ANTI - ISRAELI ARAB TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006700010003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
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• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06700010003-7
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Anti-Israeli Arab Terrorist Organizations
Secret
N? 43
4 October 1968
No. 0041/68A
?d9CF!I/C:DF PaFjs F-1_
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} It E 1
~."IAI REPORTS are supplements to the Cunrent Intelli-
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xr%udod from a4tomo* e
lot grading and
!, ~aa~ias:ifitoticM
25X1 I
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Anti-Israeli Arab Terrorist Organizations
Incidents both within Israel and along its bor-
ders have focused attention on the various Arab ter-
rorist organizations. Although the activities of these
groups have resulted in only slight material damage
and loss of life, they have caused the Israelis to take
strong reprisal actions against the bases in Jordan
from which most of the terrorists operate. These
counterraids have, in turn, brought serious internal
political problems for Jordan's King Husayn.
If these terrorist organizations-which include
Fatah, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine--were
ever able to unify or coordinate their activities as the
first two seem to be planning, they could possibly
create serious problems for Tel Aviv. As it is, how-
ever, the terrorists serve mainly to irritate the Israelis
and to keep the Palestine problem a continuing one-
seemingly defying solution.
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I
The Tradition of Terrorism
Terrorism as a way of life
in Arab-Israeli relations dates
back to the 1920s and '30s, when
it was the principal weapon used
by both Jews and Arabs in harass-
ing each other and also the Brit-
ish mandate authorities in Pales-
tine. During the late 1950s, nu-
merous paramilitary commando
groups--fedayeen--were organized
among the unemployed and dispos-
sessed Palestinians by the Arab
governments and by the Palestin-
ians themselves, largely as an
outgrowth of frustration over the
lack of aggressive action by the
Arab states after the Sinai war
in 1956.
In 1964, pressure from
many of these groups to form a
unified organization to coord-
inate their activities resulted
in the Arab League's creation
of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO). Within a
short time, however, many Pal-
estinians became disillusioned
by the propensity of PLO leaders
to engage in polemics rather
than in action, and the PLO be-
came virtually moribund.
The war of June 1967 smashed
most of the Arab armies that had
fought against Israel. Withdraw-
ing behind their cease-fire lines,
these battered forces began the
long and laborious process of
attempting to rebuild their
strength and effectiveness.
Meanwhile, well-educated, dedi-
cated Arab students--believing
that there was no other way to
prevent a de facto acquiescence
in Israel's retention of the
West Bank area--began to join
the various Palestinian terror-
ist groups.
Frequent and well-publicized
raids into the area started in
November 1967, and he terrorists'
audacity soon won them the ad-
miration of Arabs in the surround-
ing; countries. New volunteers
swelled the ranks and additional
financial support :Er'om both gov-
ernments and individuals became
available--especially to Fatah,
the; most active of the groups.
Youb.ger officers in Jordanian
military units, under orders to
curtail and suppress the activi-
ties of the terrorists, instead
began actively to support them
as did the Iraqi Army detach-
menjts in Jordan. The terrorists
were soon operating openly from
a number of sites on the East
Bank near the Jordan River.
Although these activities
were causing no damage of any
real consequence, the death of
some Israeli civilians set off
a s[t.rong public outcry that soon
forded Tel Aviv into a harsh
reaction. In early 1968, under
a newly initiated policy of
large-scale retaliation, the
Israelis launched an attack on
Karama, a major terrorist base
in Jordan. Similar large-scale
reprisals have followed at ir-
regv.lar intervals, the most re-
cent. in August against the Jor--
dan2an town of As Salt.
On the Arab side, popular
pressure was again calling for
ano?her consolidation of the
various terrorist groups into a
unified political and military
organization. In response, rep-
resentatives of the three major
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groups--the PLO, Fatah, and the
Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine (PFLP)--finally met
in Cairo in the summer of 1968
and agreed to select a 100-man
Palestine National Assembly.
The PLO and its associated groups
were given 50 seats, Fatah 38,
the PFLP 10, and two seats were
reserved for various minor or-
ganizations. Even this show of
unity may be rather short lived,
however, because Fatah and the
PFLP are reportedly already dis-
satisfied with their assigned
role in the new organization.
Fatah
The most important of the
terrorist groups at present is
Fatah, a title derived from an
Arabic acronym for the Palestine
Liberation Movement. Also known
by the name of its military arm,
al-Asifah (the Storm), Fatah has
its origin in a group founded
in the 1950s, but has become
prominent only since January
1965 when a number of PLO dissi-
dents proclaimed its revival.
By 1967, Fatah had spread through-
out the Arab world, with branches
reportedly existing in Jordan,
Lebanon, Libya, Kuwait, Syria,
and the Gaza Strip.
Fatah has become more mili-
tant since the war of June 1967,
a course dictated in part by
the circumstance that the Arab
states most actively aiding it
are the radicals--Syria, Egypt,
Iraq, and Algeria. Jordan and
Lebanon are prevented by domes-
tic pressure from openly and
actively suppressing Fatah ac-
tivities within their borders,
but they have tried to place as
many obstacles in its path as
they can.
The Fatah general command
reportedly consists of nine men,
of whom Yasir Arafat is the su-
preme commander and official
spokesman. Members of the top
command were elected by the
chairmen of the organization's
various committees on the national
branch level, and they in turn
elected Arafat and his deputy.
Little is known about Fatah's
organizational structure. It
General Operating Area of Fatah
(Palestine Liberation Movement)
Akko;?
Haifa ._
Bet
She'an
Tel Aviv-
Yafo*
uraymah
IM A N ~ A:
crams *Amman
L-----=
92244 10-68 CIA
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I
is believed to be set up on
pyramidal lines, with the small-
est unit being a cell of three
members. Cells are combined in-
to groups, which in turn are
formed into national branches.
Fatah's membership is reported to
range from a few hundred to
several. thousand, but is probably
from 3,000 to 5,000. It is not
clear how al-Asifah, the military
arm, fits into Fatah's structure.
Operating from forward bases
in Jordan at Karama, As Safi, As
Salt, and Kuraymah, Fatah sends
out small groups of less than ten
men, one of whom is probably a
local inhabitant, to sabotage
a specific target.. The group
carries its own equipment, and
because of the risk of retalia-
tion on the villages, no attempt
is made to get logistical support
from the Arabs living in the
occupied area.
There are some reports that
Fatah is an instrument of the.
Syrian Government in the same
way that the PLO is controlled
by Cairo. Damascus has been
able to channel Fatah's activ-
ities somewhat by providing the
organization with training bases,
logistical support, and an out-
let for propaganda. Moreover,
to ward off possible Israeli re-
taliation, Syria has apparently
been able to stop Fatah from car-
rying out raids into the Golan
Heights area and has seen to it
that forward operating bases are
in Jordanian territory, not Syrian.
Recent events--such as Egypt's
granting radio time to a Cairo-
based "Voice of Asifah," the mov-
ing of some Fatah political. lead-
ers to Cairo, and propaganda at-
tacks upon the Syrian Government--
suggest however, that Fatah may be
ending its relationship with
Damascus and establishing a new
array}gement with Cairo.
Financial support for Fatah
comes from a number of sources,
but the greatest amount flows in
from :rich Palestinians living in
Kuwai;t_ and Saudi. Arabia. Con-
tributions are also sought from
wealthy non-Palestinians in the
surrounding Arab countries. Saudi
Arabia and. Kuwait have official
poliq:Les of financial support
for 1 'atah and the other Pales-
tinian organizations. To raise
these funds, the Saudis levy a
five percent income tax on all
Palestinians employed by the
government; the Kuwaitis impose
a two percent tax on gasoline
sales and theater tickets.
Military support from within
the Arab bloc has consisted of
training facilities in Syria at
Horns (90 miles north of Damascus),
Harasta (on the outskirts of
Damascus) , and at various army
bases. Recent reports suggest
that Fatah may be phasing out its
use of these facilities and moving
all of its training down to Az
Zarga and Umm Qays in Jordan.
Through its military units in
Jordon, especially those stationed
at AZ Zarqa, Iraq has provided
vehicles, communications equipment,
medical supplies, arms, money, and
military training by Iraqi Army
units. A considerable amount
of small arms has been shipped
from Algeria to Syria for use
by Fatah. It is not clear, how-
ever, whether this material has
been donated by the Algerians or
whether they are merely acting
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as intermediaries for a third
country.
Among the Communist countries
China reportedly has shipped
small arms and munitions to Syria
for Fatah's use, and Peking
could be the source of the weap-
ons that have been shipped from
Algeria. An unknown number of
Fatah members as well as men
from the other terrorist groups
have gone to China for training.
Some Fatah members have been
trained by Chinese instructors
at sites within Syria. On 6
September, Damascus announced
that a delegation of Fatah lead-
ers was visiting Peking. A num-
ber of Fatah members, including
Supreme Commander Arafat, report-
edly received training in North
Vietnam.
During the summer of 1968,
Arafat and other Fatah political
leaders were reported to be
negotiating with Soviet leaders
in Moscow. The USSR is not known
to have aided Fatah so far, but
some assistance might be forth-
coming as a result of these ne-
gotiations.
The Popular Liberation Force
The parent group of the
Popular Liberation Force is the
Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion (PLO), which was formed
after Arab leaders at the Arab
League's summit conference in
May 1964 agreed to foster the
formation of an official group
representative of the Palestin-
ian people. Shortly after the
conference, delegates met in
Jerusalem to establish the or-
ganization and to draw up a con-
Page 5
General Operating Area of PLF
(Palestine Liberation Force)
Akko -
Haifa.
Damascus
Golan Weights
(lERA6L!-OCCUPIED)
AlQunaytirah
Sb'RIA
ISRAEL
Tel Aviv- ablus
Yafo*
*Amman
Jericho.
MILES
J (JA
PLF Base
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stitution which, among other
provisions, allowed for the
creation of an army.
This new army was called the
Palestine Liberation Army (PLA)
and was to be organized as a
commando force recruited from
Palestinian refugees living in
Egypt, Syria, Kuwait, and Iraq.
Funds to set up its army and
operate it came from a $28-mil-
lion grant by the various members
of the Arab League. By 1967,
the PLA had 15,000 men, and units
were organized in the Gaza Strip
(administered by Egypt), Syria,
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and Iraq. These units did not
form the independent commando
force originally envisioned, how-
ever, but were integral military
units of the armies of the re-
spective host countries.
The loss of the war in 1967
brought a sharp drop in .its
prestige. Following this debacle,
the PLO eventually established.
the terrorist group now referred
to as the Popular (or People's)
Liberation Force (PLF). The PLF,
however, now operates independently
of both the PLO and PLA commands.
It presently numbers 200 to 250
men who are apparently non-
political and seem to concen-
trate solely on terrorist activ-
ities. Reportedly operating
from, forward bases at Jarash,
Irbid, and Umm Qays in Jordan,
the PLF's activities have tended
to center in the northern Jor-
dan Valley. The group's tactics
probably parallel those of Fatah,
with, which it has been coordin-
ating its activities. On 13
September 1968, a merger of the
PLF and Fatah was announced, but
how this will be implemented
remains to be seen.
Military support for the
PLF commando group has come
from the PLA units attached to
the Iraqi Army detachments at
Jarash and Irbid and probably
involves the same type of aid
that Fatah has been receiving.
The only known aid from the
Communist countries is that Pe-
king has trained a number of
PLF members in China, but the
number of men involved and the
location or type of tra--ning
are not known.
As for the PLO, it has
served over the years as little
mote than a propaganda vehicle
fok- its various leaders. Al-
though initially free from in-
volvement in inter-Arab squabbles,
Ca4.ro's financial and logistical
support soon turned it into an
Egyptian instrument. Having
begin on terms of mutual distrust
with King Husayn from the be-
ginning, the PLO through its
Cad ro-based "Voice of Palestine"
radio program echoed Egyptian
propaganda attacks on Jordan
and., later, on Saudi Arabia.
other Arab states, while not sub-
ject to the same verbal abuse,
nevertheless probably sensed a
thi.eat to their regimes and
stayed on cool terms with the
PLOP. The organization is now
rest by conflict between its po-
litical and military leadership,
anld it is unlikely that the Arab
states, aside from Egypt, will
consider it very important in
the near future.
Popular Front for the Liberation
I of Palestine
The Popular 'Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
isl the terrorist arm of the Arab
Nationalist Movement (ANM), a
r4dical Arab political organi-
z tion with adherents in most
of the eastern Arab world.
Many of the leaders of the
ANM are themselves Palestinian
rEfugees and, after the founding
o~ Israel, they had led one or
another of the multitude of ter-
rorist organizations that came
into existence. These various
tPrrori.st groups were left in
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shambles by the war of June 1967,
and the ANM Supreme Command in
Beirut, therefore, decided in
October 1967 to establish a new,
500-man group that came to be
known as the PFLP. The rela-
tionship between the ANM and
PFLP commands is not known, al-
though George Habbash, the leader
of the ANM, and other members
of the ANM Supreme Command have
been reported as the political
leaders of the PFLP.
The PFLP terrorists report-
edly trained with Fatah members
General OperaEing Area of PFLP
Akko
Haifa .
Bet S
.0- She'an
Natanya, , 1V.st Al Mafraq.
GaQ Kuraymah
Tel Aviv- ! Y?
Yafo _- ..
.Hebron
X
t As Salt Z~lZarqa
r/Karama *Amman
PFLP
UPI As Safi
at Harasta in Syria until March
1968, when George Habbash and
other PFLP/ANM leaders were
arrested by the Syrian Govern-
ment on charges of plotting to
overthrow the regime. Since
then, training has been moved
to Fatah sites in Jordan.
Operations are still being
mounted from Syria, however,
using a no-man's-land area be-
tween the Israeli-occupied Golan
Heights and the Syrian Army de-
fense lines. The Syrians are
increasingly uneasy that these
activities may provoke Israel
into a reprisal attack.
Within the Israeli-occupied
West Bank area, reports indicate
that PFLP groups are operating
from Nablus. The PFLP also
claimed credit for hijacking the
El-Al Israel aircraft in July
1968, an indication of the group's
willingness to engage in all
types of clandestine activities.
In any event, the ANM has re-
cently been supporting the PFLP
by itself, soliciting funds
from ANM members in Lebanon and
Kuwait, the major centers of
Palestinian refugees. 25X1
Military aid from the Com-
munist world has reportedly come
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from two sources, Czechoslovakia
and China. Prague has supposedly
supplied the PFLP with its auto-
matic weapons, while Peking has
provided military training in
China.
Arab Resistance for the Libera-
tion of Palestine, reputed to
be operating in Gaza and Sinai;
the Way of the Return; and the
United Fedayeen Liberation Or-
ganization.--
Other Groups
The Syrian Government, un-
able to subvert. Fatah for use
as a political weapon., recently
organized a group known as the
Vanguard of the People?s Liber-
ation War. Inasmuch as the prime
purpose of the Vanguard is to
penetrate and seek control of
the various other terrorist
groups, it can be assumed that
its training, logistical support:,
and financing will come from Da-
mascus.
About 150 men of the Van-
guard have been sent to Jordan,
where they reportedly share the
bases used by Fatah and the PFLP.
Unlike the other organizations,
the Vanguard has not shied away
from open confrontations with
the Jordanian Government. In
late May 1968, for example, Van-
guard members attacked the main
police station in Amman which
was rumored to be holding a mem-
ber of the group, killing a num--
ber of officers.
There are at least three
other terrorist groups, but lit--
tle is known of them other than
their names: Men of the United
Outlook
If the purpose of the ter-
rorists had ever been to drive
Isra(Pl from the territory it
occupies or to inflict signifi-
cant damage upon it, there
could be no question but that
they have failed. The damage
inflicted by the raids has been
relatively minor, and the Israelis
will; certainly not withdraw be-
cause of the raids. Moreover,
Tel Aviv now has established an
anti-;infiltration system--fences,
mine's, infrared and sonic de-
vices, and land and air patrols---
that not only prevents a large-
scale penetration of Israel or
Israeli-controlled territory
but Will make even minor forays
increasingly difficult.
What seems more likely,
however, is that the terrorists'
purpose has been to irritate
the Israelis and to keep alive
the issue of the Israeli occupa-
tion:. In this, the terrorists
have succeeded, and the raids
will therefore probably continue
as long as the terrorists are
able to mount them. (SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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