WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008300030001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 30, 1970
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept.
review
completed
Secret
43
30 October 1970
No. 0394/70
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(Information as of noon EST, 29 October 1970)
Page
FAR EAST
Vietnam: Fueling the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
North Vietnam's Economy Not Restored . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Cambodia: Marking Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Soviet Industrial Growth Dips in Third Quarter . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Moscow Grasps Opportunities in Somalia and the Sudan . . . . . . . 7
East Germany: Pankow Woos the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Yugoslavia Looks Westward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
France and Algeria: Difficult Negotiations Ahead . . . . . . . . . 10
European Community Considers Steps Toward Monetary Union . . . 11
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Jordan: Husayn Appoints Tough Premier . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Libya: RCC Continues to Confound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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MIDDLE EAST -AFRICA (CONTINUED)
Bickering and Dissension Grow in Southern Yemen . . . . . . . . 14
Congo (Kinshasa): First National Elections Since 1965 . . . . . . . 15
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Chile Changes Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Bolivia: Guerrillas Plan to Persevere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Brazil: More on Church-State Friction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Venezuela: Government Clamps Down on University . . . . . . . 19
Bahamas: Pindling's Political Troubles Worsen . . . . . . . . . . 20
Colombia: Opposition Moves Left . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
NOTES: Laos: DInternational Aviation; ILO; UN - Middle East;
Syria-tray; Tanzania - Zambia - Communist China; Ecuador
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A%we SEUIZE"l' law
FAR EAST
Vietnam: Fueling the War
Communist troops in South Vietnam will
encounter a more vigorous foe during the dry
season. South Vietnam's military and pacification
forces appear to be recovering from their general
loss of momentum this summer as they set out on
new offensive operations on several fronts. This
usually happens about this time of year, when the
allies move to pre-empt Communist plans for a
seasonal campaign.
In the northern provinces, where the Viet
Cong are still strong in some rural areas, the
South Vietnamese have mounted an ambitious
new campaign to disrupt enemy base areas and
roll back Viet Cong cadre and supporters. Rein-
forcements have been sent into Binh Dinh Prov-
ince along the central coast to help blunt a sus-
tained surge of Communist terrorism. South Viet-
namese regular units from Military Region 3
around Saigon are pushing across the Cambodian
border in greater strength to prevent any new
Communist buildup. In the Mekong Delta, drives
into .long-time Viet Cong strongholds are continu-
ing, although action has generally been light.
Government forces have been most success-
ful so far in the northern provinces, where they
are making extensive use of the once-scorned re-
gional and popular forces as mobile units. This
has made it possible to bring considerable
strength to bear even in districts from which
many US troops have been withdrawn. The South
Vietnamese reportedly are also effectively using
defectors to help find base areas and Communist
cadre. Last week the South Vietnamese reported
killing several hundred Communists in sweeps
through base areas in Quang Tin and Quang Nam
Provinces; similar drives are planned for the other
northern provinces in coming weeks.
Communist efforts to reverse continuing
government pacification gains appear unimpres-
sive. Although the momentum of pacification has
slowed appreciably from the spectacular advances
made in 1969 and setbacks have occurred in some
areas, enemy activity is having little impact on the
security situation in most of the country. More-
over, the Communists' attempts to rebuild their
apparatus seem to be running into problems as
the population base easily available for recruit-
ment shrinks. Nonetheless, persistent enemy ef-
forts have helped keep government casualties high
and many South Vietnamese uncommitted.
Several recent sources have provided good
general insights into the current picture. Accord-
ing to a prisoner from Long An Province adjacent
to Saigon, for example, the massive flow of gov-
ernment personnel into the province in the past
two years has severely restricted enemy recruiting
efforts. Because the Communists lost much of
their military strength in early 1968 and govern-
ment forces gradually moved into the country-
side, the Communist apparatus has been unable to
tap the local populace for manpower the way it
had in the past.
The Communists, working hard to halt the
erosion of their influence and control, pose a
direct threat to many people and an indirect one
to many more. In a recent survey of rural areas,
more than half of the respondents said that small
to medium-sized Viet Cong units have the ability
to enter their hamlets at night. Even though pe-
riods of heavy Communist terrorism and agita-
tion, such as occurred in several provinces during
the spring and summer, have intimidated the pop-
ulace, the enemy has not sustained the pressure
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5EUKL"1`
and subsequently has lost ground in the face of
more aggressive government countermeasures.
The militant An Quang Buddhists remain
divided over antigovernment political tactics. At a
conference in Japan earlier this month Thich
Thien Minh, the leading activist, issued a strongly
worded peace proposal calling for an in-place
cease-fire next January and the immediate ap-
pointment of a United Nations supervisory com-
mission. Minh demanded that Saigon release all
polit cal prisoners and appealed to the US to let
the Vietnamese people replace the present "dic-
tatorial, corrupt, and repressive regime" through
elect ons.
Minh apparertly acted without the approval
of tha An Quang leadership, which reportedly had
authorized a more moderate statement. Buddhist
LAO3: When Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma
returned from his. two-month trip abroad this
week he was greeted by a renewed Communist
bid to get the long-stalled peace talks under way.
In a -telegram of 2.3 October to Souvanna's repre-
sentative for the discussions, the chief Pathet Lao
negotiator called for the "earliest possible meet-
ing" and noted that special envoy Souk Vongsak
would arrive in Vientiane shortly to "prepare
concrete question." for the talks. The message
did not depart from the standard Communist line
that the dialogue would be between representa-
officials have professed ignorance of Minh's pro-
posal and have refused to comment on it. The
government has been only mildly critical of
Minh's statement, but some Buddhist leaders
probably fear it will yet spark a government
crackdown on their political activity.
Minh may hope to kick off a new peace
campaign, but his long-time rival, Thich Tri
Quang, probably will continue to use his influ-
ence to temper the An Quang's antigovernment
activities.
rr Quang went out of his way to remove doubts
that he and his followers are sympathetic toward
the Communists by emphasizing his aversion to a
coalition government even if the alternative is a 25X1
longer war. Nevertheless, Tri Quang remains pes-
simistic about the future and still believes that the
Communists will eventually prevail.
fives of the "two princes," but it is possible that
the Pathet Lao, as well as the government, may be
willing to evade the impasse on this issue in the
near future. Government leaders were expressing
optimism this week that substantive negotiations
might begin at Khang Khay as early as December
and even lead to some sort of settlement within
six months. Military activity was unusually low
throughout the country in recent days, although
government forces are anticipating a counterat-
tack along the southwestern edge of the Plaine
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SLU1tr,1
North Vietnam's Economy Not Restored
The DRV economy has not yet recovered its
previous levels of output in the two years since
the bombing stopped. Government leaders con-
tinue to blame inferior management and poor
labor utilization, but the war effort undeniably
has restricted economic recovery. Although few
pressures or incentives have been brought to bear,
the entire leadership from Le Duan on down has
appealed time and time again for harder work and
better management. The response apparently has
been disappointing.
Even with the help of new, higher yielding
strains, rice output this year will still fall short of
the 4.5-million tons produced in 1965. Imports of
foodstuffs, required to offset reduced domestic
output, are now declining after hitting a peak of
almost 800,000 tons in 1968. Nevertheless, siz-
able quantities will undoubtedly be needed at
least through 1971. During the first nine months
of this year North Vietnam imported about
510,000 tons of foodstuffs as compared with
610,000 tons for the same period of 1969.
In industry the recovery is even slower. Most
of the small number of relatively modern plants
that formed the core of North Vietnam's indus-
trial sector were high-priority targets of the
bombing program and have only been partially
repaired or returned from dispersed locations in
the countryside. Power plants in the main power
network have received the most attention. In
1967 capacity was reduced to only 20 percent of
the pre-bombing level. At present about two
thirds of the pre-bombing capacity is operating.
The Haiphong cement plant, which was com-
pletely out of operation in 1967, has now been
restored to two thirds of its 1965 capacity.
Apatite exports, almost completely suspended
from 1967 through 1969, have been resumed,
although at greatly reduced levels. Coal output
remains below pre-bombing levels. Construction
has been started again at two large-scale projects,
the Soviet-aided Thac Ba Hydroelectric Power
plant and the Chinese-aided Thai Nguyen Iron
and Steel Works.
In the past two years the North Vietnamese
economic planners have particularly emphasized
the production of industrial crops and the con-
struction of small-scale, light industrial facilities
to expand the output of consumer goods, both
for the home market and for export. Such a
course involved small capital outlays and a short
planning period to coincide with the year-to-year
planning that had been instituted after 1967. As
long as the war is conducted at current levels and
other Communist countries continue to offset
lost domestic production, initiation of an all-out
economic recovery program will probably be
postponed.
Cambodia: Marking Time
Military activity continues at a slow pace as
the Communists conserve their resources ap-
parently in preparation for increased activity dur-
ing the coming dry season. Enemy harassing fire
and small-scale probes against scattered govern-
ment positions occur daily, but there have been
no significant Communist ground assaults since
late August. The intensity of enemy pressure
against major population centers in recent weeks
has dropped markedly, and there has also been a
discernible decline in Communist terrorist actions
throughout the countryside.
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The retarded pace of the war during the late
summer and ear y fall was not unexpected, in
view of several problems confronting the Commu-
nists. The monscon rains, for example, make it
difficult for them to pre-position supplies and
move troops overland through flooded rural areas.
They are operating, moreover, in an unfamiliar
and largely hostile environment, without the sup-
port of any long-established local organizations.
And, had they adopted economical tactics, they
faced additional heavy casualties from a combina-
tion of Cambodian tenacity and allied air power.
/ although
the Communists' short-term priorities may have
shifted from South Vietnam to Cambodia, they
do not foresee an early decision there.
it would be "easy" to topple the Lon Nol govern-
ment militarily, the Cambodian Communist
movement is not strong enough to form an effec-
tive or lasting government. Additional Vietnamese
Communist assets will be moved from South Viet-
nam to Cambodia, therefore, in order to help the
Cambodians organize existing liberated areas.
In any event, the enemys
' capability
to step up the fighting should improve shortly.
With better weather, supplies should begin to
pour through the Lao infiltration complex into
Cambodia. In addition, fresh North Vietnamese
units and replacements-some probably already
ticketed for action in the Cambodian theater-are
now making their way south, and cross-country
movement within Cambodia should become much
easier./
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 Oct 70
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Soviet Industrial Growth Dips in Third Quarter
The growth of civilian industrial production
in the USSR slipped in the third quarter of 1970
from the relatively good performance posted dur-
ing the first six months. Output during July-
September is estimated to have risen by only
about 5Y percent over the same portion of 1969
in contrast with the 7Y2-percent increase achieved
at midyear. Most of the slowdown is attributable
to rrarked declines in the rates of growth of
civilian machinery and consumer goods.
~ivilian machinery continues to be the in-
dustr al sector wit-i the highest growth, but the
rate of increase was two percentage points less
than at midyear. The official Soviet index of
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machinery, which includes defense-related pro-
duction, however, showed the same relatively
high rate of growth as in the six-month report,
suggesting that there may have been a further
boost in the output of military-space hardware.
Industrial support for the agricultural sector
was mixed. Increases in the production of tractors
and agricultural machinery fell below the modest
rates registered earlier, but mineral fertilizer out-
put rose by 24 percent in the third quarter over
the comparable period of 1969. If this growth is
maintained in the next two quarters, it could have
a favorable effect on agricultural production in
the 1971 crop year.
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The outlook for the Soviet consumer during
the remainder of 1970 is less favorable than indi-
cated in earlier production reports from Moscow.
The output of processed foods failed to maintain
the improved performance of the first half of the
year. Production of processed meat, although
somewhat above last year's depressed level, re-
mained only at about the level of 1968. Greater
consumer purchasing power intensified the prob-
lem of low meat output, resulting in a continua-
tion of severe meat shortages in provincial cities.
Moreover, the production of processed fish, the
main protein substitute for meat, dropped off
sharply from the level at mid-year and in compari-
son with the third quarter of 1969. An over-all
decline in the growth rate of consumer durables
was highlighted by a marked slowing in the
growth of refrigerator and washing machine
production and by stagnation in the output of
television sets. There was a generally slower pace
in the production of soft goods, with the largest
decline occurring in the rate of growth of leather
footwear.
Moscow Grasps Opportunities in Somalia and the Sudan
Soviet Deputy Premier Dmitry Polyansky
last week became the first Politburo-level Russian
leader to visit Somalia and the second of such
rank to go to the Sudan. Polyansky's trip, which
took place from 20-24 October, constituted both
an expression of Soviet satisfaction with the poli-
cies pursued by the regimes in Khartoum and
Mogadiscio since they came to power last year
and an effort to lay the groundwork for even
closer military, economic, and political ties in the
future.
The occasion for Polyansky's visit to Moga-
discio was the first anniversary of the "Somali
Revolution." While there, Polyansky gave a na-
tionwide radio address in which he lauded the
regime's policies and warmly welcomed the
Somali President's statement that his country
"had made a decisive choice in favor of social-
ism."
Polyansky's visit to Somalia probably had
more tangible purposes as well. He undoubtedly
pressed the Somalis for closer cooperation and
greater contacts, especially in the political and
military areas. He was accompanied by Army
General P.N. L.ashchenko-who went with
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Premier Kosygin to Nasir's funeral-and . First
Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Economic Rela-
tions Committee I.V. Arkhipov, whose presence
suggests that military and economic aid were dis-
cussed. The Soviets, Somalia's chief suppliers of
military equipment and training,
IThe highlight of
Soviet economic aid is the Russian-built port at
Berbera; otherwise, although such aid has been
substantial, it has been poorly planned and badly
executed.
En route to Somalia, Polyansky stopped
over in the Sudan, a visit clearly intended as an
endorsement of the Numayri regime. Since the
coup in May 1969, Khartoum has generally fol-
lowed Egypt's lead in foreign relations, including
the pursuit of closer ties with Moscow. I n return,
the Soviets have grasped the opportunity to try to
make their welcome there more or less perma-
nent. They are developing an air defense system
for the Sudan which will include SAMs, jet inter-
ceptors, and AAA, and have provided an unde-
termined amount of ground forces equipment.
Some economic aid also has been supplied.
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Moscow's interest in these two countries is
not confined to the long-term, ill-defined hope
for closer ties as is the case with other non-Arab
African states. Sornalia's strategic location is para-
mount, and there have been reports that the So-
viets are interested in the use of Somali port
facilities in the Gulf of Aden. At the same time,
the Soviets may have long-range plans to use Wadi
Seidna airfield it northern Sudan, which re-
East Germany Pankow Woos the World
The German democratic Republic (GDR) is
making an intense effort to obtain the full sup-
port Df its East European allies in its battle to win
diplomatic recognition from West Germany, while
leavirg no stone unturned in its effort to gain
recognition from other Western and nonaligned
states. Pankow's I-ighest state and party leaders
are increasingly traveling abroad, and are also
making it a point to invite foreign delegations to
visit East Germany_
The catalyst for this East German activism is
primarily West Germany's effort to normalize its
relations with EastErn Europe. Pankow hopes that
the end result of this normalization will include
all East European states simultaneously, in effect
making the success of Bonn's policy dependent
on West Germany's recognition of East Germany.
One of the major purposes of Premier Willi
Stoph's late September visit to Warsaw, and of
the visit to Prague last week of a delegation led by
chief of state and Communist party boss Walter
Ulbricht, was to remind Polish and Czechoslovak
leaders of Pankow's stand, and at a minimum to
urge them to adopt a go-slow approach in their
negotiations with Bonn. In a related move, Pan-
kow is also attempting to improve relations with
Romania, partly in an effort to persuade Bucha-
rest to use its embassy in Bonn to press East
Germany's case mcre vigorously.
portedly has been substantially improved to
handle larger planes than the Sudanese have in
their inventory. Moscow has not yet called its
accounts due in Somalia and the Sudan, but it
does appear to have some role in mind for these
two African countries relating to its larger stra-
tegic aims in the Middle East and the Indian
East German politburo members are now in
France, vainly pressing for recognition of their
government. Politburo members and government
officials have recently returned from India, Italy,
Finland, and the Netherlands. Typical of the East
German pitch to nonaligned states is politburo
member Albert Norden's remark at a New Delhi
press conference last week that "recognition of
the GDR is the crucial test of the sincerity of the
anti-imperialist struggle." Meanwhile, the East
Germans are continuing their vigorous, if unsuc-
cessful, campaign for membership in international
organizations, particularly the United Nations and
its affiliated bodies.
Pankow is obviously concerned that it may
eventually be forced to accept some "special"
relationship with West Germany as the price for
international recognition. Its hopes of forestalling
such an eventuality rest to a great extent on the
willingness of its Communist allies to include
recognition of the GDR by Bonn in their price for
establishing full diplomatic relations with West
Germany. Because the chances for this do not
appear good, Pankow is trying to enhance its
bargaining position with Bonn by acquiring
additional diplomatic recognition else-
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Yugoslavia Looks Westward
President Tito's stop in Paris on 23 October
rounded off nearly two months of intensive per-
sonal diplomacy on his part. Since attending the
Nonaligned Summit in Lusaka in early Septem-
ber, Tito has in rapid-fire succession met with
President Nixon, Belgian Premier Eyskens, West
German Chancellor Brandt, acting Dutch Premier
Witteveen and French President Pompidou.
Viewed individually these meetings have pro-
duced nothing exceptional, but collectively they
represent a concerted effort on Tito's part to
keep Yugoslavia highly visible to Western leaders.
The Yugoslavs' primary motivation for this
effort probably stems from their failure to obtain
an understanding with the Kremlin that would
negate the threat of Soviet interference in Yugo-
slavia, underlined by the example of the interven-
tion in Czechoslovakia. A marked improvement in
Yugoslav diplomatic and economic ties with Pe-
king has also taken place against a backdrop of
common concern over Soviet intentions.
Tito is also aware that Yugoslavia's continua-
tion as an independent socialist state rests to a
great extent on Western willingness to invest in
the nation's future. Nonalignment offers Belgrade
only limited economic and political potential for
development. The Soviets are not inclined to of-
fer the assistance Belgrade needs, and the Yugo-
slavs do not trust them.
The highlight of Tito's Western contacts was
President Nixon's visit to Yugoslavia. Differences
in Yugoslav and US policies notwithstanding, sub-
sequent talks between American and Yugoslav
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION: The legal com-
mittee of the International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation (ICAO) completed its special session this
week, deferring action on the US call for a multi-
lateral boycott of the air services of any nation
harboring hijackers engaged in international
Page 9
officials confirm Tito's pleasure over the visit and
the rapport established between the two. In par-
ticular, the Yugoslavs are pleased with the new
interest among members of the US business com-
munity in opportunities in Yugoslavia since the
President's trip.
Other noteworthy Yugoslav-Western con-
tacts include Deputy Foreign Minister Vratusa's
visit to Switzerland in mid-September and Assist-
ant Trade Minister Tomic's trip to Washington
recently for talks on cotton textile trade. US
Assistant Secretary of Defense Warren Nutter
spent two highly successful days in Belgrade in
early September, which resulted in increased
momentum toward renewed US-Yugoslav military
contacts.
Danish Foreign Minister Hartling, in Yugo-
slavia from 10-13 October, concluded a cultural,
scientific, and industrial agreement with his hosts.
World Bank (IBRD) President Robert McNamara
was exceptionally well received during his Oc-
tober visit. He indicated that the IBRD is willing
to increase considerably its loans to Belgrade for
the 1971-75 period.
In November, Tito will meet with Romanian
President Ceausescu and will receive West German
Foreign Minister Scheel. On 10 December, the
charismatic Yugoslav leader is scheduled to begin
an official visit to Italy, which will include an
audience with Pope Paul VI. Next spring Tito
hopes to visit the US, and French Premier Cha-
ban-Delmas will pay an official visit to Yugo-
slavia.
blackmail. The US initiative may receive further
consideration at an ICAO meeting at The Hague
in early December. The USSR, which recently
decided to join ICAO after holding out for 26
years, will participate in this meeting.
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France and Algeria: Difficult Negotiations Ahead
France and Algeria entered into the second
round of bilateral negotiations this week on a
host of problems outstanding between the two
countries. French Foreign Ministry officials have
expressed concern about the outlook for a favor-
able resolution and expect the talks to be "long
and difficult." Felations between the two coun-
tries have been exacerbated in recent months by
disputes over petroleum and wine, the arrest in
Algeria early this year of several French nationals,
and the recent arrest in Paris of two Algerians-all
allegedly engaged in espionage.
Although the two sides have yet to agree on
an agenda for negotiations, the primary issue is a
revision of the 1965 petroleum accords. These
accords govern the operations of French com-
panies in the Sahara, which produce 70 percent of
Algeria's total crude oil output. Last July Algeria
unilaterally announced an increase in the tax-
reference price of oil that in effect would have
raised the tax payments of French companies by
about 50 percent. Algeria subsequently agreed in
preliminary discussions with France to defer im-
plernentation of this decision and even seemed
amenable to lowering the proposed price. The
Algerian Ministry of Industry and Fuels, however,
announced last week that Algiers is seeking a
substantially higier price. Algeria's objective is
not only to achieve greater control over its petro-
ILO: Soviet maneuvers following the recent
appointment of a Soviet citizen to a key position
in the International Labor Organization (ILO) are
likely to provide the major issues when the ILO
gov-:rning body neets early next month. Moscow
is expected to push for the chairmanship-even
though an Asian is entitled to the position by
regional rotation-and for structural changes
leum production but also to increase substantially
its oil revenue, which amounted to $255 million
in 1969, in order to finance its ambitious four-
year development program.
A French Foreign Ministry official indicated
that other issues already raised in exploratory
fashion in earlier sessions include Algerian labor-
ers in France and Algerian wine exports to
France. On the latter issue, Paris is taking the
position that the problem has become one for the
European Communities. In view of the signature
of the EC wine accord, any wine imports would
have to be regulated in accordance with EC terms
and requirements. Another problem Paris might
raise concerns the jailed French citizens. France is
particularly worried because the Algerian Govern-
ment has thus far been unwilling even to spell out
the charges against the Frenchmen.
Despite the difficulties each side expects in
working out an acceptable solution, both Paris
and Algiers basically desire a negotiated settle-
ment. Pompidou does not have the same special
interest in Algeria that De Gaulle had, but he is
nonetheless eager to protect France's important
economic investment there. Politically he regards
this Maghreb country as an important link to the
Arab world, in which he has shown increasing
designed to alter ILO's traditional pattern of
representation by separate groups of employer,
labor, and government officials. The USSR may
also try to exploit international resentment over
the refusal of the US Congress to appropriate
funds to cover the ILO assessment on the US for
the second half of 1970.
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European Community Considers Steps toward Monetary Union
The EC Council of Ministers received this
week an ambitious, three-stage plan for full eco-
nomic and monetary union by the end of the
present decade. The plan, drawn up by a group of
experts under the chairmanship of Luxembourg's
Prime Minister Werner, had been requested last
December by the Six.
The Werner report spells out in detail only
the projected monetary union's first stage, which,
if approved by the Council, could begin next
January and last for three years. During this stage,
the central banks of the Community would, as a
trial measure, coordinate their policies of inter-
vention on the exchange markets in order to keep
exchange-rate fluctuations between their curren-
cies within narrower margins than the ones that
apply to the dollar. At the same time, the Six
would more closely coordinate their fiscal and
monetary policies.
The subsequent stages would be agreed on
only after the initial phase could be evaluated.
Already, however, the report's clear delineation
of the political and economic implications of
monetary union-involving the creation of new
institutions of economic policy-making at the
Community level along with increased control by
the European Parliament-has caused a stir,
mostly within the French Government. Among
those favorably disposed to the report, there is
some feeling that the plan should have been dis-
creetly less explicit on the institutional side. In
order to approve further work on the basis of the
Werner plan, the Council will have to reconcile
the French desire to play down the political im-
plications of movement toward monetary union
with the German desire to capitalize on those
implications.
In talking with US officials, the Commission
continues to emphasize its judgment that, because
most serious international monetary issues arise
between the US and Europe, these problems
could be solved more efficiently if there were one
European decision center.
The first serious debate of the Werner report
in the Council will take place on 23 November. If
the first stage is to begin next January, the Com-
mission will soon have to submit draft proposals
for its implementation.
The Community has apparently done little
concrete thinking about how the British would fit
in with its plans for full monetary union. In an
understatement, Commission Vice President Barre
has conceded that the existence of Britain's over-
seas sterling balances "would pose some prob-
lems." Officially, the British say they have no
reservations about the Community's projected
movement toward monetary union; unofficially,
however, there may be considerable uncertainty
in the UK about the relation between the Com-
munity actions and the enlargement negotia-
tions.
UN-MIDDLE EAST: The.debate on the Middle
East situation in the General Assembly has pro-
duced considerable acrimony and little substan-
tive progress. An Egyptian draft resolution,
sponsored by several African states in an attempt
to obtain greater nonaligned support, has been
subjected to countervailing nonaligned and radical
Arab pressures, and the precise language in which
it will be couched remains in doubt. The alter=
native US draft has received virtually no Western
backing, as most countries preferred to deal with
the Egyptian proposal, making an effort to tone it
down. Sentiment remains strong for some sort of
Assembly statement before the 90-day cease-fire
ends on 5 November.
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MIDDLE EAST - AFR
Jordan: Husayn Appoints Tough Premier
Although suspicion and hostility remain on
both sides, relations between the government and
the fedayeen had tegun to stabilize by early this
week. The announcement on 28 October of a
strong new government headed by Wasfi Tal,
however, will raise large doubts among the feda-
yeen about the feasibility of cooperating with the
regime.
A new government-fedayeen "protocol"
signed on 22 October amplified some provisions
of earlier agreements. Its most important point
restricted the bearing of arms in the cities to
"authorized elements." Tunisian Premier Bahi
Ladgham, who heads the Arab truce commission,
said privately that this would, in effect, mean the
disarriament of the fedayeen militia, even though
this was not being spelled out.
I_adgham has admitted that further work is
needed in the nor-.h and in the area near Zarqa,
but he was sufficiently sure of the situation to
hand his post over to a deputy while he returns to
Tunisia to report to President Bourguiba. On the
way, he apparently intends to visit a number of
Arab states that sponsored the Cairo agreement in
order to consolidate their support of his mission's
work
Ladgham believes that he has been moder-
ately successful in his hope of creating a basis for
better working relations between Jordanians and
Pales:inians. In the past two weeks, he points out,
only 10 or 12 people have been killed; some 720
political prisoners have been released, leaving only
abou-: 300 in government hands; and the fedayeen
newspaper Al Fatah has been licensed and its first
two ssues have been moderate and unexception-
CA
able in tone. He feels that government plans to
register all fedayeen weapons could, if properly
handled, lead eventually to disarmament.
I n retrospect, Ladgham views the most val-
uable achievement of his mission as its reaffirma-
tion of Jordanian sovereignty. The few conces-
sions made to the fedayeen, in Ladgham's
opinion, catered mainly to fedayeen self-esteem;
the writ of vital government forces-the military,
the police, and the court system-had been care-
fully preserved intact.
King Husayn has recently been giving his
hawkish relative, Zaid bin Shakir, a prominent
role in dealing with the fedayeen-presumably to
warn the commandos that the monarch is not to
be pushed too far. In his capacity as the govern-
ment member of the joint military committee
charged with implementing certain provisions of
the mid-October agreement, Shakir has-predicta-
bly-taken a hard line against the fedayeen.
Now, apparently, the king has been embold-
ened by the attitude of the Ladgham committee
and the success of Shakir's tough tactics; in his
appointment of Prime Minister Wasfi Tal, known
for his staunch opposition to radicalism, Husayn
has given Shakir a strong civilian partner in the
process of establishing internal stability in Jor-
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Libya: RCC Continues to Confound
The strong statements on foreign policy
made recently by Deputy Premier Jallud to the
US ambassador in Tripoli not only underscore the
Libyan regime's radical outlook but raise once
more the continuing question on the status of the
various members of the Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC). Since the RCC was established
following the coup in September 1969, its posi-
tion as the collegial governing body of the Libyan
Arab Republic has not been seriously questioned.
On the other hand, very little hard information
has emerged on the internal workings of the coun-
cil and the relationships among its members.
In an apparently calculated presentation to
the ambassador last week, Jallud denounced in
unequivocal terms US policy toward the Middle
East-particularly Israel-and expressed his gov-
ernment's adamant opposition to a negotiated
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Jallud's
credentials as a spokesman and negotiator for the
RCC are impeccable: he has successfully managed
the British military withdrawal, the US evacua-
tion of Wheelus Air Base, and the recent agree-
ments on increased oil pricing. His next mission is
to terminate outstanding military procurement
agreements with Britain.
Jallud's seemingly authoritative position has
been clouded, however, by a spate of reports over
the past year indicating that he has serious dif-
SYRIA-IRAQ: The struggle apparently continues
for the top spots in both the Syrian and Iraqi
branches of the Baath Party. In Damascus, the
story most often heard is that Defense Minister
Asad has upgraded his own personal position as
ferences with Premier Qaddafi. The most recent
alleged incident was a highly personal quarrel that
took place about two weeks before Jallud's con-
versation with the ambassador. In September, fur-
thermore, Jallud had been shifted from the
Ministry of Interior to that of Economy, a move
some observers considered a demotion.
Only a month later, further cabinet changes
removed Jallud's successor at the Ministry of In-
terior while giving Jallud the duties-if not the
title-of the treasury minister, who was also
dropped. These changes seem to indicate that-
despite their most recent quarrel-the premier and
his deputy have established a working arrange-
ment. The reasons for the cabinet changes them-
selves still remain a mystery, which available re-
ports merely deepen by offering conflicting
versions.
army officers, may have decided after a year of
verbal squabbling that it is time to try more active
opposition to the leadership. In any case, it is still
not clear who sides with Qaddafi and who
opposes him, making for a very touchy and
unpredictable government.
well as that of the party's military faction at the
expense of President Atasi, who also holds the
post of premier, and the civilian wing. A party
congress scheduled for this week allegedly will
grapple with the leadership question.
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In Baghdad, the situation is just as cloudy. Revolution Command Council Deputy Chairman
Hardan Tikriti, one of two vice presidents, has Saddam Tikriti is said to have stepped up the
been pushed out of power and out of the country power ladder, but here, as in Damascus, the whole
as well, allegedly over miscues on his part in story is not in, and more changes are probably in
connection with -:he Iraqi role in the Jordan crisis. store.
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Bickering and Dissension Grow in Southern Yemen
Factionalism is now so rife at the top levels
of the ruling National Front that both its General
Command and its Executive Committees are fre-
quently unable to function, causing a delay in
decision-making that is resulting in widespread
uncertainty.
The regime's pro-Soviet strong man, Na-
tional Front Secretary General Ismail, is in-
creasingly at odds with his chief rival, Prime Min-
ister Haytham, over the question of whether to
hole early trials for the followers of deposed
president al-Shabi. Haytham, head of a pro-Egypt
fac-:ion, has sought a reconciliation with al-Shabi's
followers by delaying the trials and advocating
the release of political prisoners. Although the
two men cooperated recently in rallying public
support for a provisional constitution, they are
long-time antagonists. Ismail, a doctrinaire social-
ist and veteran National Front theoretician, had
some of Haytharn's associates arrested this spring
for allegedly conspiring with Egyptian officials.
Nevertheless, the prime minister retains support
within the armed forces and among moderate
National Front members, although the death of
President Nasir has weakened his position.
A pro-Peking group has also emerged in the
National Front. The cabinet minister who heads
this faction has been building a personal organiza-
tion, and seems to have used Ismail's two-month
absence in Moscow this spring to solidify his
position. He has secured the election of many of
his supporters to provincial and local councils of
the party structure, and has gotten others ap-
pointed to government posts.
Meanwhile, fighting and unrest fomented by
the dissident National Unity Front has been re-
ported in tribal areas. The incidents have not been
numerous, but the regime's toughest and most
loyal army unit has been sent to protect the route
from the Yemen Arab Republic to Aden, and
other troops have been moved to deal with guer-
rilla operations mounted from bases in Yemen.
Although the Front is supported by Saudi Arabia,
its acts are more an annoyance than a serious
threat. In fact, the Front's motley collection of
malcontents, conservatives, and leftists seems
likely to disintegrate eventually as a result of
continuing internal discord.
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Congo (Kinshasa) : First National Elections Since 1965
The Congolese will go to the polls this week-
end for the first time since President Mobutu
seized power in 1965. They will cast their votes
for president on 31 October and 1 November and
for candidates to the National Assembly on 14
and 15 November. Although the voters will not
have any choice of candidates, the elections will
give some indication of Mobutu's success in de-
veloping broad support for his policies.
Elections had been deferred for several
years, not so much because of the Congo's uncer-
tain security situation but because of Mobutu's
desire to build his own political party, the Pop-
ular Revolutionary Movement (MPR), into a mass
organization. He sees the MPR as an instrument
to lessen his dependence on the army-which re-
mains his main base of support-and as an outlet
for the energies of ambitious politicians who
might otherwise become potential rivals. Addi-
tionally, he hopes that party activities will help
increase the national awareness of the rural
Congolese.
The most important part of the electoral
process was completed last month when Mobutu
and party leaders selected the 420 candidates for
the National Assembly from the 2,500 MPR
members who wished to stand for office. These
candidates are running unopposed, and their
names are simply being submitted to the voters of
the 36 electoral districts for approval or disap-
proval. In an attempt to lessen regional political
ties, none of the districts corresponds geograph-
ically to provincial subdivisions, and no candidate
is permitted to run in his native area. As the sole
candidate for president, Mobutu is assured of
election.
The elections are being held one month ear-
lier than originally scheduled, partially because
Mobutu was fearful that some politicians might
use a lengthy campaign to compete for personal
popularity. He may have also been eager to have
the balloting out of the way because of reports of
increased rebel activity in the eastern Congo, a
potentially embarrassing development.
The MPR has failed to arouse much grass-
roots enthusiasm for Mobutu. Voting is manda-
tory for all persons over 18, however, and a
substantial turnout for the elections will create
the impression that his regime has nationwide
support. Mobutu will exercise tight control over
the newly elected assembly, and will confine it
basically to rubber-stamping his decisions. Even
so, the assembly will be useful to Mobutu as a
source of patronage for MPR stalwarts and as an
outlet for tribal and regional grievances and politi-
cal energies.
TANZANIA - ZAMBIA - COMMUNIST
CHINA: Construction of the Tan-Zam railroad
was officially launched this week in Tanzania and
Zambia, although preparatory work has been un-
der way since July. When it is completed some-
time in 1975, the Chinese-financed railroad will
run 1,060 miles from Zambia's copper mines to
the port of Dar es Salaam on the Indian Ocean.
Over 4,000 Chinese technical personnel are
already working on the line and, according to
Tanzanian President Nyerere, there will be a total
of 7,000 Chinese in the two countries by the end
of the year. Construction reportedly will be
carried on simultaneously in Tanzania and Zam-
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Chile Changes Governments
Salvador Allende will become president of
Chile on 3 November, having received over-
whelming congressional confirmation of his
36.3-percent plurality in the presidential election
last month. Official delegations being named to
attend his inauguration indicate a noncommittal
attitude by most countries toward the prospect of
a Marxist government.
The full support given Allende in the con-
gressional runoff by the Christian Democrats in-
dicates that initial :y he probably will meet with
little parliamentary opposition to the far-reaching
programs he has promised to put into effect
swiftly. The "builcing of socialism" that Allende
has predicted, however, may -be affected by eco-
nomic considerations and by serious differences
among members of his coalition. In the eight
weeks since Allende's narrow electoral victory,
there appears to have been little significant
progress in coordinating the plans and reconciling
the ambitions with n the coalition.
The struggle over the naming of a cabinet
has revealed and 3xacerbated these differences.
Allende's own extremist Socialists have held out
for top ministries, to the dismay of the Commu-
nists and the other contenders. Socialist control
of th3 posts they demand would give the govern-
ment a more radical cast than the low-key, non-
provocative beginning the Communists and per-
haps Allende reportedly had envisioned.
The Chilean Foreign Ministry expects more
than 60 official delegations at the inauguration,
and the Communists claim that 90 countries will
be represented. The ranks will be swelled by 42
labor delegations from such countries as North
Korea and East Germany and an extensive list of
artistic notables invited by Allende's UP coalition.
Although the North Vietnamese -delegation will
be "unofficial," it reportedly will be headed by
the vice minister of foreign affairs. The five-man
Soviet delegation will be led by the vice president
of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet. OAS
Secretary General Galo Plaza's position that he
will attend the ceremonies in order to avoid ap-
pearing to discriminate against Allende is shared
by some Latin American governments. Others in
the hemisphere and some Western European
countries want to send "proper" delegations in
the hope of putting pressure on Allende to "resist
radicalization." Chile's most important neighbor,
Argentina, is deeply worried over the implications
of Allende's government but wishes to appear
friendly. It will send a cabinet minister, as will
several other countries including Mexico, Peru,
Colombia, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Ecuador.
Brazil and Paraguay, which do not hide their
distaste for Allende, will be represented only by
their ambassadors.
The assassination of Army Commander in
Chief Schneider has practically ended the pos-
sibility of any military action against Allende. It
apparently has unified the armed forces behind
acceptance and support of him as constitutional
president in a way that few other developments
could have done. It also has strengthened Al-
lende's position with the shocked Chilean public;
leftist propaganda has been warning incessantly
that rightists would make some desperate move to
avert Allende's assumption of the presidency and
has already claimed Schneider is a martyr of the
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V*MOOr Sr:URE'1' V-
Bolivia: Guerrillas Plan to Persevere
Despite the loss of its leader, Oswaldo
"Chato" Peredo, the National Liberation Army
(ELN) is determined to continue guerrilla war-
fare. The group may be hard pressed, however, to
resume significant guerrilla activities in the near
future.
The Interior Ministry officially has denied
press reports that guerrillas are active in the east-
ern department of Santa Cruz, where the army
defeated Che Guevara's guerrilla forces in 1967.
The ministry said, however, that about 50 armed
students had seized a large plantation in the area.
The army's capture of Peredo is a serious
setback for the ELN, which has seen its original
guerrilla group almost wiped out in clashes with
the army since its raid on a US-owned mining
installation at Teoponte on 19 July. During that
raid, the ELN left behind a statement identifying
Bolivian, foreign, and student members of the
ELN, without specifying that they had taken part
in the Teoponte raid. Subsequent government
identifications of dead and captured guerrillas in-
clude a large number of those named. If the
original list was based on the ELN's strength on a
nationwide basis, the group's losses during the
past three months have seriously damaged its
basic structure.
There are no firm estimates of the number
of guerrillas the ELN can still depend on for
active operations, but there probably are not
many. There is no good indication that significant
numbers of trained and motivated recruits have
recently joined the ELN. Even stronger evidence
of the ELN's weakness was its failure to open a
second guerrilla front concurrent with the
Teoponte operation. Such action would have
diverted military forces and aided the Teoponte
guerrillas to expand their operations or to with-
draw successfully. This inaction strengthens the
likelihood that the ELN committed the over-
whelming majority of its trained personnel to the
original operation at Teoponte and will require a
period of reorganization, probably lasting several
months, before it can continue serious guerrilla
activities. This view is reinforced by the statement
of an anonymous ELN leader to the Cuban news
agency Prensa Latina that the ELN does not
know how soon its operations will "resume."
Possible new
guerrilla activities
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As ide from the original press reports there is no
confirmation of a questionable communique, al-
legedly from the ELN, claiming that it has opened
two new guerrilla fronts in the Santa Cruz area.
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Despite its losses, the ELN is not ready to
renoance its posit on that guerrilla warfare is the
only means of achieving a successful revolution.
Immediately after Juan Jose Torres assumed the
presidency of Bolivia, the ELN, then under
"Chato" Peredo, announced that it planned to
continue guerrilla warfare. After Peredo's capture,
the anonymous ELN leader repeated the group's
Brazil: More on Church-State Friction
President Medici's efforts to improve rela-
tions with the Catholic Church are encountering
opposition from some military sectors. These of-
ficers are determined to weed out what they
consider subversive elements in the clergy and
Catholic lay organizations; they believe that
Medici's efforts at conciliation are hampering
their campaign.
Recent friction has resulted from arrests of
several prelates and laymen in September and
October, coupled with a government-sponsored
camoaign to discredit controversial Archbishop
Helder Camara. An emergency meeting of the
National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB)
directorate in mid-September issued a firm con-
Cardinal Saps Reviewing Troops in Brasilia
determination to continue operations in Bolivia
and stressed that similar tactics would be neces-
sary throughout the hemisphere. He specifically
stated that the Velasco government in Peru and
Salvador Allende in Chile would not be able to
achieve "revolutionary" changes and that guerrilla
warfare would continue to be necessary in those
countries.
demnation of the recent arrests and stated that
the church had an obligation to work toward
alleviating serious social problems, no matter
what the cost. The CNBB also sent a "letter of
fraternal support" to Dom Helder, who is pres-
ently in Europe.
Criticism of the government also came from
abroad. In Belgium, 4,000 demonstrators pro-
tested the arrests of members of the Catholic
Worker Youth (JOC) movement, which is head-
quartered in Brussels, and called upon the Belgian
Government and the Vatican to exert pressure on
the Brazilian administration to end the arrests and
alleged tortures. On 21 October, Pope Paul V1
clearly alluded to Brazil in a public statement
condemning "cruel and inhumane police meth-
ods," even though they were used to combat
political violence and defend public order. The
pontiff's appointment of CNBB president Cardi-
nal Rossi to a key post in his unofficial cabinet-
the first Latin American ever to be so honored-
may have been due in part to a desire to be better
informed about developments in the world's
largest Catholic country.
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tration.
Recent governments have backed away from
any open confrontation with the church, fearing,
justifiably, that in the long run the administration
would be the loser in such a contest. If those in
the military who regard the church as the
country's foremost subversive influence continue
to press their views, however, simmering church-
state tensions could become a major problem and
even threaten the stability of the Medici adminis-
Venezuela: Government Clamps Down on University
This week the Venezuelan Government took
a decisive step in its long struggle against leftist
control of the universities by sending police and
national guard troops to occupy the campus of
Central University in Caracas.
visional National Universities Council, which had
been set up to administer the law. By mid-Octo-
ber the council had decided to suspend Bianco as
rector of Central University, using his opposition
to the law as a legal pretext.
The current round of strife began last July
with mild student protest against a university
reform law that had been proposed to Congress.
The law was aimed at correcting administrative
and financial inefficiency in the national universi-
ties, but the question of university autonomy was
at the heart of the matter. Leftist students feared
that the new law would weaken their power base;
such an eventuality indeed seems to have been
one of the main aims of the bill. Protest violence
has occurred sporadically since passage of the bill
in early September.
Opposition to the law by the rector of Cen-
tral University, Jesus Maria Bianco, set the stage
for the occupation. To dramatize his protest,
Bianco refused to attend meetings of the Pro-
On 23 October Bianco yielded to pressure
and resigned. He refused to vacate his office,
however, and urged the students to resist the
appointment of a successor. In answer to Bianco's
continuing refusal to abide by the law, the gov-
ernment occupied the campus early Monday
morning.
Bianco and his leftist followers reportedly
have called for a nationwide student strike and
some violent reaction to the occupation can be
expected. It appears, however, that the university
reform law and the subsequent occupation of the
Central University campus may put an end to ten
years of Communist dominance and disruptive
activities in the national universities.
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Bahamas: Pindling's Political Troubles Worsen
Prime Minister Pindling's political leadership
is increasingly threatened by growing dissension
within his government and party.
Minister of Education Wallace-WhitfieId's
dramatic resignation, announced at the annual
convention of the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP)
that ended last week, has set the stage for a
struggle to control the party and the government.
Wallace-Whitfield, generally accepted as Pindling's
successor, has steadily increased his following,
and his resignation will have significant effects on
futura political developments. He now has the
support of ten PLP dissidents and seven opposi-
tion and independent members of the House of
Assembly. This is -_hree less than the total needed
to carry a vote of no confidence in the 38-mem-
ber parliament. A second cabinet member, Min-
ister Df Health Dr. Curtis McMillan, has also sub-
mitted his resignation to the governor; McMillan
is a strong supporter of Wallace-Whitfield. These
resignations, and the others that may follow, have
Cecil Wallace-Whitfield
Pindling's Prospect -ve
Successor
Prime Minister Pindling
placed tremendous pressure on Pindling, because
the number and quality of PLP backbenchers still
sufficiently loyal to the prime minister to accept
cabinet posts have been sharply reduced.
Citing a deteriorating economic situation, an
apparent lack of confidence by foreign investors,
and Pindling's alleged dictatorial attitude of late,
Wallace-Whitfie?d's supporters have demanded
that Pindling resign immediately. If he refuses (as
they expect), they intend to campaign in the
House of Assembly to "nullify completely" any
efforts of his administration to pass legislation.
They believe such a move will force him to resign.
Other members of the group are proposing that
Pindling dismiss immediately the controversial
Minister of Home Affairs Arthur Hanna and pos-
sibly three other ministers. Wallace-Whitfield
would then be asked to assume the Ministry of
Finance and replace the dismissed ministers with
his supporters. Still another alternative favored by
some would be to have a majority of the House of
Assembly petition the governor for Pindling's
removal. The last resort would be to seek the
three required members to carry a vote of no
confidence. This is the least desirable, as it would
require the calling of new elections. An electoral
campaign would put a heavy financial and admin-
istrative burden on the PLP at a time when it is in
a general state of disarray.
Pindling is not expected to give up easily,
however. He has been an adroit politician, but it
now appears that the opposing forces are be-
coming as determined to remove him as he is to
stay in office. It is possible that Pindling, if
pressed too heavily, would call for new elections
and seek a new mandate from the eo le with
whom he is still popular.
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tl) LU tC_rl 1 Nor
Colombia: Opposition Moves Left
Rojas Pinilla's National Popular Alliance
(ANAPO) has again succeeded in challenging the
Pastrana administration. The Chamber of Depu-
ties failed to elect a comptroller general of the
republic after two
votes were taken on 22
October. Antonio
Ordonez, supported by
ANAPO and others, re-
ceived more votes than
the ruling National
Front candidate; in
fact, Ordonez received
more votes in the re-
cent balloting than he
did on 30 September.
Unless an accommoda-
tion is reached, the
Chamber will not be
able to elect a national
comptroller, attorney
general, or vice presi-
Maria Eugenia Rojas
de Moreno
dent, as a two-thirds vote is required for election
to these positions. Foreign Minister Vasquez, be
cause of his precedence, will remain de facto vice
president of Colombia.
ANAPO's strength in Congress will continue
to be an embarrassment for the Pastrana adminis-
tration, but the real cause for concern is the trend
that is emerging in ANAPO's political direction.
Evidence suggests that ANAPO's leader, Maria
Eugenia Rojas de Moreno, intends to adopt an
extreme leftist-Marxist ideology and to formulate
programs emphasizing the "class struggle." Mrs.
Moreno has stressed that she does not intend
ANAPO to become a Communist movement. She
believes, however, that a political group striving
for social revolution must adopt some fundamen-
tal Marxist concepts in order to attract the
masses. It is not clear whether this shift to the left
has already begun, although there is evidence that
the Communist Party has penetrated ANAPO,
especially in the poorer urban districts. In some
cases the Communists are directing ANAPO ac-
tivities.
A group of conservative ANAPO congress-
men reportedly is concerned over the growing
Marxist and pro-Communist influence at the
higher levels of ANAPO.
25X1
25X1
(Moreover, there
is concern among them that the rightists have
yielded the initiative within ANAPO to the left-
ists, on whom the ANAPO leadership is in-
creasingly relying to motivate the pro-Rojas
masses. As the leftist elements assume more im-
portant roles, Mrs. Moreno is likely to find it
increasingly difficult to bring them under her
control.
ECUADOR: The kidnaping on 27 October of the
commander of the air force probably will give
further impetus to the government's campaign
against its opponents. The administration has
been on the offensive against its foes since Presi
dent Velasco assumed dictatorial powers in June.
The timing of the kidnaping-during celebrations
commemorating the 50th anniversary of the air
force attended by several foreign delegations-was
especially embarrassing to the administration. It
responded with strong measures, including the
establishment of martial law and a curfew, and
immediately began a roundup of political oppo-
nents. Velasco probably believes that a strong
stand will ensure continued military support and
give him a free rein to deal with both the small
subversive groups in the country and his legiti-
mate political foes. As time passes without an
authenticated communique from the still-uniden-
tified kidnapers, the possibility that the general
has been killed increases, as does the possibility
that the government will feel compelled to take
harsher retaliatory action against suspected terror-
SECRET
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