WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007900010001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1970
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
43
1 May 1970
No. 0368/70
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(Information as of noon EDT, 30 April 1970)
Far East
PHNOM PENH BANKING ON MILITARY AID
The Communists are continuing attacks against govern-
ment positions.
CAMBODIAN CONFERENCE IS NOW CERTAIN
The Asian conference on Cambodia scheduled to be
held in Djakarta in mid-May should give the Lon Nol
government a measure of political and psychological
support.
VIETNAM WAR TAKES ON INDOCHINESE CONTEXT
Last week's Communist-sponsored Indochinese "summit
conference" apparently skirted some tough decisions
while high-level consultations have continued in
Moscow and Peking. This suggests that Hanoi and its
various allies are not yet fully agreed on what to
do in Indochina. Communist forces in South Vietnam
are preparing for another pick-up in activity as the
Thieu government wrestles with increasing political
problems.
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN COMMUNIST CHINA
The latest crackdown on crime and factionalism is
showing no signs of abating.
LAOTIAN COMMUNISTS ACTIVE IN THE SOUTH
The Communists have staged their first significant
attacks of the current dry season in the panhandle.
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Europe
MINORITY GOVERNMENT IN AUSTRIA FACES DIFFICULT FUTURE
The minority government's first real test will come
after the summer recess when parliament considers
the 1971 budget.
GOVERNMENT MOVES TOWARD "NEW SOCIETY" IN FRANCE
Through a variety of innovative approaches to labor
relations, the French Government has thus far averted
the cycle of major strikes that usually unsettles
French society each spring.
SOVIET INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION RECOVERS MOMENTUM
Civilian industrial production was eight percent
greater in the first quarter of 1970 than in the
sluggish first quarter of 1969.
HUNGARIAN REGIME PREPARES NEW YOUTH POLICY
The Hungarian regime, worried over recurrent failures
in shaping its youth's outlook, is conducting a whole-
sale review of the youth situation that may end in
some new approaches to the problem.
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES PONDER POLITICAL PROBLEMS
The outlook for any early movement toward closer
political ties in the European Communities continues
to look dim.
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Middle East - Africa
THE ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN FRONT IS HEATING UP
Nasir's forces have displayed unusual boldness and
perseverance in striking at Israeli targets in Sinai,
a development that may force Tel Aviv to strike back,
even at the risk of encounters with the Soviets in
Egypt.
NASIR SHUFFLES HIS CABINET
The cabinet shuffle announced on 26 April signals no
significant changes in Egyptian foreign policies but
involves a number of persons long associated with
Nasir.
NATIONAL PARTY'S MAJORITY CUT IN SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTION
The ruling National Party achieved its primary objec-
tive by crushing the ultraconservative party in
last week's parliamentary election. In doing so,
however, it lost nine seats to the United Party,
giving that group an important psychological boost.
CREEPING COLLABORATION AMONG EGYPT, LIBYA, AND SUDAN
Since late last year, these three African Arab States
have instituted a number of measures designed to
achieve a closer degree of cooperation, but political
union is not yet in the offing.
Western Hemisphere
CLOSE COLOMBIAN ELECTION TIES NEW PRESIDENT'S HANDS
The closeness of National Front candidate Misael
Pastrana's victory over former dictator General Rojas
Pinilla in the elections of 19 April probably will
greatly handicap the new government.
CASTRO OUTLINES CUBA'S FOREIGN POLICY
Castro's long speech on 22 April--the centennial of
Lenin's birth--was mainly a reiteration of previous
policy statements, but was notable for the warm ex-
pressions of Cuban-Soviet friendship.
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TRINIDAD REVOLT STILL SIMMERING
The government has yet to bring the rebel regiment
under control.
HAITIAN REBELLION QUICKLY SNUFFED
The failure of last week's short-lived revolt is
likely to deter further plotting.
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Governmental power across Indochina is being subjected to increasingly sharp
pressures, pointing up its essential weakness. In South Vietnam, the Thieu
government is continuing to come under harsh attack, and even some supporters of
the regime are beginning to speak in gloomy terms. Thieu's military commanders,
despite a facade of optimism among some over their capability to go it alone, are
deeply concerned over the ramifications of additional US troop withdrawals,
especially since most North Vietnamese main force units have been staying out of
action for quite some time.
Communist military and political moves bode ill for the future of the Lon Nol
government, especially if allied raids from South Vietnam into eastern Cambodia
cause the Communists to take more drastic action to ensure a favorable regime in
Phnom Penh. The Communists may already be embarked on this course through the
medium of a Cambodian "liberation movement" headed by Sihanouk. Nevertheless,
the Cambodian Government remains optimistic about getting enough outside aid to
enable it to stay in power.
In Laos, the Communists in a sudden and unexpected move took the southern
provincial capital of Attopeu. They have not mounted a major offensive in southern
Laos since early 1968, and though their motivation for this latest action is unclear at
this time, it is a fresh reminder of the extreme fragility of the government's position
in all of southern Laos. It also demonstrates the relative ease with which North
Vietnamese troops can move west out of the infiltration corridor to strike at a time
and place of their own choosing.
The North Vietnamese, by contrast, appear to be pressing their advantage. Le
Duan has just completed what must be accounted a successful trip to Peking,
Moscow, and back, and the Communists have managed to hold an "Indochina"
conference of their own well in advance of the more comprehensive meeting called
by Indonesia's Foreign Minister for mid-May. The Communists' conference was
attended by the ousted Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, the Pathet Lao's Prince
Souphanouvong, and the Viet Cong's Nguyen Huu Tho, as well as a North
Vietnamese delegation and China's Chou En-lai. Although no formal all-Indochina
"peoples' front" emerged, as had been widely rumored, the meeting may serve as a
take-off point for a concerted effort to extend North Vietnamese influence more
widely across the Indochinese peninsula.
The Asian conference on Cambodia now seems certain to draw cabinet-level
representation from most non-Communist Asian nations. Although Indonesia invited
Communist China, North Vietnam, and North Korea, the three are not likely to
attend. The conference will have little practical effect on the Cambodian situation.
Most participants view the meeting as an exercise in Asian initiative, itself worthy of
support.
Elsewhere in the Far East, lawlessness and political factionalism continue to
worry Communist China's leaders. The latest crackdown on troublemakers is
entering its fourth month with no end in sight.
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PHNOM PENH BANKING ON MILITARY AID
The Communists are contin-
uing attacks against government
positions and key lines of com-
munication in widely separated
areas of eastern Cambodia. The
heaviest fighting during the week
was at the town of Angtassom in
Takeo Province, 45 miles south
of Phnom Penh, where the Commu-
nists are blocking the main route
from the capital to the Gulf
of Siam.
The Communists have also
attacked government positions in
`he provincial capital of Kampot.
At last report, fighting there
was continuing. Communist ele-
ments are also holding a number
of provincial towns farther east
in Kampot and Takeo provinces.
calls for the army to protect Phnom
Penh, to keep open main roads in
the southern and eastern border
provinces, and to deny the Viet
Cong access to the seacoast and
areas west of the Mekong.
Government spokesmen have
made it clear that the army's
main problem is a shortage of
essential military supplies. The
army general staff is worried about
its budget, which has no funds for
arming and equipping numerous re-
cruits. Morale in the armed
forces reportedly is good, but
one ranking Cambodian official
claims there is dissatisfaction
among some aggressive junior
officers and among the rank and
file, where some pro-Sihanouk
sentiment still lingers.
The situation has taken a
turn for the worse in the north-
east. The government military
post at Mimot in Kompong Cham
Province reportedly was captured
on 27 April, and Viet Cong and
dissident ethnic Cambodian groups
appear to have almost free run in
much of the countryside. The Com-
munists now emplaced along the Me-
kong River in the Chhlong area
threaten to cut water routes to
the large town of Kratie. Fresh
Communist harassments have been
reported in Stung Treng, Ratana-
kiri and Mondolkiri provinces, and
the morale of government forces
in those areas may be waning.
Despite recent government
military reverses, senior army
officers still believe the army
can hold areas east of the Mekong
River for up to three months with-
out substantial military aid. Cur-
rent Cambodian strategy apparently
Also, Phnom Penh is taking
an increasingly tough line with
the Communists. One top offi-
cial told a newsman that the gov-
ernment has decided it must rely
on military means to get the Com-
munists off Cambodian territory,
and he made it clear that it is
counting on substantial US mate-
rial assistance for this undertak-
ing. The official also commented
for the first time that Cambodia
would welcome military advisers.
His remarks reflect both the con-
fidence held by some Cambodian of-
ficials that the government can
cope with the Communists' current
military actions and the determina-
tion to press the struggle even
if this results in military disas-
ter.
The Communists evidently are
prepared to devote considerable
attention to forming a "Cambodian
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Cambodia: Current Situation
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SFCRFT
liberation movement."
cials trom the party headquar-
ters for South Vietnam (COSVN) are
pushing orders from Hanoi to ex-
pand "liberated areas" in Cam-
bodia. Recent evidence indicates
the Viet Cong are already arming
and training local villagers in
some areas near the border, and
in other areas are trying to pass
their own troops off as members
of Sihanouk's "army." There are
few indications, however, that
large numbers of Cambodian peas-
ants are flocking to join such
CAMBODIAN CONFERENCE
The Asian conference on Cam-
bodia is to be held in Djakarta
in mid-May. Indonesia issued in-
vitations on 28 April to 19 gov-
ernments--including Communist
China, both Vietnams, and both
Koreas--to attend a meeting of
foreign ministers on 11 and 12
May, but this date may be subject
to change. The Cambodians were
not included in the official list-
ing, but are expected to attend
in a "different" capacity.
As proposed by Indonesian
Foreign Minister Adam Malik, the
conference will concentrate on
the immediate problem of Cambodia,
although undoubtedly other Indo-
china matters will intrude. It
will call for the guarantee of
Cambodian neutrality, the preven-
tion of external interference in
its affairs, and reactivation of
the International Control Commis-
sion. Malik believes the meeting
should avoid condemnations that
would only exacerbate the existing
situation.
The three invited Communist
countries are not likely to attend.
North Vietnam and Communist China
have already stated their opposi-
tion to the conference, and North
Korea probably will make a simi-
is Now CERTAIN
larly negative announcement. The
Soviet Union, which, along with
the US, was not invited, has also
weighed in against the meeting.
Most of the non-Communist
countries invited, despite reser-
vations, are likely to attend.
There is some feeling that a purely
nonaligned conference might be more
likely to have an impact on the
situation and that there has been
insufficient focus on the goals
of the conference. There has
also been pique in several cap-
itals over Malik's penchant for
discussing the conference with
the press before broaching the
subject with potential partici-
pants.
The conference probably will
have little practical effect on
Communist activities or strategy
in Cambodia, but it should give
a degree of international polit-
ical support to the Phnom Penh
government that up to now has
been lacking. Most of those in-
vited, including Indonesia itself,
see the conference primarily as
an exercise in Asian initiative
and follow-through, which in it-
self is worthy of support.
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VIETNAM WAR TAKES ON INDOCHINESE CONTEXT
Hanoi's Indochina Summit Meeting
Indochina's prominent "outs,"
along with North Vietnamese Pre-
mier Pham Van Dong, gathered to-
gether on 24-25 April at an un-
disclosed site in south China for
the first "summit conference of
the Indochinese people." The
conference, with delegations led
by Sihanouk of Cambodia, the
Pathet Lao's Prince Souphanouvong,
and the Viet Cong's Nguyen Huu Tho
in attendance in addition to the
North Vietnamese, reasserted the
standard Communist position on
each country. The themes were
solidarity and cooperation among
all Indochinese peoples in the
face of US "aggression," but the
centerpiece of the occasion was
Cambodia. Sihanouk ostensibly
called the meeting and gave the
opening address, and the final
communique noted the conferees'
"special concern" for Cambodia.
It also made much of each coun-
try's "national united front"--
an apparent effort to build up
Sihanouk's new entry in this
field. Also, the conference con-
demned international efforts to
"legitimize" the new Cambodian
Government, including Lon Nol's
appeal to the UN and the Indone-
sian proposal for an Asian con-
ference. Sihanouk, by inference,
denounced the French proposal on
Indochina as well.
The conferees held more dif-
ficult organizational and polit-
ical problems in abeyance, per-
haps because they, as well as
their Soviet and Chinese patrons,
have serious differences on what
to do about the Indochina situa-
tion. Chou En-Lai and Kosygin did
confer their blessings on the
meeting, however; Chou, during a
personal appearance and Kosygin,
through a laudatory message. No
formal all-Indochina front emerged
from the meeting despite a spate
of rumors and some propaganda in-
dications that it would, but the
participants did call for more
summit-level meetings.
Diplomatic Maneuvers
There have been cross cur-
rents of accord and disagreement
among the Communist powers on
diplomatic strategy. Hanoi, Mos-
cow, and Peking swiftly agreed
that the Indonesian call for an
Asian conference on Cambodia was
a bad idea and "categorically"
rejected it. This rapid reaction
made Hanoi's and Moscow's cauti-
ous and ambiguous responses to
the earlier French proposal stand
out in sharp relief. Seemingly
recognizing this, Peking then
blasted Moscow for UN Ambassador
Malik's statement, which the Chi-
nese saw as encouraging Geneva-
type consultations on Indochina.
The North Vietnamese, for
their part, may be trying to iron
out any differences that have
cropped up and to coordinate
their future moves. Chief Paris
negotiator Le Duc Tho rather
abruptly returned to Hanoi from
Moscow on the 25th, but left Le
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Duan behind to continue talks
with Soviet leaders. It is also
possible that Pham Van Dong vis-
ited Peking, perhaps with Siha-
nouk, for more talks with Chinese
leaders.
In Paris, the chief Viet
Cong delegate, Madame Binh, added
to earlier indications that she
may be going home. She told re-
porters on 28 April that she has
duties not only in Paris but also
others awaiting her back home.
The Viet Cong press spokesman
had commented similarly last week,
and the North Vietnamese have
been hinting that Xuan Thuy, Ma-
dame Binh's counterpart in Hanoi's
delegation, may be leaving as
well.
Madame Binh placed heavy em-
phasis during her press confer-
ence on the recent summit confer-
ence and on the "mutual solidar-
ity" of the three countries. This
strongly suggests that the Commu-
nists think considerable advantage
can be gained now by casting their
military and political pressure
in an Indochinese context. At
the moment they may think this
approach will have more impact,
both in the US and in Southeast
Asia, than would an initiative
in Paris or any other interna-
tional forum.
More Problems for Thieu
Charges of corruption against
two senior military officers
could develop into a serious po-
litical problem for President
Thieu and heighten the traditional
animosity between civilian and
military leaders. An independent
senator, with no apparent ax to
grind, accused III Corps Commander
Tri and presidential intelligence
adviser Quang of using their mil-
itary positions for illicit per-
sonal gain. Corruption is con-
sidered a prerogative of position
in South Vietnam, particularly
within the military, and official
efforts to curb it have been long
on rhetoric but short on sub-
stance. Civilian resentment. over
the military leadership's disin-
clination to take any effective
steps to control or reduce cor-
ruption within the military es-
tablishment may have played a
part in the airing of the charges.
If Thieu's political opposition
can control the proposed legisla-
tive investigation of the charges,
the wide publicity that would
probably follow could at least
embarrass the President and would
probably hurt the government's
campaign in this summer's Upper
House elections.
After receiving permission
from Phnom Penh, the Saigon gov-
ernment moved quickly in dispatch-
ing an official delegation to
help Cambodian authorities pro-
tect the lives and property of
ethnic Vietnamese residents in
Cambodia and to expedite the re-
patriation of those seeking to
leave. Saigon had been pressing
the Lon Nol government for such
representation after reports of
atrocities committed against. Viet-
namese living in Cambodia had
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precipitated anti-Cambodian dem-
onstrations by students and dis-
abled veterans in Saigon. The
Thieu government has been attempt-
ing to avoid any provocation of
the new Cambodian leaders while
making the proper noises to mollify
domestic outrage and to prevent
any local retaliation against
South Vietnam's ethnic Cambodian
minority. Although still blaming
the Communists for the killings
of Vietnamese in Cambodia, the
government has responded to the
domestic pressure by publicly de-
manding that Phnom Penh see to
it that the killings stop and
that Cambodia assume responsibil-
ity for the welfare of the Viet-
namese pending repatriation.
New Communist Attacks Expected
Soon in South
Communist forces in many
sectors of South Vietnam appear
about to launch another series
of limited attacks. The next
round is likely to be comparable
in scope and magnitude to the
initial phase of the current
spring campaign which got under
way on 31 March. This time, how-
ever, more enemy units appear to
be getting ready to attack in the
northernmost provinces, and there
may be less country-wide coordina-
tion.
The South Vietnamese com-
mander of I Corps, Lt. General
Lam, because of increased strength
of North Vietnamese units in the
northern provinces, expects the
next phase of attacks to be more
intense in I Corps than recent
ones have been. He is confident,
however, that the South Vietnam-
ese and allied forces can contain
the expected drive and inflict
heavy casualties. Enemy attacks
planned in other sectors of the
country, however, may be less in-
tense than in the first phase.
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CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Communist China's latest crack-
down on lawless elements and for-
mer Cultural Revolution activists
is moving into its fourth month
and shows no signs of abating.
Kicked off by a series of mass
trials held in Peking during late
January, the campaign has focused
on a wide range of social and eco-
nomic offenses as part of a deter-
mined effort to restore civil dis-
cipline and control badly under-
mined by the Cultural Revolution.
Renewed attacks against once-power-
ful Red Guard groups in Peking and
elsewhere suggest that the drive
also has important political over-
tones. Peking apparently intends
the psychological shock effects
of this campaign to be long last-
ing and it has authorized the ex-
tensive use of public show trials
and executions for their coercive
impact on the populace at large.
This year's campaign is simi-
lar to the police action last fall
that accompanied the regime's war
preparations drive, but it seems
more intensive and broader in
scope. Since late February
Murder, arson, and sex crimes have
been cited, along with robbery and
pickpocketing. The high incidence
of such crimes is unusual in Com-
munist China and illustrates the
considerable extent to which break-
downs in local control during the
Cultural Revolution have engen-
dered popular disrespect for the
system. The trials are also part
of a stepped-up effort by Peking
to punish former Red Guard remnants
for their past political behavior
and to curb persistent factional
activity. During the January trials
in Peking, for example, official
slogans were displayed denouncing
several long-disbanded radical Red
Guard organizations--including the
notorious "May 16 Corps" that had
sought to topple Chou En-lai and
other top government officials dur-
ing the early months of the Cul-
tural Revolution. Elsewhere in
China, it appears that large numbers
of factionalists are being framed
on criminal charges, in many in-
stances by newly reinstated veteran
officials bent on reprisals for
their past humiliations by the Red
Guards.
at least 650 per-
sons have been executed for a va-
riety of social and economic
"crimes." There have also been
at least 36 executions in Peking
and another 50 in Shanghai. The
totals can be expected to be
hi her, however, as
the
r.ria s and executions are being
handled in a series of separate
groups that may be spread out over
several months.
25X1
The harshest sentences, often
including the death penalty, are
being given to common criminals.
Page 8
Besides its real concern about
crime, Peking also is trying to elim-
inate persistent factionalism within
local administrations across the
country and thus facilitate the con-
current campaign to rebuild the
local Communist Party apparatus in
the wake of the Cultural Revolution.
Even if the crackdown is enjoying
some success, however, its impact
on the party-building process is
likely to take long to unfold and
will probably delay even further the
long-awaited National People's Con-
gress, the civilian counterpart to
the Communist Party Con ress held a
year ago.
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LAOTIAN COMMUNISTS ACTIVE IN THE SOUTH
The first significant mili-
tary activity in southern Laos
in more than a year occurred this
week when government troops aban-
doned the provincial capital of
Attopeu in the face of an attack
by Communist forces. Incomplete
reports indicate that government
losses of personnel and weapons
were substantial. Bad weather
hampered air strikes in support
of the Attopeu defenders.
The Communists had not
mounted a major offensive in this
area of Laos since early 1968,
when North Vietnamese forces re-
captured the Se Done Valley and
virtually surrounded Attopeu and
Saravane. Reports have been cir-
culating in southern Laos for
Kona
N. R
-
Govarnlnent. '=aitooen
torces retreat
the past month, however, that
the Communists intended to break
the lull in military activity in
the panhandle.
Although the military impor-
tance of Attopeu is minimal, its
loss will be a severe political
and psychological setback to the
government. Along with the city
of Saravane, Attopeu has long fig-
ured prominently in the war of
nerves in southern Laos. It has
been attacked before, but the
Communists had never made a sub-
stantial effort to capture it.
It is too early to determine
whether the attack on Attopeu is
the harbinger of an important
shift in enemy strategy in Laos
or represents only the kind of
sporadic flareup that has oc-
curred in the south in past years.
The Communists may hope to push
government forces away from the
Se Kong River so that it can be
used as a supply route into Cam-
bodia. At a minimum, it points
up the extreme fragility of the
government's position in south-
ern Laos and the relative ease
with which the North Vietnamese
can move out of the infiltration
corridor to strike at a time and
place of their own choosing.
The military situation in
the north has remained essentially
stable during the past week. The
Attopeu attack may cause some
southern commanders to agitate
for the return of troops already
sent to support Vang Pao's forces.
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Page 9
Comrnunretcontrolled territory
n Contested territory
Commoner Colt Ne~.oaHsl
~.omro~ mna ryea
'.VIETNAM-'
WEEKLY SUMMARY 1 May 70
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Low-level Soviet commentary on. the Defense Department's announcement of
29 April regarding Cambodia takes the line that the US has "committed another
monstrous crime."
Earlier in the week, there were two Soviet pronouncements, more authorita-
tive, on Indochina developments, but both were far more specific about what the
USSR is against than what it is for. One, a TASS statement on Cambodia, was
pegged to the massacre of Vietnamese by Cambodians and implicitly warned the US
against interfering in Cambodia. The other, a message from Kosygin to the partici-
pants of the Indochinese summit, explicitly castigated the US and expressed confi-
dence that the "anti-imperialist forces" would play an "important role" in frustrat-
ing the "aggressive imperialist plans."
Soviet and Chinese officials privately confirm that no progress has been made
in the Peking talks, and that the Soviets have not made unilateral troop withdrawals
from the border. Although the talks apparently remain in recess while Soviet chief
negotiator Kuznetsov is in Moscow, both sides indicate that they intend to continue
the discussions. The Chinese have said they have not given agrement to the Soviet
ambassador-designate and have no present plans for naming an ambassador to the
USSR.
Brezhnev and other high-ranking; Soviet officials are expected in Prague on 5
May to sign a friendship treaty, but this is not confirmed.
The East Germans reminded the four powers, who are meeting in Berlin, that
they have a stake in the talks. Long-planned increases in tolls on water, rail, and road
transport between the city and the West were announced on 28 April, coinciding
with the meeting. West Germany reimburses cargo haulers for such fees, which will
add more than two million dollars to East German coffers this year.
The Warsaw Pact's new military council met in Budapest on 27-28 April. It was
chaired by pact commander Yakubovsky, and may have dealt with forthcoming
maneuvers.
The Geneva disarmament talks recessed yesterday after ten weeks of sessions
marked by a frustrating lack of progress on the key issues-CBW and the draft treaty
limiting the use of the seabeds for military purposes. The conferees return on 16
June and hope to complete their work before the fall session of the UN General
Assembly. Failure to show substantial progress in at least one of the arms control
areas could lead to calls by the nations not represented at the talks for a convening
of the unwieldy UN Disarmament Commission, which is certain to serve as a focal
point for grievances against the superpowers on arms issues.
Belgium and Italy are the leading proponents of a possible initiative at the UN
to control the delivery of arms to areas of conflict or tension. They have in mind
using the Security Council or a special subsidiary organ to regulate or at least 25X1
monitor the flow of weapons to such areas. Preliminary soundings indicate that this
plan will meet formidable political difficulties.
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MINORITY GOVERNMENT IN AUSTRIA FACES DIFFICULT FUTURE
Austria's first Socialist
government, sworn in on 21 April,
faces a questionable future be-
cause the party lacks a majority
in parliament by two seats as a
result of elections held 1 March.
The minority government's first
real test will come after the
summer recess when parliament
considers the 1971 budget.
through parliament. Both opposi-
tion parties, the People's Party
and the tiny Liberals, are closer
to each other than to the Social-
ists on most issues. Nor can
Kreisky risk alienating business
confidence and the party's new
found middle class support by pur-
suing too "Red" a program.
Chancellor Kreisky's Social-
ists neogtiated in vain for sev-
eral weeks to construct a coali-
tion with the People's Party, with
which they had been minority part-
ners in coalitions from 1945 to
1966. The efforts, however, found-
ered on the allocation of cabinet
posts, representation on key par-
liamentary committees, and several
policy issues including housing
and tax and educational reform.
The People's Party charged,
with some justification, that the
Socialists were demanding more
than their two-seat edge in par-
liament warranted. Kreisky's
adamancy stemmed in part from
hard-line, orthodox sentiment in
his own party as well as from a
belief that the People's Party--
in opposition--would not dare to
precipitate another national elec-
tion in the next few months.
Having refused to compromise
his program as the price for a
coalition, Kreisky cannot now hope
to push his most contentious plans
The new minority government
will have to pick up support in
parliament from individual Peo-
ple's Party deputies or from the
Liberals, who are often accused
of neo-Nazism. The Socialists
have long ruled out a coalition
with the Liberals, and even an
informal alliance with them over
a long period might reduce the
Socialists' electoral support.
Tacit Liberal support on some
programs, however, can be ex-
pected if the Socialists indicate
that they will promote an elec-
toral reform beneficial to the
Liberals.
Despite Kreisky's professed
optimism over the prospects for
his minority government, neither
he nor the People's Party leader-
ship has ruled out a resumption
of coalition talks at a later
date. Both major parties evi-
dently expect that the parliamen-
tary give-and-take before this
fall's budget debate will make
the other more amenable to com-
promise.
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GOVERNMENT MOVES TOWARD "NEW SOCIETY" IN FRANCE
The first anniversary of Gen-
eral de Gaulle's departure from
power passed this week in a so-
cial climate unusually peaceful
for France in the spring. That
this was so is due in large meas-
ure to the Pompidou government's
introduction of a variety of inno-
vations in the field of labor re-
lations, ranging from a new deal
for blue-collar workers to new
tactics in negotiations. These
changes are for the most part the
work of Prime Minister Chaban-
Delmas, and taken together they
are designed to implement his
vision of a "new society" in
France.
The aim of the blue-collar
worker program--which is perhaps
the government's most far-reach-
ing innovation--is to transfer
France's blue-collar workers from
hourly to monthly pay status, and
also gradually to grant this sub-
stantial sector of the French la-
bor force (approximately 7 mil-
lion workers) the fringe benefits
of white-collar workers. These
include salary for sick, matern-
ity, military, and holiday leaves,
as well as seniority and retire-
ment benefits. To date, this
program has been well received by
both labor and management and has
succeeded in improving substan-
tially the government's public
image.
Another government innova-
tion--the "social contract"--
has met with a mixed reaction
from labor. Heralded by Chaban-
Delmas as "revolutionary," the
new two-year contracts are de-
signed to provide periods of "so-
cial peace" uninterrupted by
strikes. Under the contracts,
the unions pledge to give 90-
days notice before striking, dur-
ing which period the government
hopes agreements can be reached.
In return, the unions receive a
guarantee that wages will be auto-
matically adjusted upward accord-
ing to a complex formula involving
increases in the GNP, worker pro-
ductivity, and the rate of infla-
tion.
Reluctant to give up the
right to strike, and also aware
that the "social contract" would
probably over time reduce the in-
fluence and power of the unions,
the Communist-led General Confed-
eration of Labor (CGT) has stead-
fastly opposed the concept of the
"social contract." Other smaller
unions, however, have been much
more positive, and the rank and
file of the CGT has not been
nearly as negative as its leader-
ship.
The government's tactic in
each round of labor negotiations
has been to offer enough conces-
sions to gain the acceptance of
the non-Communist unions and thus
leave the CGT isolated. So far
this tactic--coupled with other
recent innovations--has succeeded
in averting major strikes in key
nationalized sectors, as well as
in the civil service, where a
settlement was reached last week.
These successes are not likely to
prevent the CGT from getting a
big turnout for the traditional
May Day labor parade, but they
have taken a lot of steam out of
the CGT-backed "week of action"
that precedes Friday's march.
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SOVIET INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION RECOVERS MOMENTUM
Civilian industrial produc-
tion in the USSR was eight per-
cent greater during January-March
of this year than during the first
quarter of 1969. This increase
is the best posted in any quarter
since 1967. In large measure,
however, it represents recovery
from a poor opening quarter in
1969 rather than outstanding per-
formance this year.
The industrial materials sec-
tor registered the greatest recov-
ery from last year's slump, achiev-
ing its highest year-to-year gain
since the fourth quarter of 1966.
Within this sector, construction
materials scored the best improve-
ment. Output was nearly 12 per-
cent greater than last year, al-
though only ten percent greater
than in 1968.
The consumer nondurable goods
sector also made a good recovery,
with processed foods leading the
way. First quarter meat produc-
tion was up an impressive nine per-
cent from last year, but remained
two percent less than in the first
quarter of 1968. Production of
processed fish, another important
source of animal protein, increased
45 percent.
Unlike the industrial materi-
als and consumer nondurables sec-
tors, the civilian machinery sec-
tor failed to match its growth
rate of a year ago. Nevertheless,
civilian machinery output contin-
ues to increase more rapidly than
output of either of the other two
sectors.
The official Soviet index of
total machinery output, which in-
cludes defense-related production
as well as civilian durables,
showed the same relatively high
rate of growth in the first quar-
ters of 1969 and 1970. Growth of
the civilian component is known
to have slowed, however, implying
an acceleration in the production
of military and space machinery.
Industries producing goods
for use in the agricultural sec-
tor registered a mixed performance.
The growth of mineral fertilizer
output accelerated, but production
of tractors and other agricultural
machinery increased no faster than
a year ago.
The unusually high increase
of industrial production from the
first quarter of 1969 to the first
quarter of 1970 probably will prove
to be transitory. Production in
a number of industrial sectors was
held down by bad weather during the
opening quarter of 1969. Moreover,
special efforts may have been made
to boost production this year in
connection with the Lenin centenary.
Production of processed meat, for
example, may have been raised by
an unsustained spurt in slaughtering.
Production of processed fish prob-
ably rose in response to a belated
effort to compensate for the short-
age of meat than prevailed through-
out 1969 and January of this year.
Soviet leaders will attribute
the generally favorable results to
their program to tighten discipline
and evoke more intensive effort all
down the line. It is unlikely, how-
ever, that this campaign actually has
had a great impact.
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HUNGARIAN REGIME PREPARES NEW YOUTH POLICY
The Budapest regime, wor-
ried over recurrent failures in
shaping the outlook of young Hun-
garians, is conducting a whole-
sale review of the youth situa-
tion that may bring some new ap-
proaches to the problem.
The March issue of Party
Life carries portions of reso-
lutions from the central commit-
tee's plenum on youth policies
held on 18 February. According
to the article, the plenum called
for country-wide preparation of a
"uniform youth law" in which the
entire party and state apparatus
must participate. Committees at
the level of the Council of Minis-
ters and the party central com-
mittee have been set up to draft
reports based on this input.
Although no specific long-
range plans were outlined, it
seems clear from the resolutions
that the party leadership has all
but given up on the Young Commu-
nist League (KISz) , at least in
its present form, as the sole rep-
resentative and manager of youth
affairs. The article was full of
criticism of the KISz's failure
in educating even its own members
as Communists. Moreover, the ar-
ticle suggested that independent
(non-KISz) youth activities be
granted official support.
Another indication of the
failing political health of the
KISz bureaucracy was the publica-
tion earlier this year of a highly
critical article in its own jour-
nal. The author, Mikaly Sukosd,
is a long-time advocate of demo-
cratic forums for young people,
and, until the article was pub-
lished, was something of a pariah
to the bureaucrats in the KISz
leadership. Sukosd's article
blamed the widespread indifference
of young people on KISz failures
to relate to the needs of youth.
He also painted a dreary picture
of Hungarian youth's lack of na-
tional purpose or Communist ideal-
ism.
In terms of meeting the spirit
of the resolutions, the KISz leader-
ship's response to these political
pressures was typically inflexible.
A series of carefully controlled
"national youth parliaments" was
held in early April and the KISz
leadership generally tried to de-
flect responsibility for its fail-
ures onto other organizations.
These tactics failed, however,
and on 29 April the regime an-
nounced the sacking of the KISz
first secretary. His transfer
will probably be followed by
others.
The party appears to be res-
olute in charting a new course in
its youth policies. Implementa-
tion will not be easy, however.
The regime has always tended to
be timid when it deals with young
people, and it will take sustained
efforts to overcome the cautious
inertia which caused the KISz to
atrophy in the first place.
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EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES PONDER POLITICAL PROBLEMS
Despite the encouraging prog-
gress that the European Communi-
ties (EC) have been making in
other respects, the outlook for
any early movement toward closer
political ties continues to be
dim.
Last December the foreign
ministers of the Six were in-
structed to study the best way
of achieving progress toward po-
litical unification within the
context of enlargement, and to
report their findings by July
1970. Talks held so far have
dealt with three topics: a def-
inition of political unification,
the procedures and machinery re-
quired, and the participation in
this process of candidates for
EC membership.
There are indications, how-
ever, that the measures the for-
eign ministers will eventually
propose are unlikely to go much
beyond institutionally weak ar-
rangements for foreign policy con-
sultation and coordination. In
practice, such arrangements could
prove relatively meaningless, or
even a threat to the integrity and
further development of the in-
stitutions created by the Communi-
ties.
These institutions--particu-
larly the Commission, the EC's
executive body--already have their
problems. Under the terms of a
1967 agreement that created a
single Commission for the Euro-
pean Economic Community, the Eu-
ropean Coal and Steel Community,
and the European Atomic Energy
Community, the 14-member Commis-
sion was to be reduced to nine
within three years.
While this deadline is up
this July, the present consensus
seems to be that the membership
will remain at 14, even though
the Commission itself believes
that the enlarged Communities
will require a strengthened exec-
utive and that a smaller Commis-
sion would be more efficient.
The main obstacle to such a re-
treat from the 1967 commitment
are the legal problems involved.
The agreement might have to be
amended, and the amendments might
have to be ratified by the par-
liaments of the member states.
Legal experts are pondering these
questions, and the Council will
meet on them on 11 May.
Meanwhile, hopes that the
Commission will be reinvigorated
with some much-needed new blood
are rapidly waning. Candidates
so far suggested for a new Com-
mission have been undistinguished
or politically impossible. One
prospective German nominee, Ernst
Achenbach, has apparently been
withdrawn in the face of public
protests over his record as Ger-
man ambassador during the Nazi
occupation of Paris. The Ital-
ians, whose turn it is to pro-
pose a president for the Commis-
sion, have yet to persuade an ac-
ceptable candidate to consider
the job.
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Military activity along the Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire line was at a high level
during the week. At least four Egyptian aircraft, including two light bombers, were
downed during repeated raids against Israeli positions in the Sinai. Egypt also
mounted several commando raids across the Suez Canal but apparently inflicted few
casualties on the Israelis. Tel Aviv made a number of bombing attacks on Egyptian
positions along the canal and the Gulf of Suez.
Recent statements by Israeli officials may presage a renewal of
deep-penetration raids into Egypt. The Israeli cabinet announced that for the first
time Soviet pilots were flying "operational" missions in Egypt, a charge that Egypt
denied. Prime Minister Golda Meir stated that the Israelis do not want to hurt Soviet
airmen, but that "we have no choice." Israeli Chief of Staff Bar-Lev attributed the
increased Egyptian activity across the Suez Canal to active Soviet support. He said
that Israel will not allow an undermining of its position along the Canal.
In Jordan, government officials and fedayeen leaders are meeting again after a
hiatus of over two months, during which the fedayeen largely ignored the
"agreement" regulating commando activity. Little was accomplished at the first
meeting, but it was agreed that each side would appoint a negotiating team to
continue the discussions, tentatively slated to begin on 2 May.
South Africa's ruling National Party (NP) received a comfortable, but slightly
reduced, majority in last week's parliamentary election. The party farther to the
right of the NP, the Herstigte Nasionale Party, was effectively crushed, but probably
will continue to be a minor irritant to the government.
Dahomey's civilian leaders-Maga, Apithy, and Ahomadegbe-apparently have
agreed on a compromise solution to the four-month-old political crisis; each will
take a turn as head of government, with Maga the first to have the honor. It remains
to be seen, however, whether the agreement will withstand the competing ambitions
of these three rivals.
The military regime in Somalia has requested that five members of the US
Mission in Mogadiscio leave the country, allegedly for involvement in the recent
plotting against the government. The request follows a week-long propaganda
campaign claiming that the Somali conspirators, led by the vice president of the
Supreme Revolutionary Council, General Korshel, were in league with certain
"imperialist" powers.
In Afghanistan, conservative religious leaders have mounted antigovernment
protests. Triggered by the elders' opposition to Afghan-Soviet cooperation on the
Lenin centenary celebration, the protests have broadened to include attacks on
social and political changes resulting from King Zahir's cautious modernization
program. The protests have thus far remained orderly, but a confrontation between
conservatives and leftists could develop on Friday-the Muslim holy day and,
coincidentally, May Day.
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THE ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN FRONT IS HEATING UP
Egyptian forces have dis-
played unusual boldness and per-
severance in striking at Israeli
targets in Sinai. Nasir's air
defense system, buttressed by
Soviet-manned SA-3s and improved
antiaircraft artillery, appears
to have given him a feeling of
immunity from retaliation. Israel
may now believe it is compelled
to disabuse him of this idea, even
at the risk of encounters with the
Soviets.
The introduction of the SA-3
missile system has given the Is-
raelis some pause and has aroused
considerable uncertainty in Tel
Aviv as to just how far the So-
viets intend to go in assisting
their Egyptian client. In an ef-
fort to reduce the chances of di-
rect Soviet involvement, Israeli
leaders have publicly reiterated
that "they do not want to fight
the Soviets" and do not intend to
hit targets of special Soviet in-
terest at Cairo, Alexandria, or
the Aswan Dam. Minister of De-
fense Dayan has also stressed his
hope that the Soviets would keep
out of the Suez Canal area. Is-
rael, he insisted, must have air
superiority over the canal so that
it can readily spike any Egyptian
attempts to make a crossing in
force. The Israelis have stated
flatly that they would bomb any
SA-3 sites established along the
canal even though they were manned
by Soviet personnel.
Page 2 0
Now, however, Nasir has
apparently been emboldened by
the Soviet "protection." He has
resumed the very kind of mili-
tary harassment that first im-
pelled the Israelis to undertake
their heavy bombing campaign,
which progressed from strikes
along the canal in July to the
deep-penetration raids around
the Egyptian capital last Jan-
uary. Over the past week, Egypt
has launched a number of air
strikes into Sinai, has mounted
commando raids across the canal,
and has resumed heavy cross--canal
artillery barrages. Nasir, of
course, feels compelled by do-
mestic and other pressures to
continue making at least gestures
toward liberating the occupied
Arab lands. The situation will
quickly become dangerous, how-
ever, if Israeli casualties be-
gin to rise to the levels of last
spring and summer.
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NASIR SHUFFLES HIS CABINET
The Egyptian cabinet shuffle
announced on 26 April formalizes
the influence of two of Nasir's
close associates while downgrad-
ing another, but will not result
in any significant policy changes.
In a surprise move, Nasir
appointed Egypt's leading news-
paper editorialist, Muhammad Hay-
kal, to the post of minister of
national guidance. Haykal has
long been a confidant of Nasir
and his articles are often thought
to reflect Nasir's thinking. Hay-
kal apparently was brought into
the government to assist in im-
proving Egypt's propaganda effort.
In past editorials, he has criti-
cized the downplaying of Israeli
military successes against Egypt.
Another long-time Nasir as-
sociate, Sami Sharaf, was named
minister of state. Sharaf has
worked in the President's office
since the late 1950s and has been
head of presidential intelligence
for a number of years. Still an-
other Nasir colleague, Amin Hu-
waydi, was replaced as chief of
general intelligence. The former
national guidance minister, Mu-
hammad Faiq, was appointed to the
post of minister of state for for-
eign affairs, where Nasir will
probably use his extensive knowl-
edge of Afro-Asian affairs. Mah-
mud Riad remains as Egypt's for-
eign minister.
Ali Sabri, whose political
fortunes have ebbed and flowed
for a number of years, was ap-
pointed to a new position in
Egypt's only legal political or-
ganization, the Arab Socialist
Union (ASU). Sabri, who has been
a member of the ASU Supreme Execu-
tive Committee for some months,
is now secretary of the newly
created ASU Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee. Over the years, Nasir
has made use of Sabri's good work-
ing relations with the Soviets to
help maintain harmonious relations
between the ASU and the Soviet
Communist Party.
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NATIONAL PARTY'S MAJORITY CUT IN SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTION
South Africa's political parties
are busy analyzing the results of
last week's election, which returned
the National Party to power with a
comfortable but slightly reduced ma-
jority.
The final tally gave 117 seats
to the National Party, 47 to the
United Party, and one to the Progres-
sive Party. This represents a gain
of nine seats for the United Party,
composed mainly of English-speaking
ELECTION RESULTS & SEATS, APRIL 9970
whites, and is a definite psychologi- Z67
cal boost for it. The National Party
received 54.4 percent of the votes
cast, four percent less than in the
1966 election. Much of this loss can
be attributed to votes siphoned off
to the ultraconservative Herstigte
Nasionale Party, formed by Afrikaners
who bolted the National Party last
fall. This party received 3.6 percent
of the total (54,000 votes) but failed
to capture a single seat. Both the
United Party and the Progressives held
about the same percentage as in 1966.
The National Party achieved its
primary campaign objective in crush-
ing the Herstigte Nasionale Party.
However, the Nationalists' concentra-
tion on the Herstigtes, together with
inept government statements in the
last month of the campaign, enabled
the United Party to gain strength.
In their attempt to counter the ultra-
conservative threat, a few cabinet
ministers made excessively rightist
statements that frightened both
English-speaking and Afrikaner mod-
erates who might otherwise have voted
for the Nationalists.
Prime Minister Vorster has re-
viewed the returns with his cabinet,
and has discussed organizational de-
SECRET
5.4 Progressive
r Party
F Herstigte
Nasionale
"Other*
*I Seat to be settled later
FAN SEGMENTS SHOW PROPORTION OF TOTAL VOTE, FIGURES SHOW SEATS WONT
99W 4-70
ficiencies within the party. The
most important topic, however, is
what to do about those cabinet min-
isters who may have cost the party
seats. Rumors of a cabinet shuffle
are circulating again, and such a
maneuver is probable within the
next several months. Vorster, how-
ever, does not seem anxious for an
immediate change.
The Nationalists will now push
hard to get their house in order be-
fore the provincial elections this
fall. The Herstigte leaders have
not yet decided whether they will
enter that election, but, even if
they do, they will present little
threat. The United Party is the
one to beat this time, and National
Party faithful will be working
harder to fend off a second loss.
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CREEPING COLLABORATION AMONG EGYPT, LIBYA, AND SUDAN
Relations among the three
African Arab countries have be-
come closer in recent months, and
some trilateral economic accords
have been signed, but a political
union is not yet in the offing.
Beginning late last year,
probably at the initiative of
Libya and the Sudan, contacts
among the three countries became
more frequent. Since then, there
have been at least three heads-
of-state meetings, and frequent
other bilateral and trilateral
contacts at various levels. Fol-
lowing a trilateral summit in
Libya in December, a communique
announced that the three leaders
will meet every four months to
work toward the common goals of
their peoples. It was also an-
nounced that joint committees
would be set up "in all fields to
establish foundations to guarantee
tripartite cooperation and inte-
gration."
Some of these committees have
apparently been established and
have already discussed ways of
achieving greater cooperation in
agriculture, industry, education,
communications, and transporta-
tion. Little has actually been
accomplished so far, however.
Other evidence of greater
cooperation includes the numer-
ous Egyptian "experts" in various
fields who have been sent to Libya
and the Sudan. Moreover, the
Egyptian military academy has
been moved to the Sudan.
Each of the countries de-
rives some benefit. The show of
unity allows Nasir to rejuvenate
his image as the leading Arab
chief of state and aids in con-
solidating his position in inter-
Arab affairs. He also gains ac-
cess to military facilities in
the territory of his two neigh-
bors. The new regimes in Libya
and the Sudan probably believe
that association with Nasir, the
foremost Arab revolutionary, re-
inforces their own revolutionary
and pan-Arab credentials. The
leaders of the two junior part-
ners probably also hope that the
tripartite front will shore up
their domestic position, partic-
ularly against potential rivals
within the regimes.
Political union, however,
does not yet appear to be a
viable prospect. Nasir probably
retains bitter memories of the
abortive union with Syria, and
realizes the somewhat shaky na-
ture of the regimes in both Libya
and the Sudan. Additionally,
there are strong elements in both
the Sudan and Libya who oppose
closer ties with Egypt. For the
present, therefore, it appears
that the tripartite alliance will
concentrate on attempting to
strengthen economic and military
bonds, with political ties being
restricted to cooperation rather
than union.
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Planning for the traditional May Day celebrations in Latin America aroused
little attention this week, with three notable exceptions.
In Costa Rica, students plan to celebrate by protesting government approval of
a new mining concession to the Aluminum Company of America. Costa Rican
Communists are apparently spurring the students to a repeat of the demonstrations
that caused serious damage in San Jose last week.
The Bolivian Government plans to support and even participate in an
"anti-imperialist" march in La Paz. Members of the cabinet may join the marchers,
and the Ovando regime seems to believe that its support for labor may limit
antigovernment statements and possible violence.
In Panama, rumors have been flying that some dramatic announcement will be
made by the government during May Day celebrations. These rumors run from
increased government control of imports to one "as far out" as the establishment of
a "socialist republic" by General Torrijos, Panama's strong man.
Ecuador is expecting some kind of change in its government after the congress
adjourns on Monday, 4 May. Some sources say that President Velasco will assume
dictatorial powers, while others say that the elderly Velasco might resign in favor of
his nephew, the defense minister. Whichever way Velasco turns, many Ecuadoreans
see a regime either dominated or directed by the military in the not-too-distant
future.
Farther south, the Ongania government in Argentina has weathered a major
challenge to its economic stabilization program. A general strike last week by the
recently reorganized General Confederation of Labor was generally peaceful, and it
appeared that labor had rejected demands by extremists for more militant action.
Now Ongania can move ahead with plans to develop a popular base for his
government, and give labor a greater voice in the governmental process.
In the Caribbean, Cuban armed forces easily wrapped up the last of the
13-member Alpha-66 exile group that infiltrated the island on 17 April. Fidel Castro
has paid considerable attention to the incident, including remarks in his Lenin-day
speech, and may soon hold a public trial for the nine captured exiles. The situation
in Trinidad and Tobago continued tense. (See article in Western Hemisphere
section.)
The pre-election atmosphere in the Dominican Republic remains confused.
Opposition groups are still talking about combining forces for the presidential
election, on 16 May, although at least two candidates seem likely to run against
President Balaguer, who is favored to win re-election. Regardless of the outcome, the
period between the election and inauguration in August could be critical for
Dominican stability.
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CLOSE COLOMBIAN ELECTION TIES NEW PRESIDENT'S HANDS
The closeness of National
Front candidate Misael Pastrana's
victory over former dictator Gen-
eral Rojas Pinilla in the elec-
tions of 19 April probably will
greatly handicap the new govern-
ment. The official results, when
announced, will confirm that his
margin was less than two percent
of the popular vote, by far the
worst performance in the Front's
four presidential campaigns.
The major problem for the
new administration will be the
legislature, which is seriously
factionalized. Many Liberal
and Conservative congressional
slates linked to Pastrana's
name were defeated by General
Rojas' oppositionist National
Popular Alliance (ANAPO). More-
over, there will be groups rep-
resenting the other two defeated
presidential contenders, Beli-
sario Betancur and Evaristo Sour-
dis.
Senate President Julio
Cesar Turbay, a strong Pastrana
supporter, recently stated pri-
vately that he did not believe
that the new Liberal and Con-
servative congressmen loyal to
the National Front could muster
a majority in either House.
Pastrana, therefore, will find
it necessary to devise a means
of gaining sufficient coopera-
tion from the various groups if
he hopes to obtain support for
his governmental programs. In
order to gain ANAPO's collabora-
tion, Pastrana may be forced to
appoint Anapistas to his cabinet.
His only alternative will be to
enlist sufficient support from
Betancur and Sourdis legislators,
who have already demonstrated
their distaste for Pastrana and
the Front. Unless Pastrana finds
that he can come up with a work-
able arrangement, the President
could be forced to rule by decree
under a state of siege and bypass
congress completely.
Both the Liberal and Con-
servative parties, which comprise
the National Front, suffered se-
rious setbacks in the election.
The directorates of both parties
probably will be revamped in or-
der to represent more accurately
the desires of the various fac-
tions of each party. Moreover,
both parties probably will have
to make policy changes to win
mass support if they hope to re-
gain their pre-eminent positions
with the Colombian electorate in
the 1974 elections.
In the meantime, the public
order situation remains generally
calm throughout the nation. The
state of siege, imposed soon af-
ter the election, probably will
be retained until the inaugura-
tion on 7 August. Rojas and his
daughter remain under virtual
house arrest in Bogota.
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CASTRO OUTLINES CUBA'S FOREIGN POLICY
Fidel Castro's lengthy speech
on 22 April was his first major
address on foreign policy since
his endorsement of the Soviet in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia in Au-
gust 1968. Speaking in Havana
at ceremonies honoring the 100th
anniversary of the birth of Lenin,
Castro devoted roughly half of
his remarks to rather effusive
praise of the Communist leader
and to unusually warm expressions
of Cuban-Soviet friendship. Al-
though he touched on a variety of
topics in the latter half of the
speech, he gave no indications of
any significant changes in Cuban
foreign policy.
Castro bluntly addressed the
two key points of contention be-
tween his country and the US:
support of revolutionary move-
ments and Soviet military ties.
He stated flatly that Cuba would
never deny aid to a revolutionary
movement. His statements sug-
gested, however, that Cuba would
be selective in supporting revolu-
tionaries. He intimated that he
had withdrawn support from some
"who had the opportunity to start
and to conduct a revolutionary
war and they fumbled it"--presum-
ably a reference to guerrilla
groups in Venezuela and Colombia.
As for the Soviet Union,
Castro said that Cuba would never
sever its political and military
relations with the USSR. "On the
contrary," he said, "we shall al-
ways be ready to have closer mil-
itary ties with the Soviet Union."
This assertion came at a time
when Armed Forces Minister Raul
Castro was visiting the USSR,
ostensibly repaying Defense Min-
ister Grechko's Cuban visit of
last November, but more likely
negotiating for additional Soviet
military aid.
Castro also devoted attention 25X1
to the military government in
Peru. The actions of the mili-
tary in nationalization and
agrarian reform have impressed
Castro deeply, and he apparently
views the situation in that country
as ripe for exploitation. His
cautious but decidedly friendly
remarks closely followed the
ten-day visit to Lima in early
April of a delegation from Cuba's
national fishing institute. In
an obvious reference to the
Peruvian military leaders Castro
said that a revolutionary did not
have to be a Marxist-Leninist,
even though ignoring Marxism-
Leninism would place the revolu-
tionary at a disadvantage.
Castro's subtle attempt to
woo the Peruvian leadership was
repeated in his remarks about
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Chile and Trinidad and Tobago.
He said that he sincerely appreci-
ated both Prime Minister Eric
Williams' "courageous" condemna-
tion of the economic blockade of
Cuba and the Chilean Government's
action in authorizing the sale
of food products to Cuba. He
opened the door to formal rela-
tions with Chile by saying that
the Chilean Foreign Ministry had
"stated its position against the
blockade in a manner which was
not unbecoming to our country."
He emphatically ruled out, how-
ever, Cuba's return to the OAS
and reiterated his long-standing
prerequisites for any country de-
siring to re-establish bilateral
diplomatic relations with Cuba:
reject the OAS sanctions against
Cuba, refuse to participate in
the economic blockade and other
aggressions against Cuba, impose
no preconditions for relations,
and cast off "US domination" by
acting with independence and sov-
ereignty.
In discussing the clandestine
landing carried out in eastern
Cuba on 17 April by 13 armed
exiles, Castro evaluated the in-
cident as an insignificant pin-
prick. He complained, however,
that during an earlier aborted
infiltration attempt, the same
exiles had received assistance
from the US naval base at Guan-
tanamo Bay--"one more rude viola-
tion of the statutes of that ar-
bitrary base." Although he prob-
ably realizes that the US was not
involved in the landing, his com-
ment is interesting in that he
has never recognized the validity
of the agreements establishing
the right of the US to occupy the
base and thus denies the legality
of its statutes. He seemed more
alarmed by press reports of the
open recruiting of an "army" of
exiles in various cities of the
US and may have genuine doubts
about US participation, or at
least acquiescence, in this ac-
tivity.
The persistent problem of
hijacking aroused no sympathy at
all in Castro. He repeated his
contention that the "imperialists"
had originally created the problem.
He reminded his listeners that
to solve the problem Cuba had en-
acted an anti-hijacking law and
that if other countries "want to
resolve the matter of the planes,
they must abide by the letter of
the law, article by article, with-
out removing a single comma from
our law." This law would require
full reciprocity, including the
return of refugees who steal boats
to escape to the US.
The speech ends Castro's
self-imposed silence on matters
of foreign policy. Foreign af-
fairs have received only minor
attention in his public state-
ments for some time now primarily
because of his total preoccupation
with the sugar harvest. With the
1970 harvest rapidly drawing to
a close, he may feel more inclined
to direct his attention to inter-
national matters.
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TRINIDAD REVOLT STILL SIMMERING
The government has been able
to halt the public disorders that
broke out when a portion of the
army regiment mutinied on 21 Ap-
ril, but it has yet to bring the
rebellious soldiers under firm
control.
The government established
a tenuous hold over the rebels'
stronghold by appointing a new
regimental commander acceptable
to the leaders of the revolt.
The base, about 12 miles from
the capital, has remained sur-
rounded by loyal troops. The
rebels, however, still have most
of their weapons and remain in
control of the military arsenal.
The new commander, Colonel Ser-
rette, convinced the rebels to
release all their hostages and
to give up a small portion of
their arms, but they apparently
feared that if they surrendered
all of their weapons, the govern-
ment troops would attack them.
A government committee of
inquiry investigating rebel com-
plaints about conditions in the
regiment was due to report this
week. Its recommendations could
lead to a negotiated settlement.
The administration, meanwhile, is
continuing its efforts get more
armament for the loyal forces and
improve its position. The govern-
ment's lack of confidence in its
ability to resolve the issue, how-
ever, must be apparent to the dis-
sidents, and as long as they re-
tain their arms the/potential for
further difficulty exists. The
government is concerned that some
of the mutineers will leave the
base and join black power agita-
tors in the cities.
The events in Trinidad have
stirred concern and intense in-
terest throughout the Caribbean,
but they did not spark any re-
lated violence.
Despite Prime Minister Wil-
liams' early calls for assistance,
other Caribbean nations refused
to offer help for fear of identi-
fying themselves with an unpopu-
lar cause and possibly stirring
protests at home. Both Guyana 25X1
and Jamaica received specific
requests for aid but have thus
far refused.
In public, Vene-
zuelan officials were careful
stress that all actions would
be dictated by the country's
"traditional olic of noninter-
vention
Although the majority of
Caribbean leaders were reluctant
to intervene in the disorders,
their concern over the anarchical
threat posed by black power has
undoubtedly increased. Several
government leaders have expressed
reluctance to give in to ex-
tremists, but it is becoming in-
creasingly obvious that some ad-
ministrations may feel compelled
to accommodate radical demands.
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HAITIAN REBELLION QUICKLY SNUFFED
The short-lived mutiny by
the coast guard on 24-25 April
failed to attract the army sup--
port necessary for success. Pres-
ident Duvalier has utilized the
rebellion as a propaganda forum
to emphasize his strong position
and is continuing to arrest those
suspected of disloyalty.
Coast Guard commandant Col-
onel Octove Cayard, with approxi-
mately a third of his 325-man
force, mutinied last Friday and
used the unit's three cutters to
shell the national palace. The
two-day, sporadic bombardment ap-
parently did little damage, how-
ever, as the shells had limited
explosive power. The government
claimed two were killed and 30
wounded during the attacks.
None of the critical ground
units in Port-au-Prince joined
the insurrection. Those units,
of some 2,000 men, comprise the
only effective fighting force in
the country. Their loyalty, or
lethargy, condemned Cayard's at-
tempt to futility, despite the
inability of the air force's lone
P-51 to drive off the hostile
ships or silence their fire.
the hopelessness of his position,
fled to the US base at Guantanamo,
Cuba, on 25 April and requested
political asylum. His three ships
were being conducted to the US
naval station at Roosevelt Roads,
Puerto Rico.
Duvalier's henchmen had been
rounding up alleged coup plotters
since early April and Colonel
Cayard undoubtedly believed he
was under suspicion and might be
arrested soon. Arrests on 20 and
21 April probably prompted him to
move; his lack of any ground sup-
port whatsoever tends to confirm
that it was his desperation,
rather than any well-defined plot,
that led to the mutiny.
Since the shelling, there
have been reports of further ar-
rests and executions. An offi-
cial decree this week announced
that seven legislators had "for-
feited" their offices. In view
of the armed forces' loyalty,
wholesale military arrests seem
unlikely, although Duvalier may
use the coup attempt as an excuse
for a further purge of his ci-
vilian entourage.
Apparently as a precaution-
ary measure, Duvalier had troops
in the capital reinforced by
truckloads of civil militia from
the countryside. Although Duval-
ier initially reacted to the re-
bellion with frantic calls for US
assistance, the capital itself
remained calm. Cayard, realizing
/ The recent abortive re
bellion makes it unlikely that any
of the present military leaders
would be willing to move against
the regime.
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