YUGOSLAVIA: THE PASSING OF THE OLD GUARD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006900060002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 7, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO069~06000 1
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Yugoslavia: The Passing of the Old Guard
Secret
38
7 March 1969
No. 0360/69A
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06900060002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06900060002-1
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06900060002-1
 Approved For Release 200510:7K. &k bP79-00927A006900060002-1
YUGOSLAVIA: THE PASSING OF THE OLD GUARD
The ninth party congress scheduled to open in Belgrade on I 1 March
will effect a. major turnover in the Yugoslav leadership in accord with the
current emphasis on placing qualified, well-educated younger people in
policy-making positions---the climax of a concerted effort to replace Yugo-
slavia's professional revolutionaries with revolutionary professionals. At the
recently concluded party congresses in the republics, many "old partisans"
of doubtful competence were dropped from the party apparatus.
The congress probably will not designate a successor to Tito- he will be
77 in May and Yugoslav politics will continue to be affected by this
unknown, but it is not as important as it was only a few years ago. Tito, as a
symbol, has been an important factor in keeping the various Yugoslav
nationalities united, and there is no replacement for him in this capacity.
Belgrade is engaged in a large-scale decentralization of authority to the
republics, however, and it is hoped that this will afford the various national-
ities an equal voice in Yugoslav affairs and make the absence of a strong
central figure less important. Although decentralization appears to be the
safest way of dealing with the succession problem, it has its hazards. New
grants of power to the republics may whet their appetites and threaten the
fragile unity of the federation.
Special Report
Approved For Release 2005/f f'f7k RDP79-00927A006900060002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/02S(P79-00927A006900060002-1
Those were the days,
my friend,
We thought they'd
never end
We'd sing and dance
forever and a day
We'd live the life
we choose
We'd fight and
never lose
For we were young
And sure to have our way
CI The Apple Music Co.
Special Report
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
The stage has been set to make the ninth
party congress of the League of Communists of
Yugoslavia (LCY) the final act in a major trans-
formation of the party leadership and organiza-
tion that began with the ouster of Tito's heir
apparent, Alcksandar Rankovic, in July 1966.
The election results at the various republic party
congresses held between November and January
make it clear that younger and more liberal offi-
cials will replace most of the party's old guard
functionaries.
The republic congresses took a major step
forward by bringing into the federal and republic
decision-making process people who will vigor-
ously carry out Yugoslavia's economic, social, and
party reforms. Sixty-nine percent of the newly
elected republic central committees are freshmen
members and one third of them made their repu-
tations in work other than party activity. Thus, a
significant transfusion of new blood and ideas
into the primary policy organ of the republic
party organizations has taken place.
The republic nominations to the national
party organs, which the forthcoming Congress
will formalize, makes this pattern complete. The
most powerful LCY body, the presidium, is being
expanded from 35 to over 50 members, but only
12 of the old members were renominated. The
average age of the new presidium membership is
about 45; the range is from 35 to 58. The in-
dividual members are predominantly liberal or at
the very least supporters of the liberal-minded
majority on all important issues.
The outgoing LCY hierarchy was elected at
the last party congress in December 1964, when
Rankovic was still in power, and it contains many
conservatives who have only paid lip service to
Tito's reform movement. Others, while not
necessarily obstructive or incompetent, were little
Approved For Release 2005/ftZRDP79-00927A006900060002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/02i -(~ ~P79-00927AO06900060002-1
more than political hacks. Tito accomplished
what may have been one of the most difficult
tasks of his career in somehow convincing many
of these men to step down. The student riots last
June and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in
August gave a sense of urgency to Tito's campaign
to revitalize the leadership and probably accounts
for its success. A serious attempt can now be
made to align the style and role of the party with
the promotion of a self-management system.
An article in the 14 December issue of
Borba, a major Belgrade daily, dramatizes the
general acceptance of the transfer of power. The
article, written by Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo,
an outgoing member of _ the . LCY presidium and
an unreconstructed party mandarin of long ten-
ure, defended the rejuvenation of party cadres
and disclosed. that "more than half of all party
leaderships in Yugoslavia, from the base to the
top, will be replaced." Vukmanovic noted that
the replacement of old cadres will produce "cer-
tain. shocks." He wrote, "It is the hardest test of
every revolutionary to realize the time when he
must yield his place to new and more capable
cadres." He added, significantly, "If a revolu-
tionary fails this test, then he might find himself
in a conservative position, obstructing the very
development of society he once fought for-and
those who obstinately retain their leading posi-
tions might even be removed as. counterrevolu-
tionaries."
Many prominent party veterans took: the
hint. and announced before the republic party
congresses their firm intention to. step aside.for
those "who have grown up in the self-manage-
ment system." These "retirements" do not nec-
essarily mean political death for these individuals,
some of whom may be given important party
work in various party commissions. Others,
stripped of their party posts, may be assigned
government positions in accord with Belgrade's
policy of rotating state and party officials.
Special Report
TITO: NOVEMBER 1968
"The older generation must, because of
physiological and other processes, grad-
ually give way to younger people...
the younger generation should more and
more assume the leading position in the
League of Communists."
--from a speech at Osijek, Croatia
JOSIP BROZ
TITO, 1968
Approved For Release 2005/02/?7E:tGtAP79-00927AO06900060002-1
 Approved For Release 20051021 ]EC i I bP79-00927AO06900060002-1
The peaceful transfer of political power at
the ninth party congress to a younger generation
will provide Yugoslavia with an important prece-
dent to cope with future leadership crises. Indeed,
it may even be taken as a sign that when the time
comes, Yugoslavia will find a tranquil solution to
its most critical leadership problem, the selection
of Tito's successor.
THE SUCCESSION
The ninth party congress might be Tito's
last, and the nation is concerned because no other
leader can command the loyalty of all elements of
this complex society so much at odds with itself.
Tito's death would be a serious loss under
any circumstances, but it should not open a pe-
riod of chaos as it might a few years ago. The
trend toward decentralization of political and
economic power in recent years has made this
possibility less likely. Moreover, as the authority
of the party's central administrative machinery
decreases, there will be a simultaneous decrease in
the need for strong central direction from the
next party leader.
YUGOSLAVIAN ECONOMIC REFORM
The Self-Management System.
The self-management system reduces the
central government's role in the economy :
by giving increased decision-making re-
sponsibility to local commercial enter-
prises. Freed from meeting centrally de-
termined goals, enterprises have become
profit-oriented and act on their own judg-
ment of the "market." Enterprise man-
agers, in turn, are subject to policies laid
down by a workers' council elected by all
enterprise employees. This independent
spirit has also spilled over into party, gov-
ernment, and military affairs.
Special Report
Tito has been criticized by some Yugoslavs
for not grooming a successor, but his apparent
neglect may be deliberate. Tito's charisma and
special place in Yugoslav history make it impos-
sible for anyone to assume a similar role. The
most likely outcome-and the one that offers the
best prospect for an orderly succession-is the
emergence of a collective leadership that appoints
one of its members first among equals.
This collective leadership is almost certain to
come out of the party's presidium, which is em-
powered to elect the president of the LCY. The
twelve holdover nominees to the new presidium
will probably form an "inner circle," and there is
a good chance that any new president of the LCY
in the immediate future would be selected from
among these men. As time passes, however, this
group-with the exception of Edvard Kardelj and
Krste Crvenkovski-will probably lose its vantage
ground to the newcomers.
Kardelj, 58, the oldest nominee to the new
presidium, has been called the father of Yugo-
slavia's self-management policy and will continue
to be a dominant influence in the new leadership.
Crvenkovski, at 47, is one of the youngest party
veterans and is an outspoken proponent of Yugo-
slavia's liberal reforms.
Some members of the "inner circle" would
not be popular candidates to head the party be-
cause of their lukewarm support of the reform
movement. Nationality and health-and in the
case of Dabcevic-Kucar, her sex-would elminate
others from the frontrunner position. In any case,
as long as the trend toward diversification of
power and rotation of officials continues, who-
ever assumes Tito's mantle will not have his
power.
REPUBLIC AUTONOMY
The process of decentralization of federal
organs and prerogatives has gained momentum in
Approved For Release 2005/02~ilL7C y PDP79-00927AO06900060002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/Cl~BCRT1 DP79-00927AO06900060002-1
recent months. The State Security Services' com-
mand and control, for example, is now a concern
of both the federation and the republics. Eco-
nomic reform measures continue to shift financial
means, as well as much of the decision-making
power in economic matters, from the federation
to republics, provinces, communes, and enter-
prises. The republics have even been given a role
in the formulation of foreign policy.
The recently concluded local party con-
gresses provide evidence of the increased inde-
pendence of the republics. In the past, these con-
gresses followed after and simply rubber-stamped
the decisions of the all-Yugoslav party congress.
Delegates to the ninth party congress will reverse
this tradition when they arrive in Belgrade with
an obligation to promote the decisions taken at
their local congresses. In addition, the republics
for the first time adopted their own party stat-
utes, which are supposed to reflect their own
pecularities. The republics also retained their cen-
tral committees and abolished their presidiums in
direct contradiction to the party structural
changes proposed by the LCY last July.
Greater responsibility for national defense
also has been transmitted to local authorities un-
der a law passed by Yugoslavia's National As-
sembly in February. This authorizes local and
regional levels to organize and initiate armed re-
sistance. The plan provides for the establishment
of territorial, defense, civil defense, and work
units-using most of the civilian population-to
supplement the regular armed forces. In effect,
the republics would be setting up the nucleus of
their own permanent standing forces.
In another step toward decentralization the
Yugoslav National Assembly in late December
approved a revision of the constitution, the sec-
ond in two years, which will considerably
strengthen the prerogatives of Yugoslavia's repub-
lics and provinces by increasing the power of the
Special Report
Kardelj will have to overcome his reputation as a
theoretician, as a formulator rather than an ex-
ecutor of policy, before he would be selected as
Tito's replacement.
Crvenkovski has been the leader of the Mace-
donian party since 1963, and his nationality
might make him a compromise candidate to suc-
ceed Tito in the midst of a traditional Serbo-
Croatian rivalry. Yugoslavia's feud with Bulgaria
over Macedonia, if it continues its bitter course,
might also redound to his advantage.
Approved For Release 2005/03 ~i DP79-00927A006900060002-1
0-121
 Approved For Release 2005/028E P79-00927AO06900060002-1
RESULTS OF THE YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC PARTY CONGRESSES
Elected For First Time
205
(69 %)
Age Grouping
From Economic Enterprises
Women
90
37
(30 %)
(12.5%)
Under 25 10 ( 3.4%) 31-40 136 (45.8%)
26-30 34 (11.4%) 41-50 109 (36.7%)
Over 51 8 (2.7%)
CENTRAL COMMITTEES MEMBERSHIP
REPUBLIC PARTY LEADERSt
. REPUBLIC
Reduced
To
Hold
President
Secretary
NOMINEES TO
From
overs
LCY PRESIDIUM
MACEDONIA
87
52
17
Krste
Angel
Dimce Belovski
Kiro Gligorov
Lazar Kolisevski*
Slavko Milosavlevski
Azem Zulficari
Krsta Avramovic
SERBIA
136
55
15
Marko
Latinka
Miroslav Pecujlic
21-23 Nov 1968
Nikezic
Perovic
Mviilentije Popovic*
;'etar Stambolic*
Mijalko Todorovic
.Iakov Blazevic*
CROATIA
113
65
27
Vladimir
Mika
5.7 Dec 1968
Bakaric*
Tripalo*
srecko Bijelic
3avka Dabcevic-Kucar*
Pavle Gazi
Lvonko Liker
SLOVENIA
99
41
10
Franc
Adrej
Edvard Kardelj*
9-11 Dec 1968
Popit
Marinc
Stan Kavic
Sergei Krajger
Stane Kranc
Mitja Ribicic
MONTENEGRO
71
35
Veselin
Dobroslav
Emin Dobardzic
12.14 Dec 1968
Djuranovic
Culafic
Budisiav Soskic
Milorad Stanojevic
Velko Vlahovic*
Vidoje Zarkovic
Rato Dugonjic*
BOSNIA
103
45
10
Cvijetin
Nijaz
9-11 Jan 1969
Mijatovic*
Dizdarevic
Hranko Kikulic
lamdija Pozderac
Bosko Siljegovic
Stanko Tomic
Autonomous
Veli
Kadri
Fadil Hodza*
Provinces
KOSOVO
Deva
Reufi
Jovan Pecenovic
KoIj Sorika
Mirko
VOJVODINA
Mirko
Stevan Doronjski
Tepevac
Canagan-
Jozef Nadi
Unknown
94547 3-69 tEx-officio members LCY Presidium
ovic
Branko ?
Borojevic
Mirko Tepevac
Branko Borojevic
Ivan Dolnicar
Nikola Ljubicic
Special Report
Approved For Release 9Eetlff If 79-00927AO06900060002-1
 Approved For Release 200fW1V,:A-RDP79-00927A006900060002-1
Chamber of Nationalities. Proposals originating in
other federal legislative bodies must now receive
approval from the Chamber of Nationalities be-
fore they are enacted. Moreover, two of the fed-
eral chambers have been abolished, and delegates
to a newly created sociopolitical chamber will be
elected directly and proportionally to the popula-
tion of a commune whose particular interests
they will represent.
The trend toward more republic autonomy
probably will be accelerated by the new leader-
ship. Newly elected Slovenian party secretary
Andrej Marinc recently observed that the overrid-
ing postwar needs for unity and highly centralized
authority no longer exist, and that it is now both
possible and desirable that the primary locus of
party responsibility and authority be that of the
republic parties.
PARTY ORGANIZATION AND MEMBERSHIP
The new party statutes, which will receive
their final approval at the ninth party congress,
provide for major changes in party organization.
The principal aim of the reorganization is to
streamline the party's leading organs to allow for
a more rapid, flexible, and effective party re-
sponse to major issues and the implementation of
party policies.
The party congress will continue as the high-
est party organ and will meet every five, rather
than four, years to establish the general political
line. A new body, the conference, will be created
to act as the highest party forum between con-
gresses. The conference, which will consist of
approximately 300 delegates, is intended to make
basic policy decisions and will meet at least once
a year. Most of the delegates to the conference
will be elected annually by communal party con-
ferences, but one quarter of them will be per-
manent delegates throughout the entire period
between congresses.
The central committee of the LCY, and pre-
sumably its executive committee, will be abol-
ished. Their role as the leading day-to-day party
organ will be assumed by the presidium, which
will be responsible for implementing current pol-
icy within the framework of the directions of the
congress and conference. The presidium can be
convened by the president, members of the pre-
sidium, or upon the request of one republic cen-
tral committee.
With the rejuvenation of the party leader-
ship, there has been an influx of fresh blood in
the party rank and file. According to a December
issue of the Yugoslav official party journal, Kom-
munist, over 100,000 new members joined in
1968, more than twice the number of annual
newcomers admitted in recent times. It is esti-
mated that 75 percent of the newcomers are
under 25. Total party membership increased by
only 11,000 between 1961-66 and this stagnation
was accompanied by a consistent decrease in the
percentage of younger members.
Although the natural drive of every organiza-
tion to perpetuate itself accounts for part of the
current membership drive, there are other factors
as well. New members were needed to compen-
sate for the losses caused by the gradual but
significant "silent purge" that followed Ranko-
vic's ouster in 1966, and there was a need to
maintain the tradition of increasing the party
membership at each party congress. The crisis in
Czechoslovakia provided still another reason and
contributed to the success of the recruitment
program. Faced with external threats, the party
appealed for support and the population re-
sponded with patriotic fervor. Finally, the leader-
ship decided that one way to deal with dissenting
youth is to incorporate them into the body poli-
tic.
Special Report -7 -
Approved For Release 2005/ YZC 4 RRDP79-00927A006900060002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/02A ,Q R'bP79-00927AO06900060002-1
NEW LEADERSHIP-OLD PROBLEMS
The most serious internal problems facing
the new leadership are the familiar ones of nation-
ality conflicts and restless youth. Although the
regime attempted to minimize them, there were
student disorders in Belgrade last June and three
Albanian minority demonstrations in Kosovo and
Macedonia in the last quarter of 1968.
Yugoslavia's underdeveloped republics and
provinces are fertile soil for nationalist dissenters,
and the party congress probably will recommend
that the LCY take a firmer position on the eco-
nomic integration of these areas. The first major
hurdle of the new LCY leadership will be to
convince the wealthier-but equally nationalist-
republics that their destiny is linked to the well-
being of their poorer neighbors.
Tensions may be lessened by a recent revi-
sion of the constitution that provides a parlia-
mentary structure for settling intersectional rival-
ries and disputes. The party, however, will have to
solve the underlying political, economic, and so-
cial causes of the nationality problem, and this
will put a severe strain on its discipline and unity.
Yugoslavia's youth consider most of the
older generation of political leaders narrow-
minded, doctrinaire, and hostile to new ideas.
They believe that the country has paid its debt to
its partisan heroes, whose numbers seem to grow
as the years go on, and that they should be retired
RISING LIGHTS IN THE PARTY
MARKO
NIKEZIC
DIMCE
BELOVSKI
KIRO
GLIGOROV
Out of the mainstream of party life for some time, their sudden promotion to the presidium is probably
designed to give these men the necessary profile to build a following within the party apparatus.
Nikezic and Belovski have been numbers one and two in the Foreign Ministry, and are well known as
pragmatic, liberal-minded officials who will continue the reform policies. Nikezic, whose mother is
French, is Western oriented and finished a four-year tour as ambassador to the US in 1962.
Gligorov, currently deputy premier, is a former federal secretary of finance who is considered by many
as the architect of the Yugoslavia's economic reform.
Special Report - 8 -
Approved For Release 2005/02~;("P79-00927A006900060002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/0717R'C~2DP79-00927A006900060002-1
to make way for political progressives who have
demonstrated professional ability. A topical joke
among the youth tells how six men from a village
joined the partisans during World War II; four
were killed and after the war eight returned.
The invasion of Czechoslovakia last August
distracted Yugoslavia's dissatisfied youth, at least
temporarily, as nearly all Yugoslavs united around
Tito and the party in the face of the potential
threat from Moscow. The record number of
young people that joined the party during this
period has helped split the youth movement.
Those who joined the party have found them-
selves neutralized and at the same time alienated
from those who refused to join. The decentraliza-
tion of Yugoslavia's youth organizations has also
contributed to the fragmentation of the youth
movement. As a result, the kind of street action
that erupted at Belgrade University last June is
not likely to recur soon.
For the present at least, Yugoslavia's
younger generation is optimistic that the ninth
party congress will produce a revitalized party
leadership to lead the country forward. This era
of good feeling could be short-lived if nothing is
done to meet the student demands, particularly in
the areas of employment opportunity and univer-
sity reform.
OUTLOOK
The ninth party congress, which could be
Tito's last hurrah, will take a major step forward
Special Report
in achieving his long-set goals. The party organiza-
tion will be streamlined and equipped with a
vigorous new leadership dedicated to establishing
an efficient socialist market economy with the
broadest possible measure of social equality and
national unity. Direct participation of workers in
the management of their own enterprises will be
more firmly established within the framework
and under the guidance of a dynamic Communist
Party.
The potential threat from Moscow, follow-
ing the invasion of Czechoslovakia, has produced
a degree of unity among Yugoslavia's various na-
tionalists and has underscored the stake they have
in each others' welfare. Nevertheless, the explo-
sive nationality question will continue to provide
a problem of internal stability and the issue will
be the new regime's most serious challenge. The
immediate danger of student unrest seems to have
passed. Improved employment opportunities and
university reform measures would further deflate
the student movement, which is already fragment-
ing.
slavia.
To deal with the succession problem, Tito
and his new leadership are prepared to gamble
that decentralization will not enflame the sep-
aratist tendencies that now smolder in some
Yugoslav republics. The new leadership that
comes out of the ninth party congress is talented
enough to have a major impact on the control of
these events, and it is pragmatic enough to rec-
ognize that its best interests lie in a unified Yu o-
25X1
Approved For Release 2005 / 171tRDP79-00927A006900060002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06900060002-1
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06900060002-1