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March 21, 1969
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Approved For Release 2007/03/08: CIA-RDP79-00927A0070018ffff DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Secret 42 21 March 1969 No. 0362/69 State Dept. review completed Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 2007/REPRj4-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 (Information as of noon EST, 20 March 1969) Far East VIETNAM The Communists are keeping up pressure on a few key areas, primarily in III Corps, through mortar and rocket attacks, commando raids, terrorism and prob- ing actions. The offensive, now ir. its fourth week, probably has fallen short of their expectations. However, the enemy may be waiting instructions to open a new offensive phase. NEW THAI GOVERNMENT IS FORMED There were no major changes in the new 28-man cabi- net proclaimed by the King on 11 March, the final step in forming the government specified by the new constitution. COMMUNISTS EASE PRESSURE ON LAO GOVERNMENT POSITIONS Communist pressure against government positions in the north has eased somewhat over the past week, but the enemy may be preparing for another round in their dry season offensive there. SOUTH KOREAN COUNTERINSURGENCY BEING IMPROVED The South Korean Government has begun a program to upgrade its counterinsurgency effort. SECRET Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 Mar 69 Page 1 Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 2007/a LO6,IRltf2DP79-00927A007000010001-5 I:urge SINO-SOVIET BORDER REMAINS UNEASY Neither Moscow nor Peking appears ready to back down on the issue of the disputed island in the Ussuri River. An engarrement on 15 March may have involved more men than the initial clash, but was not as bloody. EUROPEAN REACTION TO THE ABM SYSTEM RESTRAINED Soviet press reaction to the US ABM decision has been restrained and the East European nations appear to be following Moscow's lead. West European media, with the exception of the Scandinavian press, have treated the President's announcement favorably. HARASSMENT OF BERLIN TRAFFIC CEASES East German propacganda charges on the manufacture of military supplies in West Berlin have also ended, possibly at Moscow's instigation. WARSAW PACT MEI:TING A PALLID AFFAIR The meeting in Budapest of the top leaders of member countries was the first since the invasion of Czech- oslovakia. Meanwhile, representatives of 67 Commu- nist parties gathered in Moscow for the final pre- paratory meeting before a world Communist conference in May. CZECHOSLOVAK FACTIONAL STRUGGLES SPREAD TO NONPARTY GROUPS The liberal-conservative solit within the Czechoslo- vak party is spreading to special interest croups outside the party as liberal elements have tried to institutionalize the pains they made before the oc- cupation. SECRET Page i i WEEKLY SL'41.\1_ARY Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 2007/g~Q$ ~l, RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 Middle East - Africa PAKISTANI OPPOSITION LEADERS STEP UP ACTIVITY Opposition leaders are stepping up their efforts to build support after last week's round table confer- ence with the government, which failed to stem con- tinuing chaos throughout the country. INCIDENTS CONTINUE ALONG THE ARAB-ISRAELI FRONTIERS Israeli planes attacked terrorist bases in Jordan again this week, and another firefight took place across the Suez Canal. In Syria, newly emerged strongman Hafiz Asad seems to be consolidating his position. NAGA THREAT RECEDES IN EASTERN INDIA New Delhi may at last be making progress in its efforts to put down protracted tribal insurgency in Nagaland. OBSTACLES IN EAST EUROPEAN OIL ARRANGEMENTS WITH IRAN Transportation problems and international politics have hampered implementation of a number of agree- ments Iran has with Eastern Europe. SOMALI PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION SCHEDULED FOR 26 MARCH Somalia's second parliamentary election since in- dependence is unlikely to produce significant polit- ical changes. SECRET Page iii WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 Mar 69 Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 Approved For Release 2007k "pip-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 Western Hemisphere THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 23 PERU HOPEFUL IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH US Most Peruvians seem optimistic that the negotia- tions will avert a US-Peruvian confrontation over the expropriation of International Petroleum Com- pany assets. POLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES CONTINUE IN PANAMA The lack of substance to the growing rhetoric of the 'October Revolution' and the apparent priority accorded military affairs have added to public skepticism that elections will be held next year as promised. THE BRITISH END ANGUILLAN INDEPENDENCE Military force was used to install a senior British official as commissioner of Anguilla but London will not ask the Anguillans to rejoin the Associated State of St. Kitts - Nevis - Anguilla. STRAINS INCREASE IN CHILE'S CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY Intraparty tensions have reached a dangerous point because of the government's handling of a police attack on squatters who invaded lands in Puerto Montt on 9 March and a split in the party could result. SECRET Page iv WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 Mar 69 Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 2007 L$Z1-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 The Communists continue to limit the scope of their four-week-old offensive in South Vietnam. The pattern set early in the offensive-rocket and mortar attacks along with occasional ground probes and terrorism against a few key areas--has not been significantly altered. The III Corps area remains the focal point but targets throughout the country also are being hit. There are indications that the enemy may soon try to step up the tempo and strength of their attacks. Meanwhile, the negotiators in Paris continue to mark time. The Chinese Communists have not indicated when their ninth party congress will get under way in the wake of the border clashes with the USSR, but it is likely to be soon. Prior to events on the border and the massive propaganda demonstrations that have been staged throughout China, the populace was being prepared for the almost immediate convening of the congress. In Laos, Communist military pressure against government positions in the north has cased somewhat, but the enemy may be preparing for another round. The Communists' failure to move gLickly to take advantage of the government forces' disarray after the fall of Na Khang suggests that the enemy's current military objectives continue to be limited The Communists apparently still hope, however, that continued shelling of the government base at Thateng will cause the base to be evacuated, thereby obviating another costly ground assault. The South Korean Government has begun a program to upgrade its counterinsurgency effort. Despite last year's generally successful security operations, the government's performance was hampered by poor coordina- tion, lack of equipment, and insufficient personnel. Most proposed changes are still in their initial stages and it will take considerable time before they will produce a significant improvement in operational performance. There were no major changes in the new Thai cabinet proclaimed by the King this week, the final step in forming the government specified by the new constitution. Some younger, professional administrators joined the cabinet but the leadership refrained from restructuring the often overlapping ministerial functions that have ? n1amied so many of Thailand's domestic programs in the past. SECRET Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 Mar 69 Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 2007/~ GT-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 VIETNAM The Communist offensive, now in its fourth week, continued to focus on maintaining pressure on a few key areas through mortar and rocket attacks, commando raids, terrorism, and probing actions. It also included limited infantry Page 2 assaults and threatening maneuvers by main force units. The North Vietnamese 5th Di- vision resumed its campaign in the Bien Hoa - Long Khanh area and struck several points around the Xuan Loc Province town and the lower reaches of War Zone "D." Losses on both sides were heavy in four days of sharp fighting. These actions may have temporar- ily deflected the 5th from deeper thrusts into the complex of al- lied fortifications along Saigon's northeastern tier. The Communists somewhat slack- ened their pace in northwestern III Corps, but continued sporadic strikes in Tay Ninh, Binh Duong and Binh Long provinces. In Long An Province, the enemy continued to shell and probe along the south- western approach corridor to Sa- gon. There were no other con- certed Communist drives elsewhere in South Vietnam. In the Mekofg Delta, the Viet Cong briefly harassed province towns with shell- ings and stepped-up terrorism. Most action again was centered in the My Tho area. In the northern provinces, activity flared up just below the eastern end of the Demilitar- ized Zone early in the week and then shifted to the lower three provinces of I Corps. North Viet- namese regulars launched a brief SECRET WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 Mar 69 Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 2007/DP79-00927A007000010001-5 rocket attack and several stiff ground assualts within a few miles of the zone. The communists once more launched light rocket attacks against South Vietnam's three principal ci- ties: Hue on the 14th, Saigon a day later, and Da Nang on 19 March. Meanwhile, there are indications that the offensive has fallen short of Communist expectations, particu- larly in the Saigon area. the enemy is dismayed because stringent government security measures in the capital city area have interfered with their ability to collect intelligence, reduced their urban guerrilla force, and hindered their efforts to infiltrate weapons in the city. The Communists are continuing to maintain pressure on Saigon's outskirts, however, and are trying to increase the level of terrorism and agitation in the city. Enemy forces throughout the country also may well be awaiting instruc- tions to open another phase of the offensive. Political Developments In South Vietnam The government is trying to handle the case of Buddhist monk Thich Thien Minh in a way that will reduce his prestige as a militant Buddhist peace agitator but not make him a martyr. So far, the Buddhists have responded cautiously, with well-controlled anger, but the militants may be planning to re- kindle Buddhist-Catholic frictions. Although the government's evi- dence against the Buddhist youth leader was overwhelming, the 10- year sentence for sheltering Viet Cong personnel has led both cleri- cal and lay Buddhist leaders to question the motives of the gov- ernment. The government is apparently confident that it can keep the lid on antigovernment dissent designed to threaten its stability. The militant Buddhists represent the leading source of such dissent, and the government is anxious to demonstrate a stern attitude in the hopes of discouraging other antigovernment elements. President Thieu has gone to some lengths to avoid making a mar- tyr of Thien Minh. After publiciz- ing the evidence against the bonze, Thieu announced that Thien Minh would receive preferential treat- ment, despite the stringent sen- tence. Thieu has also let it be known that if there is no provoca- tive Buddhist reaction, the pris- oner could be released early. At the same time, the government is keeping close track of militant Buddhist reactions around the coun- try, to make sure that they do not nurture a serious challenge to the regime. The militant Buddhists, under the direction of Thich Tri Quang, may attempt to exploit the case to generate new Buddhist-Catholic fric- tion. Although Tri Quang has re- mained fairly cautious so far, he has supported the Buddhists' charge that President Thieu and the Ameri- cans are using the affair to "de- stroy" Buddhism. This statement bracketed the "fervent Catholic" Thieu with former President Diem, thereby raising the specter of Catholic oppression of Buddhism. The Buddhists hope to get good in- ternational press coverage for a series of country-wide protest prayer meetings. SECRET Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 2007/A-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 Tri Quang is clearly test- ing the prevailing political winds to see if a successful antigov- ernment campaign can be developed by reviving anti-Catholic senti- ments. The militants' peace cam- paign has failed to gain much mo- mentum, and Tri Quang may have de- cided that the theme of religious ers7 cution may be more su cessful. NEW THAI GOVERNMENT IS FORMED There were no major changes in the new 28-man cabinet pro- claimed by the King on 11 March, the final step in forming the government specified by the new constitution. There were some shifts among the leadership but the key posts remained unchanged: Thanom re- tained the Ministry of Defense, Praphat continued as deputy prime minister and minister of the in- terior, and Thanat remained min- ister of foreign affairs. Pote Sarasin, the regime's top civilian, was also named a deputy prime minister, presumably to help offset the government's military cast. The army's role in the cabinet was, nevertheless, substantially increased by the inclusion of three additional generals. In addition to providing political continuity, the new cabinet may provide somewhat better government; several aging members of the old cabinet were replaced with younger, professional administrators. The leadership, however, refrained from-restruc- turing the often overlapping min- isterial functions that have plagued so many domestic programs in the past. It also missed an opportunity to broaden its politi- cal base by failing to include opposition elements in the cabi- net. Earlier this month the gov- ernment cleared its only potential obstacle in succeeding itself when its candidate was elected speaker of the popularly elected lower house. With the support of independent members, whose candi- date the government in turn helped elect as deputy speaker, the regime demonstrated that even with its mere plurality, it could muster a working majority. Although the outcome was never in serious doubt, the election indicated that the independents, some of whom had been sounding out the possibility of working with the opposition Democrats, would side with the government on important issues. At the same time, however, sev- eral independents have made it increasingly clear that they in- tend to exploit their pivotal position between the government and the Democrats. The strength of the opposi- tion and the tactics it will pur- sue may become clearer when the government presents its major policy positions to the legisla- ture next week. The government is not expected to make any sub- stantial shifts in these policies, although such issues as relations with the US and the government's stand on corruption may spark some lively discussion both in the legislature and the press. II SECRET Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 2007/03/0F 4E EPP79-00927A007000010001-5 COMMUNISTS EASE PRESSURE ON LAO GOVERNMENT POSITIONS Communist pressure against government positions in the north has eased somewhat over the past week, but the enemy may be pre- paring for another round in their dry season offensive there. The Communists have not fol- lowed up their capture of Na Khang on 1 March with a major effort against the remaining government positions in Xieng Khouang Prov- ince. A number of small, iso- lated government outposts have been evacuated or have fallen in the face of relatively light enemy attacks but the resolve of government forces appears to have stiffened as a result of their successful defense of the refu- gee center at Houei Tong Ko. The Communists' failure to move quickly to take advantage of the government forces' disarray af- ter the fall of Na Khang sug- gests that the enemy's current military objectives continue to be limited. No new major fighting has developed in the south although enemy activity has picked up in the long-contested Muong Phalane area and the Communists have been harassing traffic on Route 13 between Savannakhet and Pakse. Along the eastern por- tion of the Bolovens Plateau, the Communists apparently still hope that the continued Shelling of Thateng, combined with the low morale of the defenders, will cause the base to be evacuated, thereby obviating another costly ground assault. NORTH Hanoi. VIETNAM i lane T H A I L A N D Savannakhe [-7 Communist-controlled territory C13 Contested territory SECRET Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY CHINA SOUTH viET Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 207e0Kipi.CIA-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 SOUTH KOREAN COUNTERINSURGENCY BEING IMPROVED The South Korean Government has begun a program to upgrade its coun- terinsurgency effort. Last year's generally success- ful security operations were none- theless hampered by poor coordina- tion, lack of equipment, and insuf- ficient personnel. A unified security command en- compassing all rear area military, police, and militia units is being planned to overcome coordination problems, many of which were attrib- uted to inadequate equipment, over- lapping jurisdictions, and interserv- ice jealousies. Subordinate special sector military commands are appar- ently being planned for strategi- cally important areas or areas con- sidered particularly vulnerable to guerrilla infiltration. Activation of the new command structure is, however, heavily dependent on the availability of improved communica- tions and equipment. Prior to the large-scale North Korean infiltration of the east coast last fall, South Korean forces had only eight helicopters for trans- porting quick reaction troops. The US assistance program will add 15 more to the inventory by June, and the Seoul government hopes to buy an- other 17 by the end of the year with funds being collected through public voluntary donations. Equipment shortages have been particularly evident in the local militia forces organized under the national police last year. The mil- itia, which currently has more than two million personnel, mostly veter- ans, made a good showing in security operations last year despite the lack of enthusiasm shown by many of its involuntary members and the heavily armed North Korean agents it had to face. Weapons and small amounts, of ammunition are now available for only 22 percent of the militia, but the government hopes to have it com- pletely armed by the end of the year. Personnel are to be added to the 4,000-man well-armed combat po- lice force, and 18 new battalions are planned for the army's special forces units to be used as a coUn- terinsurgency mobile reserve.I 25X1 25X1 istry r a 1 shed instructions to give antiguerrilla training to all military personnel. A resident registration program is also under way to make it diffi- cult for North Korean agents to move through the country. To date, 75 percent of the population over 18 years old has been registered. The government plans to resettle an es- timated 12,000 to 13,000 families who now live in remote areas into small tactical hamlets with a com- munications link to nearby towns. This would make population control easier for security authorities but is almost certain to antagonize most of the farmers involved. Most of these changes in the counterinsurgency program are still 25X1 in their initial stages and it will be some time before a significant improvement in ope tional perform- ance is realized. SECRET Faye b WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 2007,?RLI -RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 A Pravda article of 20 March, commenting on the US decision on ABMs, accused the "military-industrial complex" in the US of "striving to unleash" a new round in the arms race. As with earlier Soviet comments, however, the article avoided direct criticism of the President and any implication that strategic arms limitation talks might be affected. In response to a US protest of a TU-95 bomber's overflight last week of Shemya Island in the Aleutians, the Soviets admitted that through naviga- tional error the plane may have come "somewhat closer" to Shemya than intended and said that they will take measures "designed to prevent unde- sirable incidents." Since the major clash over Damansky Island on the Sino-Soviet border last weekend, both sides have lobbed mortar shells at each other on an almost nightly basis. There is no sign that border clashes have occurred elsewhere. The long-heralded Warsaw Pact meeting was finally held in Budapest this week. It appears to have been a pallid affair. Evidently Moscow's desire for a show of unity led it to accommodate its allies on the Pact's command structure and on Pact policy making. The Yugoslavs, at their party congress, took long strides toward re- vitalizing the leadership and liberalizing political, economic and social poli- cies. The more conservative leaderships of the ruling Communist parties will see Belgrade's injection of new ideas into its unique Communist system as a further threat to stability in the Communist world. East German harassment and interference with West German travel to and from West Berlin has ceased, possibly at Moscow's insistence. Last week's meeting in the regularly scheduled series between President de Gaulle and Chancellor Kiesinger appears to have improved the climate of Franco-German relations somewhat. Nonetheless, there was no narrowing of differences on political policies for Europe. De Gaulle said that France would no longer participate in the Western European Union. SECRET Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 Mar 69 Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 2007(-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 SINO-SOVIET BORDER REMAINS UNEASY Neither Moscow nor Peking appears ready to back down on the issue of the disputed island in the Ussuri River. An engage- ment on 15 March may have in- volved more men than the initial clash but was not as bloody. There have been artillery ex- changes since, with casualties, if any, unreported. Both sides have probably moved reinforcements to the immediate area of the is- land. There is no evidence, how- ever, that either is planning to escalate the level of conflict or t ; widen it to other disputed areas. Although the circumstances around the dispute remain un- clear, it appears from available evidence that the Chinese trig- gered the initial clash. Peking may have chosen a site to which it believes its legal. claim is strong. Chinese propaganda since the encounters last weekend has emphasized Peking's contention that the island is "Chinese ter- ritory according to international law," because it lies on China's side of the river's main channel. The Chinese have chided Moscow for its failure to disclose fully its legal claim. Moscow has claimed that maps appended to the treaty of 1860, which set the present boundaries, show the is- land as Soviet territory, but has not yet produced such maps. Peking has published a map which seems to back its claim. on 15 March was probably a Chi- nese effort to contest that pres- ence. The island is likely to remain a scene of conflict until both sides retire from it and leave it unoccupied--apparently the normal state of numerous dis- puted islands in the Amur and Us- suri Rivers. The Soviets, how- ever, have charged that the Chi- nese had occupied the island in preparation for the incident on 2 March, and they may believe that it is now necessary to maintain a show of strength in the island area to demonstrate that they cannot be intimidated. When the ice breaks in the spring thaw, normally about mid-April, the matter of control may become aca- demic. Most of the island will probably be under water. Reports emanating unoffi- cially from Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry sources on 14 March that the Chinese had halted all Soviet aid shipments to Vietnam have not been confirmed. The Soviets prob- ably exaggerated instances of Chi- nese obstructions at border cross- ing points for several days fol- lowing the incident. The Soviets have apparently controlled--or at least strongly patrolled--the island since the initial clash. The engagement Soviet ambassadors made a concerted effort to buttress Mos- cow's version of the original in- cident by calling on government and foreign ministry heads around the world between 10 and 13 March. This effort was apparently an at- tempt to emphasize the gravity Moscow attributed to the affair SECRET Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 2007/03 G Lgi-'I DP79-00927A007000010001-5 and to stress Russian innocence. By charging the Chinese with ir- responsibility and expansionism, Moscow may also have hoped to deter the recognition or expanded rela- tions with China that several of the governments have been contem- plating. EUROPEAN REACTION TO THE ABM SYSTEM RESTRAINED Press reaction in Moscow to the ABM system remains restrained, with Soviet commentaries point- edly paraphrasing US congres- sional and intellectual critics of the decision. Ever since breaking its silence in 1968 on the subject of arms talks, Mos- cow has stressed its readiness to engage in a "serious exchange of opinions" with the US. There- fore, the Soviets may have de- cided to forgo a. propaganda at- tack on the ABM in order not to compromise the possibilities for such talks. Also, Soviet dis- armament adviser Roshchin's re- marks in Geneva suggest that Moscow will not use the US de- cision to proceed with an ABM system to delay ratification of the nonproliferation treaty. Eastern European reaction to the US ABM decision has been gen- erally limited to factual report- ing, albeit with mildly critical overtones. Available comment is not unanimous, and ranges from Sofia's statement that the ABM decision is an "unsuitable prel- ude" to the resumed Geneva dis- armament talks, to Polish charges that it reflects the "extremely aggressive intentions of the US" and runs contrary to the spirit of the nonproliferation treaty. Some Eastern European media, in- cluding the Polish, already have welcomed US ratification of the treaty. The President's announce- ment has received widespread and generally favorable coverage in the media of most West European countries. Official comment is meager, however. A West German NATO affairs specialist believed the decision strengthened the alliance. An- other official emphasized the US should explain the decision care- fully to the Soviets. Public media generally viewed the deci- sion as a. compromise which would tend to avoid an acceleration of the arms race. Madrid is examining the de- cision for clues on how the US may decide renewal of the Spanish bases agreement. The influential ABC commented that "militarily, the logic of the situation which guided the President's decision should lead to the maintenance of the Spanish bases." The Scandinavian press has generally taken a negative line. It has stressed the possible damage to the nonproliferation treaty and is apprehensive that it might cause the Soviets to escalate the arms race. The Norwegian defense minister, speak- ing as a private individual, stated that he believes that ABM deployment may increase insecu- rity and worsen east-west rela- tions. SECRET Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 Mar 69 Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 200719 fT-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 British press comment lacked strong views one way or the other. The principal papers stressed the necessity for Soviet-American con- sultations on military matters and expressed a belief that the Soviets are much more likely now to accept realistic negotiations. The Guardian, however, thought that the arms race might be ac- celerated. Canadian press comment, long critical of ABM deployment, has viewed the President's decision as better than previous proposals but still not desirable. Prime Minister Trudeau has said that he intends to discuss the subject with the President next week, but doubts that Ottawa will have a "finite" position on the mat- ter by then. HARASSMENT OF BERLIN TRAFFIC CEASES The East Germans have stopped their interference with freight shipments to and from West Ber- lin as of 17 March. The East German interzonal trade negotiator reportedly in- formed his West German counter- part in early March that inter- ference would cease after the current East German propaganda campaign had run its course. A large manufacturing firm in West Berlin also was informed this week that there would be no fur- ther harassment. East German propaganda on the alleged manu- facture of military goods and other "militaristic activities" in West Berlin has also stopped. Some West Berlin officials believe that the Soviets put pres- sure on the East Germans to end the harassment and propaganda campaign. Whether this is the case cannot be estabili-shed, but there have been indications of a lack of coordination be- tween Moscow and Pankow recently. The East Germans may have been too quick to apply against Ber- lin traffic restrictive measures which the Soviets had urged them only to "consider." Moscow, meanwhile, has at- tempted to "correct" the record on the diplomatic maneuvering which occurred before the West German Federal Assembly met in Berlin. The Soviet Embassy in Bonn released a press statement on 14 March which blamed the West Germans for scuttling the talks between the East and West Germans on a compromise solution to this is-sue. Soviet diplomats then repeated this explanation in several Western capitals. SECRET Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 200$IPVEQ1A-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 WARSAW PACT MEETING A PALLID AFFAIR The top leaders of the War- saw Pact states met in Budapest for two and a half hours 17 March and produced a brief communique and an anodyne "appeal" for a European security conference. The most significant accomplish- ment of the meeting, the first such since the invasion of Czech- oslovakia, may have been reach- ing an "understanding" on the pact's structure and command which was acceptable to the Ru- manians while at the same time allowing at least a sense of greater participation among the other members. Moscow evidently felt the need for a show of unity with its allies outweighed its urge to secure significant changes in the Warsaw Pact structure. Most of the hard business apparently was transacted in a serious of bilateral and trilat- eral meetings just before the he Soviets nc u e in the com- wanted to include' munique a condemnation of China, approval of the concept of "limited sovereignty," and statements on the Middle East and Vietnam. The Rumanians opposed all these ideas and they were therefore dropped, according to Rumanian press sources. This account may be 25X1 overdrawn, but there is probably some truth to it. Regarding the organization and structure of the pact, there clearly seems to have been some horse trading, probably largely worked out by Warsaw Pact mili- tary officials the last few months. The language of the communique seems to say that the Eastern Eu- ropean states accepted fuller in- tegration of the Warsaw Pact na- tional commands in return for a somewhat larger voice in military policy-making. Inasmuch as the changes had to be acceptable to the Rumanians, it remains to be seen if they will have any real meaning. In sum, Moscow appar- ently decided to accommodate to reality and settle for relatively mild statements so as not to create more friction before the world Communist conference in May. In Moscow, meanwhile, repre- sentatives of 67 Communist par- ties gathered on 18 March for what is described as the final, full-dress preparatory meeting before that conference. Absent are those governing parties that have consistently refused to par- ticipate in a world conference-- China, Albania, North Korea, North Vietnam, Yugoslavia, and Cuba. The major tasks of the present session are to set the date for the conference, approve draft documents on tie main anti-imperialist plank as well as on a peace appeal and a Vietnam resolution, and to de- cide on a suitable tribute to the 100t:z anniversary of Lenin's birth. The Soviets, who nursed the con- ference through five preliminary meetings in 1968 despite the ill effects of their intervention in Czec:Zoslovakia, have shown a will- ingness to seek out the lowest com- mon denominators on major issues in order to keep attendance high, and to obtain at least a superficial show of "unity." SECRET Page 11 Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 20 1ti 1d8'l'CIA-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 CZECHOSLOVAK FACTIONAL STRUGGLES SPREAD TO NONPARTY GROUPS The liberal-conservative split within the Czechoslovak party is spreading to special interest groups outside the party as liberal elements move to in- stitutionalize the gains they made before the occupation. The trade unions, which split into separate Czech and Slovak movements when federal- ization went into effect early this year, have formed a federal organization in support of the Dubcek leadership and its demo- cratic reforms. The Czech In- tellectuals Association and other groups have offered to join the trade unions in efforts to pre- serve the liberal gains made in 1968. Liberal, semi-independent youth groups have also formed a federal body, which has prompted conservatives to try to create a rival youth organization to support their views. The alli- ance between progressive students SECRET Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY and the workers has already proved to be a significant po- litical force. T:ae students groups, however, are divided on how far to press for change. The militant stu- dents in Prague, for example, failed to convince students from other districts to join them in a nationwide coalition of politi- cal activists. Mergers of liberal nonparty groups has led to an upsurge of conservative activity. Husak, the Slovak party chief, with the support of conservative Czech party leader Strougal, has pro- claimed a new, tough line assert- ing that the party has exclusive political primacy and emphasiz- ing that the ultraliberals--as well as the conservatives--must be brought under control. Since then, some Slovak organizations have been reluctant to unite with their Czech counterparts to seek r_eforn.s. Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 2007/ Rj1fRDP79-00927A007000010001-5 Military action continued in the Middle East this week as Israeli aircraft bombed terrorist bases in Jordan four times, and firing across the Suez Canal occurred sporadically. Mrs. Golda Meir, confirmed by the Israeli Knesset on 17 March, reaffirmed Israeli opposition to any imposed settlement in the Middle East. A well-informed Israeli journalist this week printed that the government will reject the latest US proposals on the Middle East. In Yemen, the government may soon attempt to form a new coalition which would include tribal leaders formerly supporting the royalists. A conference has been scheduled for this month., and the increasing number of tribal defections from the royalists has increased the chance for success. British Prime Minister Wilson's visit to Nigeria, now scheduled for 27 March to 1 April, appears designed mainly i:o acquire a softening of the federal government's war policy and thereby counteract strong UK domestic criticism of British arms sales to Nigeria. Fedcral leader Gowon may oblige Wilson with helpful public statements on federal bombing and relief policies, but he is unlikely to change his basic position that a cease-fire can come only after Biafra renounces secession. The war, meanwhile, remains stalemated. Calm has returned to Equatorial Guinea, and emergency controls have been relaxed. Negotiations with the Spanish on emergency financial aid went smoothly this week but, given the unpredictability of Guinean President Macias, arrangements could break down at any time. Internal economic and political problems persist and could lead to further instability. In Guinea, arrests of both civilians and army personnel, including the deputy chief of staff of the armed forces, continue to occur in connection with an alleged foreign-inspired plot. Unrest in the army has mounted considerably in recent weeks, as President Toure attempts to tighten party control over the military. Most of the dissident Ethiopian university students have complied with the government's order that they reregister, but many have not returned to classes and the u is not functioning at full capacity. SECRET Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 Mar 69 Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 20010(3(R8]J'cIA-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 PAKISTANI OPPOSITION LEADERS STEP UP ACTIVITY Opposition leaders are step- ping up their efforts to build support after last week's confer- ence with the government, which failed to stem continuing chaos throughout the country. The con- ference appears to have satisfied President Ayub and the conserva- tive forces, but opposition lead- ers vitally concerned with pro- vincial issues and regional re- lationships are extremely unhappy. Popular East Pakistani leader Mujibur Rahman denounced the dis- cussions as a complete failure. Mujib received a rousing welcome upon his return to East Pakistan, and he is now trying to increase his widespread support there. In a press conference on 14 March, Mujib blasted other politicians from his province for not pressing hard enough on regional conces- sions. He is now in the uncom- fortable position of contesting the elections under the new sys- tem worked out at the conference, while fending off leftist criti- cism that he knuckled under to Ayub. Mujib reportedly plans to present his own program to the National Assembly. The coalition that negotiated with Ayub dissolved itself shortly after the agreement was announced, and its eight component parties are now going their separate ways in preparation for the elections. ]x - air force chief Asghar Khan finally made his move by announc- ing the formation of a new party, which will probably attract con- servative and moderate West Paki- stani elements as well as many supporters of Ayub's disintegrat- ing Pakistan Muslim League. Meanwhile, labor and student protests continue throughout the country. A peaceful general strike on 17 March was only marginally ef- fective in West Pakistan but was completely successful in the East, where pro-Peking leftists called for a general work-stoppage fol- lowing an attack on their leader by "rightists" in West Pakistan. Confrontations between orthodox Muslims and leftists are continu- ing, particularly in the West, while increasing violence in rural East Pakistan is moving that prov- ince closer to complete anarchy. In an effort to placate mod- erate opposition forces in West Pakistan, Ayub has appointed a well-known Karachi opposition pol- itician and newspaper publisher to replace the provincial gov- ernor. East Pakistan's governor-- widely criticized for his inept handling of the civil strife-- has fled his province and is ex- pected to be replaced soon, but Ayub may be having trouble find- ing a willing candidate. Rumors of impending martial law persist, with military offi- cers talking openly about contin- gency planning. Troop movements from West to East Pakistan have been reported, and the government has issued a stern warning that the current trend toward anarchy will not be permitted to continue. SECRE'1 Page lh WEEKLY SUMM: RT 21 Mar 69 Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 200 g Oig(RE IA-RDP79-0Q927A007000010001-5 INCIDENTS CONTINUE ALONG THE ARAB-ISRAELI FRONTIERS Military action continues along the Arab-Israeli frontiers. Israeli aircraft bombarded ter- rorist bases in Jordan four times this week, and sporadic shooting took place across the Suez Canal. Israeli forces may still make a stronger response if Egypt continues its deliberate policy of "heating up" the Suez Canal area by cross-canal snip- ing and artillery firing. The Israeli Knesset on 17 March confirmed Mrs. Golda Meir's government by a vote of 84 to 12 with one abstention. She had planned to present her cabinet a few days earlier, but ran into minor snags with some of the par- ties on the right and left. In her policy speech, Mrs. Meir, with a wary eye on the upcoming Four-Power talks on the Middle East, reaffirmed Israeli opposi- tion to any imposed solution, re- iterated Israeli insistence on direct Arab-Israeli negotiations to establish a "true peace" and supported retention of the occu- pied Arab territories until a viable peace was achieved. Except for Mrs. Meir, there were no cab- inet changes. In Syria, recently emerged strongman Hafiz Asad seems to have successfully consolidated his position. Opposition to his control of the country, pos- sibly violent, is still possible, but Asad is apparently confi- dent of his position and of his control over the military. He called for a meeting of the Syrian Baath Party command this week, indicating his confidence that he could ramrod his own candidates for party leadership through the conference elections. Approximately 6,000 Iraqi troops have now moved into Syria from Jordan. Some observers believe the move indicates that Iraq is prepared to help Asad militarily should he meet with violent domestic opposition. It seems more likely, however, part of Asad's determination is to remove Syria from its isola- tion from the Arab world. Iraqi troops were to be stationed in Syria as well as in Jordan as part of an agreement concluded among the Eastern Arab Command seve:al months ago. SECRET Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 Approved For Release 2WLORICIA-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 :Co Ii. ra ~ Cauhati. aa. INDIA L.. Shillong New Delhi Applies New Pressure on Naga Insurgency . ; { SICKIM +r' R, NEPAL ~ $i Tlt7AN lm hal M mum Security forces trapped 00 men` 1 ~an.1 an i nportanf rebel leader ' * a - y Mandalay SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 20QL7QQE`.JCIA-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 NAGA THREAT RECEDES IN EASTERN INDIA New Delhi may at last be making progress in its effort to put down protracted tribal in- surgency in Nagaland. It is get- ting good results from a dual policy of dealing firmly with the Chinese-aided faction of the Naga underground while build- ing up the status of the loyal state government. Indian security forces in Nagaland--now numbering about 65,000--have been effective thus far in closing off the border between Burma and India, where the Indians claim between 800 and 1,200 Chinese-armed Nagas are trying to cross back into Nagaland. The security forces dealt the militant Nagas a se- rious setback on 16 March when they not only trapped a 200-man contingent which had just crossed the border but also captured the rebel leader most responsible for Naga contacts with China. This success bolstered the confidence of the Indian military in the area and may have badly undermined the morale of the militants. Meanwhile, Nagaland's state legislative assembly elections in February gave a solid major- ity to candidates who oppose re- bellion and who have cooperated with New Delhi in running the Nagaland State government. The Naga National Organization (NNO), whose leaders negotiated the present separate state arrange- ment with New Delhi in 1962, has formed the state government with support from 41 of 52 of the new legislators. New Delhi attributes the NNO victory and the orderly election to the increased impact of its economic aid program-- by far the largest per capita for any state in India--and to its policy of strengthening the position of loyal Nagas by work- ing solely with the state govern- ment.. New Delhi has terminated the drawn-out and unsuccessful negotiations with the underground, which had undermined the position of loyal state officials. At the same time that the state government has increased in stature, divisions have split the once-united underground into at least two groups--one oppos- ing and one accepting help from China. Tribal antagonisms have hurt the movement and have been probably more important than the China-aid issue in producing a succession of coups, kidnapings, and at: least one assassination in the last year. Militant Nagas are still capable of making trouble, but a period of relative quiet is likely now in Nagaland. If the threat: of disorder decreases, however, there may be new Com- plications for New Delhi. Mod- erate underground leaders, who oppose; aid from China and have come to eschew violence, may try to press the state govern- ment to urge new negotiations on New Delhi in the hope of winning increased autonomy for the state. New Delhi is likely to oppose such talks, but state government leaders may be in- fluenced by the close tribal ties which many of then. have with the moderate faction of the underground. SECRET Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 2007/gif~8RRDP79-00927A007000010001-5 OBSTACLES IN EAST EUROPEAN OIL ARRANGEMENTS WITH IRAN Efforts by East European countries to reduce their depend- ence on the USSR for petroleum supplies--31 million tons last year--moved ahead last week with a Czechoslovak-Iranian agreement. Prague is to import Iranian oil in return for providing Tehran with $200 million in credits for the purchase of Czechoslovak in- dustrial equipment and machinery. Specific details were not publi- cized, but earlier information in- dicated that shipments of Iranian crude would total an estimated 15-20 million tons between 1970 and 1-980. Since 1967 Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania have concluded simi- lar arrangements with Iran. Im- plementation, however, has been impeded, in part, by increased transport costs caused by the closure of the Suez Canal. Only Rumania, which had to supplement its domestic crude, has taken delivery of oil from Iran. Last autumn Bucharest ar- ranged for the delivery of Iranian oil through the Israeli pipeline to Haifa for onward shipment to Rumania. By the end of 1968 an estimated 250,000 tons of Iranian crude had moved through the pipe- line for Rumania, and shipments thus far this year have totaled about 130,000 tons. Under the terms of the agreement, Bucharest is scheduled to take a total of 3.5 million tons of crude oil by the end of 1970. Iranian oil carried by the Israeli pipeline and then on to Mediterranean and Black Sea ports is cheaper than delivery by sea around Africa and possibly even through the canal. Nevertheless, other East European countries ap- parently have ruled out use of the Israeli pipeline to avoid com- plicating their relations with the Arab states. A Czechoslovak official recently intimated the use of Israel's pipeline is "closed" to Prague "for political reasons." For Czechoslovakia and Hun- gary, the problems of transport- ing Iranian oil are compounded because their land-locked loca- tion may result in prohibitive costs that may militate against implementation of their agree- ments with Tehran. Interest in obtaining crude oil fro Ilran, however, has revived long stand- ing proposals to extend an oil pipeline currently under construc- tion in Yugoslavia to Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Intermittent discussions on this project were held last year, and financing for the proposed 360-mile line reportedly has been allocated among the interested participants. Approximately $43 million is to be raised by Yugo- slavia, $17 million by East Eu- ropean sources, and $5 million from the free world--presumably Iran, which earlier had expressed an interest in investing in the project. The project still is in 25X1 the negotiating stage, however, and many problems remain to be worked out. SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 2001,' pj qA-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 SOMALI PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION SCHEDULED FOR 26 MARCH The second parliamentary election since the Somali Repub- lic gained independence is un- likely to result in any signifi- cant political change. Unlike most of Africa where one party governments are the rule, a host of parties and can- didates are running for the 123 elected seats in the unicameral parliament. Final figures pub- lished in February listed some 69 parties registered to run in the 48 electoral districts. All but a few are one or two man parties, however, and are a political outgrowth of Somalia's many competitive tribal groups. These candidates generally rep- resent local tribal groups whose only hope depends on gathering sufficient votes to qualify under Somalia's complicated system of proportional representation. If elected, they frequently cross over to the majority party. As is usual in Somalia, tribalism, personalities, and money, have played a larger role in the cam- paign than party programs or ideology. The Somali Youth League (SYL) party is expected to retain control of the government. The SYL, since its founding in 1943, has dominated Somali politics and has controlled the government since independence in 1960. Al-- though the SYL may lose some seats, estimates of its final tally range from 59 to 79 seats. The party now holds approximately 80 seats in parliament. A coa- lition of minority parties could emerge to challenge the SYL if the SYL slips badly, but such a development is unlikely. The SYL may in fact increase its majority by defections from other parties if it makes a strong showing. The Democratic Action Party (DAP), formed in October. 1968 by former prime minister Abdirazak and a small group of breakaway SYL deputies, does not seem to have hurt the SYL as many expected. There apparently have been no additional defectors. Abdirazak's principal charge, that Prime Minister Egal's detente with Ethiopia and Kenya constitutes a sellout of the Somali inhabi- tants of those countries, appar- ently has not stimulated much popular support for the DAP. The nomination of a new gove:^nment by President Scermarche afte:f the election is a separate ques'_ion. Prime Minister Eaal appears likely to be reappointed, although there may be new faces in the cabinet. At the moment there appears to be no politician of stature or acceptable tribal background to replace him, and Egal and the president have de- veloped a good working relation- ship.. Scermarche has backed him solidly in his detente policy, and Egal, unlike his predecessors, has been remarkably effective in controlling parliament's fre- uentl unpredictable deputies. SECRET Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 Approved For Release 2007/p0?/e81~plf-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 SE(,RET WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 Mar 69 Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 2007/1 R P RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 Brazil's military government is pushing its campaign to cleanse the country of alleged subversive elements. On 13 March three more federal deputies, 92 state deputies, and one mayor were removed from office and deprived of their political rights for ten years. Although some probably were involved to some extent in corruption, others appear to have been guilty only of being too vocal in their opposition to the government. Five of the 66 federal senators and 79 of the 409 federal deputies have now been removed from office. The British ended Anguilla'sbrief period of independence this week by using military force to install a senior British official as commissioner of the tiny Caribbean island. Although this new arrangement may last for several years, the Anguillans will not be forced to rejoin the Associated State of St. Kitts - Nevis - Anguilla which they broke away from almost two years ago. Negotiations between the US and Peru o:i the problems of the expropri- ation of the International Petroleum Company and Peru's claim to a 200-mile limit to its territorial waters have been complicated by the seizure and subsequent fining of two US tuna boats on 19 March. Many Peruvian officials, however, hope that the talks will be successful and President Velasco said the incident was "not provoked by the US and we believe that it will not hamper [US negotiator] Irwin's visi_t." Ecuador's national association of law schools is planning to sponsor a series of lectures on contemporary thought in the near future. Among those who apparently will be invited as guest lecturers are: Herbert Marcuse, Stokely Carmichael, Rudi Dutschke, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, and Jean Paul Sartre. The Ecuadorean Government has already presented the sponsors with about $2,000 to help finance the affair. The Central American Common Market crisis has not yet been resolved, but significant progress was made when El Salvador and Honduras deposited a number of outstanding protocols on 14 March. Costa Rica, however, has not yet ratified an important agreement designed to increase government revenues nor has Nicaragua rescinded its recent restrictions on intraregional trade. Negotiations are continuing this weekend at a meeting of the Central American Economic Council composed of the five ministers of econ- omy. 25X1 SECRET Page 2 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 Mar 69 Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 Approved For Release 2007/Q?f@81tpff-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 PERU HOPEFUL IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH US The Peruvian Government seems anxious to keep the fish- ing boat incident on 19 March from jeopardizing the talks which have Just begun with the special US emissary. Most Peruvians seem optimistic that the negoti- ations will avert a direct US- Peruvian confrontation over the expropriation of the Interna- tional Petroleum Company, and there are a few indications that the Velasco government may be prepared to soften its position on the matter of compensation. The seizure of two US fish- ing boats beyond the 12-mile limit, however, is sure to com- plicate the talks. The vessels were promptly released but only after paying fines and license fees of nearly $26,000. The foreign minister informed the US ambassador that four other US tuna clippers had been sighted about 30 miles off the coast, but that the navy had strict or- ders not to patrol beyond 12 miles. He said this restraint was being used "in order to pre- serve a harmonious atmosphere for the Irwin mission." mbassaior Irwin's arrival was given favorable treatment _n the Peruvian press, which ex- pressed the general belief that a means would be found to avoid a confrontation with the US. Uni- versity students who used the oc- casion of the ambassador's ar- rival to stage a demonstration at the US Embassy were c.,uickly dispersed by police. More dem- onstrations will probably occur as the Communist Party is plan- ning public meetings to oppose the Irwin mission. There has also been a change in tone in statements by govern- ment officials. The IPC expropria- tion is still regarded as a closed issue, but the matter of compensa- tion no longer seems quite so certain. One Lima newspaper re- cently carried a quote attributed to President Velasco that the IPC's $690-million "debt" to the State "could be modified." These favorable trends, how- ever, are somewhat offset by such things as President Velasco's statement to a Brazilian journal- ist that what remains open for discussion is the Hickenlooper amendment and US actions, not IPC and its compensation. There are also efforts under way to es- tablish new claims against IPC based on the government's allega- tion that the company completed illegal foreign exchange trans- fers following the expropriation. I'age 24 WEEKLY S."MM\1AHY Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 Approved For Release 200781$& :IM-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 POLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES CONTINUE IN PANAMA The lack of substance to the growing rhetoric of the "October Revolution" and the apparent prior- ity accorded military affairs have added to public skepticism that elections will be held next year as promised. Several businessmen have al- ready expressed to the US Embassy their impressions that National Guard (GN) Commandant Omar Torrijos is laying the groundwork for a long-term dictatorship. Last week Torrijos emphasized his personal control in Panama by assuming the rank of brigadier general. In a press interview the same day, he made references to the guard's re- sistance to political pressure to return to the "old, corrupt" sys- tem--remarks widely interpreted as a retraction of electoral plans. Torrijos has not yet "clarified" his press statements, although two members of the electoral tribunal have submitted their resignations in protest. Most of the politicians, ex- cluded from their traditional spheres of influence and perhaps un- certain as to the ultimate power center within the GN seem to have adopted a wait-and-see attitude. 25X1 25X1 The political calm, enforced by censorship and the shutdown of troub=_e spots such as the schools, may break down next month when Pan- ama's most important secondary schoo='_, the National Institute, is scheduled to reopen. Its students have been denied credit for last year's work because they staged pro- 25X1 tests against the military take-over and their reaction could take the form of further disturbances. SECRET Page 25 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 Approved For Release 2007*.L%A-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC Associated State of St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla (Norh.) CURACAO BONAIRE ' St. BaitheiemY i y _ - AREA OF INSET ANGUIL.A Si T. JOHN THbMAS I lY" ST MARTIN (U.S.) \U.K?)ST, MAARTEYfJ\ I' BARTHELEMY ST. CROJE I ) .STAR , , 18A BUDA L ~HEVIS 1 TIGUA AJ REDORDA ~MON TSERI GUADELOUPE (Fr.) MARIE GALANTE DOMINICA (U.K.) MARTINIQUE (Fr.) ST. LUCIA (U.K.) ST VINCENT BARBADOS ") (U.K.) GRENADA (U.K.) SECRET ISLA DE MARGARITA TOBAGO TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO t.- TRINIDAD Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 2007/RLVMPIP-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 THE BRITISH END ANGUILLAN INDEPENDENCE Anguilla's brief independ- ence ended this week, when the British used military force to install a senior British offi- cial, Anthony Lee, as commis- sioner of Anguilla. Anguilla had broken away from the British Associated State of St. Kitts - Nevis - Anguilla in May 1967, soon after the fed- eration was formed, claiming it had been denied equal representa- tion by Premier Bradshaw of St. Kitts. This was the Anguillans' third attempt to separate them- selves from St. Kitts, with which they had been associated for pur- poses of colonial administration for more than 150 years. The situation had drifted since 1967 until early this year when Anguilla council leader Ron- ald Webster stated that Anguilla would declare total independence and threatened to expel Britain's SECRET Page 27 WEEKLY SUMMARY only official representative on the island unless London formally recognized Anguilla's secession. The British recalled their repre- sentative and cut off all eco- nomic aid, although they appar- ently doubted that Webster, who had declared himself "President," represented public sentiment. The decision to install a commis- sioner was precipitated by Web- ster's forcible eviction last week of the British undersecre- tary of state for foreign affairs, who hELd come to the island to work out a new constitutional ar- rangement. The Anguillans will probably acquiesce to the British especially if Webster is out of the picture, while demanding increased finan- cial support for development proj- ects. Most of the Caribbean mem- bers of the Commonwealth are likely to endorse the British interven- tion. Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 2007403/OR ;CiA-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5 STRAINS INCREASE IN CHILE'S CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY President Frei's Cnristian Democratic Party (PDC) has in re- cent years seen the emergence of a leftist rebel croup that otter takes positions closer to those of the Communist Party than of the government. This division within the PDC has been crystal- lized by the way the covern_nent handled the police attack on squatters invading land at Puerto Montt on 9 March, and the ten- sions now present could lead to a formal split within the party before the presidential election in September 1970. The government has backed Minister of the Intereor Perez Zujovic in his support of the po- lice action, in which c..iaht per- sons were killed and scores wounded. Perez has long been a favorite however, tack his target of the PDC rebels, and they hastened to at- action. The Christian Democratic Youth group issued a statement echoing the condemnation of the government by the Social- ist and Communist parties. The PDC then suspended the youth lead- ers. At the same time a Group of PDC leftists published a state- ment that supported the youth croup and criticized the govern- ment's action, saying that the party has always "condemned popu- lar repression." The leftists took the opportunity to renew their call for "unity of popular forces"--an allusion to the pos- sibility of PDC cooperation with ( the Communists in 1970. President Frei has mobilized his influence behind Perez and has received support from the cabinet and from the PDC leader- ship. The party council agreed this week, however, to hold a meeting of the party's National Commission on 1 May. This larger body will give the rebels a bet- ter forum for airing their views. The meeting of the National Commission will be enlivened as a result of a declaration this week by Radomiro Tornic, who long has been regarded as Frei's heir apparent within the party. Tomic said that he would not run for president unless he had the sup- port of the Chilean left, i.e., the Communists and the Socialists. Tomic has long called for a unity of "popular forces," but never before has he been so firm. The Communists, however, so far have rejected Tomic as a presidential candidate and seem unlikely at this point to change their popi- tion. Should PDC hotheads de- cide to leave the party, they probably will find themselves playing a minor role in any leftist electoral front.1 i SICR E1' Page 28 WEEKLY SL:\I\IAIIY Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 SQ Qyed For Release 2007/03/08: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5 Secret Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5