WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 21, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2007/03/08: CIA-RDP79-00927A0070018ffff
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
42
21 March 1969
No. 0362/69
State Dept. review completed
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(Information as of noon EST, 20 March 1969)
Far East
VIETNAM
The Communists are keeping up pressure on a few key
areas, primarily in III Corps, through mortar and
rocket attacks, commando raids, terrorism and prob-
ing actions. The offensive, now ir. its fourth week,
probably has fallen short of their expectations.
However, the enemy may be waiting instructions to
open a new offensive phase.
NEW THAI GOVERNMENT IS FORMED
There were no major changes in the new 28-man cabi-
net proclaimed by the King on 11 March, the final
step in forming the government specified by the new
constitution.
COMMUNISTS EASE PRESSURE ON LAO GOVERNMENT POSITIONS
Communist pressure against government positions in
the north has eased somewhat over the past week, but
the enemy may be preparing for another round in their
dry season offensive there.
SOUTH KOREAN COUNTERINSURGENCY BEING IMPROVED
The South Korean Government has begun a program to
upgrade its counterinsurgency effort.
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I:urge
SINO-SOVIET BORDER REMAINS UNEASY
Neither Moscow nor Peking appears ready to back down
on the issue of the disputed island in the Ussuri
River. An engarrement on 15 March may have involved
more men than the initial clash, but was not as
bloody.
EUROPEAN REACTION TO THE ABM SYSTEM RESTRAINED
Soviet press reaction to the US ABM decision has
been restrained and the East European nations appear
to be following Moscow's lead. West European media,
with the exception of the Scandinavian press, have
treated the President's announcement favorably.
HARASSMENT OF BERLIN TRAFFIC CEASES
East German propacganda charges on the manufacture of
military supplies in West Berlin have also ended,
possibly at Moscow's instigation.
WARSAW PACT MEI:TING A PALLID AFFAIR
The meeting in Budapest of the top leaders of member
countries was the first since the invasion of Czech-
oslovakia. Meanwhile, representatives of 67 Commu-
nist parties gathered in Moscow for the final pre-
paratory meeting before a world Communist conference
in May.
CZECHOSLOVAK FACTIONAL STRUGGLES SPREAD TO NONPARTY GROUPS
The liberal-conservative solit within the Czechoslo-
vak party is spreading to special interest croups
outside the party as liberal elements have tried to
institutionalize the pains they made before the oc-
cupation.
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Middle East - Africa
PAKISTANI OPPOSITION LEADERS STEP UP ACTIVITY
Opposition leaders are stepping up their efforts to
build support after last week's round table confer-
ence with the government, which failed to stem con-
tinuing chaos throughout the country.
INCIDENTS CONTINUE ALONG THE ARAB-ISRAELI FRONTIERS
Israeli planes attacked terrorist bases in Jordan
again this week, and another firefight took place
across the Suez Canal. In Syria, newly emerged
strongman Hafiz Asad seems to be consolidating his
position.
NAGA THREAT RECEDES IN EASTERN INDIA
New Delhi may at last be making progress in its
efforts to put down protracted tribal insurgency
in Nagaland.
OBSTACLES IN EAST EUROPEAN OIL ARRANGEMENTS WITH IRAN
Transportation problems and international politics
have hampered implementation of a number of agree-
ments Iran has with Eastern Europe.
SOMALI PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION SCHEDULED FOR 26 MARCH
Somalia's second parliamentary election since in-
dependence is unlikely to produce significant polit-
ical changes.
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Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 23
PERU HOPEFUL IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH US
Most Peruvians seem optimistic that the negotia-
tions will avert a US-Peruvian confrontation over
the expropriation of International Petroleum Com-
pany assets.
POLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES CONTINUE IN PANAMA
The lack of substance to the growing rhetoric of
the 'October Revolution' and the apparent priority
accorded military affairs have added to public
skepticism that elections will be held next year
as promised.
THE BRITISH END ANGUILLAN INDEPENDENCE
Military force was used to install a senior British
official as commissioner of Anguilla but London will
not ask the Anguillans to rejoin the Associated
State of St. Kitts - Nevis - Anguilla.
STRAINS INCREASE IN CHILE'S CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY
Intraparty tensions have reached a dangerous point
because of the government's handling of a police
attack on squatters who invaded lands in Puerto
Montt on 9 March and a split in the party could
result.
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The Communists continue to limit the scope of their four-week-old
offensive in South Vietnam. The pattern set early in the offensive-rocket
and mortar attacks along with occasional ground probes and terrorism
against a few key areas--has not been significantly altered. The III Corps area
remains the focal point but targets throughout the country also are being hit.
There are indications that the enemy may soon try to step up the tempo and
strength of their attacks. Meanwhile, the negotiators in Paris continue to
mark time.
The Chinese Communists have not indicated when their ninth party
congress will get under way in the wake of the border clashes with the
USSR, but it is likely to be soon. Prior to events on the border and the
massive propaganda demonstrations that have been staged throughout China,
the populace was being prepared for the almost immediate convening of the
congress.
In Laos, Communist military pressure against government positions in
the north has cased somewhat, but the enemy may be preparing for another
round. The Communists' failure to move gLickly to take advantage of the
government forces' disarray after the fall of Na Khang suggests that the
enemy's current military objectives continue to be limited The Communists
apparently still hope, however, that continued shelling of the government
base at Thateng will cause the base to be evacuated, thereby obviating
another costly ground assault.
The South Korean Government has begun a program to upgrade its
counterinsurgency effort. Despite last year's generally successful security
operations, the government's performance was hampered by poor coordina-
tion, lack of equipment, and insufficient personnel. Most proposed changes
are still in their initial stages and it will take considerable time before they
will produce a significant improvement in operational performance.
There were no major changes in the new Thai cabinet proclaimed by
the King this week, the final step in forming the government specified by the
new constitution. Some younger, professional administrators joined the
cabinet but the leadership refrained from restructuring the often overlapping
ministerial functions that have ? n1amied so many of Thailand's domestic
programs in the past.
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VIETNAM
The Communist offensive, now
in its fourth week, continued to
focus on maintaining pressure on
a few key areas through mortar and
rocket attacks, commando raids,
terrorism, and probing actions.
It also included limited infantry
Page 2
assaults and threatening maneuvers
by main force units.
The North Vietnamese 5th Di-
vision resumed its campaign in
the Bien Hoa - Long Khanh area
and struck several points around
the Xuan Loc Province town and
the lower reaches of War Zone "D."
Losses on both sides were heavy
in four days of sharp fighting.
These actions may have temporar-
ily deflected the 5th from deeper
thrusts into the complex of al-
lied fortifications along Saigon's
northeastern tier.
The Communists somewhat slack-
ened their pace in northwestern
III Corps, but continued sporadic
strikes in Tay Ninh, Binh Duong
and Binh Long provinces. In Long
An Province, the enemy continued
to shell and probe along the south-
western approach corridor to Sa-
gon.
There were no other con-
certed Communist drives elsewhere
in South Vietnam. In the Mekofg
Delta, the Viet Cong briefly
harassed province towns with shell-
ings and stepped-up terrorism.
Most action again was centered in
the My Tho area.
In the northern provinces,
activity flared up just below
the eastern end of the Demilitar-
ized Zone early in the week and
then shifted to the lower three
provinces of I Corps. North Viet-
namese regulars launched a brief
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rocket attack and several stiff
ground assualts within a few miles
of the zone.
The communists once more
launched light rocket attacks against
South Vietnam's three principal ci-
ties: Hue on the 14th, Saigon a
day later, and Da Nang on 19 March.
Meanwhile, there are indications
that the offensive has fallen short
of Communist expectations, particu-
larly in the Saigon area.
the enemy is dismayed
because stringent government security
measures in the capital city area
have interfered with their ability
to collect intelligence, reduced
their urban guerrilla force, and
hindered their efforts to infiltrate
weapons in the city. The Communists
are continuing to maintain pressure
on Saigon's outskirts, however, and
are trying to increase the level of
terrorism and agitation in the city.
Enemy forces throughout the country
also may well be awaiting instruc-
tions to open another phase of the
offensive.
Political Developments
In South Vietnam
The government is trying to
handle the case of Buddhist monk
Thich Thien Minh in a way that will
reduce his prestige as a militant
Buddhist peace agitator but not
make him a martyr. So far, the
Buddhists have responded cautiously,
with well-controlled anger, but the
militants may be planning to re-
kindle Buddhist-Catholic frictions.
Although the government's evi-
dence against the Buddhist youth
leader was overwhelming, the 10-
year sentence for sheltering Viet
Cong personnel has led both cleri-
cal and lay Buddhist leaders to
question the motives of the gov-
ernment.
The government is apparently
confident that it can keep the lid
on antigovernment dissent designed
to threaten its stability. The
militant Buddhists represent the
leading source of such dissent,
and the government is anxious to
demonstrate a stern attitude in
the hopes of discouraging other
antigovernment elements.
President Thieu has gone to
some lengths to avoid making a mar-
tyr of Thien Minh. After publiciz-
ing the evidence against the bonze,
Thieu announced that Thien Minh
would receive preferential treat-
ment, despite the stringent sen-
tence. Thieu has also let it be
known that if there is no provoca-
tive Buddhist reaction, the pris-
oner could be released early. At
the same time, the government is
keeping close track of militant
Buddhist reactions around the coun-
try, to make sure that they do not
nurture a serious challenge to the
regime.
The militant Buddhists, under
the direction of Thich Tri Quang,
may attempt to exploit the case to
generate new Buddhist-Catholic fric-
tion. Although Tri Quang has re-
mained fairly cautious so far, he
has supported the Buddhists' charge
that President Thieu and the Ameri-
cans are using the affair to "de-
stroy" Buddhism. This statement
bracketed the "fervent Catholic"
Thieu with former President Diem,
thereby raising the specter of
Catholic oppression of Buddhism.
The Buddhists hope to get good in-
ternational press coverage for a
series of country-wide protest
prayer meetings.
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Tri Quang is clearly test-
ing the prevailing political winds
to see if a successful antigov-
ernment campaign can be developed
by reviving anti-Catholic senti-
ments. The militants' peace cam-
paign has failed to gain much mo-
mentum, and Tri Quang may have de-
cided that the theme of religious
ers7 cution may be more su cessful.
NEW THAI GOVERNMENT IS FORMED
There were no major changes
in the new 28-man cabinet pro-
claimed by the King on 11 March,
the final step in forming the
government specified by the new
constitution.
There were some shifts among
the leadership but the key posts
remained unchanged: Thanom re-
tained the Ministry of Defense,
Praphat continued as deputy prime
minister and minister of the in-
terior, and Thanat remained min-
ister of foreign affairs.
Pote Sarasin, the regime's
top civilian, was also named a
deputy prime minister, presumably
to help offset the government's
military cast. The army's role
in the cabinet was, nevertheless,
substantially increased by the
inclusion of three additional
generals.
In addition to providing
political continuity, the new
cabinet may provide somewhat
better government; several aging
members of the old cabinet were
replaced with younger, professional
administrators. The leadership,
however, refrained from-restruc-
turing the often overlapping min-
isterial functions that have
plagued so many domestic programs
in the past. It also missed an
opportunity to broaden its politi-
cal base by failing to include
opposition elements in the cabi-
net.
Earlier this month the gov-
ernment cleared its only potential
obstacle in succeeding itself
when its candidate was elected
speaker of the popularly elected
lower house. With the support of
independent members, whose candi-
date the government in turn helped
elect as deputy speaker, the regime
demonstrated that even with its
mere plurality, it could muster
a working majority. Although the
outcome was never in serious doubt,
the election indicated that the
independents, some of whom had
been sounding out the possibility
of working with the opposition
Democrats, would side with the
government on important issues.
At the same time, however, sev-
eral independents have made it
increasingly clear that they in-
tend to exploit their pivotal
position between the government
and the Democrats.
The strength of the opposi-
tion and the tactics it will pur-
sue may become clearer when the
government presents its major
policy positions to the legisla-
ture next week. The government
is not expected to make any sub-
stantial shifts in these policies,
although such issues as relations
with the US and the government's
stand on corruption may spark
some lively discussion both in the
legislature and the press. II
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COMMUNISTS EASE PRESSURE ON LAO GOVERNMENT POSITIONS
Communist pressure against
government positions in the north
has eased somewhat over the past
week, but the enemy may be pre-
paring for another round in their
dry season offensive there.
The Communists have not fol-
lowed up their capture of Na Khang
on 1 March with a major effort
against the remaining government
positions in Xieng Khouang Prov-
ince. A number of small, iso-
lated government outposts have
been evacuated or have fallen
in the face of relatively light
enemy attacks but the resolve of
government forces appears to have
stiffened as a result of their
successful defense of the refu-
gee center at Houei Tong Ko.
The Communists' failure to move
quickly to take advantage of the
government forces' disarray af-
ter the fall of Na Khang sug-
gests that the enemy's current
military objectives continue to
be limited.
No new major fighting has
developed in the south although
enemy activity has picked up
in the long-contested Muong
Phalane area and the Communists
have been harassing traffic on
Route 13 between Savannakhet and
Pakse. Along the eastern por-
tion of the Bolovens Plateau, the
Communists apparently still hope
that the continued Shelling of
Thateng, combined with the low
morale of the defenders, will
cause the base to be evacuated,
thereby obviating another costly
ground assault.
NORTH
Hanoi.
VIETNAM
i lane
T H A I L A N D Savannakhe
[-7 Communist-controlled
territory
C13 Contested territory
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SOUTH KOREAN COUNTERINSURGENCY BEING IMPROVED
The South Korean Government has
begun a program to upgrade its coun-
terinsurgency effort.
Last year's generally success-
ful security operations were none-
theless hampered by poor coordina-
tion, lack of equipment, and insuf-
ficient personnel.
A unified security command en-
compassing all rear area military,
police, and militia units is being
planned to overcome coordination
problems, many of which were attrib-
uted to inadequate equipment, over-
lapping jurisdictions, and interserv-
ice jealousies. Subordinate special
sector military commands are appar-
ently being planned for strategi-
cally important areas or areas con-
sidered particularly vulnerable to
guerrilla infiltration. Activation
of the new command structure is,
however, heavily dependent on the
availability of improved communica-
tions and equipment.
Prior to the large-scale North
Korean infiltration of the east
coast last fall, South Korean forces
had only eight helicopters for trans-
porting quick reaction troops. The
US assistance program will add 15
more to the inventory by June, and
the Seoul government hopes to buy an-
other 17 by the end of the year with
funds being collected through public
voluntary donations.
Equipment shortages have been
particularly evident in the local
militia forces organized under the
national police last year. The mil-
itia, which currently has more than
two million personnel, mostly veter-
ans, made a good showing in security
operations last year despite the lack
of enthusiasm shown by many of its
involuntary members and the heavily
armed North Korean agents it had to
face. Weapons and small amounts, of
ammunition are now available for
only 22 percent of the militia, but
the government hopes to have it com-
pletely armed by the end of the year.
Personnel are to be added to
the 4,000-man well-armed combat po-
lice force, and 18 new battalions
are planned for the army's special
forces units to be used as a coUn-
terinsurgency mobile reserve.I
25X1
25X1
istry r a 1 shed
instructions to give antiguerrilla
training to all military personnel.
A resident registration program
is also under way to make it diffi-
cult for North Korean agents to move
through the country. To date, 75
percent of the population over 18
years old has been registered. The
government plans to resettle an es-
timated 12,000 to 13,000 families
who now live in remote areas into
small tactical hamlets with a com-
munications link to nearby towns.
This would make population control
easier for security authorities but
is almost certain to antagonize most
of the farmers involved.
Most of these changes in the
counterinsurgency program are still 25X1
in their initial stages and it will
be some time before a significant
improvement in ope tional perform-
ance is realized.
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A Pravda article of 20 March, commenting on the US decision on
ABMs, accused the "military-industrial complex" in the US of "striving to
unleash" a new round in the arms race. As with earlier Soviet comments,
however, the article avoided direct criticism of the President and any
implication that strategic arms limitation talks might be affected.
In response to a US protest of a TU-95 bomber's overflight last week of
Shemya Island in the Aleutians, the Soviets admitted that through naviga-
tional error the plane may have come "somewhat closer" to Shemya than
intended and said that they will take measures "designed to prevent unde-
sirable incidents."
Since the major clash over Damansky Island on the Sino-Soviet border
last weekend, both sides have lobbed mortar shells at each other on an
almost nightly basis. There is no sign that border clashes have occurred
elsewhere.
The long-heralded Warsaw Pact meeting was finally held in Budapest
this week. It appears to have been a pallid affair. Evidently Moscow's desire
for a show of unity led it to accommodate its allies on the Pact's command
structure and on Pact policy making.
The Yugoslavs, at their party congress, took long strides toward re-
vitalizing the leadership and liberalizing political, economic and social poli-
cies. The more conservative leaderships of the ruling Communist parties will
see Belgrade's injection of new ideas into its unique Communist system as a
further threat to stability in the Communist world.
East German harassment and interference with West German travel to
and from West Berlin has ceased, possibly at Moscow's insistence.
Last week's meeting in the regularly scheduled series between President
de Gaulle and Chancellor Kiesinger appears to have improved the climate of
Franco-German relations somewhat. Nonetheless, there was no narrowing of
differences on political policies for Europe. De Gaulle said that France
would no longer participate in the Western European Union.
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SINO-SOVIET BORDER REMAINS UNEASY
Neither Moscow nor Peking
appears ready to back down on
the issue of the disputed island
in the Ussuri River. An engage-
ment on 15 March may have in-
volved more men than the initial
clash but was not as bloody.
There have been artillery ex-
changes since, with casualties,
if any, unreported. Both sides
have probably moved reinforcements
to the immediate area of the is-
land. There is no evidence, how-
ever, that either is planning to
escalate the level of conflict or
t ; widen it to other disputed areas.
Although the circumstances
around the dispute remain un-
clear, it appears from available
evidence that the Chinese trig-
gered the initial clash. Peking
may have chosen a site to which
it believes its legal. claim is
strong. Chinese propaganda since
the encounters last weekend has
emphasized Peking's contention
that the island is "Chinese ter-
ritory according to international
law," because it lies on China's
side of the river's main channel.
The Chinese have chided Moscow
for its failure to disclose fully
its legal claim. Moscow has
claimed that maps appended to the
treaty of 1860, which set the
present boundaries, show the is-
land as Soviet territory, but
has not yet produced such maps.
Peking has published a map which
seems to back its claim.
on 15 March was probably a Chi-
nese effort to contest that pres-
ence. The island is likely to
remain a scene of conflict until
both sides retire from it and
leave it unoccupied--apparently
the normal state of numerous dis-
puted islands in the Amur and Us-
suri Rivers. The Soviets, how-
ever, have charged that the Chi-
nese had occupied the island in
preparation for the incident on
2 March, and they may believe that
it is now necessary to maintain
a show of strength in the island
area to demonstrate that they
cannot be intimidated. When the
ice breaks in the spring thaw,
normally about mid-April, the
matter of control may become aca-
demic. Most of the island will
probably be under water.
Reports emanating unoffi-
cially from Soviet Foreign Trade
Ministry sources on 14 March that
the Chinese had halted all Soviet
aid shipments to Vietnam have not
been confirmed. The Soviets prob-
ably exaggerated instances of Chi-
nese obstructions at border cross-
ing points for several days fol-
lowing the incident.
The Soviets have apparently
controlled--or at least strongly
patrolled--the island since the
initial clash. The engagement
Soviet ambassadors made a
concerted effort to buttress Mos-
cow's version of the original in-
cident by calling on government
and foreign ministry heads around
the world between 10 and 13 March.
This effort was apparently an at-
tempt to emphasize the gravity
Moscow attributed to the affair
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and to stress Russian innocence.
By charging the Chinese with ir-
responsibility and expansionism,
Moscow may also have hoped to deter
the recognition or expanded rela-
tions with China that several of
the governments have been contem-
plating.
EUROPEAN REACTION TO THE ABM SYSTEM RESTRAINED
Press reaction in Moscow to
the ABM system remains restrained,
with Soviet commentaries point-
edly paraphrasing US congres-
sional and intellectual critics
of the decision. Ever since
breaking its silence in 1968 on
the subject of arms talks, Mos-
cow has stressed its readiness
to engage in a "serious exchange
of opinions" with the US. There-
fore, the Soviets may have de-
cided to forgo a. propaganda at-
tack on the ABM in order not to
compromise the possibilities for
such talks. Also, Soviet dis-
armament adviser Roshchin's re-
marks in Geneva suggest that
Moscow will not use the US de-
cision to proceed with an ABM
system to delay ratification of
the nonproliferation treaty.
Eastern European reaction to
the US ABM decision has been gen-
erally limited to factual report-
ing, albeit with mildly critical
overtones. Available comment is
not unanimous, and ranges from
Sofia's statement that the ABM
decision is an "unsuitable prel-
ude" to the resumed Geneva dis-
armament talks, to Polish charges
that it reflects the "extremely
aggressive intentions of the US"
and runs contrary to the spirit
of the nonproliferation treaty.
Some Eastern European media, in-
cluding the Polish, already have
welcomed US ratification of the
treaty.
The President's announce-
ment has received widespread and
generally favorable coverage in
the media of most West European
countries. Official comment is
meager, however.
A West German NATO affairs
specialist believed the decision
strengthened the alliance. An-
other official emphasized the US
should explain the decision care-
fully to the Soviets. Public
media generally viewed the deci-
sion as a. compromise which would
tend to avoid an acceleration of
the arms race.
Madrid is examining the de-
cision for clues on how the US
may decide renewal of the Spanish
bases agreement. The influential
ABC commented that "militarily,
the logic of the situation which
guided the President's decision
should lead to the maintenance of
the Spanish bases."
The Scandinavian press has
generally taken a negative line.
It has stressed the possible
damage to the nonproliferation
treaty and is apprehensive that
it might cause the Soviets to
escalate the arms race. The
Norwegian defense minister, speak-
ing as a private individual,
stated that he believes that ABM
deployment may increase insecu-
rity and worsen east-west rela-
tions.
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British press comment lacked
strong views one way or the other.
The principal papers stressed the
necessity for Soviet-American con-
sultations on military matters
and expressed a belief that the
Soviets are much more likely now
to accept realistic negotiations.
The Guardian, however, thought
that the arms race might be ac-
celerated.
Canadian press comment, long
critical of ABM deployment, has
viewed the President's decision
as better than previous proposals
but still not desirable. Prime
Minister Trudeau has said that
he intends to discuss the subject
with the President next week,
but doubts that Ottawa will have
a "finite" position on the mat-
ter by then.
HARASSMENT OF BERLIN TRAFFIC CEASES
The East Germans have stopped
their interference with freight
shipments to and from West Ber-
lin as of 17 March.
The East German interzonal
trade negotiator reportedly in-
formed his West German counter-
part in early March that inter-
ference would cease after the
current East German propaganda
campaign had run its course. A
large manufacturing firm in West
Berlin also was informed this
week that there would be no fur-
ther harassment. East German
propaganda on the alleged manu-
facture of military goods and
other "militaristic activities"
in West Berlin has also stopped.
Some West Berlin officials
believe that the Soviets put pres-
sure on the East Germans to end
the harassment and propaganda
campaign. Whether this is the
case cannot be estabili-shed,
but there have been indications
of a lack of coordination be-
tween Moscow and Pankow recently.
The East Germans may have been
too quick to apply against Ber-
lin traffic restrictive measures
which the Soviets had urged them
only to "consider."
Moscow, meanwhile, has at-
tempted to "correct" the record
on the diplomatic maneuvering
which occurred before the West
German Federal Assembly met in
Berlin. The Soviet Embassy in
Bonn released a press statement
on 14 March which blamed the
West Germans for scuttling the
talks between the East and West
Germans on a compromise solution
to this is-sue. Soviet diplomats
then repeated this explanation
in several Western capitals.
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WARSAW PACT MEETING A PALLID AFFAIR
The top leaders of the War-
saw Pact states met in Budapest
for two and a half hours 17 March
and produced a brief communique
and an anodyne "appeal" for a
European security conference.
The most significant accomplish-
ment of the meeting, the first
such since the invasion of Czech-
oslovakia, may have been reach-
ing an "understanding" on the
pact's structure and command
which was acceptable to the Ru-
manians while at the same time
allowing at least a sense of
greater participation among the
other members. Moscow evidently
felt the need for a show of unity
with its allies outweighed its
urge to secure significant changes
in the Warsaw Pact structure.
Most of the hard business
apparently was transacted in a
serious of bilateral and trilat-
eral meetings just before the
he Soviets
nc u e in the com-
wanted to include'
munique a condemnation of China,
approval of the concept of "limited
sovereignty," and statements on
the Middle East and Vietnam. The
Rumanians opposed all these ideas
and they were therefore dropped,
according to Rumanian press
sources. This account may be
25X1 overdrawn, but there is probably
some truth to it.
Regarding the organization
and structure of the pact, there
clearly seems to have been some
horse trading, probably largely
worked out by Warsaw Pact mili-
tary officials the last few months.
The language of the communique
seems to say that the Eastern Eu-
ropean states accepted fuller in-
tegration of the Warsaw Pact na-
tional commands in return for a
somewhat larger voice in military
policy-making. Inasmuch as the
changes had to be acceptable to
the Rumanians, it remains to be
seen if they will have any real
meaning. In sum, Moscow appar-
ently decided to accommodate to
reality and settle for relatively
mild statements so as not to create
more friction before the world
Communist conference in May.
In Moscow, meanwhile, repre-
sentatives of 67 Communist par-
ties gathered on 18 March for
what is described as the final,
full-dress preparatory meeting
before that conference. Absent
are those governing parties that
have consistently refused to par-
ticipate in a world conference--
China, Albania, North Korea, North
Vietnam, Yugoslavia, and Cuba.
The major tasks of the present
session are to set the date for the
conference, approve draft documents
on tie main anti-imperialist plank
as well as on a peace appeal and
a Vietnam resolution, and to de-
cide on a suitable tribute to the
100t:z anniversary of Lenin's birth.
The Soviets, who nursed the con-
ference through five preliminary
meetings in 1968 despite the ill
effects of their intervention in
Czec:Zoslovakia, have shown a will-
ingness to seek out the lowest com-
mon denominators on major issues in
order to keep attendance high, and
to obtain at least a superficial
show of "unity."
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CZECHOSLOVAK FACTIONAL STRUGGLES SPREAD TO NONPARTY GROUPS
The liberal-conservative
split within the Czechoslovak
party is spreading to special
interest groups outside the party
as liberal elements move to in-
stitutionalize the gains they
made before the occupation.
The trade unions, which
split into separate Czech and
Slovak movements when federal-
ization went into effect early
this year, have formed a federal
organization in support of the
Dubcek leadership and its demo-
cratic reforms. The Czech In-
tellectuals Association and other
groups have offered to join the
trade unions in efforts to pre-
serve the liberal gains made in
1968.
Liberal, semi-independent
youth groups have also formed
a federal body, which has prompted
conservatives to try to create
a rival youth organization to
support their views. The alli-
ance between progressive students
SECRET
Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY
and the workers has already
proved to be a significant po-
litical force.
T:ae students groups, however,
are divided on how far to press
for change. The militant stu-
dents in Prague, for example,
failed to convince students from
other districts to join them in
a nationwide coalition of politi-
cal activists.
Mergers of liberal nonparty
groups has led to an upsurge of
conservative activity. Husak,
the Slovak party chief, with the
support of conservative Czech
party leader Strougal, has pro-
claimed a new, tough line assert-
ing that the party has exclusive
political primacy and emphasiz-
ing that the ultraliberals--as
well as the conservatives--must
be brought under control. Since
then, some Slovak organizations
have been reluctant to unite with
their Czech counterparts to seek
r_eforn.s.
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Military action continued in the Middle East this week as Israeli aircraft
bombed terrorist bases in Jordan four times, and firing across the Suez Canal
occurred sporadically. Mrs. Golda Meir, confirmed by the Israeli Knesset on
17 March, reaffirmed Israeli opposition to any imposed settlement in the
Middle East. A well-informed Israeli journalist this week printed that the
government will reject the latest US proposals on the Middle East.
In Yemen, the government may soon attempt to form a new coalition
which would include tribal leaders formerly supporting the royalists. A
conference has been scheduled for this month., and the increasing number of
tribal defections from the royalists has increased the chance for success.
British Prime Minister Wilson's visit to Nigeria, now scheduled for 27
March to 1 April, appears designed mainly i:o acquire a softening of the
federal government's war policy and thereby counteract strong UK domestic
criticism of British arms sales to Nigeria. Fedcral leader Gowon may oblige
Wilson with helpful public statements on federal bombing and relief policies,
but he is unlikely to change his basic position that a cease-fire can come only
after Biafra renounces secession. The war, meanwhile, remains stalemated.
Calm has returned to Equatorial Guinea, and emergency controls have
been relaxed. Negotiations with the Spanish on emergency financial aid went
smoothly this week but, given the unpredictability of Guinean President
Macias, arrangements could break down at any time. Internal economic and
political problems persist and could lead to further instability.
In Guinea, arrests of both civilians and army personnel, including the
deputy chief of staff of the armed forces, continue to occur in connection
with an alleged foreign-inspired plot. Unrest in the army has mounted
considerably in recent weeks, as President Toure attempts to tighten party
control over the military.
Most of the dissident Ethiopian university students have complied with
the government's order that they reregister, but many have not returned to
classes and the u is not functioning at full capacity.
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PAKISTANI OPPOSITION LEADERS STEP UP ACTIVITY
Opposition leaders are step-
ping up their efforts to build
support after last week's confer-
ence with the government, which
failed to stem continuing chaos
throughout the country. The con-
ference appears to have satisfied
President Ayub and the conserva-
tive forces, but opposition lead-
ers vitally concerned with pro-
vincial issues and regional re-
lationships are extremely unhappy.
Popular East Pakistani leader
Mujibur Rahman denounced the dis-
cussions as a complete failure.
Mujib received a rousing welcome
upon his return to East Pakistan,
and he is now trying to increase
his widespread support there. In
a press conference on 14 March,
Mujib blasted other politicians
from his province for not pressing
hard enough on regional conces-
sions. He is now in the uncom-
fortable position of contesting
the elections under the new sys-
tem worked out at the conference,
while fending off leftist criti-
cism that he knuckled under to
Ayub. Mujib reportedly plans to
present his own program to the
National Assembly.
The coalition that negotiated
with Ayub dissolved itself shortly
after the agreement was announced,
and its eight component parties
are now going their separate ways
in preparation for the elections.
]x - air force chief Asghar Khan
finally made his move by announc-
ing the formation of a new party,
which will probably attract con-
servative and moderate West Paki-
stani elements as well as many
supporters of Ayub's disintegrat-
ing Pakistan Muslim League.
Meanwhile, labor and student
protests continue throughout the
country. A peaceful general strike
on 17 March was only marginally ef-
fective in West Pakistan but was
completely successful in the East,
where pro-Peking leftists called
for a general work-stoppage fol-
lowing an attack on their leader
by "rightists" in West Pakistan.
Confrontations between orthodox
Muslims and leftists are continu-
ing, particularly in the West,
while increasing violence in rural
East Pakistan is moving that prov-
ince closer to complete anarchy.
In an effort to placate mod-
erate opposition forces in West
Pakistan, Ayub has appointed a
well-known Karachi opposition pol-
itician and newspaper publisher
to replace the provincial gov-
ernor. East Pakistan's governor--
widely criticized for his inept
handling of the civil strife--
has fled his province and is ex-
pected to be replaced soon, but
Ayub may be having trouble find-
ing a willing candidate.
Rumors of impending martial
law persist, with military offi-
cers talking openly about contin-
gency planning. Troop movements
from West to East Pakistan have
been reported, and the government
has issued a stern warning that
the current trend toward anarchy
will not be permitted to continue.
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INCIDENTS CONTINUE ALONG THE ARAB-ISRAELI FRONTIERS
Military action continues
along the Arab-Israeli frontiers.
Israeli aircraft bombarded ter-
rorist bases in Jordan four times
this week, and sporadic shooting
took place across the Suez Canal.
Israeli forces may still
make a stronger response if
Egypt continues its deliberate
policy of "heating up" the Suez
Canal area by cross-canal snip-
ing and artillery firing.
The Israeli Knesset on 17
March confirmed Mrs. Golda Meir's
government by a vote of 84 to 12
with one abstention. She had
planned to present her cabinet a
few days earlier, but ran into
minor snags with some of the par-
ties on the right and left. In
her policy speech, Mrs. Meir,
with a wary eye on the upcoming
Four-Power talks on the Middle
East, reaffirmed Israeli opposi-
tion to any imposed solution, re-
iterated Israeli insistence on
direct Arab-Israeli negotiations
to establish a "true peace" and
supported retention of the occu-
pied Arab territories until a
viable peace was achieved. Except
for Mrs. Meir, there were no cab-
inet changes.
In Syria, recently emerged
strongman Hafiz Asad seems to
have successfully consolidated
his position. Opposition to
his control of the country, pos-
sibly violent, is still possible,
but Asad is apparently confi-
dent of his position and of his
control over the military. He
called for a meeting of the
Syrian Baath Party command this
week, indicating his confidence
that he could ramrod his own
candidates for party leadership
through the conference elections.
Approximately 6,000 Iraqi
troops have now moved into Syria
from Jordan. Some observers
believe the move indicates that
Iraq is prepared to help Asad
militarily should he meet with
violent domestic opposition.
It seems more likely, however,
part of Asad's determination is
to remove Syria from its isola-
tion from the Arab world. Iraqi
troops were to be stationed in
Syria as well as in Jordan as
part of an agreement concluded
among the Eastern Arab Command
seve:al months ago.
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 Approved For Release 2WLORICIA-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5
:Co Ii. ra ~ Cauhati.
aa. INDIA
L.. Shillong
New Delhi Applies New Pressure on Naga Insurgency
. ; { SICKIM +r' R,
NEPAL ~ $i Tlt7AN
lm hal
M mum
Security forces trapped 00 men` 1
~an.1 an i nportanf rebel leader
' * a - y Mandalay
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NAGA THREAT RECEDES IN EASTERN INDIA
New Delhi may at last be
making progress in its effort to
put down protracted tribal in-
surgency in Nagaland. It is get-
ting good results from a dual
policy of dealing firmly with
the Chinese-aided faction of
the Naga underground while build-
ing up the status of the loyal
state government.
Indian security forces in
Nagaland--now numbering about
65,000--have been effective thus
far in closing off the border
between Burma and India, where
the Indians claim between 800
and 1,200 Chinese-armed Nagas
are trying to cross back into
Nagaland. The security forces
dealt the militant Nagas a se-
rious setback on 16 March when
they not only trapped a 200-man
contingent which had just crossed
the border but also captured the
rebel leader most responsible for
Naga contacts with China. This
success bolstered the confidence
of the Indian military in the area
and may have badly undermined the
morale of the militants.
Meanwhile, Nagaland's state
legislative assembly elections
in February gave a solid major-
ity to candidates who oppose re-
bellion and who have cooperated
with New Delhi in running the
Nagaland State government. The
Naga National Organization (NNO),
whose leaders negotiated the
present separate state arrange-
ment with New Delhi in 1962, has
formed the state government with
support from 41 of 52 of the new
legislators.
New Delhi attributes the
NNO victory and the orderly
election to the increased impact
of its economic aid program--
by far the largest per capita
for any state in India--and to
its policy of strengthening the
position of loyal Nagas by work-
ing solely with the state govern-
ment.. New Delhi has terminated
the drawn-out and unsuccessful
negotiations with the underground,
which had undermined the position
of loyal state officials.
At the same time that the
state government has increased
in stature, divisions have split
the once-united underground into
at least two groups--one oppos-
ing and one accepting help from
China. Tribal antagonisms have
hurt the movement and have been
probably more important than the
China-aid issue in producing a
succession of coups, kidnapings,
and at: least one assassination
in the last year.
Militant Nagas are still
capable of making trouble, but
a period of relative quiet is
likely now in Nagaland. If the
threat: of disorder decreases,
however, there may be new Com-
plications for New Delhi. Mod-
erate underground leaders, who
oppose; aid from China and have
come to eschew violence, may
try to press the state govern-
ment to urge new negotiations
on New Delhi in the hope of
winning increased autonomy for
the state. New Delhi is likely
to oppose such talks, but state
government leaders may be in-
fluenced by the close tribal
ties which many of then. have
with the moderate faction of
the underground.
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OBSTACLES IN EAST EUROPEAN OIL ARRANGEMENTS WITH IRAN
Efforts by East European
countries to reduce their depend-
ence on the USSR for petroleum
supplies--31 million tons last
year--moved ahead last week with
a Czechoslovak-Iranian agreement.
Prague is to import Iranian oil
in return for providing Tehran
with $200 million in credits for
the purchase of Czechoslovak in-
dustrial equipment and machinery.
Specific details were not publi-
cized, but earlier information in-
dicated that shipments of Iranian
crude would total an estimated
15-20 million tons between 1970
and 1-980.
Since 1967 Bulgaria, Hungary
and Rumania have concluded simi-
lar arrangements with Iran. Im-
plementation, however, has been
impeded, in part, by increased
transport costs caused by the
closure of the Suez Canal. Only
Rumania, which had to supplement
its domestic crude, has taken
delivery of oil from Iran.
Last autumn Bucharest ar-
ranged for the delivery of Iranian
oil through the Israeli pipeline
to Haifa for onward shipment to
Rumania. By the end of 1968 an
estimated 250,000 tons of Iranian
crude had moved through the pipe-
line for Rumania, and shipments
thus far this year have totaled
about 130,000 tons. Under the
terms of the agreement, Bucharest
is scheduled to take a total of
3.5 million tons of crude oil by
the end of 1970.
Iranian oil carried by the
Israeli pipeline and then on to
Mediterranean and Black Sea ports
is cheaper than delivery by sea
around Africa and possibly even
through the canal. Nevertheless,
other East European countries ap-
parently have ruled out use of the
Israeli pipeline to avoid com-
plicating their relations with
the Arab states. A Czechoslovak
official recently intimated the
use of Israel's pipeline is
"closed" to Prague "for political
reasons."
For Czechoslovakia and Hun-
gary, the problems of transport-
ing Iranian oil are compounded
because their land-locked loca-
tion may result in prohibitive
costs that may militate against
implementation of their agree-
ments with Tehran. Interest in
obtaining crude oil fro Ilran,
however, has revived long stand-
ing proposals to extend an oil
pipeline currently under construc-
tion in Yugoslavia to Hungary and
Czechoslovakia.
Intermittent discussions on
this project were held last year,
and financing for the proposed
360-mile line reportedly has been
allocated among the interested
participants. Approximately $43
million is to be raised by Yugo-
slavia, $17 million by East Eu-
ropean sources, and $5 million
from the free world--presumably
Iran, which earlier had expressed
an interest in investing in the
project. The project still is in 25X1
the negotiating stage, however,
and many problems remain to be
worked out.
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SOMALI PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION SCHEDULED FOR 26 MARCH
The second parliamentary
election since the Somali Repub-
lic gained independence is un-
likely to result in any signifi-
cant political change.
Unlike most of Africa where
one party governments are the
rule, a host of parties and can-
didates are running for the 123
elected seats in the unicameral
parliament. Final figures pub-
lished in February listed some
69 parties registered to run in
the 48 electoral districts. All
but a few are one or two man
parties, however, and are a
political outgrowth of Somalia's
many competitive tribal groups.
These candidates generally rep-
resent local tribal groups whose
only hope depends on gathering
sufficient votes to qualify under
Somalia's complicated system of
proportional representation. If
elected, they frequently cross
over to the majority party. As
is usual in Somalia, tribalism,
personalities, and money, have
played a larger role in the cam-
paign than party programs or
ideology.
The Somali Youth League
(SYL) party is expected to retain
control of the government. The
SYL, since its founding in 1943,
has dominated Somali politics
and has controlled the government
since independence in 1960. Al--
though the SYL may lose some
seats, estimates of its final
tally range from 59 to 79 seats.
The party now holds approximately
80 seats in parliament. A coa-
lition of minority parties could
emerge to challenge the SYL if
the SYL slips badly, but such a
development is unlikely. The
SYL may in fact increase its
majority by defections from other
parties if it makes a strong
showing.
The Democratic Action Party
(DAP), formed in October. 1968 by
former prime minister Abdirazak
and a small group of breakaway
SYL deputies, does not seem to
have hurt the SYL as many expected.
There apparently have been no
additional defectors. Abdirazak's
principal charge, that Prime
Minister Egal's detente with
Ethiopia and Kenya constitutes
a sellout of the Somali inhabi-
tants of those countries, appar-
ently has not stimulated much
popular support for the DAP.
The nomination of a new
gove:^nment by President Scermarche
afte:f the election is a separate
ques'_ion. Prime Minister Eaal
appears likely to be reappointed,
although there may be new faces
in the cabinet. At the moment
there appears to be no politician
of stature or acceptable tribal
background to replace him, and
Egal and the president have de-
veloped a good working relation-
ship.. Scermarche has backed him
solidly in his detente policy,
and Egal, unlike his predecessors,
has been remarkably effective
in controlling parliament's fre-
uentl unpredictable deputies.
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SE(,RET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 Mar 69
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 Approved For Release 2007/1 R P RDP79-00927A007000010001-5
Brazil's military government is pushing its campaign to cleanse the
country of alleged subversive elements. On 13 March three more federal
deputies, 92 state deputies, and one mayor were removed from office and
deprived of their political rights for ten years. Although some probably were
involved to some extent in corruption, others appear to have been guilty
only of being too vocal in their opposition to the government. Five of the 66
federal senators and 79 of the 409 federal deputies have now been removed
from office.
The British ended Anguilla'sbrief period of independence this week by
using military force to install a senior British official as commissioner of the
tiny Caribbean island. Although this new arrangement may last for several
years, the Anguillans will not be forced to rejoin the Associated State of St.
Kitts - Nevis - Anguilla which they broke away from almost two years ago.
Negotiations between the US and Peru o:i the problems of the expropri-
ation of the International Petroleum Company and Peru's claim to a
200-mile limit to its territorial waters have been complicated by the seizure
and subsequent fining of two US tuna boats on 19 March. Many Peruvian
officials, however, hope that the talks will be successful and President
Velasco said the incident was "not provoked by the US and we believe that
it will not hamper [US negotiator] Irwin's visi_t."
Ecuador's national association of law schools is planning to sponsor a
series of lectures on contemporary thought in the near future. Among those
who apparently will be invited as guest lecturers are: Herbert Marcuse,
Stokely Carmichael, Rudi Dutschke, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, and Jean Paul
Sartre. The Ecuadorean Government has already presented the sponsors with
about $2,000 to help finance the affair.
The Central American Common Market crisis has not yet been resolved,
but significant progress was made when El Salvador and Honduras deposited
a number of outstanding protocols on 14 March. Costa Rica, however, has
not yet ratified an important agreement designed to increase government
revenues nor has Nicaragua rescinded its recent restrictions on intraregional
trade. Negotiations are continuing this weekend at a meeting of the Central
American Economic Council composed of the five ministers of econ-
omy. 25X1
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PERU HOPEFUL IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH US
The Peruvian Government
seems anxious to keep the fish-
ing boat incident on 19 March
from jeopardizing the talks which
have Just begun with the special
US emissary. Most Peruvians
seem optimistic that the negoti-
ations will avert a direct US-
Peruvian confrontation over the
expropriation of the Interna-
tional Petroleum Company, and
there are a few indications that
the Velasco government may be
prepared to soften its position
on the matter of compensation.
The seizure of two US fish-
ing boats beyond the 12-mile
limit, however, is sure to com-
plicate the talks. The vessels
were promptly released but only
after paying fines and license
fees of nearly $26,000. The
foreign minister informed the US
ambassador that four other US
tuna clippers had been sighted
about 30 miles off the coast,
but that the navy had strict or-
ders not to patrol beyond 12
miles. He said this restraint
was being used "in order to pre-
serve a harmonious atmosphere
for the Irwin mission."
mbassaior Irwin's arrival
was given favorable treatment
_n the Peruvian press, which ex-
pressed the general belief that
a means would be found to avoid
a confrontation with the US. Uni-
versity students who used the oc-
casion of the ambassador's ar-
rival to stage a demonstration
at the US Embassy were c.,uickly
dispersed by police. More dem-
onstrations will probably occur
as the Communist Party is plan-
ning public meetings to oppose
the Irwin mission.
There has also been a change
in tone in statements by govern-
ment officials. The IPC expropria-
tion is still regarded as a closed
issue, but the matter of compensa-
tion no longer seems quite so
certain. One Lima newspaper re-
cently carried a quote attributed
to President Velasco that the
IPC's $690-million "debt" to the
State "could be modified."
These favorable trends, how-
ever, are somewhat offset by such
things as President Velasco's
statement to a Brazilian journal-
ist that what remains open for
discussion is the Hickenlooper
amendment and US actions, not
IPC and its compensation. There
are also efforts under way to es-
tablish new claims against IPC
based on the government's allega-
tion that the company completed
illegal foreign exchange trans-
fers following the expropriation.
I'age 24 WEEKLY S."MM\1AHY
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 Approved For Release 200781$& :IM-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5
POLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES CONTINUE IN PANAMA
The lack of substance to the
growing rhetoric of the "October
Revolution" and the apparent prior-
ity accorded military affairs
have added to public skepticism
that elections will be held next
year as promised.
Several businessmen have al-
ready expressed to the US Embassy
their impressions that National
Guard (GN) Commandant Omar Torrijos
is laying the groundwork for a
long-term dictatorship. Last week
Torrijos emphasized his personal
control in Panama by assuming the
rank of brigadier general. In a
press interview the same day, he
made references to the guard's re-
sistance to political pressure to
return to the "old, corrupt" sys-
tem--remarks widely interpreted
as a retraction of electoral plans.
Torrijos has not yet "clarified"
his press statements, although two
members of the electoral tribunal
have submitted their resignations
in protest.
Most of the politicians, ex-
cluded from their traditional
spheres of influence and perhaps un-
certain as to the ultimate power
center within the GN seem to have
adopted a wait-and-see attitude.
25X1
25X1
The political calm, enforced
by censorship and the shutdown of
troub=_e spots such as the schools,
may break down next month when Pan-
ama's most important secondary
schoo='_, the National Institute, is
scheduled to reopen. Its students
have been denied credit for last
year's work because they staged pro- 25X1
tests against the military take-over
and their reaction could take the
form of further disturbances.
SECRET
Page 25 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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 Approved For Release 2007*.L%A-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Associated State of
St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla
(Norh.)
CURACAO BONAIRE
' St. BaitheiemY
i
y _ -
AREA OF INSET
ANGUIL.A
Si T. JOHN
THbMAS I lY" ST MARTIN
(U.S.) \U.K?)ST, MAARTEYfJ\ I' BARTHELEMY
ST. CROJE I ) .STAR , , 18A BUDA
L ~HEVIS 1 TIGUA
AJ
REDORDA
~MON TSERI
GUADELOUPE
(Fr.)
MARIE GALANTE
DOMINICA
(U.K.)
MARTINIQUE
(Fr.)
ST. LUCIA
(U.K.)
ST VINCENT BARBADOS
") (U.K.)
GRENADA
(U.K.)
SECRET
ISLA DE
MARGARITA
TOBAGO
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
t.-
TRINIDAD
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 Approved For Release 2007/RLVMPIP-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5
THE BRITISH END ANGUILLAN INDEPENDENCE
Anguilla's brief independ-
ence ended this week, when the
British used military force to
install a senior British offi-
cial, Anthony Lee, as commis-
sioner of Anguilla.
Anguilla had broken away
from the British Associated State
of St. Kitts - Nevis - Anguilla
in May 1967, soon after the fed-
eration was formed, claiming it
had been denied equal representa-
tion by Premier Bradshaw of St.
Kitts. This was the Anguillans'
third attempt to separate them-
selves from St. Kitts, with which
they had been associated for pur-
poses of colonial administration
for more than 150 years.
The situation had drifted
since 1967 until early this year
when Anguilla council leader Ron-
ald Webster stated that Anguilla
would declare total independence
and threatened to expel Britain's
SECRET
Page 27 WEEKLY SUMMARY
only official representative on
the island unless London formally
recognized Anguilla's secession.
The British recalled their repre-
sentative and cut off all eco-
nomic aid, although they appar-
ently doubted that Webster, who
had declared himself "President,"
represented public sentiment.
The decision to install a commis-
sioner was precipitated by Web-
ster's forcible eviction last
week of the British undersecre-
tary of state for foreign affairs,
who hELd come to the island to
work out a new constitutional ar-
rangement.
The Anguillans will probably
acquiesce to the British especially
if Webster is out of the picture,
while demanding increased finan-
cial support for development proj-
ects. Most of the Caribbean mem-
bers of the Commonwealth are likely
to endorse the British interven-
tion.
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 Approved For Release 2007403/OR ;CiA-RDP79-00927A007000010001-5
STRAINS INCREASE IN CHILE'S CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY
President Frei's Cnristian
Democratic Party (PDC) has in re-
cent years seen the emergence of
a leftist rebel croup that otter
takes positions closer to those
of the Communist Party than of
the government. This division
within the PDC has been crystal-
lized by the way the covern_nent
handled the police attack on
squatters invading land at Puerto
Montt on 9 March, and the ten-
sions now present could lead to
a formal split within the party
before the presidential election
in September 1970.
The government has backed
Minister of the Intereor Perez
Zujovic in his support of the po-
lice action, in which c..iaht per-
sons were killed and scores
wounded. Perez has long been a
favorite
however,
tack his
target of the PDC rebels,
and they hastened to at-
action. The Christian
Democratic Youth group issued a
statement echoing the condemnation
of the government by the Social-
ist and Communist parties. The
PDC then suspended the youth lead-
ers. At the same time a Group
of PDC leftists published a state-
ment that supported the youth
croup and criticized the govern-
ment's action, saying that the
party has always "condemned popu-
lar repression." The leftists
took the opportunity to renew
their call for "unity of popular
forces"--an allusion to the pos-
sibility of PDC cooperation with
( the Communists in 1970.
President Frei has mobilized
his influence behind Perez and
has received support from the
cabinet and from the PDC leader-
ship. The party council agreed
this week, however, to hold a
meeting of the party's National
Commission on 1 May. This larger
body will give the rebels a bet-
ter forum for airing their views.
The meeting of the National
Commission will be enlivened as
a result of a declaration this
week by Radomiro Tornic, who long
has been regarded as Frei's heir
apparent within the party. Tomic
said that he would not run for
president unless he had the sup-
port of the Chilean left, i.e.,
the Communists and the Socialists.
Tomic has long called for a unity
of "popular forces," but never
before has he been so firm. The
Communists, however, so far have
rejected Tomic as a presidential
candidate and seem unlikely at
this point to change their popi-
tion. Should PDC hotheads de-
cide to leave the party, they
probably will find themselves
playing a minor role in any
leftist electoral front.1 i
SICR E1'
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 SQ Qyed For Release 2007/03/08: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000010001-5
Secret
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