WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008700020001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/04/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A008700020001-6
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review
completed
DIA review(s)
completed.
Secret
9 April 1971
No. 0365/71
Copy N?_ 54
NAVY review
completed. Q -7_ V-
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CONTENTS
(Information as of noon EST, 8 April 1971)
Indochina: Still on the Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
New Action on an Old Cambodian Front . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Laos: Ban Na Falls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Thailand: The Territorial Imperative in the North . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Party Building in China: The Things Change... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Japan May be Forced to Tackle Persistent Payments Surplus . . . . . . . . . . . 8
USSR: Party Congress Winds Down . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Bulgaria Prepares for its Tenth Party Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Israel-Egypt: Jockeying for Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Jordan: Clashes Continue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
New Cabinet in Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Ceylon: Insurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Pakistan: Resistance Continues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Haiti: What Happens After Duvalier? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Organization of American States General Assembly to Meet . . . . . . . 20
Chile: A Voice of Confidence for Allende . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Peru: Government Refuses a Confrontation With Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Bolivia: A New Anti-US Campaign Is Under Way . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
NOTES: South Korea; Portugal-US; UN - Eastern Europe; Arms Control; Zambia-
Portugal; Sierra Leone; Ecuador; Colombia
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FAR EAST
Indochina: Still on the Offensive
More Communist attacks occurred in South
Vietnam this week as part of the enemy's
"spring" campaign and Hanoi's drive to maintain
a crisis atmosphere in the aftermath of the allied
operation into Laos. The levels of enemy-initiated
activity, however, have tapered off from those
which marked the beginning of this year's sea-
sonal military effort during the last few days of
March.
Some of the heaviest sustained fighting took
place in the western highlands where elements of
two North Vietnamese infantry regiments were
brought to bear against South Vietnamese forces,
including many irregulars, defending a remote
hilltop artillery base in western Kontum Province.
The position-Fire Support Base Six-was at first
evacuated because of intense enemy pressure but
was retaken several days later amidst more heavy
fighting. Casualties on both sides have been high.
No American combat units are in Kontum
Province, and the North Vietnamese may calcu-
late that the time is ripe for testing the ability of
the South Vietnamese to defend their border
bases by themselves. At the same time, the Com-
munists clearly are hoping for new battlefield
successes as a follow-up to their insistent claims
of victory against the South Vietnamese in Laos.
Communist pressure against allied forces
gradually pulling out of the Khe Sanh area has
been sporadic and limited. Scattered shellings and
occasional ground harassments have been con-
ducted by enemy artillery and infantry regiments
deployed just south of the DMZ for some time.
More on Resolution 10
Communist defectors in Quang Nam Prov-
ince have provided more fragmentary evidence of
a new enemy policy statement for South Viet-
nam, known as COSVN Resolution 10. The gen-
eral thrust of their accounts, like other similar
evidence, suggests the new statement contains few
surprises, unless one is struck by the way the
Vietnamese Communists have held doggedly to
the same fundamental precepts of warfare for
such a long time. According to the defectors,
Resolution 10 emphasizes that US forces will be
withdrawing steadily from Vietnam in 1971 and
that this will create opportunities for the Commu-
nists to exploit. In order to be ready, enemy
forces are enjoined to abide by all the familiar
rules of a "people's war": regain contact with the
population; rebuild guerrilla forces and then up-
grade them to become mobile units; encircle the
cities; be self-reliant; and establish a secret under-
ground in government-controlled areas.
If and when a text or more complete ac-
count of Resolution 10 is captured, it may turn
out to contain additional enemy policy guide-
lines. For the moment, the hard line on pro-
tracted warfare that has filtered down to the
lower ranks in some parts of South Vietnam
seems to be the central message of COSVN Res-
olution 10.
Maritime Infiltration
The North Vietnamese evidently managed to
send a fairly large shipment of supplies by sea to
Communist forces in the southern Mekong Delta
sometime late last year. US Navy units recently
discovered an enemy SL-6 infiltration trawler,
estimated to have a cargo capacity of some 100
tons, in a narrow waterway near the southern tip
of the delta. The vessel was empty and its condi-
tion indicated it had been there since around the
beginning of the year.
A delivery of as much as 100 tons of arms
and ammunition would help considerably in
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meeting Viet Cong requirements in the lower
delta for the guerrilla warfare presently being
waged there. The commander of Communist
forces in the lower delta had asked COSVN last
October for 200 tons of munitions which, accord-
ing to a captured document containing his esti-
mate, would last for an entire year.
The task of supplying Communist forces in
the southern part of South Vietnam has been
much more difficult since the upheaval in Cam-
bodia last year. To compensate, the North Viet-
namese have increased sea infiltration attempts.
About 16 trawlers suspected of carrying Commu-
nist supplies have been detected since the spring
of 1970, but until the recent discovery of the
SL-6, only one of these vessels was believed to
have reached South Vietnam. It too probably was
a 100-ton capacity vessel which apparently ar-
rived in the delta in August; another trawler was
sunk off the coast of Kien Hoa Province in No-
vember. The remainder turned back, apparently
abandoning their missions.
The recent discovery of the large trawler, in
conjunction with some captured documents, sug-
gests that other undetected sea infiltration at-
tempts may have been successful. The documents
indicate that as of late last year Communist forces
in the lower delta were sending supplies north-
ward to the upper delta, presumably to units that
were short on supplies because of the disruption
to the supply system through Cambodia.
Meeting in Moscow
Hanoi's chief delegate to the Paris talks,
Xuan Thuy, flew to Moscow last weekend to
confer with party First Secretary Le Duan, who is
attending the Soviet party congress. These prob-
ably are routine consultations in the wake of the
allied operation in Laos and in anticipation of
President Nixon's statement on the war this week.
In addition to fashioning a response to the US
statement, Duan and Thuy might also have con-
sidered ways to capitalize in the talks on the post
- Lam Son 719 ferment in South Vietnam and the
US. New twists on old bargaining positions-
American prisoners and troop withdrawal dead-
lines readily come to mind-are possibilities on
this score. There is no reason to believe, however,
that Hanoi has any major new departures in mind
for the talks.
On 11 April North Vietnam will hold its first
national assembly elections in seven years. The
constitution calls for elections every four years,
but the previous legislature extended its own
mandate indefinitely during the US bombing of
the North.
The elections are of little intrinsic moment:
the assembly has no real power, its members in
nearly every case have been picked in advance,
and significant spinoffs-noteworthy changes in
Hanoi's top leadership, for instance-are highly
unlikely. The timing of the event is interesting,
however. Hanoi doubtless has been spurred to
spruce up its own representative bodies by the
fact that this is an election year in South Viet-
nam. Beyond that, the North Vietnamese ob-
viously have an interest in freshening the mandate
of the legislature; many members probably are
out of the country, totally out of touch with
their nominal constituencies, or dead.
New Action on an old Cambodian Front I
The Communists turned their military at-
tention away from South Vietnamese targets in
Kompong Cham this week and, for the first time
in several months, went on the offensive against
Cambodian forces in that province. At the same
time, they continued to resist South Vietnamese
clearing operations elsewhere in eastern Cam-
bodia.
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n-_,. q WAIFFKI V Sl IMMARY 9 Am 71
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During the early morning hours of 5 April
the enemy staged a flurry of coordinated mortar
and ground attacks on four Cambodian positions
on the east bank of the Mekong River, opposite
Kompong Cham city. Although bad weather
hampered the Cambodians' efforts to lend artil-
lery and air support to the positions, only one of
them was occupied by the Communists. Over half
of the government battalion defending that out-
post was able to retreat to Kompong Cham safely,
but the fate of the remainder of that unit has not
been determined. Fresh enemy attacks were re-
ported in the vicinity of the town of Tonle Bet
the next night, but Khmer Krom troops held their
ground and repelled the Communists, killing 35
of them.
It is likely that the attacking Communist
troops were drawn from elements of the substan-
tial number of enemy main force units clustered
in and around the nearby Chup plantation. Al-
though the purpose of these attacks was not clear,
it is possible that they were designed to cover the
movement of Communist forces across the Me-
kong. I n the view of the regional Cambodian
Army commander, the'attacks were facilitated by
the recent departure of South Vietnamese troops
from the area west and southwest of Suong, on
Route 7.
For their part, the South Vietnamese en-
gaged in some sharp fighting with the Commu-
nists farther to the east, near the border. ARVN
units clashed on three successive days with enemy
troops from the Communists' 5th Division just
southwest of Snuol, in southern Kratie Province.
The South Vietnamese claim to have killed 248
Communists in one of the encounters, while their
own losses totaled 18 killed, 97 wounded, and 43
missing. Although ARVN forces recently have
adopted more conservative military tactics in
their operations in eastern Cambodia, they appar-
ently intend to continue to keep trading blows
there with the Communists throughout the re-
mainder of the present dry season.
Page 4
In the southwest, the government has
launched another operation to reopen Route 4,
east of the Pich Nil pass, after an initial push
failed because a number of Cambodian Army
officers leading that drive were wounded. At
mid-week, eight government battalions, including
five paratroop battalions from Phnom Penh, left
Kompong Speu city bound for Pich Nil. The
Communists lost little time in attacking this
group, and hit it hard from the rear some nine
miles east of the pass. Heavy enemy mortar fire
mixed with ground attacks resulted in 20 Cam-
bodians killed and 100 wounded. If the task force
attempts to press on-once it gets reassembled-it
is likely to encounter more sharp opposition.
The US Embassy reports that the recent
International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission to
Phnom Penh was pessimistic about Cambodia's
prospective financial position. Because of the like-
lihood of a shortfall in budget receipts resulting
from delays in deliveries of US AID imports, the
mission estimates that the government's 1971
fiscal deficit may be well over the projected six
billion riels ($US 108 million). The IMF team
fears that because of the exclusion of certain
items from US aid financing, the government may
face dangerously large drawdowns of its own for-
eign exchange and hyperinflation. -The threat of
financial deterioration would also increase if the
security situation continues to limit imports into
Phnom Penh. The IMF team made no detailed
budget analysis, however, and did not allow for
possible cuts in GKR expenditures, for which
there appears to be ample leeway.
To counteract the expansionary effect of
budget deficits, the IMF mission recommended,
among other things, a flexible exchange rate and
the establishment of an Exchange Support Ac-
count (ESA), apparently similar to the Foreign
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 9 Apr 71
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Exchange Operations Fund (FEOF) in Laos. Un-
der that arrangement, importers could freely buy
foreign exchange from the fund with local cur-
rency., In addition to a $6-million subscription
from the IMF,:the ESA would hold Cambodia's
present foreign exchange reserves. For the re-
mainder..,of, its initial; capital and for future incre-
ments, it would depend on cash contributions
from.friendly cQu.ntries..
Laos;;-Ban Na Falls
The North Vietnanjese have forced irregular
troops to abandon :,the.artiIlery site at Ban Na,
after pgarly two rr opths?of constant harassment.
The site which provided fire support for the
Long' Tieng ' complex, has been the object of
heavy enemy shelling attacks which had made
resupply and medical evacuation difficult and had
worn, down the., rnoral,g: of the defenders.
How the fall of San, Na will affect the de-
fense of the.Long Tieng complex is not yet clear.
The irregulars apparently withdrew without ex-
cessive easualti.es,and are still an effective combat
uni.t. Moreover, recognizing the gradual deteriora-
tion.,of the situation at,,B,an Na, the government
last week moved a tasl