WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006900060001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 7, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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e
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
Secret
KT:`1: U.FN TO RECOiWS C ;NTEtt 4 2.
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE 7 March 1969
JOBe ~Uu il0$/O ax..~ No. 0360/69
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C O N T E N T S
(Information as of noon EST, 6 March 1969)
Far East
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
VIETNAM
The over-all level of attacks tapered off during
the week, but enemy forces continued sporadic shell-
ings and ground assaults and have hit Saigon twice
with rocket fire. The Communists also appear to
have begun a selective terrorist campaign against
Saigon government leaders.
CHINESE ECONOMY HAMPERED BY MAOIST PROGRAMS
A debate that may be under way among Chinese lead-
ers over broad issues affecting the economy suggests
that the outlook for economic growth is highly un-
certain.
SOVIET-JAPANESE ECONOMIC COOPERATION CONTINUES
Conclusion of an agreement calling for some increase
in trade this year and the first export of Japanese
machinery for a Siberian development project attest
to the continuing economic relations between the two
countries.
COMMUNIST MILITARY ACTION PICKS UP IN LAOS
The Communists' capture of the key guerrilla base
at Na Khang breaks a two-month military lull in the
north, while in the south the enemy is once again
turning on the heat.
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BERLIN ELECTION HELD WITH LIMITED HARASSMENT
The West German presidential election took place in
Berlin on 5 March as scheduled and was subjected
only to limited harassment conducted under careful
Soviet control.
BORDER CLASH PUBLICITY POINTS UP SINO-SOVIET ANTAGONISM 12
The incident, which may have been. the most serious
of the past two decades, is seen as an extension of
the bitter propaganda battle that Moscow and Peking
have waged since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia.
CZECHOSLOVAKS STILL HAVING PROBLEMS WITH "NORMALIZATION" 15
The Dubcek leadership continues to have problems at
home amid signs that the Soviets are less than satis-
fied with the slow progress toward "normalization."
FRENCH TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY DEVELOPS SLOWLY
President de Gaulle's continued emphasis on the stra-
tegic, rather than the tactical, components,of the
Force de Dissuasion has delayed the development of
tactical nuclear weapons,.
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Middle East 4- Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
ISRAELI SUCCESSION STRUGGLE APPARENTLY POSTPONED
Labor Party leaders have settled on Mrs. Golda Meir
as interim prime minister until the next elections.
The two real contenders for succession--Acting Prime
Minister Allon and Minister of Defense Dayan--appar-
ently intend to bide their time for the present.
EQUATORIAL GUINEA'S RELATIONS WITH SPAIN DETERIORATE
President Macias' angry attack last week on Spanish
activities in Equatorial Guinea has inflamed local
tensions and led to a serious deterioration in
Guinea's relations with Spain.
STUDENT DISCONTENT STIRS UNREST IN ETHIOPIA
This week's student demonstrations failed to get off
the ground, but did bring into focus evidence of
serious discontent within the country.
TANZANIA'S MILITARY NOW ALMOST WHOLLY DEPENDENT ON PEKING
The impending departure of the Canadian military
training mission spells the end of non-Communist in-
fluence in the Tanzanian security forces and leaves
Peking with the dominant role.
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WAR STALEMATE PUSH::NG NIGERIANS TOWARD MOSCOW
With the civil war still stalemated, federal lead-
ers are turning increasingly toward Moscow for
moral and material. support.
Western Hemisphere
VENEZUELA INAUGURATES FIRST CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PRESIDENT 27
No major policy changes are in prospect because of
the razor-thin majority by which Rafael Caldera was
elected in December.
CRACKS APPEAR IN PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT SOLIDARITY
Two cabinet resignations last weekend mark the
first break in the unified front projected by the
military government to cover up dissension among
top military leaders.
BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT DECREES REGULATORY MEASURES
The government and its military backers are contin-
uing their campaign to root. out "subversion." Two
new Institu.ticnal Acts issued last week deal with
the election process and agrarian reform.
CHILEAN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS SHOW RIGHTIST SENTIMENT 29
The results of the elections on 2 March indicate
that the political right has returned to importance
with new vigor. President Frei's Christian Demo-
cratic Party lost control of the Chamber of Deputies
and is three votes short of control of the Senate.
NICARAGUA THREATENS CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET 30
President Somoza's recent efforts to solve Nicara-
gua's financial problems and to speed the pace of
regional integration could set off a spiral of re-
taliatory actions gravely threatening the future of
the market.
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The first phase of the Communist spring offensive in South Vietnam
apparently has ended. Military activity last week returned to the pre - 23
February level, featuring sporadic shellings of allied positions and some
urban centers. This lull, however, probably is only a pause while Communist
forces prepare for the next round. Signs are beginning to appear that the
Communists are trying to use this offensive to counter recent government
gains in the pacification program. The primarily political aims underlying
Communist tactics were also evident in the attempted assassination of Prime
Minister Huong and in the renewed rocket attacks on Saigon. The Commu-
nists clearly are seeking to undermine and demoralize the Saigon government
and to stimulate US - South Vietnamese differences over the proper allied
response to these provocations.
In Laos, the Communists' capture of the key government guerrilla base
and airstrip at Na Khang broke a two-month lull in the northeast and raised
the prospect of a serious deterioration in the government's position through-
out northern Laos. The Communists are now moving against the remaining
government bases in the northeast in an apparent drive to eliminate a
government presence in areas nominally under Pathet Lao control since the
1962 Laos settlement. In south Laos, the Communists have intensified
pressure along the western edge of the Bolovens Plateau but heavy air strikes
have prevented a new North Vietnamese assault in the three-month-old siege
of Thateng.
The Chinese Communists have seized upon the 2 March clash on the
Ussuri River frontier to stage country-wide demonstrations denouncing a
wide range of Soviet policies and calling for the overthrow of the new "new
tsars" in Moscow. Tightly organized and controlled demonstrations at the
Soviet Embassy in Peking are continuing. The Chinese leaders almost cer-
tainly regard this new outburst of anti-Soviet chauvinism as a highly effective
backdrop for their impending ninth party congress.
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VIETNAM
The over-all level of Commu-
nist attacks tapered off during
the week from the high-point
reached during the first few days
of the current offensive. The
enemy continued to shell allied
positions and urban centers, how-
ever, and Communist ground forces
in battalion strength or better
struck several allied positions.
Hardest hit by enemy ground
forces were two US Marine fire-
support bases just south of the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and a
US infantry company that lost
more than forty men in an engage-
ment in the central highlands.
For only the second time in the
war, Communist tanks were used
in South Vietnam when an enemy
force unsuccessfully attacked the
Ben Het Special Forces camp in
the highlands. The enemy was
also unsuccessful in an attempted
assault on the Bien Hoa Air Base,
which was repulsed with heavy Com-
munist casualties.
The civilian populace was
subjected to several attacks from
Communist forces during the past
few days. Saigon was hit on
3 March and again on 6 March by
rocket fire, causing a large num-
ber of civilian casualties. These
attacks clearly are acts of de-
fiance designed to produce more
pressures on the US and to create
divisions among the allies. Sev-
eral other urban centers, includ-
ing Da Nang, Pleiku, and Tay Ninh,
were periodically hit with harass-
ing rocket and mortar fire. Hue
remains unscathed thus far in the
current offensive.
The heaviest civilian casu-
alties occurred when two villages
in the highlands were overrun by
Communist forces. In one, more
than 70 inhabitants were killed
by Communists. In the second, no
casualty figures have been re-
ported as yet but Communist forces
are entrenched in the village and
a portion of it was set on fire.
To tie in with their military
offensive, the Communists now ap-
pear to have begun a selective
terrorist campaign against gov-
ernment leaders. The enemy prob-
ably sees the elimination or in-
timidation of key officials as an
important element in a coordinated
effort to undermine the South Viet-
namese Government. Prime Minister
Huong was the target of an assas-
sination attempt on 5 March, the
day after a prominent Saigon edu-
cator was shot to death. Other
attacks may soon follow as the
Communists attempt to shake the
government. Numerous recently
captured documents and prisoners
testify to the Communists' intent
to stage a series of terrorist at-
tacks in conjunction with the main
force military action.
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Enemy Activity in the
Countryside
will probably make a substantial
effort to counter recent govern-
ment gains in this area.
Initial reports from the
South Vietnamese countryside sug-
gested that the Communists had
not made any significant effort
to attack government pacification
teams. In the last several days,
however` there is some indication,
especially in II Corps, that the
Communists may be stepping up
their campaign, particularly by
reeking out and killing govern-
ment cadre at the village level.
Although Communist attempts to
eliminate the government presence
in the countryside are less dra-
matic than assassinations of rank-
ing Saigon officials, the cumula-
tive effect could be far-reaching
in the long-term competition for
control of the rural population.
Before the current Communist cam-
paign runs its course, the enemy
Soviet-Built Amphibious Tank (PT-16)
of the Type Used in Ben Het Attack on 3 March
The lack of significant enemy
activity in the countryside is re-
flected in current local elections
now in progress in South Vietnam.
The first of four successive Sun-
day elections for local officials
was successfully completed on
2 March. Voter turnout was un-
usually heavy, with candidates
running for council seats in 92
villages and for administrative
offices in 189 hamlets. Communist
harassment was minimal and appar-
ently ineffective.
Casualties Show Campaign
Differences
Preliminary data on casual-
ties for the first week of the
the PT-76 is very lightly armored
and undergunned for a modern tank.
Its inherent ability to float and to pro-
pel itself across inland water obstacles
far outweighs these limitations, however.
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current offensive underscore some
of the differences between this
campaign and the major enemy of-
fensives of last year. By con-
centrating on stand-off mortar
and rocket barrages and generally
limited ground attacks, the Com-
munists have succeeded in inflict-
ing roughly the same number of
casualties on allied forces as
during the first week of last
year's Tet action while taking
less than half as many casualties
themselves. This year, however,
enemy forces have accomplished
far less in terms of disrupting
South Vietnam's urban centers,
where they suffered a great num-
ber of their losses last year.
Civilian casualties as a result
of enemy action are thus far much
lower than at Tet 1968, further
demonstrating the relatively low
level of Communist attacks on
urban centers.
Most evidence indicates that
the relative lull in fighting is
merely a pause while the enemy
prepares for another round of of-
fensive activity, probably within
the next few days. The Communists
can strike with little warning at
several key areas of the country,
particularly in III Corps.
Reports continue to indicate
that the Communists still plan to
mount at least a limited attack
against Saigon or its environs.
Political Developments
In Paris, meanwhile, the
Communists continue to mark time,
presumably in part to await the
effect that their current offen-
sive may have on the allies.
North Vietnam's chief negotiator,
Le Duc Tho, remains in Hanoi and
as yet there is no indication of
when he will return to Paris.
Vice President Ky left Paris for
Saigon on 6 March. He apparently
intends to commute frequently be-
tween the two cities in order to
keep in touch with political de-
velopments in South Vietnam-
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CHINESE ECONOMY HAMPERED BY MAOIST PROGRAMS
Official pronouncements on
the eve of the ninth party con-
gress suggest that a debate is
under way among Chinese leaders
over broad issues affecting the
economy. There is a note of real-
ism in the discussions of manage-
ment in industry, but Maoist ex-
perimentation continues in the
agricultural sector., Under these
circumstances, the outlook for
economic growth is highly uncer-
tain.
Provincial and metropolitan
newspapers are elaborating upon
a call first made in a People's
Daily editorial on 21 February
for unified planning, diligence,
and frugality; lenient treatment
of politically suspect managers
and technicians also was urged.
In the Chinese context, this con-
stitutes a "pragmatic" line in
direct contrast to the revolu-
tionary attitudes simultaneously
espoused by People's Daily. This
latter approach has severely dis-
rupted management and production
on several occasions during the
Cultural Revolution.
Industrial prcduction im-
proved somewhat during the last
half of 1968. According to Pe-
king, output during this period
"increased by a big margin" over
the first six months of the year.
Nevertheless, it is, doubtful that
total 1968 industrial output
reached the pre - Cultural Revolu-
tion level of 1966. Output of
electric power, chemical ferti-
lizer, cement, coa=_, and trucks,
for example, is be=_ieved still
below 1966 levels despite some
gains last year.
A dramatic improvement in
industrial performance is unlikely
as long as the government contin-
ues to emphasize radical political
and social reforms. While most
factories are operating in more
or less orderly fashion, politi-
cal programs are drawing away sub-
stantial numbers of workers to
supervise Red Guards at schools
and universities. Managers and
technicians also are being re-
moved from their posts on the
ideological ground that they re-
quire special political reform
because they are "nonlaborers."
Political priority also is
apparent in agricultural policy.
Food production is still the
most fundamental economic activ-
ity in China, so that Peking
must weigh the effects of each
policy change on output. Experi-
ments with changes in methods
of remunerating peasants never-
theless continue, including such
policies as giving political
standing equal weight with work
performed in determining pay,
and reducing the size of private
plots.
Peasants are further bur-
dened by being forced to provide
for millions of urban dwellers
transferred to rural areas as
"surplus population" or candi-
dates for reform through labor,
programs that will tend to under-
mine peasant incentives during
1969. Agricultural prospects
otherwise would be fairly good
because chemical fertilizer sup-
plies are building up from re-
vived domestic production and
from imports that arrived too
late for use on crops last year.
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SOVIET-JAPANESE ECONOMIC COOPERATION CONTINUES
Conclusion of an agreement
calling for some increase in trade
this year and the first export of
Japanese machinery for a Siberian
development project attest to the
continuing economic relations be-
tween the USSR and Japan.
The trade agreement calls for
a modest increase in total trade
this year to $700 million. Al-
though the agreement calls for bal-
anced trade, Japan's negotiators
voiced considerable concern over
their recurring import surpluses
resulting from Soviet failure to
buy sufficient Japanese goods.
Last year, Soviet sales in Japan
exceeded purchases by about $280
million.
This situation stems from the
nature of trade between the two.
Japanese businessmen, who find the
USSR a convenient source of many
raw materials, continue to expand
purchases of lumber, metallic ores,
and coal to meet the needs of their
rapidly growing industry. On the
other hand, the Soviet Union is
not a large importer of the type
of machinery and consumer goods
that the Japanese specialize in
exporting.
In response to Tokyo's con-
cern, Moscow again this year has
indicated it would import a large
number of ships and several com-
plete plants, but this goal prob-
ably will not be achieved. The
USSR also has allowed Japan, its
leading trading partner in the de-
veloped free world, the largest
business representation of any
non-Communist country in Moscow--
eight permanent offices represent-
ing 13 firms.
The agreement also provides
for Japan to export machinery for
the development of Siberian timber
resources as part of the first bar-
ter deal involving development of
northern Siberia. Japan is to sup-
ply $133 million worth of plant
and equipment in return for about
$163 million worth of Soviet lum-
ber over the next five years. In
addition, Japan will export $30
million worth of consumer goods.
Permanent committees continue
to study other plans to develop cop-
per, coal, and oil resources in Si-
beria, but little outside the tim-
ber deal has materialized because of
disagreements over financing and
the kinds of goods to be exchanged.
One possible deal, recently revised,
involves the development of natural
gas on Sakhalin Island. Under the
new plan, natural gas would be sent
to Japan via pipeline; this is be-
lieved to be less costly than ship-
ment in liquified form in tankers,
as called for in the previous pro-
posal. The firms studying this al-
ternative believe that 2.5 billion
cubic yards of gas eventually could
be delivered to Japan annually.
Despite continuing economic
ties, serious political problems re-
main between the two countries. Fun-
damental disagreements center on the
USSR's retention of four islands
north of Japan seized at the end of
World War II, the US-Japan security
treaty, and Japanese membership in
what Moscow considers pro-Western
regional groupings such as the Asian
Development Bank and the Asian Pa-
cific Council.
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COMMUN[ST MILITARY ACTION PICKS UP IN LAOS
The Communists' capture of
the key guerrilla base a Na Khanq
breaks a two-month military lull
in northern Laos, while in the
south the enemy is once again
turning on the heat.
On 1 March a two-battalion
North Vietnamese force inflicted
heavy casualties while overrun-
ning the most important govern-
ment querrilla base that remained
in the northeast. Although a
number of enemy units had been
sighted moving toward the base's
defensive perimeter during the
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previous two days, the government
forces apparently were surprised
by the determined attack. The
base's defenses had been weakened
last month when guerrilla forces
were withdrawn to counter enemy
threats to the south.
The capture of Na Khang is
another major step in the Commu-
nists' long-standing effort to
eliminate the government's pres-
ence in areas nominally under
Pathet Lao control since the 1962:
settlement. It is not likely
that heavily outnumbered govern-
ment defenders can hold the re-
maining isolated outposts in Sam-
neua and northern Xieng Khouang
Province should the enemy push
the current offensive.
In the south, meanwhile,
there are fresh signs of increas-
ing enemy activity along the west-
ern edge of the Bolovens Plateau.
In recent days, enemy forces have
attacked local defenders in the
Khon Sedone area, and there have
been 25X1
among villages astride Route 13
near Pakse.
This Communist effort may be
designed to force the government
to bolster its thinly stretched
forces in the Mekong Valley by
withdrawing troops committed to
the defense of Thateng. Heavy
air strikes have prevented dug-in
North Vietnamese from launching
new ground assaults in the three--
month-old struggle for that base.
1 1 25X1
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Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY 7 Mar 69
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The passing of the latest Berlin "crisis" left some unanswered questions
about Soviet - East German relations and the clear impression that Moscow
managed the situation with the larger issue of East-West relations firmly in
mind. A poorly coordinated Communist effort to strike a deal with Bonn
that would have shifted the West German presidential election from Berlin
continued right up to election eve and suggests there were at least tactical
differences between Moscow and Pankow.
From the beginning, however, the Soviets set limits on the amount of
harassment that would be allowed and carefully controlled those activities
that affected the Western Allies. Almost overlooked was the election itself,
in which the Social Democratic Party candidate, Gustav Heinemann, won a
narrow victory that may have a pronounced impact on interparty relation-
ships in Bonn and on the West German parliamentary election next Septem-
ber.
Meanwhile, the USSR and its Eastern European neighbors were still
trying to work out a common line on several intrabloc problems concerning
the organization and functions of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA. The most
pressing issue seemed to be the degree of Moscow's control and use of these
organizations in applying the principle of "limited sovereignty" in Eastern
Europe.
While the Soviets seem less than satisfied with Czechoslovak progress
toward "normalization," the Czechoslovak press for the most part remained
outspoken, the trade union congress was demanding a lessening of party
control, and Czechoslovak writers were boycotting a meeting of Soviet and
Eastern European writers in Budapest. In an outspoken speech, Dubcek
himself promised to continue the fight against those who want to recreate
the "intolerant atmosphere" that existed before January 1968.
The Yugoslavs were busy preparing for their ninth party congress,
which will open early next week. The major emphasis will be on bringing
new blood into the party and into policy-making positions, but Tito will stay
on. Neither the Russians nor certain of their hard-line allies are expected to
attend.
In France, labor, management, and the government were engaged in
reviewing the accords reached after the troubles last spring. Labor's demands
for increased wages and benefits far exceeded the government's offer.
Whether the ra k aid file will quietly settle for less remains to be seen.
Meanwhile, the price of gold rose to new highs.
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Travel Restrictions Around Berlin
Temporarily Restricted Area.
military liaison personnel.
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BERLIN ELECTION HELD WITH LIMITED HARASSMENT
The West German presidential
election took place in Berlin on
5 March as scheduled and was sub-
jected only to limited harassment
conducted under careful Soviet
control. Even at the eleventh
hour, however, the Communists
evidently thought that some chance
remained for a change of venue.
Moscow on 2 March again urged
Bonn, as it had on 23 February,
to bargain with East Germany (GDR).
The East Germans, apparently less
eager to deal the issue away,
marked time until the afternoon
of 4 March, when West German
electors already had assembled
in Berlin. The GDR then sweet-
ened its earlier proposal of
Easter passes only by offering
to consider an extended agree-
ment covering other holidays, but
only if the election first were
moved from Berlin. The East Ger-
mans scarcely could have been
surprised that the bid was re-
jected, and in all of this there
was the hint that Moscow and its
ally were not entirely of one
mind.
During the week, Moscow's
hand was much in evidence through-
out a series of sporadic autobahn
closures. The Soviets manned the
checkpoints when allied military
convoys were affected, attributed
delays to exercise-related troop
movements, and in some cases told
the convoy commander exactly when
the closure would end.
West German travelers oc-
casionally experienced long waits,
but were processed expeditiously
if they were en route to East Ger-
many's Leipzig fair, open from 2-
11 March. The rights of the West-
ern Allies and their access to Ber-
lin were not challenged. Communist
harassment during the election was
not as severe as in 1965, when ex-
ercises within the air corridors,
sonic booms, and "buzzing" over
Berlin were directed against a
plenary session of the West German
Bundestag.
Having failed to get West
Germany to change the election
site, the Communist objective be-
came one of intimidating Bonn so
that it would desist from future
efforts to strengthen political
ties with West Berlin. Moscow
clearly kept an eye to its other
interests, however, including the
possibility of exploring areas of
agreement with the new US admin-
istration.
At the same time, Moscow left
open the possibility that harass-
ment of West German access would
continue after the elections. On
28 February, it raised another and
separate issue by charging that
Bonn is using Berlin for illegal
According to Georgiy Sannikov, Soviet
second secretary in East Berlin:
Within the next six months, the East Germans
will gradually restrict the transport of industrial
goods on the highways, right down to the
buttons on Bundeswehr uniforms...
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military purposes. No systematic
application of tighter controls
over West German traffic has yet
begun, but a Soviet Embassy of-
ficial in East Berlin has warned
that. in the next six months the
GDR would be allowed to curb fur-
ther the flow of industrial goods
manufactured in the city. He
said. Moscow had approved an East
German plan that the USSR then
answer Bonn's objections with a
suggestion that Bonn negotiate
with the GDR. The Russian diplo-
mat added that Moscow has been
too preoccupied with prospective
arms talks, the Middle East, and
Vietnam to "work out the intri-
cacies of inter-German tactics."
BORDER CLASH PUBLICITY POINTS UP SINO-SOVIET ANTAGONISM
The clash between Soviet
and Chinese armed border units
on t:he Ussuri River on 2 March
may have been the most serious
of the past two decades. Both
sides have admitted casualties.
Moscow charged that 200 Chinese
troops were involved and that
the Soviet border-post commander
was among those killed. Accord-
ing to Peking, the Russians used
armored cars and tanks.
in the public exchanges fol-
lowing the encounter, Moscow and
Peking both acknowledged that
armed incidents on the border
have not been uncommon in recent
years. The ownership of various
islands in the shifting Amur and
Ussuri rivers has long been a mat-
ter of contention. and indications;
of incidents along the two rivers
have cropped up periodically.
The increased tension over
the border issue for the past
several months is an extension
of the bitter propaganda battle
that Moscow and Peking have
waged since the Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia. In Septem-
ber, Peking publicly protested
for the first time the overflight
of its border territory by So-
viet reconnaissance aircraft and
called attention to the Soviet
military build-up adjacent to
China. The Chinese charges
were mainly timed to exploit So-
viet embarrassment in Czechoslo-
vakia, but probably stemmed
also from heightened uneasiness
along the border. Peking had
not publicized previous protests
of overflights and the military
:build-up had been going on since
1965 with little public Chinese
comment.
Further evidence of border
tension was contained in several
charges by Peking in December
accusing the Russians of border
provocations. The magnitude of
the incident on 2 March may ac-
count for the haste with which
Moscow, contrary to usual prac-
tice, acted in publicizing it.
Peking probably interprets
Moscow's publicizing the clash
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as propaganda aimed at further
blackening China's image. In
countering the initial Soviet
protest, the Chinese strongly
emphasized that the disputed is-
land had always been Chinese ter-
ritory, "even according to the
unequal Sino-Russian treaty of
1860," and stressed the "re-
straint" of Chinese border guards
during the incident. Pointing
to the continuing Russian build-
up along the frontier, a joint
People's Daily - Liberation Army
Daily editorial charged that the
Soviet leadership, "greedier than
the Tsars," had further terri-
torial ambitions in China. The
editorial brought into sharp
focus Peking's claim that large
parts of Siberia are rightfully
Chinese, lost in unequal treaties
to the Tsars. This issue, es-
pecially sensitive to Moscow,
last flared into open debate
in 1964.
The willingness of each side
to air sensitive border issues
is evidence of the territorial
and national security antagonisms
that have often been concealed
beneath ideological rhetoric.
With the Soviets preparing for
the approaching world conference
of Communist parties and the Chi-
nese for their ninth party con-
gress, the two sides may well
continue exploiting this emotional
issue.
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CZECHOSLOVAKS STILL HAVING PROBLEMS WITH "NORMALIZATION"
The Dubcek leadership con-
tinues to have problems at home
amid signs that the Soviets are
less than satisfied with the slow
progress toward "normalization."
Defense Minister Dzur's week-
long familiarization visit to the
Soviet Union lacked tangible re-
sults. On his return, however,
Dzur hinted that Czechoslovakia
might strengthen its armed forces
as an earnest of its intention to
improve relations with the USSR
and others in the Warsaw Pact.
Last week, Czechoslovak party
secretary for mass media Josef
Kempny went to Moscow and Soviet
politburo member Pelshe arrived
in Prague. Kempny's visit could
result in new restrictions on
Prague's still outspoken press,
radio, and television. Pelshe
can be expected to argue the need
for strong party discipline.
The Czechoslovak trade union
congress, which opened on 4 March,
is expected to call for a broad-
ening of the restricted, post-in-
vasion version of last spring's
reform program. This would be a
clear warning to Czechoslovak
leaders that further concessions
to the Soviets at the expense of
domestic reforms will be resisted.
In his opening speech, trade union
chief Polacek said that the trade
unions would support the Communist
Party, but emphasized that they
would play a more independent role
rather than shrink to "second-
class status" solely to satisfy
party policy. The Dubcek lead-
ership faces the danger that the
trade unions might try to usurp
the party's role as defender of
the nations' rights and liberties.
The dissident Czechoslovak
writers' union refused to send a
delegation to a meeting of Soviet
bloc writers that opened on 5 March
in Budapest. The Czechoslovak
writers want an apology from their
Soviet counterparts for their at-
tacks on a Czechoslovak writers'
union president now in exile.
The government has activated
a civilian-dominated State Defense
Council in an effort to increase
its control over the defense ap-
paratus. Dubcek, who will head
the nine-member council, probably
will try to use it to curb the
influence of pro-Soviet elements
in the Ministry of Defense--whether
successfully or not remains to be
seen. Since the invasion, a num-
ber of pro-Soviet military officers
have been installed in key posi-
tions and--with the assistance of
Russian advisers--are said to be
seeking control of the ministry.
In addition, progressive jour-
nalists have warned that it is an
"open secret" that the hard liners
have made considerable inroads in
the secret police, and that the
progressives in the Interior Minis-
try are now on the defensive. The
conservatives, moreover, reportedly
have also made substantial inroads
into the People's Militia, the para-
military force of the Czechoslovak
Communist Party.
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FRENCH TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY DEVELOPS SLOWLY
President de Gaulle continues
to emphasize the strategic nu-
clear components of the Force de
Dissuasion and to disclaim inter-
est in a tactical nuclear capa-
bility for France. As a conse-
quence, development of tactical
weapons and a tactical nuclear
missile is moving at a slow pace.
Aircraft delivery systems for tac-
tical nuclear weapons are pro-
gressing well, however, partly
because the aircraft are needed
for other roles. Budgetary re-
strictions and political con-
straints probably will not per-
mit development of a tactical nu-
clear capability for the air
force prior to 1971, and for the
army until somewhat. later.
When France withdrew from
the integrated NATO commands in
1966, it lost its tactical and
air defense nuclear' capability.
Nike missile units in the air
force returned all equipment to
US control, and Honest. John Mis-
sile battalions in the army no
longer have access to nuclear
warheads. For the present,
France's only operational nu-
clear weapons are those held by
the Mirage IV strategic bomber
force,
Some Mirage III-E fighter-
bombers already have been modi-
fied for--and French pilots
trained in--the delivery of tac-
tical nuclear weapons. The Super
Mirage F-1 also may be used to
carry nuclear weapons. Now in
preproduction stage:, it is sched-
uled to become operational in
1970. The Franco-British Jaguar
fighter-bomber, scheduled to enter
service in 1972, is another nu-
clear-capable aircraft. The second
model began flight tests last month
at Istres, France, and seven Jaguars
are scheduled to fly before the end
of 1969.
For some years, the French Army
has been developing a short-range
surface-to-surface ballistic mis-
sile---the Pluton--designed to carry
a nuclear warhead about 65 miles.
This program has received only
minimal government support, however,
and the missile probably will not
achieve scheduled operational status
Although government sup-
port remains lukewarm, the French
Army looks on the system as the only
means by which it can obtain nuclear
weapons and play a meaningful role
in the French defense posture.
Despite De Gaulle's position,
Defense Minister Messmer and General
Fourquet, chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, continue to talk
favorably about a tactical nuclear
response capability for France.
Messmer has at least tacitly sup-
ported such a capability, and Fourquet
recently expressed again his long-
standing concern over what he con-
siders the general deterioration of
France's conventional forces and
their lack of a tactical nuclear
capability.
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Israel's former foreign minister Golda Meir, 71, is a shoo-in to succeed
Eshkol as prime minister. Her rival, the popular Moshe Dayan, simply did
not control the political levers of power necessary to gain the premiership.
It looks as if the next trouble spot in the Arab-Israeli conflict will be
along the Suez Canal, where Egyptian sniping is taking its toll among the
Israelis.
There is still a large gap between the Shah of Iran's demands for oil
revenue and the planned production level of the Western oil consortium. The
annual negotiations, scheduled to begin on 10 March, could be even stickier
than usual this year.
Pakistani President Ayub is preparing to resume talks with the opposi-
tion Monday amid a rash of strikes and the re-emergence of regionalist
agitation in West Pakistan.
A new rift apparently has developed in Tunisian-Algerian relations
which diminishes hopes for harmony in the Maghreb. Algerian Foreign
Minister Bouteflika will not make the official visit to Tunisia scheduled for
this month. The Algerian Government had expected the visit would comple-
ment recent gestures of solidarity among Algeria, Morocco, and Libya.
Ghana's military government has released the two Soviet trawlers and
their crews detained since last October, but the captains must stay long
enough to testify before a government commission. The receipt of a strongly
worded protest from Soviet President Podgorny and the ostentatious pres-
ence of four armed Soviet ships probably contributed to the Ghanaian
leaders' decision.
Equatorial Guinea's already shaky government apparently is badly
divided over how to deal with the current crisis in its relations with Spain,
and its prospects for survival, even if a settlement is reached, are not good.
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ISRAELI SUCCESSION STRUGGLE APPARENTLY POSTPONED
ra'he old guard managers of
Israel's ruling Labor Party, aim-
ing to retain control of the party
and to block Minister of Defense
Dayan from succeeding the late
prime: minister Eshkol, have de-
cided on one of their own, former
foreign minister Golda Meir, as
interim prime minister until the
next elections. Mrs. Meir's can-
didacy is designed. to postpone a
slashing party struggle now, and
to give the old guard.--led by
Secretary General Pinhas Sapir,
himself a potential successor--
t.ime to deal with the ambitions
for party leadership of two Is-
raeli-born military heroes, Act-
ing Prime Minister Yigal Allon
and Dayan.
As the majority party, the
Labor. Party determines who will
be Israel's leaders. It is in
the firm control of the old guard,
the now-aging Zionists of Eastern
European origin who led Israel to
independence and have held the
reins of leadership since 1948.
They know they cannot: blunt for-
ever the demands of the younger
Israeli-born "sabr.as'"--as repre-
sented by Allon arLd Dayan--for a
turnover of leadership, but they
are intent on retaining control
as long as they can.
The old guard's current tac-
tic is to stress the necessity
for national unity and the avoid-
ance of a divisive and unseemly
party struggle. All the real con-
testants have apparently agreed
to await another day--until the
parliamentary election campaign.
Sapir, the principal old guard
tactician, is subordinating his
personal ambitions in pushing
Mrs. Meir's candidacy. Allon is
unusually silent and may well have
been led to believe that he will
have party backing to succeed Mrs.
Meir.
Dayan, the most formidable
contender because of his immense
national popularity, has made no
serious bid, either. Apparently
to keep the record straight for
the future, he and his RAFI fac
tion supporters have stated they
will support no other candidate
and are abstaining on the vote
for Mrs. Meir. Dayan recognizes
that the Labor Party is the only
path to power, and has apparently
decided to bide his time.
Mrs. Meir will be 71 in May
and is not in robust health. She
has had extended periods of ill
health, but probably will be
physically able to hold office
until the elections, when, as she
has already indicated, she does
not plan to run again. From now
to then--the fall elections may
be advanced--the struggle for
leadership of the party will con-
tinue, if muted. Unless Dayan
decides to make a real play in
the Knesset over Mrs. Meir's con-
firmation--and he would have to
take the unlikely course of bolt-
ing the party now--the flash point:
may well come when the party meets
in convention (previously set for
June) to decide the ranking of
leaders on the voting lists.
part
y_ 1
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,AE I
EQUATORIAL GUINEA'S RELATIONS WITH SPAIN DETERIORATE
President Macias' angry at-
tack last week on Spanish activ-
ities in Equatorial Guinea has
inflamed local tensions, started
an exodus of Spanish residents,
and seriously strained Guinea's
relations with Spain, from which
it gained independence last Octo--
ber. The stability of this small
Afr:_can state remains uncertain.
Macias' outburst culminated
several weeks of emotional dia-
tribes against alleged Spanish
intentions toward. his country
that generated increased anti-
Spanish sentiment. among the
Guineans. The President had de-
plored Spain's failure to pro-
vide substantial aid, blaming
local Spanish officials for not
adequately presenting his views
to their government. He also
condemned the "colonial" atti-
tudes of Spanish residents.
In mid-February, the Presi-
dent: focused his attack on the
visible symbol of Spanish pres-
encee, the Spanish flag, and on
23 February ordered national
guard troops to remove the flag
from a Spanish consular office.
In an acrid confrontation with
the Spanish ambassador, Macias
then declared the ambassador per-
sona. non grata and is said to
have requested that all Spanish
nationals leave the country.
With panic spreading rapidly
among the resident Spaniards,
local Spanish authorities briefly
deployed police units based in
Equatorial Guinea under an agreed
interim arrangement to guard their
embassy and other strategic fac-
ilities. Macias reacted by com-
plaining to the UN about Spanish
violation of Guinean sovereignty,
requesting the urgent dispatch of
a peacekeeping force. In tele-
grams to General Franco, Macias
demanded the immediate with-
drawal of all Spanish forces
as well as the removal of the
ambassador and a consul. He has
apparently not pressed for the
departure of all Spanish nationals,
however.
Madrid's official reaction
has been cautious. The government
has recalled its ambassador and
dispatched an ambassadorial-level
trouble-shooter as an interim
charge. Spanish officials have
quietly conferred with more
moderate members of the Guinean
government, and apparently hope
to negotiate a resolution of the
conflict. Madrid has promised
to withdraw its forces when the
security of its citizens is as-
sured. Meanwhile, it is facili-
tating the orderly evacuation of
those Spanish nationals who wish
to leave.
For the present, tensions
remain high and emergency meas-
ures, including a curfew that at
least temporarily closed down Red
Cross relief flights to Biafra,
continue in effect. Newly armed
and jittery Guinean national guards-
men patrol the capital, and bands
of youthful militia armed with
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machetes and confiscated Spanish
handguns have appeared in the
country's other major city. Either
of these groups could spark a
further chain of events that
neither side could control. The
already shaky Macias government
apparently is badly divided over
how to deal with the crisis, and
the prospects for its survival,
even if a settlement is reached,
are not good. Spanish evacuation
from Guinea, if completed, is
likely to cause a serious deteri-
oration of the Guinean economy
and could prompt either the local
security forces or one of Macias'
many political rivals to seize
power.
STUDENT DISCONTENT STIRS UNREST IN ETHIOPIA
This week's student demon-
strations in Addis Ababa failed
to get off the ground, but did
bring into focus evidence of se-
rious discontent within Ethiopia.
The demonstrations by uni-
versity students, long among the
most vocal of Haile Selassie's
critics, came at a time when the
central government was grappling
with serious internal problems.
Over the past several months, gov-
ernment fiscal mismanagement--
exacerbated by the rising costs
of combating unrest and insur-
gency in Gojam, Bale, and Eritrea
provinces--brought the country
to the brink of economic crisis.
The government seemed incapable
of actions commensurate with the
severity of its problems. Except
for a cabinet reshuffle in mid-
February and the adoption of
stringent austerity measures,
the Emperor remained unwilling
to initiate any significant meas-
ures to modernize the economy--
which might also have the effect
of stimulating future social or
political changes.
As a result, grumbling
against the government by stu-
dents, teachers, civil servants,
and others of the educated elite
has become more open than usual.
There was also evidence of dis-
content within the armed forces
over pay and other grievances.
Some degree of anxiety even be-
came evident among the general
public as word of the government's
difficulties leaked out. Against
this background, an unusually
tense atmosphere developed in
Addis Ababa during the past two
weeks as it became apparent that
student demonstrations were im-
minent. There was apprehension
among some government and mili-
tary leaders that serious student
riots on the scale of those reached
in past years might require mili-
tary intervention, with unfore-
seeable consequences for the
government.
Prompt and firm action by
the security forces, including the
arrest of some ringleaders, pre-
vented the students from getting
out of hand, and the threat of any
immediate crisis appears to have
subsided. The underlying causes
of the discontent remain, however,
and will continue to simmer until
changes are made or another crisis
erupts.
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TANZANIA'S MILITARY NOW ALMOST WHOLLY DEPENDENT ON PEKING
President Nyerere's decision
to terminate Canadian military
assistance marks the end of his
efforts to find a. balanced, non-
aligned approach to military de-
velopment. It leaves Peking with,
a dominant role in all branches
of Tanzania's expanding security
forces and a strong base from
which to increase its influence
in the southern African libera-
tion movements.
Nyerere informed Ottawa last
month that its military training
programs with both the army and
the army's air transport wing
will. not be renewed in 1970. Fol-
lowing the mutiny of his British-
trained army in 1964, Nyerere had
sought to avoid dependence on any
single major power, and had asked
Canada to reorganize and train
the army. He obtained new arms
from. Australia, the USSR, and
Communist China.
Although the 86-man Canadian
mission has done a superb job,
Tanzania has in the interim be-
come deeply involved in the Afri-
can liberation struggle, and Ny-
erere has had to reassess his posi-
tion as fear of Portuguese retali-
ation became more acute. The
Tanzanians are suspicious of
Canada's NATO ties with Portugal
and now find it both inadvisable
and embarrassing to ;nave white
Western advisers in their command
structure. They are also impa-
tient over Canadian reluctance to
approve Tanzanian acquisition of
sophisticated weapons.
Unable to procure modern arms
from Western nations or to pay the
market price for Soviet equip-
ment, the Tanzanians have turned
increasingly to China for materiel
and specialized training, which
they can get free or on easy terms.
Chinese aid has so far included
enough small arms for 20,000 men,
as well as trucks, antiaircraft
guns, medium tanks, engineering
equipment, patrol boats, and land-
ing craft; construction of an
arms repair facility and an $8
million police training school;
and weapons training for 9,50()
police and many of the civil
militia being regrouped in "so-
cialist defense" villages along
the Mozambique border. With the
cooperation of the Tanzanian Army,
Peking has also given arms and
training to the Mozambique guer-
rillas.
Tanzania is now expanding
its army to 10,000 men, a 30-
percent increase, and is estab-
lishing a separate navy and air
force. Known Chinese commitments
to this program include construc-
tion of a $1.5 million army bar-
racks complex, a factory to pro-
duce small-arms ammunition and
mines, and a radar station.
Chinese aid to the navy under a
$10 million agreement will in-
clude more patrol boats and the
construction of a navy base at
Dar es Salaam. In addition, Pe-
king will probably provide an air
defense system including jet
fighters.
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The Tanzanians have also
asked Peking to provide aid and
advisers to the expanding National
Service, a paramilitary youth
corps formerly run by Israeli
advisers. Current Soviet mili-
tary aid is limited to a small
training mission on Zanzibar Is-
land and the provision of arms
to liberation groups. Moscow
offered an
elaborate
air defense
system last
year in
response to
a Tanzanian
request
but it was
turned down
as being
far too
expensive.
Not the least of Peking's
advantages are the militant po-
liticians in Tanzania's Defense
Ministry who consistently over-
rule the cautious British-
trained armed forces commander
and seem able to convince Nyerere
that there is less risk in ac-
cepting Chinese aid than in be-
coming too dependent on some
Western country, such as Canada. 25X1
The Chinese may also have made
the provision of more sophisti-
cated weaponry contingent u Don 25X1
Canadian withdrawal.
WAR STALEMATE PUSHING NIGERIANS TOWARD MOSCOW
Fighting has tapered off
somewhat in Nigeria's civil war,
now in its 21st month and still
stalemated.
Federal forces, still unable
to launch their planned "final
offensive," have regained some
territory lost to the Biafrans
recently along the southern
front, but have not been able
to break through to the federal
units cut off in the town of
Owerri, which controls access to
the Biafran heartland from the
south.
On the northern front, the
secessionists have not yet been
able to re-establish a secure
link with their stranded brigade
northeast of the Niger River
town of Onitsha. This brigade
controls one of the most impor-
tant Biafran food-producing
areas, and the secessionists are
making a determined effort to
open a corridor to the isolated
unit.
Gowon,
who has been obtaining the major
portion of Nigeria's arms from
the UK and from the open arms
market, probably would prefer to
continue to do so, but the fed-
eral forces' inability to achieve
a military victory is apparently
forcing him to turn more and more
to Moscow.
On 5 March, four Soviet
naval ships arrived in Lagos,
having cruised in West African
waters since visiting Guinea in
mid-February. This was the first
such visit to Nigeria and probably 25X1
reflects the willingness of
Nigerian leaders to expand mili-
tary contacts with the USSR.
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The congressional elections in Chile and plans for future elections in
several other countries dominated the news from Latin America this week.
Panama's military junta has officially decreed the "extinction" of all
political parties pending revision of the electoral code governing formation
of new parties. Figurehead junta leaders Pinilla and Urrutia say that the
move is intended to ensure that no one "gets advantage" in the elections
promised-but not guaranteed-for early 1970.
President Balaguer of the Dominican Republic has hinted that he may
run for re-election in May 1970. There is no constitutional prohibition
against a second term, but the subject of extended one-man rule is a hot
public issue, stirring memories of Trujillo's hated 31-year dictatorship.
The ruling Revolutionary Party in Guatemala has selected Finance
Minister Fuentes to replace foirner defense minister Chinchilla as its new
standard bearer for the presidential elections in March 1970. Fuentes has
been involved in party affairs for many years, but is still not a particularly
strong contender.
A bitter and vindictive political campaign for the general elections in
Costa Rica next February is already beginning to take shape. The two
leading presidential candidates at this point are former presidents Mario
Echandi and Jose Figueres.
In other political developments, Peru's military government has tenta-
tively decided that if the US asks it to return the destroyer USS Isherwood
because of the recent fishing boat incident, all five US ships on loan will be
sent back and probably replaced by ships purchased from the United
Kingdom. Peru now has two destroyers and three smaller craft on loan from
the US, but only the Isherwood could be subject to US legislation requiring
the recall of ships on loan to a country that seizes US fishing boats.
The Dutch governor of Surinam has appointed Arthur J. May, a retired
diplomat, to head a caretaker government following last month's resignation
of long-time minister-president Johan Pengel. May is a good administrator
and at least initially is expected to have support for his triple task of putting
Surinam's financial house in order dissolving parliament, and preparing the
country for new elections. 25X1
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CRACKS APPEAR IN PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT SOLIDARITY
The two cabinet resignations
last weekend mark the first break
in the unified front projected
by Peru's military government to
cover up dissension among top
military leaders.
The event that prompted the
resignation of General Valdivia,
the finance minister, and General
Maldonado, the development min-
ister, was the formation of a
committee to investicrate charges
that certain members of the mil-
itary government had been remiss
in protecting Peruvian rights by
allowing the International Pe-
troleum Company (IPC) to take sev-
eral million dollars out of the
country in the period following
the expropriation last October.
In his letter of resignation,,
General Valdivia cited his disap-
proval of the make-up of the in-
vestigating committee and his re-
sentment of the fact that he had
not :been consulted about its
formation. In fact, his position
in the government had been tenu-
ous for some time because of his
general espousal of moderate pol-
icies and his special efforts to
convince other government leaders
of the serious consequences of
not resolving the dispute with
the US over IPC. His successor,
General Francisco Morales-Ber-
mudez, will bring many of the
same views to the office, but
Valdivia's loss will be felt by
those moderates in the govern-
ment who oppose the more radical
policies of President Velasco.
Minister of Development
Maldonado gave similar reasons
in his letter of resignation but
he was obviously becoming in-
creasingly bitter because his ad-
vice was being ignored by the
President. His ministry was the
one that should have been instru-
mental in the making of policies
regarding the IPC, but Velasco
relied much more heavily on his
civilian advisers in petroleum
matters.
This so-called "kitchen cab-
inet" of Velasco's has come to
have increasing influence in the
government in the past few months,
particularly in matters concern-
ing the IPC dispute. Velasco's
advisers are all ultranational-
istic, with the majority of them
coming from the left of the po-
litical spectrum. Augusto Zimmer-
man, chief editor of the national-
istic and influential El Commercio,
and Alberto Ruiz Eldredge, a well-
known leftist lawyer known to have
had ties to Communist front groups,
appear to be Velasco's chief ad-
visers. President Velasco seems
to be attracted primarily by their
ultranationalism, knowledge of pe-
troleum affairs, and anti-IPC out-
look.
The cabinet changes do not
:seriously alter the balance of
power between the so-called mod-
erates and radicals within the
government, although the new de-
velopment minister, General Jorge
Fernandez Maldonado, is more anti-
IPC and pro-Velasco than was his
predecessor. The possible further
loss of key members of the central
bank and the state petroleum com-
pany, however, could deprive the
government of needed expertise and
of realistic advice on the serious
consequences of some of its cur-
rent policies.
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VENEZUELA INAUGURATES FIRST CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PRESIDENT
Rafael Caldera, Venezuela's
first Christian Democratic presi-
dent, will be inaugurated on 11
March in an atmosphere of eco-
nomic and political stability.
In view of his razor-thin
plurality, the 52-year-old Cal-
dera is unlikely to embark upon
any major social or economic re-
form programs early in his five-
year term. Rather, he will con-
centrate on broadening support
for his administration and enact-
ing noncontroversial parts of his
party program.
Caldera realizes that he
must tread carefully in his deal-
ings with a congress that will
be dominated by his political
opponents. Leaders of the former
governing Democratic Action Party
have already served notice they
oppose any change in petroleum
policy or, for that matter, any
other major policies formulated
in the past ten years under Demo-
cratic Action administrations.
Caldera's cabinet will prob-
ably be noncontroversial, with
emphasis upon technical exper-
tise rather than party affilia-
tion. It is expected, however,
that Perez La Salvia, Lorenzo
Fernandez, and Luis Alberto
Machado, three of Caldera's close
advisers within the party, will
receive important positions in
the new government.
Although extrem- 25X1
ists are capable of sporadic act
to demonstrate their presence,
they lack the capability and,
indeed, the unity to disrupt the
country's political stability.
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BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT DECREES REGULATORY MEASURES
The Costa e Silva govern-
ment continues to issue Institu-
tional Acts (IA) regulating po-
litical development and codify-
ing the principles of the 1964
revolution. Two new acts were
promulgated last week--one deal-
ing with the election process,
the other with agrarian reform.
On 26 February, the Presi-
dent decreed IA 7, which in ef-
fect precludes elections under
any circumstances for some time
to come. It suspends all elec-
tions in which only part of a
government body is elected and
gives the President sole power
to call new elections. The act
also forbids many of the prac-
tices by which unscrupulous state
legislators enriched themselves
at public expense.
Initially, IA 7 will affect
mainly local administrations; the
federal government will have the
power to appoint inte:rventors
whenever municipal offices be-
come vacant. If the act is still
in effect in November 1970, how-
ever, it will eliminate the elec-
tions for one third of the fed-
eral senate which are scheduled
at that time.
On 27 February, the Presi-
dent issued IA 8, which stream-
lines agrarian reform expropria-
tion machinery. Complementary
laws establish agrarian reform
associations to function as work-
ers' cooperatives and set out the
ground rules for expropriation--
abandoned land, irrigation pro-
jects, or areas of "grave social
tension." Landowners undoubtedly
are exerting pressures to have
this act modified, but if the gov-
ernment decides to implement such
measures, it will have taken a
major step toward the type of so-
cial reform demanded by its lib-
eral critics.
Students also came in for a
share of government attention.
Schools reopen this month, and
Costa e Silva has decreed stiff
penalties for any professors,
teachers, or students who engage
in demonstrations or other politi-
cal agitation. "Guilty" teachers
will be prohibited from teaching
for five years, students will be
expelled and barred from entering
any school for three years, and
foreign students will be deported.
This will probably quell student
enthusiasm for taking to the
streets, but it is likely to drive
top-flight students and teachers
abroad and have an adverse effect
on attempts to reform the outmoded
educational system.
There is no sign that the gov-
ernment and its military backers
are nearing the end of their cam-
paign to clean up Brazil and root
out "subversion." Continued
purges and restrictions seem
likely for some time to come.
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CHILEAN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS SHOW RIGHTIST SENTIMENT
The results of the congres-
sional elections in Chile on 2
March indicate that the politi-
cal right, far from being a po-
litical corpse, has returned to
importance with new vigor. The
conservative National Party,
formed in 1966 from two older
parties, cut deeply into the
support of President Frei's
Christian Democratic Party (PDC)
to win 20 percent of the vote.
The PDC is still Chile's largest
party, with about 30 percent of
the vote, but its image of a
strong center-left party offer-
ing revolution without violence
has been badly damaged.
The composition of the new
Congress will cause problems for
any further reforms attempted by
President Frei during his remain-
ing year and a half in office.
His party lost its majority in
the Chamber of Deputies and now
holds only 55 of 150 seats. In
the Senate, although the PDC
won 13 seats for a total of 23,
it is still three seats short
of control. Some battles may be
won by combining forces with
either the National Party or the
Communist Party, but such agree-
ments are likely only on a case-
by-case basis.
The leftist parties together
received about 30 percent of the
vote. The Communists emerged
solidly in third place with al-
most 16 percent but did not do
as well as they had hoped. The
Socialists overcame the defec-
tion of a splinter group and re-
ceived just over 12 percent. Pro-
Castro Socialist Salvador Allende
was the largest vote-getter in
his senatorial district and is
in a strong position to obtain
the presidential nomination next
year, for the third time, of the
Composition
of
Chilean
(PDC) Christian Democratic (PS) Socialist
(PCCh) Communist
(PR) Radical
(PH) National
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Communist-Socialist Popular Ac-
tion Front.
The Radical Party, which for
many years has been the "swing"
party in Chile, lost ground,
frustrating the leftist leader--
ship's hope for a strong showing
that would encourage the Commu-
nists and Socialists to support
a Radical for the residenc in
1970 , 25X1
NICARAGUA THREATENS CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET
Nicaragua's recent efforts
to solve its financial problems
and speed the pace of regional
integration could set off a
spiral of retaliatory actions
that would gravely threaten the
future of the Central American
Common Market.
On 28 February, Nicaraguan
President Somoza announced the
immediate imposition of taxes on
certain imports from all other
Common Market countries. Somoza's
primary motivation was to raise
badly needed government revenue,
but he was also interested in
putting pressure on his Common
Market partners to ratify, de-
posit, and implement key inte-
gration agreements..
Somoza's latest move, the
first major infraction of Common
Market agreements in the organiza-
tion's eight-year history, fell
like a bombshell at the informal
meeting of Common Market minis-
ters of economy in Guatemala
City on 1 March, and was later
described by Costa Rican President
Trejos as the group's gravest
crisis. In response, El Salva-
dor, Honduras, and Costa Rica
promised some action on contro-
versial protocols, but all three
joined with Guatemala in warning
that unless the tax was suspended
immediately they would levy a
countertax that would in effect
suspend Nicaragua from the Com-
mon Market.
Somoza appears to have lit-
tle intention of backing down or
settling for mere promises of ac-
tion. Although he hopes his pres-
ent action will be enough to gen-
erate movement on the protocols
so that the maximum benefits of
regional integration can be won,
he is prepared to contend with
any retaliatory steps taken by
his Common Market partners and
may even escalate with further
measures to gain his objective.
In the long run, however, he may
be prepared to withdraw his sup-
port of the integration movement
if action is blocked by domestic
political considerations in the
other countries.
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