WEEKLY SUMMARY
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79-00927A008200040001-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
46
Document Creation Date:
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 9, 2008
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 25, 1970
Content Type:
SUMMARY
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP79-00927A008200040001-9.pdf | 2.57 MB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2008/05/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A008200040001-9
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review
completed
WEEKLY SUMMARY
RETURN TO A'AGlitV[S & Rtt
IIII}r[GIA1[!Y AFTER US
Secret
43
25 September 1970
No. 0389/70
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(Information as of noon 24 September 1970)
Page
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Jordan-Fedayeen: The Conflict Widens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
India: Prime Minister Gandhi Wins Again . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Pakistan: Election Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
FAR EAST
Laos: Before the Rain Stops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Cambodia: Kompong Thom or Bust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Vietnam: Tired Tunes in Paris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Japan-Taiwan: Feuding over Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Communist China: Army Men Don Party Hats . . . . . . . . . . 12
Malaysia: The Leader Retires
Tito Proposes Collective Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Italy: Colombo Seeking Viable Program on Social Reforms . . . . . 16
International Community Ponders Hijackings . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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EUROPE (continued)
Sweden: Social Democrats Narrowly Survive Elections , . . , ,
Soviets Conclude Oceanographic Study Near Cape Verde . . , ~ q
European Communities Resume Talks with British 19
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Bolivia: Student Violence
Brazil: Gubernatorial Election;
Argentina: Developments on the Labor Scene 7')
Problems for US Companies in Peru . . ,
Chile: Allende Moves Forward 24
Guyana: Problems with Agricultural Labor . . .
2
Another Anti-Castro Landing Attempt Foiled . . . . .
CUBA: A NEW ERA BEGINS
(Published separately as Special Report No. 0389/70A)
NOTES: Thailand; Canada-France-tJSSR: IAEA; Mexico:
Uru
ua
g
y
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Paqe ii WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Sen 70
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MIDDLE EAST -AFRICA
Jordan- Fedayeen: The Conflict Widens
The clash took a new turn when, after a
shallow thrust on Friday, a Syrian armored
brigade crossed the border in force early Sun-
day. Jordanian armor drove the unit back after
knocking out 30 Syrian tanks. Some 15 hours
later, however, Syrian forces made a second push
into Jordan, moving as far as Irbid in the west and
Hawara to the south. According to press ac-
counts, the Syrians wore Palestine Liberation
Army (PLA) uniforms and claimed to be a unit of
this regular force of the fedayeen movement.
Damascus steadfastly denied that any interven-
tion had occurred.
Throughout the week, most of Amman re-
mained under army control. Heavy fighting raged
in and near refugee camps and residential areas,
however, as army tanks shelled sniper positions.
Field Marshal Majali, military governor of the
city, instituted a "shoot-to-kill" curfew that has
remained in effect except for occasional early-
morning breaks. All attempts to establish a cease-
fire have failed.
The Syrian incursion appears initially to
have panicked the palace in Amman, already
deeply concerned by the continuing fedayeen re-
sistance and the ambiguous threat of the large
Iraqi force in Jordan. The Jordanian tank force
was able to hold in an arc below Ramtha, how-
ever, aided by timely strikes from the Jordanian
Air Force and by constant pounding from artil-
lery on the heights around Irbid. The Iraqi tanks
continued to patrol north and west of Mafraq,
where their forces had concentrated, but did not
join battle on either side. Although Baghdad has
assured the Palestinians of support, it has so far
limited this to the supply of arms to individuals
and perhaps the dispatch of elements of the Iraqi
contingent of the PLA.
In an effort to calm the heightened tensions,
the Tunisians hastily called for an emergency
Arab summit conference, but this never got off
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the ground and was postponed indefinitely on
Tuesday. The Arab League sent a four-man dele-
gation-led by Sudanese President Numayri, with
representatives from Kuwait, Tunisia, and
Egypt-to Amman Tuesday evening to meet with
King Husayn. The team was unable to contact
fedayeen leader Yasir Arafat
Israel's stance was one of watchful prepared-
ness during the week. Israeli officials began get-
ting ready for a possible military intervention of
their own as developments in Jordan raised the
possibility of new dangers to Jewish settlements
in the Beit Shean Valley. Had the Arabs and guer-
rillas begun to dismember Jordan, Israel ap-
parently was ready to pick up some additional
insurance for itself-the Gilead Heights. The im-
minence of Israeli intervention subsided Wednes-
day morning, however, after the Syrian tanks
withdrew.
As the week ended, the Jordan Arab Army
in Amman sought to exterminate the last-ditch
resistance of the fedayeen with point-blank
cannon fire. In the north, remnants of three
Syrian armored brigades huddled astride the bor-
der, facing a hastily set up but still effective
screen of Jordanian tanks, artillery, and aircraft.
The guerrilla stronghold of Irbid was beleaguered,
but the fedayeen continued to resist stubbornly
elsewhere in the so-called "liberated area" north
of Amman, holding or contesting most of the
major towns. In the south, Bedouin tribesmen,
their faces blackened in the traditional sign of no
quarter, joined with army units to eradicate
fedayeen enclaves in the scattered villages along
the Dead Sea.
From the outset, Moscow's primary concern
over Jordan has been the possibility of US or
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Sep 70
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Syrran armored thrust,
2L'21 Sept
? Dar'a
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Israeli intervention. Following the Syrian in-
vasion, Soviet diplomats in Washington and else-
where repeatedly probed for information on
Western intentions and warned of the "serious
consequences" of any intervention. Moscow also
reportedly approached Damascus to urge restraint
and an end to the fighting, a demarche probably
prompted by Soviet concern that Syrian involve-
ment had substantially increased the chance of
"outside interference." The approach was un-
doubtedly in low key, however, and was made
with the recognition that such efforts under
similar circumstances in the past had proved
fruitless.
As the fighting in Jordan went on, and the
US and Israel made contingency military prepara-
tions, Soviet propaganda warned with increasing
sharpness against Western intervention. These
preparations were taken up by Soviet President
Podgorny in a speech on Wednesday, lending
added weight to Soviet public criticism. At the
same time, Moscow linked events in Jordan with
larger issues in the Middle East, charging they
were part of "a wide imperialist conspiracy" in-
stigated by the Israelis and intended to upset a
peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict.
The fedayeen movement is likely to become
even more radicalized in the wake of its latest
confrontation with the Jordanian Government.
Throughout late August, Yasir Arafat and his
Palestine Liberation Organization/Fatah complex
had been attempting to brake the runaway activi-
ties of extremist fedayeen groups such as the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP) and the Popular Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), which had been
inciting new troubles for King Husayn. As a result
of Arafat's failure to keep the lid on, however,
Fatah's continued leadership of the fedayeen
movement now faces its strongest challenge.
The extremists were probably eager to pro-
voke a clash with King Husayn, both to isolate
Fatah and to gain the sympathy of Arab public
opinion. Fatah's pre-eminence in the fedayeen
movement was gained largely as a result of
Arafat's ability to establish and maintain a politi-
cal relationship with the King that allowed the
fedayeen to co-exist with the government. Even
though Fatah has borne the brunt of the fighting
in most past clashes with the government, Arafat
had still been able to re-establish this relationship.
By early September, however, the PFLP and
PDFLP were finally able to bring conditions in
Amman near to chaos, forcing King Husayn to
take repressive measures.
The recent fighting has been so bitter and
apparently so bloody that it will be very difficult,
if not impossible, to reach another understanding.
Fatah, which apparently is seriously decimated,
now becomes merely another Palestine guerrilla
organization. Although it still has the largest
membership, Fatah's loss of its unique position
leaves it little room for future maneuvering. If ii
accepts support from another Arab state, it is
likely to lose its apolitical image and also stands a
good chance of becoming-or being regarded as-a
puppet. If it chooses to go underground, it not
only loses its freedom of operation but is likely to
see its ranks further depleted. A rapprochement
with the King, and there is evidence that Husayn
is seeking to re-establish such ties, would brand
Fatah as a traitor to the Palestinian cause, further
diminishing its influence.
In the future, therefore, it seems likely that
Arafat and Fatah will adopt a more radical politi-
cal program in order to compete with Habbash's
PFLP and Hawatrnah's PDFLP. Fatah also has an
opportunity to shift its activities to Lebanon,
where the commandos are not likely to be chal-
lenged seriously by a government that has less
strength and resolve than the Hashemite regime of
Jordan.
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SFC;RET
ndia: Prime Minister Gandhi Wins _4 gain
The success of Prime Minister Gandhi's Rul-
ing Congress Party in local elections in the state
of Kerala on 1.7 SSentember his strengthened' her
party's position throughout the country. In the
decion, Mrs. Gandhi soundly defeated the
)rganization Congress Party, a -or archenemy since
he unified Congress organization split in 1%9
he also nutmaneuvered the Communist Party of
ndia/Marxist (CPPVII, heretofore the most pnwer-
ul party in the slate and the more radical of
i?dia's two major Communist ?)arties.
Vlrs. Gandhi is attempting to establish the
'tulinq Congress as the country's host choice he-
1vveen conservative and Hindu communal forces
ui tb:? one hand, and extremist and radical leftist
cry'
Pnqu ,
forces on the ocher. In Kerala, she negotiated an
"electoral agreement" with the pro-Moscow Com-
munist Party of India (CPi) but stopped short of
a formal alliance. With F.aliriiiig Congress support,
the CPI-led front now has a slim majority among
the 133 elected members of the state legislature.
Although Mrs. Gandhi's ;arty holds the largest
single bloc of seats, she may well prefer to have
the CPI lead the state's new coalition government
while her Congress party o~iiy supports it.
he P'irne minister's opponents will, in any
event, attack her de facto "alliance" with the
Communists. Moreover, since the Muslim League,
essentially a communal party, was part of the
CPI-lid front, her opponents will also try to
cownoorade her secular c-edentials. A political
piagrr atist, Mrs. Gandhi is not averse to support-
ing c. accepting assistance from anyone who
supports her party's program, but she appears
reluct