WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007100060001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 13, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed.
Secret
4.
13 June 1969
No. 0374/69
RIJ N T9 Mil-"
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VIETNAM
The "provisional revolutionary government" announced
by the Communists on 10 June does not contain any
new personalities or other assets to justify its
claims to political power in South Vietnam. Presi-
dent Thieu moved quickly at a news conference in
Saigon after the Midway meeting to calm any fears
his countrymen might have that the US is initiating
a precipitous pullout. Thieu also continued to
rule out any coalition government.
PEKING GIVES INCREASED ATTENTION TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The return of Chinese ambassadors abroad, the resump-
tion of more conventional diplomatic behavior in Pe-
king, and the recent propaganda exploitation of Mos-
cow's difficulties within the Communist movement all
suggest that Peking may at last be ready for a more
outgoing and effective foreign approach.
COMMUNIST CHINA'S SPRING TRADE FAIR A FAILURE
This year's spring trade fair in Canton failed to
measure up to past performances and did little to im-
prove Communist China's foreign trade prospects in
1969.
Page
1
MALAYSIA REMAINS QUIET BUT TENSE
Despite a sharp reduction in racial incidents in the
past two weeks, tension remains high, especially in
the Kuala Lumpur area, and the possibility of further
outbreaks cannot be discounted.
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Europe
DIFFERENCES AIRED AT WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE
Brezhnev's charges against Communist China have
been endorsed by the majority of speakers, but dis-
sident parties are still challenging Soviet posi-
tions.
SOVIET DISSIDENTS DEFY REPRESSIVE POLICY
They have revived their public protests at a time
when they can cause maximum embarrassment to offi-
cials hosting the international Communist conference.
POMPIDOU MAKES MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENT
With the polls showing a wide margin in his favor,
former prime minister Pompidou appears confident of
victory and is already speaking like an elected head
of state.
CZECHOSLOVAK FACTIONAL ALLIANCE SPEEDS NORMALIZATION
The Czechoslovaks have fulfilled virtually all Sov-
iet demands for normalization, but the coalition
shaping the policies is unstable, and factional'
maneuvering may precipitate another crisis.
EAST GERMANY SUCCEEDING IN "RECOGNITION" CAMPAIGN
Syria is the fourth non-Communist state to recognize
East Germany
SOVIETS DISPLAY ONLY ONE NEW AIRCRAFT AT PARIS
A tri-jet passenger transport similar to the Boeing
727 was the only new aircraft in the Soviet exhibit
at the Paris Air Show.
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THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 19
SUDAN'S NEW REGIME ASSUMES "BUSINESS AS USUAL" STANCE
The new government in Khartoum, busy soliciting
diplomatic and military aid abroad, seems secure
for the moment as opposition elements remain in
disarray.
CONGO (KINSHASA) ARMY DEVELOPS BAD CASE OF NERVES
Events of the past several weeks coupled with tradi-
tional nervousness at this time of year have pro-
duced increased tensions within the Congo Army.
INDIA FACES NEW ROUND OF AGITATION FOR SEPARATE STATES 23
New Delhi may face a new threat.of fragmentation
within India's states as a result of five months
of agitation demanding separate statehood for the
Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh.
Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 25
ECUADOREAN OPPOSITION MOUNTING EFFORTS AGAINST VELASCO 26
Confidence in the Ecuadorean Government is eroding
and the perennial enemies of President Velasco are
working from all sides toward his overthrow.
CAMPAIGNING BEGINS IN SURINAM AMID LABOR UNREST
All party leaders are campaigning for elections,
although no date has been set, and a leftist labor
organizer is fomenting successful strikes.
POLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES AND SOCIAL UNREST IN URUGUAY
President Pacheco has suffered a major congressional
defeat over his policy of economic austerity, and
growing popular discontent makes him vulnerable to
further setbacks.
TERRORISM ON THE RISE IN BRAZIL
Terrorism is a growing worry for the Brazilian Gov-
ernment
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HARD LINERS MAINTAIN UPPER HAND IN PERU
Disagreements on how to deal with Peru's growing
economic and political problems are causing in-
creasing frictions within the military government.
PANAMANIAN MILITARY SEEKS TO CONTROL PROPAGANDA CHANNELS 31
The military government is attempting to bolster
support of its policies by acquiring control of
some privately held communication facilities.
HAITI SURVIVES EXILE INVASION SCARE
Haiti is calm following the abortive "bombing" raid
on Port-au-Prince on 4 June but the government re-
mains vigilant.
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The formation of a new "Provisional Revolutionary Government of
South Vietnam" appears to be aimed primarily at upgrading the National
Liberation Front to a position of formal equality with the Saigon govern-
ment. The Communists presumably believe this move will facilitate their
efforts to isolate and discredit the Thieu government and to promote their
scheme for creating a provisional coalition government as the first step
toward a political settlement. The "program of action" issued by the
provisional government offered to begin talks with other "political forces" in
the South with a view to setting up a coalition government.
The leading positions in the new revolutionary government have been
filled by veteran, hard-core Communists, reflecting a failure to attract any
figures with genuine appeal to non-Communist opponents of the Saigon
regime.
Although the Communists probably hoped the announcement of the
new "government" would draw a violent reaction from President Thieu,
possibly including a refusal to continue the Paris talks, he instead ridiculed
the new government and declared that it would have no effect on the
negotiations. Thieu indicated that Saigon would continue to regard the talks
as two-sided negotiations, even though "some people on the other side have
changed their names."
Immediately after his return from the Midway conference, Thieu reas-
sured his countrymen that the US is not initiating a precipitous withdrawal
of troops. He warned his critics that loose talk about US withdrawals or
advocacy of a coalition government would be severely punished.
The Chinese Communists apparently are now ready for a more outgoing
and effective foreign approach. disruptions in the
Foreign Ministry caused by the Culture Revolution nave all but ended and
that most sections are now better organized and functioning more effec-
tively.
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VIETNAM
"provisional Communists announced a
new provisional revolutionary
government" on 10 June to rein-
force their claims to political
power in South Vietnam. In do-
ing so, they did not produce any
new personalities or other assets
to justify these claims. Commu-
nist broadcasts have simply de-
scribed a series of organizational
meetings in which a "representa-
tive assembly" of leftists rubber-
stamped a slate of officials drawn
from leaders of the two Communist
fronts (the Liberation Front and
the Alliance).
The main personalities named
to the provisional government in-
clude the hard core of the Commu-
nist professionals who were in
the Front. Many of the hangers-
on who have been the nominal lead-
ers in the two front organizations
were relegated to an "advisory
council." Their lack of real power
is more obvious than ever.
The decision to form a "gov-
ernment," although not specifically
forecast in earlier Viet Cong pro-
nouncements, is in line with other
elements in Hanoi's emerging strat-
egy for moving toward a political
settlement of the war. The pro-
visional government probably sprang
from policy meetings in Hanoi in
March and April when the leader-
ship mapped out several new po-
litical moves. The first of these
came on 8 May when the Front an-
nounced its new ten-point pro-
gram.
The provisional government
poses a new kind of challenge
to the South Vietnamese Govern-
Page 2
ment and for a'time the Commu-
nists probablyjwill use it mainly
in an attempt to pressure Saigon
and to isolate: the Thieu govern-
ment. The formation of the gov-
ernment does not, however, close
out any Communist options at this
stage. The provisional govern-
ment could be used to negotiate
with other leftist political
groups for the,,"provisional coali-
tion" called for in the ten points
or it could eventually offer to
bargain with the Saigon govern-
ment. It could also be used as
a device to assert control over
territory and ;people in a period
between a cease!-fire and new gen-
eral elections.!
The Communists lost no time
in injecting their government
into the Paris negotiations. The
Front delegation to the talks was
immediately redesignated as the
Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment delegation and some members
of the Front team were called
home to serve i the new body.
The Front's Mad me Binh, with the
new title of "f` reign minister"
of the provisional government,
was left in charge in Paris.
Foreign re:oognition of the
new "government." has already be-
gun as a result!of groundwork
the Communists have been laying
recently. On 11 June, Algeria
became the first! to announce such
recognition and !,a number of Com-
munist countries probably will
recognize the provisional govern-
ment shortly.
Development
s+in Saigon.
President Th:ieu has taken the
announcement of the Communists'
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"government" in stride. He
quickly dismissed it as another
Communist ploy aimed at destroy-
ing his government, Thieu pointed
out that the leaders of the new
"government" are all "familiar
faces" from the Communist camp
and said the development would
not affect the Paris talks, which
would remain two-sided as before.
Following the midway meeting,
Thieu moved quickly to calm any
fears his countrymen might have
that the US is initiating a
precipitous pullout. He also
warned his critics that loose
talk about US troop withdrawals
or the advocacy of a coalition
government would be severely
punished. Thieu told a news
conference in Saigon that he
had proposed the replacement of
25,000 US troops because South
Vietnamese forces were capable
of taking over a larger share of
the fighting.
Although emphasizing that
in relation to arranging elec-
tions, "everything is negotiable,"
Thieu ruled out a coalition gov-
ernment. He promised harsh con-
sequences to anyone, even mem-
bers of the administration or the
legislature, who advocates such
a proposition. He also specified
that the timing and form of pos-
sible future extraconstitutional
elections were not even discussed
with President Nixon, on the
grounds that elections are a mat-
ter for the South Vietnamese to
decide.
Thieu's strong warning against
misinterpreting the Midway meet-
ing probably tempered criticism
in South Vietnam of the results
of the meeting. Public reaction
so far generally has been one of
calm acceptance. Several promi-
nent members of the National As-
sembly have expressed confidence
that South Vietnamese forces can
replace US troops and indicated
that they believe the decision to
send some US forces home will be
well received by the American
public.
The Military Situation
Communist forces launched
their so-called "June Action
Phase" during the night of 5-6
June. They shelled some 100
towns and military bases and at-
tacked several allied positions
with infantry and sapper units.
Following three days of stepped-
up activity, the pace of attacks
fell off to a moderate level
early this week. By midweek,
only widely scattered and spo-
radic enemy-initiated action had
occurred. Abundant evidence sug-
gests, however, that another
"highpoint" is likely to come
soon.
The latest phase of the
enemy's "summer" campaign was
less intense than the upsurge of
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WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Demilitarized Zone
.4 W$IB In
Pakse
Lon
KIK~
UONG\ 1~ ?tINH
% ravane
LAOS
'Loc rinh
`San Me
Thuot
AVEFAGESTRENGTH
OF' NEMY UNITS
%,C NVA
Battalion 20p-400 300-500
Regiment 1, 00.1 500 1,200-2,000
Division 5, 00-7,000 5,000.8,000
THAILAND
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Communist attacks in mid-May,
but it followed a similar pattern.
There were over 325 shellings
and ground attacks during 6-8
June compared with more than
400-enemy attacks on 12-13 May.
The Communists this time placed
more emphasis on striking South
Vietnamese military units. Cas-
ualty figures for the latest
three-day flare-up show that
some 300 South Vietnamese and
111 US troops were killed. Dur-
ing the same period more than
2,650 of the enemy were killed.
Most enemy ground action
during 6-8 June was focused in
northwestern III Corps. The
largest enemy effort took place
in Tay Ninh Province where a
regiment of the Communist 9th
Division lost almost 400 troops
in an abortive attempt to over-
run a well-defended US artillery
base.
Last weekend the Communists
also made short-duration penetra-
tions into the provincial capi-
tals of Tay Ninh and Quang Ngai
and shelled Kontum and Vinh Long
cities. These attacks accounted
for at least 37 civilians killed
and more than 150 wounded.
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Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY
There are fresh signs of
impending enemy attacks in a
number of areas.
/ Major ele-
ments of the Communist 1st, 7th,
and 9th divisions are holding po-
sitions in northwestern III Corps
while the 5th Division is deployed
to the east of Saigon where it
threatens the capital of Long
Khanh Province as well as allied
military installations in adjacent
Bien Hoa Province.
The major cities of Saigon,
Da Nang, and Hue are not imme-
diately threatened by major Com-
munist main force combat units,
but rocket sapper, and terrorist
attacks could accompany the next
round of enemy offensive activity.
By exploiting a number of
varied battlefield tactics, most
Communist forces have the capac-
ity to continue to mount substan-
tial--and in some cases prolonged--
attacks against allied forces and
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PEKING GIVES INCREASED ATTENTION TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Peking is quickening the pace
of its diplomatic activity in the
aftermath of the ninth party con-
gress. The return of Chinese am-
bassadors abroad, the resumption
of more conventional diplomatic
behavior in Peking, and the recent
sophisticated and well-timed prop-
aganda exploitation of Moscow's
difficulties within the Communist
movement all suggest that the
Chinese may at last be ready for
a more outgoing and effective for-
eign approach.
In the past month, Peking has
begun to return ambassadors to
states that remained on relatively
good terms with China during the
Cultural Revolution. The Chinese
have already filled posts in Al-
bania, France, North Vietnam, Pak-
istan and Cambodia. Ambassadors
were recalled for political rein-
doctrination in early 1967 and
only the ambassador in Cairo re-
mained at his post.
All the newly appointed en-
voys are senior diplomatic per-
sonnel with wide experience abroad
--an indication that the Foreign
Ministry is once more on a firm
professional footin
ruption cause by the Cultural
Revolution within the ministry has
all but ended and that most sec-
tions are now functioning more ef-
ficiently.
Other recent signs also point
to renewed interest in foreign af-
fairs and the improvement of Pe-
king's internationl image. During
May Day ceremonies'in Peking, Chair-
man Mao and Vice (airman Lin Piao
greeted eight new foreign ambassa-
dors to China--the first such high-
level diplomatic reception in sev-
eral years. More recently, re-
strictions on foreign diplomatic
travel in China reportedly were re-
scinded, and the foreign diplomatic
tour of China, canceled for the past
two years, is expected to take place
this fall. This normalization of
Chinese treatment of diplomats in
Peking is expected to be accompa-
nied by a more active diplomatic
posture abroad. Last week Chinese
representatives a,tt.ended Indian re-
ceptions in Afgha.ristan and Nepal
for the first time in several years.
Peking's concerted effort to
play on Moscow's current difficul-
ties within the Communist movement
reflects a more attentive and pro-
fessional approach to foreign af-
fairs. During the past week Peking
has publicly alleged a Soviet nu-
clear buildup along the Sino-Soviet
frontier, detailed a series of
"continuing" Sov:ilet provocations
along the border,' and agreed to
hold a border river navigation
meeting with the !Russians on 18
June--actions clearly timed to un-
dercut Moscow's anti-Chinese posi-
tion at its world communist con-
ference.
Such exploitation of border
issues always has been the major
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element of China's effort, in the
aftermath of Czechoslovakia, to
portray the USSR as an aggressive
and unreliable ally. Peking,
moreover, is missing few other
opportunities to turn the disaf-
fection of other Communist nations
with Moscow to its own advantage.
The Chinese recently sent National
Day greetings to Czechoslovakia
for the first time in three years
and followed by reprinting an Al-
banian editorial which voiced
strong support for Romania's in-
COMMUNIST CHINA'S SPRING TRADE FAIR A FAILURE
This year's spring trade fair
in Canton failed to measure up to
past performances and did little
to improve Communist China's for-
eign trade prospects in 1969.
Contracts concluded at the fair
reportedly were well below the
levels reached at both the spring
and fall fairs of 1968.
the quantities
of almost all the Chinese tex-
tiles, foods, and other agricul-
tural products usually sold at
the Canton fairs were inadequate
to meet foreign demand. Fewer
Chinese goods were offered for
export than in the past, while
the free world demand for certain
Chinese goods had increased; some
items in scarce supply were re-
portedly priced as much as 60
percent higher than at last fall's
fair. The Chinese, moreover, in-
sisted on stricter payment terms
than previously.
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dependent stand against Moscow.
In an obvious move to embarrass
the Russians, Peking arranged to
have a Chinese trade delegation
visit Romania, Czechoslovakia and
Poland during the Moscow conference.
According to Romanian press reports,
the Chinese delegation was received
"in a cordial atmosphere" by Ro-
manian Premier Maurer on 6 June--
the date of the first full session
of the Communist meeting.
Chinese doubts about the
stability of certain Western cur-
rencies also contributed to the
poor showing of the month-long
fair. At times the Chinese re-
stricted the use of both the French
franc and the British pound, de-
laying contract negotiations and
frustrating traders. Negotiations
also were disrupted by the clos-
ing of the ninth party congress
in Peking, which interrupted dis-
cussions for several days.
China purchased only a small
amount of free world goods during
the fair. Contracts for machinery
and equipment continued to be re-
stricted, and purchases of steel
dropped sharply from the level of
last fall's fair. Peking did,
however, sign agreements for large
amounts of chemicals.
Trade deals concluded with
Japan, China's leading trade
partner, were especially low.
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Sino-Japanese contracts reportedly
amounted to only $70 million, al-
most 50 percent below the level
signed at each of last year's
fairs. Negotiations during the
fair, however, subsequently led
to Japanese sales of almost $40
million of steel.
in addition to the purchase
of Japanese steel, the only siz-
able contracts signed by China
this year have been for roughly
4..5 million tons of Western
wheat--an amount slightly more
than last year. China currently
is negotiating contracts for fer-
tilizers with its major suppliers
in Japan. Total Chinese fertilizer
purchases 'from Japan and Western
Europe will probably fall below
last year's purchase of about
$265 million.
China'''s trade in 1968 con-
tinued to decline, falling to
about $3.6 billion, or approxi-
mately terLipercent below the level
of 1967. ' he failure to conclude
any major contracts at the fair
will not help China's trade pros-
pects thisyear
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MALAYSIA REMAINS QUIET BUT TENSE
Despite a sharp reduction in resulted in a rise in tensions in
racial incidents in the past two the neighboring Malaysian state
of Johore, which up to now has
weeks, tension remains high, es- been peaceful.
pecially in the Kuala Lumpur area, P
and the possibility of further
outbreaks cannot be discounted.
Incidents have been noted
for the first time in Sarawak
state, in East Malaysia. These
incidents, consisting of three
cases of arson in the capital city
of Kuching on 6 June were appar-
ently Communist-instigated and
aimed at stirring up racial dis-
cord. Although the situation in
Sarawak is potentially inflamma-
ble there have been as yet no signs
of significant trouble. In addi-
tion, the recent flurry of inci-
dents in Singapore, where the sit-
uation now appears to have re-
turned to normal, has reportedly
Meanwhile, key figures in
the Malay-dominated emergency
government are beginning to talk
about resuming some political dia-
logue with Chinese opposition ele-
ments within the fairly near fu-
ture. These leaders now concede
that their earlier charges that
external and domestic Communist
support was responsible for the
success of the opposition Chinese
parties in the election on 10 May,
as well as for the subsequent ra-
cial violence, were overdrawn,
and that Malay "hotheads" were
responsible for some of the worst
excesses.
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The government's effort so far to
encourage the restoration of ra-
cial harmony on the local level
has been directed primarily
through nonparty multiracial
"goodwill" committees. The de-
gree of success of these commit-
tees is highly problematical be-
cause they presumably exclude the
more significant local political
leaders.
Influential chauvinistic ele-
ments within the emergency admin-
istration and t:he Malay component
of the government's tri-party Al-
liance coalition will continue
to make difficult. any progress
toward meaningful cooperation with
the Chinese opposition elements.
Moreover, the National Operations
Council will necessarily have to
keep in mind the, Pan Malayan Is-
lamic Party, the' racist opposition
group which made; large inroads
among the Malay Population in the
May elections.
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The subject of China was much on Soviet minds this week. Speaking at
the international Communist conference, Brezhnev accused Peking of split-
ting the Communist movement and planning to wage conventional and even
nuclear war against the USSR.
Brezhnev also described Soviet policy in other areas. He endorsed the
principle of peaceful coexistence-apart from ideological struggle-and the
settlement of international problems at the negotiating table. He also reas-
serted Russia's readiness to seek negotiated limitations on strategic arma-
ments.
The controversies at the conference in Moscow over China and the
invasion of Czechoslovakia have led to a greater polarization of views and
open criticism among the Eastern European parties. Each Eastern European
party leader addressed these issues in terms of national interest and clearly
felt himself caught between conflicting interests-maintaining his position at
home and maintaining his relationships with the Soviets.
At one extreme, Ceausescu insisted on Romania's right to dissent and
to independence from Moscow, and hinted he might not be able to sign the
final document. At the other extreme, Czechoslovakia's Husak was unable to
reply adequately to the criticism of the invasion last August without alien-
ating further his population or ceding more of his shaky sovereignty to
Moscow.
At home, Husak has pretty well met Russian requirements for "normal-
ization." Party control has been reasserted, internal calm re-established and
the outspoken elements of the mass media silenced. Significant steps have
also been taken to improve relations with Czechoslovakia's Eastern European
neighbors.
The French polls give Pompidou a wide margin over Poher in the
run-off presidential election on 15 June. Pompidou's statements on foreign
policy show considerable affinity with De Gaulle's policies, but with a new
element of flexibility.
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DIFFERENCES AIRED AT WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE
Soviet Party Chief Brezhnev's
speech of 7 June placed Moscow's
anger with China clearly on the
conference record. His charges
have been endorsed by the majority
of speakers at the conference and,
by opening the floodgates of crit-
icism of China, he has overshad-
owed criticism of Soviet behavior
in Czechoslovakia. Dissident par-
ties continue to challenge Soviet
positions, however, and they have
had considerable success in draw-
ing attention to their arguments
even in the Soviet press.
Even before Brezhnev's speech
the Paraguayan party opened the
China issue. Romania's party chief
Ceausescu admonished delegates not
to condemn parties present or not
present. The Australian repre-
sentative leveled a thinly dis-
guised rebuke to the Soviet Union
over the invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia and declared he would not
sign. the conference document as
it stood.
In Romania's formal presenta-
tion on 9 June, Ceausescu cited
several negative aspects of the
conference and insisted on every
party's right to be independent.
He said that his delegation, after
consulting the Romanian central
committee, elected to remain at
the conference "to make an active
contribution to the positive course
of its work," but hinted that he
might not be able to sign the final
document. According to Western
press reports, the Norwegian, Swiss
and Spanish parties are also balk-
ing at signing the main document.
The Italian party representa-
tive, speaking on the morning of 11
June when Czechoslovak party chief
Husak was chairing the session,
criticized the Warsaw Five's in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia and said
his delegation was not willing to
sign the conference document in its
present form. He was also critical
of anti-Chinese pronouncements on
the conference floor and urged the
need for China's support against
imperialism. Later in the day,
Husak spoke and in effect rebuked
other party chiefs who condemned
the invasion.
The conference mustered its
only display of unity thus far by
adopting a resolution of support
to the Arab peoples in the Middle
East, and by issuing a "call" for
a just settlement of the Vietnam-
ese problem.
After a week marked by the ex-
pression of divergent views in sep-
arate speeches, the conference now
turns to the difficult matter of
formulating the final document.
Reportedly, much work still remains
to be done on the wording of the
document and no decision has been
reached as to whether delegations
must approve it in'toto or will be
allowed to approve separate sec-
tions. This task may draw out the
conference for another two weeks.
Unless Moscow forces the inclusion
of controversial formulations on
China, however, nearly all parties
appear likely to sign.
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SOVIET DISSIDENTS DEFY REPRESSIVE POLICY
Soviet dissidents have re-
newed their public protests at a
time when they can cause maximum
embarrassment to officials hosting
the international Communist con-
ference in Moscow. The revived
protest activity makes it evident
that the leadership's policy of
selective repression to quell
open dissent has failed.
Dissident groups have ad-
dressed two petitions to confer-
ence delegations. Historian Petr
Yakir and nine others appealed to
the delegates to work against "the
rebirth of Stalinist methods" in
the USSR, a process they identi-
fied with the period since Khru-
shchev's fall and with the invasion
of Czechoslovakia. They decried
the use of harassment, dismissal
from jobs, confinement to psychia-
tric hospitals, and prison terms
to suppress freedom of expression.
A group of Crimean Tartars
called on the delegates to con-
sider also the restoration of the
Tartars' national rights. On 6
June, five of their number and
Irina Yakir, daughter of Petr,
displayed banners in a public
square in Moscow inscribed: "Com-
munists, return the Tartars to
the Crimea." Police took the
demonstrators into custody after
five minutes, but friends said
they have been released.
In late May, 55 Soviet citi-
zens addressed an appeal to the
UN Human Rights Commission to in-
vestigate violations in the USSR
of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights guarantee of the free-
dom to hold and express independent
beliefs. Six underground writers
imprisoned for such expression,
including Yuly Daniel, Aleksandr
Ginsburg, and Yury Galanskov, have
sent a letter to the Supreme Soviet
calling for reform of miserable
conditions in the labor camps.
The policy of selective re-
pression has been specifically
aimed at preventing public pro-
test. Since the spate of them
surrounding the trial of Ginsburg
and Galanskov in January 1968, re-
pressive measures had kept protests
to a minimum and had disrupted the
dissidents' organization. For
example, in early May authorities
arrested one of the movement's most
colorful leaders, the former major-
general Petr Grigorenko, who was
in Tashkent to aid a group of Tar-
tars on trial.
The policy has been accom-
panied by a rehabilitation of Sta-
lin in all respects except the
period of mass terror in the late
1930s. An article in the conser-
vative newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya
recently invoked Lenin to support
repressive measures selectively
applied. The author quoted Lenin
to the effect that "the lash" can
be used against individual intel-
lectuals who take part in counter-
revolutionary activity but not
against a whole class.
The revival of public pro-
tests indicates, however, that
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these measures will not completely
still dissent and that the Soviet
leadership must resign itself to
periodic embarrassment. The lead-
ership would probably be divided
over the adoption of the two ob-
vious alternatives to selective
repression, a wider use of terror
or a more accomrhodatin approach
to disaffectior.L.
POMPIDOU MAKES MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENT
With the polls showing a
wide margin in his favor, former
prime minister Pompidou appears
confident of victory and is al-
ready speaking like an elected
head of state. He kicked off his
second ballot campaign with a
long prepared address which is
the most definitive statement to
date of his intentions in the
area of foreign policy.
Although Pompidou's tone
was one of openness to change,
the speech showed a considerable
degree of continuity with many
of De Gaulle's past policies.
Pompidou restated his commitment
to an independent and active role
for France in European and world
affairs. He also spoke of the
dangers of a "policy of blocs,"
called for continued efforts for
a rapprochement with the Commu-
nist world, and sounded the fa-
miliar Gaullist note of France's
special role in the underdeveloped
world, especially Africa.
Pompidou staked out a posi-
tion on the future of Europe which
seems similar to that of De Gaulle.
His language was vague, but he
offered little hope that France
would soon accept the goal of a
united supranational Europe. In-
stead, he proposed a regulariza-
tion of meetings among the chiefs
and. governments of member states
in the European. Communities, a
plan reminiscent of the De Gaulle-
backed Fouchet scheme for a "Eu-
rope of States."
Pompidou gave the appearance
of more flexibility than his pred-
ecessor by expressing a positive
attitude toward enlarging the
Communities. Be said that he
considered enlargement "desirable,"
but at the same time argued that
candidate states such as the UK
must "respect the rules of the
club," and also accept "commercial
arrangements" in preparation for
future adherence to the Communities.
The address indicated a slight
shift away from previous French
policy toward West Germany. Rather
than speaking of a "privileged"
Franco-German relationship as De
Gaulle has done,'; Pompidou called
for future cooperation that would
be an example for France's rela-
tions with other European coun-
tries.
On relations with the US,
Pompidou sought to accelerate a
warming trend already evident in
the last year of De Gaulle's rule.
The prospect of peace in Vietnam,
Pompidou argued, would allow France
and the US to "develop our rela-
tions in the spirit of comprehension
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and warm friendship which gov-
erned the last meetings between
President Nixon and President de
Gaulle."
The tone of Pompidou's address
differed sharply from a recent
article published by Foreign Min-
ister Debre which was replete with
the barbs and sharp edges that
characterized many of De Gaulle's
speeches. This divergence in style
will probably feed speculation that
Pompidou intends to drop Debre or
shift him to a less sensitive ost
after election day.
CZECHOSLOVAK FACTIONAL ALLIANCE SPEEDS NORMALIZATION
The Czechoslovaks have ful-
filled virtually all Soviet de-
mands for normalization. The con-
servative-moderate coalition that
is shaping the policies, how-
ever, is unstable, and factional
maneuvering may precipitate an-
other crisis.
Party leader Husak has met
key Soviet requirements by re-
asserting party control, promot-
ing internal calm, and silencing
the outspoken mass media. In
addition, he has taken signifi-
cant steps to improve Prague's
relations with its Eastern Euro-
pean neighbors.
Husak told the international
Communist conference in Moscow
this week that the Czechoslovak
party controls the domestic situ-
ation, and that Prague is now
prepared to strengthen its com-
mitments to the socialist camp.
Husak refrained, however, from
condoning the invasion, or admit-
ting that "counterrevolution" had
existed before the intervention.
The Poles have openly en-
dorsed Husak and appear to be
trying to help bolster his posi-
tion vis-a-vis his conservative
opponents. Polish Premier Cyran-
kiewicz arrived in Prague on 9
June, apparently on a fence-mend-
ing mission designed to facilitate
key bilateral agreements. The
Polish press, reflecting Warsaw's
desire for closer relations, has
drawn biographic parallels be-
tween Polish party boss Gomulka
and Husak.
Czechoslovak conservatives,
meanwhile, have continued to
strengthen their position at the
expense of the moderates. The
two remaining liberal-moderate
strongholds--the East and West
Bohemian regional party commit-
tees--are now supporting the
Husak leadership in order to head
off demands for personnel shifts
that would undoubtedly benefit the
hard liners.
In addition, the conserva-
tives, who now control foreign
policy, appear to be planning a
reorganization of the foreign
ministry and extensive reshuf-
fling of personnel in diplomatic
posts abroad. Diplomats who were
most outspoken in opposing the
Soviet invasion--including as many
as 20 ambassadors--reportedly will
be recalled and retired. Hard
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liners who were exiled to diplo-
matic posts probably will come
home to assume party and govern-
ment positions. This reorganiza-
tion, however, may complicate the
nationalities problem. The Slo-
vaks will expect to move into
most of the 'vacant posts in order
to gain equality with the Czechs
EAST GERMANY SUCCEEDING IN "RECOGNITION" CAMPAIGN
East Germany's efforts to
obtain international recognition
were again rewarded when Syria,
on 5 June, became the fourth
non-Communist state to establish
relations.
Foreign Minister Otto Winzer
visited Damascus early this month
to formalize what presumably had
been a prearranged agreement to
establish diplomatic relations.
Winzer said on 5 June that he
was optimistic that other coun-
tries, including some not in the
Arab world, would also recognize
East Germany. He then visited
Cairo between 6 and 9 June
Both the
East and West Germans regard Egypt
as the key to Pankow's success
in getting wider recognition.
A West German official said
that Bonn believes that Southern
Yemen may recognize East Germany
even before Egypt acts. The gov-
ernment in Aden, however, is re-
portedly divided on the issue.
If the East Germans were to offer
economic aid to Southern Yemen,
they presumably would undercut
the position of those in Aden
who argue that nothing tangible
would result for South Yemen
should it recognize Pankow.
The East: Germans have already
offered other Arab countries
economic assistance. A high-level
East German delegation that
visited the Sudan in early June
to formalize the establishment
of relations probably offered
some economic assistance/
the
East Germans continue to offer
strong propaganda support for
the Arabs vis-?&--vis Israel, a
factor which probably influenced
Iraq, Syria, and the Sudan to
recognize Pankow.
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SOVIETS DISPLAY ONLY ONE NEW AIRCRAFT AT PARIS
A tri-jet passenger trans-
port similar to the Boeing 727
was the only new aircraft in the
Soviet exhibit at the ten-day
Paris Air Show that closed last
week.
It was rumored that the So-
viets would show their TU-144
supersonic transport and possibly
the giant MI-12 helicopter as
part of what they termed a "sur-
prise" exhibit.
The new transport, the TU-
154, is the only one known to
exist and is still in the test-
ing phase. It first flew last
October and is intended as a re-
placement for several older me-
dium-range transports.
the flight to Paris because of
the relatively limited amount of
flight testing to date.
The Soviets did display the
TU-144 to foreign officials at
an airfield near Moscow on 21
May. Also, during the last days
of the show in Paris they claimed
that it had made its first super-
sonic flight on 5 June. These
measures probably were taken to
offset the loss of prestige re-
sulting from the failure to show
the aircraft in Paris.
Soviet officials at the show
said the supersonic transport was
not displayed because of a desire
not to interrupt the aircraft's
test program. A more likely rea-
son is a lack of confidence in
TU-154 as depicted on cover of Soviet pamphlet
handout at Paris Air Show, 29 May-8 June 1969
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Sudan's three-week-old military government seems firmly in control,
but the regime's strongly leftist label is causing internal problems for the
newly influential Sudanese Communist Party, which has a dozen or more
members or sympathizers in key posts.
In Senegal, President Senghor has declared a state of emergency and has
moved decisively to head off a general strike called by the national trade
union. The current trouble reflects the country's continuing political and
economic malaise, which since last year has spawned sporadic strikes by
students and labor. Senghor's decision to take a hard line probably came at
the urging of the military and has already led to a 48-hour postponement of
the general strike.
As the Nigerian civil war drags on, the federal air force is having some
success in its stepped-up effort to stop the airlift to Biafra. Arms flights to
the secessionists have been reduced somewhat, and most relief planes have
been grounded since 5 June, when a federal MIG-17 shot down a Red Cross
aircraft.
Student unrest has again erupted in Turkey following nearly two
months of relative calm. In Istanbul, a student attempt to occupy buildings
and disrupt examinations led to bloody clashes with the police during which
nearly 100 persons were injured, some seriously. During a related demonstra-
tion in downtown Ankara, a leftist-led group attacked the US military
headquarters building with Molotov cocktails, causing some damage but no
injuries.
Although the Greek Government appears as firmly entrenched as ever,
there are growing signs of opposition within some elements of the military.
In recent weeks, over 30 retired officers have been arrested and accused of
approaching active-duty officers in attempts to enlist them in resistance
activities. There is no indication, however, that key active-duty officers are
willing to oppose the regime.
In Pakistan, handbills attacking the martial law administration were
reportedly passed out by Karachi-area students. The government, which up
to now has shown clemency in dealing with student dissidents, retaliated by
passing out heavy sentences to some recent student demonstrators.
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SUDAN'S NEW REGIME ASSUMES "BUSINESS AS USUAL" STANCE
The three-week-old Sudanese
military regime, a conglomerate of
Communist, pro-Egyptian, and Arab
Socialist elements, seems firmly
in control. Apparently confident
of its position of power, the gov-
ernment is busy explaining the aims
of its "May revolution" and is seek-
ing international support.
Two of the regime's first moves
have been the recognition of East
Germany and the announcement that
a Sudanese military delegation will
soon visit Moscow and Prague. The
visit to Moscow is probably designed
to help speed up delivery of military
aid promised in an agreement of Jan-
uary 1968, but could also be to seek
additional assistance.
At home, there has been almost
no serious adverse reaction to the
coup, which its makers allege was
intended to eliminate the venality
and corruptness of the old civilian
establishment. Many of the previous
political leaders are imprisoned
and seem sure to stand trial. Sadiq
al-Mahdi, a leader of the Ansar
sect--which, along with other re-
ligious and tribal groups, comprises
a large majority of the country's
mostly rural population--was arrested
this week, probably for his group's
refusal to endorse the government.
Although the Ansar ultimately could
become a source of antigovernment
resistance, at the moment its lead-
ership is in disarray and is lying
low at the Ansar stronghold in cen-
tral Sudan.
In another move to stabilize
its rule, the regime has "resolved"
to grant regional autonomy to the
rebellious south. The prerequisite
of building a "broad socialist
democratic movement" in the south
suggests, however, that the day
is still a long way off before
the culturally and ethnically dif-
ferent southerners will be per-
mitted to run their own affairs.
Meanwhile, the government's
strongly leftist. label is causing
internal problems for the now in-
fluential Sudanese Communist Party,
which has a dozen or more of its
members or sympathizers in Ice
posts in the regime.
Although the present regime
now seems firmly established,
the problems of deriving a modern
society from Sudan's basically
tribal and tradition-bound struc-
ture are many. It will not be
accomplished without: consider-
able difficulty--and possible
new upheaval--by this or an
succeeding regime.
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CONGO (KINSHASA) ARMY DEVELOPS BAD CASE OF NERVES
Events of the past several
weeks coupled with traditional
nervousness at this time of year
have produced an elevated state of
tension within the Congolese Na-
tional Army.
Completely unaware of the height-
ened tension, student leaders at
Lovanium University near Kinshasa
went ahead with plans for a campus
strike to back their demands for
increased government stipends.
When the students marched into
town on the morning of 4 June, in-
tending to take over several gov-
ernment buildings, they were met
by army and police units under
instructions to "clobber" the
students. The army fired into
the crowds, killing about a dozen
students and wounding 20 or 30
more; about 400 arrests were made.
Student sympathy strikes in Lu-
bumbashi were held in a strained
atmosphere, but the students,
university and provincial offi-
cials, and security units all
stayed within acceptable limits
and no major incidents occurred.
Nevertheless, as the army gets
wound tighter, the risk becomes
greater that one unit may spring
forth with some anti-Euro can
violence.
I On
the other hand, nervousness lead-
ing up to independence day cele-
brations on 30 June has become
nearly traditional in the Congo--
primarily because several previous
crises began about that time. So
far this year, Mobutu and other
leading officials have remained
calm and are trying to reduce
rather than inflame tensions.
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GOA
Telengana
re9,io
* derabad
AN TYS
PRAOE sH
CEYLON
*Colombo
?Madraa
Andhra Pradesh
upset by agitation
for Telengana
statehood
*Port Blair
Andaman Is.
? State capital
State boundary
MILLS 400
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INDIA FACES NEW ROUND OF AGITATION FOR SEPARATE STATES
New Delhi may face a new
threat of fragmentation within
India's states as a result of
five months of agitation demand-
ing separate statehood for the
Telengana region of Andhra Prad-
esh. Major violence erupted
there last week when some 20
people died as police and army
troops tried to put down rioting
in Hyderabad, the state capital.
Telengana separatists are
divided into several groups, but
all reflect the deep discontent
in their backward region. They
especially resent the neglect of
the state government and the
domination of their region by the
more advanced coastal part of the
state. The Telengana sections
of most political parties in the
state now support the agitation,
including some prominent members
of the state's governing Congress
Party. In addition to a separate
state, all groups demand the im-
mediate resignation of state
Chief Minister Brahmananda Reddi,
a coastal Andhran who symbolizes
the state government's failure
to satisfy Telengana's long-
standing grievances.
New Delhi has thus far of-
fered only limited concessions,
designed mainly to reduce economic
inequities between Telengana and
the coastal region. Prime Min-
ister Gandhi and Home Minister
Chavan made separate visits to
Hyderabad last week in an attempt
to defuse the situation, but be-
fore their trips the central gov-
ernment reaffirmed its refusal
to countenance a separate state.
New Delhi hopes to avoid
concessions that will encourage
separatist agitation among dis-
contented groups in India's other
16 states. As a result of pre-
vious agitation, most recently
in the mid-1960s, India's origi-
nal state boundaries are now
drawn largely along linguistic
lines. New Delhi fears another
round of boundary juggling, forced
this time by local economic or
political discontent, such as in
Telengana.
The government could be
forced to impose "President's
Rule"--direct control by New
Delhi--if serious disorders per-
sist in Andhra Pradesh, but this
would displace a state. Congress
government at a time when the
party's fortunes are declining
in many other Indian states. Con-
gress won a solid majority in
Andhra Pradesh in the 1967 elec-
tions and until the present dis-
orders the party provided un-
commonly stable government in the
state.
Agitation calmed somewhat
after Chavan's visit on 7-9 June,
but it is likely to intensify
again unless clear concessions
are made by New Delhi. Clashes
occurred between separatist and
pro-unity groups in the latest
riots, and these too may increase
in frequency and violence, ac-
centuating the tension between
Telengana and coastal Andhra.
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Governor Rockefeller's visits, to be resumed next week, continue to be
the major topic of conversation in Latin America. Leftist extremists in most
countries yet to be visited are making plans to embarrass both the Rocke-
feller mission and the local governments. Some violence is expected in a few
of the countries.
In South America, guerrilla attacks on two towns in western Venezuela
may presage increased guerrilla activity in that country. If this is the case,
President Caldera may be under more pressure from the military to abandon
his attempts to reach a cease-fire accord with the rebels. In Chile, agitation
for the nationalization of the copper mines is continuing as the government
gets down to hard bargaining with Anaconda. The Communist-led labor
confederation in Uruguay on 11 June carried out its most successful general
strike to date.
The Caribbean Black Power Conference scheduled for 10-13 July in
Bermuda is already causing government officials concern. Current labor
troubles on the British island and the unofficial endorsement of the con-
ference by the political opposition have probably increased the anxiety of
the predominantly white, ruling Bermuda Party. In Curacao, the scene of
widespread disorders on 30-31 May, the government's decision to resign and
call early elections has calmed the island. Increased political agitation,
exacerbated by the economic problems stemming from the rioting is likely
to occur, however, during the election campaign.
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ECUADOREAN OPPOSITION MOUNTING EFFORTS AGAINST VELASCO
The erosion of confidence
in the Velasco government has been
quickening in recent weeks, and
perennial enemies of the Presi-
dent are working from all sides
toward his overthrow. The most
obvious threat to stability is
the widespread disruption in Ecua-
dorean cities by students'whose
extremist leaders"are determined
to bring down the government. Mil-
itary and police officials are
chafing to take stronger counter-
actions and may soon make some
decisive move.
Vice President Zavala reit-
erated charges this week that the
government is systematically un-
dercutting the constitution, con-
gress, political parties, autono-
mous executive institutions, and
his own position as a prelude to
Velasco's assuming dictatorial
powers. Zavala warned that Velasco
has always envisioned himself as
above the law and believes that
he can rule "with the people and
the army" and "without the con-
stitution. Although Zavala is
controversial and suspect even
within his own Radical Liberal
party, many Ecuadoreans agree
with him. His open break is
likely to give impetus to plans
of the many groups from far left
to far right whose acute desire
to oust Velasco for the fourth
time has been whetted in recent
weeks.
Such disparate groups as
industrialists, erstwhile politi-
cal collaborators, and extremist
students apparently have concluded
that the government now is weak
enough to make worthwhile some
bolder moves against it. Power-
ful economic interests on 5 June
publicly criticized the govern-
ment as hostile and obstructive
toward the private sector and un-
able to maintain public order and
confidence.!. The Radical Liberal
party has moved from. legislative
cooperationlto criticism of Vel-
asco
The mo: visible and disrup-
tive factor ri Velasco's inability
to govern of ectively is student
agitation, which has kept Quito,
Guayaquil, and other .cities in a
turmoil for Meeks. Combined ef-
forts of military and police forces
against the agitators-have been
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erratic, sometimes brutal and
fatal, frequently ineffective,
and generally unpopular. The
militant and extreme leftist stu-
dent leaders are probably receiv-
ing help, possibly including arms
and explosives, from various
sources interested in creating
discord and ousting Velasco by
any means. As the student ter-
rorists grow bolder, there is an
increasing likelihood of strong
military reaction.
CAMPAIGNING BEGINS IN SURINAM AMID LABOR UNREST
The leaders of Surinam's nu-
merous political parties have al-
ready begun to campaign actively
for elections, which they expect
to take place this year, although
the three-month-old "working" gov-
ernment of Minister-President
Arthur May has yet to announce
a date.
May, a retired civil servant
was named to head a caretaker gov-
ernment last March by the Dutch
governor following the resigna-
tion of Johan Pengel, Surinam's
long-time political leader. Pen-
gel's regime had been character-
ized by corruption, fiscal mis-
management and, in its later days,
by labor strife. May is finding
the task of putting Surinam's
house in order a bigger job than
he had anticipated, and he may
have to stay in office into the
1970s.
Pengel, however, is pressing
for early elections. His political
stock is low, but he probably be-
lieves time is working against
him, especially as the May govern-
ment is preparing a "white paper"
exposing the corruption of his
regime.
The multiplicity of politi-
cal parties in Surinam has made
it impossible for any one group
to obtain an absolute majority.
It appears at the moment that no
one will form a coalition with
Pengel--as of now, all political
forces have denounced him. The
leader of the largest Hindustani
party is negotiating with one of
Pengel's chief rivals among the
Creole parties, and the two have
tentatively agreed to form a coali-
tion that would exclude Pengel if
they receive enough votes in the
next election to form a government.
Ex - Minister President Pengel
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May has had some success in
reducing the budget deficit, up-
dating voter lists, ridding the
government of corruption, and
liberalizing the use of communi-
cations media. He has not been
as successful in coping with labor
agitation.
Strikes, accompanied in sev-
eral cases by violence, have oc-
curred frequently. Workers led
by Eddie Bruma, the leftist leader
of a small but fast-growing po-
litical party, have achieved broad
concessions from management. Other
workers are now eagerly soliciting
Bruma's services. Many political
observers believe that in the next
elections Bruma will be able to
capitalize on his labor support
and that his party will win seats
in the legislature for the first
time.
Some middle class Surinamers
fear violence during the coming
electoral campaign, and all sec-
tors have exressed apprehension
regarding the months ahead.
POLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES AND SOCIAL UNREST IN URUGUAY
President Pacheco has suf-
fered a major defeat in a hard-
fought battle with congress over
his policies of economic auster-
ity, and growing discontent among
workers and students makes him
vulnerable to further setbacks.
Last week a key faction
within Pacheco's own Colorado
party voted with antiadministra-
tion forces to censure a cabinet
minister responsible for imple-
menting a major aspect of the
austerity program. According to
a complex series of constitutional
provisions, Pacheco would have
been able to dissolve congress
and call new elections if the
minister had been censured by
less than a three-fifths majority.
The opposition forces were unable
by themselves to muster the three
fifths, but Colorado politicians
who feared new elections voted
with the opposition, thereby
censuring the minister by an over-
whelming majority. They rational-
ized that by avoiding elections
they "saved the country from a
profound political struggle at a
dangerous time." They say they
will back the President on all
future occasions.
Discontent with the Presi-
dent's austerity measures has
been mounting steadily in recent
months. Striking workers and
demonstrating students have clashed
with police almost every day for
the last two weeks. The Communist-
dominated national workers' con-
federation held a successful 24-
hour general !strike on 11 June.
President Pacheco's politi-
cal opponents may well see this
as an ideal time to press their
battle. The president has de-
clared that he will continue his
programs, but key factions within
his party may again find it ex-
pedient to go along with the
popular and congressional opposi-
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TERRORISM ON THE RISE IN BRAZIL
Terrorism is a growing worry
for the Brazilian Government
a crackdown on "subversives."
The escapees are professional or-
ganizers and revolutionaries whose
abilities will presumably be put
to use by urban terrorist groups.
They are capable of launching a
series of terrorist acts, and
they could represent a threat to
the security of the Rockefeller
mission.
Urban terrorism has become
increasingly frequent in Brazil.
For example, since 1967 Sao Paulo
has experienced a dramatic in-
crease in bank robberies, terror-
ist assaults, and assassinations
carried out by the right-wing
extremists of the so-called Death
Squad and by leftist radicals
allied with dissident Communist
Carlos Marighella.
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Security authorities are
greatly concerned over the
escape last week of nine prison-
ers, six of whom are ex-military
men sentenced for their subver-
sive activities during the Goulart
administration. Their escape was
carefully engineered and had out-
side assistance--facts which es-
pecially worry the military and
could generate new pressures for
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HARD LINERS MAINTAIN UPPER HAND IN PERU
Disagreements on how to deal
with Peru's growing economic and
political problems are causing
increasing frictions within the
military government. Price con-
trols on food, delays in signing
some foreign investment contracts,
and methods of dealing with the
growing criticism of the govern-
ment have all reportedly gener-
25X1 ated heated arguments
25x1 Q with those favoring a
hard-line approach carrying the
day in each instance.
The recent decree law call-
ing for price controls on basic
foodstuffs apparently stimulated
similar disagreements.
Rising food; prices had been
largely responsible for the in-
crease in it he cost of living in
recent months, but had begun to
decline in May following the
spring harvest and the clearing
of landslides that had blocked
the main h:Lhway into Lima since
February. The controls are op-
posed by most of the influential
economic groups in Peru.
The hard-line group, includ-
ing President Velasco, had held
the balance of power in the gov-
ernment since the October coup,
although the moderates have re-
tained some influence. The dis-
pute with the US over the IPC
issue and Peru's claim to a 200-
mile territorial sea have enabled
Velasco to wrap himself in the
flag and call upon all Peruvians
to support the government in this
time of crisis. This in turn
has forced Velasco's opponents
to follow his lead or appear un-
patriotic.
Opposition is beginning to
appear in most sectors of the
population,'however, as the mili-
tary tightens its grip. This
growing opposition could
strengthen the hand of the moder-
ates in the military or it could
lead to even more repressive
measures by the government and a
hardening of divisions within the
country,
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PANAMANIAN MILITARY SEEKS TO CONTROL PROPAGANDA CHANNELS
The military government is
attempting to bolster support of
its policies by acquiring control
of some privately held communica-
tion facilities.
The junta recently concluded
a deal with former presidential
candidate Samudio to take over
operation of the printing plant
of El Mundo, a leading daily
which ceased operations in Janu-
ary when Samudio decided to shut
down rather than submit to gov-
ernment censorshi .
The government also moved
recently to end the virtual mo-
nopoly of television channels by
two of the country's most promi-
nent families. This action has
been widely interpreted as a step
toward installation of a govern-
ment-controlled television net-
work. Plans to inaugurate a na-
tionwide "educational" television
system might, in turn, lead to
creation of politically oriented
broadcasting facilities, perhaps
in anticipation of elections sched-
uled next year. Panamanian elec-
tion campaigns have traditionally
relied heavily on public infor-
mation media, which until recently
have been firmly in the hands of
the ruling oligarchy.
A tentative decision to can-
cel the operating permit of a
Panamanian commercial airline--
largely owned by the influential
Eleta family--brought an alle-
gation from one member of the
family that the government also
plans to operate its own national
air carrier. It is possible
that these maneuvers are pri-
marily designed to dispel any
suspicions that the National
Guard is moving toward an accom-
modation with the oligarchy.
Meanwhile, preparations are
under way to reopen the Univer-
sity of Panama, which had been
a center of antigovernment agita-
tion before the military coup.
The government has appointed a
new rector to preside over the
restructured governing body and
is counting on tighter adminis-
trative controls and such security
devices as a perimeter fence to
keep the students in line.
These and other plans of
the junta government will not
be affected by the illness of
President Jose Pinilla, who
suffered a serious heart attack
on 10 June and was hospitalized
in Panama City. Pinilla and his
deputy Bolivar Urrutia are the
figurehead junta leaders, but
real power still rests with
National Guard Commandant Tor-
rijos.
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HAITI SURVIVES EXILE INVASION SCARE
Haiti is calm following the
abortive "bombing" raid on Port-
au-Prince on 4 June but the gov-
ernment remains vigilant.
The incident--which caused
little damage--was apparently re-
lated to plans by exile leader
Rene Leon to land an exile force.
This scheme has probably been
squelched by Leon's detention and
subsequent transfer to Miami after
the aircraft used in the raid was
grounded in the Bahamas.
Haiti's initial claim that
Cuba was involved will probably
be dropped in the face of growing
evidence to the contrary. It
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Page 32 WEEKLY SUMMARY
was probably another of Haiti's
many recent efforts to gain US
support by building up the Commu-
nist threat.
President Duvalier reacted
to the incident with his first
public activity since early may.
In an address to the nation,
broadcast the d.ay following the
attack, Duvalier assured his
audience that h s government was
still in complete control. The
speech, and the,'publicity it re-
ceived, were probably designed to
squash persistent reports that
he is gravely :111, which he felt
might encourage' better organized
attempts against his rule.
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