WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008700010001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
State Dept. review completed 2 April 1971
No. 0364/71
Copy N2 49
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CONTENTS
(Informnation as of noon EST, 1 April1971)
Page
Indochina: Aftermath to the Laotian Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Laos: The Beat Goes On . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The Pace Picks up in Cambodia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Communist China: Recognition Wagon Keeps Rolling . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Czechoslovak Trial is a Setback for Party Moderates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
USSR: Party Congress Opens in Moscow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
USSR: Nuclear Detonation on Massive Construction Project . . . . . . . . . . 11
Geneva Talks Feature Soviet BW Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Common Market Launches New Farm Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Finland: New Government Installed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
International Financial Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Pakistan: The Situation Remains Uncertain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Arab-Israeli Diplomatic Standoff Continues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Jordan: Clashes with Fedayeen Renewed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Recent Soviet Activity in the Indian Ocean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
India-USSR: Aid and Trade Relations Shifting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Turkey: New Cabinet Formed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Sierra Leone: Prime Minister Stevens Prevails . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Cruz Wins Honduran Presidency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Guatemalan President Forecasts Turbulence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Bolivia: Political Scandal May Prompt Military Coup . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Chile Approaches More Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
NOTES: Berlin; Yugoslavia-Italy; ICJ - South Africa; Maritime Issues; Mali; Ecuador
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Pans 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 Aix 71
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FAR EAST
Indochina: Aftermath to the Laotian Experience
Political fallout from the Laotian operation
is adding to the ferment of an election year in
South Vietnam. Public criticism of the operation
has been muted, but opponents of the govern-
ment claim that President Thieu's position has
been weakened. Big Minh and his entourage be-
lieve that popular reaction to events in Laos will
work to their advantage, and they are now more
hopeful of being able to win the presidential
election next fall.
Some usually outspoken opposition mem-
bers privately describe Lam Son 719 as a failure.
Even a relatively moderate opposition leader
thinks that, whatever the facts, the South Viet-
namese people believe the operation failed and
blame Thieu. The same politician believes that, at
least in psychological terms, the Communists have
come out on top and he fears that this will
encourage a resurgence of Viet Cong terrorist
activity, even in Saigon.
On the other hand, many independent and
progovernment politicians have publicly praised
the operation, and many private assessments
acknowledge that it will have a salutary effect on
the military situation in South Vietnam this year.
President Thieu is well aware that adverse
publicity over the Laotian operation could
damage his campaign for re-election. To counter
this and to encourage his own troops, Thieu, in a
press conference in Quang Tri Province this week,
asserted that Lam Son 719 had not been defeated
and announced that the operation was con-
tinuing.
The Situation in Quang 7Yi
The North Vietnamese are continuing to re-
act strongly to the presence of sizable allied
forces in western and northern Quang Tri Prov-
ince, and attacks in strength could occur. A series
of shellings and ambushes during the week were
more harassing than damaging, however, and few
casualties were inflicted.
The whereabouts of most of the 11 enemy
infantry regiments that were involved in defend-
ing eastern Laos is unclear. Some of these units
could be closing on Khe Sanh for a final attempt
to inflict a major setback on allied forces as they
withdraw and are more vulnerable to a large-scale
assault.
Communists' Spring Offensive
Even as they kept up the pressure in the
north last weekend, the Communists swung into
their annual country-wide spring campaign with a
series of shellings and ground attacks, and the
offensive gathered momentum. Some 41 shellings
were reported throughout South Vietnam on the
night of 29-30 March-the highest nightly total in
seven months.
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Communist forces under the Front 4 com-
mand authority in Quang Nam and Quang Tin
provinces began their campaign on schedule early
on 29 March. Enemy artillery units shelled Da
Nang and Chu Lai and a strong shelling and fol-
low-up ground attack was mounted against Fire
Support Base Mary Ann, where Americans suf-
fered more than 100 casualties. An attack by at
least three enemy battalions on the district town
of Duc Duc resulted in 66 South Vietnamese
soldiers killed and wounded, 196 civilian casual-
ties, and 1,500 houses destroyed, at a cost of 59
Communists killed.
A strong enemy attack forced the evacuation
of Fire Support Base 6 in the western highlands
province of Kontum on 31 March. Two battalions
of the North Vietnamese 28th Regiment, under
cover of heavy mortar and recoilless rifle fire,
overran the position; incomplete reports list six
killed and 33 missing, with some 80 of the at-
tackers reported killed.
Along the central coast, the new surge of
enemy action got under way late on 28 March; 13
shellings and eight ground attacks killed some 22
persons and wounded 43 on the first night. For
some time there has been a trend growing to
allow local commanders to begin action when
local conditions are best, rather than to stay with
inflexible tactics of past campaigns.
In South Vietnam's Military Region (MR) 3
Communist military action actually began to pick
up a week earlier, on 21 March. Although none of
the attacks was particularly hard hitting, 23
South Vietnamese were killed and another 76
wounded during the week ending 28 March. Most
of the activity has been in the northwestern part
of MR-3 and probably represents the sapper cam-
paign that was planned for the last half of March
as reported by agents and prisoners.
Viet Cong forces have struck hard at several
targets in the Mekong Delta provinces. Cang Long
district town in Vinh Binh Province was par-
ticularly hard hit on 28 March. Following a
200-round mortar and grenade bombardment, an
enemy force attacked, killing 45 and wounding
54, with a loss of only six of its own. Enemy
forces in the delta have generally been lying low
for most of the year, employing tactics designed
to conserve their personnel strength and supplies.
After an unusually quiet winter fighting sea-
son, the Communists apparently hope to stage a
more impressive round of attacks this spring.
They probably want to demonstrate that they can
still initiate combat within South Vietnam even
though some of their supply lines are disrupted
and most of their main force combat units are
tied up in Cambodia and Laos.
The Communists' Central Office for South
Vietnam (COSVN) recently issued a directive that
covers the likely pattern of enemy activity in the
next few months.
the directive lists some grandiose, an
runconvincing, objectives that the Commu-
nists "must" accomplish in South Vietnam by
June 1971, and it indicates that stopping South
Vietnamese Army offensives into Cambodia and
Laos is Hanoi's top priority this dry season. For
the most part, however, it realistically
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concentrates on measures to thwart the South
Vietnamese Government's pacification program.
The directive says that during the next five
months the main emphasis in South Vietnam will
be on commando tactics and terrorism. Enemy
commanders are cautioned not to make plans
beyond the capabilities of their units and to select
targets for attacks that will demoralize the gov-
ernment's military forces without alienating the
population from the Communists. In addition,
the directive orders the Viet Cong to work harder
at penetrating government administrative organi-
zations and non-Communist political parties and
to concentrate on recruiting new followers from
these two groups.
This general order is similar to other reports
on enemy intentions that have come to light
recently in widely separated parts of South Viet-
nam. It reaffirms to local units that for the time
being they are unlikely to get much beyond brave
words from higher echelons.
President Thieu Operates on Several Fronts
At the same time as he is concerned with the
Laotian operation and its aftermath, Thieu is
looking ahead to the fall elections. He may be
considering Prime Minister Khiem as his running
mate in the presidential election.
If Thieu chooses Khiem as a running mate,
he would, of course, increase the chance that Vice
President Ky will run for the presidency and draw
support away from Thieu. Ky could become an
important factor in the equation because Thieu's
election is by no means a sure thing; any diversion
of votes from Thieu would be of great help to Big
Minh. Some South Vietnamese political observers
still believe that Thieu eventually will opt to keep
Ky, despite friction between them, in order to
keep the support of Ky's remaining followers,
especially the military.
Khiem has some stature in his own right,
particularly in military and government circles,
but he is unlikely to broaden the base of support
for Thieu's ticket as much as a number of other
possible vice-presidential candidates. An offer
from Thieu, therefore, would probably reflect the
President's desire to have a vice president whom
he can regard as a helpmate rather than a major
nuisance, as he regards Ky.
The level of fighting remained high through-
out much of the country during the week, with
particular attention focused on government ef-
forts to push back Communist units around
Luang Prabang. On 26 March, the Communists
took the high ground east of the royal capital,
causing the government temporarily to close the
airport because of its vulnerability to enemy fire.
Some additional government units have ar-
rived to shore up the royal capital's defenses.
Government forces have launched a two-pronged
operation northeast of Luang Prabang designed to
expand the defensive perimeter, but this effort
has made only limited progress so far. Irregular
troops are spearheading the effort to drive back
the Communists, while regular army units in the
main are performing security chores behind the
irregular line and conducting defensive operations
in the town itself and around the airfield.
The Communists have made some state-
ments tending to clarify their motives for this
attempt to expand their control around Luang
Prabang. On 30 March, the North Vietnamese
bitterly attacked the Souvanna government, but
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0 Government -held location
0 Communist-held location
content for the moment to keep up the pressure
by shelling attacks and probes rather than by a
major ground assault against key government
positions. There are some indications that the
area northeast of Long Tieng, particularly around
Tha Tam Bleung, may be the next to be tested;
Communist units appear to be concentrating
heavily in this vicinity, and their fire has closed
the airstrip at Tha Tam Bleung. The government
has launched a four-battalion sweep operation
north and west of Ban Na to try to relieve enemy
pressure on that key artillery site.
Pathet Lao Ralliers
took time out to voice their continued respect for
King Savang, suggesting that they may have only
limited military objectives around the royal
capital. Pathet Lao representative Soth Pethrasy
last week said that the attacks were intended to
enforce the neutrality of the Laotian capital and
were a "warning to the Americans and Laotian
rightists not to use the airfield as a military base."
The government has a small force of T-28s and
AC-47 gunships at Luang Prabang.
The King, however, reportedly is concerned
that the North Vietnamese intend a siege of the
city, but such a step would be a departure from
the Communists' policy of refraining from action
against major population centers. The King is said
to be "totally committed" to remaining in Luang
Prabang and is continuing to take an active role in
planning its defenses.
Action around Long Tieng continued to be
heavy, but it appears the Communists remain
On 25 March, 31 members of the 25th
Pathet Lao Battalion and their commander rallied
to the government near Pakse. Since then, at least
69 more from this battalion have rallied, and the
government believes that elements from two
other nearby battalions are about to do the same.
The battalion commander and his deputy have
already directed government air strikes on areas
claimed to contain North Vietnamese supply and
troop concentrations.
The Pathet Lao (PL) said that they rallied
because of continuing deep conflicts with their
North Vietnamese mentors. They blame the
North Vietnamese for the death of the former PL
military commander in this region, General
Phomma, who apparently died some months ago
while being treated by North Vietnamese doctors.
Some bad feelings had existed between the North
Vietnamese and PL in this area, but this event
apparently turned bitterness to outright hostility.
The PL claim that the North Vietnamese are
trying to execute PL leaders who have proved
uncooperative. The ralliers reported that the
North Vietnamese are already in hot pursuit of
other units they suspect might defect and that
open clashes have occurred.
Souvanna and the Communists
Lao Communist leader Souphanouvong has
taken a tough tone in his response to Prime
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Minister Souvanna Phouma's message of 1 March
urging the Communists to get down to business
on Lao peace talks. For all his harsh talk, how-
ever, Souphanouvong did not appear to have
placed any new pre-conditions in the path of the
long-stalled talks. But he did reiterate the Com-
munist demand for a total bombing halt, as well
as the withdrawal of all "US, Saigon,
troops," before any "peaceful solution" could be
found. This distinction between a solution and
the conditions necessary for peace talks was made
by the Communist side last year, presumably in
order to let them engage in talks without having
to give up any of their key demands.
For his part, Souvanna has released the text
of his message to Souphanouvong on 1 March. The
contrast between Souvanna's nonpolemical mes-
sage and the rigid Communist response will un-
doubtedly reflect well on Souvanna, but is
unlikely to do anything to get the talks started.
government moved quickly to launch a small
FANK task force, support by a 105-mm. battery,
to reopen the way to Pich Nil. Communist heavy
mortar fire and harassing attacks have prevented
the task force from making rapid headway.
Farther south on Route 4, the Communi25X6
briefly controlled a shorter stretch of the highway
when they overran three villages between the
seaport at Kompong Som and the town of Veal
Renh. Although FANK elements reoccupied the
villages the following day without opposition, the
Communists have continued harassing attacks in
the vicinity of Veal Renh.
It appears that all the attacks were planned
and ordered by the Communist Phuoc Long
Front, the main headquarters for enemy opera-
tions in the southwest. The coordinated nature of
these attacks suggests that the Communists, after
resupplying and resting, may be settling in for
another sustained Route 4 offensive.
The Pace Picks up in Cambodia
The Communists appeared to be increasing
the tempo of their modest dry season campaign,
particularly in the southwest where they carried
out a series of effective attacks this week against
government positions along Route 4. They also
were more active against South Vietnamese forces
in eastern Cambodia.
The latest enemy actions along Route 4 be-
gan with a prolonged attack on the two poorly
organized Cambodian Army (FANK) battalions
holding the Pich Nil pass. The Cambodian defend-
ers managed to stand their ground with the aid of
heavy air strikes, however, while taking relatively
light losses. The Communists destroyed most of a
14-vehicle government munitions convoy in an
ambush on Route 4 east of the pass, and gained
control over a ten-mile segment of the road. The
Enemy military activity also increased in
Kompong Cham Province where the Communists
began the week with several heavy mortar attacks
against South Vietnamese commando centers in
and south of the Chup plantation. The attacks
killed 13 South Vietnamese and wounded 44
others. In a clash just east of Chup along Route 7,
South Vietnamese units more than evened that
score, however, when they reportedly killed 62
Communists-apparently from a regiment of the
enemy's 7th Division. In later and sharper fighting
south of Chup, the South Vietnamese claimed
they killed 225 enemy troops with a strong assist
from heavy air strikes.
Elsewhere in Kompong Cham, the multibat-
talion FANK operation aimed at clearing an area
between Route 7 northward to the enemy-held
Chamcar Leu rubber plantation continued to
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grind along in low gear, apparently to minimize
government losses. FANK troops reported scat-
tered skirmishes with Communist elements, but
casualties on both sides were light.
In other military developments, Communist
operations in Svay Rieng Province may also be on
the rise. The failure of FANK troops to man some
of the positions recently vacated by South
Vietnamese troops along Route 1 reportedly has
enabled the enemy to interfere with the
movement of supplies from villages along that
highway to Svay Rieng city. In the only major
fighting during the week in that province, how-
ever, Khmer Krom troops killed 70 Communists
without suffering any losses of their own in a
clash in the Parrot's Beak area.
Communist China: Recognition Wagon Keeps Rolling
On Monday, Kuwait became the seventh
country to recognize Peking since Canada broke
the ice last October. Prior negotiations were brief
and apparently not especially complicated. The
joint communique stated that Kuwait recognized
Peking as the "sole lawful government of China,"
a formula used in recognition announcements by
Canada, Italy, and Chile, and which has now
become standard for all states that previously
recognized the Nationalist Chinese Government.
However, another standard phrase in the "Cana-
dian formula," a statement taking note of Pe-
king's claim to Taiwan, was not included. This
development suggests that in the interest of main-
taining the momentum on recognition the
Chinese Communists are now willing to finesse
direct reference to the Taiwan issue, as was the
case in 1964, when French recognition of Peking
was negotiated.
As a by-product of Kuwaiti recognition of
Peking, the Nationalist Government immediately
withdrew its ambassador to that state. Taipei had
briefly considered authorizing their envoy to re-
main in place if the Kuwaitis would guarantee
that Kuwait would not demand that he leave, but
this was apparently the result of misapprehen-
sions created by inept Kuwaiti diplomacy; when
directly queried, the Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry
declined to offer the necessary assurances. This
was in fact almost a foregone conclusion, since
pressure to recognize Peking from parliament was
such that the Foreign Ministry was anxious to
avoid additional complications.
Taipei had hoped that by allowing its ambas-
sador to remain, Peking would be forced to, ac-
cept either a joint Communist-Nationalist
presence in Kuwait or the onus of demanding-
perhaps unsuccessfully-that Kuwait expel the
Nationalist envoy. This ploy was attempted un-
successfully in 1964, at the time of French
recognition of Peking. The Nationalists have sub-
sequently avoided "humiliations" of this sort, and
their hesitation in the present instance was prob-
ably designed to "prove" that flexibility would be
unavailing.
Kuwaiti recognition of Peking is certain to
increase pressures on the Lebanese Government
to follow suit. It may have an effect also on
Libya, which, despite its pretensions as a "lib-
erated" Arab state, continues to recognize Taipei.
The "Kuwaiti formula," if it now becomes stand-
ard, should also have a positive effect, from
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Peking's point of view, in Europe. Austria, which
is about to begin negotiations with Communist
China, will clearly find the new formula more
' Belgium
palatable than the "Canadian formula.,
may also consider it attractive. There is a distinct
possibility that other African states, particularly
in West Africa, will recognize Peking, although
recent US soundings in one prime candidate,
Togo, indicate that no imminent move there is
contemplated.
Persistent rumors suggest that Peru is also
considering recognition of Peking, although the
US Embassy in Lima sees no sign that a move is
under way.
EUROPE
Czechoslovak Trial Is a Setback for Party Moderates
The conviction last week of former Lt. Gen-
eral Vaclav Prchlik, a prominent official in the
Dubcek administration, is a fresh reminder of the
influence that party dogmatists can bring to bear
on the moderate Husak leadership. This, the first
clear-cut "political" trial to be held under the
Husak regime, raises some doubts as to Husak's
ability to prevent reprisals against ex-reformers.
Prchlik was charged with "hampering" important
government work in his activities while head of
the party's military committee in 1968. Other
dissidents have been tried, but for activities con-
ducted since Husak took office in April 1969.
Prchlik was tried in a military court under
the control of the defense establishment, which is
dominated by the party's dogmatic wing. It has
been this group that has consistently opposed
Husak on the issue of political trials and has
sought more severe treatment of the erstwhile
reformers. There is little information available on
the circumstances of the in camera trial and on
why Husak was unable to forestall it; he has been
able to stop civil trials in the past. The fact that
the Czechoslovak military is one of Moscow's
principal channels of control in Prague suggests
that perhaps the Soviets were involved.
slovak dogmatists' sensitivities by his bold attack
on the Warsaw Pact system. It was he who, in
July 1968, publicly criticized Moscow's domina-
tion of the Warsaw Pact and denounced the right
of a member state to station troops on the ter-
ritory of another without the latter's consent.
Dubcek at the time was negotiating with the
Soviets to remove their troops which had been
"maneuvering" in Czechoslovakia.
Prchlik's conviction reinforces recent rumors
in Prague that other associates of Dubcek will be
brought to the bar for their 1968 activities. Most
of this speculation revolves around other military
officers who in varying degrees supported the
reforms. Some, like Defense Minister Dzur,
remain in high level positions but presumably are
not immune from attack. So far, however, the
evidence does not support the fears of some in
Czechoslovakia of a return to the terror of the
1950s.
Nevertheless, the ability of the dogmatists to
initiate such trials will hamper Husak's domestic
programs. His policies of moderation and "recon-
ciliation" depend heavily on the party's ability to
gain a modicum of popular support, and this will
become more difficult in an atmosphere of retri-
Prchlik, more than most ex-reformers still in
the country, struck at the Soviet and Czecho-
bution.
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EUROPE
USSR: Party Congress Opens in Moscow
The 24th party congress got under way this
week in Moscow and thus far has provided few
surprises. General Secretary Brezhnev's wide-
ranging policy report, the main business of the
first week of the congress, contained no depar-
tures from previous policies. His statements on
foreign policy were measured and self-confident,
designed to portray the USSR as a responsible
world power. On domestic affairs, Brezhnev
coupled demands for reinforcing the party's lead-
ing role in Soviet society with strong promises of
improved welfare for the masses. Despite earlier
rumors that Stalin would be further rehabilitated
at the congress, Brezhnev reaffirmed what has
long been the official line on the late dictator.
In discussing foreign policy, Brezhnev alter-
nated between firmness and flexibility but did
not indicate that there would be any major depar-
tures in the near future. Though sharply critical
of US policies, particularly in Indochina, he as-
serted that "it is possible" to improve US-Soviet
relations and he re-endorsed the principle of
"peaceful coexistence."
Brezhnev proposed a variety of measures on
disarmament, including a conference by the five
nuclear powers. While these proposals obviously
have a substantial propaganda content, the Krem-
lin may hope that pressure will build up in the
West to find out what Moscow has in mind. On
SALT, Brezhnev reiterated Moscow's desire to see
the talks produce "positive results," while stress-
ing that they can only be successful if "no one
seeks unilateral advantage."
Brezhnev restated that the USSR is seeking
better relations with China while he firmly re-
jected Peking's "anti-Soviet line." He said that the
treaties signed by Bonn with the USSR and Po-
land would stabilize the situation in Europe and
repeatedly called upon Bonn to ratify them.
Moscow has probably taken some satisfac-
tion from the representation at the Congress of
most foreign Communist parties-China being the
principal absentee-and many other leftist groups.
It seems particularly pleased with the presence of
North Vietnam's Le Duan, who led off the for-
eign speakers and was effusive in his praise for
Moscow's "tremendous, valuable assistance" to
Hanoi.
On the domestic front, Brezhnev voiced a
strong commitment to raising the status of the
consumer sector during the current five-year plan
and beyond. His lengthy explanation for empha-
sizing consumer welfare, as well as his position
that this does not violate the party's "general
line" on the priority development of heavy indus-
try, suggest that the subject is still a matter of
controversy. He announced that the central com-
mittee will shortly draw up a program for increas-
ing the production levels of consumer goods.
On party affairs, Brezhnev expressed ap-
proval of a proposal that congresses be held every
five rather than every four years so that they can
mesh with the five-year plans. He also announced
that proposals had been made for issuing new
party cards to all members-the first such ex-
change in 17 years and one which he described as
already overdue. His lengthy criticism of the in-
discipline, formalism and indifference displayed
by some party members suggests that the card
exchange may be used to weed out some of those
members recruited during the more liberal Khru-
shchev years.
Brezhnev cited benefits allegedly derived
from the 1965 economic reform. He said that
"perfecting the mechanism of economic manage-
ment" was still a major problem for 1971-75 and
he advocated the establishment of industrial pro-
duction associations and the use of computerized
management systems.
He handled the Stalin issue with the now
standard formulation that the party had over-
come the cult of personality, as well as
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subjectivism (read Khrushchevism). Brezhnev's re-
marks on Soviet intellectuals suggest that the
campaign for ideological conformity will continue
at about its present level, but that no drastic
move against the liberal intellectuals is imminent.
He also criticized scientists for their lack of politi-
cal fervor and their tendency to work on prob-
lems unrelated to present-day needs of Soviet
society. Brezhnev announced that steps would be
taken to strengthen party control in scientific and
cultural organizations, in ministries and at all lev-
els of soviets.
All members of the top leadership attended
the congress. The seating arrangement and other
signs of protocol ranking gave few hints of what,
EAST GERMANY - WEST BERLIN: No progress
was made in the talks on 27 March between West
Berlin Senat and East German officials about
Easter passes for West Berliners. Their hopes for
an Easter agreement were squelched when the
East German negotiator rejected an arrangement
limited to the Easter holiday and again proposed
conclusion of a general agreement-another at-
YUGOSLAVIA-ITALY: Not even the bombing
of the Yugoslav Consulate in Milan could detract
from the exceptionally warm atmosphere sur-
rounding Yugoslav President Tito on his 25-29
March visit to Italy. Coming less than four
months-after Foreign Minister Moro's unfortunate
reference to Italy's "legitimate rights" along their
mutual border, which caused Tito to cancel his
planned December visit, the trip put relations
squarely back on a friendly track. Tito took
if any, changes may be in the offing. The senior
members of the politburo appeared to be firmly
in charge. President Podgorny opened the con-
gress and presided over the first session at which
Brezhnev spoke. Suslov chaired the second session
and Kirilenko the third. This represents a boost
for Kirilenko, a close supporter of Brezhnev; at
the last party congress Kosygin chaired the third
session.
Following Brezhnev's report, there was a
"discussion" during which a succession of lesser
party officials and visiting foreign Communist
party dignitaries took their turn at the speaker's
rostrum. Premier Kosygin will probably deliver
his report on the five-year plan early next
tempt to enhance Pankow's sovereignty at the
expense of Allied prerogatives. Senat Director
Mueller reiterated that he is authorized only to
discuss Easter visits. The meeting broke off after
four hours without setting a date for further
talks. Senat officials now plan to negotiate passes
for the Pentecost season at the end of
May.
advantage of an opportunity for talks on the
Middle East with Egyptian Foreign Minister Riad
(also on an official visit to Italy) and wound up
his last day, in tails and top hat, by paying an
official call on Pope Paul VI. Tito was back in
Belgrade late Monday (and absent from the Soviet
Party Congress Tuesday). He will continue his
round of talks with Western leaders later this
month when French Premier Chaban-Delmas
visits Yugoslavia.
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USSR: Nuclear Detonation on Massive Construction Project
The Soviets recently detonated the first
underground nuclear device to be used on the
projected canal to connect the Pechora and Kama
rivers. Rather than signaling the commencement
of this massive project, however, the explosion is
probably part of the feasibility tests.
The canal is to divert part of the water of
the northward flowing Pechora River into the
southward flowing Kolva-Kama-Volga river net-
work, and ultimately into the Caspian Sea. The
much-needed water, which would be provided to
the arid south, could be used to expand irrigation
of the Volga regions, fill increasing industrial and
urban requirements, and create additional hydro-
electric power. It also could reduce water loss
from the Caspian Sea, the depth of which has
fallen 8.2 feet in the last 35 years. This project
will be the most significant action yet taken to-
ward fulfilling the Soviet dream of reversing the
flow of many of the USSR's northward flowing
rivers.
The explosion, with a low-intermediate
yield, was probably undertaken to test the sta-
bility of the banks of the canal. If successful, the
Soviets plan a series of nuclear explosions involv-
ing 250 devices, totaling 36 megatons in yield,
along the northern segment of the canal. The use
of nuclear explosives would greatly reduce the
need for large earth moving equipment, which is
in short supply, and would cut costs by approx-
imately two thirds. If the Soviets proceed with
nuclear explosions on this scale for the canal
project it will lead to problems under the Limited
Test Ban Treaty, which bans explosions causing
radioactive debris to cross national borders. It is
probable that Soviet efforts during the past two
years to- seek an understanding with the US on
permissible peaceful nuclear explosions are re-
25X1 lated to this canal project.
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Geneva Talks Feature Soviet BW Proposal
The USSR surprised the 25-nation Geneva
disarmament conference early this week by offer-
ing a draft convention to ban biological weapons
(BW), thereby abandoning its previous insistence
on a treaty that would control chemical weapons
(CW) as well. The Soviet volte-face appears to
open the way for an early agreement on a BW
convention. It should also put the superpowers in
a better light with the other conferees, who have
seemed increasingly impatient with the apparent
lack of movement in the strategic arms limitation
talks (SALT) in Vienna and with the long-stand-
ing deadlock on a comprehensive ban on nuclear
testing (CTB).
The Soviet BW text is quite similar to that of
a UK draft convention the US has favored since
1969, the same year the Soviets introduced their
proposed all-inclusive ban on CBW. Although
Moscow has dropped occasional hints that it
could eventually agree to a BW-only formulation,
most observers had expected the Soviets to ad-
here to their own proposal as long as there was
propaganda mileage to be gained from US use of
tear gas and herbicides in Vietnam. Moscow's
switch, coinciding with the opening of the Soviet
Party Congress, was probably intended to under-
score Brezhnev's strong new verbal commitment
to pursue international disarmament.
The references in the Soviet draft to a CW
ban-providing that parties conduct "good faith"
negotiations on curbing such weapons-are in
keeping with US statements of policy. Less palat-
able is a reference to the 1969 resolution of the
UN General Assembly-approved by an 80-3
vote-that interprets the Geneva Protocol of 1925
to outlaw the use of tear gas and herbicides in
war. It is not yet clear how strongly the Soviets
will stick to this point, which has also become a
thorny issue in the Senate hearings on US ratifica-
tion of the protocol.
In addition to criticizing the slow pace of
SALT, many delegates at the Geneva talks have
deplored the possibility of an agreement that
would set quantitative limits on the superpowers'
missile stockpiles but not restrict qualitative im-
provements in strategic delivery systems. The
nonaligned representatives have been especially
vociferous on this point, referring often to the
obligation of the nuclear powers under Article 6
of the Nonproliferation Treaty to seek an end to
the nuclear arms race.
Several delegations consequently have given
considerable attention to a CTB, stalemated for
years by Soviet opposition to US insistence on
on-site inspection. Canada has been a pacesetter
this year in trying to find some way to broaden
the testing ban, a reflection of Ottawa's concern
over US underground testing on Amchitka Island
in the Aleutians. With the continuing impasse
over CTB verification, the conferees are in-
creasingly inclined to discuss as an interim meas-
ure a threshold test ban prohibiting detona125X1
above an agreed level on the Richter seismic
magnitude scale. A breakthrou h in this area,
however, is not in sight.
Common Market Launches New Farm Program
At an EC Council meeting last week-the the land, improve the lot of the remaining farm-
longest in Community history, and during which ers, and increase agricultural efficiency.
tens of thousands of European farmers demon-
strated tumultuously-the Six set the prices for The modernization aspects of the reform
the 1971-72 agricultural year and inaugurated a program fall short of Commissioner Mansholt's
Community program to accelerate movement off proposals, but his satisfaction that at least a start
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has been made toward recasting the EC's costly
support system seems justified. The farmers them-
selves are unlikely to be mollified by the price
hikes, which, averaging about four percent, will
not make up for cost-of-living increases nor give
them parity with industrial wages. Bonn, in par-
ticular, may have difficulties selling the EC deci-
sions to the German farmer. The "minimal" price
rises authorized are, however, a victory for
Mansholt, who had counted on the differences
among the member states to cancel each other
out in favor of his compromises. The beef price
increases should lead to more production of this
deficit commodity of the Community.
Italian tenacity, largely, enabled the Com-
mission to maintain a link between its price and
reform proposals. It may be difficult for Italy to
come up with acceptable implementation meas-
ures for structural reform, but it will be a major
financial beneficiary if it does. The Community
will pay a higher percentage of the costs in
"poor" areas-such as southern Italy-than in
more developed regions. How France's and Ger-
many's existing, expensive reform programs will
tie in to the Community program remains un-
clear.
The Council agreement stressed that rapid
progress toward economic and monetary union,
together with Common Market regional and social
policies, would also indirectly benefit reform in
the agricultural sector.
Finland: New Government Installed
A four-party, center-left coalition excluding
the Communists was formed under the leadership
of Prime Minister Ahti Karjalainen on 26 March.
The previous five-party, center-left coalition
had resigned on 17 March after the Communists
had refused to back a government price control
proposal supported by the other four parties. The
continued refusal of the Communists to modify
their stand finally resulted in Karjalainen's deci-
sion to exclude them from negotiations to end
the government crisis. This turn of events was
readily accepted by leaders of the other parties in
the coalition, who had also wearied of Commu-
nist obstructionism in the government.
Low-key Soviet press comment on these
events suggests that Moscow is weighing its own
reaction carefully. The Soviets may well have
been caught off guard by the collapse of the
five-party coalition and could still be trying to
determine the alternatives open to them.
Even without Communist backing, the new
center-left coalition enjoys a 108-92 majority
position in parliament. Furthermore, the four par-
ties in the government have long experience in
working together and can be expected to use
normal democratic means to resolve their dif-
ferences. This is in sharp contrast to the situation
existing during the previous government's term in
office when extraordinary intervention by Presi-
dent Kekkonen was often necessary to keep the
Communists in line.
Still unclear is the role the Communists envi-
sion for themselves outside the government. The
past five years of cooperation between the Com-
munist and democratic parties have worked
mainly to the advantage of the latter. Finnish
Communist leaders may now have concluded that
the only way to check the steady erosion in their
political position will be to draw closer to the
more extreme positions of the Stalinist dissidents
within the party.
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International Financial Situation
The absorption of US dollars by foreign cen-
tral banks continues at a fast pace. The West
German Bundesbank in the last three months has
increased its dollar reserves by more than $2
billion, while the dollar holdings of the Bank of
England have expanded by nearly as much.
The outflow of US short-term capital has
been heavy since early 1970 when declining US
interest rates produced wide disparities via-a-vis
the higher rates in other industrial countries. Eu-
ropean bankers, particularly, are seriously dis-
turbed because the burgeoning of dollar reserves
impedes their efforts to combat inflation at
home.
Nevertheless, some European interest rates
have begun to soften. Effective 1 April, the
Bundesbank reduced its discount rate by one full
point to five percent, which should restrict the
heavy inflow of dollars. To limit the impact on
the West German money supply, the Bundesbank
also reduced the amount of money commercial
banks can borrow at the lower rate. Immediately
following suit, the Bank of England lowered its
bank rate by a point, although at six percent it
remains higher than the German rate and will
continue to attract dollars from abroad, which are
used to pay off the UK's international indebted-
ness. The British Government hopes tight money
will put pressure on British business to resist
escalating wage demands that have been the main
inflationary force there.
A few of the smaller industrial nations-
Belgium, Netherlands and Switzerland-have been
exchanging excess dollars for gold or Interna-
tional Monetary Fund Special Drawing Rights. The
dollar holdings of these countries are relatively
small, however; only large conversions of dollars
by countries such as West Germany or France
could put serious pressure on US gold re-
serves.
MARITIME ISSUES: Some proposals that may
create serious problems for the US were offered
recently at the initial UN preparatory meeting for
the 1973 Law of the Sea conference. The confer-
ence will consider rights of passage through inter-
national straits, regulations to govern peaceful
exploitation of the resources of the ocean floor,
and territorial waters claims. Most troublesome
was Spain's interest in having the 1973 confer-
ence decide whether the passage through interna-
tional straits of nuclear-powered vessels and those
carrying "dangerous cargoes" should be termed
"non-innocent" and thereby restricted. Madrid
E
? ? 25X1
probably hopes to upgrade its influence on
NATO-related activities by this initiative, assum-
ing concessions will be offered in order to keep
the subject off the 1973 agenda. Moscow has not
taken a stand on the Spanish ploy, but is believed
to share the US concern that passage rights not be
infringed in such a manner. Latin American states
with 200-mile claims to territorial waters gained
several converts to their views that the major
powers' fishing activity off the less developed
countries should be curbed by means of broad
exclusive zones." 1
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Pakistan: The Situation Remains Uncertain
Acting suddenly and methodically, the Pak-
istan Army seized control of Dacca late on the
night of 25-26 March. Fighting continued
throughout the night and casualties, particularly
among civilians, are believed to have been heavy.
Fighting also broke out in the port city of Chit-
25X1 tagong and continued for several days, but the
army, apparently aided by naval gunfire and air
force bombing, now appears to have effectively
quashed resistance there.
of talks with Mujib, Yahya was merely stalling for
time to allow more troops to enter East Pakistan.
ahya,
pry y on 24 arch, gave the military the order
to proceed with a crackdown, and left for Karachi
the following day.
25X1
There are only fragmentary and conflicting
reports about conditions in the rest of East Pak-
istan, caused in large part by a breakdown in
communications and the subsequent isolation of
Dacca. A clandestine East Pakistani radio,
monitored in India, has reported that Bengali
forces are in control of several major cities. Al-
though many of these claims are patently false, it
appears that the Pakistan Army has met heavy
resistance in many parts of the province. The
army has continued to fly in reinforcements from
West Pakistan, and there have been air strikes in
some areas other than Chittagong.
It is not yet clear what touched off the
army's action. As late as 24 March it had seemed
that President Yahya Khan and East Pakistani
leader Mujibur Rahman were close to reaching a
compromise formula for solving the constitu-
tional crisis over demands for East Pakistani
autonomy. It is possible that during the ten days
In a speech to the nation on 26 March,
Yahya said military intervention was necessary to
preserve national unity, referring pointedly to
Mujib's demand that martial law be withdrawn as
an interim government took over. He accused
M uj i b of treason, outlawed Mujib's Awami
League, banned all political activity in Pakistan,
and imposed press censorship over the nation.
This censorship, plus the evacuation at gunpoint
of all foreign newsmen from East Pakistan on 27
March, has contributed to the confusion in the
outside world over the situation in the East.
The clandestine East Pakistani radio began
broadcasting at approximately the same time as
Yahya addressed the nation. This radio claimed
that Mujib had declared independence for the
"People's Republic of Bangla Desh" (Bengali Na-
tion) and on 28 March reported that a provisional
government had been formed, headed by a Major
Zia Khan, presumably a pseudonym. The radio,
which may have operated from Chittagong, has
not been heard in Calcutta since 30 March.
Although the Bengali radio continually in-
sisted that Mujib was still at liberty, there is
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considerable evidence that he was arrested at his
residence shortly after the army began its opera-
tions.
It has become apparent that the Pakistan
Army, at least in Dacca, has engaged in a brutal
and systematic effort to eliminate quickly and
completely all resistance in East Pakistan. Leaders
of the Awami League, university professors,
students at Dacca University, and members of the
Hindu minority communit in Dacca have been
special targets.
Although the operations
must have been p anne at a high level, the attack
on the Bengalis may have gotten out of hand as
West Pakistani troops vented their frustrations,
which have mounted in recent weeks as the East
Pakistanis have taunted them, burned the national
flag, and openly boasted of their preparations for
insurrection.
The military apparently hopes that a ruthless
show of force will subdue the Bengalis. At
present, the army probably has enough strength
to control the major cities of East Pakistan, and
ICJ - SOUTH AFRICA: Both sides have com-
pleted their presentations before the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) on the UN complaint over
Pretoria's hold on South-West Africa in defiance
of numerous UN resolutions. South Africa firmly
denied any UN jurisdiction over the territory, but
the airlift-sealift capability to supply these troops.
The final outcome probably will be decided in the
countryside, however, where 90 percent of the
population lives. The riverine character of the
terrain and the dearth of communication and
transportation facilities favor a guerrilla-style war
in East Pakistan. If the Bengalis can acquire
weapons, they may eventually be able to over-
come the West Pakistanis, who will face logistical
problems in conducting a sustained military effort
in East Pakistan-particularly during the mon-
soons, which begin in a few weeks.
Indian reaction to the crisis has been heavily
sympathetic to the East Pakistanis. On 31 March,
both houses of Parliament unanimously passed a
resolution expressing solidarity with the Bengalis
and demanding an immediate end to the use of
force to massacre the "defenseless people" in East
Pakistan. Efforts by India's UN delegation to
obtain some sort of international response to the
civil war, however, have met with negative reac-
tions, and the Pakistani Government has objected
strongly to what it claims is interference in Pak-
istan's internal affairs.
did offer to permit a plebiscite to be jointly
supervised by Pretoria and the ICJ. The court is
likely to draft an opinion supporting the UN's
contentions, but South Africa is certain not to
relinquish its control over the territory and may
renew char es that the ICJ lacks objectiv-
ity.
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Arab-Israeli Diplomatic Standoff Continues
Egypt this week continued its efforts to en-
list foreign support for its stand on resolving the
conflict with Israel.
Foreign Minister Riad met in Paris with
Egypt's ambassadors to Western Europe, and dur-
ing the week also held discussions with Italian and
French officials. Press reports allege that he in-
structed his ambassadors to urge West European
countries to put pressure on Israel, which Egypt
claims is responsible for paralyzing the Jarring
mission. Riad's tour is to continue at least until 9
April, with visits to Athens and Tehran. After a
stop in Cairo, he may then go on to other world
capitals, including possibly Moscow.
Riad also met with UN mediator Jarring,
who had left New York last week to spend the
Easter holidays with his family in Moscow, where
he is Sweden's ambassador. Jarring returned to
Paris for the one-day visit, which generated con-
siderable interest in the international community
but has so far failed to produce any new peace
proposals. UN spokesmen announced earlier that
Jarring will return to New York in the latter half
of April, but noted that the mediator would re-
turn earlier on short notice if developments
should warrant. The statement did not support
the Egyptian claim that a precondition for Jar-
ring's return is a positive Israeli reply to his Feb-
ruary memorandum.
In Egypt, media continued to play up the
various civil defense measures being implemented
throughout the country. President Sadat, during a
weekend visit to the Sudan, warned of the critical
nature of the current situation and stated that
"the coming days will be decisive." He termed it
"painfully surprising" to see the US being ex-
posed to Israeli pressures rather than the reverse.
In Israel, meanwhile, the press focused on
Secretary Rogers' briefing of the US Senate on 25
March. Some reports interpreted the secretary's
briefing as a signal of a "temporary halt" in US
efforts to promote the Rogers plan. Other papers
noted that even pro-Israeli members of the Senate
had emerged from the briefing expressing
sympathetic understanding of the administra-
tion's Near East policy. One independent Tel Aviv
daily stated that although some "high-placed ele-
ments" believe that US-Israeli relations require
advance discussion on what constitutes secure
borders, no decision on this question would be
made before Foreign Minister Eban's return to
Israel, which was scheduled for the latter part of
this week.
The semiofficial Tel Aviv daily Davar re-
ported on 30 March that Israel would shortly
present its suggestions on the opening of the Suez
Canal. The Israeli plan allegedly will call for free-
dom of navigation for Israel and will stipulate
that any agreement on the canal is not an interim
step toward additional withdrawals; Israeli forces
would withdraw only a few kilometers and Egypt-
ian forces would not cross the canal. Another
paper quotes a government source as saying, that
an interim agreement with Egypt on the canal
might be followed by an interim agreement with
Jordan, which would cover such subjects as the
status of Muslim holy places in Jerusalem, Jor-
danian access to the port of Gaza, and refugees
living on the West Bank.
Davar subsequently reported that the in-
clination in Jerusalem was to establish contacts
on opening the canal through the US rather than
through Ambassador Jarring, because of the
"growing fear" of Jarring since his surprise
demand, without prior consultation with Israel,
for total Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. Moreover,
according to the paper, there is an increasing
inclination to establish direct contacts with the
US on the majority of unresolved questions, be-
cause it has become clear to the Israelis that the
US does not reject the idea of opening the canal
in the framework of a partial agreement.
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Jordan: Clashes with Fedayeen Renewed
Amman's moves to counter an arms build-up
of several weeks by the fedayeen in northern
Jordan has rekindled sporadic fighting between
the guerrillas and government forces.
Fighting also occurred in
Amman, where the guerrillas, apparently in reac-
tion to the events in the north, attacked security
forces in various parts of the capital. Isolated
outbreaks of firing continued in other parts of the
country in the early part of the week.
Premier Wasfi Tal, in a televised address to Parlia-
ment, noted that the security problem in the
Jordanian capital would be dealt with "in as
friendly a manner as possible.''
When fighting first broke out, a Fatah clan-
destine radio station filled the airwaves with
dramatic accounts of the army's activities in and
around Irbid. By contrast, other Arab radio-
broadcasts and news agency dispatches from
neighboring capitals were low keyed in their
reporting, drawing heavily on Jordanian Gov-
ernment communiques. As the fighting continued
to drag on, however, Syria called for the re-
creation of a multinational Arab peace-keeping
force to police a cease-fire, and Egypt began to
describe the fighting as "the extermination of the
Palestinian people." Cairo further showed its
displeasure over the course of events by allowing
the Voice of Fatah, which had been forced off
the air last July, to begin broadcasting again from
the Egyptian ca ital.
25X1
Recent Soviet Activity in the Indian Ocean
The Soviets appear to be sending out feelers
to several countries in and around the Indian
Ocean for additional use of repair and bunkering
facilities. Soviet commercial ships make regular
calls at many of the harbors but naval units to
date have made little use of these facilities.
Soviet warships from the Mediterranean first
showed the flag in the Indian Ocean area in 1965
when a destroyer visited Ethiopia for Naval Day
celebrations. Since 1968, Soviet warships have
maintained a small but nearly continuous pres-
ence in the Indian Ocean in order to gain opera-
tional experience in tropical waters as well as to
maintain a military presence there. In 1968, a
group of five ships coming from Vladivostok
visited eight countries in the Indian Ocean before
returning to the Pacific nearly four months later.
Since then, the Soviets have maintained a small
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Moscow.
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
2,=
~gden
BErberal YOCOTRA
-.~-_ (Yemen (AdRn))
SEYCHELLES
WIG)
{ f,y KENYA )'(
IYemhasa
TANZANIA,
Dar as Salaam ..I
1
L:ROZET IS.
(Fr.)
CHAPS
ARCHIPELAGO
(U.)
but active force of surface ships which-though
not of great military significance-gives Moscow a
presence in a part of the world where the Soviet
Navy has not traditionally been active.
The Soviet warships frequently call at
Mogadiscio and Berbera in Somalia, but there
apparently is no formal agreement permitting the
ships to use these facilities on a regular basis.
Soviet tankers supporting naval units in the
Indian Ocean take on fuel in Aden, but the naval
units seldom visit there.
There are currently four Soviet warships,
including a cruiser and an amphibious landing
ship, plus four support ships operating in the
Indian Ocean. The warships spend most of their
time in the western part of the Indian Ocean-
primarily off the Mauritius Islands and Socotra.
Most of the naval units are drawn from the Pacific
Fleet, but new naval units built in the western
part of the USSR frequently are transferred to
Pacific bases via the Indian Ocean.
In addition to this naval activity, the Soviets
have sought the use of several Indian Ocean ports
in order to service merchant and fishing ships
operating in the area. Mauritius has agreed to
allow Russian fishing trawlers to refuel and
change crews in Port Louis. Moscow also has an
agreement with Pakistan to develop its fishing
industry and is seeking similar arrangements with
India and Ceylon. The Soviets are negotiating
with Singapore on the use of the large ship repair
facilities there. Although Soviet merchant ships
may use these facilities on a commercial basis,
Moscow's concern for security makes it unlikely
that Soviet naval units will make regular use of
them.
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COMOROIS.
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India-USSR: Aid and Trade Relations Shifting
Since the mid-1960s India has been down-
grading large-scale industrial development in the
public sector in its economic priorities. This has
weakened the role of Soviet aid projects, which
are designed to foster this aspect of economic
growth. Moreover, Moscow's aid program has
proven to be inflexible and unresponsive to the
changed circumstances in India, as illustrated by
the Soviets' failure to reallocate existing credits to
uses now desired by the Indians.
These developments notwithstanding, the
USSR is still interested in maintaining close ties
with India. In fact, a Soviet economic mission is
in New Delhi discussing greater economic cooper-
ation. Furthermore, Soviet military assistance is
becoming more important as a source of influ-
ence, especially in view of New Delhi's only mod-
erately successful efforts to develop its own arms
industry.
industrial projects-the area of concentration for
Soviet aid. For its part, Moscow has not revised
its aid to be in line with Indian requirements for
specialized industrial plants, raw materials, and
spare parts.
Because of the relative standstill in economic
aid, Soviet sales to India are expected to grow by
only 30 percent during the 1971-75 period. In
contrast, the continuing increase in repayments
on economic aid will help to double Indian ex-
ports to the USSR over that period. Moscow is
willing to ease the burden of repayment by ac-
cepting a growing share of manufactures and
other finished products, which New Delhi has
difficulty in selling elsewhere.
Recent deliveries of Soviet naval equipment
to India emphasize New Delhi's continuing
Soviet economic aid deliveries, which aver-
aged more than $100 million annually during
1963-65, are expected to drop to about half that
amount in the next few years.
Projecting these trends into the early sin i-
cates that India will probably experience a net
outflow of resources, a reversal of the substantial
inflow that took place during the heyday of the
Soviet aid program.
Underlying these developments is the re-
trenchment that took place in India's economy
during the second half of the 1960s. Although
crop failures in 1965-66 were followed by better
years for both agriculture and industry, Indian
planners nevertheless have reduced investment
programs, with the largest cuts affecting heavy
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dependence on the USSR as a source of advanced
military equipment. Moscow presently is complet-
ing delivery of eight OSA-class missile patrol
boats, and it probably will supply additional sub-
marines. Problems with a domestically designed
aircraft have led New Delhi to undertake the
Turkey: New Cabinet Formed
The formation of a cabinet acceptable to
both military and civilian leaders moves Turkey
another important step toward a more normal
political situation. A vote of confidence on the
new government and its program appears to be
assured, probably within the week.
The real test of the military-imposed coali-
tion government probably will not come for sev-
eral weeks when the first really controversial
issue-such as a revised electoral law, land reform
legislation, or new tax measures-is introduced in
Parliament. The support of the dominant Justice
Party will be essential to the continued viability
of the government.
Although the military high command has
drawn back into the wings, at least for the mo-
ment, it is maintaining close surveillance over the
affairs of state. The government of Prime Minister
Nihat Erim will continue to function under the
shadow of the bayonet for the indefinite future.
Nevertheless, the 25-member cabinet, which
received presidential and, presumably, military
approval following some initial recasting, includes
several highly qualified individuals. Erim himself,
the personification of the elitist aristocrat looked
up to by many Turks, appears to be profession-
ally and philosophically well-suited for the task
ahead. The deputy prime minister for economic
affairs, Atilla Karaosmanoglu, is Harvard educated
and an outstanding economic planner. Osman
production of Soviet MIG-21 jet interceptors.
India also continues to import Soviet SU-7
fighter-bombers. Although India hopes to replace
these Soviet aircraft with jet fighters of its own
design beginning in the late 1970s, this schedule is
unlike) to be met.
Olcay, the new foreign minister, is a career diplo-
mat highly regarded by his peers and associates.
The defense minister, although a compromise can-
didate, is also highly respected and appears to be
dedicated to Turkey's continued association with
both NATO and the Common Market.
Most of the other ministers are regarded as
highly qualified technicians and administrators
with long experience in the fields they represent.
Several, including the deputy prime minister for
administration and political affairs, are former
military officers probably viewed as watchdogs
for the high command. Most of the members are
reputed to be well disposed toward the US and
NATO; at least one has been hawkish on the
Cyprus issue. The minister of health, a professor
on the Medical Faculty at Ankara University, is
the first woman in Turkish history to hold a
cabinet post.
Following a period of uncertainty, most
Turks appear to be content to wait and see what
the new government can and will do. There is
little optimism that there will be many changes or
significant reforms, but, as signs of the times,
Turkish teahouses now serve "reformed tea" and
travelers ride in "reformed taxis."
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Sierra Leone: Prime Minister Stevens Prevails
Prime Minister Siaka Stevens apparently has
prevailed over army dissidents who were urging
his ouster even after the failure of the inept coup
attempt on 23 March by the army chief. Bol-
stered by the arrival of more Guinean soldiers and
by the apparent loyalty of at least part of his
army, Stevens is moving to solidify his still shaky
position. A period of repression and authoritarian
rule seems likely.
Stevens acted boldly late last week as the
factionalized army debated whether to allow his
civilian regime to continue. During a quick, un-
publicized visit to Conakry, he signed a mutual
defense pact with his political ally, Guinean Presi-
dent Toure. Two days later-on 28 March-an
estimated 100-150 Guinean troops arrived in
Freetown. Stevens announced the pact to his
people and urged their cooperation in a radio-
broadcast delivered as the troops were arriving.
They joined a contingent of 40 other
Guinean soldiers whose clandestine arrival a week
earlier had triggered the army chief's coup at-
tempt. Although resentment over the presence of
Guinean troops almost certainly remains high
within the Sierra Leone Army, there have been no
further moves +o challenge the prime minister.
The new a. my commander, a fellow tribesman
and long-time supporter of Stevens, claims that
the military forces of the two countries are work-
ing together amicably.
MALI: Two captains on the ruling Military Com-
mittee of National Liberation (MCNL), including
its number-two man, Yoro Diakite, were quietly
arrested late last week for coup plotting. This
marks the first open break in the unity of Mali's
leaders since the army took power in late 1968,
although Diakite's differences with MCNL chief
Moussa Traore have long been public knowledge.
Urged on by extremist advisers, Stevens has
begun a roundup of opponents, jailing 13 persons
under emergency powers granted by Parliament
during a political crisis last October. He also an-
nounced a popular militia would be formed. He
may now be prepared to use illegal means to
pursue his goal of installing himself as the coun-
try's first president, using the current crisis as an
excuse to ride roughshod over objectors. Lon-
don's replacement this week, at Stevens' request,
of the governor-general with a more malleable
man may be a first step in that direction.
Preliminary evidence indicates that Stevens'
crackdown will be accompanied by a noisy propa-
ganda campaign, including trumped up charges of
Western imperialism and involvement in the re-
cent difficulties. The official press has already
implied a US role, and statements by Stevens at
an emergency session of Parliament last Wednes-
day strengthened this impression, although they
fell short of a direct accusation. Guinean Presi-
dent Toure also has attributed Sierra Leone's cur-
rent problems to unnamed "foreign embassies"
and to "military men in the pay of imperialism."
While the Guinean presence bolsters Stevens'
immediate position, it also clearly exposes how
extensively his political survival depends on force.
Over the long run, the Guineans are likely to
prove a continuing irritant that may provoke fur-
ther violence. Stevens still lacks a dependable
military force of his own, and the situation re-
mains highly unstable.
Both captains were disgruntled because of their
lack of influence and the domination of the
MCNL by lieutenants. The rank-conscious Dia-
kite, particularly, believed he was being excluded,
and chafed at serving under Traore, a. lieutenant.
The arrests are not expected to produce a serious
challenge to Traore, either from the military or
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
ECUADOR: Defense Minister Acosta's continued
efforts to solidify his political position have split
the military and eroded some of the government's
armed forces support. Acosta attempted on 26
March to remove the commandant of the war
college, General Jacome, who in turn demanded
that Acosta and the commanding general of the
army resign. Jacome's stand was supported by
several significant army units, although the ma-
jorityof military commands did not declare them-
selves. Both Jacome and Acosta professed loyalty
to President Velasco and after negotiations be-
Cruz Wins Honduran Presidency
Nationalist Party candidate Ramon Ernesto
Cruz was elected president last Sunday in the first
essentially free elections in 14 years. Cruz, a
68-year-old lawyer, will begin a six-year term in.
June, inaugurating a government of national
unity. Popular excitement about the results was
eclipsed by a heady feeling of pride that Hond-
tween the two sides Jacome surrendered to the
army commanding general. Acosta has an un-
savory reputation but has been consistently
backed by his uncle, President Velasco, whose
own support is tenuous. The military has backed
the President, in large part for want of a better
alternative-a military junta was forced from
power in 1966, and Velasco himself did away
with constitutional rule midway through his presi-
dential term last year. Popular reaction to the
dictatorial re lime has been one of indiffer-
ence.
resources of the Nationalist Party and the ef-
fectiveness of Cruz' strong defense of national
sovereignty in the country's current difficulties
with El Salvador and the Central American
Common Market appeared to have turned the
tide.
The president-elect is not expected to em-
bark on any bold new policy initiatives and will
have his hands full coping with extant domestic
and foreign policy issues. Cruz will have to clarify
his relationship to Ricardo Zuniga, de facto head
of the Nationalist Party, and President Lopez,
who may take the position of chief of the Armed
Forces after leaving office. Cruz also will have to
work out the basis of Liberal-Nationalist party
cooperation under the unity scheme. His most
important foreign policy task will be the restora-
tion of relations with El Salvador and reintegra-
tion of the country into the Common Market. An
accommodation on either issue may be long in
coming, in view of his campaign's strong emphasis
on national sovereignty and his insistence on first
settling the border dispute with Ell Salva-
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duras had demonstrate
its political maturity to
the world. The vote ap-
parently destroyed the
myth that the Liberals
were the majority party
and would win if free
elections were held. Un-
official returns indicate
that the Nationalist
Party gained more than
52 percent of the vote
and demonstrated
strength in most areas of
the country. The su-
perior organization and
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Guatemalan President Forecasts Turbulence
President Arana has claimed to have un-
covered a Communist plot to overthrow his gov-
ernment and has predicted that the next few
weeks will be "very agitated, possibly tragic."
Congress, dominated by government backers, has
helped set the stage for a severe crackdown by
urging the executive to take whatever action is
necessary.
The President's announcement, replete with
warnings to "those playing the Communist
game," touched off a vigorous debate between
Arana supporters and the opposition in the Con-
gress. Rightist insinuations that the opposition
parties are in league with the Communist terror-
ists may indicate that the government is aware of
a leftist conspiracy-headed by former foreign
minister and opposition leader Alberto Fuentes
Mohr-to assassinate Arana and set up a leftist
coalition government. The energy with which op-
position deputies have defended themselves
emphasizes their acute sensitivity to the charge
that they may have supported the subversives.
They are concerned that hints of their implication
with Communists might gain credence and open
and to resume action against the "leftist intellec-
tuals" sympathetic to the revolutionaries. So far
the opposition has resisted efforts at intimidation
and has managed to voice its unflattering views of
the Arana government both at home and abroad
through international Christian
media.
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The security forces have dealt several serious
blows to the guerrillas. Raids in the past two
weeks have turned up a large number of docu-
ments detailing plans for accelerated terrorist ac-
tion as well as information on organization, fi-
nances, personnel, penetrations, and ro osed US
and Guatemalan tar ets.
the door to a government move against them. Even divided and damaged, insurgents are a seri-
There is pressure within the administration to ous problem; a working unification would present
tighten the state of siege, now in its fifth month, the government with a problem of formidable
diensions.
Bolivia: Political Scandal May Prompt Military Coup
A burgeoning political scandal is causing in-
creased military dissatisfaction with President
Torres and is raising the possibility that the armed
forces may begin serious coup plotting.
According to details originally published by
a La Paz newspaper, military and civilian govern-
ment officials are accused of a series of alleged
political murders, the most notable victim being
president Barrientos in 1969. The most prominent
person publicly implicated is former president
Ovando, currently ambassador to Spain. Also al-
legedly involved are a former aide to Ovando, two
military members of Torres' previous cabinet, and
military officers from previous administrations.
There is no evidence that the charges are true, and
no formal legal proceedings are under way. More
important, however, is the fact that President
Torres has not denied the charges or expressed his
confidence in the military officers involved.
Torres probably believes that circulation of
these stories is to his benefit. He can destroy the
reputations of several military officers who might
be a potential threat to his government, and he
can settle a long-time personal grudge against
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Ovando. At the same time, he can gain some
support from the left by removing unpopular
military officers. Although Torres is a career mili-
tary officer, he is not considered a strong institu-
tionalist. He might, therefore, be willing to permit
the further downgrading of the military institu-
tion to achieve personal political objectives.
It is this new attack on the military institu-
25X1 tion, coupled with Torres' failure to act, that is
strongly disturbing the armed forces, although
plots presently are individual and uncoordinated.
Chile Approaches More Elections
In an astute appeal for votes in the munici-
pal elections on 4 April, President Salvador Al-
lende is telling Chileans that his administration is
a unique "democratic and pluralistic" effort to
build socialism and deserves their support. Ac-
customed to shifting their political preferences
freely and impressed by Allende's energetic per-
formance-particularly in economic measures that
affect their lives directly-a majority of the voters
may elect candidates from the parties of Allende's
Popular Unity (UP) coalition. They have a variety
from which to choose, including non-Marxist
Radicals, well-organized Communists, and the
President's nationalistic Socialists.
Opposition parties-Christian Democratic,
National, and Democratic Radical-have not over-
come mutual antipathies. This divided opposition
may prove particularly helpful to the single coali-
tion candidate, a Socialist, in the by-election for
the seat Allende held in the Senate.
It is unlikely that any one group alone
would have enough strength to seize and maintain
control of the government, and they do not seem
ready yet to work together. If the current scandal
continues to grow, however, it may convince mili-
tary leaders that they must take direct and co-
ordinated action against Torres before military
prestige and unity suffer irreparable harm. Such a
coordinated, military coup would have a good
chance of success.
The size of the UP vote is not likely to affect
the essential program of the government, but
rather the pace and style with which it is carried
out. There are also growing indications that Al-
lende and his supporters hope to use a good
showing in the coming election to set in motion
another constitutional reform: resort to a plebi-
scite if the present congress should reject a pro-
posal to transform it into a unicameral "people's
assembly." That measure is one of Allende's pro-
jected efforts to make basic changes in Chilean
institutions.
In a speech to a mass rally on 30 March,
Allende again accused his opponents of plotting
violence against his government despite its
reliance on "legal paths." He said that the plot,
including plans to fire on members of the armed
forces as they carry out their extensive consti-
tutional responsibilities on election day, would
fail.
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