WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6
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February 13, 2006
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February 7, 1969
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SUMMARY
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Approved For Release 2006/03/16 :CIA-RDP79-00927A0069000~e0Cret ]DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY State Department review completed Secret ~~ 7 February 1969 No. 0356/69 Approved For Release 2006/03/16 :CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 25X1 gpproved For Release 2006/03/16 :CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/16 :CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 Approved For Release 2006/0~~,A'~DP79-00927A006900020001-6 (Information as of noon EST, 6 February 1969) VIETNAM The Conununists used the Paris meetings on 30 January to warn the US that there could be no resolution of specific military problems without simultaneous con- sideration of related political. issues. Meanwhile, regional antagonisms within the Saigon government appear to be increasing in virulence. There was little significant fighting as many of the enemy's combat forces remained preoccupied with preparations for renewed offensive activity. COMMUNIST PRESSURE CONTINUES IN SOUTH LAOS An extensive enemy offensive may be unfolding in south Laos. Europe Page 1 THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE ~ SOV]:ETS FOSTER ANXIETY ABOUT BERLIN ELECTIONS Moscow's line suggests that it has some hope for a relocation of the election or, failing that, of ex- tracting West German concessions in other fields. USSR PUSHES INTERNATIONAL FISHING OPERATIONS The rapid and successful expansion of the Soviet fishing fleet into many traditional fishing grounds of the free world may be tempered by international reaction as well as by domestic processing and dis- tribution problems. SECRET Approved For F~e~ase 200~/~~Y ~~`~i~RD~79-00927~006~900020001-6 Approved For Release 2006/Q~~6~~IA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 FP.CTIONALISM SHARPENS IN CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY HIERARCHY Factional infighting among the Czechoslovak leader- ship intensified as pro-Soviet conservatives stepped up their efforts to gain greate:r influence in the central committee. RL~MANIAIdS AND YUGOSLAVS STEP OF COOPERATION Rumania and Yugoslavia drew a bit closer as a result of the meeting between party leader Ceausescu and President Tito on 1 and 2 February. MLNORITY UNREST PERSISTS IN YUGIOSLAVIA Violent disturbances late last year in Yugoslavia's Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Republic of Mace- donia are symptomatic of th.e country's omnipresent problem of nationalist rivalries. DE. GAULLE PROMISES FRENCH REFERENDUM THIS SPRING 'I'he referendum that De Gaulle recently announced would be held this spring officially will be on changes in the Senate and regional government, but many Frenchmen will see it as a chance to vote for or against their President. It will almost cer- tainly be approved. PF,KISTAN'S PRESIDENT AYUB PROPOSES 'PACKS WITH OPPOSITION Pakistan's three-month-old political crisis is un- likely to be resolved by President Ayub's announce- ment that he will soon invite "responsible" opposi- tion leaders for talks. Opposition leaders have not formally responded to the offer but are generally pessimistic that discussions can produce a workable compromise. sEC;x~~r Approved Fo~~~@le~~e 2q(~/,Y6S~C~r1P79-Op9~~~0~?900020001-6 Approved For Release 2006/03~CQ~1~'I~DP79-00927A006900020001-6 JORDAN ATTEMPTS TO STRENGTHEN AIR DEFENSES Jordan is attempting to improve its air defenses in the face of almost daily Israeli reconnaissance flights, but it is unlikely that these measures will be effective against an Israeli attack. ARMY DISCONTENT RISING IN CONGO (KINSHASA) Army discontent appears to be increasing in Congo (Kinshasa), but the troops are unlikely to trans- form their complaints into actions in the near future. SOUTH AFRICA'S AFRIKANERS AGITATED ABOUT APARTHEID A growing criticism of South Africa's racial poli- cies by Afrikaner intellectuals may eventually stim- ulate a more realistic appraisal of the shortcomings of apartheid. Western Hemisphere PERU-IPC DISPUTE INTENSIFIES The military government has just set the US company's "debt" to the state at slightly more than $690 million. UNREST INCREASES IN CHILEAN COUNTRYSIDE Farmers in southern Chile, already beset by the worst drought in forty years, are becoming increas- ingly disturbed over low prices for their crops and the threat they see from the government's agrarian reform program. SECRET Approved For R~l~esa4fl06)~BYC~J~I~-0092~T~~9~~020001-6 Approved For Release 2006/0~~6C~DP79-00927A006900020001-6 GROWING RAPPORT BETWEEN ANDEAN AND COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 24 Since Colombia and the USSR re~-established relations in January 1968, there has been a flurry of Eastern European visitors, announcements of commercial nego- tiations and agreements, a.nd probings by the Andean countries toward diplomatic recognition. INDEPENDENCE CONFERENCE ON BRI'T'ISH HONDURAS DELAYED Premier Price's request to postpone the constitutional conference set for Marcn has temporarily reduced ten- sions and provides additional time for negotiation between Britain and Guatemala on Guatemala's century- old claim to :British Honduras. SEA FRET Approved For~g~lea~e 20~1~~7~~S~I,~,-iR~79-0~9~e~-Og~900020001-6 Approved For Release 2006/0~~~RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 Conflicting approaches in the Paris talks on the key issue of the relationship between political and military questions hardened last week. The North Vietnamese and the Liberation Front delegates insisted that military questions cannot be resolved without a political settlement. Vice President Ky, on the other hand, implied that the South Vietnamese will refuse to discuss political issues in Paris until military problems are settled and insisted on a prior withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces. The provinces ringing Saigon continue to be the focal point of enemy troop shifts, and over the past few months the Communists have assembled a formidable fighting force in the area. The Communists have probably con- cluded that continued pressure in this strategic, heavily populated area is likely to have the greatest impact on both the US and the South Vietnamese. Recent fighting in southern Laos has centered on the government base camp at . Thateng, but there are continuing reports of an enemy buildup in other areas of the Bolbvens Plateau. Without significant reinforcement from other regions, and given their state of near despair, the southern military leaders might abandon important positions to the Communists, including the politically sensitive provincial capitals of Saravane and Attopeu. SECRET Approved For F$~a~e 200~'~3~6Y: ~~-~79-0092~lA~~~9 Approved For Release 2006~~~?,:~-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 V}:ETNAM The Communists used the Pari:. meetings on 30 January to warn thE~ US tYiat there could be no resolu- tion of specific military problem: without simultaneous consideratior:: of rE:lated political issues. Ha- noi ' :~ delegate , Xuan 'Phuy , e x- plicitly rejected US proposals that the first order of business be nE:utralization of the Demili- tarised Zone and mutL,al troop withdrawal. The Communists want the L1S to accept at least the broad principles of their four ancl. five points for a political set- t1emE:nt before they will discuss any de-escalation of the military conflict. Both the North Vietnamese ancl. Liberation Front delegates were careful, however, to hedge their outright rejection of allied pro- posals with hints that the two sides were not as far apart on po- litical issues as it might appear. Xuan Thuy used some of the most attractive language in the Commu- nist lexicon to discuss the role of th.e Liberation Front= in post- war Vietnam, strongly suggesting that this sticky issue was open to negotiation. He played down earlier demands for a settlement "in accordance" with tYie Front's program and an immediate impor- tant share of political power for the Communists. Instead, he asked for solutions based on "self-de- termination" and an acknowledge- ment of the Front's "existence." The Liberation Front spokesman concluded his lengthy harangue with the promise that if the con- ference could agree to accept the Front's five points as a basis for settling the war, "it would create favorable conditions for t:he settlement of all substantive questions." Vietnamese Communist propa- ganda this week also reacted for the first time to reports that the US gradually plans to scale down its role in Vietnam before any political accommodation with tie Communists has been reached. I:n a broadcast on 2 February, Ha- noi ridiculed the idea of "de- Americanizing" the war. The Com- munists obviously would like to see the US withdraw its forces unilaterally and completely with- out making the Communists pay a price in return. They seem to fear, however, that the US is only considering a gradual with- drawal tied to the abilities of the South Vietnamese to take over the main part of the job them- sE~lves. They probably realize that if this were successfully e:~ecuted, even in part, it would undercut much of the pressure on the US to make political conces- sions to the Communists in order to end the war. Political Developments in South Vietnam Regional antagonisms appear to be increasing in virulence. Supporters of Vice President Ky ar_e involved both on the political SECl2.ET Approved F~t~e~~ase F00Fi1:~[7:~~-~DP79-009~~A0~~00020001-6 Approved For Release 200(~~:~A-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 front against Prime Minister Hu- ong's entourage and within the military against President Thieu's supporters. The. Ky-Huong rivalry--both personal. and professional--is in large-part drawn along north-south lines. Extremist southerners, many of whom hold influential gov- ernment positions, have begun a campaign to oust northerners from the bureaucracy. They claim that when Ky was prime minister, he dismissed many southerners from their government posts and that all key ministerial positions on the subcabinet level are con- trolled by northerners. Huong disapproves of this vendetta, but his close associates, southerners all, believe it is justified. To add to this suspicion and conflict, rumors of cabinet changes are again rampant in Sai- gon. Ky is returning from Paris to Saigon, where he reportedly 25X1 hopes to influence Thieu to place his own supporters in primary po- sitions. Ky still believes that only he can lead the country safely through the peace negotiations and into successful political competi- tion with the Communists. Military Developments in South Vietnam Many of the enemy's combat forces remain preoccupied with preparations for renewed offensive activities in key sectors of South Vietnam and little significant ground fighting was initiated by the Communists. Most fighting, generally small-unit actions, de- veloped in reaction to aggressive allied operations aimed at disrupt- ing the enemy's preparations for battle. Enemy gunners did, how- ever, launch mortar and rocket at- tacks against allied military po- sitions and installations in wide- spread sections of the country, none of which accounted for major damage or casualties. The provinces ringing Saigon continue to be the focal point of enemy troop shifts to enhance their military posture. Over the past few months, the Communists have amassed a formidable fighting force in the III Corps - Saigon area. At least four first-line infantry divisions are currently deployed in the outlying provinces of the corps, while the equivalent SEGRET Approved For~~~ease 20~6~~Ly S C~DP79-00927A006900020001-6 Approved For Release 2006/~1~RC~~RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 AN ;i 43 YEN ~,~~~ ~~~~~ CAM ',MANH SECRET Approved For Release 2006/03/16 :CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : ~~LA-F3.p~~-00927A006900020001-6 of an additional eight regiments is operative in the subregions im- mediately surrounding Saigon. The enemy also has sizable artillery, specialized combat, and local and guerrilla force assets in the area. The magnitude of such a buildup suggests that the III Corps - Saigon area remains of overriding importance to Commu- nist war planners and that it will be the scene of intensified combat over the next few months. The Communists have probably concluded that continued pressure in this strategic, heavily populated sec- tor is likely over the long haul to have the greatest impact on both the US and the South Viet- namese. Communist battle preparations continue in other parts of the country, but at a slower pace and with varying degrees of apparent urgency. The increasing threat in north and central South Viet- nam suggests that a new round of hostilities will include at least limited action on more than one front. Furthermore, it is becom- ing increasingly evident that the Communists are struggling to coun 25X1 ter stepped-up allied pacification efforts to assume more control of controversial areas. SECRET Approved For Rele 206/O~~g~~1~70927A~)0~9~0~001-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 SECRET COMMUNIST PRESSURE CONTINUES IN SOUTH LAOS An extensive enemy offensive may be unfolding in south Laos. On 2 February, North Viet- namese forces renewed their of- fensive against the government base camp at Thateng along the northeastern rim of the Bolovens Plateau. Although the 400-man garrison beat off several ground probes, much of the base's perim- eter defense has been destroyed. There are presently some five Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese battalions encircling the camp, which has made aerial resupply of the base extremely difficult. It is doubtful that the defenders could hold out against an all-out assault. Most recent fighting has centered on Thateng, but there are continuing reports of an enemy buildup in other areas of the Bolovens Plateau. The deteriorating situation at Thateng and the prospect of Communist moves elsewhere are wearing down the already slender resolve of the government's mili- tary commanders in the south. Without significant reinforcement from other regions, and given their state of near despair, the southern leaders might abandon im- portant positions to the Commu- nists, including the politically sensitive provincial capitals of Saravane and Attopeu. In the north, meanwhile, there has been no new major fight- ing. Military activity has been limited to enemy ground probes of the outlying defenses of General Vang Pao's headquarters at Long Tieng, and the exchange of iso- lated outposts southwest of Route 4 in the Muong Om area. The Na Khang area, site of a key govern- ment guerrilla base, remains quiet. sECRET Approved For Release 2006/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMAI~Y 7 Feb 69 Approved For Release 2006/03/16 :CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 SECRET Kremlin watchers were more intrigued than usual this week. This was partly because of the still cloudy shooting incident in Moscow last month and the treatment of sensitive issues in the Soviet press in ways that suggested controversy in the leadership. Kosygin was noted in public, how- ever, for the first time since late December. At week's end it was too early to tell if the total import of these matters equaled the apparent sum of their parts. Whatever the case, Moscow moved ahead on a number of diplomatic fronts. It welcomed President Nixon's action on the nonproliferation treaty and prepared for possible meetings of the four powers in New York on the Middle East. Articles in both Izvestia and Pravda reiterated Soviet readiness to talk on strategic arms limitation. In Czechoslovakia, with a party plenum scheduled for next month, factionalism and political bargaining are sharpening. The most powerful conservative figure, Husak, leader of the Slovak party, is moving to unseat Dubcek. He needs the votes controlled by Lubomir Strougal, leader of the Czech party, who so far does not seem to have been lured away from Dubcek. This may only mean the price is not right. A high-level Czechoslovak delegation led by national front chairman Erban was received in Moscow by all the top Soviet leaders during afour-day visit. Erban, a moderate supporter of Dubcek, is the highest ranking Czech- oslovak leader to visit Moscow since the fateful Kiev meeting last December. Rumania's Ceausescu anal Yugoslavia's Tito met in a Rumanian border town last weekend to consider conunon responses and tactics if Moscow puts the heat on in the spring. This is the sixth such comfort session the two Ba}kan leaders have had since January 19C>6. In Italy, continuing worker and student demonstrations preoccupied both the government and the Communists. Some leaders at the 12th Com- munist Party congress, opening on 8 February in Bologna, will want to back the demonstrators, but the party will probably avoid open endorsement in view of its policy of pursuing a peaceful road to power. West Germany's Gerstenmaier affair drew to a close. The veteran Bu:ndestag president stepped down on 31 January, victim of a public outcry over lus acceptance of a reparations payment stemming from the Nazi era. Re:fu ee Minister von Hassel was elected as his successor. SECRET' Appro~ d F~r Re~e,K~~06/03M 6R CIA-RDP79 Ob9 6 9A006900020001-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 S_F.CF':ET JOVIETS FOSTER ANXIETY ABOUT BERLIN ELECTIONS Soviet diplomats are fos- tering anxiety among some West German officials in an effort to get Eonn to reverse its choice of West Berlin as the site for electing the next federal presi- ~3ent on 5 March. While its pros- pects appear slim, Moscow's line suggests that it has same hope for a. relocation or, failing that, of extracting other West German concessions. economic and foreign affairs in Bonn's coalition government. Moscow clearly is appealing to party leaders and others who hope for achievements they can point to before West Germany's general elections later this year. Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin has scheduled another meeting with Foreign Minister Brandt, who the Soviets may expect to be susceptible to this tactic. :4n a conversation on 31 Jan- !aary with Major Schuetz of West 3erlin, the USSR's ambassador to ,Fast Germany strongly urged that the election be held in West Ger- rnany. He also said that Soviet ;~atie:nce is exhausted and that Serious countermeasures might be ~xpecaed, although, as ususal, these: were not specified. Schuetz 1ateY? told the British ambassador that the Soviet comments implied a stronger reaction than he had thought likely. Other Soviet officials have sought to play up differences among West German politicians by combining blandishmer.~t with the thre~its . For instance , the So- viet:~ have left the impression that the fate of possible agree- rnent:~ between Bonn arad Moscow on civi:L air routes, cultural and commercial exchanges, and the re- nunc~.ation of force could rest on Bonn's decision about the elec-? tion?? This is tailored especiall~~? for f:he Social Democz?ats, who have the ministries of transport and all-German affairs as well as This approach costs Moscow nothing and may reap benefits even though Bonn stays with its decision. By fanning contro- versy over the election, the So- viets seek to implant the notion that West Germany should at least t:ry to mollify the USSR by cutting back future activities in Berlin o:r by making concessions on other bilateral subjects. The West Germans have defended their orig- inal decision, but at the same time have hinted they might be willing to reconsider if the So- viets would grant concessions affecting the viability of Berlin. Such major Bonn figures as Chancellor Kiesinger and All-Ger- man Affairs Minister Wehner con- tinue to have reservations about the Berlin site. Their objec- tions center on the risk of So- viet and East German harassment and on the possible damage to Bonn's efforts to talk with Mos- cow on a broad range of issues. At present, however, the decision to hold the election in Berlin appears firm. 25X1 S1~;C K~~'1' Approved For Release 2006/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 Page g WEEKLY 15UMMAHY 7 Feb 69 Approved For Release 2006~~~,-G~-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 USSR PUSHES INTERNATIONAL FISHING OPERATIONS The continued expansion of So- viet commercial fishing operations has enabled the U5SR to penetrate many traditional fishing grounds of the free world. Strang protests by nations fearing Soviet exploita- tion of their marine wealth as well a.s the extension by some South Ameri- can countries of their territorial limits from l2 to 200 miles, how- ever, may- push Moscow toward greater international cooperation in fish- ing on the high seas. The Soviet fishing fleet--un- questionably the world's largest and most :modern--regularly operates in international waters of the At- lantic, Pacific, and Indian oceans as well as tYiie Caribbean Sea and African waters. Tn recent years, the movement of Soviet ships beyond their traditional fishing waters of the North Atlantic and the North Pacific. has-been facilitated by agreements that the USSR has reached with 14 underdeveloped countries. to develop their fishing industries. While providing for Soviet aid in establishing indigenous fishing fleets, parts, and canneries, these agreements also have provided fish- ing facilities for expanded Soviet activity in nearby waters. In re- cent months, Moscow has signed pacts covering fishery aid with Algeria, Chile, Iraq, and Pakistan, and a similar agreement is probable soon with Southern Yemen. Moscow also has cooperated with the Food and Agriculture Organiza- tion (FAO) in setting up seminars on various aspects of commercial fishing. Vast November, for example, trainees from Asian, African, and East European countries partici- pated in a four-week study cruise h aboard a Soviet oceanographic ship during which Soviet and other FAO experts gave lectures and demonstra- tions in marine biology and oceano- graphic science. The Soviet fishing fleet, which now includes more than 3,500 ocean- going fishing and support ships, is still being augmented. Recent ac- quisitions from Denmark include two trawler-training ships that will serve as floating schools to help meet the USSR's need -for profes- sional. seamen.. Each ship has ac- commodations for about 110 appren- tices plus classrooms for navigation and radio instruction. With the delivery of three more identical ships still on order, the USSR soon will be able to train 550 appren- tices at one time. Moscow also has placed orders for 40 fish-factory and refrigerator ships in Western countries as well as sizable. can- tracts for trawlers .with Poland and East Germany. In 1967, the Soviet fishing fleet brought in 5.8 million tons of fish--the third largest world catch for that year after Peru and Japan. Despite the modernization of the Soviet fleet and improvement in fishing techniques, however, the total fish catch of 8.7 million tons planned for 1970 probably is overly optimistic. The preliminary plan for 1971-75 calls for an increase of the total catch to only 9.5 -mil- lion tons in 1975, a projection of the annual average increase achieved since 1960. This rate of growth prob- ably reflects domestic inadequacies in fish-processing and refrigerating facilities as well as distribution problems. 25X1 SECRET Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY 7 Feb 69 Approved For Release 2006/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 Approved For Release 2~(~6~Q~I~6~.CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 FACTIONALISM SHARPENS IN CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY HIERARCHY Factional infighting among the Czechoslovak leadershi~~ intensi- fied as the pro-Soviet conserva- tives stepped up their efforts to gain greater influe:zae in the central committee. The conservatives are try- ing to put together a majority in the central committee before the party plenum next month. Slo- c?ak pasty leader Gustav Husak has solidified the Slovak group and is no~n~ trying to seduce Czech party boss Lubomir Strougal, who controls a key number of votes. e~ny cooperation between these two rnoder~ite-conservatives will be -ragi~.e at best, as both are guided. by thE:ir own ambitions and must also k~e responsive to the differ- ing interests of their constituen- :ies . The progressives,, their co- hesiveness apparently declining, are hoping to strengthen their position by forcing an early party congr~ass while they s1=i11 have a majority. The Russians, however, probably will not permit a con- gress until they can lie sure that a majority of delegates will sup- port the conservatives and mod- erates most responsive to Soviet objectives. Some pro~z?essives and moderates are now reassessing their positions as a result of the growing influence of the con- servatives, and a sizable defec- tion into Husak's camp could turn the tide against Dubcel~:. On 5 February, Dubcek tried to reas- sure his wavering progressive sup- portE:rs that he would. appose con- servative attempts to dominate the ~>arty as well as "extremist" efforts to create another crisis situation. Encouraged by the growing in- fluence of conservatives at the top levels of the party, pro-So- vie:t hard liners in the Ministry of Interior are becoming increas- ingly active. Meanwhile, the Dubcek leader- ship has responded to Soviet in- sistence to crack down on the out- spoken mass media. Party official:> have allegedly given editors an expanded list of censorship restric- tions, and some uncompromising radio and television personalities have been shifted. The regime also intends to transfer or demote more dissident journalists and to in- stitute pre-censorship for such anti-Soviet weeklies as Reporter, tl-ie Prague version of Time . The Soviets continue to find ways to make their requirements known to Czechoslovak officials on all levels of the party and govern- me:nt. Three more Czechoslovak dele- gations were in Moscow last week, including a national front entourage lE.d by presidium executive committee member Evzen Erban and including the heads of major mass organizations a:nd "puppet" political parties. In addition, Foreign Minister Jan Marko made a familiarization trip to the. USSR on 5 February. SEC'E~E'1' Approved For Release ?~~~~1~~~~P79-OO,~Z,E7~06900020001-6 Page 10 Approved For Release 2006/03,1~~~i~F~DP79-00927A006900020001-6 RUMANIANS AND YUGOSLAVS STEP UP COOPEaATION Rumania and Yugoslavia drew a bit closer as a result of the meeting between party chief Ceaus- escu and President Tito on 1 and 2 February. They probably agreed on common tactics in response to Moscow's efforts to force them into greater cooperation with the Soviet bloc. The two leaders may be look- ing ahead a few months to what they consider will be a time of troubles with their Communist neighbors. Rumors are rife in Eastern Europe of forthcoming summit meetings where basic changes will .be attempted in the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA). Mos- cow is said to be driving for a tighter command structure and greater standardization of forces within the pact. Greater integra- tion of the economies of Communist Europe would probably be on the agenda of a CEMA summit. Bucharest has consistently opposed measures of this sort on the grounds that they would in- fringe on its sovereignty. In light of the USSR's demonstrated willingness to use force in East- ern Europe, Rumania apparently fears it may be forced to accept Soviet demands in both CEMA and the pact or risk being isolated from the inner workings of each organization, or worse. mania. Details such as timing and location are yet to be set- tled. Because the maneuvers will in effect put pressure on Yugo- slavia as well, Tito would want to know Rumania's options and contingency plans if the USSR de- parts from the terms of the agree- ment on the maneuvers. In their communique, the two leaders em- phasized the UN resolution on friendly relations among European states, and may have been attempt- ing to direct attention to the possibility of heavy-handed Soviet tactics. They probably also discussed what attitude Rumania would take at working groups to prepare for an international Communist con- ference--both leaders have criti- cized plans to hold such a confer- ence. Yugoslavia stands by its previous position not to attend the meeting, but Rumania will have representatives present when the next working group convenes this month in Budapest. The two leaders announced an important agreement for ex- panded collaboration on indus- trial, scientific, and technical matters. Such collaboration is mainly intended to reduce the two countries' dependence on Mos- cow in these areas. Ceausescu and Tito probably thoroughly reviewed the question of the Warsaw Pact maneuvers to be held later this year in Ru- This is the sixth time the two leaders have met since Janu- ary 1966; they last met in August, to discuss and express their op- position to the invasion of Czech- oslovakia. 25X1 SECRET Approved For f$a~20d~''~:~~T9-00927A~1~~9~20001-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/16 :CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 SECRET SLOVENIA JJr, BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA Albanian National Minority in Yugoslavia ' Albanian minority group ---- Republic boundary -- - Autonomous province boundary MDN7H AND SITES 4F R)OTING November ~, Kp SO V O Poduje~ `"' ~.} . i+ec r, . Pristina .~- Suva .Gnjilane Reka, , -" Uroseva8 QCYE'n ~' . 7etovo r31.T3l~NIt1 SECRET Approved For Release 2006/03/16 :CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 Approved For Release 2006/~~~~7~'-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 MINORITY UNREST PERSISTS IN YUGOSLAVIA Violent disturbances late last year in Yugoslavia's Auton- omous Province of Kosovo and Re- public of Macedonia are sympto- matic of the country's omnipres- ent problem of nationalist rival- ries. Belgrade blamed "irredent- ists" and foreign intelligence activists for the riots but ad- mitted that its liberal minority policy had led to rising expecta- tions that could not be quickly satisfied. The economic bac}c- wardness of the area is at the base of the unrest. The demonstrators were a small but significant part--in- tellectuals, teachers, and stu- dents--of Yugoslavia's Albanian minority of about one million. They want republic status within the federal system for Kosovo. A few extremists called for union with Albania but apparently at- tracted little, if any, popular support. The only real evidence of a de:~ire for boundary changes was seen during the late Decem- ber riots in Tetovo, Macedonia, when a number of Albanians there carried placards asking for the inclusion of that area in Kosovo. These. is no evidence to sub- stantiate the regime's claims of foreign involvement, but the po- tential is there. A Hungarian official recently hinted that Budapest may exploit Yugoslavia's nationality problems unless Bel- grade tempers its stand on Czech- oslovakia. Belgrade has already complained about Hungarian broad- casts into Yugoslavia. Moreover, there i:~ the ever-present con- cern in Belgrade that Moscow might attempt to use Yugoslavia's nationality problems to counter Belgrade's criticism of Soviet policies. Albania periodically condemns Belgrade's "oppressive" policies in Kosovo. The. demonstrations occurred at a time when considerable at- tention is being placed on rais- ing the status of Yugoslavia's national minorities; Tito him- self has indicated sympathy with the Albanian cause. The regime has granted the Albanian minor- ity the right to display its na- tional flags and emblems and to celebrate national holidays. Opposition to the Albanian demands by Serbs and the conser- vative opposition within the Serbian Republic party has gained strength since the riots. In several instances, the Serbs elected delegates to the forth- coming ninth Yugoslav Communist Party .congress who were opposed to the regime's liberal minority policy. Only with great diffi- culty was the party able to annul the returns and elect more moder- ate candidates. Despite the rioting, regime officials indicate they intend to continue their liberal policy toward Kosovo. The problem is far from settled, however, and national rivalries could be a dis- ruptive factor during the party congress, scheduled to convene on 11 March. Furthermore, any concessions to the Albanian mi- nority could set a precedent for demands of the Hungarian minor- ity in the Vojvodina Autonomous Province, also a part of the Serbian Republic. SECRET Approved For`~el~~se 2~~~1~I6SU~P79-009717~~~6~020001-6 Approved For Release 2006/O~FZDP79-00927A006900020001-6 DE GAULLE: PROMISES FRENCH REFERENDUM THIS SPRING The referendum that President de Gaulle recently announced woLi.ld be held this spring officially wi:.l be on chancres in the Senate: and regional government. Many Frenchmen, however, will see it as a chance to vote for or agair:.st De Gaulle . He him~.e.lf would prob- ab'~y interpret a large "yes" vote on the referendum as a convincing-- if indirect--endorsement of his st~~tement last month that he pl~~nned to serve until his term ex~~ires in Decembes~ 1972. The referendum, the first since the one in October 1962 that established direct elections for the presidency ,. wi 11 provide,: for a radical overhaul in Frenerc local government ar-d will strip the Senate of most of its few re- maining powers. Councils will k.>e created for each of` the country"s 21 regions, and a ]_arge part of the. regional administration cur-~ rer~tly conducted iri Paris will be transferred to these councils. They will be compo:~ed of local councilors, deputies to the Na- tional Assembly, and representa-- ti~~es of labor, farmers, and business organizations as well as of the universii:ies. The Senate, a traditionali::~t body that has tendE:d to be host:~_le to Gaullist programs, will become purely consultativE:. It will "e:xamine" all economic and plan-- ni:ng legislation before submiss:'Lon to the National Assembly. De Gaulle has long contended that the Senate, heavily weighted in favor of rural areas, has ceased to be representative, Calling voters to the poll; at a time when labor and studenl~ unrest continues and the econom:~c outlook is still uncertain carr:i.es the risk of a high abstention rate. If the vote is in March, which many observers are predici:- ing, it will coincide with a scheduled round of wage talks between unions and employers-- a potential source of serious industrial trouble. De Gaulle, however, may reason that condi- tions will be even less auspi- cious later in the year, There is discontent over the austerity program designed to save the franc and oppositio~z to the embargo De Gaulle recently imposed on arms to Israel, but his popularity rating has re- mained relatively stable. In polls taken late last month by the reputable French Institute of Public Opinion, 53 percent of those queried said they were satisifed with the President. His personal popularity, coupled with the favorable attitude to- ward regionalization that even many Gaullist critics have, would seem to ensure a referendum vic- tory. Centrist political lead- ers are predicting that between 55 and 65 percent of those who vote will a rove the referendum. S~:GKET Approved For F~~asgg200~/8$d41;Y: ~IpA1-F~~1D'9-00927AB~9Q~20001-6 Approved For Release 2006/Q~I~~~C-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 The Arab states and Israel focused their attention on US discussions of the Middle East and a possible favorable US response to the French proposal for four-power talks. The Arab states were hopeful that such talks would begin, but Israeli leaders viewed this possibility as the beginning of an eventually imposed solution. The Iraqi Government, after considerable diplomatic pressure from many nations, released an American oilman imprisoned on trumped-up charges of espionage. The release was portrayed as a magnanimous gesture, perhaps to counter world-wide indignation over the recent public hanging as alleged Israeli spies of 14 Iraqis, nine of whome were Jews. In Pakistan, President Ayub invited opposition leaders to meet with him on 17 February and he asked the spokesman for the opposition coalition to select the invitees. Reaction to the proposal has been lukewarm, and many opposition leaders believe that Ayub must make some significant conciliatory gestures before discussions can get under way. Even if the meeting takes place, there is little hope that it will end the turmoil or resolve the political crisis. Prospects for Congress Party gains in northern India are poor as the midterm state assembly elections get under way. The earlier trend toward Congress in West Bengal apparently has been arrested. In Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, Congress probably will fail to gain enough seats to form stable governments. Congress appears a sure loser in the Punjab, where a local Sikh communal party and the Hindu nationalist Jan Sangh have come on strong. ~Jigerian federal leaders are showing increasing signs of frustration as they prepare for another offensive. The Biafrans are again apparently re- ceiving considerable amounts of arms over the nightly airlift and appear capable of at least maintaining the military stalemate. Eduardo Moncilane, leader of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and the strongest voice for moderation, was assassinated on 3 February. The Front has been beset by dissension, and Mondland may have been killed by members who advocate a more militant policy. SECRET Approved Fo~~el~se 20T6s~T~11p[~RI~P79-009'2kAbA6?~0020001-6 Approved For Release 20~Q~/1~?~~IA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 2X1 1 RAWALPINDI 17 January Approved For Release 2~I~~CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 dots and Demonstrations in PAKISTAN Approved For Release 2006/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 SECRET PAKISTANIS PRESIDENT AyLJB PROPOSES TALKS KITH OPPOSITION President Ayub's announce- ment that he will invite "respon- sible" opposition parties for talks has temporarily placed a damper on antigovernment vio- lence, lout it appears unlikely to resolve the country's three- month-old political crisis. In his eagerly awaited first- of-the-month broadcast, Ayub indicated that he is ready to discuss opposition proposals and will "have no hesitation in agreeing to any settlement that is arrived at through mutual dis- cussions." He emphasized that the 1962 Constitution--which he has stolatly defended in previous speeche:~--can be amended. He did not enumerate specific as- pects of the constitution that he considers negotiable, however, and did not suggest that he would meet key opposition demands for a parliamentary system of gov- ernment and direct elections. All major opposition parties, except ex - foreign minister Bhut- to's leftists and the pro-Peking extremists, will reportedly be in- vited to participate. Independ- ent government critics with no party affiliation, such as Asghar Khan, will apparently not be in- cluded. Most opposition leaders are far from optimistic about talks. The few who have commented on the proposal are skeptical of Ayub's motives and suggest that he is only trying to divide the opposition. The new opposition coalition has said that its "collective opinion" will be expressed in due course. Thus far, however, Ayub has done nothing to create a favorable climate for a meeting--such as ending the state of emergency or releasing political prisoners-- and there is considerable feeling that he must make some such gesture before talks can begin. Some leftist leaders and dissident students have already rejected Ayub's offer and de- manded that troops be withdrawn from all cities. In both East and West Pakistan, students are continuing to defy the govern- ment and to press their demands. They will probably refuse to accept any compromise whatever. Opposition plans are as yet un- clear, but a "negotiate and fight" strategy seems most likely-- conferring with the regime for immediate gains but maintaining an activist stance to force further concessions. President Ayub is probably also pessimistic about the out- come of the talks. If they fail, he will be faced with the unpleasant choice of far-reach- ing concessions or more repres- sive measures, with martial law as a last resort. He could justify harsh tactics by point- ing out that he had first tried conciliation. Many observers continue to believe that the turmoil can only be brought to an end if Ayub steps down, Al- though such a move would be out of character for him, the possi- bility cannot be completely dis- counted. SECRET Approved For Release 2006/03/16: CIA-RDP79-009?~7A0~69~g0020001-6 Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY Fe 25X6 gpproved For Release 2006/03/16 :CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/16 :CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 SECRET ARMY DISCONTENT RISING IN CONGO KINSHASA) Army discontent appears to be increasing in Congo (Kinshasa). In its new mood, the Congolese Na- tional Army (ANC) belatedly joins other sectors of the population that have suffered a decline in living standards while the regime seemingly ignores their plight. The troops are unlikely, however, to transform their complaints into actions in the near future. The ANC in the past has fared better than other groups because it forms the base of President Joseph Niobutu's power structure, and Mobutu has paid it special attention. Junior officers have long been unhappy with the army hierarchy, which is studded with incompetent and often semiliterate veterans who served in preinde- pendence~ days and got their posts only thY~ough seniority. Mobutu still depends upon the continued loyalty of tYiese men, and his de- cision t:o keep them in command po- sitions rather than retire them is based on political and not mil- itary considerations. Several recent events, how- ever, have further irritated the already disgruntled troops. The military pay raise on 1 January was far short of what was antici- pated and what junior officers January two widely respected colo- nels were dismissed and replaced 25X1 by cronies of the notoriously un- popular ANC commander, Louis Bo- bozo. Morale at ANC headquarters sank to a new low, and antigovern- ment handbills began circulating. The military is not really out of line in voicing displeasure. Since the 1967 monetary reform, prices have gone up freely while wages were controlled, and the average Congolese has experienced a one-third decrease in his stand- ard of living. Yet, when money is tight and the government sup- posedly operating on an austerity budget, Mobutu has been extrava- gant with his personal spending and his handouts to friends and allies. Moreover, Mobutu cur- rently is preoccupied with intra- African affairs and has neglected serious domestic problems. At this time, no civilian is in a position to challenge Mobutu, and army malcontents seem unpre- pared to carry their threats through. They have no leaders of sufficient stature to replace Mo- butu should they attempt a coup. There is no indication that the discontent extends to the key para- military units who are personally responsible--and resentl to al- to Mobutu. SECRET Approved For Release 2006/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY 7 Feb 69 Approved For Release 2006/0/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 SECRET SOUTH AFfZICA~S AFRIKAfJERS AGITATED ABOUT APARTHEID apartheid in South Africa is being questioned anew not only by tradi~~ional opponents of Pretoria': segregationist policies, but also by Afrikaner intellectuals and other influential memk~e:rs of the rulinq_ Afrikaner community. Crit- icism from within the Afrikaner ~~itadel will not induce major =changes in the government's policy, but it: may eventually force the Nationalist Party leaders to deal more realistically with the imprac-? ticali_ties of apartheid. 1~Tuch of the recent criticism of apartheid comes from the Afri- kaans press despite th.e fact that each of the major Afrikaans-language newspapers has at least two cabinet, members on its board of directors. One of the more influential, con- servative Afrikaans papers has states. "that the whites of South Africa. are not spiritually prepared. for th.e great undertaking of sepa- x-ate d.evelopment," and that most whites are enthusiastic "segregation talkers" but lukewarm "segregation doers." Another, more liberal Afri- kaans paper has expressed consider- able concern over the government's failure to even come close to the minimum goals for Bantustan develop- ment. One of the more independent ~~f the Afrikaner-run papers went so far as to warn its readers that the white community cannot expect to =xominate the black maj~arity indefi- :~itely. Among the recent ?~ritics of apartheid has been an ~=m.inent Afrikaner sociologist :From Pre- toria University who evoked wide- spread reaction by his statements tr.at the ideals and goals of apart- hEid will never be reached, and tYerefore should be abandoned. TYis same professor has supported tre call of several key Afrikaner newspapers for the holding of a "volkskongres'' of representative whites to reflect on the basic ccncepts of apartheid. The administrator of Natal Province, an Afrikaner reputed to be something of a Nationalist Party renegade, has also been notably frank in his criticism of apartheid. His primary message has been to the effect that apart- heid cannot work without major :ne;~ sacrifices--in terms of money, confort, and effort--by the whites to ensure the success of the Afri- can homelands program. Further, he has said that at '?five minutes to twelve" the South Africans can no longer proceed at a leisurely ox-cart pace in the implementation of apartheid. Such criticism of apartheid doriation of all of the Interna- tional Petroleum Company's (IPC) holdings, the government has an- nour~ced that the company's "debt" to t:he state has been placed at more than $690 million. In a speech on 6 February, President Vel~~.sco said measures were being ado~~ted to assure payment of the huge: debt and criticized the US for its threatened use of eco- nomic sanctions against Peru. IPC failed to ma}~:e payment on t February as demanded on an alleged $15 million debt to the state oil company for refined oil products drawn from the ex- proP~riated Talara refinery and used. in IPC's distribution out- lets. The state oil company has threatened to confiscate IPC's remaining assets and auction them. off to fulfill the obligation. Although the finance minister promised IPC's president that the company would be given an ex- tension to 8 or 9 February, there is no assurance that he can de- liver on this promise. Meanwhile, Peru established diplomatic relations with the So- viet Union on 1 February amidst great fanfare and high-sounding speeches, The event received broad coverage in the local press, with most publications supporting 'the move. Only the conservatives, whose original support for the military government has been wavering anyway, expressed dis- approval, In addition, a Soviet com- mercial mission arrived in Lima on 5 February. The Soviet am- bassador to Chile, in Peru for the exchange of notes on 1 Feb- ruary, is reported by the Peru- vian press as stating that the i:TSSR could supply Peru with ma- chinery and equipment for its oil industry, as well as heavy :Farm equipment and assencer airplanes, SECRET 25X1 Approved Fo~;l~ele~e 20~~6/g~t7~hRC~P79-00926?00020001-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 SECRET UNREST INCREASES IN CHILEAN COUNTRYSIDE C~-1ILE Area Severely acted by Drought '~ Area Moderately Affected 6y Urought Farmers in southern Chile are becoming increasingly disturbed over low prices for their crops and the threat they see from the agrarian reform program. Their grievances are complicated by the damage caused by the current drought, the worst in more than forty years. On 15 and 18 January, land- owners demanding higher government prices for wheat erected roadblocks at several strategic points along the Pan American Highway in south- ern Chile. More than forty persons were arrested, including the pub- lisher of a rightest newspaper. Because of the drought, over- all agricultural output is expected to be 20 to 30 percent less this year than last. In addition to the immediate serious effects on crop output and livestock herds, the drought is causing landowners to lay off some of their employees, These peasants, encouraged by some Socialist members of parliament, have invaded farms, and police force has been needed in some cases to dislodge them. The landowners also are appre- hensive about the impact of the gov- ernment's agrarian reform program, fearing that their lands will be seized without ade uate com ensa- tion. SECRET Page 2 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY 7 Feb 6 9 Approved For Release 2006/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 S]~JCR]E'I' GROWING RAPPORT BETWEEN ANDEAN AND COMMUNIST COUNTRIES Peru's renewa.L of relation;: with the USSR on 1 February fol- lo~~rs a year of increasing contacas between the Communist nations oa` Europe and the countries of north- ern and western South America. Since Colombia and the USSR re- esi;ablished relations in Januar~~ 19Ei8, there has been a flurry of'.' Ea::tern European visitors, an- nouncements of commercial negotia- tions and agreements, and prob- ings by the Andean countries to- waz~d diplomatic recognition. Peru noticeably increased contact with Eastern Europe dur- ing 1967 and 1968. Growing mar- kets in the bloc fo:r its major export, fishmeal, led. to the dis- patch in mid-1968 of a large dele- gation that negotiated commercial or ~~onsular agreements with the USS:E2, Czechoslovaki~~, Poland, Hun~~ary, and Rumania. Since President Belaunde':c ouster on 3 October, the military government has moved quickly to establish dip~~.omatic relations with Rumani~~., Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR, and to ratify some of the agreements that had been pend- ing. The Peruvian foreign minis- ter announced that scientific and technical as well as economic as- sistance will be sought from the USSR. and implicitly accused the US of a lack of interest in the development of Peru. rity but without overstepping t]ze very correct image they are car~a- fully cultivating in the Andean nations. Soviet propaganda has praised the Peruvian junta for its expropriation of US oil hold- ings but the U55R will probably withhold final judgment until it: is more certain of the lasting nature of the military govern- ment's "anti-imperialist" pos- ture. The Soviet economic mis- sion that arrived in Lima on 5 February will probably be will- ing to extend economic credits to Peru, but whether such credits will lead to any more actual economic benefit to Peru than has yet been the case for Chile re- mains to be seen. Among the ma- terials suggested by the mission, according to the Peruvian press, was equipment for exploiting petroleum deposits. Venezuela has resumed a di.s-- cussion of renewed relations with the US5R that was interrupted by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Caracas presently has diplomatic ties with Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, and is moving toward :resumption of relations with the 175SR and Hungary, possibly be- :Eore President Leoni leaves of- :Eice in early March. President- elect Caldera also favors rela- tions with all countries, includ- ing Eastern Europe and the US5R. The Soviets , ob~aious 1y pleased by the Peruvian Govern- ment's defiant attit~xde toward the TJS, have respondE:d with alac- The Ecuadorean Government ex- pects a Soviet delegation--appar- ently the one now in Lima--on 1.5 February to discuss both the SECRET Page ~ 4 WEEKLY E~ UMMARY 7 Feb 6 9 Approved For Release 2006/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 SECRET exchange of ambassadors and "for- malization" of commercial rela- tions. Ecuador's expectations have been raised by cocoa sales for $12 million cash to the U5SR in 1968 and prospects of selling a large and economically criti- cal crop of bananas of a type un- wanted in Japan, the US, or Western Europe. In return it has accepted offers from the U5SR, Poland, Rumania, and Czech- oslovakia to sell electrical in- stallations, machinery, cement, vehicles, and other products. ~- Bolivian President Barri- entos' recently reiterated in- terest in seeking credits from the U55R is apparently a combina- tion of reluctance to be left be- hind and a drive to pique US at- tention. The likelihood that Eastern. European countries and the So- viet Union can contribute sub- stantially to increased markets or economic development of the Andean countries is not great. More important is the opportun- ity to establish Communist mis- sions as an accepted and inte- gral part of the local scene in these countries. Thus far, the Communist representatives have been careful not to give grounds for any suspicion of their ac- tivities. The rapid growth of the Soviet Embassy in Colombia to 23 officials indicates, how- ever, an intent to establish a strong presence. Columbia has three representatives in Moscow. INDEPENDENCE CONFERENCE ON $RITISH HONDURAS DELAYED British Honduran Premier Price's request to postpone the constitutional conference set for March has temporarily reduced ten- sions acid provides additional time for negotiation between Britain and Guai~emala on Guatemala's century--old claim. A basis far settlemE~nt is not yet clear, how- ever, and the pressure for indE- pendence will continue to build. The impasse stems from Gua- temala's demand for hegemony over British Honduras and Britain's refusal to accede to any agree- ment that would be unacceptable to Belize. Guatemala contends that resolution of its territorial claim to the colony must be a pre- condition to any movement toward independence and that any prior announcement of a constitutional conference would virtually destroy hope of a negotiated settlement. Guatemala has rejected the British offer of~two million pounds to settle the dispute, however, and SECRET Approved Foar~'2e~e5ase~~/'~bu: GIA-RDP79-00792E1PA-D0~900020001-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 SECRET British Honduras: Territorial Claims >~ ~-M idClleseX~ BRITISH HONDURAS X11 ~~~ t~ ~Starin Creek GLJA'I'E~~I~A,;? :a$ io ~; Puerto Corte$ ua~r~u1Y e- r~~ Area claimed by M exico(In abeyance unless Guatemala gains territory) Area claimed by Guaeemala 25 50 _ STATUTE MIL E9 HRITIS H: HONDURAS 93789 2.69 CIA appears to be holding out for some control over British Honduras' de- fense and foreign affairs. Price regards his party's overwhelming victory in the 1965 election as a mandate to proceed with independence, and he is de- termined to achieve it before the next general election which must be held no later than March 1970. His. request to Britain for a post- ponement of the constitutional conference appears to have been a political move rather than the be inning of a new polic Thus, rel- atively little time remains for a settlement to be negotiated which would preclude. the need for a British defense guarantee. The British, thus far, have been re- luctant to extend such a commit- ment but in :the absence of a set- tlement of the Guatemalan claim they would probably have to in- clude this guarantee as part of the independence agreement. The opposition National Inde- pendence-Party fears that its chances of toppling Price would be slim if independence is granted, and-are. therefore strongly in fa- vor of delay until after new elec- tions. Should-.the oppoosition do well in the city council elections, its contention that Price does not have a- mandate to lead the country to independence will be stronger. In that event, the British might be able to gain additional time for negotiations by pressing-Price to delay until after new elections. SECRET Approved.:Fp~~~Re~~ase~~rR/~3/~~~~tDP79-0~9~~~-0$~900020001-6 25X1 gpproved For Release 2006/03/16 :CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/16 :CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 A~aor Release 2006/03/16 :CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6 Secret Approved For Release 2006/03/16 :CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6