WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 31, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
Secret
31 October 1969
No. 0394/69
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
SECRET
(Information as of noon EST, 30 October 1969)
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
VIETNAM
The North Vietnamese premier has garnered new polit-
ical and material support during his month-long swing
through China, the USSR, and East Germany. A major
test of the "Vietnamization" process may be shaping
up in the delta region.
CHINA REVIEWS ITS VIETNAM POLICY
China, as part of an effort to relieve its self-im-
posed isolation in Asia and assume a more active and
influential diplomatic role, is improving its rela-
tions with North Vietnam.
PEKING'S PARTY BUILDING EFFORTS HIT SNAGS
The Chinese Communists have made little progress to-
ward reaching the goal announced at their ninth party
congress of rebuilding their shattered party appara-
tus.
PHILIPPINE PRESIDENTIAL RACE ENTERS FINAL WEEKS
President Marcos now appears to be pulling away in
his race to become the first Philippine president
elected to a second term.
MORE CHINESE ROAD BUILDING IN LAOS
In little more than two weeks, Chinese engineers have
opened some eight miles of road in the northwest.
Page
1
SECRET
Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY 31 Oct 69
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
SECRET
Europe
EAST AND WEST CONSIDER EUROPEAN SECURITY
The members of the Warsaw Pact and NATO are moving
on the subject of European security, but with quite
different approaches.
USSR BECOMING MORE ACTIVE AT THE UN
There have been several indications recently that the
USSR is prepared to look more favorably on the UN as
as instrument for securing its foreign policy objec-
tives.
MOSCOW AFFIRMS CONFIDENCE IN CZECHOSLOVAK LEADER
Czechoslovakia's top leaders returned from Moscow on
28 October with a strong verbal endorsement of party
first secretary Husak, but apparently little else.
THE NPT IS AT THE CROSSROADS
The outlook for the nuclear nonproliferation treaty,
which was opened for signature on 1 July 1968, may be
improving.
SOVIETS WRESTLE WITH LABOR FORCE PROBLEMS
A new decree ordering the reduction of expenditures
on economic administration reaffirms the nagging de-
sire of Soviet authorities to utilize the labor force
more efficiently.
USSR AID PROGRAM IN ALGERIA MOVES SLOWLY
Despite repeated announcements on economic coopera-
tion, there is little real progress.
SECRET
Page i i WEEKLY SUMMARY 31 Oct 69
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
SECRET
Middle East - Africa
LEBANESE CRISIS CONTINUES TO DOMINATE MIDDLE EAST SCENE 20
Despite a few violent outbursts, the Lebanese Govern-
ment and the fedayeen appear to be shifting from mil-
itary confrontation to attempting a political solu-
tion through negotiations in Cairo.
SOMALIA'S REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL OFF TO CAUTIOUS START
Life has returned to normal throughout Somalia--re-
named the Democratic Republic of Somalia--and Somalis
in general apparently have accepted the bloodless
military coup of 21 October.
INSTABILITY MOUNTS IN TWO COMMUNIST-RUN INDIAN STATES
The government of Kerala has fallen, and political
strife and civil disorder are increasing in West
Bengal.
MORE TRIBAL TROUBLES IN KENYA
Tribal tensions are again high in Kenya following
rioting by opposition Luo tribesmen, the banning of
their political party, and the imprisonment of its
leaders.
POLITICAL TURMOIL AGAIN THREATENS IN CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) 25
The country's numerous and mutually antagonistic
political factions again are beleaguering Ngouabi's
regime.
SECRET
Page iii WEEKLY SUMMARY 31 Oct 69
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
SECRET
ZAMBIA SETTLES COPPER NATIONALIZATION
The agreements in principle on the nationalization
of two foreign copper companies extend substantial
short-term benefits to the companies, and Lusaka
hopes to encourage expanded foreign investment in
Zambia.
Western Hemisphere
NEW EFFORTS TO SETTLE EL SALVADOR-HONDURAS DISPUTE FAIL 28
The OAS-sponsored negotiations have not resulted in
a rapprochement between the two countries as the
Hondurans will not obey a resolution calling for an
end to its obstruction of Salvadoran trade until the
Salvadorans agree to settle the border dispute.
BRAZIL'S NEW ADMINISTRATION TAKES OFFICE
Congress is hopeful that President Medici will imple-
ment his professed intention to move Brazil toward
democracy, but fears that any sign of opposition to
the government or the military could result in the
legislature's permanent closure.
DISSATISFACTION WITH BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT GROWS
The radical policies of the Ovando government are
disenchanting the military and new economic restric-
tions may lead to discontent among the populace.
ECUADOREAN PRESIDENT MAY ASSUME DICTATORIAL POWER
Continuing student agitation and a fiscal crisis may
pressure President Velasco into assuming extra-con-
stitutional powers.
DOMINICAN POLITICS MARKING TIME IN VIOLENT FASHION
The early stages of the Dominican presidential cam-
paign have been punctuated with violence. Intensi-
fied politicking, which could lead to more wide-
spread civilian-police clashes, still awaits Presi-
dent Balaguer's decision on whether he will seek
re-election next May.
SECRET
Page iv WEEKLY SUMMARY 31 Oct 69
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
SECRET
North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong's success in garnering new
political support for Hanoi during his recent month-long travels results, in
part, from Peking's decision to resume an active diplomatic role in Asia.
China's bitter dispute with the USSR has heightened concern in Peking over
Moscow's active policies in Asia and accelerated moves toward improving ties
with North Korea as well as North Vietnam. These circumstances were
probably at work when the Chinese and Vietnamese Communists issued their
communiques. The Chinese showed a marked reduction in their hostility
toward the Paris talks and for the first time openly endorsed the Vietnamese
Communists' long-standing position that the unconditional withdrawal of all
US troops must be the crux of any settlement.
The Chinese road-building program in Laos is moving ahead again. In
little more than two weeks, Chinese engineers opened some eight miles of
road in northwest Laos, thus strengthening Communist capabilities for
supporting Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese operations.
Within China, little progress has been made toward rebuilding the
shattered party apparatus in the six months since the Chinese Communist
Party's congress of "unity." Propaganda drives aimed at goading provincial
authorities into action have not been followed by the necessary official
guidelines that would ensure effective implementation. The central author-
ities still appear at odds on how to go about reaching their announced goal
of party rebuilding, and their halting efforts so far have only added to
political tensions at the local level.
In South Vietnam it appears that a major test of the "Vietnamization"
process may be shaping up in the delta region. The enemy's renewed interest
in the rich and populous delta also reflects a probable decision to try to
build up a broader base within the population. The Communists apparently
believe the need to control a greater proportion of the people will be critical
either in the event of prolonged war or of some kind of cease-fire.
SECRET
Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 31 Oct 69
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
SECRET
VIETNAM
North Vietnamese Premier
Pham Van Dong's month-long dip-
lomatic foray through China, the
Soviet Union, and East Germany
has garnered new political and
material support for Hanoi. Dong's
most important political gains
appeared to have been scored in
Peking. During his stay there,
Chinese statements indicated a
reduction in their hostility to-
ward the Paris talks and a marked
improvement in Sino-Vietnamese
relations, a long sought North
Vietnamese goal. (See the item
on Sino-Vietnamese relations in
this issue.) In Moscow, Dong
received strong assurances of
continued Soviet backing for
Hanoi's course. Neither the com-
muniques nor statements made dur-
ing the premier's trip disclose
anything significant about Hanoi's
intentions in the war or at the
Paris talks.
Dong and his principal travel-
ing partner, economic affairs ex-
pert Le Thanh Nghi, concluded sev-
eral aid agreements for 1970.
Some of these point toward Soviet
and East European participation
in North Vietnam's reconstruction
to which the North Vietnamese are
giving more and more attention.
Nghi remained in Eastern Europe
and is negotiating similar pacts
with some of Hanoi's other allies.
Military Developments in
South Vietnam
A brief flare-up of enemy
shellings and ground probes took
place in the central highlands
this past week and government
forces fought several sharp en-
gagements in the Mekong Delta.
These actions, however, are an
exception to the general pattern
of reduced military activity
that has held since early Sep-
tember.
most enemy units now
are engaged primarily in politi-
cal indoctrination meetings and
refitting in preparation for the
"winter-spring" campaign which
may start in mid-November. Heavy
attacks could come earlier near
the remote Bu Prang and Duc Lap
outposts in southern II Corps.
Several North Vietnamese regi-
ments have been holding positions
near those camps for the past few
weeks.
There also is more evidence
of new enemy forces in the Mekong
Delta. Initially, North Vietnam-
ese reinforcements were sent to
the delta to shore up the region's
Viet Cong units which were badly
battered in 1968. Now that major
US units have withdrawn from the
delta, however, the North Vietnam-
ese face only South Vietnamese
infantry and may be preparing
a major test of the "Vietnamiza-
tion" process. The shift of large
enemy units from the remote,
sparsely populated provinces in
northwest III Corps to the rich
and populous delta represents,
in addition, a new emphasis on
SECRET
Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
SECRET
the struggle for control of the
population.
This emphasis on population
control has also been noted in
coastal I and II Corps, where
some main force units have been
broken up to operate with local
guerrillas in order to establish
contact with the people. Other
units have been ordered to attack
small allied security and pacifi-
cation forces in the countryside
during the coming winter-spring
period. The Communists appar-
ently believe that the need to
regain a broader population base
is critical, either in the event
of prolonged war or of some kind
of cease-fire arrangement.
enemy units in several areas
e country are being exhorted
to prepare for more heavy fight-
ing in the next few months. P
the North Vietnam-
ese 3rd Division has been ordered
to prepare for an offensive that
will require large-scale attacks
early next year.
the Communists
are girding for a new offensive
in which enemy forces will first
concentrate on striking at the
allied pacification program, and
later try to occuiDv areas
by US forces.
Political Developments
President Thieu's political
difficulties were compounded this
week by the withdrawal of one of
the six parties making up his Na-
tional Social Democratic Front and
by the adverse reaction of the
National Assembly to new govern-
ment austerity taxes.
SECRET
Page 3
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
SECRET
Thieu's congenitally weak
political front had been particu-
larly inactive and unproductive
since early September when its
leaders failed to get any sig-
nificant posts in the reshuffled
cabinet. President Thieu has
slighted his front almost since
its inception and he currently
seems more interested in rehabil-
itating former elements of the
Diem regime's elitist Can Lao
party. In these circumstances,
the small, Hoa Hao-based Social
Democratic Party (Dan Xa) appar-
ently became exasperated, and
pulled out, claiming that the
front serves no useful purpose.
Suspicion apparently is growing
in Saigon that Thieu is purposely
letting his front drift and may
even have trapped its member par-
ties into a position in which
Page 4
they have only limited room for
independent political maneuver.
Meanwhile, the National As-
sembly has reacted strongly to
the government's imposition of
greatly increased "austerity"
taxes on gasoline and other im-
ported consumer goods. The Up-
per. House has passed two resolu-
tions attacking the decree, one
charging that the executive has
usurped legislative prerogative
and the other expressing concern
regarding the incorrect imple-
mentation of the austerity taxes.
The Lower House also passed two
motions, one asking the Supreme
Court to rule on the decree's
constitutionality and the other
calling on the government to
rescind the tax increases. Ef-
forts to organize a progovern-
ment voting bloc in the National
Assembly, already foundering,
will probably suffer a further
setback as a result of this lat-
est legislative-executive im-
broglio.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 31 Oct 69
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
SECRET.
CHINA REVIEWS ITS VIETNAM POLICY
China, as part of an effort
to relieve its self-imposed isola-
tion in Asia and assume a more ac-
tive and influential diplomatic
role, is improving its relations
with North Vietnam.
Peking's cold treatment of
Hanoi after the start of the Paris
talks in mid-1968 severely strained
Sino-Vietnamese relations and left
China alone in its implacable and
heavy-handed opposition to a nego-
tiated settlement. In recent months,
however, movement away from this un-
profitable position has been accel-
erated by China's bitter dispute
with Moscow. Peking has become in-
creasingly concerned over its weak
diplomatic position in Asia vis-a-
vis the USSR and currently is seek-
ing to repair its ties with North
Korea as well as North Vietnam.
Moreover, Peking's decision to en-
ter border negotiations with the
Russians has made its overt opposi-
tion to Hanoi's negotiating strategy
even more untenable and Peking ac-
cordingly has been moving to a more
flexible line.
In two joint communique''s is-
sued during an extensive round of
Sino-Vietnamese discussions recently
concluded in Peking, the Chinese
for the first time officially en-
dorsed the Vietnamese Communists'
long-standing position that the un-
conditional withdrawal of all US
troops must be the crux of any set-
tlement. In contrast to Peking's
former silence on the talks them-
selves, the communiques also convey
Chinese acknowledgment, if not ap-
proval, of the Vietnamese Commu-
nists' ten-point peace plan.
Peking's new approach contains
some ambiguities, however. In a
Page 5
speech at a banquet on 23 October
for visiting North Vietnamese Pre-
mier Pham Van Dong and his delega-
tion, Premier Chou En-lai omitted
the standard Chinese call for the
Vietnamese to persevere until com-
plete victory is achieved. Instead,
he expressed the belief that the
Vietnamese would overcome all dif-
ficulties along their "road of ad-
vance"--a formulation that could
sanction various military and po-
litical moves by Hanoi.
The joint communiques, how-
ever, clearly reveal continuing
differences of emphasis between
the two, with the Vietnamese reit-
erating the correctness of their
fight-talk strategy and the Chi-
nese stressing "protracted strug-
gle." It appears that Peking has
implicitly become the champion of
the Vietnamese Communists' maxi-
mum demands in Paris without com-
mitting itself to the talks per
se or to any lesser terms the
Vietnamese might be tempted to
accept.
Meanwhile, the Chinese are
using their justification for the
current Sino-Soviet border talks
as rationalization for their new
approach to Vietnam. For example,
one recent Chinese local broadcast
stated that Peking's "dual revolu-
tionary tactics" of negotiating
while resisting Soviet aggression
can be applied "by all revolution-
ary people." Although this line
has yet to be authoritatively pro-
claimed by Peking, a number of pro-
vincial broadcasts have supported
it by invoking a 1945 article by
Mao justifying tactical negotia-
tions during a period of "pro-
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 31 Oct 69
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
SECRET
PEKING'S PARTY BUILDING EFFORTS HIT SNAGS
The Chinese Communists have
made little progress toward reach-
ing the goal announced at their
ninth party congress of rebuild-
ing their shattered party appara-
tus. They have made several prop-
aganda drives, the most recent
within the past two weeks, aimed
at goading provincial authorities
into action, but the necessary of-
ficial guidelines appear to be
missing or are so vague as to be
ineffective. Thus, six months
after the congress of "unity,"
the central authorities appear
still at odds on how to implement
party building, and their halting
efforts to date have only added
to existing tensions among polit-
ical rivals at the local level.
Earlier this month, the
authoritative Pe1e's Dail
reiterated a long-standing call
for "open-door party consolida-
tion," a practice whereby the
"revolutionary masses"--a euphe-
mism for the partially discredited
Red Guards--are allowed a voice
in determining the fitness of
prospective candidates for party
membership. By insisting that
the party organization cannot be
rebuilt without open-door consoli-
dation, the People's Dail article
probably intended warn rela-
tively conservative local and
regional authorities not to engage
in the wholesale restoration of
old party cadres to positions they
held prior to the Cultural Revo-
lution. Mao and his more radical
colleagues within the Peking lead-
ership remain committed to this
disruptive principle but it is pre-
sumably opposed by many old-line
civilian bureaucrats, and probably
a good number of military admin-
istrators as well.
Several provincial radio-
broadcasts over the past two
weeks have alleged that party
building in their areas is pick-
ing up, but most have complained
that recalcitrant factionalists
are hampering the process. These
complaints were echoed in this
month's issue of the theoretical
journal Red Flag, which noted
ruefully tiat there is still
factionalism in the revolutionary
committees--the administrative
units at the provincial level
and below that are supposed to
provide the core of leadership
for the new party machinery.
The journal scored leaders of
the revolutionary committees for
failing to quell factional in-
fighting, yet shied away from
telling them precisely what
steps they should take to end
the quarreling. Instead, it
retreated behind a fog of pious
exhortations that they must
study the thought of Mao and
thus find a way out of their
difficulties.
There have been other signs
in recent weeks that Peking may
have temporarily decided to
abandon some of its efforts to
work out accommodations between
contending forces in many faction-
ridden revolutionary committees.
The failure of the top leaders
of Shansi and Kweichow provinces
to appear for the National Day
celebrations on 1 October, for
SECRET
Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
SECRET
example, suggests that the polit-
ical situation in those areas is
in flux. In some other long-
troubled provinces, local lead-
ers appeared unaccompanied by
their major political rivals,
suggesting that Peking has been
unable to work out compromise
solutions and has simply opted
for supporting whichever forces
appear to be ascendant, regard-
less of the consequences for fu-
ture stability in those localities.
Nevertheless, many provin-
cial governments remain an uneasy
coalition of political opponents
who can be expected to carry their
quarrels into the party building
arena. Meanwhile, none has suc-
ceeded in forming a formal party
committee and reconstruction at
lower levels proceeds at a snail's
pace. Only a few party branches
have been formed and these are
mostl in communes and factories.
PHILIPPINE PRESIDENTIAL RACE ENTERS FINAL WEEKS
President Marcos now appears
to be pulling away in his race to
become the first Philippine presi-
dent elected to a second term.
For a time in September, op-
position candidate Senator Sergio
Osmena of the Liberal Party threat-
ened to make it a close contest.
His calm demeanor and reasoned
speeches had enabled him to cut
into Marcos' early commanding lead.
Continuing party factionalism and
financial difficulties have halted
the momentum of his campaign, how-
ever, and it seems unlikely that
he can call forth the needed last
minute surge needed to beat Marcos.
With less than two weeks re-
maining before the voting on 11
November, Marcos has picked up
important independent backing.
The evangelistic Iglesia ni Cristo
sect announced last week that it
would support him. This politi-
cally disciplined group, which has
a reputation for picking winners,
promises to deliver 300,000 votes
to Marcos; its backing could create
a bandwagon effect for the incum-
bent president.
Page 7
in violence. Intense press scru-
tiny and unprecedented, vigorous
monitoring by the presidentially
appointed commissioner on elec-
tions apparently have caused both
parties to hold back on tradi-
tional strong-arm tactics. The
campaign has typically centered
on name-calling and charges of
corruption, but this has little
impact on the politically cynical
electorate. Some voter intimida-
tion is still possible, however,
since Marcos is still shaken by
Osmena's early showing and he can
be expected to take any steps he
believes necessary to ensure his
victory.
Relations with the US rose
to unusual prominence in the cam-
paign. Following a public out-
cry over a US military court's
acquittal of a US serviceman who
had killed a Filipino, both can-
didates felt obliged to compete
with one another in promising to
gain clear acknowledgement from
the US of Philippine sovereignty
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
SECRET
over the bases and US personnel
stationed in the country.
The Philippine electoral
system allows the voter to ballot
separately for the top two offices,
and Nationalista President Marcos
could find that his vice presi-
dent is Liberal Senator Genaro
Magsaysay. Vice President Fer-
nando Lopez has attracted favor-
able attention by projecting a
self-effacing image, but Magsay-
say, younger brother of the anti-25X1
Huk hero president of the 1950s,
does have the important backing
of the I lesia ni Cristo.
MORE CHINESE ROAD BUILDING IN LAOS
Chinese engineers have opened some
eight miles of road southwest of
Muong Sai to limited truck traffic.
25X1
25X1
The resumption of construc-
tion on a major bridge near Muong
La, northeast of Muong Sai, sug-
gests that the Chinese also in-
tend to link up this new road xail-h
RRoute 19 at Muoncy 'Khn11;4
On the military front, gov-
ernment guerrillas are pushing
into the few remaining enemy
strongholds north of the Plaine
des Jarres. Although these opera-
tions have not netted the govern-
ment a significant amount of new
territory, they have uncovered
arms and supply caches.
25X1
2 A11
Attempts by Communist forces
to secure their supply lines into
the Nong Pet area so far have been
in vain, although in the past week
government guerrillas overlooking
Communist supply trails have come
under increasing enemy pressure.
25X1
SECRET
Page 9
WEEKLY SUMMARY 31 Oct 69
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
SECRET
The Soviet Union and the US agreed to open talks on strategic arms
limitations in Helsinki on 17 November. They also presented a revised
seabeds treaty to the Geneva disarmament conference, which closes for the
year on 31 October. Other participants at the conference seem to be
favorable to the treaty, which now goes to the UN General Assembly.
Moscow dashed the hopes of the visiting Czechoslovak leaders for a big
loan and some concession on troop withdrawal by providing little else than a
strong endorsement of party chief Husak.
Initial reaction from the Communist governments to which Chancellor
Brandt made overtures was noncommittal and cautious. East Germany did
not even publish Brandt's offer to negotiate with it. The Poles and Soviets
have indicated they will wait to see if actions follow words.
The Warsaw Pact powers convened a meeting of foreign ministers in
Prague on 30 October to draw up a common platform on European security.
The objective seems to be to take the initiative away from the forthcoming
NATO ministerial meetings and focus the attention of the Western allies on
Communist proposals.
The Council of the European Communities decided this week on
measures to soften the impact of the revaluation of the mark on German
agriculture. The measures-extensions of the present import levies for six
weeks and subsequent "deficiency payments" to the German farmers-will
probably not weaken the Common Agricultural Policy as much as the steps
taken after the French devaluation.
The Council's failure to reach agreement on a new budget and research
program for EURATOM leaves that organization in a weakened condition.
Further efforts will be made to achieve a compromise, but a decision will not
be made until after the summit meeting in The Hague on 17-18 November.
There was an unusual amount of political activity in Iberia this week.
Franco made sweeping changes in the Spanish cabinet, giving the pre-
ponderant role to technocrats favoring modernization and ties to Europe.
New approaches to Europe will still be hindered by the dislike of Franco. In
Portugal, the Caetano government's National Union won all the seats in the
parliamentary elections, which were more open than any in 40 years
SECRET
Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY 31 Oct 69
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
SECRET
EAST AND WEST CONSIDER EUROPEAN SECURITY
Members of the Warsaw Pact and
NATO are moving on the subject of
European security, but with quite
different approaches. The Warsaw
Pact foreign ministers were sched-
uled to begin two days of consulta-
tions in Prague on 30 October, which
may result in a statement of sub-
jects to be discussed at a European
Security Conference (ESC). The NATO
deputy foreign ministers will meet
in Brussels on 5 November to con-
sider East-West issues.
Moscow probably senses a need
to carry forward the momentum for
ESC that was generated by the Warsaw
Pact's Budapest appeal last March
and by Finland's call for a confer-
ence last May. The Soviets also
want to take advantage of the im-
proved political climate in Bonn
following Brandt's ascendancy and of
the recent support for ESC expressed
in Moscow by French Foreign Minister
Schumann.
The Soviet approach to an ESC
is to avoid controversial East-West
issues, such as Germany and Berlin.
Moscow would like to have the Prague
meeting propose broad subjects, like
nonrecourse to force, regional dis-
armament, and European economic,
cultural, and scientific coopera-
tion. If the Soviets can limit the
scope of ESC to broad international
political principles and wide-spec-
trum European cooperation, they will
not have to sacrifice any control
over the activities and ambitions of
the other Warsaw Pact members. Most
East European countries, however,
see prospects for greater independ-
ence from Soviet restrictions, since
Moscow itself is pushing detente to
achieve a conference.
The statement that emerges from
the Warsaw Pact is likely to eschew
polemics about West Germany. Some
hint of a more benign attitude was
contained in Brezhnev's declaration
on European security on 27 October,
which expressed the hope that West
Germany will prove to be realistic
about the existence of two Germa-
nies--a fundamental policy objective
for Moscow toward which a confer-
ence may help pave the way.
The possibility of a renewed
Warsaw Pact appeal for an ESC may
complicate the question of how the
West--specifically NATO--willre-
spond. Since last July the senior
political advisers of the Alliance
have been working to develop a ma-
jor list of issues for possible
future negotiation with the East,
and to prepare for the long-term
eventuality of an ESC.
A draft of this list has been
completed and will be reviewed by
the deputy foreign ministers in
Brussels. At the moment, the NATO
approach is intended to focus on
hard issues, including even arms
control, force reductions, and im-
proving the present status of Ger-
many and Berlin, but leaving the
broader issues of a European "set-
tlement" for the more distant fu-
ture. Such a deliberate and sus-
tained effort may be difficult for
the Allies to maintain if a re-
newed Warsaw Pact initiative
arouses governmental and public
opinion in the West in favor of
the earlier and less meaningful
ESC the Communists appear to be
seeking.
Already there are signs that a
few NATO members might be impatient
with the coordinated Alliance ap-
proach and try to accommodate a Com-
munist bid in the interests of East-
West detente. The majority of
SECRET
Page 12 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
SECRET
members appear to think that the next
NATO foreign ministers meeting, to
be held in December, must at least
be more forthcoming than the last,
when it was decided to avoid any
direct response to the Budapest ap-
peal for an ESC.
USSR BECOMING MORE ACTIVE AT THE UN
There have been several indica-
tions recently--particularly Mos-
cow's display of interest in peace-
keeping operations--that the USSR is
prepared to look more favorably on
the UN as an instrument for securing
its foreign policy objectives.
Before the start of the General
Assembly the USSR showed consider-
able interest in getting an agree-
ment on organizing and financing UN
peacekeeping forces. There have
been numerous private exchanges in
New York between Soviet and US rep-
resentatives to this end. Major
differences remain unresolved, but
there has been progress in formulat-
ing guidelines for observer missions.
The Soviets are seeking mainly
to assure themselves an equal voice
with the US and a high degree of
control over all aspects of peace-
keeping operations. Moscow wants to
keep the key decisions on peacekeep-
ing in the Security Council where it
has veto power, and shows no inter-
est in coping with the considerable
financial deficits of previous oper-
ations. Nevertheless, the Soviet
interest in peacekeeping forces ap-
pears to reflect a growing Soviet
appreciation for the UN's role in
stabilizing local conflicts. Moscow
has recognized, for example, that a
UN force might be involved in a set-
tlement in the Middle East.
The interest in peacekeeping
also suggests that the Soviet exhor-
tation to the General Assembly to
strengthen international security
was not only a propaganda ploy. So-
viet representative to the UN Yakov
Malik urged adoption of guarantees
for implementing Security Council
decisions, particularly those in-
volving peacekeeping missions.
Moscow's expressed concern with
the problems of the UN coincides
with its recent willingness to co-
operate more openly with the US on
various problems. At one time the
Soviets had been inclined to avoid
public displays of cooperation, pre-
ferring to use the UN forum to em-
barrass their great power rival on
such issues as Vietnam, foreign
bases, and chemical and biological
warfare. Malik has been downplay-
ing these subjects in his speeches,
however, and Gromyko seconded the 25X1
US statement that an era of negoti-
ation must replace an era of con-
frontation
SECRET
Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMARY 31 Oct 69
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
SECRET
Moscow AFFIRMS CONFIDENCE IN CZECHOSLOVAK LEADER
Czechoslovakia's top leaders
returned from Moscow on 28 Octo-
ber with a strong verbal endorse-
ment of party first secretary
Husak, but apparently little
else. The joint statement, is-
sued at the conclusion of the
eight-day visit, indicated that
the Soviets do not intend to
abandon the carrot-and-stick
tactics that have been so effec-
tive in Czechoslovakia.
The only really tangible
results of the bilateral talks
were an agreement to expand trade
and economic cooperation and to
sign a new treaty of friendship
and mutual assistance next May.
No substantial economic aid to
Czechoslovakia, however, appears
to have been provided. The So-
viets again agreed to increase
shipments of raw materials to ex-
ceed existing contracts and to
step up the bilateral exchange
of industrial products and
scientific and technical informa-
tion. The USSR also intends to
"assist" Czechoslovakia in pur-
chasing some scarce items in
foreign markets, most likely
from Communist countries. These
stop-gap measures are not suffi-
cient to help Czechoslovakia
overcome its current economic
difficulties.
.The red carpet treatment
accorded the Czechoslovaks, and
Brezhnev's glowing endorsement
of Husak, however, suggest that
the Soviets consider Husak to
be the man they can work with
in Prague. Moscow's imprimatur
on Husak's leadership will give
him some leverage in his own
efforts to strengthen his posi-
tion despite continuing pressures
by archconservatives seeking to
usurp his powers.
Furthermore, Brezhnev's
allusion to the "legitimate
aspirations" of the Dubcek lead-
ership in January 1968 may mean
that Husak will be allowed to
reintroduce some limited reforms
once party controls and supremacy
are restored. At the same time,
the Soviets have announced an
intention to increase their con-
tacts on all levels with Czecho-
slovak political, military, eco-
nomic, and cultural organiza-
tions. This will keep Moscow
informed and may tend to dis-
courage Czechoslovak initiatives
for reform.
Husak and his associates
went to Moscow expecting sig-
nificant rewards for the authori-
tarian controls they have reim-
posed. They must be profoundly
disappointed that the Soviets
though expressing satisfaction
with the trend of events in
Prague, did not respond to their
requests for a substantial hard
currency loan and a statement on
the eventual withdrawal of So-
viet occupation troops. Moscow
has probably shelved these re-
quests, for the present.
Both the Soviets and Husak
have noted, moreover, that "nor-
malization" has not yet been
achieved. This portends new
domestic restrictions and fur-
ther purges in Czechoslovak
party, government, and mass or-
ganizations in the immediate
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
SECRET
THE NPT IS AT THE CROSSROADS
The outlook for the nuclear
nonproliferation treaty (NPT),
which was opened for signature
on 1 July 1968, may be improving.
Forty-three ratifications, in-
cluding those of the three co-
sponsors--the US, UK, and Soviet
Union--are required to bring the
treaty into force. So far, only
21 countries, including one co-
sponsor, the UK, have ratified.
Nevertheless, action by four or
five key nations in the next few
months might get the treaty over
the hump.
The cosponsors have been en-
couraging signature of the treaty
since this step creates the prob-
ability of later ratification.
The new West German Government is
Sweden, one of the leading
"near-nuclear" states, hopes to
ratify the treaty in the next
few months.
giving a high priority to signa-
The Soviet Union took a step
toward ratification in August when
the foreign affairs commission
of the Supreme Soviet recommended
that the Presidium take favorable
action. While Moscow is also con-
cerned about the positions of In-
dia, Israel, and Japan, recent
statements of First Deputy For-
eign Minister Kuznetsov and Am-
bassador Dobrynin have again made
it clear that Soviet ratification
awaits only West Germany's signa-
ture. It is not unlikely that the
Presidium will act when Bonn signs.
25X6
25X6
L DAB
SECRET
Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY 31 Oct 69
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
SECRET
SOVIETS WRESTLE WITH LABOR FORCE PROBLEMS
Soviet authorities have dis-
played a nagging desire to use
labor more efficiently. A de-
cree to reduce administrative ex-
penditures has been issued jointly
by the party and the government,
but it lacks incentives that would
ensure its observance. Earlier,
the party approved a labor redis-
tribution experiment embodying
sufficient incentives but did not
order its general adoption.
The latest decree, published
on 24 October orders a 1.7 bil-
lion ruble reduction in adminis-
trative spending in 1970. Admin-
istrative staffs are to be reor-
ganized and reduced, staff pro-
cedures are to be revamped to
make greater use of modern busi-
ness machines, and excessive busi-
ness trips and conferences are
to be eliminated. Government
bodies and economic officials at
all levels are charged with find-
ing new, more useful jobs for
employees who are relieved of ad-
ministrative duties.
Despite long-standing cen-
tral authority over economic ad-
ministration, apparent overstaff-
ing has been endemic to the econ-
omy. Periodic campaigns to re-
duce administrative staffs have
failed to lower the percentage of
the industrial labor force in
this type of work. Moreover, the
new decree does not specify
either rewards for those who ob-
serve it or penalities for those
who do not. Efforts to make
greater use of business machines
will be impeded by the chronic
shortage of such equipment.
Earlier this month, the CPSU
Central Committee formally ap-
proved the controversial Shchekino
experiment that is being conducted
in a handful of enterprises but
stopped short of ordering its
adoption elsewhere. In this ex-
periment management is given mone-
tary incentives to economize on
labor; any workers deemed to be
unnecessary are dismissed. The
Shchekino experiment contrasts
sharply with the decree on ad-
ministrative expenses by its em-
bodiment of what seem to be ef-
fective economic incentives. It
has, however, become involved in
debate between proponents and op-
ponents of more enterprise free-
dom and greater use of monetary
incentives. An official of the
government body overseeing the
experiment has publicly expressed
reservations about its general
adoption.
There have been many other in-
dications that authorities see
a need to expand and redistribute
the labor force. Less than a
week before the decree on admin-
istrative spending was published,
the USSR Council of Ministers is-
sued a decree aimed at increasing
the employment of persons who
have been pensioned for reasons
of health or age and the employ-
ment of women. The press has
highlighted shortages of workers
in certain locations and in
various skill categories and
has urged housewives to enter
the job market. Managers have
been exhorted to pare their labor
SECRET
Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
SECRET
requirements by adopting a set of
procedures labeled "scientific or-
ganization of labor." Articles
have been published alleging that
labor resources are under-utilized
in the smaller cities and in in-
dividual plants in all regions.
Since 1967, labor exchanges or
employment agencies have been
established in a number of ci-
ties to facilitate the matching
of workers and jobs.
USSR AID PROGRAM IN ALGERIA MOVES SLOWLY
The Soviets are gradually
implementing their large aid pro-
gram in Algeria, but the newly
established Algerian-Soviet com-
mission for economic, scientific,
and technical cooperation appar-
ently will provide little impetus.
The first meeting, which was at-
tended by the highest official in
Moscow's economic aid program
abroad, produced only a draft
agreement on scientific and tech-
nical cooperation and an aide-
memoire on the results of the
technical committee's discussions.
Sketchy press reports have
stated, however, that the USSR
agreed to continue to send Al-
geria more petroleum, mining, and
agricultural technicians, as well
as experts to speed the comple-
tion of the Annaba steel mill,
which is behind schedule. At
present there are 2,000 Soviet
economic technicians in Algeria,
half of whom are working in these
areas. In addition, the commis-
sion discussed, but did not con-
clude, a trade protocol for 1970.
As in previous negotiations, the
Soviets proved to be hard bargain-
ers and stirred up Algerian re-
sentment.
Throughout 1969, announce-
ments were made on various as-
pects of economic cooperation
but little implementation was
observed. In January, a con-
tract was signed calling for the
Soviets to oversee the building
of irrigation projects in Al-
geria. By early October these
projects still were only in the
blueprint stage. The USSR also
agreed to send equipment for oil
drilling, geophysical research,
and seismic studies which Algeria
would pay for with mineral ex-
ports. A jointly financed pe-
troleum research center is to
be set up before the end of 1969.
An Oil and Gas Institute, estab-
lished in 1964 and equipped by
the Soviets, currently has a stu-
dent body of 1,000.
and petroleum.
Meetings between the two
have been held repeatedly to
facilitate the implementation
of the aid program. Still, by
December 1968, Algeria had drawn
only about $24 million out of
about a total of $228 million
in credit for industrial projects
extended in 1963-64. In 1968,
in an attempt to improve its
relations with Algeria, the USSR
agreed to purchase Algerian wine
SECRET
Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY 31 Oct 69
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
25X1
25X1
i
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
SECRET
The Lebanese crisis continued to dominate the Middle East scene this
week. Despite a few violent outbursts, the Lebanese Government and the
fedayeen and their supporters appear to be shifting from military confronta-
tion to attempting a political solution through negotiations in Cairo, with
the Soviets apparently trying to cool the situation. The two sides appear as
far apart as ever on the issue of fedayeen freedom of operation in Lebanon,
but President Hilu's decision to send his army commander in chief to Cairo
probably portends eventual Lebanese capitulation.
The Turkish political scene remains quiet as the new parliament pre-
pares to convene tomorrow. Prime Minister Demirel, who retained his
majority control of the Assembly in recent elections, is expected to make
extensive changes in his cabinet but few in domestic or foreign policies.
In India, regional problems, some with communal overtones, are dog-
ging Prime Minister Gandhi as she prepares to face her Congress Party
opponents at a weekend meeting of the organization's governing Working
Committee. Nevertheless, she stands a good chance of emerging from the
meeting in a stronger position because the old-guard "bosses" are divided.
Mrs. Gandhi is in no mood to offer them more than a face-saving compro-
mise.
Federal Nigerian forces are preparing for another "final offensive," but
it does not appear imminent. The Biafrans, who have been expecting such a
move, can probably prevent any early major gains. Emperor Haile Selassie's
latest peace initiative is still alive, but there are no signs that negotiations will
soon materialize.
Security authorities in Congo (Kinshasa) and Angola apparently are
proceeding with a joint program for repatriating former Katangan gendarmes
who took refuge in Angola after their abortive mutiny in 1967. In Burundi,
President Micombero's position has been seriously weakened. His policy of
tribal reconciliation is under heavy fire from extremists who claim that the
exposure of alleged coup plotting by the major tribe proves that the
President's policy is a failure.
SECRET
Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
SECRET
LEBANESE CRISIS CONTINUES TO DOMINATE MIDDLE EAST SCENE
Although there were some
violent outbursts in the Lebanese
crisis this past week, the govern-
ment and the fedayeen with their
supporters, shifted from mili-
tary confrontation to attempting
a political solution through ne-
gotiations. A Lebanese military
delegation led by army Commander
in Chief Bustani arrived in Cairo
on Wednesday and began discus-
sions with Egyptian officials led
by President Nasir, who finally
agreed to act as a mediator.
Fedayeen leaders headed by Yasir
Arafat are expected to arrive
shortly to take part in the ne-
gotiations.
The fedayeen have already
stated their basic demands--free-
dom to establish bases and to op-
erate freely in Lebanon--which
Lebanese President Hilu has
long opposed. With the two sides
so diametrically opposed it is
possible that the current ne-
gotiations may break down before
anything is achieved. Neverthe-
less, President Hilu's decision
first to send a negotiating team
to Egypt and secondly to have
it led by General Bustani prob-
ably portends his eventual capit-
ulation to fedayeen demands.
Moscow's support for an
Arab-arranged settlement is
probably prompted both by its
desire to avoid a wider conflict
and to reap the maximum propaganda
advantage. The Soviets presumably
believe that their intercession
with Syria will be favorably re-
ceived by the Lebanese Government.
Although the Soviets would like
to see Lebanon cooperate more
closely with the radical Arab
states and the fedayeen, it al-
most certainly does not want
the Beirut government toppled
by the guerrillas--a development
which would have unforeseeable
and possibly dangerous conse-
quences.
SECRET
Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY 31 Oct 69
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
25X1
25X6
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
SECRET
25X6
SECRET
Southern Yemen-US: Southern
Yemen abruptly broke diplomatic
relations with the US on 24
October and gave the US mission
in Aden 48 hours to leave the
country. The recent delivery
of US aircraft to Israel, the
propaganda furor over US citizens
serving in the Israeli Army,
and the emotions generated by
the Lebanese crisis were probably
all factors influencing the rad-
ical regime's sudden decision.
Southern Yemen's relations with
the US have been chilly for
some time, and the latest move
was probably advocated by For-
eign Minister Al-Baydh, who is
known to be strongly anti-US.
Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY 31 Oct 69
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
SECRET
SOMALIA'S REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL OFF TO CAUTIOUS START
Life has returned to normal
throughout Somalia--renamed the
Democratic Republic of Somalia--
and Somalis in general apparently
have accepted the bloodless mili-
tary coup of 21 October. Civil
servants are on the job and es-
sential government services are
being carried out. Regional rev-
olutionary councils are being
established throughout the coun-
try to administer local affairs.
Former prime minister Egal and
his ministers are under detention,
but the regime is uncertain about
what to do with them.
Despite its initial "left-
ist" statements, the Revolution-
ary Council is feeling its way
along and its tone has become
more moderate. The council seems
anxious to continue the tradi-
tional stance of past Somali gov-
ernments by maintaining a careful
balance in foreign relations.
Clear efforts have been made to
reassure the diplomatic community
in Mogadiscio of the government's
desire for cooperation and con-
tinued economic assistance.
neighboring countries. Both Addis
Ababa and Nairobi are maintaining
a wait-and-see position, however,
and have avoided taking any pro-
vocative action along their bor-
ders, although the Kenyans have
moved additional security forces
to the area.
The council still has not
disclosed its membership. All
reports so far agree that army
officers predominate and are
likely to continue doing so.
Although army commander, General
Siad, chairman of the council,
has stated that civilians would
be included, there is no firm
evidence a's to what politicians,
if any, have cast their lot with
the junta. This delay could be
the result of maneuvering to in-
clude individuals acceptable to
major tribal groups and regions,
but could also signal the devel-
opment of major problems within
the leadership.
Spokesmen have emphasized
that the coup was mounted purely
for internal political reasons.
Nevertheless, Ethiopia and Kenya
are highly suspicious because of
the Somali Army's record of past
support to dissidents in the two
SECRET
Page 2 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
SECRET
INSTABILITY MOUNTS IN Two COMMUNIST-RUN INDIAN STATES
India's two Communist-dom-
inated states, Kerala and West
Bengal, face increasing problems
which threaten the viability of
their governments. In one state,
Kerala, pressures building for
several weeks have already led
to the collapse of the governing
coalition.
Both states have been headed
by coalitions in which the far
left Communist Party/Marxist was
dominant, but the coalitions also
contained less radical members,
including the pro-Moscow Commu-
nist Party of India. In both
states trouble started over op-
position to the Marxists' high-
handed attempts to extend their
power at the expense of their
coalition partners.
In Kerala, Marxist Chief
Minister Namboodiripad was fi-
nally forced to resign last week
when dissatisfied parties within
his coalition joined the opposi-
tion in demanding a probe of cor-
ruption charges. The anti-Nam-
boodiripad forces have little in
common, however, and their chances c
often caused by tensions between
Marxist and non-Marxist labor
and rural groups, continue una-
bated. The dissatisfied coalition
partners are in no better position
to take control of the government,
however, than are their counter-
parts in Kerala. Rather than
topple the coalition they would
prefer to force concessions from
the Marxists.
Options are narrowing, how-
ever, as the law-and-order situ-
ation deteriorates and the warring
coalition partners become increas-
ingly unable to govern. As in
of forming a lasting alternative
government are slim. Namboo-
diripad's party is still the larg-
est in the state assembly, and
he has been asked to stay on as
caretaker until a new government
is formed.
The anti-Marxist parties in
the West Bengal coalition are
concerned with the increasing
breakdown of law and order in
their state. Violent clashes,
SECRET
Ke rata`
Coalition government
collapses, 24 October
Page 23 WEEKLY SUMMARY
T
Coalition government
threatened by
inter-party strife
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
SECRET
Kerala, West Bengal's Soviet-
oriented Communist Party even-
tually may join ranks with other
discontented groups in the coa-
lition to bring down the govern-
ment.
A prolonged period of ten-
sion and instability appears
likely. New Delhi is reluctant
to step in and impose central
government rule for fear of fur-
ther alienating the states from
the Congress Party, which has
become a minority group in both
Kerala and West Bengal. The
central government could be forced
to act, however, if violence in-
creases significantly and frag-
mentation brings the state ov-
ernments to a standstill./
MORE TRIBAL TROUBLES IN KENYA
Kenyan tribal tensions rose
violently to the surface during
the past week. President Ken-
yatta, who was making a tour of
predominantly Luo areas in an
effort to restore that tribe's
faith in his Kikuyu-dominated
government, was stoned and jeered
by the crowds. His tough security
troops opened fire; 11 Luo were
killed and nearly 80 wounded.
Kenyatta blamed the disturb-
ances on the leaders of the pre-
dominantly Luo opposition party,
the Kenya People's Union (KPU).
KPU president, Oginga Odinga, a
long-time nationalist who is par-
tially Communist financed, was
placed under house arrest as was
the party vice president. The
six remaining KPU members of par-
liament were jailed. Finally on
Wednesday the government banned
the KPU.
Although the government pre-
sented no proof that KPU leaders
had instigated the rioting, Odinga
could easily have done so. The
Luo have been unhappy with Ken-
yatta and his government since
the assassination of their fel-
low tribesman Tom Mboya in July,
which they believe was plotted
by the Kikuyu leadership.
The banning of the KPU makes
Kenya a one-party state and also
leaves the Luo, Kenya's second
largest tribe, without real po-
litical representation. With
Kenya a one-party state,Kenyatta's
Kenya Africa National Union (KANU)
will automatically win all the
seats in Kenya's first general
election, which will probably beheld
within the next two months. The
elections will, therefore, be mean-
ingful only if the primary elections
to select KANU candidates are con-
ducted honestly.
Meanwhile, spontaneous in-
cidents of violence are always
possible in the atmosphere of
increased tribal tension. The
only incident since the disturb-
ances occurred in Moscow, where
about 50 Kenyan students, appar-
ently Luos, ransacked the Kenyan
Embassy and roughed up the ambas --
SECRET
Page 24 WEEKLY SUMMARY
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
SECRET
POLITICAL TURMOIL AGAIN THREATENS IN CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)
Brazzaville's radical-left- ( Gabon, Central African Republic,
ist regime faces rising tensions i and Chad.
that threaten to plunge the coun-
try into a new round of political
turmoil. Army strong man Ngouabi,
an opportunistic ex-paratrooper
who named himself president last
December, is likely to find it
increasingly difficult to balance
the country's numerous and mutu-
ally antagonistic factions.
Ngouabi, without previous
political experience or known
ideological moorings, gained con-
trol of Brazzaville's chaotic
political scene 14 months ago
during the political crisis that
toppled President Massamba-Debat.
Working from a power base in the
army's paratroop battalion,
Ngouabi strengthened his position
through an early alliance with
extreme leftists.
The alliance with the left
has been'uneasy, however. The
regime was denounced as reac-
tionary during recent meetings
of the official youth and stu-
dent organizations
In a recent radio address,
Ngouabi angrily defended his
Marxist credentials and lashed
out at those who claim to be
more Marxist than others. He
moved this week to mollify left-
ist pressures, however, by nation-
alizing rail and port facilities
formerly owned jointly by Congo,
Page 2 5
The regime has also had to
contend with a wave of strikes
by workers who are increasingly
discontent with the meager bene-
fits of the "revolution." A re-
cent strike by civil servants
over high-level corruption
forced the removal of
~h_e finance minister and brought
a pledge from Ngouabi to produce
a comprehensive justification of
government spending. Recently
he dissolved the governing body
of the national labor federation
on charges that it was fomenting
strikes for the purpose of dis-
crediting the government.
Relatively moderate factions
also remain active, although they
are somewhat submerged by the
torrent of Marxist rhetoric that
characterizes Congolese politics.
A measure of their continuing in-
fluence is that the greater part
of the economy remains in private
hands, despite the regime's noisy
proclamations about its adherence
to "scientific socialism.
Ngouabi has thus far been
able to ward off a full-scale
crisis by juggling factions,
jailing outright opponents, and
threatening massive repression.
He is increasingly given to
shrill, emotional, and some-
times defensive outbursts that
reflect the conflicting pres-
sures on him. These pressures
could soon explode, particularly
if Ngouabi follows through on
his promise to call a national
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 31 Oct 69
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
SECRET
congress of the single political
party before the end of the year,
which would surface all the divi-
sions that beset the country.
Any attempt to postpone the con-
gress would give disgruntled ele-
ments one more rallying point for
attacks against Ngouabi's belea-
re ime.
ZAMBIA
SETTLES COPPER NATIONALIZATION
The Zambian Government has
reached agreements in principle
on the nationalization of two
foreign copper companies. The
offers are subject to the ap-
proval of the Zambian cabinet and
the shareholders of the companies.
The US-controlled Roan Se-
lection Trust (RST) and the South
African-controlled Anglo American
Corporation accepted Zambia's of-
fer of compensation based on full
book value. RST received addi-
tional concessions, however, be-
cause its book value is about one-
third less than that of Anglo
American, even though both com-
panies produce about the same
amount of copper and have similar
profits.
The concessions included an
eight-year repayment period rather
than the 12-year period applicable
to Anglo American and repatriation
of profits blocked in Zambia dur-
ing the past two years because of
restrictions on remitting foreign
exchange abroad. Although RST
originally opposed compensation
based on book value, these con-
cessions actually will enable
shareholders of RST to receive
higher payments than before na-
tionalization. Moreover, when
compensation is completed, share-
holders should receive payments
approximating pre-nationalization
levels.
To ensure operating effi-
ciency, both companies were given
management contracts to run the
mines as well as the right to hire
personnel and purchase equipment.
Zambia will at first gain
little economic advantage from the
nationalizations. If the govern-
ment holds to the terms of the
settlement, it initially will re-
ceive less foreign exchange than
it did before nationalization.
The government also is bound by
the agreement to make compensation
payments regardless of profit lev-
els. Thus, a severe decline in
prices would adversely affect its
ability to pay.
Zambia, however, hopes to
induce new foreign investment to
expand production by offering min-
ing concessions that the govern-
ment confiscated from the present
two mining groups. Moreover, if
the agreements prove financially
burdensome, the government prob-
ably will.consider pressing the
companies to renegotiate the agree-
SECRET
Page 26 WEEKLY SUMMARY
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
SECRET
Restlessness persists in Chile following last week's army revolt. A major
shake-up in army commands has forced into retirement not only General
Roberto Viaux, the leader of the uprising, but some other generals who
remained loyal to the government despite their sympathy for Viaux's de-
mands.
The government, generally regarded as weakened by the revolt, may
not come up with the promised pay raises until the first of the year.
Meanwhile, it is publicizing new military purchases in England in an effort to
boost its stock in the armed forces.
In Bolivia, military discontent is growing over the increasing influence
of the radical civilians in the cabinet. Foreign Minister General Ruiz has told
the US ambassador that he and his colleagues oppose the efforts of civilian
cabinet officers to cause strains in Bolivia's relations with the US. He added
that the military would not tolerate being used in this manner any longer.
Meanwhile, the government has been forced to shut down the oil
pipeline to Arica, Chile, and close at least two of the oil fields that were
expropriated from Gulf Oil. Petroleum storage facilities in Arica are filled to
capacity, and at present there are no markets or transportation available for
Bolivian crude. Gulf Oil says it will not resume shipment and refinement of
Bolivian oil until some agreement has been made for compensation of its
expropriated property in Bolivia.
In other South American developments, Brazilian President Medici and
Vice President Rademaker Grunewald took office on 30 October. Student
disturbances erupted in Ecuador and Venezuela.
Hopes for a resolution of the dispute between El Salvador and Hon-
duras are rapidly fading. Top Honduran officials have indicated that their
government will not obey an OAS resolution passed this week calling for
opening the border to Salvadoran transit trade. They object to the com-
panion resolution calling for settlement of the border dispute because it does
not commit El Salvador to a firm timetable for negotiations.
In Cuba, Fidel Castro launched the all-important 1970 sugar harvest
with a highly emotional speech on 27 October. As in earlier talks, he
committed Cuba to an unparalleled 10-million ton harvest and placed the
honor of the revolution at stake in attaining the goal. Castro stated that
though there is sufficient cane to produce 10 million tons, success will
depend on the output of the worker in cutting and milling it. His obvious
misgivings over the capacity of the Cubans to work efficiently was reflected
in his fre uent allusions to the critical manpower problems that must be
overcome.
SECRET
Page 2 7
WEEKLY SUMMARY 31 Oct 69
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
SECRET
NEW EFFORTS
TO SETTLE EL SALVADOR-HONDURAS DISPUTE FAIL
The OAS-sponsored negotia-
tions that have been under way in
Washington since early October
have not resulted in a rapproche-
ment between El Salvador and
Honduras. On 27 October the
organization adopted a series of
resolutions dealing with the ma-
jor issues, but the inability
of the disputants to agree on
key points dampens any hope for
a quick solution of the problem.
The major Salvadoran de-
mand has been for an immediate
end to Honduras' obstruction of
its trade with Nicaragua and
Costa Rica. The Hondurans, how-
ever will not open their sec-
tion of the Pan American High-
way to Salvadoran traffic unless
El Salvador first agrees to set-
tle the long-standing border dis-
pute. The Hondurans have com-
plained that the OAS resolution
on the border problem did not
commit El Salvador to a firm
timetable for negotiation and,
therefore, they will not comply
with the resolution calling upon
them to reopen the highway.
Honduran frustration over
the lack of US and OAS pressure
on El Salvador to begin imme-
diate border talks last week-
end resulted in demonstrations
against the US Embassy in Teguci-
galpa, the consulate in San Pedro
Sula, and the offices of the OAS
mission in the capital. Student,
labor, and other groups have vowed
to defy the OAS and to block the
opening of the border to Salva-
doran trade unless there is a
clear uid ro uo.
Salvadoran satisfaction with
OAS efforts has borne an almost
inverse relationship to Honduran
discontent. The Salvadorans con-
sider the resolutions to be some-
what of a diplomatic victory and
they are prepared to give the
OAS additional time to gain Hon-
duran compliance on the highway
issue. If some progress is not
made within the next couple of
weeks, however, the government
may decide to take unilateral
steps to end Honduran economic
strangulation.
SECRET
Page 2 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY
I
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
SECRET
BRAZIL'S NEW ADMINISTRATION TAKES OFFICE
President Emilio Medici and
Vice President Rademaker Grune-
wald took office on 30 October
after being "elected" by a joint
session of congress five days
earlier.
The voting was strictly
along party lines. Members of
the progovernment National Re-
newal alliance voted for them,
while approximately 75 legisla-
tors of the opposition Brazilian
Democratic Movement (MDB) at-
tended the session but did not
cast ballots. MDB spokesmen
claim that their attendance was
a demonstration of the party's
desire to cooperate with Medici's
professed intention to move the
country back toward democracy.
Their abstention from voting was
described as a symbol of soli-
darity with the many MDB leg-
islators who have been purged by
the government and as a protest
against the government's fail-
ure to permit direct elections.
The mood of congress appears
to be one of subdued tension.
The legislators are pleased that
they will have some role in gov-
erning the country, but are wor-
ried that any sign of opposition
to the government or to the mili-
tary could result in the perma-
nent closing of congress.
Most legislators consider
Medici a competent administrator
and a man of personal integrity.
They also believe that his lack
of political debt to any single
military faction for his election
will give him a freer hand to
govern than his predecessor. At
the same time, the congressmen
point out that the new President
has had only limited contact with
politicians and doubt that he has
the personality or desire to work
actively to give his administra-
tion greater popular appeal. The
majority do not appear very hope-
ful that he will lead Brazil back
to democratic institutions or that
he will open up the political
system very widely.
port.
If Medici does favor even
limited liberalization, he will
have to work hard to overcome
the repressive image of the in-
terim triumvirate and the Costa
e Silva government. The waves
of political purges, the recent
strong authoritarian amendments
to the 1967 constitution, the
widespread arrests in the cam-
paign to curb terrorism, and the
frequently heavy-handed press
censorship will make it very
difficult for the new administra-
tion to attain broad public sup-
SECRET
Page 29 WEEKLY SUMMARY 31 Oct 69
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
SECRET
DISSATISFACTION WITH BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT GROWS
Dissatisfaction is growing
in the military over the radical
policies of the Ovando govern-
ment and the increasing influence
of the civilian radicals in the
cabinet. In addition the economic
restrictions announced this week
may lead to popular discontent,
particularly among miners, who
apparently will not get the wage
increase Ovando promised them.
General Cesar Ruiz, the
foreign minister, recently told
the US ambassador that he and his
colleagues oppose efforts by ci-
vilian cabinet officials to cause
strains in Bolivia's relations
with the US and that the military
would not tolerate being used by
the civilians any longer. Further
evidence of military disenchant-
ment comes from Cochabamba where
middle-grade officers have openly
expressed their dissatisfaction
with the nationalization of Gulf
Oil Company and are calling for
the dismissal of the leader of
the civilian radicals in the gov-
ernment, Minister of Mines Qui-
roga.
Quiroga, however, has built
a considerable popular following
with his demagogic oratory and
extremely nationalistic and anti-
US position on most important is-
sues. An attempt to remove him
at this time would cause serious
trouble for Ovando. The President
apparently has agreed that Quiroga
should no longer be responsible
for dealings with the Gulf Oil
Company and reportedly will handle
future negotiations himself. Qui-
roga will not be easily silenced,
however, and if Ovando tries to
isolate him, Quiroga would be
likely to take his case directly
to the public, as he did with his
demands that Gulf be nationalized.
Public enthusiasm for the
Ovando government and its nation-
alistic policies may be dampened
by the austerity program announced
this week. The program, designed
in part to maintain the current
exchange rate for the peso, in-
cludes reductions in public ex-
penditures, foreign exchange
restrictions, new tax measures,
and "temporary" wage and price
controls. The run on Bolivian,
currency following the nation-
alization of Gulf brought the
country's economic problems into
focus, but they had been building
for a long time. The public's
initial reaction to the program
has been favorable, reflecting
a willingness to make sacrifices
in the face of "threats" to Boliv-
ia's sovereignty. The wage freeze
is likely to stir up resentment be-
fore long, however, particularly
among the miners who were promised
a prompt wage increase b Ovando
when he seized power
SECRET
Page 30 WEEKLY SUMMARY
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
SECRET
ECUADOREAN PRESIDENT HAY ASSUME DICTATORIAL POWER
After 14 months in office,
President Jose Maria Velasco
finds himself in a situation
that in three past administra-
tions has signaled his ouster.
As in the past, Velasco's
charisma and public support
have again been corroded by the
responsibilities of trying to
rule Ecuador. He is being pushed
by his advisers and by the ac-
tions of his opponents to take
strong measures to curb student
violence and resolve the coun-
try's serious fiscal situation.
Student disorders have
plagued Guayaquil since mid-
October, and similar violence
is now spreading to other cities.
Smoldering student resentment
over the lack of educational
facilities and over the govern-
ment's inability to come to
grips with the country's eco-
nomic and fiscal problems erupted
into open defiance when the
President, in a heavy-handed
fashion, closed a high school
after the students insulted him.
Radical student agitators were
thus handed an issue that has
broad student appeal and are ex-
ploiting it to the full. Last
week at least two students were
killed, and there is the pos-
sibility that security forces,
armed with a presidential man-
date not to let disorders get
out of hand, will have a major
clash with students. In the
face of criticism and threaten-
ing chaos, the government an-
nounced this week that the
school could reopen.
Ecuador's chronically bad
budget situation and serious de-
terioration of its balance of
payments this year have reached
a point where the repercussions
are endangering the political
viability of the Velasco regime.
Attempts by the government to
secure foreign loans for budget
support.have come to naught,
and although exports are rising
they are still far below last
year's level.
Velasco has received little fis-
cal support from the legislature,
which passed a budget for 1970
in which expenditures have no re-
lationship to revenue-raising
capabilities. The President has
also had only minimal success in
wresting control from the myriad
autonomous agencies that ham-
string his efforts to control
revenue collection and expendi-
tures. The cabinet, especially
the ministers of defense and
government, have persuasively
recommended that Velasco assume
extraordinary powers to resolve
the economic crisis. The de-
fense minister has warned that
hungry soldiers, whose salaries
are now three months in arrears
will not tolerate existing
conditions much longer.
Memories of the military
junta's political difficulties
from 1963 to 1966 remain painful
to leaders of the armed forces,
and it is expected that they
will continue supporting Velasco,
at least for the time being. If
Velasco loses what public sup-
port he now has by over-reacting
to or doing nothing about the
current unrest, the military may
overcome its reluctance to assume
power.
SECRET
Page 31 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
SECRET
DOMINICAN POLITICS MARKING
The Dominican presidential
campaign is under way with fitful,
violent starts, but campaigning
in earnest still awaits Presi-
dent Balaguer's decision on
whether he will seek re-elec-
tion next May.
The recent upsurge of polit-
ically motivated violence was
punctuated by a shooting fracas
on 19 October between police and
sympathizers of the Dominican Rev-
olutionary Party (PRD), the coun-
try's major opposition party.
Party Secretary-General Pena Gomez
was among those who narrowly es-
caped injury. One security of-
ficer was killed during the fray,
and police, who claimed they were
attacked first, made several hun-
dred arrests. Later that week
the government's Reformist Party
headquarters in the capital re-
portedly was machine-gunned, pos-
sibly in retaliation for the PRD
incident. The government's tem-
porary ban on further PRD polit-
ical rallies, announced on 28
October, could also stir a vio-
lent reaction from radicals.
Political terrorism has not
been limited to PRD supporters.
Earlier this month, a Reformist
mayor and his brother were mur-
dered by unknown assailants posing
as military officers. In late
September, former General Wessin
y Wessin, leader of the far right
Democratic Quisqueyan Party, was
so enraged at the killing of one
of his followers that he vowed
TIME IN VIOLENT FASHION
Balaguer would not be allowed to
gain re-election. Such intermit-
tent though persistent violence
has been a disturbing facet of
the early stages of the presiden-
tial race and may foretell more
civilian-police clashes on an even
larger scale when politicking in-
tensifies.
The campaign itself has been
distinguished only by a plethora
of lesser "candidacies," mainly
because Balaguer is reluctant to
announce his decision on running
again. Although there have been
sporadic attempts to force the
President's hand--Vice President
and presidential hopeful Augusto
Lora offered to withdraw from
the race if Balaguer would do
the same--most major parties are
simply delaying their party con-
ventions. Even the Social Chris-
tians, the only major party to
nominate a candidate, will hold
another convention early next
year before deciding whether
"condition" will allow the party
to participate in elections.
Balaguer's supporters are
stumping
hard
for his renomina-
tion, but
he
shows no sign of an-
nouncing
his
decision before the
first of
the
year. Assuming the
President
runs again, his tactic
of witholding
a formal announce-
ment of his candidacy until the
last possible moment will deny
his foes valuable time in which
to mobilize antire-election op-
position.
SECRET
Page 32 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040001-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/08/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400040001-8