cials of BAC and SUD are optim-
istic about meeting the present
timetable for Concorde 001, even
though several postponements have
occurred since the original date,
28 February 1968, was canceled.
Engineers responsible for the
plane's construction report, how-
ever, that the first flight date
has slipped to February 1969.
They are not optimistic that even
this schedule can be met.
The Concorde has been plagued
by technical difficulties, not the
least of which is its growing
weight problem. The increasing
weight is due largely to unantici-
pated structural and equipment
modifications and additions, prob-
lems traditionally faced in the
development of aircraft incorpo-
rating new technology. As the
weight of the plane has increased
so also have its noise level and
fuel consumption. SUD and BAC are
trying to bypass some of the dif-
ficulties by asking certification
agencies and governments around
the world to permit a reduction
of the fuel-reserve safety factor,
thus enabling either range or pay-
load to be increased.
The eventual cost of the Con-
corde program is still uncertain.
In early 1968 the developers esti-
mated that research and development
would run to nearly $1.4 billion,
or about three times their origi-
nal estimates. Higher wages and
increases in equipment prices re-
sulting from the May political
crisis in France probably will
force further increases in the
costs. BAC officials say the price
per plane is now pegged at about
$19.5 million. Both SUD and BAC
apparently intend to hold to this
price until deliveries begin, but
reserve the right to adjust the
figure. The price probably is too
low, and substantial increases are
likely.
There is at present no major
sales campaign planned for the Con-
corde, even though competition is
expected eventually from both the
USSR and the US. The Soviet super-
sonic aircraft, the TU-144, prob-
ably will take its first test
flight before the end of 1968. The
American SST is still on the draw-
ing boards and is not programed
for test flights until 1972 at the
earliest. The British and the
French contend that the Concorde
does not need publicity and that as
soon as the plane becomes airborne,
airline companies will flock to buy
it. Concorde officials are main-
taining that the venture should
have little difficulty selling 300
to 400 planes. So far, however,
only 16 airlines have taken op-
tions--for a total of 74 aircraft.
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Communist main force elements in South Vietnam left most of the
fighting this week to smaller, local units and artillery specialists. There were
a few larger-scale attacks, most notably against a US Special Forces camp
southwest of Da Nang, but enemy activity for the most part centered on
widely scattered small-scale actions, terrorism, and rocket and mortar at-
tacks.
This pattern strengthens a growing impression that the Communists are
once again settling down for the long pull, husbanding their forces for quick
exploitation of such targets of opportunity as may develop. They also may
hope to wear down US and South Vietnamese morale and spread allied
forces out by creating large-unit diversionary threats in outlying areas.
In Peking, Chinese leaders used the annual National Day celebrations to
make a show of unity and to reaffirm the policies of stabilization which have
emerged since July. Portions of speeches dealing with foreign policy were
notable for the almost total neglect of the Vietnam war, which last year was
a dominant theme.
The Laotian Communists are indicating that they would drive a hard
bargain in any future political negotiations for their return to the Vientiane
government. Pathet Lao spokesmen, although affirming that any new modus
vivendi would be worked out within the framework of the Geneva Accords
on Laos, cite changed political circumstances and increased Communist
territorial holdings as reasons why the tripartite arrangements made by the
three principal Laotian factions at Zurich in 1961 and 1962 are no longer
valid.
Prospects for any easing of Malaysian-Philippines tensions over Sabah
appear remote, now that President Marcos is exploiting the issue to advance
his prospects of re-election next year.
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VIETNAM
The Communists continued to
use economy-of-force tactics dur-
ing the week, as they have through-
out much of the current offensive
phase which began on 18 August.
The enemy mounted battalion-sized
attacks only against the Thuong
UematarIzea [one
"Rockpile' Thien
SOUTH VIETNAM
50 too
MILES
Duc Special Forces camp on the
southwestern approaches to Da
Nang and against two allied out-
posts,in Tay Ninh Province north-
west of Saigon. Except for these
unsuccessful assaults, in which
some 380 Communists were re-
ported killed, main force units
generally avoided heavy fighting.
Smaller Communist units continued
to be active in the countryside,
however, and Viet Cong terrorist
actions increased in coastal II
Corps and III Corps.
The enemy's effort to evade
allied ground operations is par-
ticularly evident in the northern-
most part of the country. US
infantry sweeps within and just
south of the Demilitarized Zone
between the Rockpile and Con Thien
have met only light sporadic re-
sistance as major elements of the
320th North Vietnamese Division
apparently have pulled back to
the north and west.
In southern I Corps, Com-
munist Front IV forces near Da
Nang and the 2nd and 3rd North
Vietnamese divisions farther
down the coast continue to menace
allied positions. Additional
sharp fighting is expected at
the Thuong Duc camp southwest
of Da Nang where elements of
three North Vietnamese regiments
have been identified but there is
little evidence that new attacks
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there will be accompanied by
other large-scale assaults in
the region.
prisoner inter-
rogation reports persistently
point to Saigon as a primary
Communist target. The reports
indicate that enemy plans to
launch at least limited ground
probes in the capital area have
been postponed a number of times
since mid-August. These delays
have probably been caused by the
general lack of success of Com-
munist diversionary attacks in
northwest III Corps, the enemy's
inability to move sufficient
troops and supplies through the
extensive allied defenses around
the city, and his desire to avoid
excessive losses by launching at-
tacks with incomplete combat
preparations.
In general, Communist tac-
tics now appear to be aimed at
wearing down US and South Vietnam-
ese morale and spreading allied
forces out by creating large-
unit diversionary threats in a
number of outlying areas. The
Communists are also re-emphasizing
guerrilla warfare tactics, par-
ticularly in the rural areas. In
their propaganda, the Communists
are stressing the important role
of guerrillas in recent fighting.
During the past month, the enemy
has successfully carried out in-
tensive harassments, shellings,
and hit-and-run guerrilla raids
against a number of government
resettlement centers and hamlet
complexes, mainly in the southern
Page 9
half of I Corps, along the north-
ern and western approaches to
Saigon, and in the delta.
The enemy probably hopes that 25X1
such steady pressure will develop
new openings for future Communist
attacks against major allied tar-
gets. Use of these tactics will
also enable the Communists to con-
serve their main force strength
and thus maintain a capability
to prolong the war.
North Vietnamese Propaganda
Commentary
The Communists continue to
give every sign of marking time
in Paris. Both the negotiators
in Paris and the propaganda com-
mentary from Hanoi took strong
exception to continuing US in-
sistence on reciprocal restraint
in response to a full US bombing
halt. Le Duc Tho, the most au-
thoritative North Vietnamese
spokesman in Paris, dismissed
Vice President Humphrey's empha-
sis on restoring the DMZ as "the
same demand for reciprocity."
Radio propaganda from Hanoi is-
sued a scathing attack on the
Saigon regime this week in an
attempt to underscore their pub-
lic opposition to Saigon's par-
ticipation in any future negotia-
tions for a settlement.
In addition, one of Hanoi's
top leaders, politburo member
Truong Ching, recently outlined
a program for the take-over of
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South Vietnam which implied a
long drawn out pro,:ess of in-
creased political and military
pressure designed to bring down
the Saigon government. Chinh
gave no indication of Hanoi's
readiness to compromise on any-
thing short of a coalition gov-
ernment in which the Communists
command full control. He also
admitted that the Communists in-
tend to use the period prior to
the US elections to promote anti-
war sentiment in the US, in the
hope of "taking advantage of
the contradictions between the
doves and the hawks."
South Vietnamese Political
Developments
President Thieu is trying
to assure that the return of
popular General "Big" Minh from
exile in Bangkok will help unify
South Vietnam behind the govern-
ment rather than threaten it with
a more potent opposition.
Although Thieu has stated
publicly that Minh would have
all the rights of any citizen and
could form a political party if
he wished, the South Vietnamese
president clearly would not wel-
come such a development. Ac-
cordingly, he sent the minister
of interior, General Khiem, to
Bangkok last weekend to negotiate
the conditions for Minh's return.
The government has publicly in-
dicated that it prefers Minh to
return on 1 November, South Viet-
nam's National Day, and hopes to
use the occasion to help unite
various factions behind the re-
gime.
"Big" Minh, however, appears
intent on demonstrating his in-
dependence of Thieu. He report-
edly plans to disregard Thieu's
wishes on timing and may return
within the next few days. More-
over, he has reportedly still not
decided to accept Thieu's offer
of a presidential advisory post.
If this accurately reflects
Minh's attitude, Thieu is likely
to have even greater difficulty
in achieving an acceptable under-
standing once Minh is back in
the country.
In order better to monitor
intrigues against him, Thieu has
decided to take over direct con-
trol of the various South Vietnam-
ese intelligence organizations
himself, although he will have
a personal intelligence adviser
responsible for levying require-
ments and producing finished in-
telligence.
Saigon has taken steps to
discredit and supplant the left-
ist leadership of the principal
student organization, the anti-
government Saigon Student Union
(SSU), which irritated the re-
gime last June by advocating a
compromise peace settlement. Two
days after police closed the SSU
headquarters building, a new Pro-
visional Student Standing Com-
mittee, presumably with government
backing, announced that it was
taking over the SSU.
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PEKING PRESENTS FACADE OF UNITY
Peking's National Day cele-
brations this week were used to
project a facade of unity and
reaffirm the policies of stabili-
zation that have emerged since
July. In some provinces, how-
ever, there are continuing signs
of factional struggle, which
probably in part are caused by
deep-seated divisions at the
center. As a result, progress
in the regime's efforts to con-
solidate and rebuild the shat-
tered party organization--which
Peking says is the next order
of business--are likely to be
halting and uneven.
A short speech by Vice Chair-
man Lin Piao at the major rally
and another by Premier Chou En-
lai at a banquet the evening be-
fore were notable mainly for the
slight attention given to Viet-
nam, a major theme last year. On
domestic affairs, both leaders
gave short shrift to the Red Guards
and asserted again that the lead-
ing role in society henceforth
will be taken by industrial work-
ers backed by the army. As in
the past, the celebrations were
an occasion for a show of unity
within the leadership. Every
leader of importance appeared in
the published lists of those who
attended National Day events.
The only change in ranking
was economic planner Li Fu-chun,
whose name was placed with the
ordinary politburo rather than with
the elite group of people in Mao's
inner circle. Li has been re-
latively inactive during the
Cultural Revolution but is sym-
bolic of pragmatic policies as-
sociated with Chou En-lai. Any
shift at this level, however
slight, is significant because
it presumably reflects jockey-
ing behind the scenes.
The need to "consolidate
and rebuild the party"--that is,
to re-establish and strengthen
lines of governing authority--
was given a further boost by a
joint National Day editorial in
People's Daily, Red Flag, and
Liberation Army Journal. In the
most explicit national statement
on the subject to date, the ed-
itorial specified that new party
members are to be recruited from
the ranks of industrial workers.
Instability in the Provinces
Political infighting is
seriously undercutting Peking's
timetable for reconstituting
local government authority in
certain long-troubled areas, as
well as in some previously more
stable regions.
In the southwestern prov-
ince of Yunnan, Peking's choice
to head the military-dominated
government set up in August is
having considerable difficulty
establishing his authority.
Recent provincial broadcasts
complain that Yunnan government
leader Tan Fu-jen's instructions
to lower level units are regu-
larly being distorted or blocked.
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In turn, subordinate administra-
tions allegedly send him false
reports on their activities or,
in some cases, no reports at all.
Furthermore, unnamed but obvi-
ously powerful persons are charged
with attempting to set up an al-
ternative center of authority
within the province. Yunnan
broadcasts have been denouncing
so-called "sham revolutionary com-
mittees," which presumably were
set up by Tan's opponents without
his authorization.
Similar charges have appeared
in recent broadcasts from hith-
erto quiet Ninghsia in northwest
China. Government leaders there
are also vigorously protesting
attempts to set up organizations
opposed to the incumbent regional
revolutionary committee. Addi-
tional complaints about increas-
ing resistance to the authority
of the approved provincial lead-
ership have been noted recently
in at least seven other provinces.
In southeastern China, pro-
vincial authorities in Chekiang
have been thwarted for many
months in their attempts to es-
tablish control over the south-
ern coastal area.
provincial broadcasts indicate
that a major dissident force con-
tinued active there through Sep-
tember. The persistence of this
mysterious partisan movement,
centered at the important port
of Wenchow, and the obvious re-
luctance of provincial author-
ities to use force against it
suggest that it is receiving
powerful backing from supporters
outside of Chekiang.
Last week a broadcast from
Hunan in central China charged
in strong terms that "counter-
revolutionary" elements had in-
filtrated the local provincial
leadership. This is the first
sign of serious opposition in
Hunan since that province was
placed under the control of the
47th Army in August 1967. It
may mean that the position of 25X1
the army commander, Li Yuan, has
been weakened. One possible
source of his difficulty is
commanders has been demoted and
publicly reprimanded by Chou En-
lai for contributing to the early
summer violence in Kwangsi by
supporting a radical Red Guard
faction.
A number of officers, mainly
in east and south China, have
been censured or dismissed re-
cently on similar charges. Most
were probably acting under orders
and believed at the time that
they were loyally serving Mao
Tse-tung. -There probably are
many other officers who supported
Red Guard factions in their prov-
inces during periods of radical
resurgence. The removal of these
officers, if attempted on a large
scale, would seriously hurt
morale and undermine the regime's
efforts to restore authority in
the rovinces.
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CHINA HAS POOR AGRICULTURAL YEAR
A mediocre performance
by the agricultural sector during
1968 may leave China in short
supply of foodstuffs well into
1969.
The 1968 grain crop will
not match the excellent 1967 crop
of almost 200 million tons. Un-
favorable weather, harried rural
leadership, and diminished sup-
port from industry resulted in
a relatively poor spring crop.
The weather for the autumn grain
crop--now being harvested--im-
proved, but this crop neverthe-
less is likely to be only aver-
age.
The regime has been appre-
hensive over agricultural pros-
pects all through the year. In
February and again in April, Chou
En-lai said in talks with Red
Guards that food production was
being imperiled by disruptions
in the distribution of chemical
fertilizers and machinery to the
farms. He also cited the con-
tinued demoralization of rural
cadres, who are the only group
large enough and qualified to
supervise farm work.
Contracts have been signed with
Japan and the European consortium
Nitrex for a record seven million
tons costing about 245 million
dollars. Most of this ferti-
lizer, however, will arrive too
late to use on this year's main
crop.
Peking may also increase
its grain imports, although
it appears to be deferring con-
tracts at the present time in
hopes of getting better prices.
So far in 1968, only 3.6 million
tons have been contracted for,
compared with 4.1 million tons
delivered in 1967. Negotiations
have been held with Australia for
a reported two million tons for
1969 delivery. Talks with Canada--
which also has a large grain sur-
plus this year--reportedly will
follow after negotiations are
completed with Australia.
With food supplies tighten-
ing, Peking is faced with a more
difficult problem than usual in
providing for food deficit re-
gions over the winter. The press
and radio are calling deliveries
to the state "patriotic grain,"
and "marks of loyalty to Chair-
man Mao," an indication that
greater pressure is being put on
Peking has reacted to this
situation by buying more chemical
fertilizers from the free world.
deliver grain.
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BURMESE MILITARY REGIME MAY EASE REINS SLIGHTLY
General Ne Win may be con-
sidering more civilian par-
ticipation in his military re-
gime and limited economic changes,
but he apparently plans no dra-
matic departures from present
policies.
In three major but somewhat
oracular policy speeches over
the past two weeks, Ne Win called
for. "national unity," laid heavy
stress on the transitional nature
of his military dictatorship, and
seemed to indicate that the proc-
ess of moving toward more "nor-
mal" rule was about to begin.
Ne Win virtually extended an open.
invitation to civilian politi?-
cians long out of power to join
him in the effort.
This is the first time in
his six years' rule that Ne Win
has even implicitly offered the
prospect of broadening his re-
gime. His apparent willingness
to contemplate civilian partici-
pation may reflect the cumulative
effect of a generally unsuccess-
ful stewardship under which the
Burmese economy has suffered a
disastrous decline.
The vagueness of Ne Win's
speeches, however, leaves his op-
tins open on cabinet changes and
on the speed with which to pro-
ceed. Much will depend on his
negotiations with civilians who
might be willing to participate
in his regime.
Ne Win clearly has no int:en-
tipn of veering very far from his
"B1armese Way to Socialism." He
took some pains to disabuse poli-
ticians of any idea that the pros-
pect of their sharing in the gov-
er.nment foreshadowed any early
ideological retrenchment or dilu-
tion of military predominance.
Ne Win indicated in his
speeches that. marketing coope:ra-
tives would eventually replace
state-run stores, but otherwise,
h~ envisions no drastic policy
changes in the economic sphere.
In particular, he made no prom-
ises of higher prices to farmers,
whose refusal to sell rice to the
state has cut rice exports, Burma's
major foreign exchange earner,
to the lowest level since World
W*r II. Accusing farmers of in-
gptitude, Ne Win said harsh
measures would be taken against
those who created. obstacles to
grain collection.
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The focus of the Middle East dispute shifted last week to New York,
where UN special representative Jarring began another round of talks with
Arab and Israeli foreign ministers. Meanwhile, daily exchanges of fire con-
tinued along the Israeli-Jordanian frontier, and three more Israeli soldiers
were killed in a mine incident in the Negev.
Indian Prime Minister Gandhi continues her good-will tour of South
America while Deputy Prime Minister Desai is in Washington attending
meetings of the World Bank. Latest reports from India, meanwhile, indicate
a growing concern over the inadequate rainfall during the summer monsoon
and a resultant downward revision in predictions for this year's foodgrain
production.
In other parts of South Asia, the reshuffling of cabinet portfolios by
Nepal's King Mahendra presumably will have little effect on government
policies.. Afghanistan's ailing Prime Minister Etemadi has returned from
medical treatment in Paris in apparently good health, which could end
rumors that he is about to be replaced by King Zahir.
Greek voters had little choice but to endorse the military government's
draft constitution in the referendum on 29 September, but the junta has
chosen to regard the vote as a solid endorsement of its rule.
In the Nigerian civil war, the intensity of fighting has sharply increased.
The Biafran Army has received sizable quantities of munitions and is mount-
ing damaging counterattacks in several areas. The federal forces, nevertheless,
continue to push toward the Biafran capital. Perhaps because of their fresh
supplies, the Biafrans last week renewed their mandate to Ojukwu to
continue the fight, thus apparently dashing the hopes for an early peace
recently expressed by a group of influential Biafrans.
Congolese President Mobutu has abrogated the amnesty granted by his
foreign minister to rebel leader Pierre Mulele and announced his intention to
bring Mulele to trial. His action should quell the bitter resentment in
Kinshasa over Mulele's triumphant return last weekend.
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COMMUNISTS ARE CAUTIOUS ABOUT AID TO SOUTHERN YEMEN
The Communist countries,
deterred by the chaotic politi-
cal and economic situation in
Southern Yemen during its first
year of independence, are moving
cautiously in making aid commit-
ments there. Communist China,
in an apparent move to pre-empt
a significant Soviet presence,
last week promised its first
economic assistance. Moscow,
however, continues to hold back
on economic aid requested in
early 1968, preferring to con-
fine itself at this time to
limited military assistance.
Some small development
credits may come from Eastern
Europe. As a result of discus-
sions held several months ago,
Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria
recently have sent experts to
Aden to survey potential aid
projects,. Assistance for the
construction of agricultural
processing plants as well as for
the development of agriculture,
mineral resources, and the fi_sh-
.ing industry have been mentioned.
China's $12 million
interest-free credit is not
.Linked to any particular proj-
ect and bears the earmarks of
a move designed for its politi-
cal impact. The credit prob-?
ably will be allocated even-
tually for land reclamation and
for the construction of roads,
.airports and airfields. Peking's
iefusal to provide budgetary
support obviously disappointed
the Southern Yemenis, who prob-
ably viewed the Chinese as their
most promising source of cash
assistance.
Thus far, the USSR has
n1ade only one shipment of arms.
this consisted of trucks, small
rms and ammunition under the
military aid agreement announced
in August. A military delegation
from Southern Yemen reportedly
Will go to Moscow soon to dis-
cuss types and amounts of equip-
nent still to be provided.
Southern Yemen is believed to be
interested in obtaining more
irifantry weapons and vehicles
as well as tanks and jet fighters,
but Moscow probably will continue
to be reluctant to assume any
extensive aid commitments.
The USSR may hope to avoid
the dilemma it faces in the
n6ighboring country of Yemen
where the Republican Government,
despite substantial Soviet
military aid, remains locked in
a'military stalemate with royalist
forces. Moscow, however, con-
tinues to fulfill 'its commit--
mbnt there. Moscow is currently
hosting a Yemeni delegation led
bt the prime minister seeking
a ditional military and economic
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OBOTE KEEPS UGANDA COOL
As Uganda prepares to cel-
ebrate its sixth anniversary of
independence on 9 October, Pres-
ident Milton Obote remains in
firm control. The air is, how-
ever, tainted with the usual ru-
mors of impending coups.
Rumors of coup plotting gain
credence because Obote enjoys
only minimal personal popularity
and the country is divided by
bitter regional and tribal rival-
ries. Obote, however, has shown
himself to be a clever politician
in balancing conflicting forces
and has used the army and police
to thwart plotters in the past.
The army is dominated by Obote's
fellow northerners, and the offi-
cers, more interested in pay
than politics, are apparently
loyal to the government. The
police force is effective and
apolitical.
Uganda appears to be evolv-
ing into a nominal one-party
state; Obote's Uganda People's
Congress (UPC) holds all but 12
of 92 parliamentary seats. The
UPC, however, is loosely organ-
ized and riddled with tribal jeal-
ousies and personal animosities,
and Obote depends more on his wits
than on the party.
Opposition elements have
been unable to organize effec-
tively in the face of Obote's per-
sonal resolution. The only formal
opposition is provided by the Dem-
ocratic Party, whose support has
divided to the point where it now
holds only six seats in Parlia-
ment. In 1966 organized opposi-
tion in the separatist Kingdom of
Buganda was crushed by force and
the Bagandan political party has
subsequently melted away.
Obote has not sought to play
a prominent role outside East Af-
rica. His main concerns have
been to ensure the security of
Uganda's borders and to obtain
economic and military assistance.
He has successfully promoted mili-
tary assistance from several coun-
tries, including jet fighters from
Israel, Czechoslovakia and the So-
viet Union. Distrusting all for-
eigners, Obote has been careful
not to allow any country to gain
pre-eminent influence in Uganda.
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YEMEN'S WARRING LEADERS GROPE FOR TRUCE
Both republicans and royal-
ists have instituted moves to-
ward reconciliation, but resist-
ance to peace is strong among
the ranks on, both sides.
After the unsuccessful left-
wing revolt of late August, the
republican government moved to
consolidate the victory of "mod-
erate" forces by appointing a
cabinet of nonentities loyal to
the premier, General al-?Amri.
The premier, once a left-
ist hard liner, has been moving
steadily toward the center as
his fortunes have gone downhill.
It is believed that he is already
in touch with both the royalists
and the Saudis through republi-
can moderate exiles. His appoint-
ment: of the new cabinet and his
plans to set up a tame 45-man
republican council from among
traditional local leaders fur-
ther suggest that al-Amri is
setting the stage for truce ne-
gotiations with. the royalists..
On 30 September the premier left
Yemen for Moscow, where it was
expected that he would press
Kosygin for still more aid, be-
lieving perhaps that even if he
failed to get a substantial re-
sponse, he would at least be
causing Saudi Arabia some moments
of worry.
Al-Amri may be misjudging
Saudi Arabia's interest in Yemen
as well as its capacity for swift:
reaction. King Faysal warned
the royalists last summer that
he would give them just one more
chance--to win the war or to
settle the peace. Faysal's
brother recently repeated the
same theme to a meeting of tri-
bal sheiks, accusing them of
being "nothing but a lot of
mercenaries."' The sheiks bridled
at this accusation, and one of
the more outspoken complained
that it was the fault of the
Saudis who had offered them the
gcdld in the first place.
The Imam al-Badr, who is
fighting to maintain his posi-
tion as head of the royalist
movement, indicated to the Saudis
ir" mid-September that he was
returning to Yemen in order to
effect a reconciliation among
tribal leaders, fighting only
thlose who insist upon it. Doubt-
less he has been simulated by
th,6 Saudi insistence on achiev-
in;q some concrete result from
the war. The Saudis believe
that the new cabinet improves
the chances for peace.
For all these indicators
ofla trend toward peace, Yemen
remains a bitterly divided coun-
try, the power rests with the
tribes, and there are many on
both sides who profit from the
war. Given even the best in-
tuitions, peace still seems rather
distant.
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The military coup in Peru and continued student violence in Mexico
were the most dramatic events in Latin America this week.
The Peruvian armed forces, led by army General Juan Velasco, deposed
President Belaunde early on 3 October. Velasco reportedly will head the
military junta which will govern the country for "at least ten years." This is
the first military coup in Latin America since the Argentine military ousted
President Illia in June 1966.
In Mexico, student violence during the week reached a level that raises
doubt about the government's capability to keep the Olympic events and
foreign visitors insulated from its domestic crisis. The bloody clashes be-
tween students and army troops on the night of 2 October that left many
dead and hundreds wounded more than doubled the previous casualties in
the two-month student campaign.
In Panama, Arnulfo Arias was inaugurated president on 1 October for
the third time. With his formidable majority in the unicameral legislature,
Arias will have enough votes to ensure virtual rubber-stamp approval of his
initial programs. His cabinet was chosen as much for loyalty as for compe-
tence.
The actions of Ecuadorean President Velasco during his first month in
office give some reason to believe that he has learned from past mistakes. He
has sacked a few of the key government officials who have dubious political
backgrounds, and has corrected other hasty initial moves which reflected
adversely on his government. Velasco also appears to be determined to press
ahead with programs designed to broaden social and economic benefits
despite the strong reaction of powerful economic and political opponents.
In the Dominican Republic, the opposition Dominican Revolutionary
Party is trying to exploit a wave of labor unrest stemming from the refusal of
the newly elected mayor of Santo Domingo to pay hundreds of city
employees fired when he took office. The opposition party reportedly has
ordered its members to promote civil disorders throughout the capital, and
some extreme leftists are planning to instigate other terrorist acts, including
attacks against US personnel. Increased agitation will present a challenge to
President Balaguer, whose administration has shown signs of losing the
initiative in recent weeks.
Terrorist attacks against US personnel and installations are likely to
occur in several Latin American countries next week in connection with the
anniversary on 9 October of the death of Che Guevara.
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MILITARY COUP IN PERU
The Peruvian armed forces,
led by army commander General
Juan Velasco, ousted President
Belaunde and took over the reins
of government on 3 October.
Operating under a long-es-
tablished contingency plan, the
army moved into key points in
Lima in the early morning hours.
Military units occupied the Na-
tional Palace, the Ministry of
Government, various police head-
quarters, the :Legislative palace,
and the central exchange of the
telephone company. President
Belaunde was forcibly arrested
and later put on a plane for Ar-
gentina. Leaders of the air
force and navy who were reported
to have had differences with Gen-
eral Velasco have reportedly been
placed under house arrest.
Leaders of the opposition
APRA party, which has long been
at odds with the military, were
caught by surprise. Within
hours of the coup, however, a
top APRA leader exhorted party
members "to defend constitutional
ord.er." Later in the morning
student groups reportedly clashed
with troops in Lima.
Military :Leaders have fre-
quently expressed misgivings
about the Belaunde administra-
tion. Their latest disagreement
with the President arose over
the government's settlement with
the US-owned International Pe-
troleum Company (IPC). Although
armed forces leaders approved na-
tionalization of IPC holdings in
the La Brea and Parinas oil
Melds, they apparently believed
that the government handled the
negotiations badly and should have
insisted on some financial settle-
ndent as well.. Civilian political
apposition to the agreement had
greatly increased political ten-
s:Lons, leading to a split in Be-
liaunde's party and finally result-
ing in the naming of a new cabi-
net on 2 October.
A military junta led by Gen-
Oral Velasco will rule the coun-
try,
and all ministerial po
sitions will. be filled by military
officers. General Angel Valdivia,
a, capable military financial
manager, has reportedly been
named finance minister, but no
other details of the new govern-,
ment are known. The armed forces,
which based their plan of action
an the Argentine model, appar-
ently intend to continue follow-,
ing Ongania's example by not re-
linquishing control of the gov-
ernment to civilians for "at
]least ten years,"
A military communique states
that the "revolutionary govern-
ment" will honor all interna-
tional treaties and commitments
and will guarantee all foreign
investment that respects Peruvian
laws. General Velasco is gen-
erally pro-US and the armed
fiorces are reportedly anxious to
establish good relations with the
US government as soon as possi-
ble.
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JEW GOVERNMENT INSTALLED IN PANAMA
President Arnulfo Arias be-
gan his third term Tuesday with
a formidable legislative majority
and a cabinet chosen as much for
loyalty as for competence.
Arias shared the inaugural
reviewing stand with National
Guard Commandant Vallarino only
a few days after a flurry of
coup-plotting among dissident
senior guard officers threatened
to bar Arias from the presidency.
Although reports that Arias
planned drastic changes in the
guard had angered Vallarino and
many key subordinates, the dif-
ferences were papered over--at
least temporarily--in a face-to-
face meeting between Arias and
the general last Friday.
Vallarino reportedly agreed
to step down during October and
accept an assignment in Washington
as military adviser to Panama's
canal treaty negotiating team.
Second Commandant Pinilla then
would succeed to the top post
for a short period before retiring
and turning over command to Third
Commandant Urrutia, Arias' original
choice for the job.
Meanwhile, Arias and Vallarino
will "work together" on internal
changes within the guard--a proc-
ess that may well lead to new
strains. Some guard officers are
still suspicious of Arias' inten-
tions, and any move that appears to
threaten their interests will prob-
ably result in renewed conspiracies.
Panama Leadership
PRESIDENT
Arnulfo Arias
1st VICE PRESIDENT
Raul Arango
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2nd VICE PRESIDENT
Jose D. Bazan
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The deputy vote count finally
ended on the eve of the inaugura-
tion, in time for the new Na-
tional Assembly to convene for
the swearing-in of Arias and
election of its officers. Of
the 42 assembly deputies, Arias'
coalition has 30 and appears
likely to receive four more who
will probably replace four op-
position deputies whose creden-
tials have been retracted. Arias'
overwhelming majority assures
him virtual rubber-stamp ap-
proval of his initial programs.
.Arias appointed a former
foreign minister, Galileo Solis,
to the important foreign affairs
portfolio. Solis, a long time
Arias supporter and a respected
lawyer, is considered friendly
to-the US. Appointment of 1
istry of Government, which has
jurisdiction over the National
Guard, can only be regarded as a.
reward for his staunch loyalty to
Arias. Zurita is likely to serve
as a willing instrument in Arias'
plans to extend his control over
the guard.
In his inaugural address,
Arias stressed unity and the need
to "look to the future" after over-
coming "conditions of tragic fiscal
bankruptcy" inherited from the
Robles government. Although he
did not mention the US-Panamanian
treaty drafts in his remarks, the
emphasis on giving first priority
to putting "our house in order"
tends to confirm earlier reports
that he does not intend to reopen
serious treaty negotiations at
least until after the US elec-
GUYANA'S ELECTION DATE SECRETLY SET
Prime Minister Forbes Burn-
ham is planning to hold Guyana's
first national election as an
independent country on 16 De-
cember. So far, however, he is
keeping the election schedule
secret in order to give his
People's National Congress an
opportunity to organize its cam-
paign ahead of the other polit-
ical parties. He also probably
believes that a short campaign
will minimize the possibilities
of violence.
In the last elections, in
December 1964, Burnham defeated
pro-Communist Cheddi Jagan's
People's Progressive Party by form-
ing a coalition with the small con-
servative United Force. This ar-
rangement put a damper on Burn-
ham's own liberal politics, and
this year he will try to win on
his own.
In. Guyana, however, voting
is almost entirely on racial lines.
Jagan's East Indian followers
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outnumber Burnham's Negro sup-
porters, and Burnham has sought
to increase his party's votes
by registering Guyanese--mostly
Negroes--living abroad.
Both the United Force and
the People's Progressive Party
are already claiming that there
have been many irregularities
connected with the overseas re-
gistration. They charge, among
other things, that the registrars
were biased and that inscription
was far easier for a Negro than
for someone of another race.
The government, of course, has
denied all such allegations but
it will be relatively easy to
tinker with the overseas vote
and Burnham is quite capable
of doing so.
Even if Burnham should get a
clear majority he would still
like to form a coalition with
the United Force. Such an ar-
rangement would be mainly window
dressing because Burnham plans
to give the United Force little
say in policy matters. A coali-
tion would appear to have wide-
spread multiracial support and,
because the leader of the United
Force is Guyana's foremost busi-
nessman, would lend an aura of
financial stability to Burnham's
regime. It would also enhance
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Page 23 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Burnham's international image.
There is a danger, however, that
relations between Burnham and the
United Force will deteriorate dur-
ing the campaign and another coa-
lition offer would be refused.
Jagan privately admits that
he does not have a chance. It
appears that his party will con-
test the elections in order to
keep up morale and to make the
going as difficult as possible
for Burnham. Tactics are still
being discussed, however, and the
party could yet decide to boycott
the election. Jagan is actually
looking beyond this election and
has decided to prepare his party
for a long period in opposition
by converting it from an essen-
tially racially based,mass organiza-
tion into a tightly knit Communist
party.
At present Jagan has no plans
to provoke violence, as he did in
1964, in an attempt to force a
postponement of the election. Ra-
cial tensions will increase as the
political campaigns get under way,
however, and incidents are certain
to occur. The security forces could
probably deal with violence on a
small scale but would have trouble
should an incident touch off dis- 25X1
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S ECRE'I`
CASTRO ACKNOWLEDGES INCREASING OPPOSITION IN CUBA
Fidel Castro has stated
that sabotage and other acts of
opposition to the regime have in-
creased since last March. In a
speech on 28 September, Castro may
have been attempting in part to
encourage greater vigilance and
zealotry among his followers, but
his remarks were also his most:
elaborate acknowledgement of anti-
regime activity in recent years.
Castro's speech commemorat-
ing the founding of the Commit-
tees for the Defense of the Revo-
lution--Cuba's neighborhood
security forces--was an unusual
commentary on "counterrevolution."
He said that more than 36 schools
have been burned by opponents of
the regime and that more than 40
acts of sabotage--mainly against
industrial.. and agricultural instal-
lations--have been committed in
the past six months.
The turning point was appar-
ently Castro's harsh "revolution-
ary offensive" of radical reforms
in March. Since then, there have
been increasing rumors of anti-
regime graffiti and slogans appear-
ing in public places, of small-
scale disturbances on food lines,
and of acts of sabotage, comple-
mented in recent weeks by widely
circulating and unsubstantiated
rumors of the beginning of armed
resistance in Oriente Province.
opposition to Castro
is more manifest than it has been
in about five years.
Castro, however, apparently
does not see any serious challenge
Page 24
to his position. He did not an-
nounce new security controls or
suggest that there would be mass
arrests or purges. He apparently
feels that his security forces
will be able to prevent organized
opposition from developing. In
addition, Castro did not suggest
that any measures would be taken
to reduce the considerable strains
on workers and consumers. He
made it clear that. he will not
trade his development programs
for a better standard of living.
He declared that "the revolution
will be drastic, implacable,
and inflexible."
This firm commitment to
harsh programs and tactics may
reflect a conviction by Castro
that the revolution has lost
vicror and that in order to re-
store it, mass mobilizations and
other projects of total moral and
physical commitment are neces-
sary. He has demanded greater
sacrifice and participation from
the populace and has granted
nothing in return but his promise
for economic uplift after 1970.
He has unequivocally placed his
prestige behind the goal to pro-
duce 10 million tons of sugar in
1970 .
By acknowledging the grow-
ing discontent and antirevolu-
tionary activity Castro has
dramatized the magnitude of the
problems that hinder economic
progress. Thus, he may be at-
tempting to create a climate of
conspiracy in order to increase
the zeal of his supporters or to
provide an excuse against the in-
creasing probability that his
1970 goals will not be fulfilled.
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A RENEWED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO
Violence this week reached
a level that raises doubt about
the Mexican Government?s capa-
bility to keep the Olympic events
and the many foreign visitors in-
sulated from its domestic crisis.
The long firefight between stu-
dents and army troops on the
night of 2 October left many dead
and hundreds wounded, at least
doubling the previous casualties
in the two-month student campaign.
the
encounter was a premeditated prov-
ocation by the students, who ap-
parently were well armed. Student
strike leaders, perhaps believ-
ing they had already won a sig-
nificant victory in their reoc-
cupation of the national uni-
versity after the troops with-
drew, pledged to continue the
campaign against the government
and broadened their demands. They
now appear determined to try to
force cancellation of the
Olympics, which they recognize
as of the utmost importance to
the government.
The government, for its part,
is so determined to prevent dis-
ruption of the games and to pro-
tect the visitors that security
forces are likely to overreact
against student provocations. The
potential for further violent in-
cidents is therefore high.
The "martyrs" created during
the past week will probably pro-
vide a new rallying point for uni-
versity students in the provinces,
where several demonstrations have
been staged in support of the Mex-
ico City strikers. All military
zone commanders now have authority
to move against disorderly students
in the provinces without checking
with the capital. One student
demonstrator was killed by police
this week in the state of Vera-
cruz, and further trouble is ex-
pected in other state well as
in the capital cit
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Secret
Secret
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