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March 5, 1971
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Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Secret DIRECTORATE OF INTELLICTENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Secret State Dept. review completed 5 March 1971 No. 0380/71 Copy N'~ 2 Q Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 CONTENTS (Inforrnation as of noon F,ST, 4 March 1971 J Indochina: Tlhe Battle Joined . 2 Another Spectacular in Cambodia . 4 The Other War in Laos . 5 The Penetrating Viet Cong 5 .................... Electioneering in South Vietnam . 6 Communist Cluna: Military Under Fire 7 ............... France Renevrs Commitment to S ace Pro rams 9 Poor Countries to Receive ~mitea iraae tsreax Polish Workers Persist with Demands 12 ----o--- - 14 European Communities Debate Farrn Prices and Policies Middle East: Diplomatic Maneuvering and Military Preparations 15 Palestinians: Parliamentary Powwow 16 Relations Between Syria and the USSR Warm Up 17 Sudan Rcvolration Flags 17 Drift Toward East Pakistani Secession Continues 19 SEPARATE :DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA: The Bantustans Chile: Elections and Foreign Affairs 20 Colombia's Troubles Increase 21 Cuba: Prens;r Latina Continues to Expand 22 Soviets Increasing Aid to Cuba 22 BRAZIL UNDER MEDICI NOTES: Nationalist China; Burma; Yugoslavia-USSR; Austria; ~~ Africa-UK; Senegal-Guinea; Panama SECRET Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Mar 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 S.~CGKJ~;'1' Tchepone urea ~~ 125 .r =?~ _ - a-036 ~~~ ~~~ -~ Location of US aircraft fired on by SAMs %/ General location of ARVN forces [ll~ong`P~ne "~,,,~, 238 . J :Mugtt~?~. V s Rossible alternate network SECRET Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Mar 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 SECRET FAR EAST Indochina: The Battle Joined Some of the heaviest, bloodiest fighting of the war is taking place as the Communists at- tempt to thwart South 'Vietnam's dry-season of- fensives into their strongholds in southern Laos and Cambodia. Both skies are playing for high stakes: the South Vietnamese seek to cripple the enemy's war-making capacity and to impress upon Hanoi that the rules of the game have been changed; the Communists must protect their sup- ply routes and are trying hard to inflict setbacks on the South Vietnamese that could have wider repercussions on the course of the war. During the past ten days the Communists have counterattacked South Vietnamese advances vigorously in both Cambodia and southern Laos. The attacks slowed the South Vietnamese drive into the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex, but at week's end Saigon's forces were beginning once again to press westward. Casualties have been heavy on both sides, but, both Saigon and Hanoi seem willing to pay this price in pursuit of their current objectives. Long before the alliE:d operation into eastern Laos was launched on 8 February, it was apparent that North Vietnam would fight hard to defend the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This conclusion was borne out during the first two vveeks of the operation as the Communists rushed reinforcements to the area and launched an accelerated drive to move supplies south before the South Vietnamese could stop them, But what w,as not so apparent-and indeed what could only be a matter of specula- tion-was that Hanoi might also view the situation as an opportunity to bring its military resources to bear against allied forces in a way that has eluded the Communists in South Vietnam for nearly two years. Recent enemy tactics strongly suggest that the North Vietnamese do see such an opportunity and that although defense of their supply lines still has first priority, they also are out to strike a blow against the South Vietnamese and the allied Vietnamization program. The developing action on the ground in Laos during the past week gives some indication of tow the North Vietnamese plan to pursue these objectives. The strongest enemy thrusts so far have come against the right flank of the South Vietnamese operation, that is, the string of posi- tions held by airborne and ranger troops on the high ground north of Route 9. The Communists apparently hope to bring such heavy pressure to bear in this area that the South Vietnamese will be reluctant to push deeper into the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex to the west and south. The upshot of these instructions was the heavy North Vietnamese attack last weekend against two South Vietnamese forward positions on hills north of Route 9. The enemy suffered heavy losses in the actions, but South Vietnamese casualties were also substantial, and part of an ARVN brigade headquarters was overrun. The fighting took place just a few miles from the area where a South Vietnamese ranger battalion had been badly battered the previous week. Fighting also has picked up in the area as- signed to the South Vietnamese 1st Division south of Route 9. The ARVN 1st Division with- drew under enemy pressure from one hilltop po- sition in this area during the week, and other units of the 1st have been involved in a series of sharp ground clashes. During the past few days the South Vietnamese have resumed westward movements toward Tchepone, leapfrogging by helicopter to hilltop positions along Route 9. So far the North Vietnamese have resisted these moves with a hail of antiaircraft fire, but the enemy has yet to carry out heavy counterattacks with ground forces against this advance. SECRET Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Mar 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 SECRET During the week the North Vietnamese added surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to their al- ready stiff air defenses in the general vicinity of the Lam Son 719 area of operations. US pilots reported being shot at by several missiles or rockets a few miles we~~t of Tchepone and along the Demilitarized Zone. SAM firings in the DMZ area are rare but not unprecedented; the firings from inside Laos may be the first the Communists have made- with these weapons in that country. Their introduction in Larger numbers could sig- nificantly increase the threat to allied aircraft supporting the South Vietnamese drive into Laos. A Hotter War Around the Cy!up Plantation South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) forces ran into increasingly strong enemy resistance in east- ern Cambodia during the week. Heavy Commu- nist rocket and mortar barrages against ARVN positions east of the Chup rubber plantation, par- ticularly near the village of Dambe on Route 75, caused ARVN losses of several hundred killed or wounded. At the same time, air strikes on enemy troops in this area reportedly resulted in some sizable Communist casualties. Some of the sharpest ground fighting took place near Dambe east of the Chup rubber planta- tion. ARVN troops clairried to have kilted about 270 Communists during a series of sharp battles around Dambe toward the end of the week. Fifty-eight ARVN soldiers were killed and over 200 were wounded. There are seven enemy regi- ments maneuvering in i:he Chup plantation - Dambe general area, where the Communists ap- pear determined to keep ,ARVN forces tied down so as to divert or delaythem from moving into the important storage ancf base areas in the sur- rounding countryside. Enemy Reactions in South Vietnam Communist forces are= using South Vietnam- ese Army (ARVN) operations in Laos and Cam- bodia to freshen appeals to their own troops to fight harder in South Vietnam, but as yet these have not matched words with action. Enemy at- tacks and support did pick up somewhat in north- ern South Vietnam during the past week, and there are many signs that North Vietnamese artil- lery and infantry elements plan to harass allied positions stretched along Route 9 between Dong Ha and Khe Sanh. Er~emy activity in Military Region (MR) 2 has generally been at a relatively low level, except for sharp attacks against ranger positions in the central highlands. In MR 3, attacks have been light and there is little to indicate that these will grow significantly in the near future_ ~ SECRET Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Mar 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 SECRET With the exception of a rash of attacks_ against government security out- posts and some skirmishes in the U Minh forest, however, the level of military activity has been moderate throughout the delta. Moscaw registered its concern over events in Indochina in a toughly worded government state- ment last week and in an-oral demarche to US Ambassador Beam by Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsav. Moscow's rc;sponse did not appear to signal an expansion of the Soviet military aid commitment to Hanoi but rather the seriousness with which the Soviets view the possibility of future action aimed directly at North Vietnam. The Kremlin .specifically reminded Washington that the DRV "is a socialist state" but only vaguely warned that the USSR would "help" repel any action again>t the North. The. USSR clearly has same apprehensions that the US will support incursions into North Vietnam and wants to be firmly on retard against such moves. Moscow warned that Indochinese develop- ments may seriously d~~mage US-Soviet relations and questioned the utility of carrying on negotia- tions with Washington in the face of alleged US violations of its Geneva. commitments regarding Laos. Moscow- has made similar statements be- fore, however, and therE: have been no indications ..thus far that.the USSR actually intends to disrupt ongoing diplomatic contacts. Moscow's reaction to Indochinese develop- ments has reflected frustration over its inability to significantly influence developments in either Washington or Hanoi, pis well as unease over the possibility that it might be called on to .take more forceful action to back up the North Vietnamese. The Soviets have sought to keep alive the possibil- ity of a political settlement, but they have made clear that the USSR considers itself powerless to bring about serious negotiations at present. Unless Hanoi shows some interest in diplomatic initiatives, therefore, the Soviets are unlikely to make any dramatic moves. Another Spectacular in Cambodia The Communists broke a five week stand- down in major attacks against Cambodian targets when they carried out a mortar and ground attack against the country's only oil refinery at the sea- port of Kompong Som. Although the attack did not have the same psychological impact as the raid against the Phnom Penh airport in late Jan- uary, it was the first time the Communists had brought the war -into the important seaport and indicates that small-unit actions against popula- tion centers may become a continuing feature in Communist tactics in the coming months. Phnom Penh's petroleum supplies will not necessarily be disrupted as a result of the damage caused by the attack, however. Enemy elements succeeded in destroying four large storage tanks at the refinery before they were driven off by local government security forces. The .Communists apparently did no dam- age to the refinery itself, however. The enemy also bombarded a nearby airfield with mortar fire, forcing its temporary closure. Only limited amounts of petroleum supplies have been trucked to Phnom Penh since Route 4 was reopened in January because of subsequent Communist harassing attacks against convoys traveling that highway. The capital is continuing to depend on the movement of petroleum sup- plies up the .Mekong from South Vietnam to maintain essential fuel stocks. Riverine convoys to Phnom Penh have been arriving there with such regularity that three-month-old restrictions on the sale of gasoline and diesel fuels to civilians re- cently were lifted. In the meantime, the Communists continued to carry out light harassing. attacks against several main lines of communication. These actions were largely ineffectual. Government forces in the Phnom Penh special military region reported the presence of sizable numbers of well-armed enemy troops within striking distance of the city. No heavy fighting occurred in the capital area, however. Nevertheless, the Cambodians remained SECRET Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Mar 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 SECRET apprehensive that enemy pressure against Phnom Penh wilt intensify as the first anniversary of Sihanouk's ouster-1$ March-draws near. The Communists, too, appear to be regroup- ing and resupplying their combat forces around the Long Tieng complex, which now also number over 10,000 men. In t south, Communist units are continu- ing to hara government outposts on then h- ern and Baste edges of the Bolovens Platga~but have done rela 'vel little dama e. Communist ground activity has been light throughout Laos for most of the week, but Com- munist forces in several ~~reas appear to be prepar- ing for increased activit~~. I n the key Long Tieng complex southwest of i:he Plaine des Jarres, ac- tion has consisted principally of small-unit clashes and shelling exchanges, ~jlthough two government outposts, four miles northeast and 22 miles east of the base, were overrun. Long Tieng itself was hit by ten rackets on 4 March, but no facilities were damaged. The government is strengthening its forces in this area, and some 1,200 irregulars from military Region III were moved into the complex on 1 March, raising government force levels to aver 10,000. Several rockets did 't Pakse on 4 M ch, causing only limited damage, ccording to preliminary reports. The`Communists are still giving con empha to subversive activities, and t to be h in some success. In the men errs o the Viet Cori T ene ratmg'"~"ie'e~bng a majority of t a orce outposts th SECRET ed from inside erable elta, 29 govern- have fallen to onths of 1971 Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Mar 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 S~C~lir;'1' have come to bring the go attempt cont Vi 'ast egard the' years, the Communists erritorial units, which to the people, as the rnment close threat to their tivities. Viet Cong o subvert these force nded in the months a to meet .with some succe ndoubtedly will d. They will amese territorial andl police forc are better fined to cope with these Communist tactics. Electioneering in South Vietnam Playing new variations of an old theme, Pres- ident Thieu has come up with a "Four No's" slogan for his election campaign. Swinging through the central highlands last week, Thieu promised , no coalition, i~o neutrality, no terri- torial concessions, and no permission far the en- emy to operate as a legal political party in South Vietnam. This seems to run counter to Thieu's earlier, mare forthcominct offers to let the Com- munists participate in elections. Thieu-has appar- ently decided to take a more uncompromising line in his campaign speeches in order to set the stage to attack the opposition, especially Big Minh, whom he probabl~,r will charge with soft- ness toward the enemy. Addressing his remarks to Hanoi, Thieu has recently begun to threaten an invasion of the North unless the latter stops sending its forces into the South. His political motives aside, Thieu clearly wants to keep North Vietnam thinking about its own defenses while it weighs its strategy and deploys its forces against the allied operation into Laos. In the longer term, he probably wants to drive the point home to Hanoi that the ground rules of this war have been changed and that Hanoi no longer enjoys the advantage of being able to invade the South without much real con- cern that the tatter's forces might move against the North. SECRET Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Mar 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 SECRET Communist China: Military under Fire Debate at the highE:st levels over the growing role of China's armed forces in party and govern- ment affairs is apparently intensifying. Although the sensitive issue of the army's day-to-day role in poli- tics has long been treated circumspectly in official pronouncements, the ground rules appear to be changing, and unusual public criticism is being directed at alleged political failings on the part of the nation's numerous millitary administrators. The points at issue are complex. They include Peking's desire to ensure centralized control over its most viable governing instrument as well as concern over the qualifications of some officers to hold posts within both the army and the civilian party appar- atus. Beyond these problems, however, the recent propaganda outpourings also raise the possibility that a divisive struggle is going on in Peking-a strug- gle that in the past ye~ir already has resulted in several major casualties among leaders whose fate at least in part may have teen determined by their attitude toward the army', future in politics. The most recent public airing of deficiencies in the armed forces came last week in an authoritative article in the party theoreitical journal Red Flag. The article launched a particularly harsh attack on the performance of both senior and junior military offi- cers-many o~F whom are directly involved in civil administration. By implication they were charged with bureaucratic shortcomings reminiscent of those for which China's former party officials were cen- sured during the Cultural I~evolution. Thus, the arti- cle claimed that the performance of many officers is marred by the twin evils of "arrogance" and "com- placency" and called for an intensified ideological struggle to eliminate these traits. According to Red Flag, this struggle should take the form of regular "open-door rectification"--a demeaning form of po- litical harassment in which officers are forced to suffer direct criticism and verbal abuse from "revolu- tionary" soldiers and even, on occasion, from civil- ians. It seems unlikely that this latest diatribe pre- sages another round of purges in the military, but its threatening tone and critical style almost certainly will impose additional strains on the morale and possibly on the cohesiveness of China's politically overburdened military hierarchy. Moreover, it is ap- parent that some army men, if not the majority, are opposing open criticism of the military's political performance on the grounds that it undercuts the army's authority. That this reaction is becoming widespread is suggested by Red Flag's unusually frank attack on the idea that one should not wash one's dirty linen in public. Although it is difficult to determine exactly which elements in the regime are authorizing the present assault on the military, it seems safe to assume that the current complaints are the product of long-standing divisions over the proper limits of the army's political role. Indeed, such divisions may have been a major factor contributing to the uncer twin laarlcrehir. .,~~+,.,-? ~., o,.i..~_ _.._._ ~~__ __ ~ 25X1 it is possible that the more recent fall of po I uro member Chen Po-ta was precipitated in part by his support of opponents of the army during the Cultural Revolution. In any case, concern over the military establish- ment seems to be one discernible thread running through the murky, behind-the-scenes leadership struggles in Peking. The issue appears still unre- solved, and the fact that a recent Mao directive ordering army men not to fear criticism has not yet been widely publicized suggests continuing disagree-25X1 ment over the manner and extent to which the prescribed rectification campaign within the armed forces should be carried out. SECRET Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Mar 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 SECRET NA~'`f~NA IST CHINA: Tai ei's claim to sover- eignty``~yer the Senkakus--officially registered for the first"'?,~time last weep, will probably not be allowed. to~`eopardize relations with Japan. The dispute over? oil exploration rights in the East China Sea are~~ has been brewing for the past 18 months, and . T~. ei no ,doubt felt it politic to claim the islands rurally in view of the fact that Peking did so last ecember, and also because of mounting domestic ~ essure to take a more forth- right -stand on the iss .Taipei's previous position had been merely to nay Japan's claim to the islands, and it has publi ignored Peking's. The Nationalists' latest prono~ cement also claims for Taiwan "full and unrestric d" rights in explora- tion and exploitation of th continental shelf in that area. Despite this, tl~e N ionalists probably hope to proceed with the ex loration through informal. agreements reached with Japan since last November. At the same Lime, they will probably give face-saving propaganda play to their new BURMA: General Ne Win's emergency medical evacua 'on to London on 20 February be se of a bleedi ulcer spurred the rulin utionary Council in considering the cession for the first time. 11 rangy military figures who form- the uppe e~e*Yon of the Revolutionary Council-pluses ~eld commanders summoned hastily tortf-goon amed Army Chief of Staff San Yu,~~ take over I~~uld Ne Win depart the scen~~~`5an Yu, a long-tirn'eti,~hometown friend of Ne Win, is considered adult, h rd-working profes- sional soldier. Burmese Government press releases on 27 February reported that Ne Win was improving and would be discharged from the hospital shortly. Continuing uncertainty in the coming months over Ne Win's health, however, combined with San Yu's lack of leadership qualities, may give rise to intensified maneuvering by others in the Revolutionary Council who might aspire to succeed to the leadership. Any period of instability following a weakening or removal of Ne Win's heavy. hand would reduce Rangoon's ability to cope with its multiple problems, par- ticularly ethnic and Communist insurgency and former prime minister U Nu's efforts to mount a resistance movement from Thailand. SECRErl Page $ WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Mar 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 SECRET EUROPE France Renews Cornmitment to Space Programs The Fre (CNES) announ a budget of $13 during 1971. This million for space programs munity. the second largest budget CNES has ever receiJ declining budgets, reflec and, after two years of a renewed commitment h space efforts. by the government to FrE~ The budget had risen teadily from $3.4 million in 1961 to a high of so e $140 million in 1968, then declined for two ors because of national economic strain and a r -evaluation of some space activities. The 1971 bu et allocates $84 million to program investments d $49 mil- lion to R&D and operating expenditure The program investrnent sector inclut~s million for the European multinational organizations, suggesting a strong French mitment to the developrrient of the Europa sp boosters and application~~ satellites. France mai tains that these programs are essential to seriou European participation iin space exploration and' applications. In actuality, the programs probably do more to further Fr~~nce's own independent space efforts, already more advanced and compre~ hensive than those of all other European cou tries combined. In addition to the E=uropean programs, 30 million will be spent on bilateral projects re ted to the development of the French-in" fired Symphonie communications satellite systeh and studies for upgrading the Diamant-B.:~ space booster, presently the basic workhorse~-of the French space program. Even if its capabilities were improved through ~~uch a joint prc~~ect, the new missile still would remain a French space booster and, as with the Diamant-B, Fr,~nce prob- ation is $10 space experi joint studi of anot_he launcher. I ighted scientifi flector the money for bilateral cooper- illion for various Franco-American ents, but only about $1 million for of space with the USSR. The 'et studies will center on the launching French solar cell package by a Soviet Last year's joint efforts were high- the landing on the moon of a Soviet package containing French laser re- he French space budget also includes some illion for programs the French will conduct selves, such as sounding rocket launchings, ospheric balloon projects, and laser experi- nts. Most of this sum, however, will be spent developing and launching three satellites this ear from France's new space center in French Paris took an early and continuing lead ong European countries in supporting space rams. France's expenditures on space activi- ties one t whole, recent years have amounted to more than Ord of the total for Western Europe as a d this proportion is increasing. France also is t ently to only West European country consist- end more on national and bilateral space proje s than it contributes to Europe's multinational activities as haJ rograms. France views its space g provided invaluable inputs to a whole range of s entific, aerospace, and military programs, as well a community. SECRET h National Space Studies Center ably would offer,~to make it available on a fee d last week that it had received basis for use b the European scientific com- having contributed to placing t of the European scientific Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Mar 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 SECRET YUG?SLAVIA-USSR: Although both si es ex- pressed satisfaction with the visit of Yugoslav Foreign Minister Tepavarent refusal to accept Egypt's demand that it withdraw from all terri- tory it occupied in the June 1967 war. The formal Israeli response to Ambassador Jarring's initiative reportedly was a more detailed version of the cabinet communique of 21 Febru- ary in which the Israelis rejected an Egyptian. offer to make peace in return for Israel's com- plete withdrawal from Sinai. Although the Israeli reply was described as not being specific on borders, Israeli officials have begun to spell out what they regard as minimal acceptable boundaries in any settlement. In a speech on ?_5 February, Prime Minister Golda Meir said, "We will not be able to leave the Galan Heights, Jerusalem, or Sharm ash-Shaykh." In a radio interview the next day, Foreign Minister Abba Ebacr also indicated that Israel would insist on .retaining these three areas. On 27 February, Deputy Prirne Minister Yigal Allon stated on radio that it was essential for Israel to retain control over Sharm ash-Shaykh and a strip of land connecting it to Israel proper, as well as retaining a defense line-along the Golan Heights. Although all three officials indicated that their statements did not represent an official decision on borders, their views appear to be shared- by a majority of government members. The final- Egyptian position on extending the cease-fire is not clear. T'he Egyptians are appar- ently willing, at least for the time being, to permit the US to continue -its efforts to persuade the Israelis to be more forthcoming on the with- drawal issue. It is notev~rorthy that, as the dead- line of 7 March approaches, the tone of Egyptian propaganda- has been consistently less strident than it was just prior to the previous expiration date of 5 February. President Sadat told a meet- ing of the Palestinian National Council in Cairo on 28 February that Egypt intends to explore fully the possibilities of a political solution to the Arab-Israeli crisis before resorting to war. Interna- tional efforts to gain- from the Israelis a more positive commitment on withdrawal, together with international appeals for continued military restraint, could provide Cairo with sufficient justi- fication for continued reliance in the immediate future on political rather than military action. The USSR, meanwhile, in an obvious at- tempt to increase pressure on the Israelis, has issued one of its infrequent government state- ments on the Middle East. The statement, re- leased on 27 February, contrasts the alleged rea- sonableness of the Egyptian response to Jarring's proposals with the Israeli communique an- nouncing Israel's refusal to withdraw to the pre- 1967 boundaries, and it attempts to link Israel's position to the latter-'s relationship with-the US. The statement also warns that the onl~~ alternative to a political settlement is a "military clash" and affirms that ali states interested in peace must act vigorously to prevent Israel and "its patrons" from frustrating such a settlement. It ends with the standard reiteration of all-out Soviet support for the Arabs in their struggle to regain their lands. Military preparations by both the Egyptians and the- Israelis appear to involve contingency planning and the alerting of forces, but there are no indications that either side is mobilizing or redeploying forces to initiate hostilities. The stra- tegic standoff that has developed is unlikely to change in the near future. Egypt's military leaders appear. to be aware that alarge-scale crossing of the Suez Canal would only produce another Arab defeat. The Israelis, on the other hand, have little to gain from another round of fighting. SECRET .Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Mar 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 SECRET Palestinians:. Parliamentary Powwow The meeting in Cairo this week of the Na- tional Cauncil, the Palestine Liberation Organiza- tion's (PLO) parliamentary body, concentrated its attention on the problem of unifying the various fedayeen organizations. The initial sessions of the council were taken up with speeches by Vasir Arafat, Council Chair- man Yahya Hammuda, and others who reaffirmed their intention to continue the military struggle against Israel. Meeting at the same time as the council was the "Popular National Conference." This assemblage, presumably responding to a fedayeen-inspired invitation, reportedly drew to- gether awide spectrurri of once-distinguished Jor- danians and East Ban4~; Palestinians. Both groups were expected to call for the prevention of any further conflict betweE~n the two peoples and to condemn King Husayn's regime. The conference also underscored the rn~ed for the unity of Pales- tinians on both banks of the Jordan River. In his welcoming speech opening the coun- cil, President Sadat of Egypt rather brusquely told the Palestinians to restrict themselves to their proper concerns. He pointed out to the delegates that the responsibilities; and potential strength of the fedayeen movement had been exaggerated from the beginning bar various states to enable them to avoid fulfilling their own obligations. The Egyptian leader counseled the guerrillas to fore- stall any further attempts to liquidate them by concentrating on unifying the Palestinian move- ment. Whatever they decide to do, Sadat now has served notice on the Palestinians not to interfere in Cairo's attempts to achie,~e a peace settl seeming) ious feda 1 mittee co m a Palestin e Li attempte d to into an a p cce ta council in fait, unsolvable problem of uni ~n organizations. A tl~ l_ used of a Fatah, an d gyration Army (P ~,eld various ~F l_ a formul th the enti cou ront for het sented to Popular F again played the mai struct any effectiv boycotting the m part in any deci sought to two quic by o with the ing the var- ependent, and A) representative oposals for unity at was to be pre- for its approval. The iberation of Palestine role in attempting to ob- ~ement toward unity by tings and by refusing to take nd other PL p any quarrels in decisions. The Conte he bud by making ity was avoided ent of a Palestinian eri tting it from the agenda reased to six in an effort to assuage PLA~'commander ?~?~ Arafat and others.) 25X1 SECRET leaders apparently nd the PLA's Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Mar 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 SECRET last mor~t;ti apparently wzis a considerable success on all frorrtSR will be "very I~rfje" establishment of an intergovernmental Commis- this year. ~"' sion for Economic and Scientific-Technical Co- a ,. During the past decade when?Cub~n-Soviet trade doubled, Havana has run a growing d'eflcit that reached an estimated $42~ million in 19~9t This deficit, after falling drtically last year, will again increase and proba'bfy will be close to $400 million by the end of the year. At that time Cuba's total debt to. ?the USSR will amount to about $3 billion, the bulk representing balance- of-payments support. Oder the years, moreover, the USSR. has provided more than $1 billion in subsidies through the preferential price it pays for Cuban sugar. operation. Most of the members are at the deputy ministerial level reflecting the importance appar- ently attached to this body by both sidess. Al- though it is too early to assess the commission's prospects, it is likely to have a difficult future in ;,view of the erratic shifts that have characterized ~u,ba's economic policies in the past. S~rvjet military deliveries last year were routine, ahd,, available evidence points to more of the same in'~1971. Shipments have consisted of newer equipment to replace materiel in Havana's aging military inventories: negotiations on more important issues. In a well- publicized press interview Torrijos characterized relations with the US as "good" although com- plaining about the violation of Panamanian sov- ereignty. Torrijos also advanced the standard re- jection of the "in perpetuity" clause in any new canal treaty and stated that his government has last weE~k, top government lead- ers criticized the US for refusing to return a minor Panamanian official arrested in the Canal Zone on drug charges. Despite earlier threats of violent demonstrations, However, the government has thus far confined itself to diplomatic protests in the wake of a US decision to fly the prisoner to Texas to stand trial. General Torrijos apparently has concluded that furtPier steps would not only be futile but also would jeopardize chances for no interest in establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union at this time. 25X1 SECRET Page 23 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Mar 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Secret DIRECTO:[~ATE OF INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Special Report 'S'eparate 1~evelopnaent in South Africa: The Bantustans Secret NB 16 5 March 1971 No. 0360/71A Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 ~,C,l~t'Cr, 1 SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE BANTUSTANS Gee fan only safeguard the white man's control over our country if we move in `the: direction of separation-separation in the political sphere at-any rate. The late Prime Minister Hendriic Verwoerd, 1959 SincE~ coming to power in 1948 the Afrikaner-dominated National Party has had as its primary goal the implementation of its policy of separation of the races (apartheid). In the last decade, the keystone of that policy has become the bantustan,~, the African tribal homelands. In theory, these territories will even- tually become self-governing, independent states, and Prime Minister Vorster has said that his government hopes to grant "independence" to one or two bantu- stans in the next few years. The chances, however, that any of the homelands will ever become self-supporting and really free of dependence on white-ruled South Africa are almost nonexistent. Granting nominal independence soon, however, could have certain advan- tages for Pretoria. It would probably reassure Afrikaner supporters of the government that it is moving ahead-albeit slowly-with separate development. It could also further the Vorster government's efforts to improve relations with a select nurnber of black-ruled states and thus sow dissension among African leaders wl~o are already at odds with each other over how best to deal with South Africa. The government hopes the bantustans will eventually become the homeland of most of South Africa's blacks, and it is attempting to remove the Africans from white-designated areas by converting the black urban labor force, on which the economy is dependent, into a migratory one. The problems confronting the government in accomplishing this, however, are monumental, and whether the Nationalists will succeed in turning present planning into practice is clouded with uncertainty. Special Report - 1 - SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 51,1~KL 1 i ~ Transkei Legislative Authority Tswana Territorial Authority Zulu Territorial Authority OSiter Bantustans Special Report - 2 - 5 March 1971 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 SECRET There .must be a white South Africa and a black South Africa politicc!lly divided but peacefully and cooperatively coexistent. S. Pienaar, prominent Afrikaner journalist Apartheid, though cruel in practice, is idealistic in theory. Alan Paton, author of Cry, the Beloved Country It is impossible to travel in South Africa today without noticing the distinctions that are made between the ra~~es. Separate facilities for whites and "non-whitE~s" are almost everywhere: at airports, post offices, beaches, graveyards, even in those areas set aside for the African. In Umtata, the capital of the Transkei, for example, there are hotels where the chief minister of the territorial government, an African, cannot stay. South African law excludes the African from na- tional political affairs and also dictates where he may live and what kind of job he may hold. Although most of South Africa's 3.8 million English- and Afrikaans,-speaking whites consider white minority rule essential and social segrega- tion desirable, only the ruling National Party, the political voice of masi: Afrikaners, espouses the apartheid ideology of complete racial separation. Afrikaners` racial fears and sense of superiority are deeply rooted in i:heir history as a frontier people among hostile fafrican tribes and in their 17th century Calvinist religion with its doctrine of the elect. For them, regimentation of blacks has always been a matter of survival, and since coming to power in 19~t8 the Nationalist govern- ment has done its utmost to shore up, formalize, and extend the country's traditional system of racial discrimination. In the last ten ye~srs or so the focus of the government's racial polilcies has become the ban- tustan, the Africans' tribal homeland. Afrikaner political leaders and intellectuals contend, with some justification, that South Africa is not one but several different "nations" as incapable of forming a single political and social unit as, say, India and Pakistan. In order for the white man (as well as the non-white) to maintain his own iden- tity and keep what he believes is rightfully his, it is argued that each "nation" should be allowed to develop .in its own way with its "own institutions, attitudes, and values." Until such time as this can be brought about, however, discrimination, or what has come to be known as "petty apartheid," will remain in force. By definition tribes are considered nations, and the government has gone to some lengths to bolster the authority of traditional tribal chiefs in African-designated reserves (bantustans) and to revive tribal ties among Africans in urban areas. Tribal dialects have become the language of in- struction in African schools, and the government has established separate universities for some tribal groups. The government-owned South Afri- can Broadcasting Corporation also has regular programing in the tribal languages. In urban areas, officials have begun to divide Africans residen- tially along tribal lines. Above all, the government has promoted its bantustan program as the answer to South Africa's troubling racial problems. Although the idea of separate homelands for blacks is a logical outgrowth of apartheid, it is also a response to foreign critics who have branded South Africa's racial policies as harsh and totally, oppressive. If current government plans are carried out, all Africans eventually will be- come citizens of these homelands, which will be given the formal trappings of independent states. In theory, Africans would then be free of white political control, and whites would retain exclu- sive rights in their part of the country where blacks would be treated as foreign migrant work- ers. What the relationship between these "inde- pendent" bantustans and white South Africa would be is unclear, although government leaders sometimes speak of a "commonwealth" of South Africa. Special Report _ 3 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 SECRET To those, therefore, v,rho criticize the South African Government for withholding political rights from the Africans, Pretoria holds up the panacea of a future multir~rcial, but racially sepa- rated, union of South Africa. To the opponents of apartheid, however, sep~rrate development is at best a utopian, self-deluding policy, and at worst (and more likely) an attempt to pull the wool over the eyes of the outside world and to provide a moral basis at home for continued white su- premacy rule. They are deeply skeptical of the government's claim that "petty apartheid" is only transitory and that the bantustans will ever achieve real undependence. Some Afrikaner intellectuals are also highly critical of the bantustan program, not because they disagree with it but I~ecause they want the government to do more to make it a reality. In fact, the government's efforts have often been compared unfavorably to the plans to industrial- ize the reserves proposed in the mid-50s by one of its own special study groups-the Tomlinson Commission.. But the late Prime Minister Ver- woerd, whom many Afrikaners look upon as the prophet of apartheid, rejected this course. As a result, the government hays concentrated largely on the more dramatic and less expensive effort of political development. Tkiey are -valleys of ald men'. and old women, of mothers anc~ :children. ThE ,men are away, the young men and.the girls areaway. The-soil can- ~not k ~her~ uny more. Cry, the Beloved Country Nearly half of South Africa's 15 million blacks now live in the eight; reserves set aside for them. These Homelands make up less than 12 percent of the land area of South Africa, and by one recent official count a~nsist of 276 bits and pieces of territory scattered mostly over the east- Special Report Typical scenes in the Bantustans ern half of the country. Although the government is committed to buying over 5,000 more square miles of land consigned to the reserves under the 1936 Bantu Trust and Land Act, it does not plan to consolidate many, if any, of the bantustans completely. This would entail the removal of too many white farmers, not to mention some white towns and major cities. Over the last decade Pretoria has pumped roughly $400 million into the homelands for land SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 purchases, township planning, housing, and other social services, as well as for agriculture. Annually that amounts to less than two percent of the government's expenditures. Although agricultural development has been ciiven priority, officials have had to combat not only chronic drought conditions that afflict much of the country but the African peasant's traditional indifference to farming and his strong resistance to change as well. Because of African neglect as well as over- population, soil erosion ,and cattle overstocking are still widespread, and food shortages are fre- quent. Many young blacks in the reserves, more- over, prefer to seek industrial jobs rather than farm because as wage earners they have at least some opportunity to eases their harsh living con- ditions. Industrial development in the reserves, however, is practically nonexistent. Since 1961 only 35 government-backed factories have been built, employing a total of 945 Africans. In con- trast, over a million and a half blacks now work as migrant laborers in the white-controlled econ- omy, and an estimated 35,000 additional Africans from the reserves join the labor market each year. Officials claim that tf?iere are just not enough experienced African businessmen and ski-led la- borers in the bantustans yet to make industrial development feasible. Although true, this is at least partly the result of the government's own apartheid labor laws that exclude Africans from holding managerial and most skilled jobs. Until recently, moreover, white corporate business in- terests were not allowed to~ operate in the reserves under any conditions. Now this restriction has been modified, but because of the lack of ade- quate water, electrical power, housing, roads, and rail facilities, few companies have shown any in- terest in investing in these remote areas. In sharp contrast with its economic program, Pretoria has put enormous effort, particularly in the last three years, into erecting administrative structures in the homelands ranging from local tribal to territorial authorities. Since 1968, seven Special Report of the reserves have acquired territorial status- theoretically the penultimate step before full independence-and two of them, Tswanaland and Northern Sotho, are expected to gain limited par- liamentary self-government within the next year or so. The South African parliament will probably also bestow homeland citizenship on blacks this year. All of this is in preparation for at least some form of eventual political autonomy for the homelands. Prime Minister Vorster stated late last year that his government hopes to grant "inde- pendence" to one or two bantustans in the next few years. If so, the Transkei will probably be the first. Unlike the other homelands it consists virtu- ally of one large solid block of land. The territory also has a long history of local self-government dating back to the 1890s, and as the oldest ban- tustan it has had most of the trappings of a modern state since 1963. It boasts a constitution, a cabinet, a partially elected legislative assembly, and a civil service (largely black), as well as a flag, an anthem, and an official Language. The Trans- kei's economy, however, is still based primarily on subsistence agriculture and migrant labor, and its government is almost entirely dependent on Pretoria for regular financial support and develop- ment funds. Consequently, the development of the Transkei into aself-supporting independent state is at best a very distant goal. Granting nominal independence soon, how- ever, could have certain advantages for Pretoria. It would probably reassure most Afrikaners that the government is moving ahead with separate devel- opment. Moreover, for some time Prime Minister Vorster has been trying to improve his govern- ment's relations with a select number of black- ruled African states, particularly Malawi, (the only African state with which it has diplomatic relations) the Ivory Coast, Gabon, and the Mala- gasy Republic. Last year Pretoria made some progress in this direction. In November, President Hou- phouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast made a public - 5 - 5 March 1971 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A008600030001-6 ~r,~,rcr~ 1 Literally built atop soiree of the richest gold mines in the world, Johannesburg is South Africa's largest city. 't'oday, its population is almost 60 percent black. .__........ appeal far a "dialague" between black- and whii:e-ruled African states, thus breaking the sur- face unity of black African opposition to Sautfi Africa. Tlhat same month, Tananarive accepted $6.5 million in economic aid from Pretoria. P. gesture toward his awn blacks, some observers believe, u