WEEKLY SUMMARY

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79-00927A008200040001-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
46
Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 9, 2008
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 25, 1970
Content Type: 
SUMMARY
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79-00927A008200040001-9.pdf2.57 MB
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Approved For Release 2008/05/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A008200040001-9 Secret DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE State Dept. review completed WEEKLY SUMMARY RETURN TO A'AGlitV[S & Rtt IIII}r[GIA1[!Y AFTER US Secret 43 25 September 1970 No. 0389/70 Approved For Release 2008/05/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A008200040001-9 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/05/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08200040001-9 Approved For Release 2008/05/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08200040001-9 Approved For Release 2008/05/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A008200040001-9 SECRET (Information as of noon 24 September 1970) Page MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA Jordan-Fedayeen: The Conflict Widens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 India: Prime Minister Gandhi Wins Again . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Pakistan: Election Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 FAR EAST Laos: Before the Rain Stops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Cambodia: Kompong Thom or Bust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Vietnam: Tired Tunes in Paris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Japan-Taiwan: Feuding over Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Communist China: Army Men Don Party Hats . . . . . . . . . . 12 Malaysia: The Leader Retires Tito Proposes Collective Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Italy: Colombo Seeking Viable Program on Social Reforms . . . . . 16 International Community Ponders Hijackings . . . . . . . . . . . 17 SECRET Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Sep 70 Approved For Release 2008/05/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A008200040001-9 Approved For Release 2008/05/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08200040001-9 SECRET EUROPE (continued) Sweden: Social Democrats Narrowly Survive Elections , . . , , Soviets Conclude Oceanographic Study Near Cape Verde . . , ~ q European Communities Resume Talks with British 19 WESTERN HEMISPHERE Bolivia: Student Violence Brazil: Gubernatorial Election; Argentina: Developments on the Labor Scene 7') Problems for US Companies in Peru . . , Chile: Allende Moves Forward 24 Guyana: Problems with Agricultural Labor . . . 2 Another Anti-Castro Landing Attempt Foiled . . . . . CUBA: A NEW ERA BEGINS (Published separately as Special Report No. 0389/70A) NOTES: Thailand; Canada-France-tJSSR: IAEA; Mexico: Uru ua g y SECRET Paqe ii WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Sen 70 Approved For Release 2008/05/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08200040001-9 SECRET MIDDLE EAST -AFRICA Jordan- Fedayeen: The Conflict Widens The clash took a new turn when, after a shallow thrust on Friday, a Syrian armored brigade crossed the border in force early Sun- day. Jordanian armor drove the unit back after knocking out 30 Syrian tanks. Some 15 hours later, however, Syrian forces made a second push into Jordan, moving as far as Irbid in the west and Hawara to the south. According to press ac- counts, the Syrians wore Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) uniforms and claimed to be a unit of this regular force of the fedayeen movement. Damascus steadfastly denied that any interven- tion had occurred. Throughout the week, most of Amman re- mained under army control. Heavy fighting raged in and near refugee camps and residential areas, however, as army tanks shelled sniper positions. Field Marshal Majali, military governor of the city, instituted a "shoot-to-kill" curfew that has remained in effect except for occasional early- morning breaks. All attempts to establish a cease- fire have failed. The Syrian incursion appears initially to have panicked the palace in Amman, already deeply concerned by the continuing fedayeen re- sistance and the ambiguous threat of the large Iraqi force in Jordan. The Jordanian tank force was able to hold in an arc below Ramtha, how- ever, aided by timely strikes from the Jordanian Air Force and by constant pounding from artil- lery on the heights around Irbid. The Iraqi tanks continued to patrol north and west of Mafraq, where their forces had concentrated, but did not join battle on either side. Although Baghdad has assured the Palestinians of support, it has so far limited this to the supply of arms to individuals and perhaps the dispatch of elements of the Iraqi contingent of the PLA. In an effort to calm the heightened tensions, the Tunisians hastily called for an emergency Arab summit conference, but this never got off Page 1 Approved For Release 2008/05/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08200040001-9 the ground and was postponed indefinitely on Tuesday. The Arab League sent a four-man dele- gation-led by Sudanese President Numayri, with representatives from Kuwait, Tunisia, and Egypt-to Amman Tuesday evening to meet with King Husayn. The team was unable to contact fedayeen leader Yasir Arafat Israel's stance was one of watchful prepared- ness during the week. Israeli officials began get- ting ready for a possible military intervention of their own as developments in Jordan raised the possibility of new dangers to Jewish settlements in the Beit Shean Valley. Had the Arabs and guer- rillas begun to dismember Jordan, Israel ap- parently was ready to pick up some additional insurance for itself-the Gilead Heights. The im- minence of Israeli intervention subsided Wednes- day morning, however, after the Syrian tanks withdrew. As the week ended, the Jordan Arab Army in Amman sought to exterminate the last-ditch resistance of the fedayeen with point-blank cannon fire. In the north, remnants of three Syrian armored brigades huddled astride the bor- der, facing a hastily set up but still effective screen of Jordanian tanks, artillery, and aircraft. The guerrilla stronghold of Irbid was beleaguered, but the fedayeen continued to resist stubbornly elsewhere in the so-called "liberated area" north of Amman, holding or contesting most of the major towns. In the south, Bedouin tribesmen, their faces blackened in the traditional sign of no quarter, joined with army units to eradicate fedayeen enclaves in the scattered villages along the Dead Sea. From the outset, Moscow's primary concern over Jordan has been the possibility of US or SECRET WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Sep 70 Approved For Release 2008/05/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08200040001-9 Approved For Release 2008/05/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08200040001-9 SECRET SECRET Syrran armored thrust, 2L'21 Sept ? Dar'a Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Sep 70 Approved For Release 2008/05/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08200040001-9 Approved For Release 2008/05/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A008200040001-9 SECRET Israeli intervention. Following the Syrian in- vasion, Soviet diplomats in Washington and else- where repeatedly probed for information on Western intentions and warned of the "serious consequences" of any intervention. Moscow also reportedly approached Damascus to urge restraint and an end to the fighting, a demarche probably prompted by Soviet concern that Syrian involve- ment had substantially increased the chance of "outside interference." The approach was un- doubtedly in low key, however, and was made with the recognition that such efforts under similar circumstances in the past had proved fruitless. As the fighting in Jordan went on, and the US and Israel made contingency military prepara- tions, Soviet propaganda warned with increasing sharpness against Western intervention. These preparations were taken up by Soviet President Podgorny in a speech on Wednesday, lending added weight to Soviet public criticism. At the same time, Moscow linked events in Jordan with larger issues in the Middle East, charging they were part of "a wide imperialist conspiracy" in- stigated by the Israelis and intended to upset a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict. The fedayeen movement is likely to become even more radicalized in the wake of its latest confrontation with the Jordanian Government. Throughout late August, Yasir Arafat and his Palestine Liberation Organization/Fatah complex had been attempting to brake the runaway activi- ties of extremist fedayeen groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), which had been inciting new troubles for King Husayn. As a result of Arafat's failure to keep the lid on, however, Fatah's continued leadership of the fedayeen movement now faces its strongest challenge. The extremists were probably eager to pro- voke a clash with King Husayn, both to isolate Fatah and to gain the sympathy of Arab public opinion. Fatah's pre-eminence in the fedayeen movement was gained largely as a result of Arafat's ability to establish and maintain a politi- cal relationship with the King that allowed the fedayeen to co-exist with the government. Even though Fatah has borne the brunt of the fighting in most past clashes with the government, Arafat had still been able to re-establish this relationship. By early September, however, the PFLP and PDFLP were finally able to bring conditions in Amman near to chaos, forcing King Husayn to take repressive measures. The recent fighting has been so bitter and apparently so bloody that it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to reach another understanding. Fatah, which apparently is seriously decimated, now becomes merely another Palestine guerrilla organization. Although it still has the largest membership, Fatah's loss of its unique position leaves it little room for future maneuvering. If ii accepts support from another Arab state, it is likely to lose its apolitical image and also stands a good chance of becoming-or being regarded as-a puppet. If it chooses to go underground, it not only loses its freedom of operation but is likely to see its ranks further depleted. A rapprochement with the King, and there is evidence that Husayn is seeking to re-establish such ties, would brand Fatah as a traitor to the Palestinian cause, further diminishing its influence. In the future, therefore, it seems likely that Arafat and Fatah will adopt a more radical politi- cal program in order to compete with Habbash's PFLP and Hawatrnah's PDFLP. Fatah also has an opportunity to shift its activities to Lebanon, where the commandos are not likely to be chal- lenged seriously by a government that has less strength and resolve than the Hashemite regime of Jordan. SECRET Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Sep 70 Approved For Release 2008/05/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A008200040001-9 Approved For Release 2008/05/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08200040001-9 SFC;RET ndia: Prime Minister Gandhi Wins _4 gain The success of Prime Minister Gandhi's Rul- ing Congress Party in local elections in the state of Kerala on 1.7 SSentember his strengthened' her party's position throughout the country. In the decion, Mrs. Gandhi soundly defeated the )rganization Congress Party, a -or archenemy since he unified Congress organization split in 1%9 he also nutmaneuvered the Communist Party of ndia/Marxist (CPPVII, heretofore the most pnwer- ul party in the slate and the more radical of i?dia's two major Communist ?)arties. Vlrs. Gandhi is attempting to establish the 'tulinq Congress as the country's host choice he- 1vveen conservative and Hindu communal forces ui tb:? one hand, and extremist and radical leftist cry' Pnqu , forces on the ocher. In Kerala, she negotiated an "electoral agreement" with the pro-Moscow Com- munist Party of India (CPi) but stopped short of a formal alliance. With F.aliriiiig Congress support, the CPI-led front now has a slim majority among the 133 elected members of the state legislature. Although Mrs. Gandhi's ;arty holds the largest single bloc of seats, she may well prefer to have the CPI lead the state's new coalition government while her Congress party o~iiy supports it. he P'irne minister's opponents will, in any event, attack her de facto "alliance" with the Communists. Moreover, since the Muslim League, essentially a communal party, was part of the CPI-lid front, her opponents will also try to cownoorade her secular c-edentials. A political piagrr atist, Mrs. Gandhi is not averse to support- ing c. accepting assistance from anyone who supports her party's program, but she appears reluct