WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT THE FIRST THREE YEARS OF THE 'ARGENTINE REVOLUTION'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007100020002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 16, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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D
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
The First Three Years of the "Argentine Revolution"
MORI DOCUMENT - Text of pub was RIFPUB
Secret
Ne 45
16 May 1969
No. 0370/69A
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W FIRST THREE YEARS OF THE "ARGENTINE REVOLUTION"
The Arge tine mi litany .coup of June 1966 launched what has become satin America`s
mo t succ sful;current experiment in authoritarian, modernizing government, The Ot ga is
adi inistr-ation, palthou9h probably not "popular," does retain public acceptance and respect.
l Visas brought a halt to the political chaos that had become the rule in Argentina during the
dei ode=full wi g_Jua Peron's fall Its economic accomplishments in cutting down inflation
ni promoting national growth have been little short of dramatic.
"f hp government now is moving to tackle some of the country's difficult social problems.
Its-suc s or failure will have a long-range impact well beyond Argentine borders. Already,
the "Argentine example" is being cited elsewhere in Latin America as an idealized model of 11
what earl b ,a mpl shed when a united military establishment seizes national leadership,
ri s abt e th7e partisanshand conflicting group interests of the past, and launches a
national "revs lution.~t ,
BACKGROUND
Upon assuming the presidency following a
military coup in June 1966, retired Lt. General
Juan Carlos Ongania committed his administra-
tion to a transformation of the country known as
the "Argentine Revolution." The "Revolution"
was to be accomplished in three stages-the first
would concentrate on stabilizing the economy
and attaining steady growth; the second would
attack the country's pressing social problems; and
the final stage would deal with the construction
of a political system that would ensure genuine
representation for all Argentines.
On 28 March 1969, as his administration
neared the end of its third year, Ongania delivered
a three-hour speech to government officials de-
scribing the accomplishments and future goals of
the "Argentine Revolution." The President de-
clared that the three key elements of the
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"Revolution" are: solidarity, as a basic spiritual
search for the dignity of man; integration, as the
synthesis of all policies; and participation, as the
strategy that will ensure that decisions reflect the
interests of all concerned, not just a minority.
Ongania said that much remained to be done in
the economic area, but the time had come to deal
with urgent social problems. He listed 120 proj-
ects to be undertaken during this stage.
Ongania has said that the use of the term
"ten years" to define his term of office is in fact
symbolic of the fact that the "Argentine Revolu-
tion" is a long-term process, not one of one, two,
three, or even five years. Thus, the political phase
appears to be still in the distant future. Ongania
has promised that when it finally does come,
Argentina will achieve what he described as a
"real democracy."
THE ECONOMIC PHASE
The first, or economic, stage of President
Ongania's program for restructuring Argentina has
met with considerable success. The initial phase
of the economic program, begun in early 1967
under the leadership of Minister of Economy
Krieger Vasena, emphasized the attainment of
financial stability. Stabilization measures included
a "voluntary" price control program, a freeze on
wages until the end of 1968, and a reduction of
the government budget deficit by holding current
spending fairly stable while increasing revenues.
As a result, the annual increase in the cost of
living was cut from 30 percent in 1966 to less
than 10 percent in 1968. The government plans
to hold the increase in 1969 to 5 percent or less.
The possiblity of a recession inherent in
these strong stabilization measures was avoided in
1967 by a variety of growth inducements such as
tax and credit preferences for investment and new
credit arrangements for consumer durables. These
measures, combined with a relatively good crop
Special Report -2 -
year and a healthy export trade, allowed a gross
domestic product growth rate of 1.9 percent in
1967 compared with one of only 0.5 percent the
previous year. In 1968, export earnings were re-
duced by weather conditions and protective meas-
ures adopted by countries that constitute Argen-
tina's most important markets. Because of an
inflow of foreign investment and extensive public
works programs, however, the growth rate
reached 4.8 percent. These public works programs
were financed in large part by sales of government
bonds in foreign and domestic markets-the first
such sales in over 20' years. The growth rate in
1969 probably will exceed 6 percent.
Since the devaluation in March 1967, the
peso has remained stable at 350 to the dollar. A
healthy though declining trade surplus combined
with. large capital inflows (including returning
flight capital) has raised gross foreign exchange
reserves to more than $800 million-the highest
level in two decades.
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President Ongania has promised that the full
energy of his government will be focused this year
on improving the efficiency of the state enter-
prises and cutting the substantial number of ex-
cess employees. Stimulation and diversification of
exports also requires attention. Much remains to
be done, but the economic phase has already
achieved a success that few would have predicted
in 1966.
FOCUS ON SOCIAL PROBLEMS
Although the economic phase is still of para-
mount importance, some beginnings have been
made on the second or social phase of the "Revo-
lution." The government has initiated a policy
designed to raise real wages without jeopardizing
the goals of the stabilization program. Although
the rate of inflation dropped sharply in 1968, real
wages also fell by an estimated 2.5 percent in that
year. In early 1969 the government authorized a
general wage adjustment effective for the entire
year. For the private sector this amounted to an 8
percent increase plus higher allowances for de-
pendents, bringing the total increase for the aver-
age worker with two children to about 12 per-
cent. Personnel of the several state enterprises
also were covered under this program. For both
groups, these wage increases are to be financed
through increases in productivity and are not to
result in higher prices.
Government employees, including the
underpaid teachers, military and police forces,
received a raise averaging 20 to 25 percent. The
governmental pay raise is the first stage of a
five-year program designed to make government
pay scales competitive with those of private in-
dustry. At the end of five years these pay scales
are to be roughly equal in real terms to those
that prevailed before 1943. All raises are to be
financed by economies in other parts of the
ministries' budgets.
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One of the government's most important
social programs will focus on alleviating the
housing shortage, currently estimated at 2.3 mil-
lion units. Authorities have already begun work
on eradicating the slums that are found in many
cities, and there are plans for the construction of
low-cost permanent housing for the persons who
are displaced by the renewal projects.
The administration appears to be entering
the social phase of its program with an appropri-
ate degree of caution. It nevertheless may encoun-
ter difficulties in assuring that the new wage
scales and the costs of even the limited social
programs now under consideration do not result
in a resurgence of inflationary pressures. The year
ahead will be an important testing ground of its
ability to pick its way through the sometime
conflicting goals on the road to economic pro-
gress and social improvement.
POLITICS-"LIBERALS" AND
"NATIONALISTS"
The Ongania government has closely adhered
to its ban on activity by political parties, which
were dissolved shortly after the coup, and has
moved swiftly to discourage any gatherings that
could be considered to have a political character.
Although members of some of the former parties
have attempted to put together an opposition
force, they have had little success. With the par-
ties largely neutralized, politics is limited to a
contest for dominance between supporters of two
conflicting ideologies within the administration.
Thus far Ongania has carefully maintained a bal-
ance between the two main factions.
One group encompasses the "liberals," who
are in fact conservative in outlook. They are pri-
marily the industrialists, landowners, bankers,
publishers, and economic technicians like Krieger
Vasena. Their general tenets are free enterprise,
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stabilization of the economy, paternalism but not
permissiveness toward labor, and an eventual-
though perhaps distant--return to some form of
democracy.
The other sector comprises the "national-
ists," who tend to be less single-minded than the
"liberals," but who generally share a belief that
democratic capitalism has been tried and has
failed in Argentina. Some of them probably
would like to see the creation of a type of corpor-
ate state, characterized by extensive government
direction of the economy and by a political sys-
tem involving representation through councils of
workers, employers, and other sectors rather than
through political parties. The "nationalists" are
represented by key civilians such as Interior Min-
ister Borda and Secretary of Government Diaz
Colodrero, and retired military men including
Generals Villegas (secretary-general of the Na-
tional Security Council), Senorans (chief of the
Secretariat of State Information), and Repetto
(secretary-general of the Presidency).
At least some of the "nationalists" are con-
vinced that the government cannot undertake the
social-and eventually the political-stages of the
"Revolution" without some base of support out-
side the military. They see a potential base in the
organized labor movement, which has acted as a
powerful opposition force to every government
since the overthrow of Juan Peron in 1955.
GOVERNMENT RELATIONS WITH LABOR
The main responsibility for handling the
administration's attempts to win labor sup-
port-or at least cooperation-has been given to
Labor Secretary San Sebastian. He has effectively
used techniques such as securing audiences with
Ongania for selected labor leaders to increase
steadily the number of union heads willing to
collaborate to some degree with the government
in the hope of gaining special benefits. Approxi-
Special Report
mately 47 leaders of the "collaborationist" bloc
attended the most recent session with the Presi-
dent, held last January.
Administration officials have also had public
and private contacts with some leaders of unions
in the second-and I~argest-bloc, who are willing
to carry on an unofficial "dialogue" with the
government on economic issues, but almost cer-
tainly would not accept a government attempt to
get control of organized labor. The influence of a
third small group of unions whose chiefs reso-
lutely oppose the government and its policies, and
who accuse the leaders of the other blocs of
"selling out" to the administration, appears to
have declined sharply in recent months. Numer-
ous other unions have not publicly adopted any
position in relation to the government.
The lines between the various blocs are not
rigidly drawn; there appears to have been measur-
able movement away from total opposition to the
government toward a willingness to see what it
has to offer. Within the individual unions there
are also frequently very difficult currents of
thought on how to deal with the government.
The administration has not hesitated to use a
heavy hand to bring back into line the few unions
that have attempted to challenge it openly by
violating the virtual ban on strikes. A strike by
Buenos Aires port workers in December 1966
ended with the government taking over adminis-
tration of the union and the union's chief spend-
ing two years in prison for allegedly urging for-
eign dock workers', to demonstrate solidarity with
their Argentine colleagues by refusing to unload
Argentine ships. The government terminated a
strike at the state;-owned oil refinery at La Plata
in late 1968 by taking over control of the local
union and firing about 1,700 workers who re-
fused to return to their jobs. Operation of the
refinery has continued satisfactorily without
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replacement of the dismissed workers. The trade
union status of several other major unions has
also been suspended because of their participation
in illegal strikes.
The government appears determined to use
persuasion, and force where needed, to bring to-
gether the various labor factions into a single
General Labor Confederation (CGT), which has
existed on paper since the Peron era, but has
never been a united central labor organization.
The government has taken some preliminary steps
toward this goal by verifying the membership of
the unions, checking their financial status, and
determining which labor leaders would be most
likely to cooperate with the government's eco-
nomic and social policies.
The press frequently has speculated that this
year the administration may call for simultaneous
elections of new officers in all the nation's unions
and manipulate the results where necessary to
assure the election of candidates not strongly
opposed to the government. This tactic would
almost certainly meet firm opposition from many
powerful and ambitious union chiefs, who have
built up substantial
support within their
own organizations. A
number of these men
also are important
figures in the Peronist
political movement.
Probably pre-eminent
among them is Au-
gusto Vandor, head
of the wealthy metal-
workers' union, who
reportedly is Onga-
nia's main target for
removal.
While the gov- Labor Leader Augusto Vandor
ernment has been
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working to secure the cooperation of labor
through individual union leaders, some adminis-
tration officials-almost exclusively from the "na-
tionalist" sector-have attempted to secure labor's
support through numerous political contacts with
emissaries of Peron. They hope to convince the
exiled dictator to use his still powerful influence
with the masses to get them to cooperate with the
Ongania government. At the same time, Peron
appears to be attempting once again to unite his
supporters from all the labor factions into a single
Peronist bloc-possibly headed by Vandor-which
would give him a major advantage in his negotia-
tions with the government. In view of the strong
anti-Peronist sentiment that exists in the upper
military levels even 14 years after his overthrow,
it is difficult to conceive of any benefits the
administration could offer the politically astute
Peron in exchange for his backing or even neutral-
ity, or what attitude his enemies in the military
would take toward such an offer.
Many "liberals" are very skeptical about the
government's plans to consolidate labor and
about its contacts with Peronists. They doubt
that the government could control the restruc-
tured CGT, and suspect that a united labor move-
ment-even an ostensibly "friendly" one-could
prove to be a greater challenge to the government
than the present divided one. Insistence by "lib-
erals" on the need for continued government
austerity also conflicts with the "nationalists"
view that the administration should use assets
such as its welfare program funds and its author-
ity to grant wage increases to obtain labor sup-
port. The recent resignations of some members of
the economic team in the cabinet appear to be a
symptom of these tensions within the admin-
istration.
MILITARY SUPPORT OF THE
GOVERNMENT
Although Ongania has insisted that his
administration is not a dictatorship, the armed
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Army Commander-in-Chief
Alejandro Lanusse
forces unquestionably are its principal base of
support. He recognizes that a serious loss of con-
fdence on their part could result in his removal.
Ongania has successfully weathered at least two
difficult situations involving the replacement of
top military officers, and his handling of these
problems probably strengthened his standing with
the armed forces. Although military approval for
the President's policies is not universal-particu-
larly for those involving the delicate Peronist is-
sue-most officers acknowledge Ongania's author-
ity and honesty.
The recent substantial military salary in-
crease, which was accompanied by a rise in other
benefits, will probably do much to alleviate the
armed forces main complaint. There had been
serious concern at high levels about the large
number of capable officers who were leaving to
enter private business because of their difficult
economic situations.
The government has also gained military sup-
port by authorizing the purchase of new equip-
Special Report -6
ment to replace some of its obsolete and inef-
ficient arms. Much of the equipment has been
obtained in Europe because comparable items are
not obtainable from the United States, or because
European suppliers offer more favorable terms.
The army has acquired-among other items-60
Italian 105-mm. howitzers, 60 AMX-13 light
tanks and 24 AMX 1 15-mm. self-propelled howit-
zers from France, and 60 Swiss armored cars. The
navy's $83 million modernization program in-
cludes the purchase' of a Dutch aircraft carrier of
World War II vintage; six minesweepers from the
UK, and six jet fighters from Italy. Other con-
tracts probably have been signed for two sub-
marines from West: Germany and for one or two
destroyer escorts equipped with surface-to-air
missiles from the IUK.. The air force is scheduled
to receive this year the remaining 25 of the 50 US
A-4B jet fighters purchased in 1966. Twelve re-
conditioned Canberra jet bombers are being
obtained from the ,UK. Recent reports indicate
that the air force signed a contract last November
for 14 French Mira e III supersonic aircraft, and
the purchase is awaiing Ongania's approval.
A substantial part of this material will be
assembled in Argentina. Eventual domestic pro-
duction of most types of equipment is planned.
The Argentine military hopes during the next
decade to become a major supplier of arms to
other Latin American armed forces.
The majority of officers, especially those at
upper levels, are stilll; strongly anti-Peronist. Army
commander in chief Lt. General Lanusse and
several other top officers recall with bitterness
that they spent the last four years of Peron's rule
in prison for their part in an attempt to over-
throw him. They reportedly doubt the wisdom of
the administration's', public and secret contacts
with Peronists, but have refrained from publi-
cizing their views. They apparently did not op-
pose the government's recent decision to permit
ten Peronist officers who had been expelled from
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the services to wear the uniform again and to
collect pensions. However, as the government pur-
sues its plan to integrate the Peronists into the
future political framework, the hostility of these
officers may well rise sharply.
INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE LEFT
The leftist extremist groups in Argentina are
weak and disorganized, and do not appear to be
capable of presenting any serious threat to the
government. The Argentine Communist Party's
membership has fallen from a high of 90,000 to
less than 50,000, of whom 10-12,000 are active
cadre. The Communists traditionally have had an
important influence in the Argentine University
Federation, but since the Ongania government's
major reduction of the political role of students
and the removal of suspected leftists from facul-
ties in 1966, there has been a decline in the
party's activities in this area. In late 1967 a group
of younger party members calling themselves the
Communist Party - National Committee for
Revolutionary Recovery broke from the party
primarily because of the rigidity and lack of imag-
ination of its old-line leadership.
The Communists have long tried to form
alliances with the Peronists, but they have found
sympathy only among the fringe extremists of the
movement. At the 13th party congress, held in
April 1969, the Communists' frustration at their
lack of success in winning Peronist adherents re-
sulted in the adoption of a resolution to "make a
complete break with Peronism and to initiate an
all-out campaign to nullify the influence of Peron-
ism throughout the country." It is doubtful that
the resolution will be implemented.
MILITARY AND SECURITY OFFICIALS
Government forces rapidly swept up small
groups of would-be guerrillas in Tucuman Prov-
ince in late 1968 and in Jujuy Province in Febru-
ary 1969. Military and security officials are con-
cerned about a series of terrorist attacks and
Special Report
attempts to steal arms that have occurred since I
April. The incidents have taken place at widely
scattered locations, including military posts. They
may be the work of one or several local groups,
possibly collaborating with members of Uru-
guayan extremist groups such as the Tupamaros.
Security forces have rounded up militant Peron-
ists and leftist extremists, and have detained a few
antiadministration retired military officers, in-
cluding perennial coup plotters Generals Candido
Lopez and Rauch, but there is not any firm
evidence that these persons were in fact responsi-
ble for the attacks.
INCREASING FERMENT IN THE
CHURCH
The Catholic Church in Argentina has long
been characterized by its conservatism and its
ability-with some brief exceptions-to accom-
modate itself to the government in power. The
hierarchy generally has not spoken out on social
issues so long as these did not directly affect the
Church. Clergymen such as Bishops Jeronimo
Podesta and Alberto Devoto, who for many years
have decried the conditions of the rural and urban
masses, have been the exception.
During the last year, however, a growing
sector within the Church has begun to advocate
reform and innovation, although conservatives,
such as Argentine primate Antonio Cardinal
Caggiano, still hold great power. Most of the
progressives appear to belong to a loose organiza-
tion called the "Movement of Priests of the Third
World."
The Conference of Argentine Bishops was
obliged to recess last December when it could not
reach a consensus on implementation of the social
reform recommendations of the Latin American
Bishops' Conference at Medellin, Colombia in
September. The Argentine bishops met again in
April to deal with the Medellin document, and
the differences between the conservatives and
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liberals received wide press attention. The final
document of the conference, which calls for the
"liberation" of peoples from economic, social,
and political oppression, and urges that priests be
given a greater role in managing church affairs,
suggests that the progressives' views may have
prevailed.
The most spectacular incident of discontent
among a significant minority of clergy occurred
last March with the resignation of 30 priests in
the archdiocese of Rosario over serious difference
with their Archbishop. The priests charged that
Archbishop Guillermo Bolatti was indifferent to
the area's social problems and had refused to
initiate a dialogue with them about these matters.
The prelate had taken several actions diametri-
cally opposed to the
priests' liberal views,
such as refusing to
permit worker-priests
in his diocese, placing
persons who shared
his conservative views
in charge of groups
such as Catholic Ac-
tion Youth, taking
disciplinary action
against priests who in-
troduced procedural
innovations in their
lower class parishes,
and expelling two for-
eign-born priests for
insubordination.
Guillermo Bolatti
A series of incidents heightened the differ-
ences between the Archbishop and the priests,
with clergymen and lay church groups in Rosario
and other areas taking one side or the other. At
least 300 Argentine priests reportedly have an-
nounced their support of the liberal group. On 25
March the Archbishop left for Buenos Aires and
Special Report - 8
went on to Rome to seek an audience with Pope
Paul VI. The Rosario priests then sent the Pope a
telegram defending their views and requesting a
canon trial to absolve them of conservatives'
charges that they were attempting to tear down
the hierarchical structure of the Church.
The degree of freedom with which individual
clergymen may speak out on issues not directly
concerned with religious matters has become a
major issue in the progressive-conservative fer-
ment. In January 1969, Buenos Aires Archbishop
Juan Carlos Aramburu instructed priests in his
jurisdiction not to make public statements or take
part in public gatherings of an economic, social.,
or political nature without prior authorization.
He noted that while the clergy should encourage
lay persons to participate actively in seeking pro-
gress in the economic, social, and political fields,
they should not lead such movements nor suggest
solutions. Cardinal Caggiano's recent Holy Thurs-
day address contained a pointed warning that
certain religious sectors were becoming overly
concerned with man-oriented religion at the ex-
pense of God-oriented faith.
Some clergymen have gone beyond criticism
of the Church in their efforts to attack social and
economic conditions in certain parts of the coun-
try. Last December, priests in several cities took
part in a Christmas Eve protest movement against
the continued existence of "misery and inequal-
ity," and led hunger strikes instead of celebrating
the traditional Christmas mass. Some denounced
the social and economic policies of the govern-
ment as bearing most heavily on those least able
to afford it.
In April, priests took part in demonstrations
in depressed areas of Tucuman and Santa Fe
provinces, where the closing of sugar mills for
financial reasons had left large numbers of work-
ers without jobs. Police used tear gas to break up
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the demonstrations and arrested the priests in
both places. The Archbishop of Santa Fe then
issued a declaration that expressing solidarity
with those concerned with the problems of the
community is no crime. Some priests have also
taken the workers' side in a prolonged strike at a
major printing plant in Buenos Aires.
PROSPECTS
The next few years of the "Argentine Revo-
lution" will see a continuation of Ongania's pro-
gram of economic planning closely combined
with social engineering. Political activity will re-
volve largely around differences within the gov-
ernment on emphasis and priorities. Most deci-
sions will continue to be made by the central
government; although Ongania has stressed that
the administration is determined to hand over
many of its responsibilities to the provinces, this
appears to be a distant prospect.
Both "liberals" and "nationalists" are care-
fully watching a project in Cordoba Province that
may serve as a model for the type of community
participation in government envisioned by Onga-
nia. Governor Carlos Caballero has formed a
council representing management, labor and other
sectors to assist him in a strictly advisory capac-
ity. Some groups in Cordoba refused to take part
in the council because they believed it was only a
facade of "community participation," and that it
was a dangerous first step toward a corporate
state; this view is probably shared by most
"liberals."
The effort to secure the collaboration of
organized labor in the social phase will perhaps be
the greatest test to date of the government's
strength and diplomacy. Ongania reportedly is
convinced that labor must give up its political
role, and that this may require the "sacrifice" of a
generation of union leaders who attained their
high posts by successfully combining labor efforts
Special Report - 9
and politics. The personal popularity of Peron
among the masses will continue to be a factor
that the government cannot afford to ignore, and
it must also take into account the danger that
frequent official contacts with him may stimulate
the hostility of anti-Peronist military men such as
Lt. Gen. Lanusse whose support the administra-
tion needs.
Perhaps Ongania's most ambitious economic
and social project will be the development of the
area south of the 42nd parallel known as
Patagonia. For a week in early April, Ongania
moved the seat of government to Patagonia in
order to draw national attention to the region's
needs and to spur its development. This vast area,
comprising about one-fourth of the national terri-
tory, has only about two percent of the country's
total population. Probably only a bare majority
of the inhabitants are Argentines; the remainder
have come from neighboring countries-princi-
pally Chile-because of the higher wages paid in
Argentina.
The strategic implications of this fact have
long concerned the Argentine military and civilian
authorities. In 1969 a Joint Southern Command
was created to plan and coordinate major air-sea-
land maneuvers to be held in Patagonia in Octo-
ber. The press has suggested that this unique new
structure may also coordinate civic action proj-
ects there. Ongania has assigned high priority to
accelerated development of the coal and iron
mines and the establishment of other industries;
the construction of airports and highways; the
expansion of telephone, radio, and television
facilities; and the attraction of new residents. The
key project for the region, and one of the largest
ever to be undertaken in Argentina, is the con-
struction of the giant El Chocon-Cerros Colorados
hydroelectric project. A World Bank loan of $82
million will finance part of the cost of the
project.
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As a part of the over-all modernization pro-
gram, the government is particularly interested in
expanding its international contacts in science
and technology. In 1968 it created the National
Science and Technology Council, one of whose
responsibilities will be to advise the government
on and coordinate dealings with foreign countries
in this area. In March Argentina signed a joint
agreement for scientific cooperation with West
Germany that might serve as a model for agree-
ments with other nations. The West German
Siemens firm is constructing Argentina's first nu-
clear power plant at Atucha, about 60 miles
northwest of Buenos Aires. Its desire to be free to
develop nuclear energy research for peaceful pur-
poses has led Argentina to question the wisdom
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and by
implication, the motives of its advocates.
In the absence of effective action by the
former political parties, it is possible that progres-
sive elements within the Church may take the
lead in pressing the government for faster action
in the social area. At times this concern may lead
to conflicts with the civil authorities, particularly
where the government for economic reasons dis-
misses employees or closes down inefficient state
or private enterprises, as occurred in Tucuman
and Santa Fe provinces. The issue of state-church
relations is complicated by the strong Catholic
10 -
Special Report _10-
orientation of Ongania and many of his close
orientation
collaborators.
If the "Argentine Revolution" continues to
progress, the government will probably dedicate
more of its attention to foreign affairs. Argentina
has long aspired to a position of leadership in the
"southern cone" of South America, and Ongania
has stated that the internal turmoil currently
plaguing its traditional rival, Brazil, gives his coun-
try an exceptional opportunity to increase its
international standing.
The Ongania administration's relations with
the United States have improved substantially
since 1966. While recognizing Argentina's special
relationship with the US, Foreign Minister Costa
Mendez declared in March 1969 that his country
is subject to no one's "sphere of influence" and is
determined to preserve its freedom of political
action and economic independence. The minister
said that Argentina intended to strengthen its
traditional ties with Europe in order to work for
the promotion of a "multipolar international
community." Costa Mendez stressed Argentina's
willingness to trade with all nations, including
those of the Communist bloc. Incidents such as
Argentina's seizure of Soviet fishing boats opera-
ting within its territorial waters, however, have
caused some deterioration in relations with the
USSR.
16 May 1969
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Secret
Approved For Release 2006/05/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100020002-2