WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007400050001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
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• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Secret
7 November 1969
No. 0395/69
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(Information as of noon EST, 6 November 1969)
VIETNAM
An "abridged" version of.a speech by party first
secretary Le Duan provides new evidence of policy
differences within the North Vietnamese leadership.
Meanwhile, the Communists on 3 November conducted
their heaviest military attacks since September,
and infiltration apparently has picked up substan-
tially.
CHINESE AGRICULTURE HAS GOOD YEAR
Food supplies appear to be sufficient for current
needs and may even provide small amounts for reserves.
Europe
UN DISARMAMENT DEBATE DUE NEXT WEEK
The US-USSR draft treaty limiting the use of the sea-
beds for military purposes and various proposals to
control chemical and biological weapons are expected
to be the primary topics.
YUGOSLAV RAPPROCHEMENT WITH WARSAW PACT MEMBERS STALLS
Belgrade's efforts to normalize relations with Warsaw
Pact countries has been frustrated by press articles
criticizing the Yugoslav system.
sECx~;T
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EURATOM IMPASSE LEAVES FUTURE IN DOUBT
Failure to agree on a new research program and a bud-
get leaves the future of EURATOM in grave doubt.
TECHNOCRATS DOMINATE NEW SPANISH CABINET
Franco's sweeping cabinet changes of last week have
given the leading role to technocrats who will stress
economic and social progress and closer ties with
Western Europe.
Middle East - Africa
LEBANON REACHES TENTATIVE ACCORD WITH FEDAYEEN
Lebanon has been relatively peaceful this past week
as a result of the cease-fire that went into effect
on 2 November, but there is more negotiating ahead
to spell out the details of the accord reached in
Cairo between the government and the fedayeen.
FACTIONAL STRIFE WRACKS INDIA'S CONGRESS PARTY
The bitterness of the power struggle between Prime
Minister Gandhi and the old-line party bosses makes
a formal split a growing probability.
GREEK REGIME WEATHERS NEW OPPOSITION EFFORT
Former Premier Karamanlis, self-exiled in Paris since
1965, has failed to generate any support for his bid
for leadership of the opposition.
NEW ULTRARIGHTIST PARTY IN SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTION RACE
South Africa's ultraconservatives, who were ousted
from the ruling National Party in early October, have
formed a new political party to contest the parliamen-
tary election in April 1970.
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Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 19
BRAZILIAN DISSIDENT COMMUNIST LEADER KILLED
Carlos Marighella's lieutenants and many other ex-
tremist leaders remain at large, however, and may
accelerate their activities to counter the blow to
their morale.
PERU MOVES TOWARD AGREEMENT WITH FOREIGN INVESTORS
The Velasco government has announced that the signing
of contracts with two US companies is near, but there
are still political obstacles to be overcome.
MILITARY AND POLITICAL CHANGES IN CHILE
Last month's army uprising may have triggered an
early start of the campaign for the presidential
election next September.
VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT FACES GROWING UNREST
Student demonstrations, labor unrest, and a stale-
mated Congress pose the most serious challenge to
President Caldera's authority since his inauguration
last March.
FINANCIAL PROBLEMS TROUBLE ECUADOR
Sagging export earnings, an archaic fiscal system,
and unrealistic budgets are pushing the Velasco
administration toward an economic crisis that it may
not have the political strength to survive.
CASTRO'S PROBLEMS AND THE CUBAN SUGAR HARVEST
There is evidence that Cuba is experiencing problems
with the current sugar harvest but Castro remains
committed to his goal of ten million tons.
SURINAM'S PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IMPROVE
The new government to be formed shortly is expected
to bring greater stability, barring unforeseen racial
or labor trouble.
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The Sino-Soviet talks that began in Peking on 20 October have still not
produced even preliminary agreements. The Chinese are pressing hard for an
accord on military disengagement in disputed areas along the border in order
to avert further conflicts, whereas the Russians would like to concentrate on
reaching a broader agreement on specific territorial differences. Both the
Soviets and Chinese have noted the lack of progress in Peking, the Soviets
commenting that they found the going difficult and the Chinese blaming the
Soviets for wanting to negotiate from a position of strength. Nevertheless,
neither Communist Hower seems to want the talks to fail.
Disagreements over policy among the leadership in Hanoi surfaced again
in a speech by party first secretary Le Duan that was distinctly defensive in
tone. In a frank plea for party unity, Le Duan plaintively objected to a party
policy that would force everybody to adhere to one person's opinion. He
may have been referring to Truong Chinh, whose views on the war and
domestic policy seem to have prevailed during the past year.
Communist military activity in South Vietnam was fairly widespread
this week, particularly on 3 and 4 November. Especially hard hit were allied
units north of Saigon along the Cambodian border. There are a number of
indications that Hanoi may be planning increased military activity early next
year. In Laos, Communist activity picked up slightly in the southern pan-
handle as the Communists put more pressure on government forces there.
Activity in the north remained at a low level.
Final results of the Australian elections held on 25 October are in, and
the government emerged with a majority of only seven. This represents a loss
of 14 seats, which the opposition Labor Party picked up and more for a gain
of 17 seats. The government coalition's poor showing, particularly that of
Prime Minister Gorton's Liberal Party, has resulted in serious opposition to
his erratic leadership. A strong bid to take his place will be made by two or
three ranking figures at a Liberal caucus to be held on 7 November
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VIETNAM
Cracks in the Collective Facade
In North Vietnam, new evi-
dence of policy differences within.
the leadership emerged in an
"abridged" version of a speech
by party first secretary Le Duan.
In an unusually-frank plea for
party unity, Le Duan insisted
that the principle of collective
leadership requires discussion of
opposing views. He complained
that it was wrong for the party
"to adopt the opinion of one per-
son and force all others to follow
it."
This is the first time since
Ho Chi Minh's death that a speech
by Le Duan-has been publicized,
and it is the first time in two
years that his views about the
war have been aired. By linking
references to divergent views in
the party with pleas for continued
priority support for the war and
caution in restoring socialist
authority in the North, he left
a strong impression that there
are deep divisions in Hanoi over
these matters. Moreoeer, what he
said suggests that he is fighting
an uphill battle on behalf of his
views.
Firm conclusions about the
relative position of the North
Vietnamese leaders cannot be drawn
from this speech alone, but it is
the clearest indication to date
that a struggle for control of
the party has been under way. The
other main contestant probably is
Truong Chinh, the next ranking
member of..the party politburo, who
has spoken out .authoritatively on
.two occasions since Ho's death,
and whose views on the war and
on domestic policy in North Viet-
nam seem to have carried the day
during the past year. The defen-
sive tone of Le Duan's recent re-
marks appear to cast him'in the
role of a dissenter on recent pol-
icy trends. -The fact that Le Duan's
views were broadcast, albeit
abridged, suggests that he still
retains considerable authority
and that many policy and leader-
ship questions may still be unde-
cided.
Communist Activity Flares Up
in South Vietnam
Communist forces carried out
their heaviest attacks since early
September just hours before President
Nixon's speech on 3 November,
shelling more than 45 allied po-
sitions throughout the country.
Nearly half of the attacks
occurred in the provinces around
Saigon and the enemy also made
four sharp ground attacks against
US strongpoints in that region.
Some 140-Communists were killed
in the ground assaults and there
were about 70 allied casualties.
Overall, the- action was less in-
tense than in the surges of enemy
activity during the summer. It
appears likely that the Communists
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scheduled this flare-up to demon-
strate their continued vitality
at a time when attention in the
US and elsewhere was focused on
the President's Vietnam address.
The enemy also went into
action this week in the southern
highlands near the remote Bu Prang
Special Farces Camp, launching a
series of heavy shellings and
ground probes that forced allied
troops to withdraw from three out-
lying positions around the camp.
The Communists have deployed the
equivalent of a full division in
the Bu Prang area this fall. and
they may intend to sustain pres-
sure for a prolonged period.
The Communists have laid
siege to remote allied outposts
along South Vietnam's borders
periodically throughout the war.
These sieges, mounted from bases
inside Laos and Cambodia, have
in the past drawn allied strength.
into remote areas away from the
population; they have also drama-
tized the enemy's continuing will-
ingness to fight.
The Bu Prang actions and the
widespread shellings this week
may represent the opening of the
enemy's winter-spring campaign.
A wide variety of sources have
indicated that the campaign would
start this month on a relatively
modest scale. The evidence con-
tinues to suggest that the Commu-
nists will stress shellings plus
sapper and guerrilla tactics and
limit the commitment of their
regular troops at least in the
Page 3
earliest stages of the winter-
spring period. At the same time,
however, reports of enemy troop
indoctrinations reveal that the
Communists are keeping some of
their regular forces mentally pre-
pared for more heavy fighting in
the days ahead.
Opposition Leaders in Saigon
Speak Out
Two of Saigon's most promi-
nent political figures, Senator
Tran Van Don and General Duong
Van "Big" Minh, moved into the
political limelight last week.
Don, a leading critic of President
Thieu's policies since last spring,
suggested that South Vietnam adopt
a neutralist foreign policy and
engage in political competition
with the Communists.. The sena-
tor, predicting that domestic
pressures would soon drive the
US to reach an agreement with the
Communists that could lead to a
Communist take-over of South Viet-
nam, proposed that the country
cease relying on the generosity
of "foreign powers" and create a
"third force" between the "pro -
free world" elements and the Com-
munists. This third force, he
said, would "likely be the biggest
and most popular" national force
and would be able to end the war
by defeating the Communists in
political competition.
The popular Big Minh, who
has stayed in the background since
his return from exile last year,
couched his proposals in more
vague and general terms. He ex-
pressed his willingness to assist
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in promoting Vietnamese unity and
in ending the war, and suggested
holding a national convention to
work toward establishing a "truly
representative government." Al-
though offering few details, Minh
did assert that peace talks should
be conducted only between Vietnam-
ese. He also advised newsmen to
observe his actions "in the days
to come.'?
It is not clear to what ex-
tent the moves of Don and Minh
were coordinated. Their remarks
suggest that both men believe that
President Thieu is likely to be-
come weaker as the US withdraws
more troops and that opportunities
may open up for themselves. There
have long been indications that
Don aspires to be prime minister,
preferably in a government headed
by Minh. The two may have been
encouraged to speak up at this
time by the adverse public reac-
tion to the government's recent
decree increasing taxes on imports.
In addition, Don and Minh may be
genuinely concerned that the US,
in its haste to disengage, might
try to force South Vietnam to ac-
cept some coalition arrangement,
and they may believe that it is
time for the Vietnamese to try
to work out their own political
settlement.
Don and Minh
pro a y o nbt expect to have
any immediate impact on events,
but they do have a substantial
appeal among Buddhists and in
the army. They may hope that
well before the scheduled presi-
dential elections in 1971 they
will begin to appear to many South
Vietnamese, as well as to the US
and Hanoi, as a possible alterna-
tive leadership in Saigon that
could end the war. In this case,
they may be banking that events
will force Thieu from office be-
fore the end of his constitutional
term.
Thieu, meanwhile, strongly
defended his new "austerity" tax
decree in a speech of 31 October
on the eve of National Day. The
measure has provoked harsh criti-
cism throughout the country, partly
because it was followed by sharp
price increases. Declaring that
Vietnam's allies would not
forever continue financial aid,
Thieu called for greater economic
as well as military self-suf-
ficiency and threatened to resign
if the new taxes were not allowed
to go into effect. The govern-
ment claims that most prices will
go down again in the near future,
following which public criticism
is likely to subside. The de-
cree has left a legacy of dis-
content in the National. Assembly,
however,-and Thieu is likely to
encounter considerable opposition
to other parts of his le isla-
tive ro ram. ~
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CHINESE AGRICULTURE HAS GOOD YEAR
Chinese food supplies appear
sufficient for current needs and
may even provide small amounts for
reserves. The 1969 grain harvest,
estimated at slightly less than
200 million tons, seems reason-
ably good. This will be the third
successive year of adequate to
very good harvests, during which
period private plots also have
prospered.
This modest success in the
agricultural sector, aided by
average or better weather condi-
tions, has been in part fortui-
tous. During the years of the
cultural revolution, Peking was
too preoccupied to pay much at-
tention to agriculture. A half-
hearted move to reorganize the
communes to enhance collectivism
and abolish private plots had pro-
gressed only to the experimental
stage by early 1969 and has since
virtually died out. The break-
down of social and administrative
controls during the cultural revo-
lution, however, had the unin-
tended effect of raising the in-
centive of peasants by allowing
them to retain a larger share of
the h arvests.
The government at present
appears willing to continue its
moderate, pragmatic policies for
agriculture of recent years. At
the same time, it apparently con-
siders that the countryside pos-
sesses resources that have not
been fully exploited. Since the
end of the ninth party congress 25X1
last April, Peking has sought to
step up grain exactions b ab
five percent
In a ition,
an a emp is eing made to-pass
on to the communes themselves most25X1
of the costs of continued agri-
cultural development and improved
rural welfare services, They
are being told to build local
factories to provide additional
industrial support required by
agriculture and to finance their
own schools and medical programs.
The main function of the cen-
tral government in ensuring ade-
quate levels of food for consump-
tion is to import sizable amounts
of grain and chemical fertilizers.
Grain imports in 1969 will total
about 4.3 million tons. Imported
grain serves not only to reduce
transport problems encountered in
feeding the cities but it also has
been used in the past to augment
central food reserves. Chemical
fertilizer imports in 1969 may
exceed four million tons, roughly
matching domestic output. Pur-
chases of chemical fertilizer are
likely to continue because using 25X1
fertilizer to produce food is more
economical than buying grain di-
rectly.
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The Soviet Embassy has informed the US that Deputy Foreign Minister
Vladimir Semenov will head the delegation during at least the preliminary
stage of the strategic arms limitations talks beginning in Helsinki on 17
November. Although First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, who is still
negotiating with the Chinese in Peking, has been formally designated as chief
of the mission, a Soviet Embassy official did not exclude the possibility that
Semenov might remain in charge if "it worked out well." Semenov has
conducted the bilateral talks with the US regarding a settlement in the
Middle East.
NATO deputy foreign ministers convened in Brussels on 5 November in
the wake of a renewed call by the Warsaw Pact for an early European
security conference. The Allies are likely to respond that they can accept the
idea of such a conference only on the basis of thorough preparation,
concentration on the major issues, and participation by the North American
members of the Alliance.
The Chinese representation question is scheduled to come to a vote
early next week in the UN General Assembly. Barring an unforeseen develop-
ment, for instance, diplomatic recognition of Peking being granted by a
major country such as Canada or Italy, the voting pattern should a -
proximate that of 1968, and Taiwan will retain its seat.
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UPd DISARMAMENT DEBATE DUE P'~EXT h~EEK
The annual debate on disarma-
ment issues in the UN General As-
sembly's political and security
committee should begin late next
week. The US-USSR draft treaty
limiting the use of the seabeds
for military purposes and various
proposals to control chemical and
biological warfare (CBW) agents
are expected to be the primary
topics.
Prospects for the seabeds
treaty improved in late October
when the Soviets agreed at the
last minute to revisions of the
draft. The revisions--including
the deletion of a provision that
the superpowers could veto amend-
ments to the treaty--are. designed
to increase the draft's accepta-
bility to the nonnuclear states.
The ather members of the Geneva
disarmament conference welcomed
the new draft before adjourning
for the year, but some indicated
they would offer further revi-
sions. Canada and Brazil are
certain to press for co-partici-
pation rights for a coastal state
in any observations of treaty com-
pliance off its shores.
Although the Soviets have
not energetically followed up For-
eign Minister Gromyko's proposal
for UN action on Moscow's draft
CBW convention, they hope that
this subject will receive priority
consideration during the debate.
The Soviet draft would ban the de-
velopment, production, and stock-
piling of CBW agents and require
parties to the convention to de-
stroy existing stocks or divert
them to peaceful uses. A number
of countries may also offer reso-
lutions that would in effect have
the General Assembly interpret
the Geneva Protocol of 1925 as
prohibiting the use of CBW agents,
including tear gas, in war. The
US has repeatedly reminded pro-
ponents of such proposals that
these moves might complicate US
ratification of the protocol--
an issue now under consideration.
A compromise may be worked out to
permit the referral of the vari-
ous CBW resolutions to the Geneva
disarmament conference for further
consideration.
There remains considerable
feeling in New York that the Ge-
neva talks have been an ineffec-
tive medium dominated by the co-
chairmen. This sentiment is re-
flected in concern over the short
time allotted for the disarmament
debate. The general receptivity
of the other Geneva participants
to the revised seabeds draft, how-
ever, is likely to deflect criti-
cism that the superpowers are at-
tempting to ram an inadequate
treaty through the UN. The an-
nouncement of the forthcoming
talks on strategic arms limita-
tions may also serve to lessen
criticism.
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YUGOSLAV RAPPROCHEMENT WITH WARSAW PACT MEMBERS STALLS
Recent criticism of Warsaw
Pact countries in the Yugoslav
press points up Belgrade's frustra-
tion over its failure to normalize
relations with Moscow's allies.
The Yugoslavs thought they had an
agreement with the USSR not to
dramatize their differences in the
press and that this agreement would
be emulated by the other states in
the Warsaw Pact.
Belgrade's disappointment on
this score is showing. The Yugo-
slav party journal, Kommunitt,
noted on 30 October that the Polish
press was presenting Yugoslavia's
economic reform "with an inclina-
tion for a malicious presentation
of its results." The Yugoslav
news agency, Tan u complained
the same day about an article in
the Prague party daily, Rude PrT avo,
that compared current events in
Yugoslavia with last year's chaotic
situation in Czechoslovakia.
Sofia upset the Yugoslavs by
placing unusual emphasis on the
celebration of the 25th anniver-
sary of the Bulgarian Army's "lib-
eration" of Serbian and Macedonian
cities while discounting the role
the Yugoslav Army played in these
victories. The Yugoslavs view
this as a Bulgarian ploy to justify
claims to Yugoslav territory. On
its side, the Yugoslav military
journal, Narodna Armiya, is se-
rializing successes of its counter-
intelligence against Bulgarian spy
nets.
Belgrade was also disturbed
by publication in the West German
press on 26 September of East Ger-
man party documents severely criti-
cizing the Yugoslavs for ideologi-
cal, economic, and other sins
against Marxism-Leninism. Under
pressure from Belgrade, the East
Germans a month later stated that
the documents were counterfeit,
but both countries know they are
authentic.
Although Yugoslavia and the
USSR have not exchanged polemics
for several months, the truce may
be short-lived. The Yugoslavs un-
doubtedly believe all these actions
have Moscow's blessin .
On the other side of the coin,
Belgrade's relations with Romania
remain good, although Bucharest
tacitly disapproves of Yugoslavia's
liberal internal policies. Yugo-
slavia has also had some success
in easing tensions with Hungary;
but Moscow probably will not allow
a genuine reconciliation.
EURATOM IMPASSE LEAVES FUTURE IN.DOl1BT
The Council of Ministers of
the European Community (EC) on 1
November passed its second self-
imposed deadline of the year with-
out agreement on a new research
program and budget for the Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community (EURA-
TOM). This leaves the future of
the organization--originally de-
signed to help provide the EC with
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a powerful industry for the peace-
ful uses of atomic energy--in grave
doubt.
During its first ten years,
EURATOM operated on a "pluriannual"
basis--approving research programs
and budgets to cover several years.
By 1967, however, national differ-
ences had sapped its common
strength, and since then the mem-
bers have been able to agree for
only one year at a time. These
short-term measures limited EURA-
TOM's participation in primarily
national projects and created dif-
ficulties for the operation of its
research centers.
A new pluriannual research and
training program proposed by the
EC Commission last spring was de-
signed to restore some of EURATOM's
lost momentum. The program was to
cover a five-year period, to have
a budget of $392 million, and for
the first time to involve EURATOM
in nonnuclear as well as nuclear
activities. A substantial portion
of the budget was to be devoted to
"complementary" or "special" pro-
grams in which all member countries
would not have to participate.
By 1 July, the original dead-
line set for adopting the Commis-
sion's proposal, the EC Council had
not been able to agree. As the sec-
ond deadline approached, Dutch Eco-
nomics Minister De Block traveled
to member state capitals to try to
bring about a compromise. When the
Council met on 28 October, however,
it decided to postpone a decision
not only on the Commission's pro-
posal, but also on De Block's sug-
gested compromise.
The main obstacle to agreement
on this new pluriannual program--
and indeed the main obstacle to the
development of EURATOM throughout
its history--has been the national
interests of its members. At the
present time, France, the Community
member least in need of EURATOM, is
opposed to any meaningful new pro-
gram. The French do not think
EURATOM should involve itself in
nonnuclear activities. They con-
sider even the compromise budget
figure proposed by De Block--$154
million--too high.
Whether these differing na-
tional interests can be reconciled
will become clearer in the next
few weeks. The Commission hopes
that the future of EURATOM will be
one of the topics at the European
summit in The Hague on 17-18 Novem-
ber. After that, the Council will
meet to attempt to agree to a re-
search program and a budget before
the end of the year. Meanwhile,
the Community's permanent represen-
tatives will be trying to work out
new compromise formulas.
The long-term future of EURA-
TOM, however, will most likely de-
pend on other Community developments.
Success in achieving greater in-
tegration in the Community in tech-
nical and scientific fields could
help preserve EURATOM. On the
other hand, should Britain, West
Germany, and the Netherlands con-
clude the gas centrifuge agreement,
which would be outside EURATOM's
framework, the result could be a
weakening of that organization, 25X1
especially if there is a long de-
lay before the British achieve
Communit membershi .
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TECHNOCRATS DOMINATE NEW SPANISH CABINET
In the sweeping cabinet
changes made last week, the larg-
est since 1957, Franco gave the
leading role to forward-looking
technocrats who will stress eco-
nomic and social progress as well
as closer ties with Western Eu-
rope.
While the Generalissimo has
continued the representation of
the military and the National
Movement (Falange), he has given
the largest number of portfolios
to a group of economic specialists
associated with the Roman Catholic
lay organization, Opus Dei. Al-
though Opus Dei is suspected by
many Spaniards of wanting to take
over the government, its leaders
stress that its purpose is to
promote the use of Christian prin-
ciples in the daily activities of
its members.
The leader of the Opus Dei
group of specialists is Minister
for Economic Planning Lopez Rodo,
who appears to have emerged as the
chief policy maker and has the
support of Vice President Carrero
Blanco, the principal government
figure after Franco. Although
only two other cabinet members
belong to Opus Dei, the fact that
several of the new appointees are
close associates o= Lopez Rodo has
led to a general belief that Opus
Dei will dominate the cabinet.
The predominance of the Lopez
Rodo faction indicates further em-
phasis on modernization and lib-
eralization of the economy. This
move is not likely to lead to a
corresponding political liberali-
zation any time soon, and certainly
not as long as Franco is in power.
The business orientation of the
cabinet may well bring it into
conflict with labor, especially
if the government stands firm
against wage increases. Although
the government's labor organiza-
tion was given representation in
the cabinet through a newly created
position, the minister is a busi-
nessman.
In foreign affairs, the new
cabinet will promote closer ties
with Western Europe, but the antip-
athy of European liberals to the
present regime will prohibit member-
ship in the European Community and
NATO at least until after Franco
is gone. Lopez Bravo, the new
minister of foreign affairs, en-
joys good relations with the Brit-
ish and is likely to de-emphasize
the Gibraltar issue as part of the
program to improve relations with
Europe. His sophisticated person-
ality and broad economic background
are expected to smooth the pending
negotiations on the future of the
US joint bases in Spain, but the
actual impact of his appointment
on the substance of the agreement
cannot be ?predicted at present.
Military representation in the
cabinet has been continued through
the appointment of three high-rank-
ing officers as new ministers of
the three armed services. They
are known to be pro-US and should
reinvigorate the, professional mili-
tary leadership.
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Fighting that continues to flare periodically along most of the cease-fire
lines in the Middle East was highlighted this week by a number of Egyptian
commando raids across the Suez Canal and by Israeli retaliatory air attacks.
Lebanon has been relatively peaceful, but the details of the tentative accord
reached in Cairo between the government and fedayeen representatives must
still be worked out. Further disturbances remain a constant danger. In the
UN, this session's principal debate on the Middle East will probably be
kicked off next week when the UN Relief and Works Agency comes up for
discussion.
Somalia's Revolutionary Council has finally announced its mernber-
ship-20 army and five police officers-and has appointed a 14-member
cabinet. Army commander Siad remains as president of the council, and the
other members are middle-level officers of diverse background and experi-
ence. The cabinet consists mostly of young, educated civilians not politically
involved in previous governments.
In South Asia, the long drawn out struggle for control of India's ruling
Congress Party gained momentum last week. Prime Minister Gandhi seems
determined to wrest the party organization from the old-guard leaders, who
are fighting back strongly. The two sides are almost evenly balanced, but a
meaningful compromise seems unlikely, and the Congress Party faces the
most serious test of its unity since independence. In East Pakistan, mean-
while, Urdu-speaking refugees from India clashed violently with native Ben-
galis. The handling of the violence, which subsequently produced a serious
confrontation between predominantly West Pakistani military officers and
East Pakistani civilian government officials, further aggravated regional ten-
sions.
Prospects continue dim for the Nigerian peace initiative being pushed
by Haile Selassie as head of an Organization of African Unity committee.
Biafran leader Ojukwu has again publicly rejected any such mediation while
the OAU still officially supports "one Nigeria." Ojukwu also continues to
insist on a cease-fire prior to substantive talks. In the civil war, additional
Biafran air attacks on oil facilities in the Mid-West State have increased the
general nervousness of the oil companies.
President Mobutu of Congo (Kinshasa) is in Belgium on an official visit
intended to dramatize the gradual restoration of cordial relations since the
troubles of 1967, when a mutiny of white mercenaries resulted in Congolese
attacks on Belgian residents and a sharp reduction in Belgian technical
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LEBANON REACHES TENTATIVE ACCORD WITH FEDAYEEN
Lebanon has been relatively
peaceful this past week as a result
of the cease-fire with the fedayeen
that went into effect on 2 November.
There have been occasional outbursts
of gunfire in scattered locales, but
the agreement has not been officially
violated. One discordant note was
the sabotaging--for the second time
in less than a week--of Tapline in
southern Lebanon.
The danger of further disturb-
ances continues, however. The Pal-
25X1 estinian refugee camps are reported
to harbor many armed fedayeen. For
its part, the Lebanese Army has de-
cided to increase its manpower
Although the fedayeen have in-
ferred that they have been granted
operational "freedom of action"
within Lebanon, the details of the
tentative accord reached in Cairo
between the Lebanese and the feda-
yeen delegations remains secret.
Apparently, however, it was an agree-
ment on broad principles only. The
Lebanese Government and the fedayeen
representatives are to meet soon in
Beirut to work out the details.
There may be even further delays in
arriving at a comprehensive agree-
ment because the negotiations in
Cairo included only the Palestine
Liberation Organization and Fatah,
and agreement with other fedayeen
organizations must still be reached.
The Soviets probably have
emerged from the Lebanese crisis
with an enhanced image among the
Arabs and with new friends in Bei-
rut. Moscow played an active role
in trying to calm the situation,
both by urging restraint on the
Syrians and by throwing full sup-
port behind the mediation efforts
in Cairo. The Soviets have also
exploited the crisis for its propa-
ganda value, taking full credit for
preventing an alleged threat of US
intervention. In addition, they
have tried to strengthen their rep-
utation as the protector of the
Arabs' right to settle their own
affairs. Nevertheless, Moscow was
genuinely concerned that the crisis
might get out of hand and is almost
certainly relieved that the talks
in Cairo were successful in lessen-
ing tension--even if only tempo-
rarily.
FACTIONAL STRIFE ~IRACKS INDIA'S CONGRESS PARTY
The long drawn out struggle
for control of the ruling Congress
Party gained momentum last weekend.
Prime Minister Gandhi is now deter-
mined to wrest the party organiza-
tion from the old-guard leaders, who
appear equally set on retaining
their hegemony.
Mrs. Gandhi, emboldened by her
successful political maneuvering
against the party "barons" last
summer, has now decided to press
for a more complete victory. In
October, she accused old-line Con-
gress Party president Nijalingappa
of "illegally" trying to unseat
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Prime Minister Gandhi Congress Party President
Nijalingappa
one of her supporters on the party's
powerful working committee. This
gave her an excuse to petition party
leaders for support in holding early
elections to select a new party pres-
ident. When the petition results
were made public this week, Mrs.
Gandhi claimed that she had gained
the backing of a majority of the
members in the party's governing
body--the All India Congress Commit-
tee.
Nijalingappa fought back by
ruling that the petition was "out
of order," and by dropping more of
her supporters from the working com-
mittee. He then invited her to show
cause why party disciplinary action
should not be taken against her, and
warned of the possible expulsion of
all those who attend the general
party meeting she has called for 22
November to elect a new president.
Moreover, Nijalingappa's group is
threatening to use its strength to
deprive Mrs. Gandhi's government of
its 23-seat majority at the next
session of Parliament, now set for
17 November.
Mrs. Gandhi shows no sign of
backing down and appears, in fact,
to be forcing Congress members to
take sides for a showdown that could
lead to the long-heralded formal
split within Congress ranks. She
can use her tactical advantage as
prime minister to postpone the next
parliamentary session until Febru-
ary. Meanwhile, she is continuing
to weed out cabinet members not
fully committed to her, and her sup-
porters have set up their own office
in New Delhi, separate from the reg-
ular party organization.
Neither Mrs. Gandhi nor- Nijalin-
gappa has shown any willingness to
compromise, but the situation re-
mains extremely fluid. An impor-
tant consideration is the fact that
neither side is eager to divide
the party formally and thus en-
danger Congress' one-party rule --
the major source of political sta-
bility in India. In case the party
does split and new elections are
called, it is unlikely that either
faction would emerge with a ma-
jority in parliament. Mrs. Gandhi
may nevertheless be willing to
chance early elections. She has
been attempting to cast the current
struggle in ideological terms de-
signed to enhance her appeal to
the electorate as the embattled
champion of popular socialist
ideals.
At the moment, the two camps
seem almost evenly balanced, and
even a compromise would only give
them time to regroup for a future
contest. The ill feeling engen-
dered by the present struggle makes
reconciliation extremely difficult
and presents the Congress Party
with the most serious to
unit since independence.
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GREEK REGIME WEATHERS PHEW OPPOSITION EFFORT
Former Premier Karamanlis,
self-exiled in Paris since 1965,
has not been able to generate any
support for his call a month ago
for an overthrow of the present
Greek regime.
After a silence of over two
years, the former premier prob-
ably issued the statement--widely
interpreted at the time as an
open invitation to the armed
forces to revolt--under pressure
from his supporters. These fol-
lowers, ranging from ex-politi-
cians in self-exile to cashiered
and retired officers in Greece,
have been urging him to return to
an active olitical role.
Initially, according to the
US Embassy, Karamanlis' statement
"electrified" opposition elements,
who probably hoped for some imme-
diate sign of action against the
regime. Subsequently, however,
opposition leaders in Greece and
abroad became much more cautious
in their su ort.
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The regime apparently does
not consider that Karamanlis poses
any serious threat as a potential
opposition leader.
ternative to the present regime.
All in all, the former pre-
mier appears to have played his
cards too soon to stimulate and
lead an effective opposition move
against the Greek Government.
The net result, therefore, has
been to demonstrate once again
the current lack of any real al-
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NEw ULTRARIGHTIST PARTY IN SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTION RACE
The formation of a new ultra-
conservative political party in
South Africa has complicated the
outlook far the parliamentary
elections set for next April, al-
though as of now the ruling Na-
tional Party remains the heavy
favorite.
The new party, Herstigte
Nasionale Pa`rt~ (Afrikaans for
Refounded National Party), was
formed last month at a congress
of far-right political elements.
Its leadership, headed by Dr. Al-
bert Hertzag, includes the par-
liamentarians who were ousted
from the National Party in early
October for disagreeing with
Prime Minister Vorster's poli-
cies. The new party, which es-
pouses Afrikaner culture and
values, adopted a platform call-
ing for more vigorous implemen-
tation of apartheid, less aid
to the South African blacks, cur-
tailment of contacts with black
African states, and literacy in
Akrikaans as a requirement for
immigrants seeking South African
citizenship.
When Prime Minister Vorster
announced plans in mid-September
to hold national elections a
year earlier than scheduled, the
position of his National Party
seemed unassailable. Its organ-
ization was good, its funds were
ample, and the threat from the
opposition United Party was mini-
mal. Most observers predicted
then that the National Party
would increase its parliamentary
majority, and some claimed the
election would bring South Africa
to the brink of one-party rule.
Since the open break, however,
South African politicians and
pollsters have grown more cau-
tious in assessing the political
landscape.
Even so, the new party faces
serious problems. It lacks dy-
namic leadership, and has only
six months to get organized be-
fore the elections. Although it
may win no more than three or four
seats in parliament, it could be
more representative of rank-and-
file Afrikaner attitudes than its
national strength indicates. The
unknown factor is how many con-
servative Afrikaners feel deeply
enough about the current issues
to vote against the National Party.
Ironically, while South Afri-
ca's opposition parties have been
anxiously waiting far a major split
in the National Party, it now seems
that recent developments might work
against them. Many United Party
regulars may decide to support Vor-
ster in his fight against the far-
right wing.
Vorster has cultivated English-
speaking South Africans, who form
the backbone of the United Party,
and other political moderates in
an effort to project the image of
a reasonable, pragmatic leader.
The votes he picks up among these
elements could compensate for those
he will lose to the new party. On
balance, therefore, the National
Party could emerge about where it
is now--with a simple majority of
the popular vote and an overwhelm-
ing majority of the seats in par-
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
President Nixon's Latin American policy speech on 31 October was
received favorably by most Latin officials. Others, however, want to reserve
judgment until they see how the new policy is to be implemented. As was
expected, leftist extremists have expressed dissatisfaction, and Cuba has
condemned the President's pronouncements.
Brazilian terrorists were dealt a setback on 4 November when dissident
Communist Carlos Marighella was killed by police in Sao Paulo. Marighella's
death will undoubtedly result, temporarily at least, in a serious loss of
morale and prestige for the entire Communist-dissident-terrorist movement
in Brazil. The terrorists can be expected to regroup, however, and Mari-
ghella's supporters may be spurred into staging some spectacular action.
Student violence in Caracas was ended when the military occupied the
campus of Central University. Most Venezuelans approved this rare military
action because they had become increasingly alarmed over the prolonged
unrest. The students, who are only temporarily cowed, can be expected to
become restive again. Meanwhile, in eastern Venezuela, renewed contact
between the army and insurgents has resulted in the death of at least two
soldiers.
In other South American developments, military equipment purchases
in Europe continue to be a subject of interest. According to the latest
information, the recently announced Chile -United Kin dom arms deal
includes two submarines and two fri ates. ~
Central American foreign ministers will meet this weekend in Costa
Rica in an effort to resolve the El Salvador -Honduras dispute. Persuading
Honduras to open its section of the Pan-American highway to Salvadoran
traffic will be high on the agenda. Any willingness on the part of El Salvador
to compromise with Honduras may have been undermined, however, by the
factionalism within the government party that led this week to the election
of a new opposition-supported congressional leadership
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BRAZILIAN DISSIDENT COMMUNIST LEADER KILLED
The death of dissident Com-
munist leader Carlos Marighella
on 4 November will be a severe
blow to Brazil's extreme leftists.
His lieutenants and many other
extremist leaders remain at large,
however, and may accelerate their
activities to counter the blow to
their morale.
The death of Marighella was
the result of a lengthy investiga-
tion by a joint force of civil and
military security agencies in Sao
Paulo. Over the past few months
they have arrested several members
of Marighella's terrorist organi-
zation--the National Liberation
Action (ALN)--and members of sim-
ilar groups that had ties with
him. Interrogation of these in-
dividuals enabled the security
forces to arrest 23 members of his
support apparatus early this month.
Marighella developed a rep-
utation as an extremely effective
leader during his long career in
the pro-Moscow Brazilian Commu-
nist Party and after he left that
organization in late 1967 because
of his advocacy of violent methods
and his sympathy for Fidel Castro.
Marighella subsequently started
his own organization based on
small, fairly independent groups.
His followers carried out bank
robberies, attacks on security
and military installations, air-
liner highjackings, and kidnap-
ings. His chief lieutenant,
Joaquin Camara Ferreira, had a
major role in the abduction of
US Ambassador Elbrick last Sep-
tember.
Security officials are en-
couraged by the elimination of
Marighella, and hope to destroy
his forces completely. The small
size of the groups and their com-
partmentation will make this a
difficult task, however, as many
high-level extremists such as
Camara Ferreira and renegade army
Captain Carlos Lamarca remain at
large to continue his work. They
now might attempt some spectacular
operation both as a reprisal and
as a bid to restore badly damaged
morale.
The confirmation that leftist
clergymen were deeply involved in
Marighella's operations could
worsen the already tense relations
between the military and the
church. Zealous officers may
press for thorough investigation
of liberal priests whom they sus-
pect of sympathizing with the sub-
versives, and the Catholic hier-
archy might interpret this as an
attack on the church itself.
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PERU I~'IOVES TOWARD AGREEMENT WITH FOREIGN INVESTORS
The announcements last week
that the US-owned Southern Peru Cop-
per Company (SPCC) will make a large
mining investment in Peru and that
the government has reached an agree-
ment with the International Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company (ITT)
were received with elation by the
public and the parties to the nego-
tiations as well. The actual sign-
ing of the contract with SPCC, how-
ever, apparently has been delayed
by serious disagreements in the
cabinet.
On 28 October the government
announced that the SPCC will invest
up to $500 million over the next
five years.
The delay in getting
final cabinet approval and in sign-
ing the contract could indicate that
Velasco may be forced to try to
press the company for additional
concessions in order to placate the
radicals in his government.
The agreement with ITT calls
for the company to receive $16.4
million-for its shares in PERUTELCO
and to reinvest at least $8.2 mil-
lion in a new hotel in Lima. The
agreement was well received by the
public and is being hailed as proof
that the International Petroleum
Company's problems with the military
government were unique and that
other foreign investors will have
no serious difficulties with the
government. The contract with ITT,
however, is not scheduled to be
signed until 22 December, allowing
ample time for opponents to try to
embarrass the government over the
terms of the contract and perhaps
force a reconsideration.
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MILITARY AND POLITICAL CHANGES IN CHILE
The shock waves from last
month's army uprising are still
being felt in the political arena
as well as among the armed forces.
The uprising may have helped
trigger the early announcement of
the presidential candidacies of
Christian Democrat Radomiro Tomic
and ex-president Jorge Alessandri,
a conservative independent, Ales-
sandri had been avoiding a commit-
ment to run in next September's
election while he tested the po-
litical currents, but public re-
gard for him seemed to be growing.
Both candidates have thus effec-
tively squelched rumors that they
might not run.
P~ieanwhile, the Communist and
Socialist parties continue to dis-
agree publicly over the real na-
ture of General Roberto Viaux's
revolt while they squabble pri-
vately over the program of the
leftist-Marxist unity front for
the presidential election. Sev-
eral leaders of the Socialist
Party, which is more revolutionary
and extremist than the Communist
Party, are not happy with their
own candidate, Salvador Allende,
despite Allende's strong admira-
tion for Fidel Castro. The Commu-
nists favor Allende because he is
a proven vote-getter and because
they feel they can influence-him.
Allende, who has r~1n for the
presidency and lost three times,
reportedly has some support in
the still restless Chilean mili-
tary, General Rer.e Schneider, who
was elevated to the position of
army commander after the Viaux
revolt, told the US Army attache
on 2 November that he believes
Allende will win the election next
year, and that he would not oppose
an Allende government,
Schneider believes, however,
that the army would not accept as
president Jacques Chonchol, a rad-
ical agrarian reform expert who
is a possible alternative to Al-
lende as candidate of the unified
leftist front. Chonchol, a United
Nations agrarian reform adviser
in Cuba from 1959 to 1961, re-
cently broke with the Christian
Democrats after serving as direc-
tor of President Frei's agrarian
reform program for nearly five
years. In this role, Chonchol
was widely blamed for political
agitation among peasants whose at-
tempts at take-overs of private
lands to force agrarian reform
sometimes involved confrontations
with army troops.
Air force officers this week
forced the replacement of their
top commanders and there are
other indications that the tra-
ditionally apolitical stance of
the Chilean armed forces is being
changed by the belief that those
who do not play the political
game in Chile lose prestige and
influence.
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VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT FACES GROWING UNREST
Student demonstrations,
labor unrest, and a stalemated
congress pose-the mast serious
challenge to President Caldera's
authority since his inauguration
last March.
In an attempt to quell three
days of violent demonstrations at
the Central University in Car-
acas, Caldera on 31 October or-
dered troops and armored vehicles
onto the "autonomous" university's
grounds. The protests erupted
over the death of a student in
government custody and quickly
spread to other universities
throughout the country. Spo~
radic violenceis still continu-
ing in some cities.
Although the government had
contingency plans to enter the
university in case of disturbances,
Caldera was reluctant to do this
for fear it might unite non radical
students and extremists in defense
of traditional university "auton-
omy."
Although Caldera's decision
won. the plaudits of influential
sectors of the business community,
it has not stilled criticism of
his handling of the whole situa-
tion. There is a general feeling
that the government's permissive-
ness tow and leftists and students
caused the demonstration and that
the new administration is not res-
olute enough in dealing with ex-
tremists.
The administration maybe
forced to take firmer action if
the nationwide teacher's strike
now under way attracts the support
of violence-prone students and
workers. The 56,000 teachers who
struck during the height of the
university disorders are demand-
ing a substantial wage increase
and other bonuses, which the gov-
ernment claimG it cannot afford.
The public is generally sympathetic
towards the teachers who have not
had a general pay raise in 11
years, and there are recurrent
reports that university students
as well as petroleum workers. and
the chauffeurs' union may stage
sympathy strikes.
Widespread student disorders
could also erupt if the opposi-
tion Democratic Action Party se-
cures administration support for
its plan to amend the law that
governs the country's autonomous.
national universities. The
changes would limit university
autonomy and limit student repre-
sentation on university governing
councils. The government will be
under heavy pressure to support
the proposals, but faces violent
opposition from its leftist-domi-
nated youth wing and extremist
parties in Congress.
At the same time, the ad-
ministration's social and eco-
nomic,program has been stalemated
because of its minority position
in both houses of Congress: and
because the President has refused
to bargain with the opposition.
Caldera's aloof .style seems to
be a major factor in the impasse.
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The US Embassy reports that the
President's popular support has
declined markedly since March.
The buoyant feeling of self-as-
surance and confidence in the
permanence of Venezuela's demo-
cratic institutions that was
evident in March has ebbed, and
there are recurrent rumors of
plotting by the military and
some opposition party leaders.
A continuation of the downward
trend could spark further talk of
moves to find some nondemocratic
alternative.
FINANCIAL PROBLEMS TROUBLE ECUADOR
A growing financial crisis
exposed by the government's in-
ability to meet its current op-
erating expenses is gnawing away
at public confidence in the
Velasco government.
Sagging export earnings, an
archaic fiscal system, and unreal-
istic budgets for 1969 and 1970
are pushing the administration
toward an economic crunch that
it may not have the political
strength to survive. Student
protests, which got off to a
noisy start in October, are add-
ing to the public's growing con-
cern that the Velasco administra-
tion is not able to cope with the
country's numerous problems.
The most pressing financial
problem is how to raise $12.5
million to cover current govern-
ment debts and expenses. The
government has tried to raise
the cash by selling bonds abroad
and to oil companies in Ecuador,
but it has not been successful
because of the low interest rates.
Further financing by credit from
the Central Bank--in effect,
printing more money--is a possi-
bility, but this would only add
to the country's serious infla-
tionary problems and make the
administration's situation more
acute next fiscal year. The
most talked about solution is
an emergency budget financed
through new and increased taxes
and by tapping the revenues of
the numerous autonomous govern-
ment agencies.
Should a special session of
Congress not approve an emergency
budget as appears likely, Presi-
dent Velasco might be forced to
assume extraordinary powers.
Velaseo's opponents and at least
part of the populace would dub
him a dictator if he did this,
however, and the political- vi-
ability of his administration
would be severely tested. Vel-
asco is aware of the dangers in-
volved in such a move, and he
probably would do it only as a
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CASTRO~S PROBLEMS AND THE CUBAN SUGAR HARVEST
There are indications that
Fidel Castro is running into prob-
lems in his grandiose scheme to
produce ten million tons of sugar
in the 1970 harvest. He has stead-
fastly refused to scale down this
unrealistic goal, but his speech
on 29 October suggests that he
has some doubts about Cuba's abil-
ity to achieve it.
According to Fidel, the ten
million ton target, which was set
several years ago and has been
played up heavily ever since, is
within reach and can even be sur-
passed if all the cane presently
earmarked for cutting is harvested
and processed. He warned, how-
ever, that the "carelessness, neg-
ligence, and lack of discipline"
that had plagued past harvests
cannot be repeated. He placed the
burden of responsibility for a
good harvest on the "workers and
leadership cadres," thereby re-
lieving himself and his adminis-
tration of any blame if it fails.
The prob lem of worker absen-
teeism in particular seemed to ir-
ritate Castro. Five days after his
speech the radio announced that
more than 3,300 "committees to
fight worker absenteeism" had been
formed in Havana Province. The
other provinces presumably will
follow suit. To illustrate the
seriousness of this problem, one
labor union official has complained
that in May, June, and July in
Camaguey Province alone only 65
percent of the agricultural work-
ers .showed up even though the av-
erage work day was only six hours.
Another key feature of Castro's
speech was his continued adherence
to moral rather than material in-
centives as a means of increasing
production. He maintained that
"the socialist society cannot re-
sort to the procedures of the cap-
italists," and he insisted that
appeals to an individual's sense
of honor and dignity would produce
better results than an offer of
money.
The matter of moral versus
material incentives, which remained
controversial until the former was
made a basic tenet of revolutionary
doctrine in late 1966, apparently
has again become an important issue
among some intellectuals. Members
of the faculty and student body of
the School of Humanities of the
University of Havana--usually con-
sidered a stronghold of pro-Castro
sentiment--openly challenged Fi-
del's thesis recently, and in -
doing drew a wrathful blast from,
the Cgmmunist Party's organizing
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secretary, Armando Hart. In Sep-
tember, Hart accused the dissent-
ers, particularly those in the De-
partment of Philosophy, of being
guilty of "individualism" and cau-
tioned them against thinking they
were wiser in revolutionary theory
than Fidel. He rejected any sug-
gestion of the superiority of ma-
terial incentives and reminded them
that "academic freedom" was subject
to party discipline.
These early straws in the
wind are an inauspicious begin-
ning for a harvest that is so
dependent on the attitude of the
Cuban workers. Without a gigantic
effort by the masses, the goal of
ten million tons will not be
achieved even under otherwise
optimum conditions. The evidence
suggests the harvest may already
be in serious trouble and may not
even break the existing record
of 7.2 million tons roduced in
1952.
SURINAM~S PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IMPROVE
By winning 19 of the 39 seats
in the elections on 24 October, the
United Hindu Party (VHP) has emerged
as the strongest political-force in
Surinam's unicameral legislature.
Its victory also ended nearly a dec-
ade of Creole (Negro) political
domination.
The Governor has asked Jager-
nath Lachmon, the leader of the VHP,
to form a government and he is try-
ing to establish a coalition with
the National Progressive Party, the
second largest Creole Party in the
country. The two parties, by virtue
of their two thirds majority in the
legislature, will be able to enact
constitutional changes. They are
not expected to press for early in-
dependence from the Netherlands,
however, and they will probably
downgrade the issue and emphasize
economic development instead.
Selection of the next prime
minister could be of critical im-
portance for Surinam. Lachmon
has no interest in the post, and
he may not even accept a ministry.
About 35 percent of the population
is Creole, and they might react
strongly--perhaps violently--to
the selection of a Hindu or other
non-Creole as prime minister. In
order to avoid trouble, Lachmon's
party reportedly plans to have
a Creole head the government.
The new government will face
a somewhat subdued opposition in
former Minister-President Pengel's
National Party of Surinam, which
retained only 11 of its 17 seats.
Pengel has stated that he will not
accept a seat in the Staten (leg-
islature). Edward Bruma's extreme
leftist Nationalistic Republic
Party captured its first and only
seat in the Staten. Both parties
espouse immediate independence
and are potential troublemakers.
The relatively calm atmos-
phere of the election and the
strength of the probable coali-
tion partners, however, point to
improved prospects for political
stability, barring unforeseen ra-
cial or labor outbursts.
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