WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79-00927A008400010001-0
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S
Document Page Count:
28
Document Creation Date:
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Document Release Date:
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Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 27, 1970
Content Type:
SUMMARY
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
iq ARAN{!ES i ktW* CEltiEq-
t~,iirtCisAiElY A1TEf USE
JOB
State Dept. review completed
Secret
114
27 November 1970
No. 0398/70
q-7-z V,5-V3
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(Information as of noon EST, 25 November 1970)
Page
Vietnam: New Strikes in the North . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Cambodia: Keeping the Heat On . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Thailand: Insurgent Prospects Improve . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Laos: The Southern Campaign Begins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Sino-Soviet Relations: Restoring Appearances . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Communist China: A Step Closer to the UN . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
USSR-Japan: Tokyo Hits a Sore Spot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
North Korea: The Economy Is Making Mixed Progress . . . . . . . . 8
Bavarian Election Helps Bonn and Strauss . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Hungary: Brezhnev Endorses Moderate Reform Program . . . . . . 10
Bulgaria-Romania: New Friendship Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Italy: Coalition Government Under Strain . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Israel: Jarring Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Guinea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Pakistan: Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Chile: The Government Faces Its First Problems . . . . . . . 18
Latin America Takes a New Look at Cuba . . . . . . . . . . 19
Mexico: New President Foresees Good Relations With the US .
NOTES: Yugoslavia: Poland-France; East-West Germany; Ethiopia; South
Africa - Malagasy Republic; Syria
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S1 GRE'1'
FAR EAST
Vietnam: New Strikes in the North
The Communists reacted to last weekend's
air strikes against the North with much tough
talk, but they have backed it up so far with only a
pro forma gesture of protest in Paris. Hanoi of-
ficially denounced the raids as violations of the
US pledge to halt all bombing of the North as an
"extremely serious act of war." A Foreign Min-
istry communique strongly reasserted Hanoi's
longstanding position that no "understanding"
exists that would allow uncontested US aerial
reconnaissance over the North.
Although Communist propaganda portrayed
the US as having deliberately broken the arrange-
ment that led to four-way talks in Paris, Hanoi
clearly is not of a mind to break off the talks
now. A spokesman for the North Vietnamese
delegation hinted at a news conference that Hanoi
expects them to go on. The Communist delega-
tions boycotted this week's session in Paris, but
said they would return to the table on 3 Decem-
ber. This follows the pattern set last May when
the Communists skipped a meeting after a series
of US air strikes in southern North Vietnam.
because it wants to condemn the action without
acknowledging that US forces moved in and out
of North Vietnam with impunity. The Foreign
Ministry sent a relatively mild statement to North
Vietnamese news agencies abroad cn the 24th,
but then quickly withdrew it. The only reaction
that had appeared by midweek was an unat-
tributed article in the party newspaper. Like
Hanoi's initial commentary on the air strikes
before the Pentagon announcement, it avoided
comment on the rescue effort itself and said only
that the US had attacked a POW installation. It
reasserted Hanoi's contention that air strikes did
occur in the general Hanoi-Haiphong area and
that, because of this, Hanoi took an "extremely
serious" view of the situation.
The Communists apparently hope to step up
their military activity within the next week or so.
Available evidence still indicates, however, that
the enemy is primarily concerned with conserving
and rebuilding his weakened forces in South Viet-
nam and that the coming "winter" or dry-season
campaign there will be limited in magnitude.
Last weekend's action in North Vietnam is
not likely to have a lasting effect on whatever
prospects there are in Paris. Some form of Com-
munist military retaliation in South Vietnam
could be in prospect however; rocket attacks
against a major city or two seem a good bet. In
this way, Hanoi might seek to underscore its
contention that the US has broken its pledge to
stop bombing the North and that Communist
forces are not constrained by any kind of un-
derstanding.
Meanwhile, Hanoi apparently has run into
difficulty formulating a response to Washington's
announcement about the POW raid, presumably
Although the enemy's local forces north of
Saigon are now relatively weak and pacification
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has been making better progress there than in
most other parts of the country, Hieu thinks the
Communists are still better organized than their
recent military operations have indicated. He
fears that the government's territorial security
forces alone are not capable of taking full advan-
tage of the enemy's current condition. He believes
that regular army units should be used to support
the Regional and Popular Forces rather than
pursue enemy units in Cambodia where they are
not an immediate threat to South Vietnam.
Hieu's views of the Communists' problems
and intentions in his area of responsibility are
generally supported by a wide variety of intel-
ligence. In his present command covering Binh
Long, Phuoc Long, and Binh Duong provinces he
lacks the support American combat troops pro-
vided to him in an earlier command, and he must
use his forces in pacification and security roles as
well as in the Cambodian sweep operations.
Hieu's concerns may be somewhat shared by Pres-
ident Thieu, who recently imposed limitations on
the extent of South Vietnamese operations into
Cambodia for fear of overextending his forces.
Saigon politicians are giving more of their
attention to the 1971 presidential election al-
though it is still more than ten months away.
"Big" Minh says he will run for president, and
other opposition elements already are making
campaign plans. President Thieu also is looking
ahead to next year, and progovernment poli-
ticians have begun to assess his prospects for
re-election. Although these maneuverings are still
in the preliminary stages, the election probably
will be the main focus of attention in Saigon
political circles until next fall.
It is far too early to project the outcome of
the elections. Much of the pessimism over Thieu's
prospects apparently stems from soundings in
areas where oppositionist sentiment is tradi-
tionally strong. Nevertheless, Thieu may need to
mend his political fences to solidify his position.
He has indicated that he intends to rely more on 25X1
the government bureaucracy for support than on
political parties, but outright art o osi`tion
would weaken his campaign.
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Cambodia: Keeping the Heat On
The Communists continued to keep govern-
ment forces at bay in Kompong Cham Province,
and initiated several successful attacks on Cam-
bodian units and minor industrial installations in
the Kirirom area near Route 4. It is not clear
whether these actions foreshadow the beginning
of a broader offensive campaign.
A 16-ship government convoy bound for
Kompong Cham city on the Mekong was halted
by heavy enemy fire 20 miles southwest of the
city. Two ships were heavily damaged; four Cam-
bodians were killed and 52 were wounded. On the
ground, government reinforcements trying to
move east along Route 7 in order to reopen that
road between Skoun and Kompong Cham were
stopped by Communist troops near Prey Totung.
Before the riverine convoy arrived at midweek,
government defenders at Kompong Cham had to
rely on air drops because enemy harassing fire
deterred cargo planes from landing at the city's
airfield.
In the southwest, coordinated enemy attacks
succeeded in driving Cambodian soldiers out of
their positions at the Pich Nil pass overlooking
Route 4, the Kirirom hydroelectric complex, and
the Stung Chral cartridge factory. These attacks
marked the first significant Communist activity in
the Kirirom area since late July. Six government
battalions were scheduled to launch counterat-
tacks to retake the lost positions and to reopen
the vital highway to Kompong Som.
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Economic negotiations between the Cam-
bodians and the South Vietnamese were sus-
pended without agreement on several major issues
when the Saigon cabinet withheld approval of
agreements covering trade relations. The Cam-
bodians, for their part, balked over Saigon's re-
Thailand: Insurgent Prospects Improve
The insurgent movement in northeastThai-
land is continuing to rebound from the setbacks
suffered during the 1967-68 period. During the
past rainy season, the insurgents concentrated on
improving their organization and village support
network in traditional operating areas rather than
significantly expanding their armed strength-
which remains around 1,500-or attempting to
move into new operational sectors. There is evi-
dence, however, that for the first time in the
northeast the insurgents have established a secure
base, in the Duong Luang area of Nakhon
Phanom Province. This region has been the most
active insurgent area since the movement in the
northeast began in 1965.
In addition to supporting the training and
indoctrination of insurgents and the filling out of
quasimilitary village units, the base has facilitated
an increase i, ,,,;~r,gi1support for the insurgency.
Laos: The Southern Campaign Begins
Communist forces overran several key gov-
ernment positions on the Bolovens Plateau in a
series of closely coordinated attacks on 22 No-
vember. The enemy captured two main irregular
Page 4
quest for a $38 million "contribution" from
Phnom Penh to help defray costs of South Viet-
namese military operations in Cambodia. Al-
though South Vietnamese intransigence may be
largely a bargaining ploy for the next unscheduled
series of talks in Phnom Penh, such apparent bad
faith likely did not sit well with some Cambodian
leaders who are already hypercritical of their Sai-
Despite their improved capabilities, the in-
surgents have avoided large-scale or highly visible
actions. Increased terrorism and harassment of
the government's fledgling village defense forces
are designed to gain the initiative witE out
prompting a major government counteroffensive.
Such tactics are effectively playing on both Bang-
kok's belief that the insurgency in the northeast is
well in hand and the Thai Army's desire to turn
over its counterinsurgency role to police and ci-
vilian agencies.
With the deteriorating situations in Cam-
bodia and Laos providing the pretext, the '2nd
Army has since midsummer reduced its counter-
insurgency force commitment in the northeast by
two thirds, or to less than 1,000 troops. More- 25X1
over, the army now is under orders to engage in
suppression operations only in response to emer-
gency situations.
bases, Sites 26 and 38, northwest of Attopeu as
well as four other outposts in the same general
area. Two other sites, about 15 and 30 miles
north of Attopeu, were also captured.
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Government forces were able to reoccupy Site 38
despite heavy shelling, but attempts to retake Site
26 have been repulsed. Continuing air strikes on
the bases now in enemy hands may make it diffi-
cult for the Communists to maintain their foot-
hold on the eastern rim of the Plateau.
The Bolovens Plateau, as the dominant ter-
rain feature in the area, has been hotly contested
for the past several years. Its importance has
grown this year, however, because the Commu-
nists are intent on protecting their infiltration
corridor from the raids and intelligence activities
of government guerrillas based on the plateau and
Page 5
because the eastern rim of the plateau commands
the Se Kong River and Route 16. These are po-
tential infiltration routes the North Vietnamese
would presumably like to make greater use of
during the current dry season.
Vientiane is still waiting for definitive word
from IPathet Lao leader Souphanouvong on the 25X1
arrangements for peace negotiations that Com-
munist: envoy Souk Vongsak and Prime Minister
dialogue moving.
e I ast d
to eep the
Pathet Lao re resentative Soth Pethrasy
made statements that 25X1
seemed to support government assertions that the
procedural roadblocks to the Khang Khay talks
have been cleared away. Soth reportedly said that
while the Pathet Lao still consider that the chief
government negotiator will be representing Sou-
vanna as an individual rather than as prime minis-
ter, they will, in an effort to get negotiations
started, no longer contest the issue: A Pathet Lao
broadcast of 22 November adds substance to this
report by finessing the question of Souvanna's
official status, describing him as "known as the
chief of the Vientiane side."
In somewhat less explicit fashion, a Pathet
Lao broadcast of 21 November indicated that the
Communists intend to keep exploring the chances
for talks despite the increasingly "aggressive acts"
by the US in Laos. The broadcast said these acts
"complicate efforts to solve Laotian questions
and hinder the holding of a meeting," but in-
dicated that explorations with Vientiane were
continuing.
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Sino-Soviet Relations: Restoring Appearances
The arrival of the newly appointed Chinese
ambassador, Liu Hsin-chuan, in Moscow this
weekend caps recent efforts by both sides to
return to a routine, businesslike atmosphere in
state relations. Liu's appointment, which has been
rumored for months, was only confirmed on 18
November when Peking announced he was
present during the first meeting between Chou
En-lai and the new Soviet ambassador, V. S.
Tolstikov, who arrived in China six weeks ago.
Both countries have publicly reaffirmed re-
cently their interest in achieving a "normaliza-
tion" of relations, but each has also characterized
the other's statements as "only words" not fol-
lowed by "actual deeds." Peking's message to the
Soviet government on the 53rd anniversary of the
Bolshevik revolution early this month claimed
"differences of principle" should not hinder "ef-
fective measures" to settle "important outstand-
ing questions in state relations." The Chinese
adopted this line prior to the opening of the
Peking talks last year and probably repeated it to
avoid being branded as "obstructionists" by the
Soviets who continued to publicly stress their
""conciliatory" attitude by conspicuously repro-
ducing an edited version of the Chinese state-
ment. A speech on 6 November by Politburo
member Suslov marking the anniversary had a
more austere tone, however, reminding Peking
that fundamental ideological differences cannot
be compromised.
Although the improved climate reflects both
sides' determination to sustain the diminished
tensions along the border, it is unlikely that it
presages movement toward resolution of specific
differences. The announcement on 22 November
that an "agreement on the exchange of goods and
payments" had been signed in Peking by the
respective vice ministers of foreign trade is
symbolic of current Sino-Soviet relations. Al-
though the protocol-the first since 1967-%s a
tangible indication of the "new atmosphere,"
omission of the period covered by the accord and
Peking's remark that "the two sides will continue
to exchange views" lend credence to reports of
still unresolved problems. Moreover, both Soviet
and Chinese representatives have recently stated
that the Peking political talks continue stale-
mated, with less frequent meetings reduced' to
exchanges of position papers. The border-river
navigation talks, which began last July, also
continue without any sign of agreement.
Communist China: A Step Closer to the UN
Last week's General Assembly vote on the in the coming year and to gain momentum as a
Chinese representation issue almost certainly result of the UN vote.
ended the usefulness of procedures that have kept
Peking out of the UN for two decades. The
erosion of support for Taipei asthe sole represent-
ative of China in the UN during the past six
months led to a plurality (51 to 49 with 27
abstentions) for the first time on the "Albanian"
resolution to admit Peking at the expense of
Taipei. The Nationalists' loss of support, which
occurred largely as a result of China's more "rea-
sonable" diplomatic posture, is likely to continue
More important, however, is the decline of
support for the Important Question motion that
makes any change in China's representation
dependent on a two-thirds majority of the As-
sembly. Last week's 66-52 vote was a decrease
from last year's 71-48. But even this result was
achieved because a number of nations had made
an early commitment to vote "yes," and several
states have expressed reluctance to vote the same
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SJ(JKJ 1,
way next year, inasmuch as the motion would
seem "a device to frustrate the will of the ma-
jority." Some states, in fact, have already indi-
cated they expect to alter their position.
The Chinese Communists can be expected to
press strongly in the coming year for the defeat of
the "illegal" Important Question resolution.
Peking's recent public and private statements in-
dicate it is extremely sensitive to the possibility
that continued passage of that motion will buy
time for the "two China's" or "one China, one
Taiwan" formula favored by many states. The
Chinese fear that a number of nations supporting
the "Albanian" resolution will line up in the
future behind such a motion or that the China
representation issue may be put in the broader
context of "universality of membership." Indeed,
the large number of abstentions on the "Al-
banian" motion last week is indicative of the
dilemma faced by many states that favor Peking's
entry, but not Taipei's expulsion.
Both Chinese regimes are certain to stress
that any such compromise "solution" would not
be viable, because each would refuse to hold a
seat if the other were also represented. However,
even in the unlikely event that such a motion
carried in the Assembly next year, the National-
ists might well immediately withdraw from the
work' body-thus permitting Peking to enter on
its own terms.
I n a broader sense, last week's vote was a
sharp blow to Taipei's prestige. Peking will un-
doubtedly attempt to exploit its advantage to the
hilt, further undermining the Nationalists'
diplomatic position both in the UN and the world
community. One obvious line of attack, facili-
tated by the UN vote, would be to encourage
furthE!r diplomatic recognitions of the Peking
regime; Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Chile, and
several African states are waiting in the
USSR-Japan: Tokyo Hits a Sore Spot
Tokyo's campaign for the return of the
southern Kurile Islands-taken by the USSR fol-
lowing the defeat of Japan in World War II-has
drawn a testy Soviet response. In a move clearly
designed to indicate Soviet displeasure over
Tokyo's public agitation for the reversion of the
disputed territory, Moscow informed the
Japanese on 19 November of the indefinite post-
ponement of talks slated to begin this week on
ensuring the safety of Japanese fishing in the
vicinity of the Kuriles.
Moscow's action came about a month after
Prime Minister Sato injected the "northern ter-
ritories" issue into his UN General Assembly
speech. Sato's remarks, which particularly irked
Moscow, capped a two-pronged Japanese cam-
paign of low-key diplomatic approaches to the
USSR and a noisy propaganda offensive in Japan
itself. Moscow delivered a stiff oral protest against
the campaign on 11 November
Moscow's
postponement of the fishery talks was designed to
put teeth into this admonition.
Tokyo recognizes that the return of the is-
lands is virtually out of the question. Previous
Japanese attempts to revive this issue have run
into Soviet insistence that it is closed.\
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Moscow's refusal to discuss the islands is
partly rooted in military considerations; Soviet
possession ensures control of access to the Sea of
Okhotsk. In addition, Moscow wants to avoid
reopening the sensitive question of Soviet rights
to territory seized in World War I i lest this rein-
force irredentist sentiment in Eastern Europe and
China.
Moscow also fears that Tokyo will use the
issue to stir up additional support for Japanese
rearmament. Tokyo's plans for expanding Japa-
nese military forces have caused increased con-
cern. Defense Minister Grechko issued a public
warning last September that Moscow will take the
"rebirth of Japanese militarism" into account in
formulating its own military programs.
Moscow probably wants to avoid a situation
in which the "northern territories" issue would
dominate Soviet-Japanese relations to such an ex-
tent that it might disrupt growing economic ties.
However, the Soviets are clearly intent on impres-
sing on Tokyo the seriousness with which they
view this issue, and may take further steps to get
the Japanese to desist.
North Korea: The Economy Is Making Mixed Progress
The North Korean regime appears to be gen-
erally satisfied with the gains made under the
"seven-year" plan which was stretched from 1961
to 1970, but South Korea's recently burgeoning
economy is cause for some embarrassment. Per-
haps as a result, the goals of the new six-year plan
reflect Kim 11-song's strong contention that a
socialist economy is capable of rapid self-sus-
tained growth in every economic sector.
According to a report given by First Vice
Premier Kim Il before the recently concluded
fifth party congress, industrial output by the end
of this year will have grown at an annual rate of
12.8 percent since 1960, and the seven-year plan
will be "fulfilled successfully." The original plan
was extended because of a temporary withdrawal
of Soviet aid in the early sixties when relations
with Moscow cooled and recent increased military
spending.
Most of North Korea's industrial growth
during the last ten years has been concentrated in
the strategic heavy industries. Output of coal,
crude steel, and machine tools has more than
doubled, while that of electric power nearly
doubled. Growth in light industry, however, made
only moderate advances, and agricultural pro-
duction barely kept pace with population in-
creases. A modest increase in the output of
textiles and other consumer goods may have im-
proved somewhat the living standard of the
average North Korean worker. Nonetheless, the
entire economy grew at only about half the rate
of that of South Korea over the same period.
The new six-year plan described by Kim is
ambitious and calls for a 14-percent annual in-
crease in industrial output. Although it promises
further improvements in the standard of living,
there will be continued concentration on the stra-
tegic heavy industries. As a whole, this plan is
more in keeping with North Korea's capabilities
than the inflated goals of the seven-year plan, but
its success is dependent in large measure upon
keeping down military spending and continued
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EUROPE
Bavarian Election Helps Bonn and Strauss
All the major parties benefited from the
results of last Sunday's election in Bavaria.
By drawing 12.4 percent in Middle Fran-
conia and thus meeting the state requirement of
at least ten percent of the vote in one district, the
Free Democrats (FDP) renewed representation
they had lost in the state legislature in 1966. This
success reinforces the psychological boost the
Bonn coalition won in Hesse earlier this month.
Also, it provides further evidence that the party's
role as junior partner in Chancellor Brandt's gov-
ernment has won new voter support and has
halted the party's decline.
As in Hesse, the Social Democrats (SPD) lost
a few percentage points, but are compensated to a
large extent by the success of their partners, upon
whom they must depend for their slim Bundestag
majority. Moreover, recent embarrassing dis-
closures of an abortive attempt by the Christian
Social Union (CSU) to bring a Bavarian FDP
Bundestag deputy, Karl Geldner, into the CSU
will probably strengthen the Bonn coalition by
discouraging other FDP Bundestag members from
following three who defected to the opposition in
October.
BAVARIA ELECTION
(22 November 1970)
Percent of the Vote
(State 1970)
Percent of the Vote
(State 1966)
Percent of the Vote
I. Bavaria
(Federal 1969)
CSU
56.4
48.1
54.4
SOD
33.3
35.8
34.6
FDP
5.5
5.1
4.1
NOD
2.9
7A
5.3
DKP
(Communist)
Page 9
Landtag Seats
1970 1966
124 110
70 70
10 0
0 15
As expected, the CSU, the Bavarian affiliate
of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), re-
tained control of the Munich government by win-
ning an absolute majority, though the margin of
victory is surprisingly wide. Bavaria is a con-
servative stronghold and CSU leader Franz-Josef
Strauss, though a controversial figure nationally,
is very popular in the state. The "Geldner affair"
obviously failed to hurt the CSU, which benefited
from voter resentment over inflation.
The outcome undoubtedly enhances Strauss'
standing in the national party. It will encourage
him to assert his influence forcefully in January
when the national party congress meets to decide
key policy questions and perhaps to select the
man who will become chancellor should the CDU
win the 1973 federal elections In general, the
Christian Socialists have clearly shown their aver-
sion to Ostpolitik and most recently zeroed in on
the reconciliation treaty with Poland, initialed in
Warsaw last week. CDU/CSU leaders allege that
the treaty's acceptance of the Oder-Neisse
frontier violates the West German constitution
and that only Bonn made concessions. Strauss is
believed personally to favor even more vigorous
opposition and may interpret his Bavarian success
as a mandate to urge an all-out attack on Os-
tpol iti k.
The ultra rightist National Democratic Party
(NPD) continued its steady decline, losing all 15
of its seats. Many of the former NPD votes and
those of the now defunct Bavarian Party went to
the CSU. As in Hesse, the CSU also drew some
support from conservative Free Democrats unable 25X1
to accept the FDP's new liberal course. For its
part, the FDP won over some liberal voters from
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Hungary: Brezhnev Endorses Moderate Reform Program
Soviet party boss Brezhnev endorsed the
Hungarian party's domestic reform program in a
speech to the Hungarian party congress on 24
November. Brezhnev announced the Soviet
party's "full understanding and high appraisal" of
the program and made it clear that Budapest's
internal stability, loyalty to the USSR and "prin-
cipled approach" to the reforms were the con-
trolling factors in his positive assessment. The
endorsement will be viewed with relief by the
Hungarians. They have been nervous because in
the past the Soviets were reluctant to state their
views on changes intended to liberalize political
life by permitting popular participation in local
government.
During his keynote speech, Hungarian party
boss Kadar affirmed Hungary's intention to es-
tablish diplomatic relations with West Germany,
when Bonn has cleared up its bilateral problems
with Hungary's allies. Kadar noted that Bonn's
failure to recognize East Germany is a potential
obstacle to progress but he seemed to place more
emphasis on West German "resoluteness" in con-
tinuing its Ostpolitik than on resolution of the
problem of the two Germanies. This formula is
probably meant to convey to East Germany that
Hungary hopes the Ulbricht regime will be forth-
coming in its talks with the Brandt governri]ent.
The congress so far has been a political tour
de force for the Hungarian party leader. His
speech of 23 November-particularly his de-
lineation of internal political reforms--was
couched in terms calculated to reflect firm
domestic stability, sober-minded confidence, and
careful progressivism. So far there has been no
dissent from conservative opponents of the
reforms, who were unusually vocal prior to the
meeting. Presumably Brezhnev's sup ort for
Kadar will further intimidate them.
Bulgaria-Romania: New, 'riendship Treaty
A new 20-year Treaty of Friendship, Co-
operation and Mutual Assistance was signed in
Sofia on 20 November by Romanian President
Ceausescu and Bulgarian leader Zhivkov, replacing
the one of 1948. It is unique in the sense that the
clause calling for joint efforts toward interna-
tional detente binds both parties to work for a
conference on European security, even though
Romanian and Bulgarian views on this subject are
known to differ markedly.
I n other respects, the new agreement varies
only slightly from the authoritative Soviet-
Romanian pact and from the Polish-Romanian
treaty signed on 12 November. Each side is com-
mitted to supplying all necessary assistance, in-
cluding military, in the event of an armed attack
on the other. There is no reference to the
Page 10
"Brezhnev doctrine" of limited sovereignty, and
economic cooperation within CEMA received
only perfunctory treatment. Zhivkov emphasized
the importance of increased Bulgarian-Romanian
economic contacts, including the joint construc-
tion of a large hydroelectric complex on the
Danube, but the Romanians exhibited little
interest. The agreement calls only for Sofia and
Bucharest to "inform" each other on mutual in-
ternal economic developments.
The two leaders reiterated their well-known
foreign policy differences, albeit in a moderate
and conciliatory tone. Zhivkov stressed the
importance of Soviet "experience" as a model for
building socialism, but Ceausescu, did not even
mention the USSR. Both leaders moved to
strengthen Balkan cooperation, but each
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indicated his country should have pre-eminent
leadership in this activity. Zhivkov implied that
his archenemy, Yugoslavia, with which Romania
maintains warm relations, was fostering "enmity
and hatred" in the Balkans.
?
YUGOSLAVIA: The highly charged nature of
the debate on stabilization of Yugoslavia's econ-
omy was dramatized by the sudden resignation of
Vice Premier Miljanic, coordinator of the stabili-
zation program, on 18 November. He may have
resigned in part over the issue of whether to
devalue the dinar. In announcing the resignation,
Premier Ribicic noted that there has been re-
sistance to the stabilization program and implied
that regional interests were not cooperating.
East Germany's leader, Walter Ulbricht, will
be the next to sign a similar treat` in Bucharest,
probably in early December.
Earlier in the week, the republic and provincial
governments expressed support for the program,
but each stressed those aspects it finds most pal-
atable. Two days after the announcement of Mil-
janic's resignation, the cabinet debated the stabili-
zation program for over ten hours before adopt-
ing a set of proposals scheduled to be introduced
on 2(3 November to the Federal Assembly, where
the debate undoubted) will resume. 25X1
FRANCE-POLAND: This week's visit to Poland
by Premier Chaban-Delmas and Foreign Minister
Schumann demonstrates continuing French in-
terest in pursuing "detente diplomacy" with the
East, a policy earlier advanced by President
Pompidou's trip to Moscow. Coming on the heels
of the Warsaw-Bonn accord, whose potential im-
pact is compared in both Eastern and Western
Europe to that of postwar Franco-German recon-
ciliation, the visit also helps Poland stress that its
political and economic policy toward Western
Europe is balanced and not wholly focused on
relations with West Germany. The Poles are in-
terested in obtaining the French leaders' reitera-
tion of France's de facto recognition of the Oder-
Neisse border, first extended by De Gaulle in
1959 and restated during his visit to Poland in
September 1967. Such a French statement now
could be used by Warsaw to press for similar
moves by other Western powers. Warsaw also
wants more forthcoming French support for a
f
con
erence on European security, which Paris,
however, ties to prior progress on a Berlin settle-
EAST-WEST GERMANY: Working-level talks be-
tween the two Germanies began on 27 November.
In making its offer on 19 November for an "ex-
change of views" with Bonn, Pankow specified
that the discussion should be limited to West
German "transit" traffic to West Berlin in ex-
change for a cessation by the Federal Republic of
its "illegal" official activities in the city. A day
after Pankow's agreement to talk, the East Ger-
man news service complained that recently con-
cluded meetings in West Berlin of the Bundesrat
financE! committee and of the finance ministers of
the West German states were "hostile to detente."
Although the East Germans have tacitly agreed
with West Germany to broaden the scope of the
talks, Pankow's limited terms of reference indi-
cate indeed that little more than an "exchange of
views" can be expected for some time. 25X1
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Italy: Coalition Government Under Strain
Prime Minister Colombo's four-party coali-
tion is under serious political strain. At the heart
of the problem are the differing attitudes among
leaders of the government parties toward an in-
creasing political role for the Communists (PCI)
at the national level.
The coalition's program hinges on an eco-
nomic and financial bill designed to ensure a
dependable base for certain key social reforms. If
the bill fails to pass there probably would be a
new wave of the social protest strikes comparable
to those that undercut industrial production last
spring.
Most Christian Democrats, Republicans, and
Unitary Socialists want to push the measure
through the Chamber, with night sessions if neces-
sary, to give the Senate time to act before 24
December, the expiration date of the temporary
decree that the bill is to confirm. The Socialists
favor a more drawn out approach, accepting some
Communist amendments, before rejecting the
many offered by the ultraleft Proletarian Social-
ists and dissident Manifesto Communists.
Compromise in this manner with the PCI
would hold risks for the economic stabilization
features of the bill. It would also further erode
the traditionally rigid anti-Communism of the
Italian center-left that has insisted the govern-
ment parties vote together to pass major legisla-
tion with no regard for possible Communist help
or hindrance in parliament.
The government has the votes to force the
measure through, unamended, on a motion of
confidence, but at the very least, this would
deepen the existing divisions within the coalition
over present and future attitudes toward the PCI.
Consideration of the PCI assumes increasing
importance to politicians when they think in
terms of the presidential election in December
1971. Christian Democrats and Socialists con-
tending for the office must count on dividing the
non-Communist vote. Consequently, they are
courting the PCI, which is almost certain to pro-
vide the decisive margin as it did for incumbent
President Saragat in the election of 1964.
In addition, a number of Socialists and left-
wing Christian Democrats see merit in a future
political grouping that would include the PCI.
Left-wing Christian Democrat Donat-Cattin, for
example, recently explained in a public interview
that he sees the present situation as part of a
development toward an eventual alliance of all
leftist forces, including the Communists.
Many government party leaders conse-
quently are reluctant to back a vote of confidence
that would draw clear battle lines between the
center-left and the PCI. On the contrary, they are
seeking more flexible parliamentary groupings.
The PCI, for its part, has increased its par-
ticipation in local and regional government over
the past year. In parliament this fall, the Com-
munists have posed as the constructive op-
position, abstaining on an ultraleft motion to
declare the government's economic bill unco-sti-
tutional and refusing to join the ultraleft's fili-
bustering tactics. ,
moreover, party leaders have expressed their in-
terest in steadily enlarging the party's political
role at the national level.
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Israel: Jarring Talks
The Israeli cabinet, at a meeting on 22 No-
vember, apparently made no decision about re-
turning to the Jarring talks. The official com-
munique stated only that the government would
work to create the conditions that would justify
participating in talks held under Jarring's aus-
pices. The Israeli press generally believes the cabi-
net emerged from the meeting more unified than
before, although differences between Defense
Minister Moshe Dayan and other members of the
cabinet apparently persist. At a Labor Party meet-
ing on 23 November, Dayan reiterated his view
that Israel should seek talks with Egypt to estab-
lish a new cease-fire agreement, despite the viola-
tion of the first agreement by the movement of
missiles in the standstill zone.
According to the US Embassy, the issue un-
der debate in Israel is not whether to return to
the Jarring talks because, with the exception of
the extreme right wing, everyone agrees that the
talks must be resumed sooner or later. The real
debate is said to be between those who see the
talks as a bona fide chance for peace and conse-
quently want them renewed immediately, and
those who view the talks as something Israel must
do to gain an extension of the cease-fire and to
please the US. The latter want to drag out the
decision as long as possible in the hope of winning
maximum advantages for Israel. The embassy be-
lieves that the majority of Israelis are not sure one
way or another. The view of the Israeli press is
that Israel will ultimately return to the talks, 25X1
although a decision to return will be postponed
for several weeks, because further "clarification"
from the US must be sought.
ETHIOPIA: In a well-executed ambush on 21
November, the commander of the army's 2nd
Division was killed, the most dramatic success
scored by the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) in
its current terrorist campaign. Although ELF
guerrillas have staged random ambushes in the
past, this one was apparently aimed specifically at
the commander, the highest ranking Ethiopian
killed to date in the Eritrean insurgency. The
murder may have been to retaliate for recent
army executions of ELF members or to demon-
strate the guerrillas' capabilities in order to coax
more aid from their foreign sponsors.
The general's death has already sparked
heavy retaliatory operations by the army in the
area. The incident is also likely to bring renewed
army pressure on Haile Selassie to establish total
military rule in Eritrea. The Emperor has allowed
the army wide latitude in provincial affairs in
recent months, but has preferred to leave the
over-all administration in civilian
Page 13
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Guinea
The commando assault on Conakry,
Guinea's capital, earl this week largely achieved
the objectives but
failed to trigger a coup. President Toure, although
badly shaken, has probably been strengthened
politically by the episode. Extensive repercussions
unfavorable to Portugal and the West in general
now can be expected.
Groups of commandos, almost certainly
from neighboring Portuguese Guinea, disem-
barked from four unmarked ships in the early
morning of 22 November at points along the
peninsula on which the Guinean capital is
situated. They struck quickly at widely separated
targets, including prisoner camps, the presidential
compound in the suburbs, the port area, and the
headquarters of the Guinean-supported African
guerrilla group operating in Portuguese Guinea.
After inflicting extensive physical damage and
freeing Portuguese soldiers being held captive by
the guerrillas, and some Guinean prisoners as well.
the intruders began to withdraw to their ships
within hours of their arrival without acting di-
rectly to stage a coup.
The bulk of the force, the total size and
composition of which is not yet known, probably
had re-embarked by the next morning, although
remnants are surely still at large in Conakry. Only
a small number of commandos apparently were
killed or captured. Casualties among the defend-
ers were almost certainly higher. Several Euro-
pean bystanders were also killed.
There are no indications that the invaders
received support from the Guinean populace,
which appears in fact to have rallied promptly to
the government. Even some persons who previ-
ously had shown little affection for the regime
became its defenders. Moreover, Toure's political
system seems to have held together rather well.
The largely untrained "people's militia"-n-
trusted with live ammunition for the first time-
responded zealously.
There is weighty evidence to support Toure's
charges that the attack was backed by Portugal
and originated from bases in Portuguese Guinea.
Among other indicators, the operation refledted
considerable planning and logistic su ort.
The immediate impact on the Toure regime,
which has been declaiming against "imperialist"
plots since independence in 1958, has been to
drive it into a frenzy of apprehension about,fur-
ther incursions either by sea or by land. The
government claims to have repulsed attempted
landings each night since the assault on 22 'No-
vember, but it is unlikely that additional landings
have occurred or will occur soon. Toure, n ver-
theless has atepealed urgently for support.
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With but few exceptions member countries
of the 41-state Organization of African Unity
(OAU) have condemned the attack and many
have extended offers of support to Toure. Several
countries, including Nigeria, announced in ad-
vance of any specific requests from Toure their
willingness to provide military help. Sierra Leone
has already moved a company of troops to a
camp inside Guinea. Tanzania has pledged sub-
stantial financial support, and demonstrations,
sometimes organized spontaneously by students,
are taking place in many countries. An OAU
meeting has been set for 9 December in Lagos,
guaranteeing that the furor will continue in Africa
for some time.
In response to an appeal from Toure, the UN
Security Council, meeting in emergency session,
adopted on 23 November a resolution authorizing
a fact-finding mission. It is scheduled to arrive in
Conakry on 25 November. The resolution made
no mention of Lisbon, which has denied any
responsibility.
SOUTH AFRICA - MALAGASY REPUB-
LIC: Officials signed economic aid agreements
last weekend worth almost $6.5 million. The
South African loans will be used to develop a
tourist complex in northern Madagascar. Coming
in the wake of Ivory Coast President Houphouet-
Boigny's call for talks between black- and white-
ruled states, these agreements are likely further to
strengthen Prime Minister Vorster's hand domes-
tically in pursuing his "outward looking policy."
SYRIA: Prime Minister and Defense Minister
Asad has appointed a provisional 26-man cabinet
including some military men close to him, a half
dozen pro-Egyptian ministers, two Communists,
and a number of men who have been retained
from the former cabinet. Damascus still has had
Malagasy officials were publicly effusive in
their gratitude for the aid, and President
Tsirariana urged South Africa to become more
involved in Mada scar's economic development
little to say publicly about the "adjustments" in
the leadership and there has been little popular
reaction to Asad's action. Most observers see only
25X1
slight changes in Syrian policy arising out of
Asad's power grab.
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NOIE: "Azad Koshmit itot*" is rwt
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25* `?? JAMMU
NORTH- AN13f
Peshawar K49M-MR _
_.' s LA Tt"
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Pakistan: Elections
On 7 December, Pakistanis will choose from
among more than 1,500 candidates for 300 seats
in the National Assembly. This constituent assem-
bly is to prepare a constitution to be submitted
within 120 days to President Yahya Khan for
final approval.
Mujibur Rahman's Awami League (AL), the
leading advocate of greater Bengali autonomy, is
the only party running candidates for each of
East Pakistan's 162 elective seats, and many ob-
servers believe that this relatively moderate party
will score from 80 to 100 victories. Bengali criti-
cism of the government's handling of relief opera-
tions following the recent cyclone-tidal wave
could intensify already existing resentment of
West Pakistani dominance and result in an even
greater sweep for the AL. Conservative parties
have failed to work out effective election alli-
ances, and the leftists have fielded only a relative
handful of candidates. There has been some indi-
cation that leftist extremists may resort to vio-
lence in an effort to disrupt elections; it is doubt-
ful, however, that they possess sufficient funds
and strength to force a postponement of elec-
tions.
I n West Pakistan's largest province-the
Punjab-two religious conservative parties, three
moderate parties each claiming to be the authen-
tic Muslim League, and the leftist Pakistan
People's Party (PPP) of former foreign minister
Bhutto should all win seats. Taken together, the
Council Muslim League (CML), the Pakistan
Muslim League Conventionist, and the Qaiyum
Khan faction of the Pakistan Muslim League
(PMLC:) would seem to have the support of a
majority of the voters. By splitting the vote, how-
ever, they will. help both the increasingly active
PPP and the religious parties. The CML seems to
have a slight lead, but it is expected to fall far
short of a majority.
I n Bhutto's native Sind, the same parties are
contending, but the PPP has a slim chance of
winning at least half the seats. In Baluchistan and
the Northwest Frontier, the PMLQ apparently is
about even with a left-leaning regionalist party.
No party, including the East Pakistani
Awami League, is likely to win enough seats to
dominate the constituent assembly. Despite
speculation about postelection alliances, the
formation of a viable coalition will be difficult
and many Pakistanis doubt that the National
Assembly will be able to accomplish its primary
purpose.
The
election seems likely to be held on schedule,
although the balloting has been postponed in
about ten constituencies hit by the recent cyclone
disaster, Subsequent intervention, however, in the
constitution writing process by either the generals
or President Yahya cannot be ruled out./ 25X1
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
C h i l e : The Government Faces its First Problems
At the national plenum of President Al-
lende's Socialist Party (PS) last week a contro-
versy arose between the hard-line faction, led by
Senator Carlos Altamirano, and the secretary gen-
eral of the party, Senator Aniceto Rodriguez.
Rodriguez criticized the hard liners for not having
participated enough in Allende's presidential
campaign. Altamirano, emphasized that he and
his followers had organized armed units and intel-
ligence groups to support the campaign.
Altamirano added that he was only interested in
working with "revolutionaries," not just in the PS
but also in the Movement of the Revolutionary
Left (MIR) and other parties.
This rivalry within the PS has been aggra-
vated by the occupation of government buildings
in several provincial cities by Socialists who com-
plained that party members had not been given
enough government jobs. Rodriguez claimed that
these actions had been taken without the author-
ity of the PS central committee, but they may
have had his tacit support; at least one of the
seizures was instigated by two of Rodriguez' close
allies. President Allende is disturbed by these ac-
tions. He pointed out to the PS plenum that the
success or failure of his administration will reflect
on the Socialist Party and demanded an end to
the illegal sit-ins.
Allende is trying to placate the MIR, in
order to prevent a renewal of urban terrorism that
alarmed many Chileans during the election cam-
paign. The MIR has acted as his personal body-
guard for several months. He believes that he can
control it and, with the PS, build a counterweight
within the Popular Unity coalition to the more
numerous and better organized Communist Party.
Allende is stoppingthe prosecu-
tion of terrorists arrested by the Frei govern-
ment or now in hiding. Those in jail have been
released unconditionally, and charges have been
dropped against others. It seems likely, however,
that MIR leaders, who make no secret of their
disdain for constitutional procedures, eventually
will become dissatisfied with the pace of Al-
lende's actions and resume their violent activitjes.
Such a development would present Allende with
the unpalatable alternatives of tolerating ter-
rorism or cracking down on revolutionaries, thus
impugning the authenticity of his own leftist
credentials.
Allende's government also faces a difficult
dilemma in dealing with the occupation of urban
land by squatters, as well as the seizure of new
but unoccupied housing that had been assigned to
and paid for by lower class workers. In the
Santiago area more than 4,000 dwelling units
have been seized since the election in September.
On 17 November protesting homeowners stopped
traffic on a major highway out of the city for 24
hours. The government now must reconcile the
demands of the squatters, its own promise to
resolve quickly the critical housing shortage, and
the need for enforcement of the law and the
homeowners' claims.
On another front, the plan of Allende and
the Communists to buttress leftist forces within
the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and thus
obtain PDC support for crucial legislative pro-
posals is running into difficulty. The PDC or-
ganized the occupation of some of the housing
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units in an effort to maintain its influence among
the urban poor, where it has long been a strong
competitor of the Communists and Socialists. It is
becoming increasingly clear that the PDC's sup-
port for Allende in the congressional runoff has
not guaranteed that the new government will
move slowly against PDC interests. Christian
Democratic bureaucrats are retaining their jobs
with increasing difficulty, and a Communist-led
strike at an important PDC publishing house
threatens to bankrupt the company. As a result,
PDC legislators are marshaling their forces and
may oppose Allende's budget proposal and a plan
for nationalizing all banking facilities.
Private Enterprise
The take-over of two partly US-owned com-
panies last week may serve as a warning that the
administration is willing to force private enter-
prise to cooperate. The take-overs were precipi-
tated by complaints of Communist-led labor
unions and carried out under a 1945 labor law.
Recent government press leaks indicate that its
1971 wage policy will further shift income away
from management, and a new "escalator" feature
will redistribute income among wage-earners by
granting substantially larger increases to lower-
paid groups. Prices will be rigidly controlled and
companies will be expected to offset the addi-
tional profit squeeze by expanding output.
Copper
The new minister of mines has announced
that Chile will propose to the meeting of copper
producing countries in Paris that joint action be
taken to seek new markets and break out of the
"iron circle" of present market arrangements. He
cited as a potentially good market Communist
China, which has periodically shown interest in
direct copper purchases from Chile. Chile's
copper output is expanding rapidly as a result of
the extensive investment of US companies there
in recent years. I
Latin America Takes a New Look at Cuba
Chile's resumption of diplomatic relations recommendation by maintaining diplomatic and
with Havana on 12 November has prompted sev- commercial relations with Cuba, was the only
eral other countries to review hemisphere policy Latin American state to applaud Chile's move.
toward Cuba. The resolution of the Organization
of American States (OAS) in 1962 that suspended
Cuba from the inter-American system and the
resolution in 1964 that called on member states
to sever all ties with the Castro government, in- Jamaica, which was admitted to the OAS in 1969
creasingly are being questioned. and maintains commercial relations with Cuba,
has not reacted publicly.
Chile was the first country formally to re-
verse its compliance with the 1964 resolution. Most Latin American countries have been
Mexico, which refused to comply with the OAS reluctant to criticize Chile publicly, although it is
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widely recognized that the viability of the OAS
has been undermined. Uruguayan Foreign Min-
ister Peirano Facio believes that Chile's action
threatens the "credibility of all inter-American
obligations." He is worried that other Latin
American countries may also recognize Cuba un-
less a majority in the OAS reaffirms th
resol
Ecuador has indicated that it will abide by
the 1964 OAS stand although two government
ministers and many prominent Ecuadoreans ap-
parently favor re-establishing ties with Havana.
President Velasco, who is not known for the
consistency of his public statements, said recently
that "there can be no peace in the hemisphere if
an American state is maintained in perpetual
excommunication."
Venezuela, which brought the charges of
subversion against Havana that resulted in the
1964 OAS resolution, is taking a passive role now.
In a press conference on 19 November, President
Caldera refrained from criticizing Chile or Cuba,
and said that Caracas was discussing the matter
with other Latin American states.
The US Embassy in La Paz reports that
"third world" foreign policy proponents in
Bolivia can be expected to attempt to bring about
a "liberalization" of policy toward Cuba. A vote
in the OAS on Cuba could reflect the same partial
change in policy that resulted in Bolivia's recent
abstention in the UN on the Albanian resolution.
A number of countries, including Argentina
and Brazil, apparently prefer to avoid a public
re-examination of Cuba's revolutionary role and
place in the inter-American community. Such a
review would aggravate divisions within the ;OAS
and would probably result in a larger "pro-Cuba"
vote than in 1964 when four countries voted
against sanctions. Some countries, moreover, may
no longer believe that Cuba's more cautious and
selective support to Latin American revolu-
tionaries is cause for sanctions.
In any case, there is considerable concern
throughout the hemisphere that if the OAS fails
to act other states will move unilaterally to
recognize Cuba and further discredit the QAS.
The Peruvian Government is the most likely to
follow such a course even though it has fre-
quently reaffirmed its adherence to collective
decision making within the OAS framework, The
US Embassy in Lima reports that if the Cuba
question came to a vote in the OAS, Peru would
be inclined to vote against the 1964 resolution. In
the long run, however, if the OAS fails to act,
Peru may be tempted to take unilateral action in
recognizing Cuba.
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Havana stands to gain regardless of whether resume participation as long as the US is a mem-
the OAS acts or not. Castro flatly refuses to ber. He has indicated a willingness, however, to
renounce his role as an "exporter of revolution" consider bilateral relations with countries that
and vehemently denounces the OAS, refusing to publicly disavow the OAS sanctions. E:~__ ~ 25X1
Mexico: New President Foresees Good Relations with the US
The Mexican presidential succession on 1
December holds promise for another good era of
US-Mexican relations.
Incoming President Luis Echeverria's strong
but realistic nationalism gives him a clear under-
standing of the overwhelming importance of the
United States to Mexico, and he clearly intends
this "special relationship" to be an asset rather
than a problem. Echeverria considers his meeting
with President Nixon this month a total success,
and he believes that now that he has established a
good personal friendship with the US President he
can pursue Mexico's interests in bilateral affairs
with full vigor.
desire to bring the most modern technology into
Mexico and to continue the flow of investment,
but he wants closer control over the conditions
under which both operate. As president-elect,
Echeverria held a number of conferences with the
US business community in Mexico and he has
invited leading US businessmen to his inaugura-
tion.
outgoing President Diaz Ordaz leaves his
successor a healthy legacy of achievement in the
fence-mending field, particularly in the form of
settled boundary disputes. Diaz Ordaz and For-
eign Minister Carrillo Flores, however, have been
sharply criticized by the extreme left, which is
chronically suspicious of a "sellout" to the
"northern colossus."
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Mexican-US trade and US investment are of
prime interest to Echeverria. He has stressed his
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,rr, l
Although a number of constant vexations
will continue to test US-Mexican friendship,
increasin I constructive bilateral exchange Looks
hopeful.
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