WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT GUATEMALA - - THE PRE-ELECTION SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007200040002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 18, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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D
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Guatemala -- The Pre-Election Situation
Secret
Np 43
18 July 1969
No. 0379/69A
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The frail political stability laboriously developed under the present Guatemalan adminis-
tration will suffer serious strains during the political campaign now under way for the general
elections next March. Violence has shown a steady increase since Ma
Supporters of the rightist presidential candidate have threatened similar action if it
appears that their candidate will lose the election or be deprived of the presidency illegally.
With the ruling Revolutionary Party in control of the electoral machinery, either develop-
ment is possible.
The most important ingredient in the political spectrum is the military. The armed
forces have the power to install the legally elected candidate or anyone else they wish. So far
in this century, only one duly elected Guatemalan President has turned over control to a duly
chosen successor.
BACKGROUND
During the President's three years of rule,
some 15 months have been under one form or
another of emergency condition. As a result,
overt politics have been suspended and there has
been little partisan commentary, organizational
activity, or even interest on the part of a largely
apathetic electorate.
Early in its term, the Mendez government
was characterized as the country's first reformist
regime since 1954, and its supporters hoped that
it would provide a clear-cut contrast to the mili-
tary regimes that had ruled for the previous 12
years. President Mendez has done little, however,
to establish meaningful patterns for social and
economic change that would meet the country's
pressing needs. He has vacillated under pressure
from vested interests, and early in his term it
became apparent that his chief desire was to com-
plete his term. Bureaucratic red tape and a gener-
ally tight budgetary situation notwithstanding,
the government has been completing and inaugu-
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rating a series of small public works projects, but
these small efforts have proved disappointing to
the largely forgotton electorate that brought the
government to power.
Nevertheless, over the past few months there
has developed a growing faith in the government's
viability, and stability-delicate though it may
be-probably rests on a broader base than it has in
the past ten years or more. The military, for
example, have chosen not to leave the barracks on
several occasions during Mendez' term that earlier
could have precipitated a take-over. Foremost
among these events was the sudden dismissal in
March 1968 of three high-ranking officers respon-
sible for many of the excesses perpetrated during
the government's counterinsurgency campaign
from late 1966 to mid-1967. The military ac-
cepted the dismissals and the extensive shifts that
followed. For the first time in over a decade the
military yielded to civilian rule.
Following the command changes, Mendez
issued orders for a continuation of the
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counterinsurgency campaign--albeit on a reduced
scale-which is still under way. The President's
action served to dispel much of the military's
distrust for him. Since then Mendez has gradually
placed officers loyal to the principles of constitu-
tionality in positions of authority and has gone
out of his way to curry the military's favor. The
President's brother, Colonel Guillermo Mendez,
an army doctor, has been an excellent liaison
between the palace and military headquarters. In
addition, the fact that the President is not a
charter member of the ruling party also has made
relations with the military more cordial.
Nevertheless, the President still lacks support
in depth from the armed forces, and the trend
toward increased professionalism within the mili-
tary could be quickly reversed. The military's
long tradition of acting as the country's political
arbiter is difficult to outgrow. Moreover, Guate-
mala's endemic economic and social problems,
and any resumption of large-scale Communist
insurgency, could generate sufficient unrest to
provoke a military take-over. The officer corps is
dominated by conservative, virulent anti-Commu-
nists who are prone to view any social or eco-
nomic change as a threat to their favored posi-
tion. The corps is prepared to prevent the left
from regaining the prominence it enjoyed during
the years prior to 1954.
The military's suspicion of the ruling Revo-
lutionary Party is likely to become a critical ele-
ment as the election nears. Fear that the left may
return to power may cause agitation within the
armed forces for a coup. The fact that a well-
known rightist, Colonel Carlos Manuel Arana
Osorio, is running for the presidency for the two
rightist parties, the National Liberation Move-
ment and the Institutional Democratic Party will
make the military's nonpolitical role more diffi-
cult; there is already evidence that army person-
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nel have begun to pressure peasants in the north-
east to vote for Arana.
THE POLITICAL PARTIES
The ruling Revolutionary Party (PR) was
founded by the President's brother, Mario, in
1957 and was to have been his vehicle to the
palace. When he died on the eve of elections in
October 1965, the candidacy passed to his
brother.
By Guatemalan standards the PR is a well-
organized political party. It enjoys substantial and
widespread support, including an extensive net-
work of rural cadres. As the government party, it
enjoys a steady flow of funds and other public
services.
The PR's presidential candidate, Mario
Fuentes Pieruccini, is not regarded as a threat by
vested interest groups. Fuentes 25X6
served as minister of finance under Mendez and
most observers believe he has done a creditable
job of running the ministry.
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In his campaign Fuentes reaffirms the pres-
ent government policy condemning violence, but
favors using the legitimate security forces instead
of vigilante groups against it. He also says he
intends to combat Communism with positive
social action. Although history has demonstrated
that Guatemalans, especially the highland Indians,
tend to vote for the party in power, Fuentes will
have to overcome his lack of charisma before he
can make a major impact on the rest of the
electorate.
The two rightist parties, the National Libera-
tion Movement (MLN) and the Institutional Dem-
ocratic Party (PID), joined forces early this year
to back Colonel Carlos Arana. The MLN traces its
history back to the "liberationists," a group of
men instrumental in overthrowing the Commu-
nist-leaning Arbenz government in 1954. Because
of its rightist orientation, the party's platform has
always been strongly anti-Communist; most of its
support comes from the officer corps and wealthy
business and landed families. The PID, more a
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political club than a party, also represents the
country's more conservative families. Colonel
Arana's "law and order" campaign theme and
strong anti-Communist stand make him an appeal-
ing candidate to the oligarchy.
Colonel Arana, former commander of the
powerful army brigade at Zacapa, is credited with
clearing northeastern Guatemala of the Commu-
nist guerrillas. Arana armed some 3,000 civilians
to augment his army forces and gave them carte
blanche in dealing with those they believed to be
"Communists." Many innocent persons were
killed, and in many cases it became apparent that
the civilians were doing away with political foes.
After he was relieved in March 1968, Arana
served as ambassador to Nicaragua until April
1969 when he returned to begin his campaign.
The Christian Democratic Party (DCG) was
founded in 1955 by a group of wealthy, devoutly
Catholic Guatemalans. The character of the party
has since changed profoundly, and by 1964 it
began to espouse a liberal reformist program. The
DCG can count on only a small following, but it
may attract many of the disillusioned leftists who
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GUATEMALA: FAR Guerrilla Zones
Zones: Approximately 30 men
Regions: Approximately 10 men
PuebleNuevo
- Tiquisate,
95606 7-69 CIA
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Cohan
San Cristobal z; Santa Rosa
Region
Northwestern Quetz
Region
Vuiche Salama
Z'acapa
.Cuilapa
I Progresso : " _,
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have abandoned the PR. The DCG candidate,
Jorge Lucas Caballeros, is a former army officer
and served as minister of finance during the
Peralta government (1963-66).
THE COMMUNIST LEFT
Since May 1969 there has been a marked rise
in violence in Guatemala City and in the north-
eastern region of the country. A further increase
could produce near panic in the capital. The
150-man pro-Cuban Rebel Armed Forces (FAR)
has been responsible for most oft recent kill-
ings, bombings, and kidnapings.
many months o inactivity
have caused serious friction, divisions and morale
problems. Presumably the bombing of a TV sta-
tion in Guatemala City on 20 May, which caused
about $500,000 damage, and the assassination on
1 June of prominent MLN leader Mario Lopez
Villatoro and his bodyguard have remedied some
of these problems. Lopez' killing is perhaps the
most serious single. incident since US Ambassador
Mein's assassination last year.
Many FAR leaders and experienced cadre
have been killed by government forces during the
past two years and the movement has been forced
to rebuild its rural support network, retrain and
recruit personnel. and generally revamp the organ-
ization.
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The army still lacks mobility
and communications, despite a recent improve-
ment in its capabilities.
The FAR's proven strength, however, lies in
its ability to carry out sporadic and well-planned
urban attacks. Over the years it has published lists
of persons targeted for assassination and its abil-
ity to carry out the threats has been a demoraliz-
ing factor.
The Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT)
also has suffered serious internal divisions, and it
has been driven further underground in the past
year and a half. At present, the PGT is engaged in
organizing and enlisting support. It has a tactics
school located near Mazatenango and an urban
resistance front in Guatemala City. The party has
not been very active and reports suggest that it
would prefer for the time being to avoid terrorist
action that would polarize sentiment against the
left and benefit the chief law and order candidate,
Colonel Arana. If the FAR begins a new offen-
sive, however, the PGT probably will be pulled
into the struggle.
THE OUTLOOK
The prospects for a peaceful campaign and
transfer of power are not encouraging. Although
law and order are principal concerns of the elec-
torate, it appears that the Communist terrorists
intend to maintain a fairly steady level of vio-
lence. Should the terrorists succeed in assassinat-
ing one of the presidential candidates or another
political or military leader, President Mendez
would be faced with a serious dilemma. He would
be under heavy pressure from rightists to crack
down hard on the terrorists, a move that would
further alienate the left and might weaken sup-
port for the Revolutionary Party. Hesitation, on
the other hand, might provoke a military coup or
at least the re-emergence of the right-wing vigi-
lante groups dormant since last year, and the
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eye-for-an-eye struggle between the left and the turn back the progress that has been achieved in
right would resume. Colonel Arana would benefit the past several years. Confidence in the central
from either development. government would be eroded and prospects for a
violent solution would grow.
A renewal of the bloodletting, traditional in
a country that lacks political maturity, would
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