WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007200030001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 11, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
OSD review completed
NAVY review completed.
State Dept. review completed
Secret
47_''
11 July 1969
No. 0378/69
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(Information as of noon EDT, 10 July 1969)
VIETNAM
A two-week lull in enemy activity ended last week
when enemy shelling attacks took place throughout
the southern half of South Vietnam. The Saigon gov-
ernment is considering moves to improve its image
and mute its critics; two cabinet members and a staff
aide who have been heavily criticized by members of
the National Assembly in recent weeks may be replaced.
LAO GOVERNMENT FORCES MAKE SMALL GAINS
The government has made some limited gains in its ef-
fort to recapture Muong Soui.
SOUTH KOREAN PRESIDENT AVOIDS STAND ON THIRD TERM
The recent student demonstrations have failed to force
President Pak's hand on the third-term issue.
MALAYSIA'S LEADERS HOLD TO PRO-MALAY POLICIES
An indecisive and increasingly fragmented leadership
appears to be charting programs and policies that are
likely to divide the racial communities further.
Europe
Page
1
EUROPEAN REACTIONS TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S ROMANIAN VISIT 12
Leaders in both Eastern and Western Europe are.still
speculating about the effects President Nixon's trip
to Romania will have on US-Soviet relations.
OSD review completed
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SOVIET DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERS IN YUGOSLAVIA
Despite a number of friendly gestures on Moscow's
part toward Yugoslavia, a substantial improvement in
bilateral relations does not appear possible.
USSR TO STEP UP ECONOMIC AID TO IRAQ
The USSR will concentrate its economic assistance
efforts on developing Iraq's extensive petroleum re-
sources.
DISARMAMENT TALKS FOCUS ON SEABED ISSUE
Most Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee members
hope to agree on the text of a seabed treaty this
session, but the US and Soviet positions are still
far apart.
SOVIET NAVAL SQUADRON TO MAKE FIRST CUBAN VISIT
The visit, to occur during the anniversary celebra-
tions of Castro's 26 of July movement, indicates the
expanding scope of Soviet naval operations and is an
example of Moscow's use of naval forces for political
purposes.
ITALY UNDERGOING GOVERNMENT CRISIS
The government's resignation has stopped progress on
social legislation and sharpened the issue of rela-
tions between the democratic parties and the Com-
munists.
NONALIGNED MEETING HAS ONLY LIMITED OBJECTIVES
Representatives from 51 self-styled nonaligned coun-
tries showed up in Belgrade on 8 July for a long-
planned and much delayed consultative meeting to try
to salvage as much cooperation from among this group
as possible.
Middle East - Africa
NEW NOTE OF BELLIGERENCE SOUNDED IN MIDDLE EAST
The continued fighting along the Suez Canal and the
recent spate of air battles reflect increased belli-
gerency in the Middle East. Egypt continues to ini-
tiate most of the shooting along the canal, but
Israel is also taking a more active posture on the
military front.
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ISRAEL MAINTAINS AIR SUPERIORITY IN MIDDLE EAST
Israel's success in downing Egyptian fighters in re-
cent air clashes is evidence that it controls Middle
East skies despite Egypt's larger inventory of planes.
KENYA FACES POLITICAL ADJUSTMENTS
The assassination of Tom Mboya eliminates much of the
uncertainty about who will succeed Kenyatta, but it
has embittered many Kenyans, who believe that it was
politically motivated.
INDIAN INTEREST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA STEPPED UP
New Delhi continues to seek an expanded role in South-
east Asia, but its recent efforts toward regional eco-
nomic cooperation indicate little real progress.
Western Hemisphere
LIMITED RETURN TO POLITICAL NORMALITY IN BRAZIL OPPOSED
President Costa e Silva and some moderates in the
government are working to restore a more normal
political life to Brazil, but these efforts are op-
posed by many military and civilian hardliners.
ANTI-US SENTIMENT WANING IN PERU
The lifting of the US ban on military sales has
prompted Peru to agree to discuss problems that
have arisen over fishing rights in its claimed ter-
ritorial waters and to renew discussion on the IPC
issue.
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Dr&)1E1 I
The Vietnamese Communists have apparently begun their July cam-
paign-the final phase of the summer offensive-and limited attacks are
expected over the next few weeks. A high point may come around 20 July,
the 15th anniversary of the Geneva Accords.
Communist terrorists continue to exact a steady toll of South Vietnam-
ese Government officials and supporters. These tactics have been successful
enough in several areas of II Corps to weaken the local people's confidence
in the government forces' ability to protect them.
There are indications that President Thieu and Prime Minister Huong
will move to improve the government's image and to mute its critics by
replacing two cabinet ministers and a staff aide who have been heavily
criticized by members of the National Assembly in recent weeks.
Charges and countercharges made this week by Communist China and
the USSR of provocations in the Amur River area may foreshadow the
breakdown of Sino-Soviet border river navigation talks in Khabarovsk. The
talks, were expected to run into difficulties over disputed islands in the
Ussuri and Amur rivers and the larger territorial claims Peking has been
pressing on Moscow.
The Lao Government has made some limited gains in its efforts to
recapture Muong Soui, but progovernment neutralist forces that were re-
grouped after the fall of that base have been unwilling to press attacks
against the enemy. The Communists could put additional pressure on the
neutralists by attacking progovernment guerrilla bases north of the Plaine des
Jarres that supplied some of the forces the government is using in its
offensive.
An adroit police response to student demonstrations in South Korea
has enabled President Pak to continue to side-step the issue of whether he
will seek re-election in 1971. Student violence has ended this week as the
schools closed for summer vacation, but renewed protests are expected when
colleges and universities reopen in late August.
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VIETNAM
A two-week lull in enemy
activity ended last weekend when
enemy shelling attacks took
place throughout the southern
half of South Vietnam. These
were followed by increased bom-
bardments of key allied targets
including Saigon during the week.
Phis activity probably signaled
the start of the enemy's July cam-
ai n, forecast
as t e final phase
of the Communists' summer offen-
sive.
the enemy could
reach a so-called "highpoint"
of activity around 20 July, the
15th anniversary of the Geneva
Accords. This period also coin-
cides with the dark of the moon,
a favorite time of the enemy for
offensive operations.
The Communists may try to
make some new political initia-
tives in conjunction with the up-
coming attacks. One prisoner
from the northern delta said
that his unit's mission is to en-
sure that a shadow regime, pre-
sumably the Provisional Revolu-
tionary Government, will "emerge"
during the offensive. Although
he gave no specifics, the pris-
oner apparently was referring to
some plan for popularizing the
provisional government in local
areas throughout the country.
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Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY
25X1
25X1
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The Communists probably
also plan another round of ter-
rorism and sapper activity in
the Saigon area.
In addition, heavy casual-
ties during last year's fighting
in Saigon reportedly crippled
Communist terrorist capabilities
there. The Communists have been
forced to fill their commando
ranks with infiltrators from North
Vietnam, whose unfamiliarity with
cities in the South has limited
their effectiveness in Saigon.
Nevertheless, the infiltration
of small sapper cells into the
city strongly suggests that in-
creased enemy action in and
around the city is forthcoming.
Such action most likely will be
accompanied by a step up in enemy
rocket attacks. In recent weeks
these have been rather ineffectual
but they receive a lot of press
headlines, nevertheless.
Page 3
Although the level of enemy-
initiated military activity fell
off after the so-called June
"highpoints," Communist terrorists
continue to exact a steady toll of
South Vietnamese Government offi-
cials and supporters. In several
areas of II Corps, for example,
the enemy's terrorist tactics
threaten the ability of the local
government forces to protect the
people, particularly in rural
areas. In an apparent attempt to
hamper government pacification
efforts, abductions and terrorism
have been concentrated against
the People's Self Defense Forces,
Revolutionary Development cadre,
and members of the National
Police.
In III Corps, Viet Cong
terrorist activity has remained
relatively high despite the over-
all reduction in enemy activity
there. Primary targets for Com-
munist terrorists have been the
self-defense forces and local
government officials. Captured
enemy documents in III Corps indi-
cate the enemy's intention to
eliminate or neutralize govern-
ment employees or informants at
the hamlet, village, and district
levels. Allied forces have seized
a number of lists of government
personalities at these levels,
which appear to be fairly accurate
and up to date. These lists ap-
parently were compiled by various
elements of the Communists' dis-
trict- and village-level infra-
structure.
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South Vietnamese Political
Developments
The South Vietnamese Govern-
ment is considering moves to im-
prove its image and to mute its
critics. There are indications
that President Thieu and Prime
Minister Huong may replace two
cabinet ministers, as well as a
controversial staff aide, all of
whom have been heavily criticized
by members of the National Assembly
in recent weeks. Although Huong
has also been under attack from
the Assembly, Thieu apparently has
no plans to replace him in the near
future.
The government has appar-
ently decided not to bring for-
mal charges against left-wing
politician Tran Ngoc Lieng, who
has called for a "government of
reconciliation." The police re-
portedly have completed their in-
vestigation, which was clearly
intended as a warning to would-
be unofficial peacemakers, and
have determined that evidence is
insufficient to warrant legal ac-
tion. The five-year prison term
given to another prominent figure,
Saigon Daily News publisher Nguyen
Lau, may increase criticism of the
government's press policy. Lau
was clearly guilty of giving in-
formation to a Viet Cong agent
in the eyes of most informed ob-
servers.
Political Developments in
North Vietnam
Hanoi has not yet made good
its announced intention to re-
lease three US prisoners. The
North Vietnamese evidently will
follow past practice and insist
on turning the captives over to
a peace group. This will delay
the Americans' return for several
weeks. In addition to the release,
Hanoi announced on 3 July that
US captives remaining in North
Vietnam would be permitted to re-
ceive gifts from their families.
The Communists probably
hope that these actions will be
taken by world, and particularly
American domestic, opinion as a
conciliatory gesture. All of
this is doubtless part of the
scenario that has been unfolding
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since the high-level strategy
sessions in Hanoi this spring.
Senior negotiator and politburo
member Le Duc Tho reportedly left
Paris for Hanoi on 9 July. The
impact of this on the talks is
uncertain. It is conceivable
that his return is connected with 25X1
domestic and party matters--areas
in which Tho has special respon-
sibilities.
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LAOS: Current Situation
kPhgu
?, KJloun
Phou
6oun_g
Vluong
Soul
(PLA(NE
I ES
JAR'3ESj
Xieng Dat
Government-held location
? Communist held location
gPr.R 1 T
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LAO GOVERNMENT FORCE MAKE SMALL GAINS
The government has made some
limited gains in its effort to
recapture Muong Soui.
Government troops encoun-
tered only light resistance in
clearing enemy forces from the
Route 7/13 road junction some 40
miles west of Muong Soui. The
government has also reoccupied
its defensive position astride
Route 7 at Phou Soung. Progov-
ernment neutralist forces, who
were regrouped after the fall of
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Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Muong Soui to play a prominent
role in this operation, have been
unwilling to press attacks against
the enemy, however.
The Communists have the
option of putting additional
pressure on Vang Pao's thinly-
stretched forces by attacking
government guerrilla bases north
of the Plaine des Jarres, where
local. defense forces were re-
cently weakened in order to sup-
port the Muong Soui operation.
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SOUTH KOREAN PRESIDENT AVOIDS STAND ON THIRD TERM
The recent student demonstra-
tions have failed to force Presi-
dent Pak's hand on the third-term
issue.
Pak's opponents had hoped
that the disturbances would com-
pel him to declare publicly for
re-election in 1971, thereby giv-
ing them a clear target. Pak,
however, has again side-stepped
the issue with the ambiguous
statement that, while he himself
would not actively seek a consti-
tutional amendment to permit a
third term, his administration
would take "appropriate legal
procedures" to ensure free popu-
lar expression if such an amend-
ment were formally proposed.
The authorities appear to
have been equally adept in control-
ling the thousands of student
demonstrators in their repeated
attempts to move out from the
campuses to the streets. Al-
though some students reportedly
have been seriously injured, the
riot police generally have been
careful to avoid actions that
could generate public support
for the demonstrators, thus far
notably lacking.
Sporadic clashes between po-
lice and student mobs have occurred
in the past few days, but the vio-
lence appears to be abating as
the schools close for summer va-
cation.
Meanwhile, third-term advo-
cates within the government party
are concentrating on winning over
party dissidents in the National
Assembly. In addition to some
independent votes, the regime
will need the support of vir-
tually all 109 government party
assemblymen in order to obtain the
117 votes needed to pass the amend-
ment when it goes to the Assembly,
probably late this year or early
next year.
The holdouts continue to
express confidence that they can
block passage of the amendment,
but their leaders recently spoke
in terms of controlling about 10
votes in contrast to earlier claims
of more than 30.
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7r.l~ltr, 1
MALAYSIA'S LEADERS HOLD TO PRO-MALAY POLICIES
An indecisive and in-
creasingly fragmented leadership
appears to be charting programs
and policies that are likely
to divide the racial communi-
ties further.
Deputy Prime Minister Razak
holds near dictatorial powers as
head of the emergency government's
National Operations Council, but
he continues to refer many major
decisions to Prime Minister Rah-
man, despite the fact that the
latter is largely discredited
among the Malay community. Rah-
man, moreover, is recuperating
from an eye operation
Rahman, despite strong pres-
sures on him to resign or assume
a figure-head position, may in
fact be attempting a political
comeback via his leadership
of a nationwide system of multi-
racial goodwill committees. Fur-
ther, a recent statement by Rah-
man calling for a conference of
Southeast Asian leaders to dis-
cuss regional defense matters
was apparently not cleared with
anyone in the government. Con-
tinued efforts by Rahman to
reassert himself could further
complicate leadership problems
and alienate Malay support for
the government and its policies.
Notwithstanding these prob-
lems, the government has moved
ahead in outlining its essen-
tially pro-Malay policies. Offi-
cial statements indicate clearly
that any return to parliamentary
forms must be preceded by restora-
tion of law and order and a
"normalization" of communal re-
lations along a pro-Malay bias.
In a recent economic policy
statement, Razak stressed the
goal of racial harmony, but placed
major emphasis on improving eco-
nomic opportunities for the rural
Malays.
In the fields of language
and education, moreover, a
government policy paper stipulates
that Malay and English will be
the sole languages of instruction
in the secondary schools. This
policy reverses Rahman's liberal
policies, which tolerated the
use of Chinese and Tamil, and
will further polarize the Chinese
and Malay communities.
Malay leaders talk of a
return to "normalcy" in three
to six months, but it seems un-
likely that any moves to eliminate
emergency controls will be taken
soon. In any event, when par-
liamentary forms are finally
restored, political competition
and debate will almost certainly
be circumscribed.
In the meantime, communal
emotions remain dangerously high.
In recent weeks a scattering of
incidents in Kuala Lumpur and
elsewhere have raised the offi-
cial death toll since the ini-
tial outbreak of violence in mid-
May to over 200; unofficial es-
timates range as high as 1,000.
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While pretending to be unconcerned about President Nixon's visit to
Romania, Eastern European leaders have been concentrating on their own
affairs this week. The Yugoslavs are presiding over a difficult conference in
Belgrade, trying to pull together 51 nonaligned states with disparate interests
long enough to agree on holding a nonaligned summit conference in the
future.
East Germany's boss, Walter Ulbricht, is still recuperating from the flu
and has missed going to Moscow to lead a high-powered delegation for
important talks. Economics and attitudes toward West Germany probably
are in the forefront of the discussions.
The East Germans scored a significant breakthrough this week with
Cairo's announcement that it will grant Pankow diplomatic recognition. This
move makes it easier for most other Arab and African states to do likewise.
The Romanians have invited the Soviet party and government leader-
ship to their 25th liberation anniversary, which will be held on 23 August.
The Soviets have not yet replied, nor have they told Bucharest whether they
intend to come in July for a ceremony signing a new friendship treaty.
Rumors have begun circulating in Eastern Europe of massive Warsaw
Pact maneuvers scheduled for mid-August featuring movements to the West
German, Austrian, and Yugoslav borders. This would also put these forces
close to Romania's frontier. The rumors apparently are designed to intimi-
date the Romanians and the Yugoslavs, as well as the Czechoslovaks, who are
restive as the first anniversary of the invasion approaches.
In Czechoslovakia itself, the party crackdown on the news media
continues, and purges of district-level party organizations are under way. It
appears that the turn of the liberals in the government apparatus will come
soon. The axe has already begun to fall in the Foreign Ministry, and Minister
Jan Marko, who was appointed by Dubcek, is believed to be fighting for his
post.
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EUROPEAN REACTIONS TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S ROMANIAN VISIT
Leaders in both Eastern and
Western Europe are still specu-
lating about the effects Presi-
dent Nixon's trip to Romania will
have on US-Soviet relations.
Moscow has not yet taken an
official stance, suggesting that
the Soviet position is still a
subject of discussion. Some in-
direct and relatively moderate
criticism appeared in the Soviet
press last weekend. Soviet of-
ficials also continue to be gen-
erally noncommittal in their
private comments.
Differing assessments of the
President's purpose in scheduling
bhe trip may be one element con-
tributing to Moscow's evident
difficulty in reaching a position
on this matter. Romania has ex-
tended an invitation to Soviet
leaders to attend their 25th
anniversary celebration in August.
Soviet leaders, meanwhile, appar-
ently have put off a projected
trip to Romania this month while
they consider their next step.
In Eastern Europe, the Ro-
manians and Yugoslavs have offi-
cially indicated their pleasure
over the prospect of the Presi-
dent's visit, and the Yugoslavs
are looking forward to a Presi-
dential visit to their country
at a later time. In an official
editorial, the Romanians have
emphasized that their invitation
is consonant with the declara-
tion recently signed in Moscow
by most of the world's Communist
parties, implying that they
should not be criticized for it.
The Bulgarians, who are
probably reflecting Moscow's
view, have referred, however, to
the President's visit as "cheap
sensationalism." This article
has been quoted in the Polish
and Hungarian press. The Czech-
oslovaks and Hungarians, on the
other hand, have informed their
people of the visit with reprints
of generally favorable Western
press commentary. The only com-
ment of Hungarian origin specu-
lated that the US is using Ro-
mania as a bridge to China. Al-
bania, on the other hand, at-
tacked the trip as one more step
in US-Soviet collusion against
China, and this has been re-
printed in Peking.
In most Western European
capitals there has been rela-
tively little official comment.
Italian Prime Minister Rumor has
characterized the visit as pos-
itive, provided the Soviets do
not consider it provocative.
Publicly, Paris is stressing
that the visit will continue De
Gaulle's policy of detente.
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SOVIET DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERS IN YUGOSLAVIA
The Soviets have been pur-
suing a diplomatic campaign aimed
at convincing the Yugoslavs of
their willingness to repair the
damage to their relations result-
ing from the invasion of Czecho-
slovakia. Despite a number of
friendly gestures on Moscow's
part, including its offer to send
Foreign Minister Gromyko to Bel-
grade later this year, however,
it appears that the "friendship
offensive" will fall far short
of effecting a complete reconcil-
iation with the heretical Yugo-
slavs, and will be limited to
improving state relations.
Soviet Ambassador Benediktov
made the first overtures during
a meeting with Marshal Tito in
mid-May. In addition to the
tentative scheduling of the Gro-
myko visit, the main results of
the talks were a reduction in
mutual polemics and an agreement
to set up a "committee of experts"
to moderate ideological differ-
ences between the two states.
Other Eastern European states,
probably at the behest of the
Soviets, have also announced
their willingness to improve re-
lations with Belgrade.
Moscow appears primarily in-
terested in silencing Yugoslav
criticism rather than in seeking
a genuine rapprochement. The So-
viets have been largely success-
ful in their efforts. The Yugo-
slav press has been subdued, and
with one apparently accidental
exception, it allowed the recent
Moscow International Communist
Conference (ICC) to pass without
comment.
The Yugoslavs at first in-
terpreted the ICC's silence on
Yugoslavia as a reciprocal ges-
ture
Even though
e ovie press itself has not
been directly critical of Yugo-
slavia since late May, both the
Czechoslovak and Bulgarian press
recently published polemical arti-
cles critical of Yugoslav "re-
visionism" and "anti-Sovietism."
An ideological rapprochement
seems out of the question. Nei-
ther side is likely to compromise
its views on such matters as the
concept of "limited sovereignty"
and related issues.
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USSR TO STEP UP ECONOMIC AID TO IRAQ
The USSR will increase its
economic assistance efforts in
Iraq under the terms of several
newly signed agreements. The
Soviet programs will concentrate
on assisting Iraq to develop its
petroleum resources.
During the recent visit to
Moscow by the Iraq deputy pre-
mier, the USSR extended a $70-
million credit to the Iraqi Na-
tional Oil Company (INOC) for
the exploitation of two oil fields
in southern Iraq, including the
rich North Rumaila field. The
credit, which covers the provi-
sion of Soviet equipment and
technicians, will be repaid in
Iraqi crude oil one year after
production begins.
The Soviet credit to INOC
appears to cover the cost of
both the first and second stages
of development proposed for North
Rumaila, which was expropriated
from the Western-owned Iraq Pe-
troleum Company in 1961. Pro-
duction by the end of the first
stage, which is scheduled to take
three years from the start of
development, is to be about five
million tons of crude a year,
yielding annual revenues of about
$45 million. Upon completion of
the second stage, for which no
time schedule has been specified,
production is to be at the rate
of about 18 million tons a year,
generating annual revenues of
approximately $160 million. Esti-
Page 14
mated proved reserves at North
Rumaila exceed one billion tons.
Under a separate agreement
a Soviet trade organization will
provide INOC with $72 million
worth of equipment and technical
aid to develop petroleum resources
in the al-Halfayah area in south-
eastern Iraq. Although no ex-
ploration has taken place in al-
Halfayah, Western oil experts be-
lieve it to be a promising area.
The agreement calls for downpay-
ments of 25 percent, the balance
to be covered by a commercial
credit payable in five years.
All payments under this agreement
are to be made in accordance with
the Soviet-Iraqi trade agreement
of 1958, which provides for the
settlement of accounts in hard
currency.
ago.
The USSR has also agreed to
undertake the construction of
three irrigation dams, to survey
natural gas deposits, and to sur-
vey and develop certain iron de-
posits to support a proposed iron
and steel plant. In addition,
Soviet technicians are to conduct
navigational surveys of the Tigris
River, and to study the feasibil-
ity of a shipbuilding dock in
Basra and the development of the
Fao navigational canal. No cred-
its to finance these projects
were announced, but approximately
$50 million may still be avail-
able from the Soviet credit of
$137.5 million extended ten years
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DISARMAMENT TALKS Focus ON SEABED ISSUE
The Eighteen Nation Disarma-
ment Committee (ENDC), with two
new members--Japan and Mongolia--
has resumed its negotiations fol-
lowing a six-week recess. The
committee will be under pressure
to draft a compromise seabed arms
control treaty.
A number of nonnuclear coun-
tries--members and nonmembers of
the ENDC--have threatened to turn
to the UN Disarmament Commission
(the General Assembly sitting as
a committee of the whole) unless
they gain a greater voice in Ge-
neva and the talks become more
productive. Inasmuch as Soviets
are holding up any further en-
largement of the committee, a fail-
ure to produce some new arms con-
trol measure could lead to a dis-
armament free-for-all in New York
this fall when the 24th General
Assembly opens.
Most ENDC members hope to
agree on the text of a seabed
treaty this session, although
the US and Soviet positions are
still far apart. The Soviets
favor across-the-board demilitari-
zation of the seabed, with recip-
rocal inspection rights, whereas
the US prefers a ban limited to
nuclear and other mass-destruction
weapons, with rights to observe
and consult but not inspect. The
Soviets propose exempting seabeds
within a state's 12-mile territor-
ial waters. Washington, on the
other hand, advocates exempting
only a three-mile-wide coastal
band.
International sentiment seems
to support a ban more comprehen-
sive than the US formulation.
There is particularly strong
pressure to include some conven-
tional weapons in the prohibition.
The majority of the NATO allies
have expressed these views, and
nearly all of them favor the So-
viet 12-mile-wide coastal strip
over the three-mile-wide band
that the US wants.
Practically every country
has a different idea on the veri-
fication issue, and it could
prove a sticking point in nego-
tiations unless the committee's
cocharimen--the US and Soviet
delegates--are allowed to take
the lead in reaching a compromise.
The Soviets have recently acknowl-
edged a relationship between the
kinds of weapons covered by the
ban and the type of verification
needed. Since they have hinted
at flexibility on the former,
they may be open to negotiation
on the latter as well.
The committee will also con-
sider a report drafted for UN
Secretary General Thant on the
effects of chemical and bacterio-
logical warfare (CBW). Thant has
called for an agreement to halt
development, production, and
stockpiling of CBW agents. Prog-
ress on this volatile issue seems
unlikely during this session, how-
ever, because the participants
will probably be unable to agree
on what substances should be con-
sidered CBW agens.
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SOVIET NAVAL SQUADRON TO MAKE FIRST CUBAN VISIT
The forthcoming "friendship"
visit of a Soviet naval squadron
to Cuba is another example of the
expanding scope of Soviet naval
operations and the use of naval
forces for political purposes.
This is the first time So-
viet warships have visited Cuba
and the ships will be on hand
for the 16th anniversary celebra-
tions of Castro's 26th of July
movement. The squadron, due to
arrive on 20 July for a one-week
visit, has been moving slowly
across the central Atlantic since
leaving home waters in mid-June.
It consists of three guided-mis-
sile ships, two diesel attack
submarines, a tender, and an
oiler. On 9 July the squadron
was sighted some 250 miles south-
west of Bermuda.
The visit will probably
shape up as another high point
in Cuban-Soviet relations which
have been warmer this year than
at any time since the Brezhnev-
Kosygin leadership assumed power.
Some new economic or technical
commitments to Cuba may be an-
nounced during the visit. In
January Castro praised the So-
viets for the first time in three
years, and he is likely to reit-
erate his praise of Soviet aid
and technology during the 26 July
celebrations. Although no prep-
arations for Cuban holiday ob-
servances have been noted, Cas-
tro will probably deliver a key-
note speech. Cuban media have
already begun to emphasize the
importance of the visit to Cuban-
Soviet friendship and say it is
a "cause for rejoicing."
On the other hand, the most
that can be said for the terse
announcement of the visit by the
Soviets, who probably initiated
it, is that propaganda advantages
for Cuba were not their foremost
consideration in promoting the
visit. 25X1
ITALY UNDERGOING GOVERNMENT CRISIS
The resignation of Christian
Democratic Prime Minister Rumor's
government on 5 July has stopped
progress on social legislation
and sharpened the issue of rela-
tions between the democratic par-
ties and the Communists. The
coalition of the Christian Demo-
cratic, Socialist, and the very
small Republican parties is act-
ing on a caretaker basis until a
decision is reached on a new
government. The Communists are
calling for a coalition of the
left, although without any ex-
pectation of success at this
time.
The crisis was forced when
the Socialist Party formed in
1966 by the anti-Communist So-
cial Democrats and the old-line
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Socialists, redivided on 4 July
into two separate political par-
ties. The conservatives, who
have christened themselves the
Unitary Socialists, included,
at least initially, less than
one third of the Socialist par-
liamentary deputies.
President Saragat, who is
sympathetic to the Unitary So-
cialists, hinted earlier that
he would dissolve Parliament and
call national elections should
the Socialists split. Other
solutions will be attempted
first, however, because there is
no precedent under the current
constitution for holding elec-
tions before the end of the reg-
ular parliamentary term, which
does not expire until 1973.
The political crisis and
negotiations looking toward a
new coalition will highlight the
issue of relations between the
democratic parties and the Com-
munists. The small Republican
Party on 7 July stated it would
not enter a new center-left
coalition because both Social-
ists and Christian Democrats
were raising false issues, prin-
cipally the Communist issue, to
justify power struggles.
No substantial faction of
either Christian Democrats or
Socialists advocates including
Communists in a coalition gov-
ernment in the near future.
There are, however, real dif-
ferences in both political group-
ings over the parliamentary role
of the Communists.
The factions on the left of
both parties advocate accepting
Communist votes for social re-
forms, even when such reforms
are opposed by conservatives
within the ruling parties. Here-
tofore, the center-left govern-
ments have agreed to resign
rather than accept needed votes
from the opposition--principally
the Communists--on a government
measure. Disagreement on this
subject was a main feature of
last week's Socialist Party meet-
ing. The national council of
Christian Democratic Party con-
vened on 9 July to consider
similar problems of policy and
leadership.
The Communist Party plans
cautiously to exploit the dis-
array in the political lineup.
It hopes to build a strong left-
wing coalition in conjunction
with the leftist factions of
the other parties.
In any case, the momentum
of the reform program in Par-
liament, which has been consid-
ered the best long-term guarantee
of government stability, has
been lost. While a wide ranging
secondary school law and a gen-
erous social security pension law
have been passed, long-promised
tax, university, and other so-
cial reforms cleared only pre-
liminary legislative stages.
A prospect of increased
labor unrest during the second
half of 1969 seems likely to ex-
acerbate political dissension.
Upcoming labor negotiations will
involve some 50 national contracts
and 4 million workers, one fifth
of the country's entire labor
force.
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NONALIGNED MEETING HAS ONLY LIMITED OBJECTIVES
Representatives from 51 self-
styled nonaligned countries showed
up in Belgrade on 8 July for a
long-planned and much-delayed con-
sultative meeting. Their purpose
is to salvage as much cooperation
from among the less developed
countries of Africa, Asia, and
Latin America as the widely di-
vergent national interests of the
countries will permit.
To avoid open disagreement,
the meeting, which will continue
through 11 July, will attempt
only to reaffirm the basic prin-
ciples of nonalignment, promote
economic cooperation, and approve
future gatherings that some par-
ticipants hope will lead to a
full-scale conference such as
those held in Belgrade in 1961
and Cairo in 1964. Prospects are
dim, however, for firm commitments
from the delegates to convene such
a meeting in the near future.
The meeting is the culmina-
tion of 18 months of intensive
effort and careful planning on
the part of the Yugoslavs. Tito
has taken pains to keep the more
controversial issues such as Viet-
nam and the invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia off the agenda and to ensure
that the meeting does not turn
into a platform for polemics on
the part of the more radical rep-
resentatives.
Discussion of the Middle
East question
could yet prove the
cats yst for such a polemic, how-
ever, as there are representatives
who will attempt to exploit this
issue. Various other radical
groups will also want to air
their grievances from the stage
the meeting provides.
The Yugoslavs have calculated
the damage that failure to con-
trol the meeting would have for
their own policies and prestige,
and are attempting to stage a
low-key, well-managed affair.
Tito recognizes that nonalign-
ment has lost most of its appeal
because of changing circumstances,
but the concept remains central to
Yugoslavia's foreign policy.
Thus Tito is constrained to con-
tinue his efforts to provide lead-
ership to a group of "uncommitted"
states that individually wish to
avoid aligning themselves with
the larger power blocs.
Even Tito realizes, however,
that this objective has only lim-
ited possibilities, and that the
dream he once had of a large non-
aligned group able through its
cohesive effort to exert influ-
ence in the world arena is no
longer a practical expectation.
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Israel is adopting a tougher line toward the Arab states on both the
military and diplomatic fronts. Israel seems to have set its course on a "no
budge, hit hard" policy to demonstrate to the Arabs and the Big Powers that
it will not accept an unsatisfactory settlement.
Fedayeen concern over the recent changes in the Jordanian govern-
ment, army, and security forces has increased the chances of a confrontation
between Amman and the terrorist organizations. Fearful that the new
appointments signal a government offensive against them, the fedayeen have
called a general alert and have given orders to avoid at all costs provoking
members of the Jordanian armed forces.
A new labor policy announced in Pakistan on 5 July promotes trade
unionism, legalizes strikes, and increases minimum wages. Although some
labor leaders are dissatisfied with certain measures, initial over-all reaction by
labor has been favorable. Meanwhile, a new policy to revamp the entire
education system that will arouse considerable controversy has been pro-
posed by the government.
The Nigerian civil war remains stalemated, although heavy fighting has
continued along the southern front. One federal oilfield near Biafran-held
territory has stopped production as a result of a secessionist raid, and oil
officials are nervous about the danger of future Biafran attacks.
The military-police junta in Ghana has taken another step toward a
return to civilian rule by setting national parliamentary elections for 29
August. Party elections for parliamentary candidates are under way through-
out the country. The junta plans to transfer power to the new government
on 30 September.
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NEW NOTE OF BELLIGERENCE SOUNDED IN MIDDLE EAST
A series of air clashes in
which 13 Arab aircraft are claimed
to have been downed by Israel over
the past two weeks highlight the
increasing belligerency of the op-
posing forces in the Middle East.
Tel Aviv, which is usually
fairly reliable in its military
claims, reported the downing of
four Egyptian aircraft on 1 July
and two more on 7 July. In the
largest air battle with Syria since
the 1967 war, Israel on 8 July
claimed to have shot down seven
out of an estimated total inven-
tory of 58 Syrian MIG-21s. Tel
Aviv denied losing any aircraft
during these encounters.
Ground fighting has died down
along the Jordan River in recent
days, but the Suez Canal continues
to be the scene of heavy daily fire-
fights.
lar forces despite Israeli retalia-
tion, and the Arabs' continuing re-
fusal to come to the peace table.
The heightened Israeli tough-
ness has come in the wake of the
recent Soviet-Egyptian talks in
Cairo, which the Israelis seem to
regard as indicating a continuation
of Arab inflexibility and hostil-
ity. Israeli leaders have defended
the new ferocity as necessary to
prove to the Arabs that they can-
not move Israel from the cease-
fire lines without a peace agree-
ment.
On the diplomatic front, Is-
rael expressed its defiance in the
UN Security Council by ostenta-
tiously moving its police headquar-
ters into East Jerusalem. After
Tel Aviv was censured by the Coun-
cil for its annexationist design on
Jerusalem, the Foreign Ministry is-
sued a statement indicating that
Israel would continue its annexa-
tion and that Jerusalem would re-
main united and the capital.
Cairo's initiation of most of the
fighting along the canal apparently
reflects its need to satisfy dom-
estic critics, to belie the per-
manency of the cease-fire line,
and to keep attention focused on
the volatile nature of the Middle
East situation.
Israel is increasingly taking
a more active posture on the mili-
tary front and one of open defiance
on the diplomatic front. The
rougher over-all position seems
to reflect Israeli frustrations
growing out of the never-ending har-
rassment by Arab fedayeen and regu-
Dayan and other cabinet minis-
ters have this past week also made
their designs on the occupied ter-
ritories a little clearer. Two
cabinet ministers indicated that
the Gaza Strip would remain in Is-
raeili hands, an issue that the Is-
raelis have previously left fuzzy.
Dayan publicly annexed the Golan
Heights by his proposal that they
should be treated as part of Israel 25X1
and not as occupied territory. He
also publicly stated that Israel
needed "major changes" on the West
Bank and would hang on to Sharm
ash Sheikh.
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ISRAEL MAINTAINS AIR SUPERIORITY IN MIDDLE EAST
The downing of a number of
Egyptian fighters in recent air
clashes with the Israelis under-
scores the fact that, although
Egypt has a larger inventory of
planes, the Israelis still con-
trol Middle East skies.
The Egyptians have done much
to protect their aircraft by
building dispersal airfields and
concrete shelters, but they still
lack proficient pilots.- Unless
Egypt acquires more planes and
trained pilots by this fall, the
air balance will swing even more
in Israel's favor as the first of
50 F-4 Phantom jets arrive from
the US.
In early June, Egypt had
about 330 fighter aircraft com-
pared with Israel's some 280, a
numerical advantage that is more
than offset by the superior qual-
ity of Israeli pilots and ground
crews.
The capability of the Egyp-
tian Air Force currently is lim-
ited in part by a shortage of
trained pilots.
A number of Egyptians are
currently receiving pilot training
in the USSR, but it will take sev-
eral months before they can be
considered combat-ready.
Soviet ships continue to
make military deliveries to Alex-
andria, but the USSR has not de-
livered any fighter aircraft to
Egypt in the last six months.
The introduction of Phantoms
into the Israeli inventory will
significantly augment the Israeli
Air Force. The first of these
aircraft will be delivered in
September and all but six recon-
naissance versions are to be in
Israel by mid-1970. Israel also
now has about half of the 100 A-4
Skyhawks purchased from the US.
Each month three more A-4s are
turned over to the Israelis. The
status of the 50 French-built
Mirage 5s embargoed by President
de Gaulle is still in doubt.
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KENYA FACES POLITICAL ADJUSTMENTS
The assassination of Tom
Mboya has eliminated much of
the uncertainty about who will
succeed President Jomo Kenyatta,
but it has embittered those who
suspect that the murder was po-
litically motivated.
Mboya's death ends a long
struggle within the ruling Kenya
Africa National Union (KANU) be-
tween the President's closest
advisers--who are commonly called
the Kikuyu Establishment and who
would lose their positions of
power if a non-Kikuyu became
president--and the followers of
Mboya who are offended by heavy-
handed Kikuyu tactics. Neither
side was able to gain a decisive
advantage, but Mboya's death
should ensure that the Establish-
ment candidate, Vice President
Daniel arap Moi, a member of a
minor tribe who is amenable to
Kikuyu wishes, will prevail.
The Kikuyu Establishment,
nevertheless, is still faced
with serious problems. The most
immediate is to keep order in
the face of the belief by Mboya's
fellow Luo tribesmen that the
assassination is a part of their
continuing political struggle
with the dominant Kikuyu. The
police, well trained and equipped,
are the main defense against
violence, and they dealt effec-
tively with disturbances in
Nairobi during Mboya's funeral.
There is no indication that the
1.5 million Luo--14 percent of
the population--will attempt a
united uprising, but if a revolt
should occur the security forces
would be severely taxed.
The assassination brings
other problems. Mboya was Kenya's
most able minister, and there is
no one with his administrative
skill to assume the crucial min-
istry of Economic Development.
Finding a replacement for his
post as KANU secretary-general
will be an equally difficult
problem.
Mboya was an outstanding
political organizer and was
given much of the responsibility
for planning party activities
against the opposition Kenya
People's Union (KPU), a party
based primarily on the Luo tribe
The KPU as been
steadily losing ground to KANU;
their parliamentary representa-
tion has been reduced to 8 out
of 158 seats. The KPU did, how-
ever, win a recent by-election
when Mboya refused to partici-
pate for KANU, and the Establish-
ment demonstrated its ineptness
at electoral activities. The
Kikuyu must now face efforts by
the KPU to capitalize on the bit-
terness and suspicions engend-
ered by the assassination. If
the KPU leadership is able to
form an alliance with Mboya's
former non-Kikuyu allies, KANU
and the Establishment will face
a tough political fight.
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INDIAN INTEREST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA STEPPED UP
New Delhi continues to seek
an expanded Indian role in South-
east Asia, but its recent efforts
indicate little real progress.
on 3 July Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi concluded a 12-day official
trip to Japan and Indonesia dur-
ing which regional economic coop-
eration--India's favorite means
for strengthening Southeast Asia--
was an important topic of discus-
sion.
In Tokyo the Indians suc-
ceeded in obtaining an agreement
for the resumption of Japanese
project aid to India, which had
been halted in 1966. They failed,
however, to convince the Japanese
that India can contribute toward
the economic development of South-
east Asia. Japan has strongly
opposed India's participation
in existing regional economic
organizations because India is
seen as a potential drain rather
than a significant donor, and
possibly as a future competitor
to rising Japanese inroads in the
area. The Indians were rebuffed
with the usual line that they
should concentrate efforts on
their own multifold domestic prob-
lems before trying to assist their
eastern neighbors.
India's reaction to Moscow's
recent loosely defined proposal
for an Asian "collective security"
arrangement has been negative.
Throughout her trip Mrs. Gandhi
denied New Delhi has any detailed
information regarding it. She
maintained, however, that the So-
viets have no desire to establish
a military presence in Asia, and
that the proposal is probably
designed to check the powers of
Communist China and the US in
the area. In line with India's
traditional aversion to military
alliances, Mrs. Gandhi insisted
New Delhi is unwilling to par-
ticipate in any kind of regional
military pact, because such a
scheme would only exacerbate
regional tensions and provoke
Communist China.
In the Indian view, any
power vacuum resulting from the
withdrawal of the British from
Malaysia and Singapore by
1971 and the eventual termina-
tion of US involvement in Viet-
nam should be filled by Asian
nations alone. Mrs. Gandhi's
repeated disavowal of interest
in a new Soviet-dominated pact
was probably aimed at dispelling
possible apprehensions among
some Asians that India, in its
bid for more influence in South-
east Asia, might be acting as a
broker for Soviet interests.
The Brezhnev proposal,
which appears to have taken New
Delhi by surprise, is also un-
appealing to India because of
its distinct anti-Chinese character.
Any seemingly anti-Chinese move
on India's part would undermine
its attempts to keep the lines
open to Peking in hopes of an
eventual Sino-Indian rapproche-
ment. It could further strain
Indo-Pakistani relations and
jeopardize chances for meaningful
Pakistani participation in the
overland trade transit conference
proposed by Soviet Premier Kosy-
gin in late may as a means of
fostering subcontinental economic
cooperation.
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Latin America's attention was focused this week on the continuing
dispute between El Salvador and Honduras. Efforts by the Central American
mediators to dampen the crisis have not yet been successful. Honduras has
thus far taken a moderate, conciliatory tone. Strong pressures in El Salvador
for a tough policy toward Honduras are still, however, impeding efforts to
resolve the conflict, and there is growing fear that Salvador might attempt to
invade Honduras.
In South America, representatives of Chile, Ecuador, and Peru at a
meeting in Lima approved a US proposal for a fisheries conference for all
four nations. This conference will open in Buenos Aires on 30 July and may
contribute to easing the tension over west coast fishing rights. The South
American nations involved, however, have already gone on record that there
will not be any discussion of their jurisdiction over 200 miles of adjacent
seas.
In Uruguay, President Pacheco has placed the nation's police forces
under military control in an effort to stem subversion and violence. The
President's decree followed the fatal shooting on 7 July of a Montevideo
policeman by the Tupamaros, Uruguay's most active terrorist group. Under
the new rule, civilian police will remain under the overt control of the
Minister of the Interior, but they will not be responsible for their acts under
civil law. The police are thus freed from liability in the event "shoot-to-kill"
orders to control violence are carried out.
Tightened British immigration controls appear to be holding down
attendance at Bermuda's four-day Regional Black Power Conference which
ends Sunday. The British have also stationed 100 Royal Marines on the
island in anticipation of possible disorders.
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LIMITED RETURN TO POLITICAL NORMALITY IN BRAZIL OPPOSED
President Costa e Silva and
some moderates in the government
are working to restore a more
normal political life to Brazil,
but these efforts are opposed by
many military and civilian hard
liners.
In his meetings in June with
Governor Rockefeller, Costa e
Silva made his firmest commitment
yet to re-establish a degree of
normal political activity in
Brazil. He declared that Con-
gress--suspended last December--
would be reopened within two
months; that a new constitution
would be presented shortly after-
ward to Congress for approval;
and that congressional, state,
and municipal elections would be
held in 1970. Costa e Silva
added that the presidential elec-
tion would be held on schedule
in 1971 and that under no circum-
stances would he stand for re-
election.
The government has already
taken steps toward a limited re-
turn to constitutionalism without
sacrificing what it considers its
security needs. Vice President
Aleixo and collaborators have been
preparing a draft of extensive
amendments to the 1967 constitu-
tion, or possibly a complete new
one, and on 6 July a five-member
commission was created to put the
proposed changes in final form
for presentation to the President
around 17 July.
The most important reforms
probably will mean another increase
of the powers of the executive
branch at the expense of the leg-
islative, and the establishment
of stringent new regulations con-
cerning political parties, elec-
tions, and eligibility for public
office.
There remain powerful civi-
lian and military groups that
seriously doubt the wisdom of
even limited liberalization at
this time. These hard liners
believe that only a start has
been made in carrying out the
goals of the 1964 revolution.
They demand that the process of
eliminating elements they consi-
der corrupt, subversive, or other-
wise undesirable from the govern-
ment and public institutions be
continued.
The periodic meetings of the
National Security Council to an-
nounce new punitive measures against
public officials are probably a
result of the hard-line pressure
on the President. At its most
recent session on 1 July, some
81 state deputies and lower of-
ficials lost their political
rights for ten years, and six
other persons were forcibly re-
tired.
Leaders of the opposition
Brazilian Democratic Movement?
whose members have been the prin-
cipal targets of the penalties--
claim that the continuing purges
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and other forms of harassment
are seriously hampering their at-
tempts to comply with a govern-
ment order that the country's two
parties hold municipal, state,
and national conventions by No-
vember. They charge that the gov-
ernment's actions violate speci-
fic guarantees regarding freedom
of political association made by
Justice Minister Gama e Silva
in June.
Some of the hard liners, such
as Gama e Silva, appear to have
accepted the fact that some nor-
malization will take place, and
are attempting to get into posi-
tions where they can shape the
degree and way in which it occurs.
Several hard-line generals on ac-
tive duty are joining the govern-
ment's political party, and may
intend to run for major offices
under its banner. This move could
further discourage civilians who
hope for a less restrictive po-
litical environment.
Other military extreme hard-
liners have maintained staunch
opposition to any liberalization,
and some have openly attacked
Costa e Silva as the spokesman
of the moderates. The govern-
ment recently has cracked down
on some of the most intransigent
military men.
A hard-line colonel--and
brother of the Interior Minister--
was forcibly retired in May, and
on 1 July the National Security
Council removed General Moniz de
Aragao from his post as director-
general of army supply and from
the service high command. The
general had made speeches to his
subordinates denouncing the Presi-
dent for allegedly engaging in
nepotism and tolerating corruption
among his advisers, and had pre-
sented the charges in a letter to
the army minister. Although the
vote of the high command for re-
moving Moniz de Aragao was unani-
mous, and there apparently have not
been any serious repercussions
from the action, his accusations
are accepted as true by a number
of younger officers of the rank
of colonel.
Although the President's
move toward liberalization indi-
cates that he is reasonably confi-
dent of his position, his actions
in this direction and his sanc-
tions against the hard liners serve
to increase their hostility toward
him. As the timing for the re-
opening of Congress and the hold-
ing of elections becomes more firm,
the gulf between moderates and hard
liners is likely to widen.
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ANTI-US SENTIMENT WANING IN PERU
The announcement by the US
on 3 July that it was lifting the
ban on military sales to Peru and
Ecuador has generated a much more
favorable attitude toward the US
from both the Peruvian press and
government officials.
As an immediate result of
lifting the ban, Peru, Ecuador,
and Chile have agreed to meet
with the US on the problem of
fishing rights in waters claimed
by the three countries. All three
claim jurisdiction over waters
out to 200 miles from their
coasts. This has often resulted
in strained relations with the
US, particularly when Peru and
Ecuador have seized and fined US
fishing boats operating within
the claimed 200-mile limit.
As a further result of the
easing of tensions, Peru's For-
eign Minister Mercado says his
country is now ready to renew
discussions with the US on prob-
lems arising from the expropria-
tions last October of the US-owned
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International Petroleum Company
(IPC). There are indications
that the Peruvian Government gen-
uinely wants to find a solution
to this problem, although there
is still no assurance that it is
prepared to compensate IPC ade-
quately for the expropriated
property.
One of Peru's primary motives
in its new effort to get along
with the US is probably the mili-
tary government's desire to solve
as many of its outstanding prob-
lems as it can before it becomes
completely involved in implemen-
ting the far-reaching domestic
reforms, most of which are still
in the planning stage. A con-
tinuing inflow of foreign capital
is important to the effective im-
plementation of the government's
reform program, including the re-
cently promulgated agrarian re-
forms. A resolution of the coun-
try's difficulties with the US
would help ensure this inflow.
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Secret
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