CEYLON LOOKS TOWARD ELECTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007400020002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 17, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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becrei
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Ceylon Looks Toward Elections
Secret
N! 45
17 October 1969
No. 0392/69A
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D
Elections for a new legislature to succeed the one whose term expires on 22 March 1970
will be important for the country's continued stability and development. The present
government, in power since 1965 and dominated by Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake's
United National Party, inherited a host of economic and social problems from the previous
regime, a coalition led by Mrs. Bandaranaike and her leftist Sri Lanka Freedom Party.
Senanayake's basically Western-oriented, moderate government has halted the drift to the left
in both internal and foreign policies and has taken measures to put the country back on the
road to economic recovery. Although Ceylon's financial outlook is still clouded by unsolved
problems, it now appears to have emerged from the economic morass of the early 1960s with
a measure of economic growth.
Senanayake has also given the country a period of relative domestic tranquility and has
endeavored to unify its pluralistic society by reducing tensions between the Sinhalese
Buddhist majority and the Tamil, Christian, and Muslim minorities. In the 1970 elections-for
which no specific date has been set-Ceylon will either opt for a continuation of his moderate
policies or will again bring to power a leftist coalition, which would include the pro-Soviet
Ceylon Communist Party/Moscow (CCP/M).
Although economic issues will weigh heavily in the coming campaign, an important
factor with emotional overtones will be the relationship between the Sinhalese and the
minorities, especially the Tamils. Senanayake at this time appears to have a slightly better
than even chance to win, but the task of appealing to the minority communities without
antagonizing his Sinhalese supporters will be a difficult one. To add to his problems, the
opposition is expected to attempt to heighten communal tensions still further as elections
approach.
Prime Minister
Dudley Senanayake
Leader of the
United National Party
Special Report - I
When Ceylon gained independence from
Great Britain in 1948, the ruling United National
Party (UNP), led by a Westernized elite with a
common background and British education, faced
only fragmented and ineffective opposition from
a few small Marxist parties or those representing
the Tamil minority. The nation's economy, bol-
stered by an abundance of foreign exchange
earned by the major exports of tea, rubber, and
coconut appeared relatively sound.
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Buddhist Temple at Kandy, Allegedly
the Repository of a Tooth of Buddha
By about 1952, however, prices for these
exports had begun to fall, and foreign exchange
earnings with which to buy needed imports de-
clined. The Sinhalese, faced with a worsening
economic situation and unable to influence the
ruling elite, began to stir. A concommitant revival
of interest in Sinhalese-Buddhist traditions added
to discontent with the secular-oriented UNP rule.
In 1951 S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike bolted the UNP
and formed the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP),
ostensibly providing a choice between the UNP
and the revolutionary socialism of the Marxist
left.
Mildly socialist in outlook, Bandaranaike
posed as the champion of traditional Sinhalese-
Buddhist culture. His exploitation of popular
sentiment in the election campaign of 1956 had
the unintentional effect of placing the Tamil
minority in the position of the "enemy." He won
the election and pledged to fulfill the aspirations
of the Sinhalese community.
Serious communal clashes broke out in 1958
when Bandaranaike, hemmed in by Sinhalese ex-
tremists, was unable to reach a compromise with
Special Report -2
the Tamils, who were agitating for official recog-
nition of their language, at least in the northern
and eastern provinces where they predominate.
The Buddhist clergy, disappointed that their share
of political power was not commensurate with
their expectations, also became dissatisfied. The
period of violence unleashed during Bandara-
naike's rule was climaxed in 1959, when he was
assassinated by a disaffected Buddhist monk.
After a brief interim of UNP rule, the SLFP
regained control in July 1960 under the leader-
ship of the former prime minister's widow, Mrs.
Sirimavo Bandaranaike. She proved more aggres-
sive than her husband in promoting Sinhalese
interests, and Tamil agitation led to a declaration
of a state of emergency from April 1961 to May
1963. In the economic sphere she extended state
control by nationalizing some industries, freezing
wages, and making trade in certain commodities a
state monopoly. Such measures did not improve
the deteriorating economic situation, however.
Excessive deficit spending forced prices upward;
the tax structure and investment climate dis-
couraged foreign investors, and tight import con-
trols created shortages of agricultural equipment
and raw materials for industry.
Her government fell in late 1964, when sev-
eral SLFP members of Parliament, dissatisfied
with their party's growing alliance with the leftist
Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), crossed to the
opposition. In the 1965 election campaign, UNP
leader Dudley Senanayake charged the SLFP with
intensifying economic problems, allowing Marxist
influence to grow, and attempting to control the
press. The UNP did not win either a majority of
the popular vote or enough seats to form an
independent government, but Senanayake put to-
gether a workable coalition and moved to meet
Ceylon's economic and social problems.
17 October 1969
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Ceylon: Present Parliamentary Lineup
NATIONAL
INDEPENDENT
\.~ OPPOSITION
Other - 5
PRESENT STATUS OF THE PARTIES
Senanayake's UNP now holds 73 of the 151
elective seats in the 157-man Parliament. Inde-
pendents, appointed members, and representa-
tives from a few small parties contribute approxi-
mately a dozen supporting votes. The UNP has
gradually lost its earlier image as a Western-ori-
ented instrument of foreign interests and the
privileged classes. It has espoused "democratic
socialism" and has posed as the defender of
Sinhalese-Buddhist interests. Senanayake's party
is basically moderate, however. Its version of so-
cialism is in effect a call for a mixed economy, its
policy of nonalignment is inclined toward the
West, and its advocacy of Sinhalese-Buddhist
goals is tempered by an understanding attitude
toward Tamil aspirations.
Senanayake in 1965 designated national
unity as the primary social goal of his new govern-
Special Report
ment. Generally the country has enjoyed a period
of order, although leftist-inspired riots broke out
in early 1966 over proposed legislation-actually
implementing earlier SLFP proposals-calling for
limited official use of the Tamil language. Vio-
lence ended quickly, however, when a state of
emergency was proclaimed. Although the procla-
mation was not lifted for almost a year, Senana-
yake made only limited use of his extraordinary
powers. Under the present administration, Sinha-
lese-Tamil tensions have subsided somewhat, al-
though animosities between the two communities
are so deep-seated that a serious resurgence of
communal violence is an ever-present danger.
In the 1965 elections, Senanayake's limited
support for Tamil interests during the campaign
won for the UNP parliamentary seats in 12 out of
the 28 constituencies having significant Tamil
populations. The independent Federal Party (FP),
largest of the Tamil political parties in Ceylon,
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holds about a dozen more of these seats. The FP
left the government in September 1968 when the
prime minister decided it was politically impos-
sible to implement proposed measures for giving
Tamil districts a measure of autonomy. The de-
fection of the FP was not a complete loss for
Senanayake, however, because the opposition
coalition was deprived of a potentially valuable
campaign tactic in Sinhalese districts-alleging
that a "secret pact" existed between Senanayake
and the FP.
As of mid-summer 1969 Senanayake was
described as generally optimistic about his party's
chances in the coming elections, although he re-
portedly predicted they would be very close.
Senanayake's chief lieutenant, Minister of State J.
R. Jayewardene, has warned that the UNP could
lose through party complacency at the local level
despite apparent determination at the top for an
all-out effort.
The opposition to the present government
centers around a coalition of three parties-the
SLFP, the LSSP, and the CCP/M; Mrs. Bandara-
naike is the titular leader of the alliance. The
SLFP is the largest component of the coalition,
currently holding 41 seats in Parliament. The
LSSP, a Trotskyite party founded in 1935 by
upper-class intellectuals, is perhaps the largest ele-
ment in Ceylon's small and divided Marxist move-
ments and now has nine Parliamentary seats. The
CCP/M, founded in 1943 by a group of dissidents
from the LSSP, holds four seats.
This leftist alliance is an uneasy one. Al-
though one wing of the SLFP favors closer co-
operation with the Marxists, other elements
within the party, including important financial
backers, are strongly opposed. The LSSP suffers
from an identity crisis, being midway between the
more moderate SLFP and the more radical
CCP/M. In the autumn of 1968 the LSSP sought
to drive the CCP/M from the coalition, using as a
pretext the Communist Party's initial failure to
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osition Leader and
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.suneman
Gen _ral of
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condemn the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
The persuasive efforts of Mrs. Bandaranaike, un-
der heavy pressure from the more conservative
elements within her own party, finally compelled
the leader of the Communist Party to issue a mild
condemnation of the Soviet action despite strong
objections by a sizable element within the party's
central committee. This episode damaged morale
within the coalition, but differences have been
gradually papered over as elections approach.
Special Report -4- 17 October 1969
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Both the LSSP and the CCP/M realize that if
they are to participate in the government, they
will have to ride in on the coattails of the SLFP.
In turn, the SLFP apparently needs the alliance
with the two leftist parties if it is to win the
margin of parliamentary strength necessary to
form a government. Nevertheless, renewed dis-
sension within the coalition is a continuing pos-
sibility. Even before the Czechoslovak issue arose,
the partners suspected each other of building up
their respective strengths at the expense of their
colleagues. Furthermore, in addition to the group
of SLFP members opposed to cooperation with
the Marxists, there reportedly are small elements
within the two leftist parties who resent what
they view as their leaders' blind acceptance of
SLFP domination. Although the three parties re-
portedly have agreed on the allocation of seats to
be contested in 1970, such agreements in past
by-elections have not prevented interparty clashes
within the coalition. As a current example, a
prominent member of the SLFP's Islamic Front
plans-to the dismay of some SLFP leaders-to
campaign in the coming election against Pieter
Keuneman, Secretary General of the CCP/M, and
there is a good chance that Keuneman may lose.
Economic problems will figure prominently
among the issues in the elections. Despite at-
tempts by Senanayake to bolster the nation's
economy, the outlook is mixed. In 1968, the real
gross national product (GNP), measured in 1959
prices, amounted to $1,489.3 million, an 8.3 per-
cent increase over that of 1967. Growth in 1967
over 1966 had been only 4.4 percent. Real per
capita GNP was $125, as compared with $118 in
1967. Pent-up demand for consumer goods, how-
ever, has raised prices considerably. Although
some Ceylonese view this spiraling cost of living
as an unpleasant adjunct to economic develop-
ment, the opposition coalition can be expected to
stress rising living costs in the campaign.
Special Report
Additionally, out of a labor force of ap-
proximately four million, more than 500,000 are
unemployed. The presence of about 10,000 job-
less university graduates in this group, mostly arts
majors unable to find suitable jobs and prevented
from doing menial labor because of the stratifica-
tion of Ceylonese society, further aggravates the
situation. Senanayake's government has drawn up
numerous schemes to provide jobs, but the results
have not been satisfactory. This large body of
unemployed provides the opposition with a
ready-made issue and raises the prospect that a
sizable portion of the jobless will vote against the
UNP. In an obvious attempt to lessen the odds,
the UNP has recently pledged to employ 1,900
graduates by the end of 1969.
Government strategists plan to capitalize on
,Ceylon's substantial agricultural growth. Con-
cerned that Ceylon was forced to import about
half of the rice it consumed annually, Senanayake
in 1966 launched a "Grow More Food" cam-
paign, aiming for a 75-percent self-sufficiency in
rice by 1970 and complete sufficiency by 1972.
To attain these goals, the government raised the
price of home-grown rice as an incentive to farm-
ers to increase private production and at the same
time cut in half the government-subsidized rice
ration. It also issued at subsidized prices fertilizer,
insecticides, and other aids; allocated on a 30-year
lease basis large tracts of jungle land for growing
foodstuffs, and used its Land Army-not unlike
the US Civilian Conservation Corps of the
1930s-to clear additional land and produce sub-
sidiary foodstuffs. Work will soon begin on the
massive Mahaweli River diversion project, which
over a 20-year period should double Ceylon's
cultivatable acreage.
The results of these efforts in agriculture
have been encouraging. In the 1966-67 crop year
(August to August), Ceylon produced about
784,000 long tons of milled rice, and provisional
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Preparing Fields for Rice Seedlings
figures for the 1968-69 season prectret 951,000
tons. 't'his would be the largest harv.,st ever pro-
luced in Ceylon, but it would still fall below the
target of a little over one million tors because of
i prolonged drought. Ceylon's imports of rice
have declined from about 494,000 tons in 1966
to a probable total of about 300,00(. tons for the
current year, representing a sizable saving in for-
eign exchange. Most of the imported rice is ob-
tainred from Communist China on favorable terms
as mart of a rice-rubber barter deal.
Ceylon's principal exports hav been hard
hit by declining world prices for tea rubber, and
Spt cial Report
coconut. Although the volume of exports rose
slightly in 1968 over 1967, earnings actually de-
clined from $347 million to $332 million. Meas-
ures taken so far to improve the balance of pay-
ments picture-devaluation in 1967 and the estab-
lishment in 1968 of a special Foreign Exchange
Entitlement Certificate Scheme to provide a float-
ing multiple exchange rate-have been only par-
tially successful. The increasing prices of imports
and the declining prices and limited markets for
Ceylon's major exports have therefore prevented
the country's rapid growth in agricultural produc-
tion from having as great an effect as might have
been expected.
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Allied to economic issues is the role of or-
ganized labor. Although the labor vote controls
election results in only a handful of urban con-
stituencies, it holds the "swing" vote in at least
two dozen others. Politically motivated strikes
may be called by unions dominated by the op-
position coalition in efforts to embarrass and
weaken the UNP. The SLFP traditionally has
lacked a strong trade-union base, however, and
the coalition-affiliated unions have frequently
been at odds with each other. A highly publicized
strike at the end of 1968 fizzled partly through
lack of coordination among the coalition's
unions, and there have been open contests be-
tween coalition parties for control of unions-
especially between the LSSP and the CCP/M.
The UNP does not have a strong trade-union
base of its own, but a parliamentary ally is the
once powerful Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP),
led by Minister of Fisheries and Industries Philip
Gunawardene, an ex-Marxist and trade unionist of
long standing. Although the MEP's union strength
has declined in the past few years, it retains
considerable influence in the important port area,
and the MEP's participation in the government
enhances the UNP's image among workers in
general.
Another important trade union asset for the
government is its relationship with the Ceylon
Workers Congress (CWC), the largest in Ceylon
with over 350,000 members. Composed mostly of
Indian Tamils, the CWC is led by S. Thondaman,
an Indian Tamil who has acquired Ceylonese citi-
zenship. Unlike "Ceylon Tamils," whose ances-
tors have lived in Ceylon for generations and who
have full voting rights, the Indian Tamils' fore-
bears were brought over from southern India in
the second half of the 19th century to work on
plantations. In 1948 approximately 90 percent of
these people lost their franchise as a result of
discriminatory legislation and have since remained
Special Report
stateless. The CWC can influence political deci-
sions by its power to disrupt the export of key
products responsible for the crucial flow of for-
eign exchange. Furthermore, although the num-
ber of enfranchised Indian Tamils is small, they
hold a pivotal vote in 17 or 18 upcountry con-
stituencies where neither the SLFP nor the UNP
can command an absolute majority. At one time a
formal parliamentary ally of the SLFP, Thonda-
man abstained from an important vote of confi-
dence in 1964 because of the SLFP's growing
anti-Tamil program; Mrs. Bandaranaike lost by
one vote, and her government fell. The CWC then
cooperated with the UNP in the 1965 elections,
and it will probably support the UNP in the
approaching elections despite its increasing irrita-
tion with the UNP's policy on communal issues.
In order to counter the opposition's charges
that the UNP is a capitalist party, the government
has tried to create an image as the only party
representing all interest groups in the country,
including labor. Although refusing to bargain with
what it considers "politically motivated" de-
mands, it has displayed sympathy with legitimate
demands of labor, while asking the workers to
understand that wages cannot surpass the econo-
my's ability to pay. The continuing high rate of
unemployment, disenchantment within some
Sinhalese public service unions over the govern-
ment's slowness in compelling Tamil employees
to learn Sinhala, and the increasing cost of living
are issues that could lessen the government's
vote-getting potential among workers in the 1970
elections. Recently announced increases in wages
for public servants, however, might partially
counteract some labor criticism of the govern-
ment.
In addition to using select economic issues in
the campaign, the opposition coalition intends to
exploit the communal problem between Ceylon's
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Sinhalese
7,517,750
70
8
Tamil
2, 293,160
.
21.9
Ceylon
1,170,310
11
0
Indian
1,122,850
.
10
9
Moors
688,880
.
6.5
Burghers &
Eurasians
46,050
Malays
24,130
Others
20,090
1969 Estimate: 12,200,000
Based on 10% tabulation
by the Dept. of Census
and Statistics
CEYLON
Ceylon Tamil
0 Indian Tamil
Moor/Ceylon Tamil
Coconut * Tea
Rice 0 Rubber
0 20 40Milrs
l 0
40 Milometers
1CEYLON
Special Report
17 October 1969
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Sinhalese majority (about 70 percent of the popu-
lation) and its Tamil minority (about 22 percent).
In order to retain power, Senanayake's UNP must
win a number of Sinhalese-Buddhist seats and
hold onto a substantial majority of seats decided
by the minority groups. In the absence of unity
among the dominant Sinhalese, the role of minor-
ity groups in the coming elections could be a
determining factor. Tamils, Christians, and Mus-
lims presently constitute at least 70 percent of
the population in constituencies that elect 54
members of the 157-man Parliament. The na-
tional government presently holds 30 of these
seats, the left-wing opposition coalition 10, and
the independent opposition (the Federal Party)
14. Almost half of the government's strength in
Parliament stems from constituencies in which
minority groups form a significant bloc of voters.
The opposition therefore hopes to force the
UNP into either risking the loss of its Sinhalese
constituencies or alienating the UNP's supporters
among minorities by forcing Senanayake to vie
with the opposition in an emotional appeal for
Sinhalese votes.
the
communal issue poses an extremely difficult
problem for Senanayake, touching as it does on
centuries-old fears and animosities. The Sinhalese
have not forgotten that Ceylon in the past has
seen many incursions by Tamils from nearby
India. They fear, moreover, that agitation for a
federal Tamil state embracing Ceylon's northern
and eastern provinces would lead to the disinte-
gration of their island nation. The Tamils, on the
other hand, resent the virtually exclusive cultural
emphasis in recent years on Sinhalese traditions
and the anti-Tamil discrimination resulting from
the resurgence of Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalism.
Special Report
Picking Tea on an Upcountry Estate
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Ceylon: Seats Won in Parliamentary Elections Since 1956
-175
-150
-125
-100
OTHER
CCP/M
LSSP
-75
FP
UNP
- 50
- 25
April March July March
1956 1960 1960 1965
Several violent incidents occurred in May, and
Tamil support for the Ceylon Dravida Munnetra
Kazagham (CDMK)-an imitation of the Tamil
nationalist party presently in control of India's
Tamil Nadu State-was reportedly growing, cre-
ating a strong counterreaction among the Sinha-
lese. Many local government councils in Sinhalese
areas had passed resolutions urging the national
government to ban the CDMK.
Senanayake
gave three speeches strongly condemning at-
tempts to capitalize on communal problems, and
Minister of State Jayewardene warned that the
government would not hesitate to use drastic ac-
tion against politicians and religious agitators who
incited communal incidents. In reply to opposi-
tion demands raised in Parliament that the CDMK
be outlawed because it had foreign connections,
Senanayake countered by saying that other politi-
cal parties in Ceylon also had connections with
foreign countries, and that these too would have
to be banned if he were to proscribe the CDMK.
Special Report
Recent speeches by CDMK leaders allegedly
urging the use of revolutionary tactics may com-
pel a change in government policy toward the
CDMK, however.
Senanayake would be in a better position to
allay Sinhalese fears regarding the Tamils if more
progress had been made toward implementing the
Ceylon-Indian Tamil Repatriation Agreement of
1964, which aims at settling the problem of the
million or so stateless Tamils in Ceylon. The
agreement provided that India would accept
525,000 of these Tamils over 15 years, Ceylon
would grant citizenship to 300,000 over the same
period, and the future of the remainder would be
resolved at a later date. As of mid-1969, India had
granted Indian citizenship to only 44,000 Tamils,
almost 10,000 of whom had reportedly left Cey-
lon, and Ceylonese citizenship had been granted
to only about 1,000 stateless Tamils. Although
the responsibility for some of the delay in repatri-
ating Tamils to India lies with Tamil Nadu author-
ities, the Ceylonese Government has slowed the
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process through bureaucratic mismanagement.
The tempo of repatriation has picked up some-
what in the past few months and this will prob-
ably continue in the interval before the coming
general elections as the UNP tries to prove to the
Sinhalese that it is protecting their interests.
Despite some slippage in UNP popularity
over the past four years, Senanayake's chances of
retaining power in the 1970 elections appear at
this moment to be slightly better than even. Par-
liamentary by-elections and local elections since
1965, however, instill a note of caution. The UNP
did poorly in the by-elections held in the first half
of its present term, but since the end of 1968 it
appears to have held its own against the opposi-
tion coalition. The UNP has had even less success
in local elections, however. In over 270 local
elections held from the beginning of 1968 to
mid-1969, 129 were won by the opposition coali-
tion, 92 by the government and its supporters,
and 56 by independents. In elections for local
government bodies between late 1968 and May
1969, the opposition coalition emerged with con-
trol of 50 local councils, up from 43; the UNP
won control of 15, down from 24; and independ-
ents held 28, an increase of 2. Such elections,
however, are often determined by local factors
including caste and family connections and may
not be an accurate gauge of public sentiment for
or against the national government. The UNP is
understandably worried, however, by the absence
in recent local elections of a substantial progov-
ernment trend in those districts in which rice
production has noticeably increased in recent
years.
There are many intangible factors, often un-
related to the issues, which also cloud forecasting.
The opposition coalition appears determined to
make an all-out effort in the coming campaign,
and a complacent attitude on the part of the UNP
could more than offset some of the disadvantages
the opposition faces. Also, in the 21 years since
independence, Ceylon has built up a pattern of
alternating parties in power. In the 1965 election,
about 70 percent of the seats were won with
pluralities or majorities of less than 55 percent,
and a relatively small increase in votes for the
opposition in these swing districts could shift
control of the next parliament. Finally, Mrs.
Bandaranaike's personal popularity among the
Ceylonese voters remains generally high in spite
of her past failures and might have been enhanced
by stories of an alleged assassination attempt
against her in February.
If the UNP wins the election, it is likely the
government will maintain its past economic poli-
cies favorable to economic growth. The island
would also be likely to enjoy relative communal
peace. Ceylon's policy of nonalignment, which
has included friendly relations with the West,
would almost certainly be continued.
On the other hand, a victory for Mrs. Banda-
ranaike's alliance presumably would mean a re-
turn to the left-of-center domestic and foreign
policies that characterized her earlier rule and
would revive prospects for renewed communal
disturbances. Ceylon's foreign orientation would
be basically anti-Western, a throwback to the
early 1960s when Mrs. Bandaranaike used Asian-
African forums to heap abuse on the US. One
interesting aspect of a Bandaranaike victory
would be the relationship that might then evolve
within the coalition. In a Bandaranaike govern-
ment, Communist influence could be significant,
as the CCP/M has been promised that, for the first
time, it would participate as a member of the
national government. One CCP/M leader has
stated, however, that the real struggle for a Marx-
ist government will begin only after the opposi-
tion coalition returns to power. Mrs. Bandara-
naike, nevertheless, remains confident that she
can control her Marxist allies
Special Report - 11 - 17 October 1969
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Secret
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