WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007000040001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 11, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927A007000 40001-2
Secret
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
Secret
41-
11 April 1969
No. 0365/69
70 . S3 7
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(Information as of noon EST, 10 April 1969)
Far East
VIETNAM
The Communists appear to have ended their spring
offensive, but there is no indication that major
enemy units are withdrawing out of the country.
Meanwhile, the Communists are still side-stepping
the issues raised by President Thieu's recent polit-
ical initiatives, apparently recognizing that the
South Vietnamese President has upstaged them on the
peace front.
LAO FORCES ABANDON SOUTHERN BASE AFTER LONG SIEGE
Low morale and difficulties in moving fresh troops
and supplies into the government garrison at Thateng
in south Laos led local defenders to evacuate their
positions on 3 April.
TOKYO PREPARING FOR OKINAWAN NEGOTIATICNS
The Japanese Government's overriding interest in
securing Okinawa's return is dramatized by a re-
shuffling within the Foreign Ministry to strengthen
Japan's negotiating team.
Europe
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CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERS ACT TO ASSUAGE SOVIET FEARS
Dubcek and other top party leaders, apparently with
a new cohesiveness, have begun the arduous task of
trying to convince the people that they must comply
with the new restrictive domestic policies intro-
duced last week.
YUGOSLAVIA AND RUMANIA ARE TARGETS OF RUSSIAN POLEMICS 10
Yugoslavia and Rumania have aroused Moscow's ire
because of their uncompromising attitudes and lack
of support for the way the Soviets handled the Czech-
oslovak crisis and the border dispute with China.
HUNGARY TRIES TO BALANCE DOGMATISTS AND LIBERALS
Hungarian leader Kadar is faced with an embryonic
resurgence of conservative elements that could sour
his delicately constructed relations with Hungary's
intellectuals.
RIFT WIDENING IN FINNISH COMMUNIST PARTY
The Finnish Communist Party, seriously split since
its 15th congress closed on 6 April, now faces the
possibility that its conservative and liberal wings
will break apart and form rival parties.
CANADA TO REDUCE NATO FORCES
The announcement last week that Canada will remain
in NATO but carry out a "planned and phased reduc-
tion" of its forces in Europe is the first of the
Trudeau government's long-awaited decisions on de-
fense policy.
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INTELSAT MEMBERS RECONSIDER POSITIONS
Nations participating in the recent INTELSAT confer-
ence in Washington have expressed little surprise
that no final agreement was reached, and preparatory
meetings will begin soon to set the stage for another
meeting in the fall.
Middle East - Africa
MIDDLE EAST CONTINUES IN QUIET TURMOIL
Artillery exchanges along the Suez Canal, the first
Israeli air strike on the Jordanian port of Aqaba,
and an Iranian show of strength against Iraq high-
lighted developments in the Middle East this week.
EGYPT'S OIL REFINERY COMPLEX AT SUEZ HARD HIT
The extensive damage caused by the shelling of the
Suez oil refinery complex last month, for the second
time in less than two years, demonstrates Israel's
capability to disrupt Egypt's oil economy.
SOVIET PRESIDENT VISITS ALGERIA AND MOROCCO
Soviet President Podgorny's visits testify to the
growing influence of the USSR in the western Medi-
terranean. The visit to Algeria accomplished its
ceremonial purposes, although some political diver-
gences were not entirely bridged. Podgorny's recep-
tion in Morocco was more on the correct side, but
the visit was one more sign of the gradual warming
of Soviet-Moroccan relations.
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COUNCIL SHAKE-UP COMPLICATES GHANA'S POLITICAL SITUATION
The replacement of General Joseph Ankrah as head of
Ghana's military government by young and mercurial
Brigadier Akwasi A. Afrifa is likely to cause a
fundamental shift in power relationships.
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SECRET
Western Hemisphere
PANAMANIAN NATIONAL GUARD EXTENDS ITS CONTROL
The guard leadership seems intent on remaining in
control for some time regardless of the outcome of
any future elections.
UNCERTAINTY PREVAILS IN PERU
The deferral of US economic sanctions under the
Hickenlooper amendment brought an initial reaction
of relief in Peru, but government leaders are now
concerned that badly needed credit will be withheld
and that foreign investors will defer action until
a final decision is reached.
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The Vietnamese Communists appear to have ended their spring offen-
sive. There is no indication, however, that enemy units are withdrawing to
border sanctuaries or out-of-country bases. There were a few sharp clashes
east of Saigon this week, but they were the result of allied sweep operations
rather than any enemy initiative.
The Communists apparently have been caught off guard by President
Thieu's recent political initiatives. Thieu's six-point peace plan, which he
presented to the National Assembly in Saigon on 7 April, has been only
ineffectively rebutted by the Communists. The Liberation Front and the
North Vietnamese have been sidestepping Thieu's proposals for negotiations
but have avoided rejecting them outright.
There has been a virtual news blackout on the proceedings of the
Chinese Communist Party's ninth congress ever since it opened on 1 April.
This lack of substantive reporting-in sharp contrast to usual practice in
Communist countries-suggests that delegates are engaged in heated debate
on policy issues which the leadership wishes to conceal.
The abandonment of the government position at Thateng in southern
Laos late last week does not significantly alter the military equation in the
Bolovens Plateau area. The loss of the position is, however, another step in
the Communists' campaign begun in late 1967 to isolate the plateau and
keep government forces confined to areas along the Mekong 1Ziver. The
government withdrawal came after a costly five-month effort by the Com-
munists to take the outpost.
The Japanese Government has strengthened its team for forthcoming
negotiations with the US on the return of Okinawa to Japanese administra-
tion. Prime Minister Sato's major problem in ariranging reversion continues to
be to find a formula acceptable to both the US Government and the
Japanese people regarding the status of US bases in Okinawa after reversion.
The Japanese and Okinawan peo le are adamantly opposed to the presence
of nuclear weapons in Okinawa.
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R(p
VIETNAM
The Communists appear to
have ended their spring offensive.
The level of violence over the
country has dropped dramatically
in the past week.
The enemy may be using the
current period to refit and rest
many of his major formations,
some of which have suffered sub-
stantial casualties. Prisoners
have also hinted that the Commu-
nists are now holding indoctrina-
tion sessions to review the re-
sults of the recent campaign.
There is no indication, however,
that enemy units are withdrawing
to out-of-country bases and border
sanctuaries.
Meanwhile, there have been
a few sharp clashes east of Sai-
gon this week, but they have re-
sulted from allied sweeping oper-
ations rather than any initiative
on the part of the enemy. Major
cities have remained free of
shellings, although four rockets
struck the northern outskirts of
Saigon on 8 April causing light
casualties and damage.
Political Developments in
South Vietnam
April, Thieu offered mainly a
restatement of Saigon's existing
policy of "national reconciliation"
in exchange for Communist military
withdrawal, but he also subscribed
to the more distant goal of reun-
ification based on free elections.
Thieu reassured militant
nationalists, who have criticized
his offer of secret talks, that
the government could now afford
to take such initiatives in the
negotiations because of its
strong position in South Vietnam.
Moreover, he suggested that ne-
gotiations could be conducted
"under several formulas, in
several places, and at several
levels," suggesting a willingness
to meet with the Communists out-
side the forum of the Paris talks.
Thieu devoted most of his
address, however, to the need to
begin now to unite anti-Communist
political elements against the
day that political competition
with the Communists begins. He
also announced that he will per-
sonally head a "broadly based" po-
litical organization, to include
all individuals and groups that
approve of his program.
President Thieu has followed
up his 25 March announcement that
Saigon is ready for secret talks
with the National Liberation
Front by outlining a six-point
program to end the fighting. In
his state-of-the-nation address
to the National Assembly on 7
Page 2
Thieu had previously indi-
cated that he would
identify imse f with the Lien
Minh at a national convention of
this progovernment front to be
held later this month. Presiden-
tial secretary General Nguyen Van
Huong--Thieu's political aide--is
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reportedly working on preparations
for the convention, including a
reorganization and expansion of
Lien Minh activities and efforts
to persuade new groups to join
the front.
President Thieu has
~~ expressed confidence 1
Ea a ility to organize the South
Vietnamese people politically,
although he clearly realizes that
a number of ambitious politicians
will be unmoved by the cause of
national unity. Despite Thieu's
optimism, he faces problems in
trying to mobilize non-Communist
political groups. To date, the
Lien Minh has failed to organize
effectively outside of Saigon,
and it is likely to be hampered
by the personal rivalry between
its current leaders.
In addition, initial reac-
tion in Saigon to Thieu's Na-
tional Assembly speech indicates
that although there is widespread
hope that his efforts will suc-
ceed, there is also considerable
skepticism. Many nationalist
politicians appear to welcome the
move, although they have generally
reacted cautiously, and the mili-
tant Buddhists have expressed
their opposition.
Thieu believes the major
Communist threat will come at the
village level and he intends to
take measures immediately to
strengthen the government's posi-
tion there. He recently told
high US officials that he believes
he has about six months to get
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ready for political competition
with the Communists before the
peace negotiations reach their
"culmination point." To meet
the Communist threat at the local
level, the government will try to
increase its cadre force in the
hamlets and villages, improve
local administration, and raise
the standard of living of people
in rural areas.
Communist Political Reaction
The Communists are still
side-stepping the issues raised
by President Thieu's political
initiatives. They apparently
recognize that the South Vietnam-
ese President has upstaged them
on the peace front, but to date
their rebuttal has been both slow
and ineffective.
The Liberation Front made a
special effort to recapture some
of the headlines in Paris by call-
ing an unusual and formal press
conference on 7 April. Newsmen
who came anticipating a thorough-
going riposte to President Thieu's
six-point peace plan were treated
only to a 15-minute harangue on
alleged allied atrocities in
South Vietnam, and most of them
walked out before the conference
ended. In general, the Front
spokesman avoided any substantive
comment on President Thieu's six
points. He did say, however, that
the Front would never pay the
price of dissolving itself for the
privilege of participating in the
noli-nical life of South Vietnam.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 11 Apr 69
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LAO FORCES ABANDON SOUTHERN BASE AFTER LONG SIEGE
Low morale and difficulties
in moving fresh troops and sup-
plies into the Thateng garrison
in south Laos led local defenders
to evacuate their positions on 3
April.
Thateng is the first impor-
tant government position in south-
ern Laos to fall to the enemy this
year. The withdrawal came after
a costly five-month effort by the
Communists to take the outpost.
Government forces still control
a high point overlooking the
camp, however, and plans have
been drawn up to strengthen this
position.
The loss of the garrison may
eventually open up to the enemy
a motorable road onto the east-
ern portion of the Bolovens Pla-
teau, but it does not signifi-
cantly alter the military equa-
tion in the plateau area. It is,
however, another step in a Com-
munist campaign that began in
late 1967 to isolate the plateau
and keep government forces con-
fined to areas along the Mekong
River.
Recent Pathet Lao harass-
ments along Route 13 appear to
be part of this effort, and
fresh pressure against small
government positions at Keng
Nhao and Paksong may be de-
signed to remove the last ves-
tiges of government presence in
the northern portion of the pla-
teau.
In northern Laos, meanwhile
except for ground assaults against
the government's newly reoccupied
position at Phu Cum. the Commu-
nists have not pressed their of-
fensive. Government forces, for
their part, continue to make
some progress in diversionary
attacks in the Plaine des Jarres
area.
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TOKYO PREPARING FOR OKINAWAN NEGOTIATIONS
The Japanese Government's
overriding interest in securing
Okinawa's return is dramatized
by a reshuffling within the For-
eign Ministry to strengthen Ja-
pan's negotiating team.
A major feature of last week's
reorganization was the appointment
of aggressive diplomat Hiroto Ta-
naka as roving ambassador to as-
sist Ambassador Shimoda in Wash-
ington. The naming of this spe-
cial emissary, who will spend
half his time in Washington, is
designed to present more effec-
tively the Japanese position on
the timing and conditions for
Okinawa's return to Japanese ad-
ministration. A deputy vice
minister was designated coordi-
nator of all Okinawan matters as
part of the reorganization.
These moves indicate that the
Japanese are completing the final
groundwork for negotiations on
Okinawa that they hope will be
successfully concluded during the
visits to Washington of Foreign
Minister Aichi in June and Prime
Minister Sato later this year.
The toughest problem facing
Sato in arranging Okinawa's re-
turn is to devise a formula for
the post-reversion status of US
bases acceptable to both the US
Government and the Japanese pub-
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lic. The Japanese people clearly
want the same "homeland-level"
status for Okinawan bases that
governs US bases in Japan. This
would preclude special weapons
and require consultations prior
to major force deployments.
Although Sato has not fore-
closed any negotiating options,
he now appears to favor a formula
for reversion that would grant
fairly liberal base rights in ex-
change for removal of nuclear
weapons. The strong public pres-
sures Sato must take into account
were reflected in a nationwide
poll early this year; less than
three percent of the Japanese
wou:Ld tolerate nuclear weapons
on Okinawa. Sato's suggestions
last February that the presence
of nuclear weapons in Okinawa
following reversion would not vio-
late Japan's constitution drew
harsh and widespread criticism
from the press, opposition, and
public.
Serious dissension within the
ruling Liberal Democratic Party
on the nuclear question is another
compelling factor shaping Sato's
negotiating tactics. Sato is
well aware that party rivals such
as faction leaders Maeo and Miki
--both outspoken proponents of
"homeland-level" reversion--would
quickly exploit any surge of
popular feeling against the
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government's handling of the
Okinawa issue in their attempts
to oust the prime minister as
party leader.
The increasing popular pres-
sure for reversion in Okinawa
itself over the past year is yet
another prod for Japan to move
ahead rapidly on the issue. Base-
related incidents, including the
crash of a B-52 last November,
have given added momentum to
local leftist efforts to rein-
force their campaign for "imme-
diate reversion" with a drive
against any US military presence.
This week, the Ryukyuan legisla-
ture unanimously passed a strongly
worded resolution, the 17th of
its kind, calling for reversion
without nuclear weapons or free
US use of bases.
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The 20th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty is being celebrated
in Washington this week with clear signs that the European appetite for
detente has been whetted by the Warsaw Pact appeal for a European security
conference. Skeptics are unconvinced that the Soviets are sincere, but many
of the NATO countries apparently wish to explore the matter further.
Well aware of this, Moscow actively supported the appeal. Soviet
diplomats presented the case for a conference to key Western governments in
reasonable terms, even letting it be known that Moscow had no objection in
principle to US participation. A Soviet government statement on 8 April
blamed NATO for all the ills of Europe and concluded with a call for a
conference. The substance of the Soviet proposal remains essentially un-
changed from similar ones made in 1966 and 1967, and Moscow may have
achieved its main objective simply by stirring hopes of a European settle-
ment as the NATO ministers gathered.
The Sino-Soviet border remained quiet although Soviet propaganda
continued the attack.
In Czechoslovakia, Dubcek and the other top party leaders have appar-
ently been able to come together in a new cohesiveness. Nevertheless, the
domestic political situation became more complicated as the regime effected
new restrictive policies in response to Soviet demands for a clampdown.
A high-level Polish delegation led by party boss Gomulka arrived in East
Berlin for two days of talks with the irascible East Germans, probably about
the new European security proposals, as well as economic cooperatio
Rumanian Foreign Minister
Manescu's three-day visit to Moscow apparently failed to produce any
agreement on major issues, including revision of the mutual assistance pact,
European security, or the China border issue.
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CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERS ACT
Dubcek and other top party
leaders, apparently with a new co-
hesiveness, have begun the ar-
duous task of trying to convince
the Czechoslovaks that they must
comply with the new restrictive
domestic policies introduced
last week. The regime also
seemed to be searching for ways
to maintain its popular support
despite new Soviet pressures for
the kind of clampdown that doubt-
less would alienate the popula-
tion.
The authorities, neverthe-
less, are applying the most unpop-
ular restriction--press censor-
ship. They reshuffled the edi-
torial staff of the main party
daily, Rude Pravo, suspended or
confiscated some weeklies, and
appointed a new government censor.
Journalists who are Communist
Party members have been warned
that they face disciplinary pro-
ceedings if they attack party
policy. This is only a half
TO ASSUAGE SOVIET FEARS
measure, however, for there are
many non-Communists in the media.
Some organizations, like the
trade unions, are hoping to avoid
the imposition of outside censor-
ship by agreeing to scrutinize
the content of their own publi-
cations.
In a major speech last week,
Dubcek tried to justify the new
restrictions by acknowledging that
the recent anti-Soviet demonstra-
tions had precipitated the most
serious political crisis since the
invasion, and he hinted that the
Russians had lost their patience.
He warned that another anti-Rus-
sian outburst would mean the end
of his regime, the demise of the
reform program, and the return
of Soviet occupation troops and
tanks to major urban areas.
Many Czechoslovak organiza-
tions have reaffirmed their sup-
port of the present leaders and
reluctantly approved the new re-
strictive policies. Progressive
Prague Celebration of Hockey Victory Over Russians,
Which Led to Violent Anti-Soviet Eruptions on Night of 28-29 March
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trade union leaders agreed to try
to calm the situation, and an-
nounced that for the first time
since the invasion they will con-
tribute to Dubcek's "normaliza-
tion" efforts by exchanging dele-
gations with the trade unions of
the invasion powers.
The rank and file workers,
however, have threatened a general
strike to protest anticipated
price increases--if they are an-
nounced. Students in Prague also
plan to strike in the near future
over newly imposed press censor-
ship. The workers might call a
general strike in this situation,
too, if there are harsh reprisals
against the students.
Czechoslovak leaders have
enough time, however, to try to
mollify the students and workers,
but may have difficulty because
of the regime's growing credi-
bility gap. In an effort to dis-
courage further public anti-Soviet
provocations, Interior Ministry
officials took immediate security
precautions, and small, armed
Czechoslovak military units
joined reinforced police patrols.
The leadership also has
moved to shore up its popular
support in the faction-ridden
Czechoslovak Army. President
Svoboda last week made four trips
to key military posts, probably
to use his immense prestige to
try to ensure that the armed
forces will remain ready and will-
ing to follow the regime's direc-
tives. As a sop to Moscow, how-
ever, Prague cracked down on anti-
Soviet dissidence in the armed
forces and plans to punish mili-
Page 9
tary personnel who took part in
anti-Soviet disturbances.
Despite the complications
it has imbued into the domestic
situation, the recent crisis
proved once again that when the
chips are down the top leaders--
all moderates--can stick together.
Even Slovak party chief Husak, a
"realist" who at times has been
highly critical of the party
leadership, is said to have ral-
lied support for Dubcek and to
have stiffened the backs of wa-
vering moderate and progressive
leaders, who seemed ready to be
stampeded into accepting Soviet
demands for a harsh crackdown.
Regardless, Dubcek again is
walking a tightrope. He must
persuade Moscow that he will no
longer drag his feet in respond-
ing to its directives. At the
same time, to maintain his re-
gime's stability, he must cater
to progressive groups such as the
workers, students, and intellec-
tuals. Meanwhile, Dubcek's pro-
pensity to temporize, which at
present he seems unwilling to
abandon, appears likely to gener-
ate :aew crisis situations.
Moscow welcomed the proposed
restrictive measures and gave ex-
tensive press coverage to Prague's
statement promising a crackdown on
"concealed antisocialist forces."
The Soviets made it clear, how-
ever, that they would be watching
carefully to see that Prague's
actions matched its words. The
departure by mid-week of Defense
Minister Grechko and Deputy For-
eign Minister Semenov, whose strong
representations had goaded Prague
into action, suggests that the So-
viets have been at least tempo-
rarily mollified.
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YUGOSLAVIA AND RUMANIA ARE TARGETS OF RUSSIAN POLEMICS
Yugoslavia and Rumania have
aroused Moscow's ire because of
their uncompromising attitudes
and lack of support for the way
the Soviets handled the Czecho-
slovak crisis and the border dis-
pute with China. In the past
week, Soviet press articles clearly
spelled out Moscow's vexations.
Under the guise of criti-
cizing the Yugoslav press, the
Soviet daily Sovetskaya Rossiya
of 4 April castigated Belgrade
for engaging in an "anti-Soviet"
campaign. The article was par-
ticularly critical of Belgrade's
neutrality on the Sino-Soviet
border dispute. It also took the
Yugoslavs to task for criticizing
Soviet policy in Czechoslovakia
and for equating the Warsaw Pact
with NATO.
Sovetskya Rossiya touched
a sensitive nerve when, in addi-
tion to taking note of Yugoslavia's
economic difficulties, it observed
that Yugoslavia owed its security
to the existence of the Warsaw
Pact. The article had steered
clear of criticizing the regime
directly, but Belgrade immediately
replied that it considered the at-
tacks to be upon the entire range
of its domestic and foreign poli-
cies, in this way reserving the
right to reply in the future.
An article in Pravda of 7
April, critical of bourgeois
nationalism" and those who would
"juggle with the concept of
sovereignty," had special meaning
for Bucharest because it coin-
cided with the arrival in Moscow
of Rumanian Foreign Minister
Manescu, who had been invited for
an exchange of views. The un-
compromising article contained
the clearest restatement in re-
cent weeks of Moscow's doctrine
of limited sovereignty. Moscow
may have been motivated partly
by a desire to establish a posi-
tion from which to bargain with
Manescu on revising the Soviet-
Rumanian mutual defense treaty,
which expired in early 1968.
Any reiteration of this principle,
however, with its veiled impli-
cation of justified intervention
in Eastern Europe, is unnerving
to leaders in both Bucharest and
Belgrade.
The Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty
When a threat arises to the revolutionary gains of a
people in any country and thus... to the fraternal
community, it is the international duty of the
socialist states to do everything to nip this threat in
the bud....
i~ravdu, 7,9pril 1969
Elsewhere in the Balkans,
Bulgarian pressure on Yugoslavia
over Macedonia may be abating.
Foreign Minister Bashev, in a
major policy review on 4 April,
publicly disclaimed his country's
responsibility for the squabbling
over that issue for the last year
and a half and denied that his
country had any territorial claim
on Yugoslav Macedonia. Bashev
also had kind words for Bulgaria's
other neighbors--Rumania, Turkey,
Greece, and Albania. Sofia appar-
ently wants to counter the ill ef-
fects of its unquestioning support
of the USSR and to put the best
face possible on Bulgarian for-
eign policy before an official
visit by party boss Zhivkov to
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HUNGARY TRIES TO BALANCE DOGMATISTS AND LIBERALS
Hungarian leader Kadar is
faced with an embryonic resur-
gence of conservative elements
that could sour his delicately
constructed relations with Hun-
gary's intellectuals, most of
whom are liberals whose goodwill
is necessary for the viability
of his moderate regime.
The stronghold of the hard
liners is the Philosophical In-
stitute of the Academy of Sci-
ences, and the prime mover is
its ex-chief, Josef Szigeti.
Recently, the party had demoted
him from his chairmanship because
of his authoritarian methods, but
Szigeti is now maneuvering to
undermine Kadar's working rela-
tions with responsible liberals.
zige i s politi-
cal durability and influence is
derived from his ties with con-
servatives in the Soviet Union
and East Germany.
Since the early sixties,
the Hungarian party has largely
kept its promise of simultane-
ously preventing the return of
Stalinist attitudes while keep-
ing "dangerous" liberals under
control. Until censorship was
lifted in Czechoslovakia, for
example, Hungarian intellectuals
probably had the most freedom of
expression in Eastern Europe.
Since the intervention, however,
the liberals have borne the
brunt of the authorities' crack-
down against ideological devia-
tio::is, and they are now complain-
ing that it has been too one-
sided.
The party's failure to si-
lence Szigeti and his supporters
illustrates how insecure it is
about Moscow's skepticism over
Kadar's gradual liberal reforms.
The Soviet Embassy staff, accord-
ing to current Budapest rumors,
is now closely watching even the
most innocuous regional publica-
tions for signs of "dangerous"
attitudes. In this tense atmos-
phere, the conservatives appar-
ently feel free to work against
liberal policies.
Kadar has tried to restore
both the delicate balance and
the calm of the period before
the Czech invasion. Szigeti's
demotion was one aspect of this
effort. A party-government com-
munique in early March reiterated
the party's determination to
fight both dogmatists and irre-
sponsible liberals, and averred
that political reforms were to
be directed from the top rather
Courageous thinking is not individual adventurism
anc! not gambling with the life of the people, but is
always an integral part of the responsibility felt for
the cause of the country, the people, reality, and
socialism. According to our experiences, both the
dogmatic and revisionist attitudes are equally dan
ger2us.
Hungarian party secretary Bela Biszku
in an address to the party political academy
on 13 March 1969
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than forced by pressures from be-
low, as happened in Czechoslovakia.
This tactic has been only
partly successful. Conservative
attacks on liberal proponents of
meaningful sociological research
have lessened, for example, but
party controls over liberal sociolo-
gists have been increased, and lib-
eral apprehensions over seeping
Stalinism have not been assuaged.
In many ways, the cultural scene
mirrors Kadar's main political di-
lemma: maintaining movement in his
domestic reforms without causing a
coalescence of conservative opposi-
tion or alarming the Soviet Union.
RIFT WIDENING IN FINNISH COMMUNIST PARTY
The Finnish Communist Party
(FCP), seriously split since its
15th congress closed on 6 April,
faces the possibility that its con-
servative and liberal wings will
break apart completely and form ri-
val parties.
The liberals were aided in
their take-over of the FCP by a walk-
out of the conservatives over the
selection of the new central com-
mittee. In their absence, the lib-
erals swept out most of the obstruc-
tionist conservatives in the leader-
ship. In electing a successor to
conservative party secretary Ville
Pessi, however, the liberals re-
vealed their own internal differ-
ences. Lapland district secretary
Arvo Aalto defeated organization
secretary Erkki Kivimaki, who had
been groomed for the post. The
victory of Aalto, a firm liberal,
over Kivimaki, a moderate, was also
a sign of grass-roots discontent
with the party bureaucracy.
The conservatives, whose
strength is concentrated in the
traditional areas of Finnish Marx-
ism in southern Finland, have an-
nounced they will call a congress
of their faction on 26 April to de-
cide whether to remain within the
party or form their own "Communist
Page 12
Workers' Party." The return of
some of the conservative dissenters
to the FCP congress before its Con-
clusion, however, is a sign of re-
sistance to an actual split.
Until the break within the
party came into the open, the ma-
jority liberals had held that the
minority should accept the deci-
sions of the majority, but they al-
lowed it full freedom for propa-
ganda and organizational activity.
The liberals now condemn the con-
servatives for continuing such ac-
tivity, maintaining that it is a
defiance of party discipline and
contrary to Leninist procedure.
A final split in the FCP could
significantly influence the up-
coming parliamentary elections,
which by law must be held by March
1970 but can take place earlier.
The FCP, operating through the
People's Democratic League, usually
gets about 20 percent of the vote,
and of the 42 seats it won in Par-
liament in 1966, almost one fourth
can be identified with the conserv-
ative faction. Since 1966, the FCP
has also had the distinction of
being the only Communist Party
taking part in a Western European
government.
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CANADA TO REDUCE NATO FORCES
The announcement last week
that Canada will remain in NATO
but carry out a "planned and
phased reduction" of its military
forces in Europe is the first of
the Trudeau government's long-
awaited decisions about future
Canadian defense policy. The de-
cision is a compromise between
several cabinet factions, includ-
ing one that favors withdrawing
completely from NATO.
The decision, outlined in
these general terms, actually rep-
resents what the previous admin-
istration did but with consider-
ably less fanfare. Trudeau, how-
ever, may well have in mind more
sweeping cuts than the not insig-
nificant reductions made in pre-
vious years. In announcing the
decision, he said only that the
scope and timing of the cuts may
not be determined for some time.
In Europe, Canada now has an
air division with some 100 aging
fighter-bombers and a mechanized
army brigade of less than 6,000
men. Ottawa could cut back by
not replacing the aircraft when
they become obsolete in the early
1970s, or it might retain both
air and ground elements while mak-
ing substantial reductions in
each. More drastic cutbacks, how-
ever, might cost Ottawa the po-
litical voice it wants in alli-
ance affairs.
Trudeau talked only in the
vaguest terms about other related
strategic aspects of the deci-
sion. When asked if this move
foreshadowed a reduction in the
over-all military budget, he re-
plied, "not necessarily." Ques-
tioned whether the decision is
aimed at a withdrawal of all Ca-
nadian forces from Europe at some
time, Trudeau said, "maybe, maybe
not."
Trudeau did say that Canada
will continue to cooperate with
the US in the defense of North
America. He raised the possibil-
ity that the forces recalled from
Europe will be used "to play a
role in Canada which is now played
by foreigners." This statement
suggests that Ottawa might in-
crease its contribution to NORAD,
which it has long been reluctant
to do. Trudeau might make such a
gesture in hopes that it would
strengthen Canada's voice in de-
cisions about continental defense,
such as the deployment of an ABM
system.
Press reaction in Canada. has
been extremely mixed, with criti-
cism by both pro- and anti-NATO
editorialists.muted by the lack of
specific information. The conserv-
ative opposition has attacked the
government for confusing Canada's
allies by not giving details.
There has been only limited
foreign reaction so far. West
German Foreign Minister Brandt,
for example, commended Canada on
its decision to remain in NATO.
He expressed concern, however,
about the effect of the Canadian
withdrawal on possible East-West
negotiations for mutual force re-
ductions and on other alliance
members who have talked about re-
ducinq their own commitments.
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INTELSAT MEMBERS RECONSIDER POSITIONS
Participants in the recent
INTELSAT conference in Washing-
ton, having failed to agree on
future permanent organizational
arrangements, are now re-examin-
ing and sharpening their posi-
tions for future meetings. All
68 INTELSAT members, together
with nearly 30 observer nations,
met for four weeks beginning on
24 February to try to set up
definitive future arrangements
for the satellite telecommunica-
tions consortium. Several im-
portant issues remain unresolved,
however, and a second plenary
meeting is planned for November;
meanwhile a preparatory committee
will meet next month to work out
draft agreements.
The major issues yet to be
negotiated involve the organiza-
tion and structure of the con-
sortium. A chief concern of the
delegates is the role of the US--
and COMSAT, its representative--
in INTELSAT's future. There was
especially strong sentiment for
replacing COMSAT as the manager
of the consortium with a more
international body. Many mem-
bers also insist upon new voting
procedures in the assembly and
the governing body to eliminate
the current veto power of the
US. Other items under discussion
included the consortium's legal
personality, its procurement
policy, and the existence of
future regional satellite systems.
Most participants were not
surprised that no definitive
agreement was drafted. There
is general satisfaction that the
conference permitted a useful
exchange of views, the isolation
of points of disagreement, and
the education of smaller coun-
tries in the complexities of
satellite telecommunications.
Some participants have ex-
pressed the hope that the US will
soften its position before the
November meeting. A West German
Foreign Ministry official, for
example, has asked that the US
negotiate INTELSAT's arrangements
with an understanding of their
political importance to Europe;
he views the principal conflict
as one between efficiency and
political considerations. A
Belgian minister has said that
the resolution of major conflicts
at the November meeting will de-
pend upon the willingness of mem-
bers--"particularly the US"--to
engage in "serious negotiations."
The Soviets attended the
conference as observers. A So-
viet minister stated 25X1
that the Soviets desire a single
global telecommunications satel-
lite system, but they also in-
sist that membership be univer-
sal--the US has favored member-
ship in the International Tele-
communications Union as a pre-
requisite. The Soviets also in-
sist that regional systems be
permitted, that control of the
consortium be internationalized,
and that votes by distributed "more
democratically." The Soviet re-
presentative indicated that Mos-
cow would wait until the conclu-
sion of INTELSAT's negotiations
before acting on its own Inter-
sputnik proposal.
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In the Middle East, shooting incidents continue to be the order of the
day, with large-scale artillery duels across the 13uez Canal occurring sporadi-
cally. The tacit Israeli-Jordanian truce in the Gulf of Aqaba was broken by a
fedayeen rocket attack on the Israeli port of Elat, for which Israel retaliated
with an air strike against Aqaba on the opposite shore. On the diplomatic
front, efforts to work out a political solution to the impasse are now
concentrated in New York, where the Big Four representatives held their
second meeting this week.
Pakistan's martial law administration is firmly in power, and its spokes-
men continue to pledge efforts to redress the ills that led to the protracted
violence against the Ayub regime. In a news conference on 10 April, Yahya
Khan stressed his intention to end corruption in government and promised
new attempts to meet the demands of students, workers, and peasants.
Meanwhile, prompt arrests are being made for violations of the strict martial
law regulations and at least one serious clash has occurred in East Pakistan
between the police and demonstrators.
In the Nigerian civil war, a federal drive into Biafra from the north has
temporarily stalled, but only after some federal forces advanced to within 11
miles of Umuahia, the secessionist capital. Umu.ahia does not appear to be in
any immediate danger, but the Nigerians will probably soon return to the
attack. The fall of the secessionist capital would represent a significant
psychological victory for Lagos, but it would not mark the end of the
conventional war, as Biafran leader Ojukwu would almost certainly move his
headquarters elsewhere in Biafra.
President Toure's witch hunt against alleged imperialist-inspired con-
spirators has brought Guinea's long-declining economic life to a near stand-
still and has stirred tension and discontent throughout the country. The
national treasury is believed to be empty and food staples are in extremely
short supply. Toure appears to have disposed of whatever threat may have
existed, however, and retains the u er hand.
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MIDDLE EAST CONTINUES IN QUIET TURMOIL
As four-power talks seeking
a solution to the Arab-Israeli
conflict began in New York this
week, Egyptian and Israeli gun-
ners exchanged artillery fire
across the Suez Canal, Iranian
military forces continued a de-
monstrative buildup along the
Iraqi-controlled Shutt-al-Arab
River, and Israeli aircraft for
the first time made a retaliatory
attack on the Jordanian port of
Aqaba. Syria's Baath party emerged
from a protracted congress with
a rearranged leadership coalition
that precariously balanced the
two principal factions. In the
Arabian Peninsula, meanwhile, both
Yemen and Southern Yemen produced
new but only slightly altered
cabinets.
Egypt-Israel
Sporadic but intense firing
has occurred along the Suez Canal
as both Egypt and Israel continue
defensive preparation in antici-
pation of yet more shooting. To
minimize the effects of costly
artillery duels, Port Said was
to have been closed to merchant
shipping after 1 April, and the
civilian population is to be evacu-
ated from the city in the course
25X125X1 of this month,
The Israelis claim that the
recent artillery exchanges along
the canal were triggered by Cairo's
realization that Israel was quietly
completing a heavy fortification
system that would drastically
limit Egypt's military options.
The Israelis say the barrages
were ineffective, that their
bunkers are about complete, and
that the Egyptians now have to
contend with a well-fortified
Israeli front line. Israeli mili-
tary leaders have warned that
heavier "retaliation" might occur
once the bunkers were finished.,
The effectiveness of the
Israeli defense was demonstrated
in recent incidents in which the
Israelis suffered only minor
casualties during a week of in-
tense shelling. The Israelis
also claim that their own artil-
lery fire was extremely accurate,
and an Egyptian official recently
acknowledged that Egypt suffered
over $100 million in damage--pri-
marily to the oil refineries--as
a result of the exchanges.
Israel this week for the
first time made an air strike
against the Jordanian port town
of Aqaba following a fedayeen-in-
stigated rocket attack on the
Israeli port town of Elat on the
opposite shore. Jordan, in a Sort
of unwritten agreement with Israel,
has tried to head off fedayeen
activity in this important port
area to prevent such an attack.
This time, however, the Israelis
claim they had no warning, and
they moved precipitately to in-
voke their aggressive policy of
"active defense" in retaliation.
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Iran-Iraq
Iranian military forces
have been building up along the
Shatt al-Arab River during the
past two weeks in response to
Iraq's attempts to enforce its
rights to the waters that sep-
arate the two countries. The
Iranian Navy has been put on
alert, as have units of the
army, and over 1,500 elite gen-
darmerie forces have been sent
to the border area. General
Oveisi, gendarmerie commander and
Iran's top military trouble-
shooter, has been supervising the
operation.
The trouble stems from Iraqi
harassment of Iranian fishermen
and a decision by Iraq to search
all ships entering the river
flying the Iranian flag. Since
1937, the Iranians have chafed
under a British-imposed treaty
that placed most of the river
under Iraqi control, and they
are sensitive to attempts to
interfere with their free use
of the waters. Nevertheless,
the current buildup is not ex-
pected to lead to open hostili-
ties.
Syria
In Damascus, the military-
dominated Baathist regime has
apparently once again managed to
meld competing factions within
the party into an uneasy coalition.
The new leaders of the Syrian
Baath party were announced on
31 March, with the leadership
about equally divided between
the two major party factions--one
led by Defense Minister Hafiz
Asad and the other by military
leader Salah Jadid. The unusual
length of the party congress in-
dicates considerable dissension
among the party ranks during the
meetings.
Hafiz Asad has held the up-
per hand since late February, but
was probably anxious to reach
some sort of compromise arrange-
ment with his opponents to enable
the party to present a united
front to the public. Asad
presumably remains in control, 25X1
but infighting will inevitably
continue despite this latest com-
promise.
EGYPT'S OIL REFINERY COMPLEX AT SUEZ HARD HIT
For the second time in less
than two years, Israel has dis-
rupted the oil economy of Egypt.
The shelling of the oil refinery
complex at Suez last month has
reduced Cairo's domestic refining
capacity from 545,000 tons of
products a month to only 145,000
tons, or about one quarter of
Egypt's domestic requirements.
As an interim supply measure,
Cairo has concluded an agreement
with the British Petroleum Com-
pany (BP) under which some Egyp-
tian crude oil from the Murgan
field,, normally processed at
Suez, will be shipped to the
company's refinery at Aden for
processing. The agreement, which
is for one year, calls for BP to
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Israeli-controlled areas following
June 1967 hostilities
.01 T'ERR: N'E`_ N
S Y R I A
/ *Damascus
,GOLAN HEIGHTS
Haifa.
-' 1 ''.Ytrrnuk R.
ISRAEL)
SECRET
rat laid \1'
AI Arts
Al Qantarah
Canal
Israeli shelling disrupts
oil
Egyptian oil economy
pipeline
Cairo
S SINAI
refinery
Murgan A ,17i.141,
Egypt shipping crude oil
to BP refinery in Aden
Hurghada
"~L3
j J O R D A N
1
EiafiJ Aqaba
SAUDI
A R A B I A
-Lq'Sharm ash-
Sh,lykh
Murgan to Aden
l apprbx, 1,400 miles
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supply 200,000 tons of refined
products per month. This quan-
tity represents about one half
of the products. provided by the
Suez refineries immediately prior
to the shelling and about one
third of Egypt's total demand.
Several tankers of crude oil al-
ready have been dispatched to
Aden.
Egypt made a similar arrange-
ment with BP in November 1967
following damage to the Suez re-
fineries by Israeli shelling, but
it was then on a month-to-month
basis. By mid-1968, the refin-
eries had been restored suffi-
ciently to discontinue that ar-
rangement with BP.
The length of the new agree-
ment with BP suggests that dam-
age from the March shelling is
more extensive than in 1967 and
that the Egyptians may not in-
tend to restore the complex in
the near future. In addition
to storage tanks and process
equipment, the marine loading
facilities and the refinery elec-
tric power plant as well as the
fertilizer plant and the cement
plant adjacent to the refineries
reportedly were damaged, and a
small Egyptian tanker was sunk in
the harbor basin. Estimates of
damages vary as high as $100 mil-
lion.
Continued sniping in the vi-
cinity of Suez may impede the move-
ment of products from Aden to
Suez. In early April, however,
a Greek-flag tanker reportedly
unloaded fuel oil without inci-
dent at the damaged jetty at
Suez for delivery to Cairo via
the pipeline. No Egyptian tank-
ers have yet appeared at Suez.
The Egyptians are establish-
ing temporary anchorage and un-
loading facilities south of Suez
and a short pipeline to connect
with the Suez-Cairo pipeline. They
may be planning to use this alter-
nate discharge point to avoid
possible Israeli harassment of
Egyptian tankers returning from
Egypt still will have to im-
port an additional 230,000 tons of
petroleum products a month to
meet the level of demand exist-
ing p:cior to the recent shelling.
There are indications that Egypt
is making approaches to inter-
national suppliers for bulk pur-
chases of kerosene and fuel oil.
Stocks on hand are not known, but
preliminary estimates suggest that
acute shortages of these two prod-
ucts may occur in a matter of
weeks. The physical limitations
on import facilities at Alexandria
as well as on the pipeline south
to Tanta--about 50 miles north
of Cairo--probably would pro-
hibit the import through Alexan-
dria of the quantity of additional
petroleum products necessary to
offset the loss of the Suez re-
fineries.
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SOVIET PRESIDENT VISITS ALGERIA AND MOROCCO
Soviet President Podgorny's
visits to Algeria and Morocco
testify to the growing influence
of the Soviet Union in the west-
ern Mediterranean. The Soviets
apparently see no need--or pros-
pects--for expanding their influ-
ence in Tunisia and so declined
a Tunisian invitation to Podgorny
on the grounds that the Tunisian
press has been hostile toward So-
viet policy.
On the surface, Podgorny's
visit to Algeria--from 26 March
to 1 April--went smoothly, cli-
maxing a series of high-level So-
viet visits during the past year.
Soviet Defense Minister Grechko
spent ten days visiting the Al-
gerian armed forces last summer;
last month, Algerian Foreign Min-
ister Bouteflika went to Moscow,
where the two sides agreed to set
up a permanent commission to ad-
minister their increased economic,
scientific, and technical cooper-
ation. This activity can be ex-
pected to increase and will prob-
ably be accompanied by an expan-
sion of the Soviet presence in
Algeria, which already includes
nearly 4,000 civilian and mili-
tary technicians and advisers.
The Podgorny party, report-
edly encountered a few obstacles,
however. It pressed hard for a
public stand by the Algerians in
support of the Soviet position on
Czechoslovakia and for Algerian
recognition of East Germany. The
Algerians, whose press has pre-
sented only the Soviet position
on Czechoslovakia and who have
long had close ties with East Ger-
many but do not recognize it, de-
murred on both requests.
Early in the visit, Algeria's
President Boumediene delivered a
speech calling for the "removal
of all forms of foreign military
presence" in the Mediterranean,
These remarks reportedly irritated
the Soviets, who presumably have
no plans to cut back on their own
activities and are content simply
to denounce the presence of the US
Sixth Fleet.
The Algerians unsuccessfully
pressed for an uncompromising $o-
viet stand in support of the liber-
ation of Palestine. The Soviets,
however, agreed in principle to
the Algerian request to cease sup-
port for and contact with the il-
legal Algerian Communist Party,
a commitment that the Algerian'
plan to test shortly.
Podgorny's trip to Morocco
was one more sign of the gradual
warming of Soviet-Moroccan rela-
tions. In the past year, Rabat
had agreed to a Soviet naval visit
to Casablanca and to the opening
of a Soviet consulate there. the
two sides signed a five-year trade
agreement last July and, during
Podgorny's stay, announced the'es-
tablishment of Soviet-Moroccan
friendship organizations in both
nations and a commission to adXnin-
ister their economic and techni-
cal agreements. Moreover, Pod-
gorny's arrival on 1 April was to
have coincided with the scheduled
beginning of Aeroflot service
between Rabat and Havana, a route
Moscow has been trying to acquire
for more than two years.
The Moroccans gave Podgorny
a correct and colorful reception.
His arrival was given sparse pub-
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licity, however, and was over-
shadowed by the signature of the
accord associating Morocco with
the European Economic Community.
Before the visit, moreover, the
King had pointedly dedicated the
dam that the Soviets are building
in the south, and did not include
this or any other Soviet project
in the schedule.
Podgorny's response to the
King's welcoming speech, while
apparently bland and superficially
correct, contained some elements
to give the Moroccan regime pause.
For instance, his stress on the
people-to-people aspect of So-
viet-Moroccan relations implies
an effort to appeal to the Moroc-
can people over the head of the
monarchy. Also, his suggestion
that Morocco follow the Soviet
pattern has no appeal for a Moroc-
can king bent on preserving his
own unchallenged authority.
Podgorny's farewell state-
ment seemed designed to mask areas
of disagreement with respect to
VietnELm, the Mediterranean, and
to some extent the Middle East
crisis. A divergence of politi-
cal views on these subjects, how-
ever, does not preclude Soviet-
Moroccan cooperation in economic,
scientific, cultural and perhaps
even military fields.
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COUNCIL SHAKE-UP COMPLICATES GHANA'S POLITICAL SITUATION
The abrupt removal last week
of General Joseph Ankrah as head
of the governing National Libera-
tion Council has left Ghana's body
politic in a state of shock and
has lowered public confidence in
the pro-Western, military-police
regime. Although no changes are
expected in the government's basic
policies, the shake-up seems
likely to cause a fundamental
shift in the power relationships
within the council and could pro-
duce developments that would de-
lay the transfer of power to a
civilian government.
The decision to oust Ankrah
came after his colleagues dis-
covered he had solicited money
from local and foreign business-
men for political purposes in con-
travention of the ban on political
activity. His successor, agreed
on only after the senior army of-
ficer on the council refused the
chairmanship, is young and mer-
curial Brigadier Akwasi A. Afrifa.
Whether the council retains
the cohesiveness necessary for an
orderly transfer of power to a
civilian government will depend
in large measure on the ability
of council vice chairman John
Harlley to keep Afrifa on an even
emotional keel. Harlley, who is
also national police chief, has
played the role of kingmaker on
the council. The power and in-
fluence of the dynamic Afrifa, a
member of a royal family of the
Ashanti tribe, could mount in
short order, however.
Afrifa is already being cul-
tivated by politicians of the
Ashanti-dominated political group-
ing that long opposed Nkrumah.
They view Afrifa's rise to chief
of state as having improved the
political fortunes of their party,
and they are likely to encourage
him to chart a course independent
of Harlley, who favors a rival
political faction. The play of
these forces could have an ad-
verse effect on meeting the Sep-
tember target date for return to
civilian rule. The council still
insists it will meet the deadline,
however, and Afrifa, in his first
public action, has announced that
the ban on political activity will
be lifted on 1 May. Ministerial
portfolios have also been exten-
sively reshuffled in an effort to
give the regime a new public image.
Senior army officers are
vocally upset over the leadership
change. They resent Afrifa's
brashness and his rapid rise in
rank. Many believe that the
senior army officer on the coun-
cil should be made chairman and
that the military should have
greater representation on the
council. Some, especially An-
krah's fellow tribesmen, suspect
the ouster was engineered by Harl-
ley for tribal and political
reasons.
Press reaction to Ankrah's
dismissal has been varied, with
privately owned media calling
for a thorough probe, an action
that could implicate other prom-
inent Ghanaians in the scandal.
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The decision by the US to defer economic sanctions against Peru for its
expropriation of the International Petroleum Company was the main topic
of conversation in the hemisphere this week. Most Latin American leaders
have expressed pleasure and relief over the deferral. The foreign minister of
Colombia and an adviser to Brazi, s foreign minister, however, commented
that the postponement would be interpreted throughout Latin America as a
sign of weakness on the part of the US.
In other developments, the Caldera government in Venezuela is taking a
more pragmatic approach to foreign relations than did its recent predeces-
sors. On 7 April, diplomatic relations were re-established with Peru, marking
the first deviation from the ten-year-old Betancourt Doctrine of nonrecogni-
tion of governments that come to power unconstitutionally. The move sets
the stage for recognizing the military governments of Argentina and Panama,
perhaps this week. The government is also pushing ahead with negotiations
to establish or re-establish relations with the USSR and some of the Eastern
European states.
The 1970 presidential election in the Dominican Republic is already
occupying political center stage, there, and early jockeying for the nomina-
tions points to an extended period of unrest. The latest prospective nominee
is ambassador to the US, Garcia-Godoy, prov;;sional president in 1965 and,
probably the most popular candidate the left could put forward. Garcia-
Godoy will be seeking to undercut President Balaguer, who has also made a
veiled appeal to the public to support a national movement for his own
re-election. The candidate of the far right is Wessin y Wessin, the leader of
the regular military during the 1965 revolt.
The "expert-level" meeting of the Special Committee for Latin Ameri-
can Economic Coordination ended on 7 April. In a joint communique, the
delegates declared their determination to achieve a "Latin American person-
ality" with its own values and criteria. A second "expert-level" meeting will
be held from 7-14 May, followed by a ministerial session from 15 to 17 May,
probably in Vina del Mar, Chile.
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PANAMANIAN NATIONAL GUARD EXTENDS ITS CONTROL
Six months after seizing
power, Panama's National Guard
leadership is showing an inten-
tion to remain in active control
of the country for a long time
to come, regardless of any elec-
tions that may be held.
A communique issued by the
presidential press office, appar-
ently at the behest of top guard
officials, asserted that govern-
ment institutions will remain
under the "patriotic protection"
of the military--a euphemism for
establishment of the guard's power
to sit in judgment on the actions
of any regime.
The National Guard is stead-
ily expanding its propaganda ef-
fort to demonstrate its popular
origins and to generate some sup-
port outside its ranks. The guard
portrays itself increasingly as
being composed almost entirely
of men from the lower classes.
Guard commandant Torrijos has
received extensive coverage in
the controlled press, which ex-
tolls his virtues and publicizes
his activities. During a recent
tour of the western provinces,
General Torrijos was pictured
surrounded by "enthusiastic"
peasants as he sought support
from rural groups.
A spate of new actions by
the government junta shows a
trend toward greater subordina-
tion of government components
to National Guard influence.
The National Department of In-
vestigations (DENI), Panama's
small civilian police unit, has
been formally placed under the.
direct administration of the
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guard. Although formerly respon-
sible to the president, DENI has
actually been under the supervi-
sion of aguard officer since the
ouster of Arnulfo Arias last Oc-
tober. The junta has also ap-
pointed four new supreme court
judges whose chief recommendation
is sympathy for government poli-
cies rather than personal ability.
In addition, a cabinet decree des-
ignating 11 October as "National
Guard Day" now officially com-
memorates the occasion of the
guard take-over.
some signs of normalcy never-
theless are appearing. Business
conditions appear to be stabili-
zing and economic activity has
increased. Despite the lack of
any independent evidence of popu-
lar support for the regime, no
organized opposition has yet
emerged, and promises of elec-
tions next year remain vague.
Torrijos' most immediate chal-
lenge is the possible reopening
this month of secondary schools
and next month of the university,
both chronic centers of agita-
tion.
UNCERTAINTY PREVAILS IN PERU
The deferral of US economic
sanctions under the Hickenlooper
amendment pending further negoti-
ations on the International Petro-
leum Company (IPC) has stimulated
increasing uncertainty in Peruvian
economic and political circles.
The initial reaction in Peru and
throughout the hemisphere was one
of relief, but Peruvian Govern-
ment leaders are concerned that
badly needed credit will be with-
held and that foreign investors
will defer action until a final
decision is reached.
Prior to the announcement,
a Lima newspaper expressed this
concern when it said that the
extension of the time limit
would be almost as bad for Peru
as application of the sanctions.
Another newspaper stated that
"six more months like the last
six" would be harmful for the
Peruvian economy and would para-
lyze the greater part of expected
investments.
'US mining companies had been
planning large expenditures for
the development of new conces-
sions before the expropriation
of IPC. These as well as other
foreign business ventures in Peru
have been held up pending a final
settlement of the IPC issue, which
now is entering an administrative
phase that can last until 6 Au-
gust.
Leaders of other Latin Ameri-
can countries expressed pleasure
and relief over the announcement
that the sanctions had been de-
ferred. Foreign Minister Lopez
Michelsen of Colombia, however,
reportedly said that the postpone-
ment would be interpreted through-
out Latin America as a sign of
weakness on the part of the US
Government. This sentiment was
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echoed by an adviser of the Bra-
zilian foreign minister, who
said that now other countries
will think they can act with
impunity in defying the US.
President Velasco has publicly
termed the deferment of the sanc-
tions a "Peruvian triumph," but
the "triumph" was not sufficient
to make him a national hero or
to strengthen his position sig-
nificantly. F_ I
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