WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CIA-RDP79-00927A007300070001-6
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RIPPUB
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S
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35
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December 21, 2016
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June 4, 2008
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1
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Publication Date: 
October 3, 1969
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SUMMARY
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Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Secret DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Secret 44 3 October 1969 No. 0390/69 State Dept. review completed Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 SECRET (Information as of noon EDT,, 2 October 1969) Far East VIETNAM The first important policy statement delivered in Hanoi since the death of Ho Chi Minh placed major emphasis on building socialism, a theme that the speaker, politburo member Truong Chinh, has been advocating for more than a year. In Saigon, mean- while, there is increased nervousness over US inten- tions. SOVIET-INDONESIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS TO BE RESUMED Moscow has agreed to resume some economic aid to Indonesia despite failure to reach final agreement on the important issue of repayment of Indonesia's large debt to the USSR. MUFFLED DRUMS IN PEKING The ceremonies commemorating the 20th anniversary of Communist rule in China could not conceal the fact that there was precious little to celebrate. SECRET Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 Oct 69 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 SECRET Europe MORE PURGES ANTICIPATED IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA The recent Czechoslovak party plenum set the stage for a major purge of the party, state, and mass organ- izations. The party is still divided and Husak prob- ably will face further challenges from the extremists. YUGOSLAV REGIME WORRIED OVER BREAKDOWN IN AUTHORITY President Tito has condemned the lack of discipline among party members at all levels and has threatened a selective purge. EC TRADE AGREEMENTS CAUSE CONCERN IN GATT International trade circles are becoming increasingly concerned about the growing number of preferential trade agreements negotiated by the European Community. AGRICULTURAL PROSPECTS MIXED IN EASTERN EUROPE Romania and Hungary may set new grain production re- cords, but harvests in Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia are expected to be the smallest in three years. TRIBAL OATHS UNSETTLE KENYA A massive resurgence of tribal oath-taking ceremonies among the dominant Kikuyu tribe has heightened tribal tensions. INDIA'S PRIME MINISTER VISITS TROUBLED NORTHEAST Mrs. Gandhi's visit last week set off violent demon- strations, pointing up the strategic region's local problems and its difficulties with the central gov- ernment. SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A007300070001-6 SECRET SOMALI PRIME MINISTER EGAL AT TURNING POINT Since the beginning of Egal's second term in June, his government has been relatively inactive and he appears to have lost his momentum. Western Hemisphere NEW BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT EMPHASIZES NATIONALISM The Ovando government, installed following the coup on 26 September, is seeking to align itself ideolog- ically with Peru, and is combining exaggerated nation- alism and anti-US sentiment at least in part in the hope of striking a popular chord with the Bolivian public. POLITICAL PROBLEMS AWAIT NEW BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT The successor to President Costa e Silva will have to deal with widespread political discontent. CHILEAN MILITARY THINKS IT IS GETTING SHORTCHANGED Discontent in the Chilean armed forces over low pay is again increasing, and opposition political forces are capitalizing on the issue. SECRET Page i i i WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 Oct 69 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A007300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A007300070001-6 SF.CIZET VENEZUELA REACTS TO INCREASED INSURGENCY The most serious outbreaks of guerrilla activity in several months may force the government to revise its pacification program. GOVERNMENT OF NETHERLANDS ANTILLES STILL IN FLUX New elections may have to be called unless a govern- ment can be formed soon. Page iv WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 Oct 69 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A007300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A007300070001-6 SECRET After five months out of public view, both Mao Tse-tung and his heir, Lin Piao, appeared in Peking to mark the 20th anniversary of Communist rule in China. The leadership did not produce any new or distinctive policy guidelines on this important occasion, and the sobriety and restraint of the ceremonies reflected clearly that there was little to celebrate. One highlight of the almost perfunctory proceedings was the emergence of a considerable thaw in Sino-Vietnamese relations. In marked contrast with last year's National Day, when Vietnam was ignored, Chinese propaganda went to considerable lengths to emphasize solidarity between Peking and Hanoi. Peking may be seeking opportunities to influence Hanoi during the early post-Ho era. The unusually high level of both the North Vietnamese and North Korean delegations to Peking suggests that the Chinese are making renewed efforts to counter Soviet attempts to isolate them. The first important policy statement from Hanoi since the death of Ho Chi Minh emphasized the necessity of building socialism so that the struggle in the South could be pursued more effectively. In saying this, politburo member Truong Chinh restated a theme that he has advocated for more than a year. No other clues to the composition of the leadership in Hanoi came to light during the past week, but Chinh's remarks strongly suggest that he remains one of the dominant voices. The Thieu government, apparently concerned over increased nervous- ness in Saigon regarding US intentions and over the possible impact of renewed antiwar agitation in the US, has been, trying to reassure the public about the US commitment and the resolve of the South Vietnamese armed forces. Japanese student "guerrillas" have opened their campaign against the police in earnest. Hit-and-run attacks with Molotov cocktails have been directed at police facilities in Tokyo, Osaka, and Kyoto during the past week. Major antigovernment demonstrations anticipated on 10 and 21 Octo- ber are expected to be preludes to violent demonstrations against Prime SECRET Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A007300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A007300070001-6 SECRET North Vietnamese Leadership Developments VIETNAM sive floods along the Red River this summer. According to some reports, most of the victims have been children. There are no re- liable indications, however, of how far the epidemic has spread or of how many people have been afflicted. The mortality rate is believed to be in the range of 5 to 20 percent of those af- flicted. Politburo member Truong Chinh last week delivered the post-Ho regime's first important policy statement. Speaking in his ca- pacity as chairman of the National Assembly's standing committee, Chinh restated policies that he has been advocating strongly for more than a year. Once again he seemed to argue that more of North Vietnam's energies should be de- voted to "building socialism" and repairing the physical damage and decline in morale caused by the war. The war itself took a sec- ondary place in Chinh's speech, although he maintained that the best way to support the war ef- fort is to make certain that North Vietnam is strong. No other clues to the distribution of power in the current leadership emerged during the week, but Chinh's re- marks strongly suggest that he remains one of the dominant voices in Hanoi. Epidemic in the North A serious epidemic--probably a debilitating strain of dengue fever--has been in progress in parts of North Vietnam since around early September. It may have been exacerbated by exten- Page 2 South Vietnamese Po itical Deve opments There is increased nervous- ness in Saigon over US intentions, some of it taking the form of tougher talk on the issues of war and peace. There is more mum- bling about danger from premature US troop withdrawals and more pub- lic statements against any further concessions to break the deadlock in the Paris talks. Recent cease- fire proposals emanating from prom- inent American citizens have been attacked by South Vietnamese spokesmen--some from groups that have themselves advocated a cease- fire in the past--as "meddling," "unacceptable," or as likely to hand victory to the Communists. The Thieu government, appar- ently concerned over this domestic uneasiness and over the possible impact of renewed antiwar agitation SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A007300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 SECRET in the US, has been trying to re- scattered actions took place assure the public about the US near the Demilitarized Zone, in commitment and the resolve of the provinces north of Saigon, the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. and in the delta. In a recent television appearance, Thieu claimed that, while the pace of "Vietnamization" to date has been based on South Vietnam's ability to replace US soldiers, more weight would be given in de- termining future US withdrawals to two other criteria: the status of the talks in Paris and the level of enemy activity in Viet- nam. In a follow-up interview last week, Defense Minister Vy went a step further by declaring that future US troop reductions would depend on favorable progress in Paris and a lessening of enemy activity on the battlefield. Thieu, meanwhile, has pub- licly observed that the replace- ment of all US troops would not be possible by the end of 1970 but would require several years to complete. He also told a gathering of government trainees that substantial additional US forces could be withdrawn if ad- equate material help were forth- coming, but that South Vietnam would not stop short of victory whatever happened. Military Developments The ground war was rela- tively quiet again this week, maintaining the general pattern of the past three months. Light, The latest battle casualty reports reveal that both allied and enemy losses decreased sig- nificantly in the third quarter of this year. During July, Au- gust,, and September an average of some 150 US personnel were killed each week, compared with an average of some 280 per week in all of 1968 and about 245 per week in the first six months of 1969. For the past three months approximately 230 South Vietnamese military personnel have been killed per week, down from an average of nearly 470 combat deaths per week in 1968 and about 310 per week in the first six months of this year. Current allied casualty rates are generally in line with those of the so-called "lull" periods in the summer and late fall of 1968. Reported enemy battle losses during the past three months have also dropped off, averaging about 2,500 deaths per week compared with an average of some 3,500 enemy killed per week during all of 1968 and the first half of 1969. These lower casualty figures reflect changes in enemy tactics this year. Except for late Febru- ary and March, when the Communists carried out a costly offensive, SECRET Page 3 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 SECRET the Communists have concentrated their efforts on brief surges of shellings and limited ground at- tacks. Moreover, the "highpoints" of enemy activity during the past three months have been consider- ably less intense than those in May and June. Page 4 The most sig- ns icant threat is still near the remote Bu Prang outpost in II Corps, where the Communists have assembled a sizable concentration of regular units. Communist regi- ments have also been noted repo- sitioning themselves near the Cam- bodian border area north of Sai- gon, possibly foreshadowing early offensive action there. SECRET 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 SECRET SOVIET-INDONESIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS To BE RESUMED Recent talks in Djakarta have re-established a framework for Soviet-Indonesian economic relations. Further discussion on the important issue of re- payment of Indonesia's huge debt to the USSR has been deferred, however, to a later round of talks. These probably will be held following a meeting later this month of Indonesia's West- ern creditors, who are consider- ing a long-term plan for repay- ment of Indonesia's debt. Despite failure to reach final agreement on all issues that existed before or arose following the abortive Commu- nist coup in Indonesia in 1965, significant steps have been made toward reviving economic rela- tions. The USSR agreed to re- sume aid to some projects held in abeyance since mid-1966, in- cluding a steel plant and a superphosphate fertilizer plant. The USSR also indicated its will- ingness to extend new aid for Indonesian tin and fishing indus- tries and to continue cash sales of spare parts for previously supplied Soviet military equip- ment. The month-long talks aired divergent positions on repayment of Indonesia's $800-million debt, largely incurred from Soviet mili- tary aid. Djakarta firmly under- scored its inability to repay this debt in accordance with a rescheduling arranged in 1966. Indonesia has failed to make any of the payments--totaling about $40 million--that have fallen due under that agreement, claiming they were too stringent for Indonesia's weak economy. As an alternative, Indonesia proposes that the USSR consider extendin much easier repayment terms. The Soviets' willingness to resume some economic assistance to Djakarta represents a soften- ing in their attitude and sug- gests that Moscow now feels it is more in its interest to culti- vate the Indonesian Government. For the last three years the So- viets have avoided being identi- 25X1 fied with the regime because of its persecution of Indonesian Communists. SECRET Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 SECRET IIUFFLED DRUMS IN PEKING The ceremonies commemorating the 20th anniversary of Communist rule could not conceal the fact that there was precious little to celebrate. The sobriety and re- straint of the occasion reflected the severe domestic and foreign problems facing the regime. Al- though Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao both appeared, reportedly in good health after a five-month absence from public view, they did not produce any new or distinctive Page 6 policy guidelines. Lin's brief and nondescript address at the National Day rally and a speech by Chou En-lai at a reception on 30 September gave short shrift to the Cultural Revolution. Both leaders merely reiterated the need to rebuild the party and con- solidate local governments--many of which are still bedeviled by factionalism. The fact that these same themes were emphasized at last year's National Day attests SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 SECRET to Peking's slow progress in re- pairing the political damage caused by the Cultural Revolution. Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect in the otherwise drab pro- ceedings was the emergence of a considerable thaw in Sino-Vietnam- ese relations. The Chinese pro- vided elaborate welcoming cere- monies for the North Vietnamese delegation headed by Premier Pham Van Dong and for the National Liberation Front/Provisional Revo- lutionary Government delegation. In marked contrast with last year's National Day when the topic of Vietnam was ignored, Chinese propaganda went to considerable lengths to emphasize the solidar- ity between Peking and Hanoi. A Chinese news agency commentary of 29 September congratulated Hanoi on its "victories over US aggres- sion" and used the analogy of "lips and teeth" in describing the closeness of Sino-Vietnamese relations--language identical to the Chinese line before the ad- vent of negotiations. In Hanoi, the North Vietnamese turned out an impressive display of high- level leaders to celebrate the Chinese anniversary and stress the importance they attach to their alliance with Peking. Sino-Vietnamese relations have been strained since Hanoi opted for negotiations in mid- 1968. Peking, however, undoubt- edly has been encouraged by the lack of progress at Paris and now may believe that closer relations with Hanoi will afford it new op- portunities to influence the post- Ho leadership. The unusually high level of both the North Korean and North Vietnamese delegations to Peking suggests that Peking is making renewed efforts to counter Soviet attempts to isolate China. The National Day ceremonies also spot- lighted Peking's continuing pre- occupation with the tense Sino- Soviet frontier. Chinese pro- nouncements were full of allu- sions to Soviet efforts at "nu- clear blackmail" and attempts to foment "rebellion" in frontier areas. Despite this hostile and defensive posture, however, 25X1 Lthe Kosygin-Chou meeting o 11 September resulted in an agree- ment: to hold border talks. An authoritative Chinese editorial of 30 September pointedly referred to China's desire to settle border disputes through negotiations. Although this merely reiterates Peking's long-standing public po- sition on the border dispute, its timing may indicate that talks are indeed in prospect. China's latest atmospheric nuclear test on 29 September has not been mentioned, even in con- nection with National Day. Nor- mally, the Chinese Communists make a nuclear test the occasion for major propaganda fanfare, but Pe- king may have decided that it was prudent not to flaunt its nuclear program on the eve of talks with Moscow. SECRET Page 7 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 SECRET SECRE`I' Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 Oct 69 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 SECRET Ironically, in Czechoslovakia the ultraconservatives, who are wary of association with the West, increased their strength as a result of the recent central committee plenum. In the purge of the party and government, Dubcek, who last year was considering diplomatic relations with Bonn, lost two of his high posts. Although Husak apparently is still in control of the party, he is hard pressed by the ultras. Some cooling of the Sino-Soviet border dispute appears in the offing as hints of new negotiations flow from Moscow. There are also signs that the Soviet leaders are engaged in increased politicking at home. Evading the usual practice of silence on unresolved questions, first deputy premier Polyansky has entered the current press discussion of collective farm man- agement with two sharply worded articles signed by his personal assistant. His move suggests a growing intensity in the behind-the-scenes debate on domestic affairs. The European Community is considering ways to adjust the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to the German decision to let the exchange rate of the mark "float." The result is likely to be that the CAP, only recently adjusted to the French devaluation, will be weakened further. The deadline passed on 1 October for British compliance with the UN General Assembly's resolution requesting London "to terminate the colonial situation in Gibraltar." In retaliation for British inaction, Madrid cut off telephone and telegraph communication between Gibraltar and Spain. The Swedish Social Democratic Party chose Olof Palme as its new party chairman by acclamation. It is likely that Palme will follow tradition and simultaneously serve as prime minister after Tage Erlander ends his 23-year term in office on 14 October. SECRET Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 Oct 69 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A007300070001-6 SECRET MORE PURGES ANTICIPATED IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA The long-awaited plenum of the Czechoslovak party central committee which took place on 25- 26 September set the stage for a major purge of party, state, and mass organizations. Party leader Husak emerged from the meeting in apparent control of a still-di- vided party, but despite his ap- parent decision to rule in a more authoritarian manner he may face even greater challenges from the archconservatives, whose position was strengthened by the plenum's decisions. In a hard-hitting speech on 25 September Husak indicated that the plenum's purge of the central committee and the revamping of the federal and the Czech governments was but the beginning of a thor- oughgoing purge. Husak emphasized that the most important task will be the ouster of liberal elements from the local party organizations. The party will also concentrate on regaining control of education, science, art, and culture, fields which are still dominated by lib- erals or moderates. In addition, the trade union organizations will be a major target. Some local party organizations, particularly those in Prague, have already ousted liberals, and the party or- ganizations at several universi- ties have been disbanded. Husak's remarks suggest also that those members of the central committee who were elected at the now-dis- credited extraordinary 14th party congress may eventually lose their positions on the committee. against "antisocialists" who break the law. He apparently remains opposed to political trials, but some extremists, including Czech party boss Strougal, have already voiced their disappointment that Dubcek and others did not indulge in self-criticism, and already j have exerted pressure on Husak to arrest at least some of the 1968 leaders. On 1 October the Federal Assembly lifted the parliamentary immunity of Vaclav Prchlik and agreed to a proposal to prosecute him. Prchlik, who had severely criticized the Soviet Union last year, was expelled both from the central committee and the party last weekend. Husak devoted the major por- tion of his speech to describing the alleged mistakes of Dubcek and other leaders and to discussing the events that led up to the in- vasion. He stopped just short of justifying the invasion, but his speech and the central com- mittee resolution condoning the invasion doubtless were well re- ceived in Moscow. Husak's strong attack against the regime of former party chief Novotny and his statement that "old sectarian tendencies" are still in evidence indicate that he is aware that he still must deal with discontented ultracon- servatives. The central commit- tee, the Czech party bureau, the Czech government, and to a lesser extent the federal government are now more conservatively oriented. Husak also warned that he will not tolerate open opposition, and he threatened legal measures Among the long-time hard liners returned to positions of eminence were KarelHoffmann, SECRET Page 10 WEEKLY SUMIMIARY Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A007300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 SECRET Oldrich Svestka, Drahomir Kolder, and Antonin Kapek. The individual who gained most from the plenum, however, was the party's moderate- conservative ideologue, Josef Kempny, who replaced Dubcek on the presidium and was selected to be a deputy premier and member of the Czech party bureau. The Slovak party central committee, which began a plenary session on 2 October, probably will also make personnel changes that will redound to the advantage of the archconservatives. As the Czechoslovak party prepares in the coming months for a party con- gress, Husak probably will find it even more difficult to with- stand challenges from the more conservative wing of the party. DEPUTY PREMIER: Josef Kempny* DEPUTY PREMIER: Peter Colotka I DEPUTY PREMIER AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN TRADE: Frentisek Hamouz*2 DEPUTY PREMIER AND MINISTER OF PLANNING: Vaclav Hula* DEPUTY PREMIER AND MINISTER-CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEE FOR TECHNOLOGY AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT: Miloslav Hruskovic* 1 DEPUTY PREMIER: Karol Laco* 1 MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: Jan Marko 1 MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE: Col. Gen. Martin Dzur MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR: Jan Pelnar MINISTER OF FINANCE: Rudolf Rohlicek MINISTER OF LABOR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS: Michel Stancel i MINISTER-CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR PRICES: Ignac Rendek*1 MINISTER-CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR INDUSTRY: Josef Krejci MINISTER-CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR AGRICULTIJRE AND FOOD: Koloman Boda1 MINISTER-CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR TRANSPORT: Jaroslav Knizka* 1 MINISTER-CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR POST AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS: Karel Hoffmann* MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO: Bohuslav Kucera MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO: Jan Pauly* !Slovak ? Hamouz had been a deputy premier, *Newly appointed 28 September 1969 but not the Minister for Foreign Trade SECRET Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 Oct 69 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A007300070001-6 SECRET YUGOSLAV REGIME WORRIED OVER BREAKDOWN IN AUTHORITY The Yugoslav leadership is se- riously concerned about the wide- spread disregard by local officials for central policy directives and is intent on restoring faith in the federation's ability to solve Yugo- slavia's many problems. President Tito has sharply condemned lack of discipline among party members at all levels and has threatened a se- lective purge. The most flagrant challenge to central authority occurred last July when the Slovenian government bit- terly and publicly opposed the de- cision of the Federal Executive Council (FEC) to exclude Slovenian road projects from a loan financed by the International Reconstruction and Development Bank. Conflicts be- tween Yugoslavia's republics are commonplace, especially over eco- nomic matters. The Slovenes intro- duced a new tactic, however, by mo- bilizing an unprecedented wave of public protest, and the central re- gime felt the heat of this unusual political pressure. Tito interrupted the summer holidays in August and convened the party's executive bureau, which re- affirmed its confidence in the FEC and called for a better performance in getting the true facts on contro- versial matters before the public. The FEC subsequently rejected Slo- venia's request for a reversal of the road decision. The Slovenian government grudgingly accepted the FEC edict, but it is still rankled by the affair and has publicly blamed FEC bungling for the whole problem. While the Slovene incident is the most celebrated case, national- ity excesses have created difficul- ties in other sections of the coun- try. In a series of toughly woxded speeches along the Dalmatian coast in late August, Tito attacked pet economic projects in Croatia and Serbia. He severely chastized local Communists who ignore party direc- tives, and called for more direct contact between party and enterprise officials. Since then many party organizations have met to discuss the "struggle against nationalism," and on 19 September Belgrade's party secretary repeated Tito's warning of a purge of "negative forces" from party ranks. The stage is now set for de- bates on regional priorities at a party presidium session scheduled for 14 October and in the Federal Assembly, which convened on 30 Sep- tember. Tito is eager to tighten the party's control over internal affairs by ensuring discipline from the center, but he does not want to retreat from the liberal course on decentralization that he introduced. One difficulty of party officials is that they are committed to a pol- icy of governmental decentralization that intrinsically undercuts their control. Local officials tend to become regional particularists in order to maintain their power and because they fear political insta- bility if they submit to central ad- ministration. Tito and other na- tional leaders understand this, and will proceed with caution in any cleansing of the party's ranks. SECRET Page 12 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A007300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 SECRET EC TRADE AGREEMENTS CAUSE CONCERN IN GATT The increasing number of preferential trade agreements ne- gotiated by the European Community (EC) is becoming a growing source of concern in international trade circles. Many of the contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) feel that the arrangements are merely an exchange of discriminatory pref- erences and do not meet the terms of Article 24 of GATT. This arti- cle requires that such agreements must lead to the formation of a genuine free trade area or customs union covering a substantial por- tion of the trade involved. The Council of Ministers of the Community formally approved limited association agreements with Morocco and Tunisia last July. While the agreements fell short of the full association with the Community that Morocco and Tu- nisia had sought, they granted significant preferences to the exports of the two countries. Morocco and Tunisia, in return, agreed to grant preferences to a number of Community products. The Community has submitted these agreements to GATT for considera- tion, where they have already met with opposition. Objections are also likely to be raised when the Community con- siders general trade agreements with Spain and Israel. The re- sumption of negotiations for a preferential agreement with Spain is apparently near. In 1962, Spain applied for negotiations that would lead to full Community membership, but its accession has been strongly opposed by some community members on political grounds. The Spanish, therefore, will probably accept for the time being a trade arrangement, al- though they view it as the first ste.? along the road to membership. Israel has requested associ- ation with the EC, and while agree- ment seems distant, there have been some signs of movement. France has said that it would be prepared to negotiate with Israel if the principle of negotiating similar agreements with Arab coun- tries were accepted. Germany has said that it has no objections to negotiations with any Arab coun- tries requesting them. Recently, Egypt formally requested nego- tiations on a preferential trade arrangement with the Community. Meanwhile, the Community has al- ready granted ad hoc preferences to citrus imports from Israel as well as from Spain. Officials in GATT are now pon- dering ways to deal with the EC cases while preserving the integ- rity of GATT. The assistant sec- retary general has said that some- thing must be done to reconcile the political and economic real- ities of the EC cases with the provisions of the agreement. GATT is carrying out a general investi- gation of nontariff barriers to trade, including preferences. Moreover, the Organization for Eco- nomic Cooperation and Development and the UN Conference on Trade and Development have been considering ways to generalize preferences. 25X1 Agreement on these matters seems to be a long way off, however. SECRET Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 25X6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 SECRET AGRICULTURAL PROSPECTS MIXED IN EASTERN EUROPE Weather in Eastern Europe has boosted crop yields in south- ern countries and reduced those in the north compared to those of a year ago. In Poland, Czech- oslovakia, and East Germany con- sumers will continue to find sev- eral types of food in short sup- ply this winter. Official estimates are not yet in, but total grain production in Eastern Europe probably will approximate the 6 6 7 million met- ric ton record output of 1968. Unless unforeseen difficulties develop, both Romania and Hungary may set new grain production rec- ords. Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia's grain harvests are expected to be the smallest in three years, however, and their harvests of potatoes and forage crops are expected to be down sharply. High prices and short- ages of livestock products, es- pecially meat, will prevail for at least the next six to eight months in most East European coun- tries. Eastern Europe's demand for imported grain is expected to ex- ceed the 6.1 million tons imported last year by 10 to 15 percent. This reflects the increased needs of the northern countries for feed grain. Most of the increased grain requirements probably will be pur- The US a so is expected to continue its role as a supplier of grain this year, but the size of its deliv- eries will be dependent on price and credit arrangements in the competitive market created by large free-world grain surpluses. The USSR, despite its medio- cre harvest, will continue to be the major source of imported grain for the deficit countries in Eastern Europe. The southern East European countries (including Yugoslavia) may have exportable surpluses of wheat and corn to- taling nearly four million tons. These countries will seek to ex- port their surpluses to Western markets in order to obtain hard currency. Nevertheless, some of the East European sur- plus grain producers may be will- ing to sell somewhat larger quan- tities than usual this year to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany because of the depressed Western grain market and possible Soviet pressure. SECRET Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 Oct 69 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A007300070001-6 SECRET Israeli aircraft are still flying their almost daily air strikes along the cease-fire lines with Egypt and Jordan, particularly against Egyptian forces along the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Suez. The strikes seem to be having only a limited effect on the Egyptians' intentions to maintain their harass- ment along the canal. A rise in the number of fedayeen-caused clashes on the Israeli-Jordanian cease-fire line may soon induce the Israelis to hit again at the East Ghor Canal, which they had permitted the Jordanians to repair just prior to Prime Minister Golda Meir's trip to the US. Mrs. Meir, who was to end her visit on 6 October, pressed the US for economic and military assistance, but gave no hint of any change in the basic Israeli position of no withdrawal without direct Arab-Israeli peace talks, The Burundi regime has stopped arresting alleged coup plotters, and outward calm has returned to the capital. President Micombero's strong show of force has probably unnerved his opponents for the present, but underlying tensions between the two major tribes remain. South Africa's colored people have voted against apartheid in the first election for a "colored parliament" that is intended to handle the affairs of these two million mulattoes. The antisegregation .Labor Party captured 26 of the 40 elective seats. Although the proposed council will have little power, the white government is obviously chagrined that pro-apartheid parties did not fare better. Afro-Asian states may seek a UN General Assembly resolution calling for sanctions against South Africa when it fails to withdraw from South-West Africa by 4 October in accordance with a Security Council resolution. Pretoria, which is not about to pull out, can count on the UK and other major trading countries to oppose sanctions and to ignore a resolution even if it passes. In East Pakistan this week, troops occupied strategic locations on Dacca University campus to prevent possible demonstrations and a mass student meeting scheduled for 29 September. SECRET Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 Oct 69 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A007300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 SECRET TRIBAL OATHS UNSETTLE KENYA For the first time since the bloody Mau Mau revolt of the 1950s, Kikuyu leaders are exploiting traditional tribal oaths in swearing their fellow tribesmen to absolute loyalty. The massive resurgence of oath-taking cere- monies has heightened tribal ten- sions in Kenya. Although the current pledges do not contain the terrorist over- tones of those of the Mau Mau, Kenya's other tribes see the oath- taking as evidence that the Kikuyu are determined to maintain their pre-eminence. These tribes inter- pret the ceremonies in the con- text of long-standing intertribal rivalries and also in the light of their suspicions that the as- sassination last July of Tom Mboya, a Luo, was arranged to en- sure Kikuyu domination of the government. The oath-taking began as a reaction to the violent anti- Kikuyu feeling after Mboya's mur- der. It has since been organized throughout the Kikuyu areas and has even extended to neighboring tribes. Although President Ken- yatta, as the foremost Kikuyu leader, could stop the ceremonies, he has not done so. As the oathing continues, there is danger that relatively minor tribal clashes--such as a land dispute that flared up last month between Kalenjin and Kikuyu tribesmen--will spark more seri- ous violence. There is also dan- ger of conflict among the Kikuyu themselves, many of whom are being forced to take the oath. One Xi- kuyu Christian minister was re- cently beaten to death for re- fusing. Some -army officers are be- ginning to worry that the oath- taking may undermine the effi- ciency of the armed forces by stirring up tribal rivalries within the ranks. The two top army officers, neither of whom is a Kikuyu, are known to be concerned over the government's failure to stop the oathing. In an unprecedented action, they recently attempted to discourage further ceremonies in two areas by moving in troops without prior government clearance. With Kenya's first general elections due early next year, tribal tensions and the loyalties of the security forces will be of particular concern both to the ruling party and to the per- sistent but disorganized opposi- SECRET Page 18 WEEKLY SU Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 5r:cRE'1' INDIA'S PRIME MINISTER VISITS TROUBLED NORTHEAST Prime Minister Gandhi encoun- tered discordant notes in strategic northeast India last week as she continued a nationwide tour aimed at capitalizing on her recent po- litical victories. Her problems stemmed mainly from New Delhi's long neglect of the region's economy, and the central government's inability to solve a series of long-standing and complex political problems in the area. For the most part, the local people reacted with indifference to Mrs. Gandhi's efforts to win support by claiming credit for the central government's recently inaugurated "progressive" policies. Instead, she was pressed for action on a va- riety of parochial issues. In the union territory of Manipur, she was met with violent demonstrations-- six people were killed--demanding full statehood for the area. Al- though another union territory, Tri- pura, received her more cordially, she was presented with statehood demands there, too. In both places, she was urged to sort out leadership squabbles among local politicians in her Congress Party; on 24 September, soon after her departure, the weak Congress government of Manipur fell after a no-confidence vote. In Nagaland, where an insurrec- tion has been under way for more than a decade, state government pol- iticians and the faction of the Naga underground that now eschews vio- lence welcomed her sympathetically, but she was unprepared to meet the Nagas' demand for negotiations lead- ing to independence. She resorted to an old government demand that militant Nagas, who have accepted help from China and Pakistan, sever all foreign ties before further political concessions would be granted. A two-day public tour of Assam had to be canceled because of secu- rity problems resulting from a mass movement demanding the construction of a government petroleum refinery in the state. The Indian Government believes that the refinery would be uneconomic, but local leaders see it as both a vital development proj- ect and a symbol of tl,,_central NORTHEAST INDIA 9619710-69 In contrast wih Mrs. Gandhi's earlier goodwill visits to other areas of India, the trip to the politically and economically un- developed northeast was something of a public relations nightmare. She was constantly plagued by the people's lack of interest in "all- India" problems and by their tend- ency to evaluate the central gov- ernment's worth by its ability to solve parochial issues. The north- east problem highlights the strong centrifugal forces at work in India-- forces that Mrs. Gandhi must deal with as she attempts to revitalize the Congress Party in preparation for the next scheduled general elections in 1972. 25X1 SECRET Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 Oct 69 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 SECRET SOMALI PRIME RINISTER EGAL AT TURNING POINT Somalia's Prime Minister Mohamed Egal, who arrives in the US next week for a short visit, was confirmed for a second stint in office last June. Since then, however, he appears to have lost the momentum that produced a num- ber of significant accomplishments during his first term. After taking office in 1967, Egal made dramatic progress in areas where his predecessors had been notably unsuccessful. His efforts at detente with Kenya es- tablished a firm foundation for relations that previously had been nonexistent He even man- aged to improve relations with the deeply suspicious Ethiopians. Within Somalia, Egal exerted a firm hand over the dominant but capricious government political party, the Somali Youth League, and also prevented Sor:aalia's tribal-ridden politics from dis- rupting his foreign and domestic policies. Now, however, despite some concessions by both sides, Egal as nearly run out of ways to continue prouuctive discussions with the Ethiopians. The two countries are stalemated over the question of Ethiopia's right to tax the livestock of Somali no- mads during seasonal migrations. Two serious clashes this summer in Ethiopia between troops and the migrating nomads had serious repercussions in northern Somalia by undermining Egal's policy of urging restraint on the nomads l'agv 2 0 while the governments sought a solution. Egal's performance in the domestic political arena has also begun to falter. His attempts to strengthen the central goverment by enlarging his authority and forging a one-party state--only one of the 124 parliamentary dep- uties is now outside his party-- have instead heightened tradi- tional Somali distrust of central- ized authority. His blatant sanc- tioning of rigged national elfic- tions last March, and the impe,si- tion of political controls over the police, Supreme Court, and the press have strengthened his control over the inefficient Pu- reaucracy but have made politi- cal enemies. Moreover, the sub- sistence economy continues stog- nant despite some $400 million that Somalia has received in or- eign aid--and sizable additio al amounts do not appear in the offing. Egal is apparently not in serious trouble yet despite gkum- bling among politicians and o0ca- sional rumors of difficulties,be- tween him and President Scermirche. Nevertheless, although Egal's party presents a monolithic a - pearance, his control could b, weakened by the 60 percent tupnover of deputies that took place in the national elections. There are a number of important party factions and individuals ready to maneuver against him when the unpredictable Somali parliament opens in late October. SE CRET Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A007300070001-6 SECRET Page 2 2 SECRET WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 Oct 69 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A007300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 SECRET The new Bolivian government, led by General Alfredo Ovando, has already set the tone for the immediate future by emphasizing nationalism. Continued attacks on "US imperialism" can be expected. The military regimes of Brazil, Argentina, and Peru were the first to recognize the new government. In Brazil, top military commanders, seeking a replacement for President Costa e Silva, appear to have selected General Emilio Medici, a close personal friend of the President. An announcement of this choice and of the term of office seems imminent. The cancellation of a proposed 36-hour general strike in Argentina has temporarily headed off a serious clash between President Ongania and the Peronist-dominated General Labor Confederation. In other developments, the Netherlands Antilles may be forced to call for new elections unless a government can be formed in the near future. Venezuelan guerrillas have staged their most serious attacks in recent months; and the Panamanian Government is beginning to focus more atten- tion on the canal issue. Although a formal request to resume talks with the US has not yet been made, some indication of the government's intentions may come to light in pronouncements during the first anniversary of the military coup on 11 October. Nationalistic noises will also be made by Peruvian President Velasco on the 3 October anniversary of last year's military coup and on the 9 October anniversary of the take-over of the International Petroleum Company. The Latin American foreign ministers, in New York for the opening of the UN General Assembly session, held two meetings earlier this week in an effort to resolve problems between El Salvador and Honduras but made no prog- SECRET Page 2 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 Oct 69 25X6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 SECRET NEW BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT EMPHASIZES NATIONALISM The Ovando government, in- stalled following the coup on 26 September, is seeking to align itself ideologically with Peru, and is combining exaggerated na- tionalism and anti-US sentiment at least in part in the hope of striking a popular chord with the Bolivian public. General Alfredo Ovando Can- dia seized power and was "named" president of the "revolutionary government" by the commanders of the three armed services. He then named a cabinet of ten civilians and five military officers. The civilian component is made up almost entirely of strong crit- ics of the US and is expected to lead the government in a leftist and nationalistic direction. The early target of the anti-US attacks from those in and close to the government is the US-owned Bolivian Gulf Oil Company, and to a lesser extent, other US business enterprises. Ovando's equivocating statements on the Gulf issue have given en- couragement to those who want the company nationalized. ~ Top Gulf officials in Bolivia appear optimistic that they can reach a satisfactory agreement with Ovando, but the US Embassy fears that he may have difficulty in selling to the public a settlement that falls short of nationalization. Anti-US attacks in the last few days have concentrated more on areas where there is less likelihood of a confrontation with the US that could damage Bolivia's weak economy. On 29 September a major La Paz news- paper, apparently with the ap- proval of the government, charged that the US, through its aid and financing policies, was responsible for the recent crash of a Boliv- ian airliner which claimed 74 lives. The exaggerated nationalism and the anti-US sentiment being expressed in La Paz at the pres- ent time is reminiscent of what occurred in Peru following the military takeover there a year ago, Indeed, General Ovando has expressed on several occasions his desire to form an "ideological confederation" with the military government of Peru. The Peruvians, however, have taken a very cau- tious attitude toward the new Bolivian Government. ~~ Peru recognized the new Bolivian Government early, but the foreign minister has made it clear that there are several dif- ferences in the Peruvian and Bo- livian situations and is quoted as saying that the "Peruvian revo- lution is not for exort." 25X1 SECRET Page 24 WEEKLY SUM Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 SECRET POLITICAL PROBLEMS AWAIT NEW BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT The administration that re- places President Costa e Silva will face major political problems. Top military officers continue to work toward selecting Costa e Silva's successor, and General Emi- lio Medici has been given the nod. The minister of labor and social security, Jarbas Passarinho a 49- year-old retired army colonel, re- portedly will be his running mate. A formal announcement of the schedule for the President's resig- nation and the transfer of power to his successor is likely to be made very soon. The governing tri- umvirate that assumed power on 31 August will probably call Congress back into session for the first time since being suspended last December. The triumvirate itself has purged at least nine more fed- eral deputies and one senator. The remaining members probably will not speak out against any of the new ad- ministration's measures because they know that if Congress steps out of line the military will not hesitate to close it again. Political discontent is due to a number of reasons. These include the purge of public officials, the executive's assumption of greater authoritarian powers at the cost of the legislative and judicial branches, the unlikely prospects that the President and state gov- ernors will be popularly elected, and the government's limited suc- cess in halting serious urban ter- rorism despite the adoption of ever more drastic punishment. Discontent appears to be par- ticularly acute in the wealthy state of Sao Paulo and in the underdevel- oped northeast. Leading Sao Paulo politicians, including Governor Sodre, are concerned about the de- terioration of relations between the government and the public. The consulate general reports that lo- cal politicians and journalists are growing "desperate" about the sit- uation, and are convinced that sub- version and terrorism will increase as long as the country has a mili- tary government that is unable to generate effective public support. The prestigious newspaper 0 Estado de Sao Paulo has joined the chorus of Uisco:)ntent by severely criticiz- ing the government for "destroying political institutions." It also warned that the military could lead the country into chaos by assuming the role of an electoral body. The problem in the northeast apparently is due primarily to the efforts of military officers to weed out public officials, rural labor leaders, and clergymen whom they consider corrupt or subversive. ~ The governor of Perna uco State, Nilo Coelho, had hoped to form some kind of loose alliance with other governors in the northeast to resist the mili- tary pressure, but they apparently could not agree on a united posi- SECRET Page 25 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 SECRET CHILEAN MILITARY THINKS Discontent in the Chilean armed forces over low pay is again increas- ing, and opposition political forces are capitalizing on the issue for their own purposes. Rumors that unrest in the tradi- tionally apolitical military had reached serious levels culminated last week in television reports that a coup had been quashed during the national independence day celebra- tions. The late arrival of an army contingent at a ceremonial mass and the subsequent relief of its com- manding officer apparently were the basis for the reports. The imposi- tion of stricter security measures in response to reports of extremist plans to attack army installations also helped to spread the rumors. Pay at all levels of the armed forces is low, and adjustments al- T is GETTING SHORTCHANGED ways lag substantially behind the country's chronic and presently rapid inflation. An automatic wage increase in September amounted to about $3 a month for majors. Many officers complain that the efficacy and prestige of the military are declining also because of obsolete and inadequate equipment, reduced recruiting and operational exer- cises, and alleged general neglect by the Frei government. The service chiefs are con- cerned over the unrest, but they have not persuaded the government, which is already hard pressed for wage raises by other groups, to ad- just military pay. President Frei's uncompromising attitude may indi- cate that he wants to bring the is- sue to a head. He has promised to give special attention to military needs in 1970 pay raises, ative Nationalist Party legisla- tors unsuccessfully introduced a bill to raise military pay 25 per- cent. Both political extremes un- doubtedly will continue efforts to Marxist political groups and newspapers are excoriating the gov- ernment for its inattention to:the needs of the military and are pub- licizing the activities of retired military personnel who are trying to stir up discontent in the ac- tive forces. In September, conserv- ensure their credit rating with the armed forces. SECRET Page 2 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 Oct 69 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A007300070001-6 SECRET VENEZUELA REACTS TO INCREASED INSURGENCY Since 23 September, Communist guerrillas have ambushed government troops several times and have at- tacked numerous military and civil- ian installations. One officer and at least four enlisted men have been killed so far, and several others have been wounded. Most of the in- cidents have taken place in eastern Venezuela, the traditional opera- tional area of the Castroite Move- ment of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). The outbreak of guerrilla activity is the most serious in several months, and may force the Caldera government to revise the pacification program it insti- tuted shortly after taking power last March. The minister of de- fense announced early this week that the government will have to review the program if it can be proved that guerrillas freed un- der the program were involved in the recent incidents. Under the pacification program, the govern- ment has held counterinsurgency op- erations to a minimum and has of- fered amnesty to guerrillas if they lay down their arms. Some guerril- las were also freed under the pro- gram. The program has been carried out reluctantly, but many officers believe that only aggressive opera- tions will put an end to the guer- rilla problem. President Caldera stated last week that his government will dis- tinguish between aggressive groups and those with "similar ideologies but which have chosen to struggle within the framework of domestic institution." The military is greatly disturbed by the upsurge in guerrilla activity, which they at- tribute partly to the pacification problem. It is unlikely that Presi- dent Caldera will prevent the mili- tary from pursuing the guerrillas, but he will not want to abandon his program entirely. The recent attacks may be an effort by the guerrillas to force the government to abandon its paci- fication program because they fear it is eroding their base of support. They probably also want to demon- strate their independence of the national leaders of the MIR and the youth group, both of which seem to be considering accepting the gov- ernment's offer. If the guerrillas acted on their own, the leaders of the MIR and the youth group will probably break with them. Although this would deprive the guerrillas of needed logistical support and some of their troops, at least the guer- rillas would have demonstrated their determination to continue with the armed struggle. SECRET Page 2 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A007300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 SECRET GOVERNMENT OF NETHERLANDS ANTILLES STILL IN FLUX Interim Minister-President Sprockel may be forced to call for new elections unless a gov- ernment can be formed in the near future. The deadline of 29 Septem- ber for the installation of a new administration passed with- out results. The governor asked former finance minister Petronia to form a government to overcome the impasse that resulted when no party gained a legislative ma- jority in the elections on 5 Sep- tember. Petronia is the leader of the Aruba Patriotic Party, which is allied with the Democratic Party. These parties controlled the government prior to the elec- tions, and with 11 of 22 seats, are still in a strong position to head a new administration. Although the scattered opposition parties might be able to organize a coali- tion with the help of the Aruba Pa- triotic Party, if it broke its agree- ment with the Democrats they prob- ably would not be able to hold the coalition together for very long. The opposition parties prob- ably would not want new elections because they realize that the Demo- cratic Party and the Aruba Patri- otic Party would increase their ef- forts to secure one more seat. The Workers Front reportedly has been offered two cabinet posts by the Democrats if they join in' a coali- tion. The next few weeks should produce a spate of intensive po- litical maneuvering. THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES Oemocrsttc Party 7 Aruba Patriotic Party 4 National Peoples' Party 3 Workers Front 3 Aruba Peoples* Pa.ty Grouping 4 United Bonaire Patriotic Party and the Bonaire Workers Party SECRL` rl. This coalition held 13 Mats in the provnius government Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07300070001-6