WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006800050001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 3, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Department review completed
Secret
44.
3 January 1969
No. 0351/69
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(Information as of noon EST, 2 January 1969)
VIETNAM
The Communists have continued to work hard to bol-
ster the image of the Liberation Front as Saigon's
equal. For its part, Saigon has been trying to con-
vince world opinion that the unyielding attitude of
the Communists is delaying progress in Paris. Most
ground fighting during the past week was the result
of Communist reaction to allied military operations.
INDONESIA PREPARES FOR WEST IRIAN VOTE
Indonesia is trying to eliminate dissident groups in
West Irian in order to ensure an orderly vote favor-
able to Indonesia in this year's "self-determination"
election.
RADICAL FORCES IN CHINA SHOW NEW STRENGTH
Since the October plenum of the Chinese Communist
Party, radical elements in the leadership apparently
have been able to seize the initiative on some issues.
Page
1
Europe
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 7
SOVIETS WARM UP TO BONN AND THE WEST
Moscow is taking a somewhat more amiable line toward
West Germany as it proceeds with fence-mending ef-
forts in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
In their current diplomacy, the Soviets may also be
keeping one eye on the new US administration.
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CZECHS AND SLOVAKS FEDERALIZE DESPITE EMERGING PROBLEMS
The federalization of Czechoslovakia, which splits
the country into two semi-autonomous Czech and Slo-
vak states under a streamlined central government in
Prague, went into effect on 1 January. Announcements
of the formation of a new federal government, however,
failed to mention the status of National Assembly
President Josef Smrkovsky.
BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT REORGANIZED
Party boss Todor Zhivkov has reorganized the top
levels of the government and has reshuffled personnel
in a continuing effort to solve troublesome economic
and administrative problems.
FRENCH STUDENTS CONTINUE MILITANT LINE
Although a measure of calm has returned to French
universities, the decision last week of the National
Union of French Students to declare itself "a mass
political movement" and to reject the government's
educational reform program shows that student unrest
is far from over.
COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE AIRS DIFFERENCES
When the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference
gets under way next week in London, the British will
find themselves in the hot seat as Afro-Asian mem-
bers bring up such potentially explosive issues as
Rhodesia, Nigeria, and British policy on Commonwealth
immigration.
EUROPEAN SPACE PROGRAM FACES NEW CRISIS
Britain has plunged the European Launcher Develop-
ment Organization into a new financial impasse and
has cast a shadow over recently announced West Euro-
pean efforts to establish a unified space effort in
certain fields.
Middle East - Africa
BEIRUT RAID HEIGHTENS MIDDLE EAST TENSIONS
The recent raid by Israeli commandos on Beirut air-
port appears to have aroused almost universal con-
demnation of Israel, while knitting Arab resistance
more tightly together.
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WAR-WEARINESS GROWS IN NIGERIA
Federal Nigeria is growing weary of the war as the
military stalemate continues. The Biafrans appear
determined to hold out and wait for the Lagos regime
to collapse.
PAKISTANI OPPOSITION LEADERS MEET TO PLAN STRATEGY
An upcoming three-day strategy meeting of opposition
leaders may provide some measure of their ability to
work together. Meanwhile, antigovernment groups
continue to organize disturbances throughout the
country.
Western Hemisphere
HAITIAN PRESIDENT PREOCCUPIED WITH INTERNAL PROBLEMS
President Duvalier has instituted additional secu-
rity measures in an attempt to cope with recurrent
terrorist activities, and is making changes in his
immediate circle of advisers that are causing some
tension.
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The Vietnamese Communists, during this period of impasse in Paris
over seating and other procedural arrangements, are confining themselves
mainly to nurturing the image of the Liberation Front as an independent
entity and a valid spokesman for South Vietnam. They also pass up few
opportunities to enlarge upon alleged differences between Saigon and Wash-
ington over negotiating tactics.
On the Saigon side, Vice President Ky's return to Paris may at least be
delayed; there is some speculation that he may not return at all. The
government's unity appears imperiled not only by differences over tactics to
be pursued by South Vietnam in the Paris talks but also by strong under-
currents of friction between Ky and Prime Minister Huong.
Fighting in South Vietnam was light this week. The Communists
generally observed their own three-day New Year's truce. There continue to
be indications, however, that the enemy is getting into position for more
intensive activity should Hanoi conclude that it would be propitious.
In the inevitable jockeying for power in advance of the Chinese Com-
munists' ninth party congress, radical elements in the leadership are scoring a
few points. Harsh Maoist programs are moving into high gear in the country-
side and may have a seriously disturbing effect. The new upheaval in some
areas caused by this latest radical backlash may at the least force a delay in
holding the party congress, thought to have been tentatively set for early
spring.
The Chinese, meanwhile, are pushing ahead with their road construc-
tion in northwest Laos. Recent aerial photography shows that the road being
built southward from Ban Botene is now motorable to within five miles of
the Pathet Lao stronghold of Muong Sai. Government guerrillas in the area
claim as many as five Chinese battalions have been brought in to provide
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VIETNAM
Communist military activity
this week closely followed the
pattern of the previous week, with
a mid-week holiday standdown that
was called for and generally ob-
served by the enemy. Most ground
fighting was the result of Com-
munist reaction to allied mili-
tary operations against enemy
troop concentrations and routes
to target areas. Communist mor-
tar and rocket crews continued
their harassing attacks, especially
in northern III Corps.
Allied forces, which did
not schedule a New Year's cease-
fire, continued to disrupt enemy
efforts to set up offensive ac-
tions.
Communist Political Developments
The Communists have contin-
ued to work hard to bolster the
image of the Liberation Front as
Saigon's equal. While the allied
delegations consulted with their
governments and with each other
during the past week, the Com-
munists in one forum after another
castigated Saigon for obstruct-
ing the talks, The Communists
renewed the call for a replace-
ment of the Thieu government with
a "peace cabinet" that would sit
down and negotiate with the Com-
munists in Paris. Hanoi openly
warned the US in one broadcast
that even if the procedural has-
sle were resolved, there was
little prospect of progress on
substantive issues as long as
Saigon clung to its present "at-
titudes."
Using every opportunity to
contrast Saigon's alleged in-
transigence with their own "good
intentions," the Hanoi - Libera-
tion Front delegation in Paris
issued a joint communique on De-
cember 26 claiming that a round
table was a real and probably
final compromise on the part of
the Communists on seating ar-
rangements. They hinted broadly,
however, that if the allies ac-
cepted it, the Communists were
prepared to be flexible on other
procedural problems.
Throughout the week, the ef-
forts to tear down Saigon's repu-
tation and to feed its suspicions
of Washington's intentions were
coupled with maneuvers designed
to strengthen the position of the
Liberation Front. The Communists
pressed for additional meetings
between Front and US representa-
tives on the prisoner issue, and
gave extensive publicity to the
reception of the head of the Front
delegation in Paris at the French
Foreign Ministry. The Front also
talked up their local revolution-
ary committees as an effective
challenge to Saigon's authority
in the countryside. In a series
of interviews granted this week,
the head of the Front delegation
implied that these local Communist
administrative authorities blan-
keted practically all of South
Vietnam, and predicted that the
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Front would set up a national
government to rival Saigon. He
was purposefully vague as to the
timing of such a move, however.
Political Developments in
South Vietnam
Following the return of Vice
President Ky to Saigon for con-
sultations, the South Vietnamese
have begun a propaganda campaign
to convince world opinion that it
is the unyielding attitude of
the Communists that is delaying
progress in Paris. Government
spokesmen are emphasizing that
South Vietnam has already made
many concessions, including agree-
ing to a round table, "provided
the character of a two-sided ne-
gotiation is reflected physically."
In what appears to be a
further effort to reduce impa-
tience in the US, President Thieu
has publicly announced that he
believes some US troop withdrawals
will be possible in 1969 in view
of improving South Vietnamese
military capabilities. His con-
fidence in his country's growing
self-reliance is reminiscent of
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the attitude that prevailed be-
fore the Tet offensive last
February, however, and would
probably be severely weakened by
a major new Communist offensive.
Meanwhile, the delegation's
morale is undoubtedly low as a
result of the pressures it has
encountered in Paris and a lack
of support from the home front.
The dismissal of 12 staff mem-
bers of the delegation from their
regular Saigon jobs is virtually
certain to be interpreted as a
slap at Ky and his friends, and
will weaken the delegation's
prestige in Saigon.
Ky has let it be known that
he is considering not returning
to Paris, probably in the hope
of getting assurances from both
Thieu and the US that his services
are valued. There is little in-
dication that he has made any
progress in returning some of
his supporters to key positions
in the regime or has otherwise
made any political capital, as
he hoped he would when he agreed
to go to Paris.
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INDONESIA PREPARES FOR WEST IRIAN VOTE
Indonesia is trying to elim-
inate dissident groups in West
Irian in order to ensure an
orderly vote favorable to Djakarta
in this year's "self-determina-
tion" election.
Indonesia is required to
let the West Irianese determine
their future status, either
independence or union with Indo-
nesia, before the end of this
year under terms of the 1962
"New York Agreement." This
agreement ended the dispute be-
tween Indonesia and the Nether-
lands over the former Dutch ter-
ritory of New Guinea and trans-
ferred its administration to
Indonesia. Since its administra-
tion began in May 1963, Djakarta
has encountered consistent local
agitation against union with
Indonesia. This resistance has
been increased by the central
government's neglect of the area
and exploitation by local Indo-
nesian administrators.
The anti-Indonesian move-
ment includes a poorly armed but
persistent guerrilla organization
of some 2,500 men, which the
Indonesians have been unable to
flush out of the jungle. The
Djakarta government now believes,
however, that it is making progress
through amnesty offers and nego-
tiations. One of West Irian's
three major rebel leaders, along
with approximately 700 of his
followers, surrendered in early
December after a government-
offered amnesty. A second leader
has sent representatives to
Djakarta to discuss possible
surrender terms.
In parallel moves to improve
its image, Djakarta has begun
introducing more consumer goods
into West Irian and upgrading
the caliber of its military and
administrative personnel. Djakar-
ta's resources are limited, however,
and administering the territory
places added pressures on the
government's already strained
finances.
The opposition, expecting a
rigged vote, is apparently now
trying to get on record as ob-
jecting to the manner in which
Indonesia plans to conduct the
self-determination election. The
Indonesians intend to have the
votes cast by hand-picked dis-
trict representatives and tra-
ditional tribal chiefs who can
be made to see the practicality
of voting to remain with Indonesia.
A United Nations represent-
ative, who will participate in
establishing procedures for the
voting, is apparently sympathetic
to Indonesia's objectives. He
desires, however, that the
voting be carried out in a manner
that will not invite suspicion
of undue manipulation. Presumably,
Indonesia will delay the voting
until near the end of 1969.
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RADICAL FORCES IN CHINA SHOW NEW STRENGTH
Since the October plenum of
the Chinese Communist Party, radi-
cal elements in the leadership
apparently have been able to
seize the initiative on some is-
sues. Extreme social programs
advocated by Mao Tse-tung have
been intensified, despite the
social and political unrest they
create. It is possible that the
regime will postpone again the
overdue party congress, which has
been tentatively set for early
spring. A People's Daily edi-
torial on 31 December confirmed
that the congress would be held
in 1969, but did not specify a
date.
In the jockeying for power
almost certainly going on in ad-
vance of this congress, the radi-
cals have scored a few points.
Radiobroadcasts from two prov-
inces claim that some provincial
leaders opposed by the radical
Cultural Revolution Group in
Peking were recently "exposed."
Although nobody was named, one
man is almost certainly Wang En-
mao, long-time military and party
leader in Sinkiang. During the
Cultural Revolution, radical forces
have made repeated attempts to
dislodge Wang, but have had no
apparent success.
Meanwhile, harsh Maoist pro-
grams are moving into high gear in
rural areas and may have a seri-
ously disturbing effect. A re-
cent directive by Mao to push the
Cultural Revolution in the coun-
tryside this coming winter and
spring is being interpreted in
at least one province as a demand
to launch a large-scale purge of
"class enemies." A Shensi broad-
cast of 25 December said that in
response to Mao's demand, the
military planned to send squads
of troops to all villages to help
"clean out" the large number of
spies, traitors, landlords, and
other "bad elements" who allegedly
still exist. A similar campaign
conducted recently in Kwangtung
resulted in thousands of execu-
tions, often after public tor-
tures.
The transfer of urban dwell-
ers to the countryside--begun on
a large scale last fall, partly to
satisfy Mao's long-standing con-
viction that heavy physical labor
is good ideological training for
everyone--was given another spur
on 21 December with the publica-
tion of a new Mao "instruction"
on the subject. According to
provincial broadcasts, entire
families will now be resettled,
not just high-school-age youth
and cadres, the previous targets
of the campaign. Some reports
suggest that as much as one fourth
of the population of large cities
will be dispersed. This forced
emigration has added to the army's
burden of maintaining public or-
der in rural areas, because it
is deeply resented by both the
emigrants and their unwilling
hosts in already overpopulated
communes. In some communes near
Canton, troops are being perma-
nently assigned to keep people
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The tension in the Middle East has encouraged new Soviet diplomatic
efforts aimed at achieving some movement toward a political settlement of
the area's problems. There have been some signs of flexibility in Moscow's
position, although it conforms closely with the aims of the Arab nations and
probably has Cairo's approval. The USSR has avoided the excessive harshness
that would damage its diplomatic efforts, however, and appears genuinely
interested in working with the Western powers to patch together the ele-
ments of a political settlement.
Federalization came quietly to Czechoslovakia this week. Some new
faces showed up among the leadership, but there were no real surprises. The
leaders skirted the issue of the future of progressive assembly president
Smrkovsky, whose fate will be decided later this month. The visit by a Soviet
party delegation to Czechoslovakia this week seemed aimed at strengthening
conservative elements at lower levels in the Czechoslovak party-a technique
the Soviets have increasingly used to influence top-level policy and appoint-
ments in Prague.
Political differences between the Russians and Yugoslavs over the
invasion of Czechoslovakia have not unduly affected their bilateral economic
relations. The two countries have just signed their annual trade protocol, and
it provides for an optimistic increase in trade above that of 1968.
car-en in erviews o ance or iesmger
an oreign Minister Bran revealed differences in tone over prospects for
negotiations between Bonn and Moscow in the coming year.
The newly confirmed Italian foreign minister, Pietro Nenni, says that
Rome intends to sign the nonproliferation treaty soon, a move delayed by
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
The Portuguese foreign minister has announced that his government
wants to reopen negotiations with the US to renew the Azores base agree-
ment, which ran out in 1962 and has since been replaced only by an
informal understanding. In return, Lisbon probably will press the US to be
more sympathetic toward its position in Africa. 25X1
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SOVIETS WARM UP TO BONN AND THE WEST
Moscow is taking a somewhat
more amiable line toward Bonn as
it works to undo the damage done
by the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
Fence-mending apart, in its cur-
rent diplomacy toward the West,
Moscow also has one eye on the
new US administration, and would
prefer to be as free as possible
of accumulated diplomatic bur-
dens. Not far below the surface,
too, is Soviet fear of China's
troublemaking capability, which
encourages Moscow to damp down
tension on its Western flank.
Moscow has muted its anti-US
propaganda in general, and has
carefully avoided criticism of
the President-elect. The Soviets
have stressed restoration of
their rapport with France. They
have also made protestations of
goodwill to the Italians, the
Dutch, and the Belgians, and have
cozied up quietly to the European
Community. Soviet propaganda
continues to bully the UK, how-
ever, probably because of the
relatively low premium on good
Anglo-Soviet relations in the
short run.
In what amounts to a tacti-
cal about-face, after months of
hurling abuse at Bonn after
Czechoslovakia, the Soviets have
moved to resume negotiations of
a civil air agreement with West
Germany. They have also inti-
mated that they are ready to re-
sume talks on exchanging declara-
tions renouncing the use of force.
Alternate use of the carrot
and the stick is a well-established
feature of Soviet dealings with the
West Germans, and the current ver-
sion is likely to be no more than
another tactical maneuver designed
to play on differences within the
Western alliance. The USSR is
well aware that Bonn fears the
prospect of far-reaching talks be-
tween Moscow and the new US admin-
istration. The Soviets also sense
Bonn's keen interest in salvaging
something of the Eastern diplomacy
it had been pursuing before Chech-
oslovakia.
The Russians have sweetened
their civil air proposal by offer-
ing Bonn coveted onward flight
rights from Moscow to points in
the Far East. The USSR will be
less responsive to West Germany's
request for membership in an ex-
panded Geneva disarmament confer-
ence, however. The Russians, cer-
tain to set a high price even to
admit Bonn as an observer, are
likely to demand West German rat-
ification of the nonproliferation
treaty and equal status at Geneva
for East Germany.
Bonn's designation of West
Berlin as the site for election of
the federal president in March is
likely to put the current trend
in Soviet - West German relations
to an early test. Bonn's move im-
plies difficulties with the So-
viets and East Germans, who have
warned against such "provocations."
The first Soviet reaction, in the
form of an oral protest to Allied
ambassadors in Moscow, seems to 25X1
have been essentially for the rec-
ord, however, and in the nature of
an appeal to desist.
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CZECHS AND SLOVAKS FEDERALIZE DESPITE EMERGING PROBLEMS
The federalization of Czech-
oslovakia, which splits the coun-
try into two semiautonomous Czech
and Slovak states under a stream-
lined central government in Prague,
went into effect on 1 January.
Announcements of the formation
of a new federal government, how-
ever, failed to mention the status
of National Assembly President
Josef Smrkovsky. The issue of
his continuing in his position
has generated considerable fric-
tion between the Czechs and Slo-
vaks, and it probably will not
be settled until a new federal
assembly is formed later this
month.
Both the new federal govern-
ment and the Slovak national gov-
ernment have brought in young,
competent officials, but the new
personnel assignments contain no
surprises. Only two of the seven
heads of federal ministries are
new appointees. Jan Marko, a
Slovak technologist, was named
minister of foreign affairs--
though he has no experience in
this area--while Jan Tabacek, a
Slovak economist-technologist,
was designated minister of for-
eign trade. Marko is said to be
a "compromise" candidate who was
selected over a pro-Soviet hard
liner nominated by conservative
leader Vasil Bilak.
The status of Smrkovsky has
become a cause celebre. Many
Slovak organizations have backed
Slovak party boss Husak's demand
that a Slovak fill one of the top
three positions in the federal
government. Inasmuch as Presi-
dent Svoboda and Premier Cernik
have already been confirmed in
their posts, the Slovaks are in
effect calling for Smrkovsky's
ouster.
Students, workers, farmers, an
intellectuals have threatened to
demonstrate en masse if any of
the liberals in the leadership--
particuarly Smrkovsky--are dropped,
or if Dubcek's reform program is
further compromised.
Another ranking Soviet party
delegation arrived in Prague on
26 December as part of a con-
tinuing Russian effort to keep
in close touch with Czechoslovak
officials during the period of
"normalization." The eight-mem-
ber Soviet delegation, heavily
weighted with party professionals,
was headed by Konstantin Katushev,
central committee secretary for
relations with other Communist
parties. It also included first
deputy foreign minister Vasily
Kuznetsov, who served as Mos-
cow's troubleshooter in Prague
after the invasion. The delega-
tion has met mostly with Czech-
oslovak conservatives, and one
of the aims of the visit is no
doubt to strengthen these con-
servative forces in the Czecho-
slovak party.
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Changes in Bulgarian Council of Ministers
27 December 1968
Chairman (Premier):
First Deputy Chairman:
Deputy Chairmen:
Zhivkov, Todor
Zhivkov, Zhivko
Avramov, Luchezar
Kubadinski, Pencho
Mikhaylov, Ivan
Tanchev, Petur
Tsolov, Tano
MINISTRIES
Chemistry and Metallurgy
Pavlov, Georgi
Communications
Tonchev, Stoyan
Kfta#W I#td
:
.
Finance
Popov, Dimitur
Foreign Affairs
Bashev Ivan
Foreign Trade
Waatqov:tuchszar
Forests and Forest Industry
Mill
Dakov, Mako
Angel
Mffakov
,
Internal Trade
Takov, Peko
Justice
Daskalova, Svetla
111111011111
Vlhev
Misho
,
Light Industry
Belcheva, Dora
Machine Building
lvanov, Mariy
National Defense
Dzhurov, Dobri
National Education
e>eitev, Stefan
Power and Fuel
Popov, Konstantin
Public Health
Ignatov, Kiril
`Phev, Apostol
Transport
Committees
Vachkov, Marin
Art and Culture
Matev, Pavel
Zhi
`hi
ko
ko
v
v,
v
State Committee for Science and
Technical Progress Popov, Ivan
State Control Stefanov, N inko
State Planning Committee
New organization
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BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT REORGANIZED
Party boss Todor Zhivkov
has reorganized top levels of
the government and reshuffled
personnel in a continuing effort
to solve troublesome economic
and administrative problems.
The changes signify a recentrali-
zation of authority and a tight-
ening of party control, in con-
trast to the cautious attempt
in recent years to induce flexi-
bility into the decision-making
process.
Zhivkov's proposals were
approved, apparently without op-
position, at a party plenum on
26 December, and were ratified
the next day by the National
Assembly. Most of the changes,
which touch nearly all the higher
levels of the party, government,
and even mass organizations,
carry forward the directives of
the plenum held last July. As
envisaged then, Zhivkov's plan
streamlines the functioning of
the cabinet and consolidates
various departments in the par-
ty's administrative apparatus.
Although the number of gov-
ernment ministries remains the
same, the decision-making power
has been compressed into fewer
hands. Four of Zhivkov's deputy
premiers were given ministerial
portfolios. There were only two
important, clear-cut demotions.
The minister of foreign trade was
replaced, probably because of the
unsolved balance of payments
problem. The minister of in-
ternal affairs fell victim to
the government's desire to bring
more effective leadership into
security affairs.
The party tightened its
control over the economy, never
significantly loosened, by con-
solidating economic-oriented
ministries and creating a new
Economic Coordination Committee.
Zhivkov has appointed his first
deputy for government affairs,
Zhivko Zhivkov, to head the new
committee and has given it a
wide latitude of responsibility
and power. The committee will
be expected to solve the economic
problems that have resulted from
rapid but unbalanced growth and
from overextension in Western
credits. Other administrative
changes point up Sofia's desire
to de-emphasize its highly prop-
agandized economic reform pro-
gram, which was never actually
implemented.
Moscow's harsh repression
of the Czechoslovak experiment
has not been lost on the Bul-
garian leadership, and Sofia is
apparently trying to form even
closer ties with the USSR.
Zhivkov probably coordinated
his package plan with the Soviet
leadership when he and two of
his important deputies recently
flew to Moscow for high-level
consultations. Sofia is looking
to Moscow for timely aid in
coping with its serious economic
and financial difficulties, and
in return is giving unquestioning
support to Moscow's international
policies. 25X1
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FRENCH STUDENTS CONTINUE MILITANT LINE
A measure of calm has returned
to French universities following
a number of serious incidents in
December, but the student commu-
nity remains in a volatile state.
Moreover, actions taken recently
by the major student union, the
National Union of French Students
(UNEF), suggest that students may
take an even more militant atti-
tude as the school year progresses.
The UNEF has been in the forefront
of the student movement in recent
months, particularly after the ban
on extremist organizations reduced
the activity of other groups.
At its three-day national con-
gress in late December, the UNEF
decided to go beyond the role of
defender of purely student inter-
ests and, despite opposition from
Communist and moderate elements,
plunged into the field of politics.
The congress approved a statement
describing the UNEF as a "mass po-
litical movement," and adopted a
platform calling for defense of
political liberties within the
universities, rejection of the
government's program for educa-
tional reform, and concerted ac-
tion with the workers. This openly
political posture is certain to
arouse the ire of many in the gov-
ernment, and especially in the par-
liament, who strongly opposed even
the limited amount of political
freedom granted students in the
education bill.
The UNEF's re-election of
Jacques Sauvageot as its president
also points to the possibility of
greater militancy in the universi-
ties. Sauvageot, a key leader in
the student revolt last May, had
stated prior to his election that
the students are "preparing for
the overthrow of the regime." The
UNEF platform's call for concerted
action with the workers is also
supported by Sauvageot, who fears
that otherwise students will be
isolated. Workers and their union
leaders remain wary of any close
association with the students, how-
ever, and will. probably try--as
they have successfully in the
past--to keep the protests and de-
mands of the two groups separate.
The deep divisions that still
exist among students may impair
their ability to mount an effec-
tive protest against the govern-
ment. At the congress, Sauvageot
failed in his effort to integrate
into the UNEF representatives from
the extremist "action committees"
that emerged during the May crisis.
The committees, unable to unseat
Sauvageot, withdrew from the con-
gress and stated their intention
to hold an assembly of their own
this month.
Moderate and Communist stu-
dents were also dissatisfied, not
only with the political line
adopted by the congress but also
with what they believed was unfair
treatment meted out by the major-
ity. The short shrift given the
orthodox Union of Communist Stu-
dents by the UNEF congress reflects
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the hostility that has long marked
relations between the Communist
Party and French students, who see
the party as part of the "estab-
lishment." The French Communist
daily, L'Humanite, has already
protested the political role
chosen by the congress, asserting
that UNEF action as a "political
striking force" would be directed
against the organized workers'
COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE AIRS DIFFERENCES
The conference of prime minis-
ters of the Commonwealth countries
in London from 7 to 15 January will
again reveal wide differences on
international questions, and will
also produce a barrage of criticism
of British policies.
The atmosphere of the confer-
ences, held about every two years
in London, has become increasingly
tense over the last decade as newly
independent Afro-Asian countries
join the Commonwealth and use the
meetings as a forum to air their
grievances. The disparity of in-
terests between such countries as,
for instance, Australia and Swazi-
land, not to mention the bitter
disp-itos between member states--
notably India and Pakistan--has
raised questions about the viabil-
ity of the Commonwealth. This
year's divisive issues include Rhode-
sia, Nigeria, and Britain's immigra-
tion policy.
Much to London's dislike, Rho-
desia will again be a main topic of
discussion. The last conference in
September 1966 was devoted princi-
pally to this subject, and a threat
of the African members to leave the
organization was barely averted.
This year the Africans will prob-
ably charge that Prime Minister
Wilson broke his pledge of "no inde-
pendence before majority rule" by
the offers he recently made to Ian
Smith. Wilson may attempt to con-
vert the Africans to a more "real-
istic" approach, but he will have
rough going.
Britain and Nigeria will prob-
ably try to keep the Nigerian
civil war off the main agenda, al-
though Tanzania and Zambia can be
expected to lobby on behalf of the
Biafrans. The pro-Biafrans will
assail the British policy of sup-
plying arms to the federal side,
and there may be some attempt to
pass a resolution calling for an
international arms embargo. Partly
in anticipation of the Commonwealth
meeting, the British launched their
much-publicized peace initiative of
last month. They will probably
stress their numerous attempts to
find a solution to both the politi-
cal and humane aspects of the con-
flict.
Indira Gandhi intends to
criticize recent British restric-
tions on Commonwealth immigration
into the UK. In conjunction with
some Caribbean members, India is
expected to suggest the establish-
ment of a special bureau in the
Commonwealth secretariat that would
be responsible for immigration
problems and questions of race re-
lations. The British, as well as
the Australians and others, prob-
ably oppose this plan and will
argue that it would infringe on
national sovereignty.1
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EUROPEAN SPACE PROGRAM FACES NEW CRISIS
Britain has plunged the
European Launcher Development
Organization (ELDO) into a new
financial impasse and has cast
a shadow over recently announced
West European efforts to estab-
lish a unified space effort in
the fields of launchers as well
as applications and scientific
satellites.
At a meeting of ELDO's
council on 19-20 December, the
British agreed to pay their $23-
million contribution to the 1969
budget only if they were relieved
of any future obligation. Lon-
don's 1970 share of the contem-
plated $626-million total costs
of the present ELDO program--
aimed at development of the
Europa II rocket--would have
been $17 million. Long opposed
to European "duplication" of
American capabilities in the
launcher field, the UK had al-
ready made known its intention
to withdraw from ELDO in 1971.
As a result of the British
stand at the ELDO council meet-
ing, France and Belgium refused
to vote at all on the proposed
1969 budget. Moreover, the Ital-
ians reiterated that they might
not pay their contribution for
1967 and 1968--already in arrears
--nor that due for 1969. At
European space meetings at Bonn
in November, Rome had provision-
ally agreed to a compromise
whereby it would accept a reduced
ELDO budget--which cut projects
in which Italy would have had a
role. In return, the French and
Germans had agreed to purchase
from the Italians--outside the
scope of the ELDO program--a
crucial booster motor for the
French-German Symphonic communi-
cations satellite project. Bonn
and Paris will now presumably
have to take over development
of this so-called apogee-perigee
motor.
It is not clear what action
Britain's ELDO partners may take
if they are unable to persuade
London to reconsider its posi-
tion. At the least, France may
find it a heavy burden--in its
present economic difficulties--
to assume a portion of the
British default. At the Bonn
meetings, the UK had agreed to
continue to furnish its Blue
Streak rocket--the first stage
of the Europa II--even after
1971. Presumably, this commit-
ment remains firm, but the UK's
withdrawal from financing of the
last phase of the present pro-
gram will probably further de-
lay ELDO's hope of having Europa
II ready in time for a 1971
launching of the Symphonie.
ELDO ministers may meet in
February to attempt to find a
long-term solution to the new
impasse. In the meantime, ELDO
will finance its operations on
a month-to-month basis, with pay-
ments not to exceed last year's
level .
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Arab-Israeli incidents continued at a high rate last week, highlighted by
the Israeli attack on Beirut airport, which earned the Israelis a unanimous
vote of condemnation by the UN Security Council. The raid has put
Lebanon's fragile internal political balance in danger, and all security forces
have been placed under army command to enforce a ban on demonstrations.
There is some feeling that the government may have to change its generally
pro-Western policies in order to hold the country together. The Soviet Union
has already offered immediate military and economic aid to the Lebanese.
Arab terrorist organizations seem bent on provoking more incidents from
Lebanese territory, raising the prospect of further Israeli retaliation.
Trade accords signed on 28 December may increase Algeria's long-range
economic dependence on the USSR. The Soviets agreed to purchase im-
portant quantities of wine and petroleum, and no longer will require annual
balancing of trade between the two countries. Thus, the way may be open
for an influx of Soviet goods not matched, in the short range at least, by
Algerian exports.
Political unrest in Pakistan continued to be reflected in strikes, demon-
strations, and protest marches as the new year opened. An aide to former
foreign minister Bhutto has announced that Bhutto will oppose Ayub for the
presidency in the 1969-70 elections. The announcement was probably de-
signed to steal the initiative from other opposition leaders now meeting in
Dacca in an effort to come up with a unified campaign strategy.
In Nigeria, frustration over the continuation of the stalemate in the civil
war is growing as serious antitax rioting persists in the Western State.
Throughout Nigeria the prolongation of the war is being attributed increas-
ingly to Western support for Biafra, and there is growing criticism of the US
decision to provide transport aircraft to relief agencies active in Biafra.
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BEIRUT RAID HEIGHTENS MIDDLE EAST TENSIONS
The recent raid by Israeli
commandos on Beirut airport
appears to have aroused almost
universal condemnation of Israel,
while knitting Arab resistance
more tightly together.
On 28 December, Israeli com-
mandos attacked Beirut civil air-
port by helicopter and destroyed
13 civilian aircraft on the
ground. There was virtually no
Lebanese armed resistance, and
the only casualties appear to
have been Israelis. Damage now
appears to be considerably less
than the initial estimate of
$43.8 million, and was largely
covered by insurance. The an-
nounced intention of the raid was
to retaliate against Lebanon,
which Israel claims connived in
the Arab fedayeen attack on the
El Al airliner in Athens airport
earlier last week.
Both Lebanon and Israel took
the matter to the UN Security
Council, where, as expected,
Israel was condemned unanimously.
Most nations are appalled at the
risks taken by Israel in attack-
ing an international airport
and deplore the extension of the
Arab-Israeli conflict to inter-
national air traffic.
Beyond initial shock at the
type and extent of Israeli retali-
ation, responsible world leaders
generally believed that the "law
of retaliation" adopted by Israel
would not only be counterproduc-
tive in damping down Arab terrorism
but would serve to heighten Arab
zeal. It is the stated objective
of Arab resistance groups to draw
reluctant or moderate Arabs into
an active role in the struggle
for Palestine. By punishing
Beirut for the Athens incident,
Israel may have greatly assisted
the terrorists in forcing the
reluctant Lebanese Government
to join activist Arab nations.
Even the Israeli press has
shown mixed feelings in dealing
with the raid. Although news-
papers of all political hues
rationalize about the effective-
ness and efficiency of the epi-
sode, there appears to be an
underlying mood of pessimism
about the present system of fight-
ing terror with greater terror.
The Arab reaction has been
predictable. The ineptness of
the Lebanese defense has embit-
tered the people and weakened
still another moderate Arab
regime. At the same time, the
Lebanese now see the struggle
with Israel from a more personal
and committed point of view.
The fedayeen smell success in the
spate of publicity and have vowed
a "rain" of revenge raids against
Israel. Arab leaders have sensed
that the public mood has quick-
ened in response to the harden-
ing of Israeli policy. King
Husayn has once more called for
an Arab summit meeting to assess
the new danger of escalating ten-
sions and to try to create more
unity of purpose and military op-
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WAR-WEARINESS GROWS IN NIGERIA
War-weariness and frustra-
tion over the continuing military
stalemate are growing in Nigeria,
where federal authorities are
becoming increasingly suspicious
of US intentions. The Biafrans,
who almost certainly see these
developments as justification of
their defense strategy, appear
determined to hold out.
In the Western state, spo-
radic rioting over taxes persists,
and there is increasing evidence
among the Yoruba tribesmen of gen-
eral disaffection with the state
government, extending in some cases
to the federal level. This malaise
appears rooted in economic discon-
tent, but includes a growing dis-
satisfaction with corruption
among state officials and with
the failure of the federal author-
ities to end the war. There are
indications that such agitation
will continue in the West and may
spread to Yoruba elements in the
Lagos state.
Frustration over the stale-
mate is becoming evident in north-
ern Nigeria, where the federal
authorities' inability to win
is being attributed increasingly
to Western, and particularly US,
support for Biafra. Press re-
ports about US intentions to in-
crease relief aid to the Biafrans
were interpreted in the north as
"aid and comfort to the enemy,"
and the recent US provision of
airplanes to relief agencies
flying to Biafra will almost
certainly provoke a strong ad-
verse reaction.
In Lagos, federal leader
Gowon told the US ambassador that
providing relief planes could
have very serious consequences
for US-Nigerian relations and re-
quested further clarification
of the US move. Gowon indicated
his belief that this action gave
more evidence of a US shift to
a position of support for Biafra,
and made public a strongly worded
communique that could well spark
anti-US demonstrations.
The Biafrans, who believe
that if they hold out long enough
the Lagos regime will fall apart,
are now attempting to bolster
their military position to stave
off an expected major federal
offensive.
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PAKISTANI OPPOSITION LEADERS MEET TO PLAN STRATEGY
A three-day strategy meet-
ing of opposition leaders, sched-
uled to begin on 3 January in
East Pakistan, may provide some
measure of the disparate anti-
government forces' ability to
work together.
Leading government critic
Asghar Khan plans to attend the
meeting, which will reportedly
include most other major opposi-
tion leaders, both independent
and party-affiliated. If the
group decides to contest the
1969-70 elections and back a
single candidate, Asghar may be
hoping that his enthusiastic
support in West Pakistan, his
recent warm reception in East
Pakistan, and his reputation for
honesty and integrity will make
him the most acceptable man to
oppose President Ayub Khan.
Several other opposition
leaders have personal ambitions,
however, and are probably also
hoping for the bid. The acting
chairman of ex-foreign minister
Bhutto's People's Party announced
Saturday that Bhutto--in jail
since 13 November for inciting
violence--will oppose Ayub for
the presidency in 1970. Bhutto
will not be able to attend the
3 January meeting, but his
supporters probably hope that
the announcement of his candidacy
will steal the initiative from
Asghar and other contenders.
Initial reaction from within anti-
government ranks to Bhutto's pro-
spective candidacy, however, has
been largely negative.
of brutality.
Various antigovernment
groups continue to organize dis-
turbances throughout the country.
A highly effective general strike
and a sizable, student-led pro-
test march in Rawalpindi on 25
December resulted in violence
and at least two reported deaths.
Border militia were called in the
following day to help the police
maintain order. Rawalpindi
students are reportedly planning
further demonstrations to protest
alleged police atrocities. In
East Pakistan, pro-Peking leftists
staged a rural strike on 29 Decem-
ber that apparently was effec-
tive only in scattered areas,
largely at the periphery of the
province. Several deaths were
reported in Dacca, however. In
responding to the continuing un-
rest in the country, the police--
at times reinforced by the mili-
tary--have been moving in to re-
store order but acting with re-
straint, apparently on orders
from Ayub to avoid unnecessary
violence, bloodshed, and charges
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Brazil's National Security Council announced on 30 December that
thirteen politicians, including opposition leader Carlos Lacerda, have been
stripped of their political rights. Ten of the thirteen were federal deputies
from the opposition Brazilian Democratic Movement, one was a deputy from
the progovernment party, and one was a federal judge.
Panama's military junta pre-
fers a "nonpartisan" presidential election in 1970 that would be outside the
traditional political party system. The members of the 3-man Electoral
Tribunal have been charged with revising the electoral code and are studying
a plan that calls for a "popular consultation" that would select a president
from several candidates hand-picked by the junta. Elections for a new
National Assembly may be as far off as 1976.
President Balaguer of the Dominican Republic has dissolved his palace
intelligence service and has given its chief, Colonal Tejeda Alvarez, an
ambassadorial post. Tejeda's close ties with the ambitious commander of the
important First Brigade, Colonel Nivar Seijas, raise speculation that Balaguer
believes it a convenient time to weaken Nivar's influence by removing one of
his strongest allies.
Efforts to achieve a reconciliation between the secessionist Caribbean
island of Anguilla and the Associated State of St. Kitts from which it
withdrew have failed. Consequently, Anguilla council leader Robert Webster
plans to declare total independence on 8 January. The main problem for the
present moderate leaders of the small island would be that of finding a way
to survive without substantial outside assistance.
Peru's military government appears to be actively seeking Latin Ameri-
can backing for its position on the International Petroleum Company (IPC)
issue. The Peruvians hope to put pressure on the US to refrain from using
economic sanctions against Peru, which has expropriated IPC property, but
without compensation so far.
The Argentine Government has ended the 21-month-old wage freeze and
has authorized an eight percent across-the-board salary hike. Other increases
in the minimum wage and family allowances will probably raise average
income per wage earner by 11 percent.
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HAITIAN PRESIDENT PREOCCUPIED WITH INTERNAL PROBLEMS
President Duvalier has in-
stituted additional security
measures throughout Haiti in an
effort to cope with recurrent
terrorist activities, according
to the US Embassy.
During the past two weeks,
hit-and-run terrorist attacks
were made on US installations
for the first time. In mid-
December, two bombing attempts
were made against the US-
Haitian binational center in
Port au Prince. One of the
bombs caused minor damage, but
the other was found before it
could be set off. In addition,
fire destroyed the headquarters
of the US-financed malaria eradi-
cation program. A small group
of Communist activists may be
responsible for the recent sabo-
tage, but the possibility that
some other groups were involved
cannot be ruled out. Last July
and August, Communist activists
were blamed for a spate of ter-
rorist incidents.
President Duvalier is also
making changes in his immediate
circle of advisers that are
causing some political tension.
He apparently is attempting to
patch up a family feud with his
eldest daughter, Marie Denise,
and her husband, Colonel Max
Dominique, who were exiled to
Europe in June 1967. In August
1968, Duvalier granted amnesty
to Dominique and his family, and
last month, Marie Denise returned
to Haiti. She was subsequently
appointed to an important palace
position, replacing one of the
President's close confidants.
In a recent interview, Marie
Denise said that her husband
will join her within the next
two weeks.
The strong rivalries
among members of the palace en-
tourage apparently are now be-
coming increasingly bitter as a
result.
The terrorism and palace
intrigue are not likely to alter
Duvalier's personal power posi-
tion, but they will have an un-
settling effect on over-all
political conditions. 25X1
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