WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007100040001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 29, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

P" _,
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
, 4',
29 May 1969
No. 0372/69
State Dept. review completed
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(Information as of noon EDT, 28 May 1969)
Far East
VIETNAM
North Vietnamese and Liberation Front delegates
in Paris are still trumpeting the Front's ten-
point peace program while North Vietnam's chief
delegate is back in Hanoi, probably to work out
new diplomatic tactics to counter President Nixon's
proposals and those which may come out of the
Nixon-Thieu meeting of 8 June. On the military
scene, all available evidence continues to point
to a high state of readiness in many Communist
units and to their intention to hold the initia-
tive for a summer campaign.
COMMUNISTS COUNTER GOVERNMENT OFFENSIVE IN LAOS
The Communists have succeeded in recapturing
Xieng Khouangville, but Meo leader Van Pao con-
tinues to press his counteroffensive in the Plaine
des Jarres area.
NEW ROUND. IN SINO-SOVIET POLEMICS
As the 5 June date for the opening of the Soviet-
sponsored Moscow conference of Communist parties
approaches, both the Soviets and the Chinese are
maneuvering for political advantage by exploiting
border issues.
Europe
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 9
NO FIRST BALLOT DECISION EXPECTED IN FRENCH ELECTION 10
The French presidential election will not be de-
cided in the vote on Sunday 1 June; the pollsters
agree that Pompidou will win a plurality this Sun-
day, only to be defeated by Poher in the run-off two
weeks later.
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"FINAL" PREPARATIONS UNDER WAY FOR COMMUNIST CONFERENCE ll
The World Communist-Conference is scheduled to
open 5 June but some dissatisfaction with con-
ference documents is still evident.
POLAND PUSHES FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE
Warsaw sees any movement toward such a conference
as buttressing the status quo in Europe, and'. thus
in Poland's interest.
YUGOSLAVIA SEEKS SHIFT TOWARD WESTERN TRADE PRACTICES 13
Belgrade is seeking to improve the efficiency of
its less competitive industries by having more
of the country's foreign trade conducted in Con-
vertible currencies.
FACTIONAL STRUGGLE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA INTENSIFIES,
With an important party plenum opening this week,
Husak has been busy trying to win additional sup-
port both at home and abroad.
Middle East - Africa
LEFTIST MILITARY COUP IN SUDAN
The new leftist military cabal that seized power
in a bloodless coup on 25 May is still working
to consolidate its hold on the country.
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Western Hemisphere
THE CURRENT SITUATION IN PERU
The military government is reacting more harshly
to criticism
Governor Rocke-
e er as been advised no o come to Lima and
the removal of US military missions has been for-
mally requested.
ANTIGOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS CONTINUE IN ARGENTINA
Student riots and labor agitation are presenting
President Ongania with the worst civil disturbances
since he came to power three years ago.
STUDENT VIOLENCE SPREADS THROUGHOUT VENEZUELA
Violent student demonstrations spread throughout
Venezuela last week while Castroite guerrilla
groups sought to encourage student violence to
further their own ends.
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No new Communist initiatives are likely in Paris pending the meeting
between Presidents Nixon and Thieu on Midway on 8 June. Xuan Thuy,
chief of North Vietnam's delegation to the Paris talks, has returned to Hanoi
for consultations and will probably remain there until after Nixon and Thieu
confer.
Before he left Paris, Xuan Thuy hinted that Hanoi might approach US
proposals for mutual troop withdrawals through the kind of "understand-
ing" which broke the bombing impasse last year. Otherwise, the Communists
have not elaborated on the Front's new ten points to counter US proposals.
Many Communist military units in South Vietnam are now in a high
state of readiness, and another outbreak of county-wide attacks could come
at any time. A summer offensive featuring a series of shelling and sapper
attacks seems quite probable.
Moscow and Peking have been maneuvering for political advantage in
advance of the opening of the World Communist Conference in Moscow on 5
June. The Chinese have been trying to undercut the Soviets' image by
countering Soviet charges of Chinese aggressiveness with their own charges of
Soviet provocations along the Sino-Soviet border. The Chinese have also
tried to project an image of reasonableness by agreeing to talks with the
Soviets on border river navigation and border demarcation.
Meo leader Vang Pao is continuing his counteroffensive in the Plaine
des Jarres area of Laos despite the Communists' success in recapturing Xieng
Khouangville. Vang Pao's longer range plan is to try to press northward into
the Plaine itself. There are, however, continuing signs that additional North
Vietnamese reinforcements may be moving into the area.
The security situation in Malaysia improved considerably this week.
Re-establishment of any meaningful racial harmony will take some time,
however; many Chinese are now convinced that members of the Malay party
of the tri-party Alliance deliberately planned the disturbances that began on
13 May.
Deputy Prime Minister Razak has made it clear that the National
Operations Council will remain as the effective government for some time.
Malay leaders, who have concluded that Prime Minister Rahman must be
eased out, recognize that a future government that will ensure the primacy
of the Malays will, at the same time have to give enough voice to the
Chinese to gain their acquiescence.
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VIETNAM
The Vietnamese Communists
are still pondering how to re-
spond to President Nixon's peace
initiatives of 14 May. The
clearest sign of this is the cur-
rent trip to Hanoi by Xuan Thuy,
chief of the North Vietnamese
delegation at the Paris talks.
It comes soon after the North
Vietnamese had thrashed out their
basic strategy and laid out a
new negotiation position in the
Front's ten-point program of 8
May.
Xuan Thuy's return to Hanoi
probably is designed to work out
new diplomatic tactics in the
light of President Nixon's pro-
posals. He probably will stay
at least until after Presidents
Nixon and Thieu meet on 8 June.
In the meantime, the North
Vietnamese and Liberation Front
have been spelling out their ob-
jections to the new US proposals.
At the 22 May sessions of the
Paris talks, the Communists re-
jected US proposals for mutual
troop withdrawals but left an
impression that Hanoi might be
willing to tackle this issue
through the kind of "understand-
ing" which broke the impasse on
the bombing question last year.
The Liberation Front's Tran
Bui Kiem reinforced earlier im-
pressions that the main Communist
objection to allied proposals to
date is that they do not provide
adequate assurances for the sur-
vival of the Communist apparatus,
much less its ability to func-
tion as a legitimate political
entity. In particular, he re-
jected the idea of elections held
under the authority of the present
Saigon government.
Kiem repeated the proposition
in the Front's program that "neither
party shall impose its political
regime" on the South during an in-
terim period between a cease-fire
and general elections. He also
said that the Front: proposed a
"provisional coalition government"
for this period, but he left ample
room for bargaining on this issue.
Kiem did not say that the Front's
proposal was the only way to solve
the problem of interim political
authority, but he did insist. that
such a transitional period required
a "provisional ad:ntinistration."
The Military Situation
in the South
Many Communist units are in
a high state of readiness and an-
other outbreak of country-wide at-
tacks similar to those of 12-13
May could come at any time.
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9th Divisions do not pose an im-
mediate danger to the capital but
they remain active in countering
allied sweeps and in harassing
outposts. These forces could
strike hard at outlying bases and
towns at any time.
In Saigon, enemy activity
fell off sharply during the week,
The Threat by Area
Communist forces in the
northernmost provinces could
play a much greater role in a
summer campaign than they did
in the spring offensive in late
February and March. Elements
of the North Vietnamese 325th
Division and several independent
regiments have recently been more
active in the Demilitarized Zone
area. The impact that these
units can have on the situation
in I Corps was dramatized a week
ago by the heavy fighting on Ap
Bia Mountain in western Thua
Thien Province where the 29th
Regiment made a determined stand.
More heavy enemy action is also
anticipated in II Corps in the
coming weeks.
In the provinces around Sai-
gon, most enemy main force units
remain in much the same positions
that they have occupied since the
spring offensive tapered off in
late March. The 5th Division,
however, which shifted southward
out of War Zone "D" earlier this
month, continues to pose a serious
threat to Xuan Lac northeast of
Saigon. To the northwest of Sai-
gon, the Communist lst, 7th, and
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In the delta, Viet Cong in-
itiated actions were generally
light but the enemy lost heavily
in a number of clashes with US
and South Vietnamese troops. Re-
cent evidence indicates that the
Communists are introducing sub-
stantial numbers of North Vietnam-
ese troops into the delta for
the first time in the war. Viet
Cong defectors have been coming
over in record numbers in the
delta and the enemy has been
able to mount only a few signifi-
cant offensive operations in re-
cent months.
On 26 May the Communists an-
nounced that they would observe
a 48-hour cease-fire in honor of
Buddha's birthday beginning at
7 AM on 29 May. The South Viet-
namese Government announced some
time ago that allied forces would
cease offensive operations for
24 hours at 6 AM on 30 May.
The Saigon Political Scene
President Thieu's new Na-
tional Social Democratic Front
was successfully inaugurated at
a convention in Saigon on 25 May.
Thieu appeared in his role as
President of the Council of
Chairmen, along with the leaders
of the six parties which now
constitute the organization.
Thieu emphasized that the
new front was not intended to pro-
vide South Vietnam with a dicta-
torial, one-party system, but
rather to open the door to all
those who want to join the anti-
Communist fight'i. He said a way
would be found to associate so-
cial, religious and other groups
with the new group, although the
front itself would remain re-
stricted to political parties
that could qualify under a new
law now being considered by the
National Assembly. Thieu called
for those who wished to partici-
pate in the anti-Communist strug-
gle but who differed with the
policies of the new front to or-
ganize themselves.
The party laders finally
agreed with Thieu that no votes
would be taken by the organiza-
tion's ruling council unless re-
quested by Thieu,, and that deci-
sions would be made by a consen-
sus as interpreted by Thieu. Al-
though the politicians wanted a
formal share of national policy-
making authority,,'they finally
settled for an advisory role.
The National. Social Demo-
cratic Front still has a long
way to go. Six parties have
joined but it is not clear
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whether their leaders will swal-
low their disappointment over
not getting positions in the
cabinet immediately and give
their full support to the new
group. In addition, the front
still consists largely of north-
ern and central Vietnamese elements.
This could cause intensified re-
gional divisions unless more south-
ern-oriented groups are persauded
to join.
For his part, President Thieu
may see the new front as a vehicle
in which various political fac-
tions can acquire a feeling of
participation in the government
process. A hint of what Thieu
probably sees as the basic or-
ganizations for the struggle
against the Communists came in
his address at the front's con-
vention. He referred to "other
important anti-Communist elements"
such as the army, the civil serv-
ice, and the government adminis-
tration. He noted that the front
"will cooperate" with these forces
against the Communists.
Thieu's efforts to promote
unity among anti-Communist politi-
cal groups could be hampered by
the activities of Senator Tran
Van Don, who has recently adopted
an aggressively antigovernment
position. Don has criticized
Thieu's activities in forming
the new front, proclaiming that
the army--the only real force
in the nation--must be unifed
and that he, but not Thieu, can
accomplish that unification.
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LAOS: Current Situation
Government-held location
Communist-held location
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Government guerrillas
move against supply rout(
gKhayangvii
aiETitong Captured by enemy force
22-23 May
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COMMUNISTS COUNTER
GOVERNMENT OFFENSIVE IN LAOS
The Communists have suc-
ceeded in recapturing Xieng Khou-
angville, but Meo leader Vang
Pao continues to press his coun-
teroffensive in the Plaine des
Jarres area.
A multibattalion Pathet Lao
and North Vietnamese force took
over government positions on the
strategic high point of Phou Khe
on 22 May, and the following day
forced heavily outnumbered gov-
ernment troops to abandon Xieng
Khouangville. Government guer-
rilla teams have also pulled back
from positions along Route 4,
from which they had interdicted
Communist supply movements since
the government counteroffensive
got under way over a month ago.
Vang Pao, who has written
off Xieng Khouangville as inde-
fensible, hopes to muster about
four battalions to recapture Phou
Khe. If this operation suc-
ceeds, he evidently plans, with
Prime Minister Souvanna's en-
couragement, to press his offen-
sive northward into the Plaine
des Jarres itself. Government
troops are still holding posi-
tions they captured two weeks
ago on the southern edge of the
Plaine, and guerrillas with
strong US air support are now
moving against the Communist sup-
ply routes leading into the
Plaine.
Heavy casualties suffered
in the recent fighting, and con-
tinuing signs that additional
North Vietnamese reinforcements
may be moving into the area, sug-
gest that Vang Pao's plans may
be overly ambitious.
In south Laos, meanwhile,
the military situation has re-
mained quiet.
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NEW ROUND IN SING-SOVIET POLEMICS
As the 5 June date for the
opening of the Soviet-sponsored
Moscow conference of Communist
parties approaches, both the So-
viets and the Chinese are maneu-
vering for political advantage
by exploiting border issues. In
their efforts to obtain foreign
Communist support before the con-
ference, the Soviets are seeking
to contrast Peking's alleged pro-
vocative and reckless actions on
the f
rontier with Moscow's
statesmanlike willingness to ne-
gotiate border problems. The
Chinese Communists, on the other
hand, are attempting to
d
un
ercut
this approach by issuing counter-
allegations of Soviet provoca-
tions and by accepting a two-
month old Soviet proposal to re-
open talks on border demarcation.
In view of the propaganda
objectives of both sides, it is
unlikely that meaningful negotia-
tions will develop. In response
to Peking's message agreeing to
a meeting of the joint border
river navigation commission in
mid-June, the Soviets last week
proposed that this session con-
vene on 18 June. The last ses-
sion broke down in 1967 when Mos-
cow charged Peking with raising
broader territorial issues beyond
the competence of the commission.
Peking's acceptance of the
Soviet proposal of 29 March to
reopen border demarcation talks
was clearly timed to undermine
Soviet preparations for the Mos-
cow conference. The Soviet mes-
sage was contentiously worded and
obviously intended for propaganda
effect. Peking's reply is in the
same spirit, charging the Soviets
with complete responsibility for
the current dispute and challeng-
ing their sincerity in proposing
negotiations. It repeated the
long-standing Chinese demand that
Moscow recognize the treaties es-
tablishing the Current frontier
as "unequal treaties." Peking
certainly expects Moscow to re-
ject this condition because the
Soviets have consistently refused
to give the Chinese an opening
which would legitimize China's
claims to Soviet territory.
Meanwhile, both sides are
continuing propaganda exploita-
tion of tension along the border.
The "unofficial'? Soviet Radio
Peace and Progress; claimed last
week that since the Ussuri inci-
dents in March Chinese leaders
had ordered provocations along
other sect;
Some Communist Dart-i ec
uve
the Ussuri clashes and uMosc
owris
apparently trying to gain maximum
backing against Peking at this
time by claiming mew Chinese
provocations. Peking has replied
in kind. On 20 May the vice
chairman of the Sinkiang Regional
Revolutionary Committee stated
that the USSR has increased its
provocations against Sinkiang by
creating incidents along the
frontier after the armed clashes
last March.
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The USSR and China scheduled talks on river navigation problems
along their border, but the accompanying polemical outbursts leave in doubt
the prospect for serious negotiating efforts. Premier Kosygin, speaking in
Afghanistan at the beginning of the week, clearly kept the "Maoists" in the
front rank of world evils along with neocolonialism and imperialism. His visit
to Pakistan bears further witness to Moscow's concern for its relations with
its non-Communist Asian neighbors.
Representatives of more than 60 Communist parties met in Moscow
this week to prepare for the World Communist Conference set for 5 June.
There were signs that obstacles still remain.
Czechoslovak party leader Husak has been engaged in a hard fight to
retain control of the party as conservatives, led by Czech party bureau chief
supporters in key regional party posts have been replaced by Strougalites.
During the past two weeks Husak has held private talks with Hungary's
Kadar, Poland's Gomulka and East Germany's Ulbricht, apparently in an
effort to gain whatever backing and acceptance he can in order to strengthen
his hand before the plenum.
The Polish regime is putting new steam into its five-year-old effort to
bring about a European Security Conference and is now stressing the need
for flexibility and adequate preparation. The Poles believe any movement
toward a conference would buttress the status quo in Europe and thus be in
their interests. They have apparently fallen back to an earlier position and
now say all interested states, including the US and Canada, should attend the
conference.
French opinion polls in the presidential campaign continue to forecast a
plurality for Pompidou on the first ballot on 1 June and a majority for Poher
in the runoff on 15 June.
Before the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee recessed for a
month, a consensus developed in support of the US-USSR motion to invite
Japan and Mongolia to join the committee when it reconvenes on
July.
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No FIRST BALLOT DECISION EXPECTED IN FRENCH ELECTION
In the most generously
polled election campaign in French
history, all recent opinion sound-
ings agree on two essential points:
the election will not be decided
on the first ballot on Sunday,
1 June and Pompidou will win a
plurality on the first round,
only to be defeated by Poher in
the runoff on 15 June.
The Gaullists are hoping
that Poher has now "peaked," and
that he will run a poor enough
second on the first ballot to
make many of his present support-
ers reconsider their positions.
This analysis is not entirely
wishful thinking, judging from
a comparison of recent polls taken
by the reliable French Institute
of Public Opinion. They show
that Poher's first ballot strength
has fallen from 37 percent on 14
May to 27 percent in the latest
poll on 24-25 May, and that
I)efferre has only eight percent
with the Communist and other far-
left candidates holding an impres-
sive 22 percent. The polls also
reveal Pompidou's primary problem:
his support has hovered from the
beginning just over 40 percent.
Even so, if Poher does no
better than the latest poll indi-
cates the Pompidou camp may have
cause for optimism. Gaullists
will play on latent voter fears
by hammering away at the "victory-
through-Communist-support" theme
during the two weeks between bal-
lots. Pompidou supporters will
be hoping that'French voters, who
have a record of erratic electoral
behavior will make a last-minute
shift and put their man over the
top.
The Gaullists will also con-
tinue to raise the question of
most long-range significance for
the French political system: will
a Poher victory mean a return to
the ministerial instability of the
Fourth Republic. They will point
out that given 'the top-heavy Gaull-
ist majority in the National As-
sembly (almost 300 out of 487), a
Poher-selected cabinet would be
unable to govern and new legis-
lative elections would become in-
evitable.
Poher is countering this argu-
ment by saying that he has no in-
tention of calling new elections
unless the Gaullist party votes a
motion of censure, thus trying to
shift back onto the Gaullists the
burden for what would probably be
unpopular elections following a
year in which Frenchmen have al-
ready been called to the polls
three times. Poker has not made
his postelection plans clear.
He is probably thinking, however,
in terms of a broadly based coali-
tion cabinet that would be accept-
able to the many Gaullists who
would prefer cooperation with him
to risking their National Assembly
seats in new elections.
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"FINAL" PREPARATIONS UNDER WAY FOR COMMUNIST CONFERENCE
The World Communist Confer-
ence is scheduled to open on 5
June, but some dissatisfaction
with conference documents is still
evident. Debate in the prepara-
tory committee, which has been
meeting since 23 May, centers on
the draft of the main document in
its Soviet-approved formulation.
Four commissions reportedly will
deal with objections and amend-
ments to each section of the main
document.
TASS has named 63 parties
represented in Moscow.
The
Czechoslovak party paper pointed
out that the invasion of Czecho-
slovakia still influenced some
party viewpoints, although politi-
cal changes in Prague have reduced
opposition to Moscow on this point.
A preparatory meeting in March
had been unable to agree on the
wording or content of the main
draft--particularly those sections
dealing with "unity of action"
among Communist parties. This is
a shorthand term for Soviet domin-
ation of world Communism
Page 11
Even though the Soviets have
applied pressure and persuasion to
the Rumanian and Italian parties,
it is'probable that both parties
will maintain at least pro forma
objections. Rumanian party leader
Ceausescu will lead a delegation to
the conference with a "mandate" to
express Rumania's point of view and
to work for improvement of the con-
ference document. 25X1
news reports of com-
mittee proceedings agree that the
Italian party delegate demanded es-
sential changes in the document.
In addition to the four com-
missions working on the main docu-
ment, editorial commissions for the
documents on peace, Vietnam, and
the 100th anniversary of Lenin's
birth have been meeting. Certain
parties, especially the French and
Italians, previously objected to
an ideological formulation for the
Lenin document. The documents on
peace and Vietnam are unlikely to
arouse controversy. I
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POLAND PUSHES FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE
Since the Budapest appeal of
last March, Warsaw has put new ef-
fort behind its five-year-old ini-
tiative for a European Security
conference. The Poles are newly
aware that the issue faces tough
sledding, and are stressing the
need for flexibility and adequate
preparation. They believe that
any movement toward such a confer-
ence would buttress the status quo
in Europe, and therefore be in Po-
land's interest.
Polish Deputy Foreign Minis-
ter Winiewicz paid brief working
visits to the Hague and to Brus-
sels this week, and will report-
edly visit Vienna in early June.
Winiewicz had earlier told US of-
ficials in Warsaw that in each in-
stance he would solicit his hosts'
opinions on Poland views of the
European security proposals. He
appeared delighted at this first
trip into Western Europe since
the invasion of Czechoslovakia,
and hoped to resume the discus-
sions which he had started in past
years with the smaller NATO coun-
tries.
In a speech on 23 May, Pre-
mier Cyrankiewicz extolled the idea
of a European security conference
along now familiar lines, but
warned for the first time publicly
that it will not be convened soon.
This may have been the result of
frank discussions in Warsaw last
week with Finland's Foreign Min-
ister Karjalainen, whose govern-
ment had offered to host the con-
ference and play a role in its
preparation. Despite mutually
laudatory speeches, no communique
was issued at the end of Rarjala-
inen's visit, reportedly because
of a disagreement on the wording.
The Poles are said to have pro-
posed setting up a working group
composed of two NATO, two Warsaw
Pact, and two neutral states, one
of which would be Finland. The
Finns apparently considered this
premature.
Winiewi.C2: probably encoun-
tered the same cautious views in
Western Europe. Belgian offi-
cials, at least, reportedly were
not enthusiastic over the pros-
pect of his visit.
US and C radian participa-
tion in the p~oposed conference
is another stacking point. In
their original proposal in 1964,
the Poles envisaged US participa-
tion but later backed off in view
of the Soviet. ;position that the
conference should be limited to
European states. Last week, how-
ever, a Foreign Ministry offi-
cial, who worked both on the
Budapest Appeal and on party
chief Gomulka's recent speech
concerning a Polish dialogue with
West Germany, told US Embassy
officials that'the European se-
curity conference should be at-
tended by all interested states,
including the tS and Canada.
The Poles are clearly anx-
ious about Soviet views on this
and other related issues. For
example, they :reportedly pressed
Karjalainen for; details on the
recent talks in :Leningrad between
Finnish President Kekkonen and
Soviet Premier Kosygin, because
Moscow had not informed Warsaw
about them.
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YUGOSLAVIA SEEKS SHIFT TOWARD WESTERN TRADE PRACTICES
Belgrade is seeking to im-
prove the efficiency of its less
competitive industries by having
more of the country's foreign
trade conducted in convertible
currencies. Yugoslavia recently
notified the 23 trading partners
with which it has bilateral clear-
ing arrangements that it wishes
to replace the present barter
system with settlement in hard
currencies. The countries in-
volved include all seven of the
CEMA states
Details are not available,
but the proposal would mean a
complete switch to hard currency
trade for certain underdeveloped
countries. In the case of the
Communist countries, however,
Belgrade is not likely to risk
seriously disrupting trade with
this area by unilaterally insist-
ing on hard currency settlement.
As a first step toward abolishing
the barter system, Yugoslavia
probably would agree to a watered-
down arrangement in which clear-
ing balances were settled in hard
currency. Belgrade has proposed
this idea to CEMA in the past,
but only Czechoslovakia and Hun-
gary have reportedly agreed in
principle.
Trade under barter clearing
agreements, particularly with
Communist countries, has increas-
ingly conflicted with efforts to
make Yugoslav enterprises more
competitive on the world market.
Under the barter system, less
competitive enterprises are able
to unload low-quality products
because both trading partners
resist exchanging their better
goods, which can be sold else-
where for hard currency. Clear-
ing prices under the barter sys-
tem, moreover, often have been
set artificially high.
As the system presently op-
erates, Yugoslav exporters have
found a ready market for their
poor quality exports, while Yugo-
slav importers have been reluctant
to take many of the overpriced,
low quality goods offered in ex-
change. Belgrade therefore has
accumulated unwanted surpluses in
its clearing accounts with the
result that added controls had to
be imposed in order to reduce ex-
ports and to enforce fulfillment
of import quotas.
These problems have caused
Yugoslavia's clearing trade to
decline in recent years. Bel-
grade's share of trade with all
clearing partners in total Yugo-
slav trade has fallen from 45
percent in 1966 to 40 percent in
1968; trade with Communist coun-
tries has slipped from 34 percent
to 30 percent during the same
period. Belgrade appears willing
to permit further declines in the
share of this trade to derive the
longer term benefits of improved
international competitiveness of
Yugoslav enter rises.
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FACTIONAL STRUGGLE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA INTENSIFIES
Party first secretary Husak--
mindful of the threat posed by re-
gime conservatives--last week con-
centrated on gaining additional
support at home and abroad before
what promised to be a difficult
party central committee plenum
opened on 29 May.
The Husak leadership is por-
traying itself as the only alter-
native to a return to Stalinism.
It is also attempting to show it
can get along with Moscow. The
arrival in Prague last week of
Soviet Marshal Yakubovsky and
Deputy Premier Baybakov gave rise
to a spate of rumors, never de-
nied, that Husak might be able to
negotiate a partial withdrawal of
Russian troops and a substantial
loan from Moscow.
On the federal level, Husak's
supporters are attempting to re-
place former Dubcek appointees
with moderates who will back the
present leadership. The liberal
chief public prosecutor, Milos
Cerovsky, resigned under pressure
from the conservatives but was
replaced by Jan Fejes, a moderate
and well-respected Slovak jurist.
The conservatives, led by
pro-Soviet, Czech party bureau
chief Lubomir Strougal, have be-
come more open in their opposi-
tion to Husak. Strougal is try-
ing to form a power base in Bo-
hemia and Moravia. He has engi-
neered special elections at re-
gional party meetings by means of
which his followers have replaced
the incumbents who came to power
in 1968. Thus far, the party
committees in North and South
Moravia and in Central. and South
Bohemia, have been reshuffled and
the leaderships and the editorial
boards of publications in the
other four regions also have been
changed.
The conservatives have gained
ground on other fronts as well.
Federal Interior Minister Pelnar
has promised to rehabilitate
those security officials publicly
accused as "collaborators" in the
aftermath of the Soviet invasion
last August. This move could
greatly strengthen the position
of the hard liners who are trying
to wrest control of the interior
Ministry from the party leader-
ship. On 26 May, Prague radio
apologized to all "comrades in
public functions, central author-
ities and interior ministry of-
ficials" that it had accused of
treason on the basis of rumors
during the confused period after
the invasion.
Conservatives have gained
a strong hold on foreign policy
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planning as a result of hard liner
Pavel Auersperg being named as
chief of the party central com-
mittee's foreign affairs depart-
ment. This appointment means
that now the top three party of-
ficials responsible for interna-
tional relations are pro-Soviet
conservatives. A number of con-
servatives prominent under former
party boss Novotny are said to
be waiting in the wings for other
top posts in the party and gov-
ernment.
Although the conservatives
are not strong enough to challenge
Husak at the plenum, they prob-
ably are maneuvering to gain ad-
ditional high level posts. Husak,
on the other hand, probably will
seek to use the plenum to bring
more of his supporters into high
positions.
A confrontation could de-
velop. Significantly perhaps,
party secretary Vasil Bilak, a
Strougal conservative, returned
early this week from the Moscow
meeting preparing for the inter-
national Communist conference.
He will undoubtedly lend strength
to the conservative representa-
tion at the plenum.
Husak has attempted to cre-
ate the impression of a growing
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Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY
rapprochement with other East
European leaders. Following up
his recent visit to Budapest, Hu-
sak went alone to Warsaw on 24 May
for talks with Polish party boss
Gomulka and also by himself to
East Germany to see Walter Ulbricht.
While Husak probably got nowhere
with Ulbricht, there are signs
that the Poles at least might be
willing to give Husak a chance
to prove he can "normalize" the
situation in Czechoslovakia.
The Soviets, however, have
denied Husak full public support.
A source of the US Embassy in
Prague, who is a specialist in
intra-bloc affairs, believes that
the Soviets are playing cat and
mouse with Husak, forcing him
to fulfill their demands while
dangling possible concessions,
such as a partial troop with-
drawal and/or a substantial
loan to bolster Czechoslovakia's
sagging economy. The same source
also suggested that the Rus-
sians may remember their one-
time opposition to Gomulka,
which proved to be a mistake, and
may now be willing to wait and
see if Husak, whose background is
strikingly similar to Gomulka's,
is in fact cut from the same cloth.
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
The leftist military cabal that seized power in Sudan on 25 May is still
attempting to consolidate its hold on the country. The top three members of
the ten-man Revolutionary Command Council that now heads the govern-
ment have close Communist or Egyptian associations, and 12 of the 21
members of the new cabinet are known or suspected members of the
Sudanese Communist Party. Principal opposition to the new regime is
provided by the conservative Umma Party.
The normally quiet Syrian-Israeli cease-fire line was the scene of an
extended exchange of gunfire on 27 May, but both the Suez Canal and the
Jordanian-Israeli border were relatively quiet. Although small-arms firing
continues, the heavy artillery duels of the last few weeks along the canal
have ceased, at least temporarily. Lebanon remains without a cabinet;
fedayeen activity within the country once again appears to be on the
upswing.
Nigerian military targets have come under attack by Biafra's one or two
newly acquired airplanes, apparently small, single-engined propellor craft.
The secessionist air raids, although of little military significance, have in-
creased pressure on the federal government to attack all aircraft flying into
Biafra, including relief planes.
Turkey's short-lived crisis last week has left political circles somewhat
stunned, but the imminence of national elections in October should spur the
politicians to get campaigning under way in the near future. Meanwhile, the
major US air base at Incirlik is virtually closed down as labor and manage-
ment remain at odds over final details of a strike settlement.
A Moroccan military mission will go to Moscow in July to "test the
atmosphere." Over the past few years, the Western-oriented King has been
expanding relations with the USS
Ceylon's Prime Minister Senanayake is increasingly concerned over
minority
d'
l
i
h
s
s
an
e
possible outbreaks of communal violence between t
Tamils and the majority Sinhalese. Ceylon has experienced encouraging
economic growth in the past two years, but a revival of communal disturb-
ances could set back this progress and result in a loss of government support
in elections to be held within the next year.
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LEFTIST MILITARY COUP IN SUDAN
The leftist military cabal
that seized power in a bloodless
coup on 25 May is still attempt-
ting to consolidate its hold on
the country.
The primary source of au-
thority in the new regime is the
ten-member Revolutionary Command
Council headed by Colonel (now
Major General) Jafar Muhammad
Numayri, who has had Communist
connections. The only civilian
on the council is the new prime
minister, Babikar Awadallah, who
has had close Communist and Egyp-
tian associations. Another mem-
ber of the council
is major Faruk
Ethman Hamadnallah, who holds the
key post of minister of interior.
The other council members are ob-
scure field-grade army officers
whose political orientation is
as yet unknown.
Twelve of the 21 members of
the new cabinet are suspected or
known members of the Sudanese
Communist Party. Seven of the
12 are either present or former
members of the party central com-
mittee. The other members of the
cabinet belong to the leftist,
urban-based Democratic Unionist
Party, and some are known to be
agents of the Egyptian intelli-
gence service.
The principal opposition to
the new regime is provided by mem-
bers of the conservative Umma
Party. The estimated two million
members of the Ansar religious
sect, who constitute the major
support of the party, have in the
past been a major obstacle to 25X1
leftist ambitions. An estimated
30-40 percent of the armed forces
are Ansars.
All of the officers ap-
pointed to key commands in the
army following the coup are re-
portedly pro-West political mod-
erates. These officers may have
been appointed, only to reassure
the army that a radical purge was
not about to occur; they may be
gradually transferred and re-
placed by more radical officers.
Prime Minister Awadallah,
speaking to the foreign repre-
sentatives in Khartoum, attempted
to portray the new regime as non-
aligned and socialist. He stated
that the chief foreign policy
theme of the new government will
be "Arabism," with full support
for the Palestinian cause. Al-
though Awadallah reportedly re-
assured Western ambassadors that
the new government has not moved
into the Communist camp, he has
also said that the government
would establish closer relations
with the Soviet bloc, and on 27
May announced a decision to es-
tablish diplomatic relations with
East Germany.
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Student demonstrations and disorders continue at a high pitch in
several Latin American countries, and are threatening to mar the second of
Governor Rockefeller's four fact-finding trips.
Student protests in Bogota and several other Colombian cities in ad-
vance of the governor's arrival on 27 May caused the Lleras government to
impose tight security measures throughout the country during the two-day
visit. Demonstrations are also likely in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela.
Venezuelan universities and secondary schools have been plagued with
unrest since March, as competition for control of the student movement has
stimulated increasingly stronger antigovernment action. Violence is spread-
ing, and it has taken on more of an anti-US cast as the Rockefeller visit
approaches.
In Argentina, student disturbances have presented President Ongania
with the worst civil unrest since he came to power three years ago. Leftist
extremist students have succeeded in turning riots in most major cities into
broader antigovernment protests, and have attracted some labor support.
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THE CURRENT SITUATION IN PERIJI
Peru's military government
has formalized its request that the
US withdraw its military missions
following official confirmation
that US Government sales of mili-
tary equipment had been suspended
according to US law as a result
of Peruvian seizures of US fish-
ing boats. It also made clear
that Governor Rockefeller would
not be welcome in Lima during his
current visit to South America.
Augusto Zimmerman, who has
been one of Velasco's closest ad-
visers but whose influence now
may be on the decline, recently
told the US Embassy that the gov-
ernment's harsh reaction to the
suspension of military sales was
intended as a signal to the US
not to invoke more severe sanc-
tions. He said, however, that
for now the Peruvian response
would go no further than the can-
cellation of the Rockefeller visit
and requesting the withdrawal of
US military missions.
Foreign Minister Mercado told
the US ambassador that he was
deeply concerned over the continu-
ing deterioration of US-Peruvian
relations, but that he saw no pos-
sibility of improvement soon. He
expressed interest, however, in
the ambassador's suggestion that
a small number of military advis-
ers remain in Peru as part of the
US Embassy and said that he would
advocate this at the next cabinet
meeting.
Further complicating rela-
tions between the two countries
is the continued impasse in ne-
gotiations over the expropriation
of the International Petroleum
Company (IPC).
The military government is
also having its problems at home.
The recent deportation of a maga-
zine editor beoause he published
articles critical of the govern-
ment has stirrod additional criti-
cism from the press and various
civilian political leaders. Even
Alberto Ruiz Eldredge, the presi-
dent's closest. ,civilian adviser,
has denounced the deportation and
may be preparing to represent the
editor in the Peruvian courts in
an effort to reverse the action.
The true motives behind this op-
portunist's denouncement of an ac-
tion that almost surely had the
president's approval are not yet
clear, although', it could indicate
that some shake-up is coming soon
in the top echelons of the govern-
ment.
The military government's re-
action to press 'criticism, which
in most cases has been mild and
coupled with statements of support
on other issues,, is becoming in-
creasingly harsh
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ANTIGOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS CONTINUE IN ARGENTINA
Student riots during the
last two weeks have presented
President Ongania with the worst
civil disturbances since he came
to power three years ago.
The disorders began on 15
May when police shot and killed
a student in Corrientes during
an attempt to disperse a meet-
ing protesting an increase of
food prices at the national uni-
versity. The death touched off
protest demonstrations in most
major cities and resulted in at
least three other deaths. The
majority of universities were
closed, and the country's second
largest city, Rosario, was placed
under military rule.
Leftist extremist student
leaders have been successful in
turning the riots into broader
antigovernment protests and in
attracting some labor support.
Workers have staged sporadic sym-
pathy strikes since 15 May and
some unions plan a 24-hour nation-
wide strike on 30 May.
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The government is continuing
to take a hard line. Demonstra-
tors have been warned that they
can be imprisoned for up to 15
years and that the death penalty--
although it does not exist under
Argentine civil law--can be invoked
against anyone who kills a police-
man or a soldier. These measures
have dimmed the enthusiasm of
many students, but extremist
leaders are determined to keep
the pot boiling and more trouble
is expected.
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STUDENT VIOLENCE SPREADS THROUGHOUT VENEZUELA
Violent student demonstra-
tions spread throughout Venezuela
last week, growing out of the
"academic renovation" movement
that has caused unrest in the
universities and secondary schools
since March.
Competition for control of
the student movement has pushed
student leaders into ever stronger
antigovernment action. At the
same time Castroite guerrilla
groups have sought to encourage
student violence: to further their
own ends.
As the time for Governor
Rockefeller's visit approaches,
the violence has taken on more
of an anti-US cast as students
use the visit to widen their ap-
peal. Even the youth wing of
President Caldera's Social Chris-
tian party has announced that it
will hold peaceful demonstrations
to protest the governor's arrival.
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