WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008600040001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 14, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 13, 1971
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
USAID review completed
12 March 1971
No. 0361/71
ARMY review(s) completed.
State Dept. review completed
Copy
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CONTENTS
(Information as of'noon EST, 11 March 1971)
FAR\EAST
Indochina: Deepei'4nto Laos . . . . . i . . . . . ' ' w . . . . . . . . . . 2
'
Chou Visits Hanoi . t . 3
The Other Laos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
A Reduced Tempo on the Cambodian Front, . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The Candidates at Work lu Saigon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Taipei Reacts Mildly to US Foreign Policy -eport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Ferment Over UN China Reprekntation . . . . . . . . 8
Communist China Moves Toward I expand Interitional Air Service . . . . . . 9
Chou En-lai Paints Rosy Picture of Chines Econgsmy 10
Soviet Land Bridge Links Japan-Europe a 3s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
USSR: Political Maneuvering on the Ev of t e PSU Congress . . . . . . . . . 13
Poland: Gierek Builds More Confide e . . . 14
Yugoslav Constitutional Changes .?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Norway: Labor Gets a Chance . 16
IDDLE EAST - AFRIC
Middle East: Cease-fire Expii0s but Calm Prev,ils 17
Palestinian Parliament Unptductive . .. . . . 18
Turkey: Demirel Governr,}ent Still under Pr4ssure . . . . . . . . . 19
Pakistan: Final Showdown Delayed But Nof Averted . . . . . . . . . 20
India: Mrs. Gandhi on; ?fhe Road to Victory 21
WESTERN HMISPHERE
Cuba-Chile: Expanding Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .F 22
Uruguay: Another Kidnaping Adds to Presidet-t's Problems . . . . . . . 23
Guyana: Bauxite Legislation Passed at High Peice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Colombia: Situation Returns to Normal . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
NOTES: Yugoslavia-Hungary; Maritime Issues; Guatemala
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LAOS PANHANDLE
LAOS
CAMBODIA
Stung Ire
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sovrii
Kgntum
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FAR EAST
Indochina: Deeper into Laos
The South Vietnamese regained the initiative
this week in their drive to disrupt the Ho Chi
Minh Trail. The move into Tchepone gave Sai-
gon's troops a needed morale boost that helped
offset several recent tactical setbacks in which
government units had been forced to give ground
after taking heavy casualties. Relying heavily on
US helicopter support, the South Vietnamese
moved west to Tchepone from one strongpoint to
another along the escarpment south of Route 9
rather than along that road itself. By week's end
they were getting into a better position to disrupt
enemy supply movements on the main north-
south road complex in the Lao panhandle.
So far these new South Vietnamese advances
have provoked extremely heavy enemy antiair-
craft fire but only limited infantry counterat-
tacks. The South Vietnamese troops are bracing
for stronger enemy ground assaults, however.
These could come either in the immediate
Tchepone area or, as is more likely, farther east
where the bulk of the North Vietnamese main
forces is located. Their deployment in this area
suggests that the Communists intend to attack
some of the dozen or more South Vietnamese
strongpoints extending from the border. Strong
Communist pressure here would tend to isolate
those units farther west around Tchepone itself,
and might even force a South Vietnamese pull-
back from some of the main supply routes.
Resistance to the South Vietnamese push in
Laos already has cost the Communists heavily.
The US command in Saigon estimates that the
equivalent of eight enemy battalions have been
put out of action.
Enemy Casualties Highest Since '68
Throughout South Vietnam, Laos, and Cam-
bodia the total number of enemy troops reported
killed by US and South Vietnamese forces has
been more than 5,000 in each of the past two
weeks. Even allowing for substantial exaggeration,
Communist losses clearly have been extremely
heavy-as heavy, in fact, as at any time since the
large enemy offensives of 1968. The Communists'
willingness to accept such losses, mainly in Laos
and Cambodia where they have recently chosen
to stand and fight, underlines the importance
they attach to defending their supply routes and
bases in those countries. In addition, the enemy
apparently is willing to pay such a high price in
order to inflict a major setback on South Viet-
namese forces. South Vietnamese casualties have
also been substantial, increasing steadily during
the month of February to a level of more than
900 killed per week, according to preliminary
data. This figure would also approach the peak
level of 1968.
If Hanoi does not stop sending its forces into
the South, President Thieu warned last week,
South Vietnam may be forced to defend itself by
attacking the North Vietnamese in their own ter-
ritory. Thieu clearly wants to keep Hanoi think-
ing about its own defenses as it considers how to
counter the allied operation in Laos. He also has
the forthcoming presidential election in mind,
and he has used the opportunity to whip up
enthusiasm for the struggle against the Commu-
nists being waged under his leadership.
Hanoi is continuing to show concern about
possible attacks on North Vietnam. The North
Vietnamese press and radio have been full of
warnings in this regard in recent months.
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Chou Visits Hanoi
Chou En-lai's highly publicized weekend
visit to Hanoi dramatically demonstrated Peking's
concern over events south of its border as well as
continued Chinese support for the North Viet-
namese war effort. Chou accused the US of
posing a "serious threat to China"-the first high-
level reference to this theme since 20 February-
warning that China had made "adequate prepara-
tions" and, further, that the US "must be respon-
sible for all the serious consequences" arising
from an expansion of the war in the "Indochinese
region."
Chou's statements regarding the threat to
China, parts of which were repeated in an official
joint communique, do not, however, go beyond
anything the Chinese have said on that subject
before. This suggests that his remarks are pri-
marily intended for effect in Hanoi rather than as
a signal by Peking of heightened concern about its
own security under present circumstances.
In two recent instances, two Politburo mem-
bers in speeches discussing current military devel-
opments in Indochina diid not even refer to
China's security interests.
A major point of Chou's visit, therefore,
appears to have been to dramatize the notion that
China is a factor to be considered in the Indo-
china situation, that Peking remains vitally inter-
ested in events south of its border, and that it is
still a "secure rear area" for the North Vietnam-
ese. Such reassurances are probably calculated to
allay reported nervousness in North Vietnam re-
garding future allied intentions. Chou's visit was
Page 3
also meant to reaffirm strong Chinese support for
the Vietnamese in the event of a further allied
expansion of the war.
One of the main topics of discussion during
the visit was almost certainly a further increase in
the supply of Chinese military equipment. Ac-
companying Chou were high-ranking military of-
ficers who have been previously involved in
Chinese military aid to North Vietnam, including
the director of the General Logistics Department
of the Chinese armed forces and the officer in
charge of the logistics department's armament
section. They were both on hand last month in
Peking for the signing of a supplemental eco-
nomic and military aid agreement with the North
Vietnamese.
The Chinese and North Vietnamese probably
also discussed contingency plans in the event that
the South Vietnamese follow through on their
threats to carry the war directly to North Viet-
nam. Chou may also have raised the possibility of
eventually introducing some Chinese troops into
North Vietnam in order to free more Vietnamese
forces for the fighting. According to the joint
communique, both sides reached "completely
identical views on questions of "how to deal
with possible US military adventures." The com-
munique adds that the Chinese would not flinch
"even from the greatest national sacrifices" in
aiding the Vietnamese, but this pledge is ex-
plicitly put in terms of a further expansion of the
Indochina conflict.
Although serious discussion regarding con-
tingency planning probably took place, the thrust
of the official statements on Chou's visit tends to
emphasize China's role of continuing to provide
"all out" rear support as well as reaffirming the
belief that the North Vietnamese on their own
will be able to win the fight. There is nothing to
suggest, moreover, that Peking's attitude on this
score has undergone a change or that the Chinese
view the current situation with increased alarm.
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Communist forces scored some significant
victories on the Bolovens Plateau as a result of
heavy fighting last week. Site 22, the last major
Laotian Government base on the eastern rim of
the plateau, fell on 9 March after a determined
Communist assault by a force estimated at three
battalions with support from a heavy-weapons
unit and sappers. The four battalions of irregulars
defending the site withdrew after withstanding
more than two days of almost continual shelling
and ground attacks.
One day earlier, two irregular battalions
were forced to abandon Site 165, some five miles
southwest of Site 22, and three other smaller
positions. All six irregular battalions withdrew
westward and heavy air strikes were called in on
the enemy forces. The orderly withdrawal from
these positions apparently is in keeping with a
recent government decision to avoid, whenever
possible, costly defenses of fixed positions on the
plateau.
Fighting in the Boliovens region has been at a
low ebb since early January, when government
defenders repulsed a Communist assault on the
northern side of the plateau. Communist forces
had been regrouping for a new thrust at the
irregulars, especially along the eastern rim where
the government bases have constituted a threat to
the enemy infiltration corridor into Cambodia.
The tenacity of the assault in the face of
extremely heavy air strikes suggests that the Com-
munists place considerable emphasis on clearing
the heights overlooking Route 16 and the Se
Kong River. These have not yet figured prom-
inently in the Communists' logistic effort in the
lower panhandle, but it is possible that the enemy
would like to make greater use of the westerly
river and road routes to Cambodia in the waning
months of this year's dry season.
Shelling attacks continued around the Long
Tieng complex in northern Laos. There have been
numerous inconclusive clashes brought on prin-
cipally by aggressive government patrolling, and
irregulars have uncovered fairly substantial caches
of Communist weapons and rice. To the north of
the Plaine des Jarres, irregulars and village defense
forces recaptured Phou Cum, which had been
taken by the Communists on 22 February.
There is evidence, however, that the Com-
munists are far from ready to throw in the towel
in northern Laos.
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A Reduced Tempo on the Cambodian Front
The pace of the ground fighting in the Chup
rubber plantation area in central Kompong Cham
Province slackened as South Vietnamese forces
regrouped along Route 7 to rest and refit. Last
week's heavy but inconclusive combat in the
Dambe area, northeast of Chup, apparently
dictated a temporary standdown in the South
Vietnamese offensive. A lull is probably equally
welcome to the Communists, who have taken
some substantial losses in the past few weeks. The
Communists did not abandon the battle com-
pletely, however, and they managed to keep
moderate pressure on South Vietnamese troops
near Chup and near Snuol, in southern Kratie
Province. Heavy enemy mortar barrages in both
those sectors reportedly caused some costly
South Vietnamese losses in manpower and ma-
teriel.
The Communists clearly intend to resist any
additional efforts by the South Vietnamese to
destroy their facilities in the Chup area.
Still in the Doldrums Elsewhere
The Communists also maintained a low mili-
tary profile in most other areas of the country
during the week, holding themselves to light
harassing attacks against scattered Cambodian
positions. For their part, government forced suc-
ceeded in breaking the enemy's brief control over
a portion of Route 4, near Kompong Som. A
regiment of Cambodian reinforcements from
Phnom Penh has arrived in Kompong Som to help
strengthen the defenses of the seaport town and
the nearby oil refinery. The most significant
action on Route 4 took place some 15 miles west
of Phnom Penh, however, where government
units clashed with an estimated enemy battalion.
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Cambodian soldiers, backed by air and artillery
support, claimed to have killed 65 Communists in
that encounter while suffering only minor losses
of their own.
ppnrt` Your'Locdl"ommunists
Al1iouh the Comm,unisjir continued to
forgo Large-scale.,,a~ctions against important govern-
ment positions, th'Ltr w,i~s'fr sh evidence that con-
siderable enemy circa r' tional work is being
undertaken in r,afie c untr Vie. A Cambodian
Army soldieriivho rec {fitly esca from a Com-
munist ba?e camp in sou ern Komp~r-q Chhnang
Province has reported, fo example, that_ there
were four Vietnamese and wo Khmer Commu-
ist battalions in thacamp. The Vietnamese
ions each contained p Cambodian troop
than battalions ere not attac
ese units and ./had their ow
political cadr
report find
using su
ho
port,
he two
d to the
eaders, in-
who report-
re 1954. This
ating that the
The Candidates at Work in Saigon
President Thieu's prospects for re-election
may have been strengthened by the government's
performance in the fight against inflation. The
USAID index shows that prices in Saigon have
risen only one half of one percent since July,
whereas prices rose almost 30 percent per year in
1969 and in early 1970. The new average rate
indicates that government measures are working
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 Mar 71
andled relations wit local villagers.
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well, at least for the time being. Prices are still
high, but the recent leveling off will help deprive
Thieu's critics of one of their most telling issues.
Some new measures announced last weekend may
spark some further grumbling, but they are
designed to help block further inflation, and the
net effect is likely to be helpful to most South
Vietnamese citizens.
Thieu has also helped his election campaign
by exempting government salaries from the in-
come tax. Although South Vietnamese Govern-
ment economists objected to this move, they
seem to agree that the tax loss will involve rela-
tively small sums. The measure will strengthen
support for Thieu among government cadre, some
of whom can be expected to work with greater
enthusiasm for his return to office.
wiper ,acts Ivlllaiy to u5 t-oreign Policy Report
Despite persisteht"~c4. s of outrage in the desire for friendl
Nationalist Chinese legisl~i:ure nd.Tin some news- easing ten~ th
his 25 February re
The Chinese ambass
ing his government's
dor on 4 Ma h-,i i express-
t
trerrje
ivity over the
use of the term "Peso
1e"s Republic of China,"
he US avoid use of that
term, which he said is I subject to misinterpreta-
tion, if-the US intention is only to make clear its
resent China, but
staf - take this pos
mines mo on Tai
flecting a uctmu and
US approach to Chir1~+ poky have been made by
high-level officials in Taio
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Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY
'e}Eti nos with Taipei while
Pekin. The ambassador said
nable term not only
ccept Peking's claim to
could encourage other
n. Similar comments re-
standing of the current
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vJhsih the Chinese amba
expressions of outrage,
dent's assn e on 2 March t
ite the Vice Presi-
t the government
e the hard liners
asement and na-
prolest. Wh
y g
r
b
had made a st
IJ
h
e
have charged - Iith ap
t
ivete, other representati~
report, have voiced gra
ton's reassurance that it
commitment. In addition,
other government organs
echoes of the legislature's fee~ngs, which are most
aptly characterized by an
widely quoted in the press t,
of Dulles, no one who reall
though expressing
anonymous lamept'
at "since theie`ath
understands Com-
munism has appeared on thett4mericap-cene."
Although the report corttinues to receive
considerable attention in Ehe 'Nationalist press,
the restrained discuss.iof in the island's most in-
fluential papers reflects a concerted government
effort to highlight the report's positive references
to the US-Taipei relationship. These articles also
claim that esident Nixon has persona jly'main-
tained a strong=anti-Communist stares and that
he made the recd t "futile gest " toward the
mainland only in rder to avert criticism by
"forces of appease- enn'- within the US Gov-
ernment and amon A e public. The hardest line
was generally tkd by those papers that have
recently been' cri cal of Taipei's own foreign
policy. Tteir art cles, which called the gov-
ernrpneht's reac ion to the report "mealy-
u
h
...:l
tak
_" I
ngne--
c
S
li
e s
to
featist!?' diplomatic tactics. The government,
however,'' r+tL the p st has considered verbal
protests an a2#uat response in adverse cir-
cumstances, and nei r these newspaper attacks
on Taipei's policy r;,%the government's ex-
pressions of underst ndin4-. f the US position
suggest that more serious posts are being
planned or that a more fl xi le,-Nationalist
foreign policy is contemplated.
Ferment ovl r, UN China Representation
Last faF ' UN'eneral Assembly vote giving
a thin majorit or he first time to the "Al-
banian" resolution seat Peking and to expel
Taiwan has set in m?tithe expected interna-
tional soul-searchin'over futq,re handling of the
Chinese represent ion issue. W'ikPeking con-
tinuing to insist that it will not acce t,,,,UN me =
bership unless T 'wan is removed, tern-
`
e U r
oriented govern me s are looking h
advice before deter ining t i own positions.
They are especially ea ter. now whether the US
tactic that rti s a fi o-thirds majority vote for
any c h g t , m Chinese r gpresentation.
The UK has been thimost importunate on
this point because it believes continued support
of the IQ tactic
Peking on raising drip
ambassadoriaj,.:lei.
is clearly! it?rthe directia
pt sate its talks with
'tic representation to the
drift of British thinking
porgy. -fin fact, officials h
M1 is opposed to any "d
"two Chinas" formulat
some attention and
exclude Peking.
of withdrawing its sup-
ve told the US that the
vice" such as the several
ns that have received
designed ultimately to
In consultations ith the US, however, both
Aus is and New gland have seemed much
less kee facilitatin Peking's entry. Both favor
new procetactics o safeguard Taiwan's posi-
tion. They have ? gges ed the adoption of a dual
representation ford .la4 that would concede the
Security Council seat Peking but would require
a two-thirds vote for am move to oust Taiwan.
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The Chinese repre4entation issue has been
the subject of intensive 4 bate in Japan, and the
11S attitude will be a major factor in Tokyo's
u'r'tdecision. The Satp government appears
v~r
inclined in for at =least another year its
position that Tar
'epresentation at the UN
should be preserved,iposs~tbly. by offering some
sort of two Chinasa~ formula t i t-RQ ing could
t
ll
no
swa
ow.
Such a formula hov ,gvet"remains as un-
palatable to Taipei a 41.E to Peking. In a recent
statement of iiis 1 1 foals, the Nationalist Gov-
ernment ,,en asized i s desire to improve its posi-
tion m international rganizations and to combat
the "growing appea merit" of Peking's claims
within the US. Consutations have indicated that
Taiwan considers
tion as a permane
essential to mintgn its posi-
t member 'of the Security
Council, and it ther
merely with represen
sembly and -in other U
Last week Sovi
and New York reit
Peking's UN entry.
remains concerned
kiri'g's_ resence at th
Soviet ap` l to the
re would not be content
entities.
officials in both Moscow
ated Moscow's support for
espite this posture, Moscow
ver the implications of Pe-
UN, which could undercut
rge third-world contingent
there. Neverth'el'ess, th
its somewhat improv
USSR is unlikely to upset
lations with Peking by
becoming identified wither to forestall main-
land China's entry.
Communist China Moves Toward Expanded International Air Service
During the past year, Peking has demon-
strated an interest in expanding its international
air service, perhaps even to Europe. At present,
China's civil airline (CAAC) flies abroad only to
the USSR, North Korea, and North Vietnam on a
twice-weekly basis and to Burma once a week.
The only free-world airlines now serving China are
Air France, with a weekly flight from Karachi to
Shanghai, and Pakistan International Airlines
(PIA) with its twice-weekly flight from Dacca to
Shanghai via Canton. By expanding its interna-
tional air service first to Europe and perhaps later
to East Africa, Peking would not only gain pres-
tige, but would acquire more secure lines of com-
munication to its diplomatic and economic out-
posts overseas.
Peking has civil air agreements with nine
free-world countries and reportedly is interested
in one with Tanzania, where the Chinese are en-
gaged in a major aid project. Recently, the Chi-
nese inquired about technical landing rights in
Turkey for an air route probably through Paki-
stan and Iraq to Romania.
In mid-1970 Peking bought four medium-
range British Trident jets from PIA. CAAC's fleet
includes several Viscount turboprop transports
obtained from the UK in the early 1960s and
some Soviet-built transports, both of which could
be used for international flights. Since 1963, Pe-
king has bought 38 short- and medium-range So-
viet transports valued at approximately $60 mil-
Last fall Peking sent a delegation to the UK
and France to discuss aircraft purchases. In the
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UK, the group attended the Farnborough Air
Show and exhibited the most interest in the Tri-
dents, the short-range BAC-111 jet transport and
the VC-10 long-range jet transport. A British dele-
gation from the Hawker Siddeley Aircraft Com-
pany is presently in Peking, probably to discuss
the sale of more Tridents.
A French firm recently acknowledged that it
is negotiating with the Chinese for the sale of
three to nine Caravelle medium-range jet trans- 25X1
ports and two to four Nord 262 short-range tur-
boprop planes. The value of this aircraft package
could run as high as $50 million.
Chou En-lai Paints Rosy Picture of Chinese Economy
In recent conversations with his long-time
acquaintance Edgar Snow, Premier Chou En-lai
tried to demonstrate that China has emerged from
the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution with a
strengthened economy. Snow's previous visit in
1965 had served a similar purpose, permitting the
Chinese leadership to show that the country had
recovered from the 1959-61 "times of trouble"
following the collapse of the Great Leap Forward.
Chou's central point was that the leadership
regards the economic losses suffered during the
1966-69 Cultural Revolution as more than bal-
anced by domestic political gains. He went on to
claim that in 1970 China produced more grain,
petroleum, steel, chemical fertilizers, and cotton
textiles than ever before. In an important revela-
tion, he reported that China has some 40 million
tons of grain in reserves, not including stockpiles
held by individual communes. His assertions of
general agricultural and industrial advances accord
with US estimates, although his specific numerical
claims have an upward bias.
Chou defended the continuing import of
grain by declaring that China is a net exporter of
food, importing cheap wheat and exporting more
expensive rice on a modest scale because this
practice is economically profitable. His argument
is not supported by data on China's grain trade,
however. He boasted that China has no inflation,
no personal income taxes, and no internal or
external debts. Chou's remarks led Snow to spec-
ulate that China's gross national product can be
compared to those of advanced industrial coun-
tries. Chou's statements suggest that the leader-
ship is satisfied with the present economic situa-
tion and is reasonably optimistic about prospects
for the immediate future. The interview failed to
reflect, however, such continuing problems as the
narrowness of the margin between grain produc-
tion and population growth or the technological
backwardness of much of the Chinese econ-
omy.
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EUROPE
Soviet Land Bridge Links Japan-Europe Trade
After three years of experimentation, a
regularly scheduled service for containerized
freight is now being offered between Western
Europe and Japan via the USSR. Although traffic
has been light, the new service may eventually
capture a large share of the trade between Japan
and Europe.
Called "Japan-Europe Container Service"
(JEURO), it is the result of remarkable interna-
tional cooperation in marked contrast with the
bogged-down status of similar proposals for a land
bridge across North America. Three container
ship voyages are made monthly in each direction
between Yokohama/Kobe in Japan and the Soviet
port of Nakhodka. Up to 100 containers per train
are shipped on special all-container trains between
Nakhodka and Moscow, where those for conti-
nental Europe continue on by rail and those for
the UK go by a rail-sea route via Leningrad.
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SECRET
During 1.967-70 transit time averaged a slow 40
to 42 days because of a lack of cooperation by
European railways and delays at the port of Nak-
hodka, but now it is expected to average only 35
days, with potential for improvement. This will not
quite match the time of the fast container ships
between Japan and Europe, but the new service
offers a rate advantage of perhaps 15 percent, which
is subsidized by the Soviets.
Experimental traffic amounted to only a few
hundred containers a year, mostly of high-priced
items such as electronics equipment. Regular service,
which commenced at the beginning of February,
calls for a monthly volume of traffic of up to 180
containers each way. Lack of adequate port facilities
at Nakhodka is a major obstacle to a greater flow of
traffic.
After the planned completion in 1973 of the
container section of the new port at Wrangel near
Nakhodka, which is a joint Soviet-Japanese project,
the new service will be capable of carrying between
120,000 and 140,000 containers per year or about
two million tons of cargo. Japan, which exports a
greater portion of general cargo to Western Europe
than it imports from that area, would be the major
beneficiary of the subsidized route. Bulky items
such as certain iron and steel products, however,
would continue to be sent by sea.
The realization of even the maximum planned
potential of JEURO should not be a burden to the
Trans-Siberian Railroad. Capacity volumes through
Wrangel still will require only two additional trains
each way per day compared with a through capacity
of some 90 each way per day on the Trans-Sib,
which is considerably greater than its current traf-
fic. 25X1
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USSR: Political Maneuvering on the Eve of the CPSU Congress
The confusion dominating the preparations
this winter for the 24th CPSU Congress has
settled to the extent that all but one of the
oft-postponed republic-level congresses have
taken place, but there are still indications of polit-
ical uncertainties.
The republic congresses, originally scheduled
to be held in late January and early February,
were repeatedly postponed, probably to permit
prior publication of the draft directives for the
five-year plan. But the late rescheduling of the
Ukrainian Congress for 17 March and the re-
placement of republic second secretaries in
Estonia, Kazakhstan, and Georgia suggest that
political maneuvering both at the republic level
and within the central leadership may also have
contributed to the confusion.
In Estonia, a Moscow cadres official re-
sponsible for the Baltic republics and Belorussia
was appointed second secretary. The appointment
of an ethnic Russian to this post may hurt Es-
tonian national pride even though his predecessor
does not appear to have been removed for "short-
comings." It is not yet clear whether the change
will adversely affect the political fortunes of the
outspoken Estonian first secretary, I. Kebin. The
shift in Kazakhstan, however, suggests a further
waning of Podgorny's influence inasmuch as the
outgoing second secretary was one of his long-
time proteges. The secretary, who was ousted as a
central committee secretary in 1965 as the result
of rivalry between Brezhnev and Podgorny, has
been transferred this time to a relatively meaning-
less post in Moscow. The new second secretary's
ties with the leadership remain unclear but his
background suggests that he belongs to the Brezh-
nev camp. In any event, the departure of Pod-
gorny's protege will probably enhance the posi-
tion of Kazakh First Secretary D. Kunayev-a
fervent supporter of Brezhnev.
The Georgian second secretary,
spoken advocate of collective leadership who re-
vealed that Khrushchev's ouster was accompanied
by a decision to prohibit a leader from combining
the posts of first secretary and premier, has also
been replaced, as has the premier of the Uzbek
Republic. Moreover, in the RSFSR, the position
of Politburo member Voronov seems to have been
further eroded by the appointment of a probable
Brezhnev protege as first deputy premier for agri-
culture.
On balance, these changes seem to benefit
Brezhnev, whose influence in republic party af-
fairs may increase, especially in Kazakhstan, inas-
much as the second secretary is normally respon-
sible for cadres. These changes do not, however,
reflect a major shift in the political balance within
the central leadership. Perhaps in an attempt to
play down Brezhnev's enhanced public stature,
the unity of the collective leadership was ostenta-
tiously demonstrated when all Politburo members
from Moscow attended, quite unnecessarily, the
centennial of the birth of a Ukrainian poet on I
March.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 Mar 71
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Poland: Gierek Builds More Confidence
The Gierek regime is continuing to gain
public confidence, to consolidate local party au-
thority, and to demonstrate loyalty to Moscow
and its allies.
A lengthy meeting last week between Po-
land's Roman Catholic primate, Stefan Cardinal
Wyszynski, and Premier Jaroszewicz was a major
step toward realizing the regime's commitment to
normalize church-state relations. This was the
first such top-level contact in over a decade, and
could signal a readiness on both sides to begin a
working-level dialogue on a multitude of issues.
Although the meeting was welcomed both by
church sources and the populace, the stress on the
"gradual" nature of any future normalization
contained in the episcopate's subsequent com-
muniqur strongly suggests that the church does
not foresee an early breakthrough.
Gierek's stumping through the country, in-
cluding his promise to make another visit to the
volatile Baltic coast area later this month, in-
dicates that the regime's posture vis-a-vis the em-
boldened workers is still largely defensive. There
are some signs, however, that the people are more
realistically assessing the strictures-internal and
external, political and economic-within which
the regime must operate.
For his part, Gierek is continuing his efforts
to assure both domestic conservatives and Mos-
cow that he intends to keep developments under
party control. His statement in Katowice on 6
March warning against attempts by "centers of
hostile subversion" to inflame and disorganize
public life in Poland was designed to underscore
the regime's watchful attitude.
paratus continue to focus on improving the re- U. ~,,,,,~Z o icia s, with the exception of scattered
sponsiveness of the local bureaucracy to both the
leadership and to the people. Additional person-
nel shifts at the provincial level and below coin-
cide with a continued round of talks by Gierek in
various parts of the country designed to overcome
footdragging among middle-echelon party of-
ficials. Last week he kicked off the first of a
round of local party conferences to prepare for
the next party congress.
comments by a few low-level diplomats, have
been circumspect. The Soviet press has not di-
verged since December from a policy of low-key
and factual, if highly selective, reporting. Soviet
concern, nevertheless, is real, as manifested by
Moscow's prompt and generous tender of eco-
nomic assistance-including a $100-million hard
currency credit-to the beleaguered Polish govern-
Yugoslav Constitutional Changes
The publication on 28 February of 21 draft
constitutional amendments completed the first
phase of President Tito's proposed government
reforms. The proposals sharply alter the nature of
the centralized Yugoslav system by giving greater
autonomy to the constituent republics and pro-
vinces, creating a collective presidency, and re-
stricting federal powers to matters concerning na-
tional defense and foreign policy and to effecting
a unified economic system. As important as the
amendments themselves, were the heated debates
surrounding their drafting, which assumed pro-
portions hitherto unknown in the Communist
world and infused a dramatic new vigor into
Yugoslavia's political life.
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SECRET
In general, the decentralization is welcomed,
at least in principle. The Serbs and Albanians in
the autonomous province of Kosovo, however,
differ among themselves over the future role and
position of the provinces. Also, the Croats have
seized on the occasion to press for greater re-
public autonomy; in particular, they question the
federation's right to regulate foreign trade.
The trade unions are taking advantage of the
situation to demand a greater role in society, and
they apparently will get it. The unions have
stepped up their fight to improve the standard of
living and were instrumental in forcing the gov-
ernment to compromise on a wage freeze. Al-
though work stoppages have been semiofficially
sanctioned in Yugoslavia for some time, the
unions will soon have another weapon in their
arsenal when the right to strike becomes legal this
spring.
Aware that he may have opened Pandora's
box by encouraging widespread discussion of the
pending changes, Tito, in presenting the amend-
ments to the party presidium on 2 March, urged
those present to work hard for quick implementa-
tion in order to avoid distortions. He also an-
nounced that the party will be in for extensive
reorganization, probably before the end of the
YUGOSLAVIA-HUNGARY- Recent agreements
indicate an upswing in trad nd industrial co-
operation between these two caun Trade this
year is slated to rise 21) percent over t el of
1970; moreover, the 1971-75 trade agreem
calls for a substantial increase over the previous
five-year period. There is sufficient diversity of
production between the two countries to permit
significant trade growth', and the existence of
complementary industries could lead to increased
Page 15
SECRET
of transit and transport facilities. To ac-
e the new agreements, existing pro-
year. He urged the government not to wait for the
amendments to become law but to enact the
necessary portions of the economic stabilization
program as soon as feasible and in the spirit of the
proposed system. Tito also disclosed that a
second set of constitutional amendments, de-
signed to carry the current economic and political
reforms to their logical conclusion, will be intro-
duced over the next two years.
Tito's urgings notwithstanding, it was open
season on the proposals. The 17 party officials
who rose to endorse both Tito's remarks and the
explanation of the reforms given by Edvard
Kardelj all gave their own slant and interpretation
to the proposals. Serbian party leader Nikezic, for
example, took the occasion to call for an im-
provement of the amendments, citing the
"vagueness" of the economic portions; Croatian
party leader Dabcevic-Kucar made a predictable
chauvinistic appeal for greater republic auton-
omy.
It was Krste Crvenkovski, the leading
Macedonian party official, however, who saw
some real value in the whole period of argument
and compromise. He expressed his satisfaction
not with the amendments but with the give-and-
take that produced them.
production cooperation. A $65-million pact on
joint vehicle production is one of several recently
concluded industrial cooperation agreements that
are expected to broaden the scope of bilateral
relations. Talks were held last week on the joint
nstruction of factories as well as on the recipro-
convertible currency settlement of
e to be reviewed later this
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Norway: Labor Gets a Chance
Lab Party leader Trygve Bratteli has been
given a ma ate to form a minority government
following the .allure of an attempt to reconstitute
the four party, c ter right coalition.
The bourgeois ernment, led by Per Borten
of the Center Party, fe n 2 March after over five
years in office when Bor admitted that he had
disclosed confidential infor tion concerning Nor-
way's negotiations with the E: pean Communities
(EC) to the leader of the antient movement. Ever
since being returned to office in 9 with only a
two-seat margin in parliament, the g rnment h
suffered sustained intra-coalition sni
steady decline in popularity, and political ervers
predicted its early demise. Yet time an ga the
four parties managed to pull themse es toget
and stagger through the successio f crises con-
fronting them.
The debate within the gornment over entry
however, and by the begin r> frig of this year Conser-
vative and Liberal party enders were no longer
reluctant to accuse Borth and his Center Party of
insincerity in supports g the coalition's policy fa-
voring accession. T major Oslo Liberal Party
newspaper, Dagblat, repeatedly splashed confi-
dential Center P ~"ty internal discussions on EC
strategy across i ? front page, embarrassing Borten
and forcing hirto repudiate the harsher views of
his backers. It was this newspaper that printed the
contents of the memorandum Borten discussed
with the antimarketeers, and it was the Liberal
Party chairman, acting as head of the bourgeois
bloc in parliamen iGho clamored for a police inves-
tigation of the ak,regardless of how many higher-
F sous, Borten resigned, but his party backed
hi b the end, and as a sign of its resentment of
s treatment at the hands of its coalition partners,
the party stiffened its opposition to EC entry, call-
ing for satisfaction on this issue before it would
support a new center-right coalition. After a week
of negotiations by a leader of the Christian Peoples
Party, who was acceptable to the Center but had
long been anathema to the Liberals, the effort col-
lapsed, and Bratteli was called in.
be
of t
The new government, whose membership will
ade known on 15 March, can count on only 74
150 votes in parliament and can therefore be
and ford
gian entry
policies. Though committed to Norwe-
will be oblig
to the EC, the Labor Party leadership
to move carefully in the face of stiff
opposition fro
iate these group
its youth and left wings. To concil-
ratteli may make such gestures as
proposing recogni
couraging detente
ern Europe.
n of North Vietnam, and en-
orway's relations with East-
MAR
seabeds committee,
the 1973 Law of the
n planning for
Sea Conference,
hold a meeting as the re
regional groups over subc
The stakes for the 1973
cause of the iss
claims, fis
ES The IN General Assembly's
It of a dispute amon
mittee_S frtvn'i l%1Tiips.
f ice are high be-
of+~ ad-territorial waters
fights, regui.~tions to govern ex-
SECRET
73 agerta
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ploitation of the dee abeds, and rights of passage
through international st its. The Ljn, Americans,
with some Africans or#,`insisting on chair
-
man
sbi:ps o1 ec fic ommittees in hopes of con-
,,
froYling deliberations on issues most vital to their
i C`ere, s and perhaps f even preventing a subject-
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Middle East: Cease-fire Expires but Calm Prevails
Th armed forces of Israel and of the sur- ever, or how Q love they can resist
week has pas without major military clashes
despite the expi #ion of the formal cease-fire
between Egypt and el on 7 March.
President Sadat's ' ction of a further
cease-fire extension leaves rky Cairo's future
military plans against Israel. In n address to the
nation, the President announced t we cannot
extend the cease-fire longer than w 'ave done."
He left future military options ope when he
declared that "we will watch, follow eve s, and
decide for ourselves' what we feel it is our d to
ow-
likelihood of restraint. A semiofficial Tel Aviv
Sadat added, however, that "this does not ?daily says that Moscow influenced the Egyptian
mean that political action will stop and that the' -and with the intention of sabotaging any rap-
guns alone will speak." Cairo's continuing interest' ' p chment between Cairo and Washington. A
in a political solution was evident in Sadat, ne aper affiliated with the Israel Labor Party,
expression of confidence in the ON, in Secretafy on t other hand. does not believe that Envnt
Ueneral Thant, and in the UN's Middle Cast can res a firing now because it lacks the notes-
mediator Gunnar Jarring. The President further sary mili - ry strength. An organ of the National
called upon the big four to continue their irfterest Religious PlLrty recommends that an information
in the Arab-Israeli crisis and directed a'special
"
plea at the US to
discharge its duty""and get
Israel to agree to withdraw from they=occupied
Arab territories.
Sadat's refusal to extend the cease-fire is
probably intended in part to increase the sense of
uncertainty about the future i ~the Middle East
and thus give added urgency t international ef-
forts to end the Arab-Israeli nfrontation. +ka..,.
reflects the rressures ',ern .. gypt's. poll#' ?and
military 4headcrs to achieve om a progress
toward the reset' f t ` ost territory. Many
Egyptians are q .-rd uctant to accept the
status quo - iefinitely is not fear how seri-
ously gypt's leaders iiew these pressur
Israeli public and official reaction to Sadat's
speech indicate concern coupled with cautious
optimism that -,a de facto cease-fire would con-
tinue. The $raeli press covered the Egyptian
President's j5eech extensively. Sadat's recent trip
to Mosco ', editorialists reasoned, meant that
relations,?-between Cairo and Moscow had been
strengt6ned. According to a Tel Aviv inde-
pendeti't daily, Sadat's announcement, although it
camp as no surprise, indicates that "Egypt has
ag th put its finger on the trigger" and that the
dgger of a conflagration is far greater than the
campaign be
that a weaken
augurated to persuade the public
would signify a
papers state that I
that would enable
ncession to the USSR. Several
el is searching for a formula
without Israel's maki
total withdrawal.
a prior commitment to
Official Israeli comme
has also been prolific. Forei
on Sadat's speech
speaking shortly after Sadat, s
would continue to observe the
Minister Eban,
ed that Israel
-fire in ac-
cordance with the 1967 Security Cou
tion and on the basis of reciprocity. 0
it resolu-
osition
also
leader Menahem Begin said that Israel sho
announce that it reserves the right to decide
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SECRET
whether or not to open fire. Prime Minister Golda
Meir described Sad 's statement as tantamount
to a threat with a I decl revolver. Deputy Min-
ister Yigal Allon said t t Sadat's announcement
should not be taken light but observed that the
Egyptian Army is not capa breaching the
Israeli position.
Meanwhile, the Egyptian President's move
has apparently won him an upsurge in popular
support from the more militant Arabs in the
'ddle East. Palestinians in both Lebanon and
continued their rest
ment, but the un
miscalculatio
sibility tha
Egypt and Israel have
nt :since Sadat's announce-
"rtainty created by the absence
se-fire increases the chances for
Sadat has also left open the pos-
Egypt may at some point put heat
under the negotiating process by instigating
limited military action. Under the defensive alert
conditions now prevailing, however, any such
incident could escalate rapidly. There was some
minor action between fedayeen forces and the
Israelis during the week.
Jor n were reportedly jubilant over his rejection
of a ther extension of the cease-fire. Even
moderate rabs have said that Sadat had no other
choice in t face of Israeli intransigence, but
they have note a%Vith satisfaction the fact that he
left the door open for continued efforts in the
diplomatic arena.
Palestinian Parliament Unproductive
The recently concluded session of the Pales-
tine National Council in Cairo produced little
more than a restatement of the desire to unify the
fedayeen movement.
As it did at its previous session, the council
adopted a plan for the "political, military, and
financial unification" of the various commando
groups within the framework of the palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO). Under the current
plan, proposed by Yasir Arafat, the 115-man
council calls for its own replacement by a new
150-man council within 91) days. The new body is
then to elect a political bureau to replace the
present PLO Executive Committee. Other bodies,
including the PLO central committee, will con-
tinue in existence.
By laying the burden of implementing any
unification plans upon its successor, the present
council was able effectively to side-step the issue
of making any real effort to unify the resistance
movement. Moreover, the continued existence of
bodies such as the central committee provides
those fedayeen organizations that are unwilling to
surrender their separate identities a way to
sabotage any move to force a merger. I n par-
ticular, the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, which boycotted the council's meeting,
is certain to reject any move to establish a single
fedayeen front unless a radical socialist political
program similar to its own is adopted by all
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Turkey: Demirel Government Still under Pressure
Th&
airmen by
tremists touch
manhunts in mo
off one of the most extensive
rn Turkish history. Their un-
ceremonious releas
abductors apparentl
five days later, when their
what they believed was
to ease temporarily the pr
government. This episode, ho
ingly helter-skelter character o
have far-reaching repercussions in
and military circles.
ver, and the seem-
he search could
oth political
ye i
ng no\
The kidnaping ~lf, in the name of
leged Turkish Peoplesiberation Army-
appar tly is only a ca ei
more tha 20-was a ty
patterned er simil
tries. The teQrist
ized by a few Tur
imprisoned in sout as
anicked in the face of
minent arrest, appeared
"ba
who
,rn T.
their return from Syi~ja,
be trained in guerrilla to
g-,terrorism
ther coun-
y was organ-
arrested and
With the release of the amen, attention is
again beginning to focus on t e complexities of
SECRET
Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY
cent abduction in Ankara of four US
veral heavily armed Turkish ex-
the internal politi
budget was approv
legislation desi
ment's hand fit
the proposed
over opium
are to be
made in
situation. The national
in late February, and Parlia-
onsider government-sponsored
ed to strengthen the govern-
dealing with extremism, pass on
ill to tighten government control
cultivation, and develop needed
d social legislation. If new elections
Id later this year, changes must also be
I t h o ugh the government demonstrated
fir ess in the face of the terrorists' demands and
in is relentless search for the kidnapers, Demirel
ent where his party now is two votes shy of a
1=_, i+.,
25X15X1
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Pakistan: Final Showdown Delayed But Not Averted
Recent speeches by President Yahya Khan
and East Pakistani leader Mujibur Rahman have
reopened the possibility of a negotiated solution
of Pakistan's present crisis, bt- here-seems-to-be
little nces between East and
n 6 March President Yahya Khan an-
no nced that the National Assembly would con-
vene on 25 March to begin writing a constitution.
This move was a concession to the East Pak-
istanis, who had hoped to use their majority in
the assembly to force through a constitution
granting a great deal of provincial autonomy.
Yahya's indefinite postponement earlier in the
week of the meeting of the assembly had resulted
in a general strike accompanied by violence in
East Pakistan.
Yahya, however, accompanied his conces-
sion with strong criticism of recent East Pakistani
activities. He implied, moreover, that he would
use force if necessary to prevent East Pakistan's
secession and would not accept its autonomy
demands, which would whittle central govern-
ment responsibilities down to defense and foreign
affairs. Later, he underscored his veiled threat by
appointing Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan-a tough but fair
West Pakistani-as governor of East Pakistan.F--]
Mujib replied the following day. Many had
expected him to proclaim East Pakistan's inde-
pendence, but instead he called for a noncoopera-
tion movement that has largely hamstrung central
government activities in East Pakistan. Mujib also
said his Awami League (AL)-which holds almost
all of East Pakistan's national and provincial as-
sembly seats-would not consider attending the
National Assembly unless Yahya met certain con-
ditions, including immediately turning the prov-
ince over to its elected representatives.
Since the speech, the AL has moved to fill
the vacuum created by the noncooperation move-
ment and has established de facto control over
much of the province. Mujib appears to have the
backing of almost all East Pakistanis, and so far
the central government has not tried to stop him.
President Yahya apparently is still hopeful
of reaching a peaceful solution, btrt e-wi --almost
certa' .refuse-to giv '-irr--to all of the East
P i demands. His announced intention to
fly to Dacca has the appearance of a last-ditch
effort to find a compromise. Even should he be
willing to make major concessions on provincial
autonomy, there now is some question as to
whether Mujib, who is being pushed toward inde-
pendence by his followers, would be inclined to
settle for only East Pakistan's original demands.
orders in the East that the y would find
extremely difficult n+1 mpossible to suppress.
Should negotiations fail, Yahya and the mili-
tary would have to intervene or face the prospect
of East Pakistan's gradually drifting into inde-
pendence. Al aftemp ~" o 1TOId the country to-
getl r by force could lead to wi ead dis-
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India : Mrs. Gandhi on the Road to Victory
Incomplete election returns indicate Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi's gamble in calling early
national elections will have paid off handsomely.
Her Ruling Congress Party will probably far ex-
ceed the 261 seats needed for a majority in the
521-seat lower house.
Mrs. Gandhi campaigned vigorously against a
four-party alliance whose challenge was seriously
weakened by internal bickering and by its failure
in numerous constituencies to back only a single
candidate. She was particularly eager to free her-
self of the need for parliamentary support from
various minority parties-a dependence caused by
the split in the Congress Party in late 1969.
Mrs. Gandhi is now assured of widespread
support for the economic and social programs she
is expected to propose. So far, however, she has
failed to outline specific programs to implement
her promise of providing a better deal for the
poverty-stricken masses.
The poll is essentially a strong vote of con-
fidence in Mrs. Gandhi's leadership and an en-
dorsement of the Ruling Congress Party. The
prospect is for a stronger, more stable central
government that will continue to emphasize
moderate socialism at home while maintaining
India's traditional independent foreign pol-
icy.
Page 21
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 Mar 71
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Cit~-Chile: EXpanding Relations
The, re-establishrrnt of diplomatic ties be-
tween Ch' e and CubAk has been the most im-
portant sing XdevelopmI l: for the Castro regime
calling on memf r states
Cuba were imposeNn 19
when Chile official
in the number, variet
tween the two countr
In an early mo
tacts, the Chilean Cei
1970 lifted all restri
between the two co
earlier that year by the
action was followed by
to sever relations with
umed diplomatic rela-
as been a steady increase
nd warmth of ties
broadening con-
merce; trade
en resumed
tion. This
e signing of a
iversity
,iously negotia
tween the University of I'javana and the C
Catholic University. The a
effect on 1 January and i
two years, includes the e
lean
reement, which
change of prof,
and students to attend serlfinars and the e
/ J
el Castro greets capt4 n of Chilean Naval Training Ship
of information on he activities of both uni-
versities.
Of even more im ortance was the signing of
a commercial agreeme t on 12 February 1971,
even though some pr lems arose during the
otiations. The agree nt, which covers 1971
ank. extends through 19 3, envisages an annual
trade turnover of $20 mi lion. Havana radio and
Prensa atina press annou . cements reported that
a teleco unications agr ement was signed on
15 February, , between the Chilean services of the
National Tel.communicaions Enterprise and the
Cuban Enterpr~for Rao Communication. This
pact provides for the clo e interconnection of the
two countries' tran rissi n links.
The two governor' is signed a bilateral civil
air agreement on 25 Fe' Cuary providing for two
weekly flights by the C j ilk n Government airline
from Santiago to Havan There will be a weekly
Cuban flight to Santiago with.maintenance stop
in Lima. Such an arrangement will be useful in
accommodating the gro'tving number of persons
traveling between the to countries. At present
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Mexico is the only other Latin American country
with regularly scheduled air'; service to Cuba. In
addition, Cuba and Chile signed on 8 March an
agre' men providing for tjie exchange of films,
newsreels, `ocwrrntai and delegations to
minister and the Cuban' amba attended tfie
Although Castro must b?Uecr~'that the re-
establishment of form ties-between the two
nations is a victory. , . "imperialism" and is a
definite ecorlom?c asset fro Cuba, he appears to be
proceeoinT'very cautiously for fear of doing
anything that would crate problems for Chile. In
addition, Castro proba -ly realizes that socialism
in Chile is still very much-in the experimental
stage. N ._
,..CS'stro will, at leas in the short run, con-
tii ue to seize every oppottunity to move closer to
the Chilean GovernmXthe t. An elaborate welcome
was given in Havana Chilean naval training
ship Esmeralda whe it arrived on 22 February.
No effort was spared y the Cubans in playing up
'
thesship
.s, visit, and 9del Castro personally spent
several houn-oard Jn two separate occasions.
Uruguay: Another Kidnaping Adds to President's Probems
Last month's conflict between the President
and the Congress has eased somewhat, but a re-
newal of political hostilities seems likely when the
legislative session opens on 15 March. The kid-
naping of the attorney general on 10 March will
probably add to the President's problems with a
Congress that has frequently opposed his policies.
President Pacheco made a few concessions as
a result of the criticism aroused by his closure of
a left-wing newspaper on 16 February. The pub-
lishers of the suspended daily apparently will be
allowed to print another newspaper under a dif-
ferent name. In addition, the recently appointed
minister of interior has been less abrasive in his
dealings with Congress than was his predecessor.
He and two other ministers agreed to Congress'
demand that they meet with the permanent leg-
islative committee to discuss the closure.
Page 23
Nonetheless, basic points of contention re-
main. On 1 March the permanent legislative com-
mittee, which handles congressional business
between regular sessions, again rejected the execu-
tive's request for the reimposition of security
measures that were promulgated immediately
after the kidnaping of Britain's Ambassador
Jackson in January but had lapsed. The Pacheco
administration, probably encouraged by its suc-
cess in capturing terrorists and uncovering
planned operations while functioning under the
security measures, wants to maintain its initiative.
The abduction of the attorney general will
prompt the government to press even harder for
increased police powers.
In recent weeks the Tupamaros have released
Brazilian consul Gomide and US agronomist Fly,
both of whom were held for six months. The
most recent kidnaping, the Tupamaros' eighth,
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occur?i.r~raa fvcr?da~bFore the scheduled
meeting in:.Punta
operJ,jng of a .hemispheric trade
del-.Este anc1.guarantees? the terrorists another
flood of publicity: This slap, at the government
? came at a time when a movement to amend
the constitution and allow Pacheco to run for a
second term was gathering some strength. If
Pacheco persists in a re-election bid, the possi-
bility increases that the terrorists will continue to
use kidnapings in an attempt to embarrass the
government and discredit the President's hard-line
approach.
Guyana: Bauxite Legislation Passed at High Price
Prime Minister Burnham's bauxite nation- government agreed to have PPP representatives in
alization legislation was approved by parliament all government corporations, including the baux-
on 1 March by a vote of 48 to 3. To achieve this ite corporation, and intimated it may soon grant
victory, however, Burnham was forced to grant a legal recognition to the Guyana Agricultural
number of potentially important concessions to Workers Union. This organization, the labor arm
Communist Cheddi Jagan and his political party of the PPP, has been trying for years to gain
for their support. The affirmative votes of Jagan's control of the workers in the key sugar industry.
People's Progressive Party (PPP) gave the govern- In addition, the government agreed to relinquish
ment the two-thirds legislative majority it needed in June its right to declare any area of the coun-
to change the constitution to permit the nation- try under a state of emergency, as well as the
alization of an enterprise with "reasonable" com- minister of home affairs' broad powers of arrest
pensation. The measure spelled out the rules for and detention. These powers have been used to
Guyana's eventual take-over of the bauxite in- harass and intimidate PPP members and to restrict
dustry. their movement both within the country and
It C
No date has yet been set for "vesting day,"
when the government will formally assume con-
trol of the Canadian-owned Demerara Bauxite
Company (DEMBA), and there is no indication
that the government will move soon against the
US-owned Reynolds Aluminum Company sub-
sidiary in Guyana. -p~nhab1 ~c i1L YO d,
...ixn4"raeitati n until details -of the orderly
admin-ictra ive-turnover o1 DEMBA have been
wexkecf out and: ?arketing riegot i at ions now
Prtrn?nt emissaries abroad
are-concluded. Meanwhile, DEMBA is continuing
to operate normally.
Jagan evidently drove a very hard bargain in
getting Burnham to agree to the concessions. The
abroad. PPP members who wish to trave o om
munist countries will no longer be denied pass-
ports or have to declare false destinations. Jagan
also won some long-sought reforms in the election
commission, whose function it is to control voter
registration and to ensure the fairness of elec-
tions. He obtained a promise from Burnham to
reduce racial discrimination in government hiring,
as well as permission to hold "peaceful demon-
strations."
It is doubtful that Burnham intends to
honor all aspects of his agreement with Jagan. He
may be forced to face up to some of them,
however, and perhaps to make additional conces-
sions in the hope of forestalling a further dis-
ruption in the economy and of keeping gan
quiet during these difficult da s.
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Colombia: Situation Returns to Normal
The student and labor disturbances that began
on 26 February and culminated in a largely unsuc-
cessful nationwide work stoppage on 8 March have
ended. Colombia has returned to normal and the
administration has emerged apparently in a
strengthened position.
It is estimated that no more than 10 to 15
percent of the membership of the Union of Colom-
bian Workers (UTC), which called for the strike,
actually stayed home. Labor received little support
from the general public, university students, or the
opposition. Nevertheless, both the UTC and the
government are claiming victory. The UTC seems
convinced that the strike was successful because, in
spite of strong government pressure, thousands of
workers were willing to stay away from their jobs
to express peacefully their concern over social and
economic ills in Colombia. The Pastrana administra-
tion believes it prevailed because its strong action
averted violence on 8 March. For several weeks the
government had extra troops in the streets. Con-
servative and Liberal Party leaders, including several
former presidents, met with Pastrana on that date
to demonstrate national unity. Pastrana later said,
"The silent majority has spoken with its actions and
has supported law and order and made 8 March
antistrike day."
GUATEMALA: The 4
curfew and resume harsh
ernment may reimpos a
curity measures in view
of the continuing high Ile
terrorism has picked up substari
alization over the past two mont
of violence. Leftist
Ily since the liber-
siege, which has been in effect for
r months.
Incidents of known political violence duri
Febru-
ft.
ary totaled 64, perpetrated mainly by the
Thirty-five persons were killed, including five sec
rity officials. At least nine assassinations, mostly of
security men, have occurred so far this month, and
kidnapings of prominent businessmen have netted
several thousands of dollars for the Communist
terrorists.
Even though the stoppage was not effective,
Past na's labor problems have not ended; much
will de nd on how he handles the UTC leadership.
An acco odation with labor would probably de-
lay further ntigovernment action from th/t sector.
Should Past a take a hard line, howwever, labor
would unite a 'nst his administration he govern-
ment already In shown itself cap bile of taking
strong measures b declaring a state=,f siege, impos-
ing censorship and t ing riot cool measures, and
engaging in tough ba aining w r striking teachers
and railroad workers. hou it decide to move
against the UTC the o c e would be either a
labor movement united gainst the government
under UTC leadership, ; r broken UTC with the
Communist-front Tr a Un n Confederation of
Colombian Worker - picking p strength as the
largest remaining or central i Colombia.
Relati calm will probably . evail for the
next few onths, but the underlyin olitical, so-
cial, an economic problems that cau d the dis-
turba es still persist. These problems ark, likely to
incr se unless the government moves ah d more
forcefully and effectively, especially in the social
field. 25X1
counterterrorism by the government has been 25X1
almost nil in recent weeks. The low profile by the
security forces is unlikely to be maintained much
longer, however.
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