WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008700040001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 23, 1971
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
Secret
23 April 1971
No. 0367/71
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.7r,1~.[Cr, 1
CONTENTS
(Information as of noon EST, 22 April 1971 J
Indochina: Politics Take Command
I
The Military Emphasis Is on South Vietnam
2
Ping Pong Ricochets
. 6
ou orea: rest en is an i ates ea or t e Wire
. 8
Japan Seeks Closer Economic Relations with Australia
. 9
Polish Party Holds Stock-taking Session
10
Berlin Negotiations
11
Yugoslavs Suspect Soviet Ties to Radical Emigres
11
France-Algeria: Era of Special Relationship Closes
13
Italy Considers Measures to Stimulate Economic Activity
13
The Netherlands Elections: No Choice, No Change
14
Ceylon: Soviets Send Supplies as Situation Stalemates
16
Pakistan: Bengali Resistance Crumbling
18
Arab Unity: More Form Than Substance
19
India: More State Governments in Mrs. Gandhi's Camp
20
Brazil: Government/Terrorist War Claims More Victims
21
Argentina: Political Maneuvering Breeds Dissension
22
Uruguay's President Under Attack
22
Panamanian Cabinet Changes
24
Cuba: Castro's Foreign Policy Speech
24
The Situation in Haiti
26
NOTES: IAEA; International Aviation; USSR-Sudan; Jordan; Sierra Leone;
Colombia
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FAR EAST
Indochina: Politics Take Command
The expectation that Lon Nol's return to
Phnom Penh would have a calming effect on
political infighting in the capital was short lived.
On 20 April the prime minister resigned because
of ill health. Although there apparently was com-
mon agreement among a number of important
civilian and military officials that Lon Nol should
step down, some of his supporters generated suf-
ficient political pressure to force Chief of State
Cheng Heng to ask Lon Nol to organize a new
government. By midweek there were reports from
official sources that he had agreed to do so.
The prime minister's concern for his health
is genuine. His personal physician, for example,
told the US ambassador that Lon Nol wanted to
step down until he regained enough strength to
play a more active political role. There seem to
have been other factors influencing his decision to
quit, however. Foremost among these were pres-
sures from various politicians who believe that
sweeping changes are needed to arrest the govern-
ment's drift and inefficiency.
It is likely that much of the countervailing
pressure for Lon Nol's continuation in office was
orchestrated by the prime minister's brother, Lon
Non. The latter has played his cards with some
skill. He evidently organized pro -Lon Nol peti-
tions by military officers, students, and others
and mixed assurances to the press that Lon Nol
would stay on with veiled threats about the con-
sequences if someone else became prime minister.
Although Lon Non does not occupy a high office,
he does wield considerable political and military
influence through his leadership of the govern-
ment s extralegal Special Coordinating Commit-
tee" and through his close relationship with the
elite South Vietnamese -trained Khmer Krom
units.
If Lon Nol does stay on, he is likely to
function only as a figurehead and rely on Sirik
Matak and other leaders-including his senior gen-
erals-to conduct the regime's business. The selec-
tion of a new cabinet may prove a difficult task,
however. Some of the administration's more in-
fluential backers have stressed that the new cabi-
net must represent all political factions, and that
it must not retain any of the corrupt "old guard"
if it is to win approval from the National As-
sembly. This is a tall order to fill, because Phnom
Penh has far more professional critics than it has
talented technicians willing to assume the thank-
less job of trying to run the various ministries.
There appears to be a good chance that Son Ngoc
Thanh, who was Cambodia's popular first prime
minister, may obtain a post in the new govern-
ment. Cheng Heng has asked Thanh, who spent
most of his time during the past year recruiting
Khmer Krom troops in South Vietnam, to par-
ticipate in the formation of the new government.
Thanh recently indicated that he would be willing
to replace Lon Nol, if necessary.
Three for the Presidency
Although no one has formally declared him-
self acandidate for South Vietnam's presidency
and the campaign will not officially open for
several more months, the three major contenders
are off and running. Indeed, the battle lines are
already beginning to take shape. President Thieu,
Vice President Ky, and Big Minh have recently
developed independent positions on the key is-
sues, and they all seem determined at this point
to stay the course. Minor candidates may yet
appear to complicate the picture, but it is un-
likely that any of them can match the appeal of
these three.
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Until recently, Vice President Ky appeared
to be threatening to run for president mainly in
an effort to retain his position as President
Thieu's running mate. He is now sharply attacking
the government's performance on a broad range
of issues, however, and he seems to have aban-
doned any idea of running for vice president on
Thieu's ticket. Although Ky is telling potential
supporters that he has gained substantial backing
for a presidential bid, he actually appears to be
having difficulty recruiting adherents, and his cri-
ticism of the government could in part reflect
frustration over his poor political prospects. More
than once in the past Ky has failed to see projects
through to the end, and it is still possible that he
will refrain from entering the race.
Ky is emphasizing the need for a political
solution to the war, thus seeming to draw closer
to Big Minh's position and raising the possibility
of eventual olitical collaboration between them.
Minh first indicated publicly his interest in
the presidency late last year but has moved cau-
tiously since then.
Now, how-
ever, he is beginning to expand on previously
vague public positions on the issues. While ex-
pressing opposition to a coalition with the Com-
munists, he nevertheless has denounced Thieu's
alleged policy of seeking peace by "exterminating
the Communists to the last one."
Thieu is still taking ahard-line, anti-Commu-
nist position in image-building travels around the
country. He delivered a hard-hitting speech in
Hue last weekend, praising the performance of
South Vietnamese troops in Laos and ruling out
political compromise with the Communists. Thieu
also decried "deceitful politicians" who seek to
build political careers by assuming a defeatist
attitude and using the "blood and bones" of the
people.
The Military Emphasis is on South Vietnam
Perhaps with a view toward reinforcing their
position as a major force in South Vietnam, the
Communists appear set to begin another phase of
their spring military campaign.
Most of the evidence suggests that scattered
shellings and commando raids will be launched
before the end of the month. More intense prep-
arations have been noted in the coastal regions of
the northern provinces, but attacks are likely in
some other selected regions in the southern part
of the country as well.
The last spurt of coordinated enemy action
erupted at the end of March. Previous campaigns
by the Communists have followed a cyclical pat-
tern geared to the lunar month, permitting them
to attack under cover of the dark of the moon.
The next phase of the enemy's current campaign
will probably be similar to the last effort, in
which they concentrated on allied outposts, ref-
ugee centers, and a few district towns as prime
targets. Several major cities and military bases
may also be struck by enemy artillery and terror-
ist squads.
The Scene in the Central Highlands
During the last two months or so, the central
highlands have been the locale of a number of
strong enemy strikes against populated areas and
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South Vietnamese positions. The
most headlined of these has been
the attempt to take and hold Fire
Support Base 6. By midweek,
South Vietnamese reinforcements
apparently had forced the Commu-
nists to lift their siege and blunted
enemy offensive activity elsewhere
in the central highlands. Both sides
have suffered heavily in these and
previous actions. Communist losses
in men have been substantial and
they were unable to attack Ben Het
and Dak To as planned; on the
other side the South Vietnamese
pacification program in the area
has been dealt a sharp setback.
Until the fighting around Fire
Support Base 6 captured headlines,
allied activity in Laos overshad-
owed other strong enemy strikes in
the central highland provinces of
Kontum and Pleiku. In early
March, for example, the South
Vietnamese Army's 42nd Regiment
and the 22nd Ranger Battalion
were hit hard while preparing a
probe into enemy strongholds in
the Plei Trap Valley of southwest-
ern Kontum Province. Following
more than 24 hours of stiff fight-
ing South Vietnamese battle dis-
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eroded steadily since American troops were
pulled out of the province a year ago. He claims
that at the present time the Viet Cong can enter
at will all hamlets not located along Routes 14
and 19-the two major roads crossing the prov-
ince. In possibly the most damaging action of the
enemy's spring campaign, elements of the North
Vietnamese 95B Regiment attacked the district
town of Phu Nhon in mid-March and occupied it
for five days. This has undoubtedly shaken the
confidence of the government's territorial secu-
rity forces in the highlands and thereby reduced
their effectiveness.
cipline broke down and many soldiers turned and
ran. Over-all allied casualties were 23 killed, 80
wounded, and another 257 missing, most of
whom are presumed captured or dead; Commu-
nist losses were estimated at about 330 killed.
The commanders of both of these units were
subsequently relieved of duty. This defeat has
affected the morale of most South Vietnamese
forces in the region.
In Pleiku Province, the province chief re-
cently stated that the security situation has
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The South Vietnamese position in the cen-
tral highlands has changed markedly since last
year, the greatest factor being the total with-
drawal of all American combat troops. The assign-
ment of Major General Dzu as commander of
South Vietnam's MR-2 last fall brought improve-
ments in many areas, but he was still forced to
shuttle units from the populated coastal lowlands
to cope with the enemy threat in the rugged
highlands. Furthermore, manpower requirements
of some of his new military operations have
placed more dependence on the territorial secu-
rity forces, many of which are not capable of
handling the burden.
General Dzu recently stated that US air and
logistical support in the highlands' counteroffen-
sive has been good. His principal immediate prob-
lems are a lack of good intelligence on enemy
intentions, the general apathy #oward the military
by the populace, and the poor morale that has
characterized MR-2 forces for years. Dzu still
hopes to improve the military situation in the
highlands before the monsoon rains begin next
month.
There has been little enemy resistance during
the first days of the combined US -South Viet-
namese operation into western Thua Thien Prov-
ince that began on 13 April.
Aside from supply and transportation units,
the only enemy main-force combat unit in the A
Shau Valley area is the North Vietnamese 6th
Regiment. Elements of the North Vietnamese
3246 Division, however, are probably coming
back from Laos, where they fought during Opera-
tion Lam -Son 719, and the North Vietnamese 4th
and 5th regiments located to the east in Thua
Thien Province could help counter the allied oper-
ation,
Communist forces during the past week
maintained heavy pressure on government units
defending the Long Tieng area, but made no
substantial gains. Most of the action was con-
centrated around three key hilltop positions
where the extended fighting has cost both sides
dearly.
Near Ban Na at Hill 1663, which the govern-
ment has been trying to maintain as the anchor of
a defensive line north of Long Tieng, the ex-
change of artillery fire has been almost con-
tinuous in recent days, and bitter actions have
been fought for tactical advantages. At Phou
Long Mat, a hill mass about four miles north of
Tha Tam Bleung, government troops struggled all
week to dislodge a determined enemy force from
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an outpost the Communists had occupied on 11
April. Augmented by 300 fresh troops from Long
Tieng, the objective was taken on 19 April but
had to be abandoned almost immediately because
of punishing mortar fire. North Vietnamese forces
have been equally stubborn in their defense of
positions on Hill 1662, located about five miles
northeast of Long Tieng, and continue to resist all
efforts to root them out.
The Communists' willingness to fight for
these positions indicates that they want to keep
within striking distance of Long Tieng. It is pos-
sible that the North Vietnamese, who have re-
cently shifted the bulk of their forces into areas
north and east of the irregular stronghold, are
preparing fora major push before heavy rains
make cross-country movement difficult and place
additional burdens on their supply lines. A North
Vietnamese rallier has stated that the Communists
are busy prepositioning supplies for an offensive
against Long Tieng in early May.
An all-out drive would be a switch in tactics
for the Communists, who so far have avoided
large frontal assaults in favor of attacks by mortar
fire to wear government forces down. Further-
more, the Communists have taken heavy losses in
the three-month campaign at Long Tieng, and
they are now outnumbered by government de-
fenders who also enjoy the advantage of air sup-
port. The irregular forces, however, are also feel-
ing the strain of protracted fighting, and even if
the Communists do not pull out all the stops,
there is the danger that-as in the case of Ban
Na-government units will cave in under the con-
tinuing pressure.
The 16 April ceremonies in the royal capital
marking the beginning of the Lao New Year were
somewhat subdued by the continued fighting in
the vicinity. The Communists continue to tell all
who will listen that they have no intention of
investing Luang Prabang. The Soviet ambassador
and the North Vietnamese and Communist Chi-
nese charges attended the Kin 's New Year's re-
ception there.
By week's end, the military situation was
also improving as government forces finally made
some headway in driving enemy units from the
high ground east of Luang Prabang. Irregular
troops have captured three key positions along a
ridge about four miles from the capital's airfield.
North Vietnamese forces seem determined to
challenge these recent government gains, but the
build-up of the irregular forces to over 5,000 men
as a result of reinforcements from other military
regions, and the increasingly effective use of air
and artillery support should make the Commu-
nists' task a difficult one.
Little Military Action in Cambodia
The Cambodian Army's latest effort to
break the Communists' hold over Route 4 east of
the Pich Nil pass appears to be in serious trouble.
Frequent enemy harassing fire against the govern-
ment task force bogged down on the highway
resulted in mounting losses in personnel and ma-
teriel. The main concentration of government
troops on Route 4 has not been able to make any
significant advances toward Pich Nil because of
the slow progress of flank security elements.
Moreover, steady Communist harassment of the
two weary Cambodian battalions that have been
stranded on hilltop positions in the pass itself has
drastically curtailed aerial supply deliveries to
them.
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Ping Pong Ricochets
Peking's decision to open China's doors to
Americans, aside from its considerable bilateral
significance, was also made with a view toward its
broader, international repercussions. The Chinese
almost certainly have taken into consideration the
potential effects their actions would have, parti-
cularly in Tokyo, Moscow, and Taipei, and are
watching with great interest the rethinking of
China policy going on in other capitals.
The country where the move has been most
immediately felt is Japan. Tokyo's relationship
with Peking is currently the hottest political issue
in Japan, and the Sato government has regularly
taken its lumps for its cautious approach to the
problem. Moreover, Peking's deliberate snub-
failing to invite the Japanese table tennis team to
China when the invitation to the US team was
extended on Japanese soil-was obviously calcu-
lated to fuel the already strong domestic concern
in Japan that it may get left behind the US in
moving toward an improvement in relations with
Peking. At any rate, recent developments in Sino-
US relations are sure to enliven the debate on the
China issue in Japan and may lead Tokyo to
consider additional efforts to develop contacts
with Peking. Indeed, Washington's decision last
week to relax restrictions on trade with Commu-
nist China has already put greater pressure on
Tokyo to liberalize economic dealings with main-
land China.
Peking no doubt also carefully weighed the
impact its response to US initiatives would have
in Moscow, which has always been sensitive to
signs of a rapprochement between Peking and
Washington. The Soviets' public reaction has been
in low key, and they have generally focused on
the "anti-Sovietism" motivation behind recent
decisions of Peking and Washington. The Soviets
have also sought to contrast Peking's critical
words about US imperialism with its forthcoming
actions, and they have even spread the word that
Hanoi is upset by such Chinese perfidy. Soviet
attempts to make political capital out of these
developments in Sino-US relations, however, do
not obscure Moscow's genuine concern. The
USSR fears that recent events have brought a bit
closer one of the things it dreads most-mean-
ingful US-Chinese collaboration that could. even-
tually threaten to swing the world balance of
power against Moscow. Peking clearly expects and
will welcome signs of Soviet nervousness in this
regard.
The Nationalist Chinese in Taipei have so far
reacted to recent developments between Peking
and Washington in a relatively restrained manner,
but there is no question they are deeply disturbed
by them. The Taiwan press typically has de-
scribed Peking's moves as a "plot," and has sug-
gested that Washington is being led down the
garden path by the Communists. The Nationalists
almost certainly expected that something of this
sort was bound to come given the direction of
Washington's China policy, especially once US
passport restrictions for travel to Communist Chi-
na were lifted. Peking's treatment of the Ameri-
cans' visit, on the other hand, is a deliberate
attempt to exacerbate the increasingly uneasy re-
lationship between Taipei and Washington.
In terms of general impact, Peking's new
approach to the United States is also part of its
diplomatic campaign to win greater international
recognition and influence among states that are in
the process of reshaping their China policy. The
Chinese in the short run are particularly keen on
gaining additional support at this year's UN vote
on the China question. The significance of the
Chinese and US moves continues to set UN cor-
ridors buzzing with talk about Peking's improved
chances for admission this year.
All of these considerations will continue to
enter into Peking's thinking on how best to ex-
ploit the changed context of Sino-US relations.
The favorable repercussions so far almost cer-
tainly have persuaded the Chinese to keep this
particular ball in play. ~
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Peking Plays It Cool
The movement toward rapprochement be-
tween Burma and China has led Peking to make
some tactical adjustments regarding Chinese-sup-
ported activities in Burma. Peking has taken steps
recently to help keep Chinese-backed insurgents
in northeast Burma under wraps by discouraging
them from initiating inflammatory activities
against government units and installations.
These moves clearly were
made in the interest of preserving the momentum
of the recent improvement in state relations. Pe-
king has not, however, completely forsaken Com-
munist or tribal insurgents in Burma, nor does it
appear willing to suppress permanently pro - Chi-
nese Communist "cultural" activities in Rangoon.
The insurgents have not, in fact, ventured
from the border areas as they have in past years,
and there has been no repetition of the heavy
fighting of last fall. There is still time in the
current dry season, however, for the insurgents to
heat up the situation. They continue to attack
isolated Burmese positions in the mountains and
have even been active in some new border areas.
In addition, recruiting and training are continuing
on the Chinese side of the mountainous border
and new guerrilla bands have been formed.
Burmese officials had attributed the absence
of significant insurgent activity so far this year in
part to Peking's reduced encouragement of the
insurgents following the resumption of normal
state relations. This rosy assessment received a
jolt, however, when a new clandestine radio sta-
tion, the "Voice of the Burmese Peoples," was
established in the Sino-Burma border area less
than a week after the arrival of the new Chinese
ambassador in Rangoon in late March. The Chi-
nese almost certainly played the major role in
providing the equipment, setting it up, and op-
erating the new station. The clandestine station
provides the Chinese with the means for propa-
ganda support to the insurgents without involving
their own official media, which have not reported
on the Burmese Communists since last September
and have not attacked the Ne Win regime in well
over a year.
Peking has exercised similar caution in its
approach to Chinese activities in Rangoon. Elabo-
rate celebrations and high-powered proselytizing
among the overseas Chinese community have
been proscribed by Peking, and all activities are
apparently monitored closely by the Chinese
Embassy. Peking's restraint is in large part due to
Rangoon's equally strict attitude on Chinese ac-
tivities; the Burmese clearly are not eager to pre-
cipitately relax their tolerance regarding develop-
ments affecting the Chinese community.
Although it has foreclosed none of its op-
tions, Peking obviously attaches a high priority to
the restoration of friendly relations with Ran-
goon. It is almost certainly unwilling to risk ac-
tions that might result in charges of blatant inter-
ference in Burmese internal affairs and that could
jeopardize its diplomatic efforts. The Chinese are
unlikely to reverse this order of priorities while
their present diplomatic offensive remains in high
gear.
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Sou#h Korea: Presidential Candidates Head for the Wire
South Korea's presidential election on 27
April promises to be a much livelier affair than
originally anticipated. When the campaign got
under way, the major opposition party was in
disarray after spending its limited financial and
human resources in a futile effort to block consti-
tutional changes permitting President Pak Chong-
hui to run for a third successive term. From the
ruins, however, emerged a highly attractive candi-
date in the person of Kim Tae-Chung, a talented
young National Assemblyman with the temerity
to attack the government on issues that hurt.
Kim has come down hard on corruption and
government authoritarianism and has pressed for
abolition of the local militia system and for a
fresh approach to the problem of national unifica-
tion. Pak has countered by comparing his own
considerable record of achievement with Kim's
lack of leadership experience and by hammering
on the compelling theme that only he has the
credentials to deal successfully with the threat
from the Communist North.
Kim's effective oratory and willingness to
speak out on sensitive issues are drawing overflow
crowds, suggesting that. he is narrowing the gap
between Pak and himself. The President remains
the favorite to win, but observers in Seoul now
predict that the outcome may be considerably
closer than in 1967 when Pak led his closest rival
by some one million votes. Kim is generally con-
ceded Seoul, and possibly 50 percent of the vote
in Pusan, South Korea's major southern port and
second largest city. In addition, Kim can count on
carrying his home region-the country's populous
southwestern rice basket.
Many of those who relish hearing Kim tear
into the administration, however, may on election
day hesitate to substitute his untested abilities for
the security Pak has demonstrated he can provide.
This is likely to be particularly true in the coun-
tryside, where the President can depend on sup-
port from a pervasive government bureaucracy
skilled in delivering the votes to the party in
power. .Pak also appears sure to carry the con-
siderable military vote.
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The only disruptive element in an otherwise
essentially orderly and unrigged contest has been
demonstrations by students protesting the govern-
ment's new compulsory undergraduate military
training program. The authorities, however, have
shown considerable skill in defusing what could
have been a serious embarrassment to Pak's cam-
paign. By avoiding the creation of student mar-
tyrs and by carefully slanting reporting on stu-
dent protest, the authorities have generally suc-
ceeded in isolating the demonstrators from the
election campaign. Following the large-scale turn-
out of students for the 19 April anniversary of
the 1960 uprising that toppled former president
Rhee, the students apparently have succumbed to
government pressures and have called a mora-
torium on street demonstrations until after the
election.
Japan Seeks Closer Economic Relations with Australia
The first Japanese cabinet-level visit to
Australia, to be made later this month by the
minister of international trade and industry, re-
flects Tokyo's growing dependence on Australian
raw materials and Canberra's search for more in-
vestment in its manufacturing industries.
years. Canberra would also like to develop its
capability to expand exports of manufactured
goods to world markets and thus seeks. greater
Japanese investment in its manufacturing in-
dustries.
Japan is now Australia's principal export
market, accounting for over one fourth of total
exports in 1970. Over 90 percent of Australia's
iron ore and coal is purchased by Japan. These
two commodities constituted almost 40 percent
of the more than $1 billion worth of Australian
exports to Japan last year. Japan is almost wholly
dependent on imports for its supply of iron ore
and now gets some 30 percent of its requirements
from Australia. It is negotiating sizable purchases
from new iron ore deposits in western Australia,
and by 1975 it plans to more than double its
1969 imports of 23 million tons. In addition,
Tokyo is interested in recently discovered uran-
ium deposits in Australia to supply fuel for its
growing nuclear electric power capacity. Austra-
lia, in turn, is rapidly increasing its purchases
from Japan, especially of manufactured goods
such as heavy machinery, transportation equip-
ment, and iron and steel products.
Australia's mining boom will continue to be
the mainstay of its rapid export growth for some
Tokyo generally has shied away from sub-
stantial direct investments overseas. This policy
may begin to change, however, as the rapid build-
up of foreign-exchange reserves puts increased
pressure on Tokyo to relax restrictions on the
outflow of private and government capital. Total
Japanese direct investment in Australia is rela-
tively small, lagging far behind that of the US and
the U K there.
Japanese industry leaders, somewhat shaken
by the recent rise in world crude-oil prices, are
giving strong backing to a plan proposed by the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry to
provide up to $500 million annually in low-
interest, foreign-exchange loans to assist domestic
industries develop overseas raw material re-
sources. Such funds are not expected to be fully
available until 1972, but a large Japanese trade
and investment delegation that recently visited
Australia may have laid the groundwork for po-
tential investment projects there.
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EUROPE
Polish Party Holds Stock-taking Session
Poland's new leadership reviewed its four-
month record at a party plenum last week and
concluded that conditions for an orderly solution
to the country's difficulties have been established.
They admitted, however, that many problems
persist that will not be solved "today or tomor-
row" and once again warned local party authori-
ties to end their detached approach to the needs
of the workers.
In the keynote address, politburo member
Edward Babiuch complained about passive local
officials who wait for instructions from above
instead of personally dealing with the workers'
problems before they become explosive. He made
it unmistakably clear that "close and direct links"
between party officials and the masses-as exem-
plified by the activities of party leader Edward
Gierek-were indispensable. The constant repeti-
tion of this theme since Gierek assumed power
indicates that many members of the entrenched
middle levels of leadership have yet to respond
positively to Gierek's style of leadership.
In order to overcome such footdragging,
Gierek must rise above his previous position as a
powerful provincial leader and build up his sup-
port within the national political organization. By
acceding to Gierek's wishes to hold the sixth
party congress at the "turn of the year"--one year
ahead of schedule-the plenum laid the ground-
work for increasing both Gierek's power and na-
tional stature. In addition, Babiuch outlined the
timing and agenda of the three plenums that will
precede the congress. Publicizing this type of in-
formation so far in advance is most unusual and is
designed to enhance the image of Gierek as a man
with a solid plan that will be executed in an
orderly fashion.
The remainder of the plenum dwelt on Po-
land's economic problems, which have occupied
most of the leadership's time since December.
The forecast is only for gradual improvement in
what will be a long-term struggle to narrow the
gap between the expectations of the populace and
the economy's ability to satisfy them. Gierek
thanked the USSR for credits and applauded the
results of the recent Soviet party congress, par-
ticularly its emphasis on consumer welfare. He
also made an ambiguous reference to Soviet "sup-
port" for additional credits that would allow Po-
land to increase its exports, especially of con-
sumer goods, to the USSR.
Babiuch announced the abolition of compul-
sory deliveries by private farmers to the state of
slaughter cattle, grain, and potatoes beginning
next January. The loss to the state will be par-
tially offset by an increase in rural land taxes. The
regime obviously hopes that the elimination of
the unpopular deliveries, along with a recent in-
crease in prices paid for farm products, will result
in the availability of more foodstuffs not onl for
the Polish worker but for export. ~~25X1
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Berlin Negotiations
Recent talks between West Berlin Senat Di-
rector Mueller and East German State Secretary
Kohrt on granting passes for West Berliners have
produced no positive results, and prospects for
progress in the near future appear dim. Kohrt has
persistently tried to draw .Mueller into a discus-
sion of inner-Berlin matters now under negotia-
tion by the four powers. In addition, the East
Germans have mounted a propaganda campaign
that charges the West-particularly Bonn and the
Senat-with "obstructionism." This is part of Pan-
kow's policy of trying to divide Allied ranks,
especially the US and West Germany.
In contrast with earlier rounds on 6, 12, and
27 March, the atmosphere on 17 April was less
cordial. Both sides, however, remain interested-
each for different reasons-in continuing the
talks. The next session has been set for 6 May.
Meanwhile, there have been no noteworthy
developments in the four-power ambassadorial
talks. For the moment, the Soviets seem content
to mark time in the four-power forum while
awaiting further developments in the inner-Ger-
man talks. The 15 April publication in the Polish
press of a tendentious version of the Soviet draft
plan was undoubtedly aMoscow-inspired move to
counter Western press stories on Soviet intran-
sigence, and was also intended to appeal to public
opinion in the West.
Yugoslavs Suspect Soviet Ties to Radical Emigres
Belgrade is convinced that Soviet duplicity is bureau, as well as Croatian party president Dr.
behind- the marked increase in Croat chauvinism Sava Dabcevie-Kucar, have been the targets of
both at home and abroad. In the last month the specific attacks.
Yugoslavs have openly hinted that an unnamed
"foreign power" . is partly responsible for their
troubles. The Soviets have tried to cultivate The Croats strongly suspect that the Yugo-
sympathizers among Yugoslav dissidents, but Bel- Slav security forces SDB are involved in this
grade may be inflating Moscow's role for do- slander campaign
mestic consumption.
Concern over foreign meddling in Yugo-
slavia's internal affairs reached serious propor-
tions last month at a party presidium meeting,
which discussed a slander campaign allegedly
backed by foreign intelligence and directed at the
Croatian leadership. Aimed at discrediting Croa-
tia's present leaders by tying them to emigre
separatists, this campaign apparently has been
building for the last two to three years. Mika
Tripalo and Vladimir Balearic, Croatia's two
representatives on the powerful party executive
~ The Croatian party ce trn a
committee met on 6 April, discussed unspecified
organs- of the federal government accused of
spreading slander, and promised to investigate.
The meeting stopped short of naming-names but,
if the Croatians are right, a major scandal could
emerge.
In broader terms, Croat officials point an
accusing finger at those forces in Yugoslavia op-
posed to President Tito's pending reforms. By
implication this includes any pro-Soviet forces
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lingering in the country, as well as the numerous
backers in the SDB of ousted former authori-
tarian Yugoslav vice president Aleksander Ran-
kovic.
The recently concluded trial of Der Spiegel
correspondent Hans Peter Ruhlmann on es-
pionage charges is another example fueling Yugo-
slav fear of Soviet meddling. Throughout the pro-
ceedings, the Yugoslavs did little to hide their
IAEA: The Board of Governors of the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) approved
this week the recommendations of a special com-
mittee on how the agency should fulfill its safe-
guards responsibilities under the Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT). The recommendations grew out of
more than a year of negotiations and reflect a
number of delicately balanced compromises on
the frequency and intensity of the inspections
suspicion that Ruhlmann was an agent of both
the Soviets and the East Germans.
Admittedly the picture remains murky and
is further clouded by the country's highly emo-
tional response to the recent murder of Yugo-
slavia's ambassador in Stockholm by Croat emigre
radicals. Nevertheless, Tito's recent warnings 25X1
about opposition to his reforms may mean heads
will roll, not only in the republics, but in some
federal organs as well.
and on the method of financing the verification
program. The IAEA secretariat is now expected
to proceed more quickly to negotiate safeguards
agreements with the nonnuclear-weapon states 25X1
adhering to the NPT. Under terms of the treaty,
these agreements must be reached b March of
next year.
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION: The legal sub-
committee of the International Civil Aviation
Organization is presently meeting in Montreal to
consider US-Canadian proposals for multilateral
sanctions against countries that harbor persons
engaged in aerial hijackings or in other forms of
interference, such as the holding of planes and
passengers for ransom. The two nations recently
agreed on a compromise draft convention, having
submitted competing drafts last fall.
Some estern coun-
tries are also believed to fear the adverse effect on
their airlines of a cutoff of flights through a key
region or transit points.
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France-Algeria: Era of Special Relationship C~Yoses
The French decision last week to break off
state-to-state negotiations with Algeria over oil
marked the end of the special relationship that
had existed between France and its former de-
pendency since 1962. The French have left room,
however, for continued cooperation as national
interests dictate.
The French decision, conveyed to the Alge-
rians on 15 April, terminated the diplomatic talks
that had been conducted intermittently over the
past 18 months. In a communique published the
same day, the French stated that practical agree-
ments for the continued activities of French oil
companies in Algeria should be decided by the
Algerian authorities and the companies them-
selves.
In wording that set businesslike terms for
the new relationship with Algeria, the French
announced that they will continue to honor pres-
ent agreements for cultural and technical cooper-
ation and for the immigration of Algerian work-
ers. France will also continue to participate in the
industrial development of Algeria. France made
clear, however, that the extension of present
agreements and its participation in specific indus-
trial projects will depend on considerations of
French national interests. This position contrasts
with the basic accords that have governed
Franco-Algerian relations since 1962. Under these
accords, France offered economic, technical, and
educational aid in return for military and petro-
leum privileges in Algeria.
In view of the emotion associated with these
accords, it is not surprising that Paris' decision has
been widely criticized in France. Accusations
against the government range from the charge
that it has indulged in excessive nationalism to
one that it has abdicated its responsibilities. Crit-
icism, however, has also included the more con-
vincing charge of vacillation over the last year.
Suspicions, moreover, have been directed abroad,
and fears have been voiced that the Soviets and
the Americans will move in where the French
move out.
Although the French announcement may
help to introduce a less emotional atmosphere, it
recognizes implicitly that relations are likely to be
distinctly cool for some time to come. It also
implies that France now realizes that it has little
chance of using its relationship with Algeria to
promote a leading French role in the western
Mediterranean or in Western relations with the
Arab world.
As for Algeria, the government has indicated
considerable satisfaction that France at last has
accepted the principle of full Algerian sover-
eignty. Algiers has long been determined to end
all vestiges of colonialism and had made clear that
its basic objective was control over production
and recovery of its natural resources. The Alge-
rians were prepared, psychologically at least, for a
diplomatic break with France and were relieved
that Paris stopped short of such a step. Mean-
while, the Algerians have taken steps to recruit
technicians in the event that French oil operators
pull out completely, and they probably are also
seeking new markets against the possibility of a
char decline in French urchases.
Italy Considers Measures to Stimulate Economic Activity
The Colombo government is weighing the and both domestic consumption and investment
need for an emergency package of short-term demand are flaccid. Budget Minister Giolitti has
measures to stimulate economic activity. Output suggested the adoption of a number of measures
has been sluggish since the first quarter of 1970 primarily to stimulate investment. These include
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easing the tax on petroleum products, allowing
the government to assume some employers' social
security charges, and granting aids for housing
construction.
The government is facing a dilemma. In the
first quarter of 1971 tax receipts fell 14 percent
short of forecasts even as costly housing and
health reform legislation was being prepared. But,
unless the government forgoes additional current
revenues to stimulate economic activity, growth
of the tax base, which is necessary for long-range
financing of promised social reforms, may not
occur. Originally forecast at six to seven percent,
growth estimates of four to five percent for real
gross national product now are considered opti-
mistic. Similarly, the forecast for growth of indus-
trial output has recently been reduced from 7.5
percent to 4.5 percent-and even this presupposes
some recovery by the end of April.
Industrial output growth has been disap-
pointing following the strong poststrike surge in
late 1969 and early 1970. Modest gains were
posted in January-February 1971, but the level of
output was still slightly below that in the cor-
responding months of 1970. The construction
and textile industries have been in a serious
slump, and performance in chemicals, metallurgy,
and automobile manufacturing has also been off.
The continued slack in output growth this year
cannot be attributed solely to labor tensions-
strike activity has eased considerably since the
third quarter of 1970.
Demand has been sluggish in view of uncer-
tainties regarding prospective economic, political,
and social developments. Consumers have been
hesitant to make large purchases despite sizable
increases in disposable income in 1970. Private
investors-facing weak consumer demand, lower
profit margins, low utilization of capacity, restive
labor, and political uncertainties-are not rushing
to borrow from the banks.
Relatively strong foreign demand is now the
most positive element in the economy. Exports,
revived somewhat after setbacks in 1970, have
risen 15 percent in the first two months of this
year. The government hopes to stimulate domes-
tic activity by fostering the favorable export
trend through proposed legislation that will in-
crease subsidy funds for export credits. ~~ 25X1
The Netherlands Elections: No Choice, No Change
Polls taken earlier this month indicate that
Dutch voters are continuing to drift away from
the establishment parties. As a result, the center-
right, four-party government is in danger of losing
its majority in parliamentary elections on 28
April.
wage and price controls. These have had only a
limited effect, however, and labor discontent has
increased in the process. The most important
issue to the voters is housing, where skyrocketing
construction costs have impaired government
efforts to develop more and lower cost structures.
Voters are concerned almost exclusively
about domestic issues. The country is suffering
from serious inflation, a condition the govern-
ment has attempted to alleviate primarily with
The Dutch election system stimulates little
voter interest, however, and sharp swings from
past voting patterns are unlikely. As many as 28
parties will enter the campaign, and any party
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that musters 1/150th of the vote wins parlia-
mentary representation. Votes may be cast only
for party lists, not for individuals. Many votes will
be cast for parties that are either merely narrow-
interest groups or that simply ridicule politics in
general. About 25 percent of the electorate is
expected to stay away from the polls.
The platforms of the two main contenders
show marked similarities. This circumstance re-
flects the fact that each is a coalition of parties
that had to agree among themselves to a common
program; one is made up of the three confessional
parties in the government, and the other com-
bines Labor with two parties devoted to political
renewal. The latter promises to spend more on
domestic programs and to seek the greater econ-
omies in defense, but it also is calling for an even
larger tax increase than are the parties of the
ruling coalition.
TF~e similarity extends also to foreign policy.
Both coalitions pledge continued membership in
USSR-SUDAN: Sudanese President Numayri's
visit to the USSR on 14-16 April seems to have
been a last-minute decision and to have dealt
primarily with contentious issues in Soviet-
Sudanese bilateral relations. The Sudanese delega-
tion was originally to have been led by high-rank-
ing economic and defense officials. The scope of
the talks was apparently expanded, however,
when Numayri decided to head the delegation. In
addition to aid matters, talks probably covered
NATO but are sharply critical of the regimes of
NATO members Greece and Portugal. Both
pledge in a general way to pursue a Conference on
European Security, but the Labor/renewal group
would probably press this and other detente
themes with the greater vigor; Labor also advo-
cates recognition of East Germany.
Most of the traditionally conservative Dutch
electorate will probably vote for the party they
have supported in previous years, and neither of
the coalitions is likely to win a clear majority. In
the postelection effort to form xa new coalition
by winning over other parties, the confessional
parties are the most likely to reach the magic
number of 76 seats with the support of the Lib-
erals or perhaps of a right-wing Socialist party or
even of some Calvinist groups. Prime Minister De
Jong has already announced his availability to
lead such a coalition. If events follow this course,
the elections will probably produce no significant
change in present policies.
the continuing stalemate in the war in Southern
Sudan, Numayri's problems with the Sudanese
Communists, and the situation in the Middle East.
The final communique characterized the talks as
"frank," suggesting that the two sides were not in
agreement on all these issues. The military mem-
bers of the delegation remained in Moscow after
Numayri's departure, presumably to continue
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MIDDLE EAST -AFRICA
Ceylon: Soviets Send Supplies as Situation Stalemates
There has been little change in the security
situation, with the insurgents avoiding contact
with the government forces and the military con-
tent to retain a static, defensive posture. AI-
though the government controls the major cities,
the rebels apparently hold about ten large areas
plus several scattered small pockets throughout
the island.
Thus far, government forces have managed
to contain major insurgent activity, but it is still
possible that an all-out effort by the guerrillas
could tilt the balance in their favor.
posedly the cream of Sinhalese-Buddhist youth,
are being eliminated by "reactionaries" acting in
conjunction with Ceylon's Tamil-Hindu minority.
The current presence of Indian troops and equip-
ment in Ceylon could lend credibility to such an
allegation.
CEYLON
The insurgents themselves apparently believe
their struggle will be a protracted one.-
They also hope to gain increase popu ar suppor
as a result of public and parliamentary criticism
of the summary executions of captured insurgents
by the security forces. The rebels believe that
Sinhalese politicians sympathetic to their cause
will play on the theme that the insurgents, sup-
0 20 40 Miles
0 40 Kilometers
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the
Government of Ceylon issued a statement deny-
ing rumors that a shipment of construction ma-
terial brought in by the Chinese in connection
with the building of the Bandaranaike Memorial
Hall in Colombo had sinister implications.
Meanwhile, the power struggle between left-
ists and moderates within the government has
continued. The leftists have regained some
ground, after initially being suspected by Prime
Minister Bandaranaike of backing the insurgents.
Five of the original seven members on a govern-
ment committee on reconstruction, whom she
appointed, are prominent representatives of the
far left. She later added two more moderates to
the group, however, and at present neither side
appears to be dominant. The leftist comeback
may be partially a by-product of recently an-
nounced Soviet military aid to the government.
At least 60 Soviet personnel have arrived to
assemble the new equipment and to train the
Ceylonese in its use. The immediate practicality
of the MIGs is questionable.
an army com-
mander stated that the eylonese would not use
the MIGs until their own pilots could fly them. If
Soviet equipment is to be used effectively in the
near future, however, the Soviets or other quali-
fied foreign pilots will probably have to fly the
planes. In view of the publicity- accorded recent
Soviet deliveries, Moscow will probably be re-
luctant to become prominently involved in
quelling the insurgents.
A number of factors presumably influenced
the Soviet decision to come to the aid of the
Bandaranaike government. Moscow regards the
united front government as a distinct improve-
ment over its predecessor and is particularly
pleased that it includes the Ceylon Communist
Party/Moscow. The Soviets have little sympathy
for the tactics of the "Che Guevarists";.Moscow
probably feared that the uprising would bring a
right-wing reaction that would threaten recent
leftist gains. The USSR, moreover, was aware of
its vulnerability to charges of complicity with the
insurgents because some of the leaders of the
movement had- studied in Moscow. In .making
their decision, the Soviets probably were also
encouraged by the knowledge that their moves
were in line with those of the Indian Government,
which has also provided military assistance to
Ceylon. They also were probably happy to have
the opportunity to establish themselves as an
arms supplier, and to offset the credit gained by
Western countries in giving prompt support to the
Cey I onese.
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Pakistan: Ber2gali Resistance Crumbling
The army has regained control of most of
East Pakistan's important towns, although it has
not yet moved into some parts of the province.
Bangla Desh forces-poorly led, organized,
trained, and equipped-have been no match for
the professional West Pakistani troops. When it
can spare the time and men, the government
should have little difficulty in occupying the re-
maining towns of significance.
Nevertheless, the army seems to have little
prospect of exercising effective control over the
countryside and the bulk of East Pakistan's 75
million people before the onset of the monsoon.
Bengali forces-although dispirited-have not been
destroyed but instead have faded into the villages
along with the many refugees from the cities.
Some who were fighting for Bengali independence
a few weeks ago may well have decided by now
that they have had enough. Others, however, are
thinking of sabotage and guerrilla operations.
Bengali capabilities for guerrilla warfare are
limited by inexperience, lack of equipment, and
disorganization. On the other hand, the monsoon
rains this summer will hinder government military
JORDAN: The Jordanian Army, continuing its
intensive sweep of fedayeen areas in Amman, has
now occupied the eastern sectors of the city and
is concentrating on the western sectors. Only
sporadic fire has occurred during the house-to-
house searches in the capital. The fedayeen have
evacuated peacefully, taking much of their
armament with them, but security forces con-
movements, giving the Bengalis a breathing spell
and the Indians time to provide further help.
Although India has decided against recog-
nizing the Bangla Desh government-at least for
the time being-it remains closely involved with
the East Pakistani separatists. Even at the cere-
mony proclaiming Bengali independence, Indian
logistic and public relations support was obvious
to foreign observers. Moreover, India has refused
to act against the Pakistani diplomats who have
taken over the mission in Calcutta in the name of
Bangla Desh.
At the UN, India's delegate continues to
warn of the difficult refugee situation-over
100,000 East Pakistanis may have fled to India so
far-but has dropped his claim that a Security
Council session would be desirable. The Pakistanis
have filed a complaint at the UN alleging Indian
interference in their internal affairs and have re-
ceived support from Iran, Kuwait, and other Mos-
lem states. Secretary General Thant has been re-
buffed by Pakistan in several efforts to organize a
UN-sponsored relief mission for all of East Paki-
stan, but he remains hopeful that some role can
tinue to uncover considerable stocks of explosives
and weapons. Some of these may have been part
of an arms cache; the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine insists that it will still
mount a clandestine terrorist campaign against
Jordanian authority, even though the security
forces are now in a better position to deal effec-
tive) with such tactics. ~
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Arab Unity: More Form Than Substance
The proposed Federation of Arab Republics
(FAR), as set forth in the Benghazi Declaration of
17 April, appears to be only a nominal union of
Egypt, Libya, and Syria within which each state
will retain its sovereignty.
The structure apparently will be much looser
than the unitary state established between Egypt
and Syria in 1958, which was dominated by Cairo
and ended in failure in 1961. The presidential coun-
cil of the FAR, composed of the three heads of
state, will merely formalize an arrangement already
in use for summit-level consultation on foreign and
defense policy. The council will not, however, in-
fringe upon the authority of the three leaders to
deal with the domestic affairs of their respective
countries. The federal national assembly will no
doubt be as powerless as the Egyptian legislative
body, which operates as a creature of the regime.
With regard to foreign affairs, the new group-
ing's lack of political clout is underscored by the
stipulation that separate diplomatic corps and seats
in the United Nations will be retained, allowing for
freedom of action in international relations. Despite
the declaration's rhetoric of "no peace, no negotia-
tion," there is no indication that the Egyptians have
given up their effort to work out a settlement.
Althaugh Libya's Qadhafi made an attempt at the
summit meetings last week to persuade Sadat to
take a harder line, the Egyptian President appar-
ently refused.
In the military field, the federal unified com-
mand has little organizational meaning; the armed
forces remain under the operational control of each
chief of state. Moreover, the scheduling of a refer-
endum on the question of federation in the three
countries as late as 1 September suggests that the
leaders anticipate problems in agreeing on the
specifics of a federal constitution.
Sudan's conspicuous absence from the federa-
tion-after having joined with Egypt and Libya to
form an "alliance" in December 1969-is a result of
its chronic domestic difficulties. President Numay-
ri's position is already somewhat shaky, and he is
apparently unwilling to exacerbate old Sudanese
fears of Egyptian domination by joining the union
at this time. Numayri's abstention climaxed a long
and bitter quarrel with Qadhafi that centered on
the Libyan leader's unyielding demands for rapid
movement toward political unity. The Benghazi
Declaration did, however, leave the door open for
Sudan's eventual accession.
Informed foreign reaction to the Benghazi an-
nouncement also has tended to question the signifi-
cance of the federation. Other Arab states, in-
cluding Jordan, dutifully welcomed the declaration
as a step toward greater Arab unity. France, which
has delivered six of the 100 Mirages contracted for
by -the Libyan Government, took the occasion to
reiterate that the transfer of any of these aircraft to
another Arab state would result in the suspension
of further deliveries.
Egyptian Foreign Minister Riad's visit to Mos-
cow produced a joint communique suggesting that a
Soviet-Egyptian initiative on the negotiating front
may be in the offing. The communique, issued in
Moscow on 21 April, spoke of agreement on "joint
steps aimed at normalizing the situation" in the
Middle East, but gave no further details. The So-
uiets have clearly been perturbed by US-Egyptian
discussions of President Sadat's proposals for re-
opening the Suez Canal, and may well want to put
up an alternative negotiating ploy with their own
stamp on it. Israeli Deputy Premier Allon's visit to
.Washington evoked press accounts of a new Israeli
version of a plan to reopen the canal, but it ap-
peared inadequate to meet Egyptian requirements.
Nevertheless, the "initiatives" injected at least the
appearance of motion to the negotiating process,
even though UN negotiator Jarring remains in Mos-
cow and is not expected back in New Yark until
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India: More State Governments in Mrs. Gandhi's Camp
As a result of Prime Minister Gandhi's land-
slide electoral victory last month, opposition state
legislators and other politicians in several key
states have jumped on her bandwagon, further
strengthening her Ruling Congress Party's posi-
tion.
In Uttar Pradesh, India's most populous
state, an opposition coalition was replaced by a
Ruling Congress government in early April after
defections from right-of-center coalition parties
gave Mrs. Gandhi's party a majority in the state
legislature. The defections were touched off when
the Ruling Congress demonstrated its popular
strength in March by winning 73 of the state's 85
seats in the lower house of the national parlia-
ment.
The southern state of Mysore-ruled by the
opposition Organization Congress Party until Mrs.
Gandhi's party also triggered a wave of defections
there by winning all 27 of the state's parliamen-
tary seats last month-is now under direct central
government rule, with election of a new state
legislature expected later in the year. Although
opposition governments are managing to hold on
in three other states-Gujarat, Orissa, and India's
second most populous state of Bihar-they have
also been weakened by defections. The opposi-
tion regional party that governs Punjab retains a
majority in the state legislature but suffers from
internal divisions.
After extensive jockeying for position, Mrs.
Gandhi's supporters have formed a coalition gov-
ernment in violence-torn West Bengal, where state
and national elections were held simultaneously;
the state had been under direct central govern-
ment rule for a year. Although the elections did
not give any party a majority in the state legis-
lature, the Ruling Congress made sizable advances
and almost overtook the Marxist Communists as
West Bengal's strongest single party.
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Asa result of these developments, govern-
ments controlled or supported by Mrs. Gandhi's
party are now in power in 12 of India's 18 states,
and two others-Tamil Nadu and Nagaland-are
ruled by regional parties friendly to the Ruling
Congress. Moreover, given the traditional willing-
ness of Indian politicians to abandon weakened
parties in favor of those that are winning, Mrs.
Gandhi's Ruling Congress may succeed in wrest-
ing one or two additional states from opposition
control in the months ahead. Her improved posi-
tion at the state level should enhance the pros-
pects for state cooperation in her economic re-
form efforts. It should also slow the trend that
had been developing prior to the. March elections
toward an assertion of states' rights at the ex-
pense of the center.
State governments controlled or
supported by Ruling Congress
or friendly regional parties
State governments opposed by
Ruling Congress
States under direct central
government rule
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SIERRA LEONE: Siaka Stevens was sworn in on
21 April as president following a series of rapid
parliamentary moves that included adoption of a
new constitution, declaration of a republic, and
transformation of the new constitution into a
strong presidential system. Stevens is protected
against legal ouster until a newly granted five-year
term ends in 1976. Stevens' successful completion
of his drive to capture full executive powers will
further embitter political opponents and increase
the likelihood of antigovernment plotting
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
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Brazi I : Government/Terrorist War Claims More Victims
Brazilian authorities believe that the murder
on 15 April of a prominent businessman who had
collaborated with the military could signal a
switch iin terrorist tactics from kidnaping to mur-
der. They attribute this shift both to a thinning of
the subversives' ranks as a result of government
repression and to the administration's hardening
attitude with respect to the demands of kid-
napers.
Security officials have suspected in recent
months that the terrorists' losses could also drive
them to unite previously autonomous groups.
The VPR, probably is still the most important
terrorist group despite its heavy losses and would
be a vital element in the formation of any joint
front. The terrorists have demonstrated their
capability to murder selected targets, either pri-
vate persons or overnment officials. I
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i
Pamphlets left with the body of the indus-
trialist, who was machine gunned on a Sao Paulo
street, warned that he was the first in a series of
individuals linked to the government and to "US
imperialism" marked for elimination. The killers,
identified as members of the Tiradentes Revolu-
tionary Movement (MRT) and the National Lib-
erating Action (ALN) also claimed that their act
was in retaliation for the death on 5 April of a
leader of the MRT in a gun battle with police.
7~wo more MRT activists were killed by security
officials late last week.
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Argentina: Political Maneuvering BreedsDisserision
The loosening of the reins on political ac-
tivity by .the Lanusse government has engendered
new dissension within the military, which is now
being exacerbated by the as-yet-undenied specula-
tion that former dictator Juan Peron will be in-
vited to return to Argentina.
President Lanusse is aware that the growing
strains in the armed forces could undermine his
Uruguay's President under Attack
President Pacheco is again implementing
tough policies on the issues of public order and
terrorism, but he continues to suffer political
embarrassments with respect to these and other
problems. A continuation of his uneven perform-
ance will prove damaging not only to his personal
political stock but also to the chances of the
sole base of power. He appears intent, however,
on pursuing the policy line he established when
he took over the government last month of re-
turning to an elected constitutional government
within three years. Thus far he has concentrated
on convincing the public that he is sincere and
that the elections, when they come, will be free
and meaningful. He has initiated discussions with
representatives of all political groups and parties,
including the Peronists, and appears to have
deliberately fostered speculation that Juan Peron
is free to return to Argentina.
The President has had unexpected success
with civilian politicians and labor to date, but he
must soon take steps to assuage the growing sus-
picions and fears of the military.
Thus, President Lanusse will experience con-
siderable difficulty during the next several
months in maintaining his balance on the political
tightrope he is walking. It appears that his first
test will concern the possible return of Peron,
which is strongly opposed by most military lead-
ers but is being demanded by a large sector of the
public.
incumbent Colorados in the presidential and con-
gressional elections this November.
At the end of 1970, apparently in recogni-
tion of the increased sensitivities of both legisla-
tors and the public in an election year, Pacheco
eased up on the political and economic controls
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he had rigidly exercised for most of his term. He
lifted media censorship, removed the ban on sev-
eral leftist political parties, and decreed a pay
raise for government and private workers. Since
then, however, the President has closed down
individual papers, and Congress has strongly at-
tacked administration policies. The legislative
enmity has carried over to other issues, with Con-
gress refusing requests for increased police powers
and calling several cabinet ministers for interpella-
tion. Last week Pacheco reimposed censorship,
affording his critics another opportunity to
charge him with dictatorial behavior.
In the last four months, the President has
made a number of top-level personnel changes.
Several shifts, such as the naming of a new de-
fense minister and education minister this month
have increased cabinet support for Pacheco's
tough policies. Other ousters have been forced by
congressional censure. Earlier this month, the for-
eign minister resigned as a result of congressional
allegations of improper government assistance to
a bank he owned. The finance minister, also
implicated in the scandal, resigned last week and
was replaced by the minister of education, who
himself had been rumored as a candidate for
removal. The continuing necessity for cabinet-
level shifts adds up to a personal political loss for
the President.
The banking scandal could cause Pacheco
even more headaches. The. Tupamaros have
claimed credit for the kidnaping of a wealthy
industrialist with financial ties to the bank in
question and say they intend to interrogate him
at length. Recently, the Tupamaros have con-
centrated their attacks on alleged government
wrongdoing, a variation of their earlier and highly
successful Robin Hood tactics.
The government has shown increased effec-
tiveness against the urban guerrillas as well as
greater awareness of the advantage of using the
media for anti-Tupamaro publicity, but its record
of achievement remains- spotty. For each govern-
ment success, the Tupamaros seem willing and
able to raise the stakes. The imprisonment of
large numbers of terrorists still shows little sign of
exhausting the reservoir of new recruits. ~
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Panamanian Cabinet Changes
General Torrijos presided over a sweeping
reshuffle of cabinet and subcabinet positions last
week with apparently two objectives in mind. The
first, which was only partly attained, was to field
a stronger team to manage the economy. The
second was to give the administration a face lift-
ing aimed at presenting a more leftist and nation-
alistic image. The new look, however, probably
portends a change in emphasis rather than a major
policy shift.
The most significant personnel changes were
the appointments of two leading leftists-Materno
Vasquez as minister of justice and Romulo Esco-
bar as rector of the National University. Although
Torrijos considered them trusted political opera-
tives, both men had been dismissed from the
Romulo Escobar Materno Vasquez
University Rector Minister of Government
and Justice
Cuba: Castro's Foreign Policy Speech
Fidel Castro's fiery and emotional speech on
19 April was his first major foreign policy address
in a year. The main thrust of his speech, which
was carried live over Cuban radio and television,
was a reiteration of three major points: complete
rejection of any reconciliation with the US; total
cabinet in May 1970 when the General felt the
need to reassure foreign investors who were con-
cerned about the possible leftist drift of the re-
gime. Their re-emergence at this time signals a
new government willingness to tolerate or even
promote political activity among students and
peasants as well as renewed interest in organizing
and institutionalizing domestic political support.
Most of the constraints that have militated
against radical social or economic experiments
still obtain, however. The government still wants
to attract foreign investment and to maintain
business confidence. It also seems interested in
fostering a climate in relations with the US favor-
able for canal negotiations. In addition, persistent
budgetary strains make it difficult for the govern-
ment to embark upon headline-grabbing new
spending programs. Nevertheless, the very limits
on the government's ability to deliver will tend to
engender a distractingly high level of revolution-
ary rhetoric as Torrijos seeks to renew popular
enthusiasm for his regime.
The cabinet shuffle appears to have little
direct foreign policy impact, and the retention of
Foreign Minister Tack indicates there will be no
change in the government's strategy on canal
negotiations. Appeals to nationalism, however,
and mobilization of student support will provide
the government with a lever with which to press
the US on canal-related issues. 25X1
repudiation of the Organization of American
States (OAS); and reaffirmation of support for
revolutionary movements in Latin America. Al-
though the speech occurred on the tenth anniver-
sary of Cuba's Bay of Pigs victory, the apparent
absence of the usual preparations for the speech
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suggests that it may have been scheduled hastily.
Castro may have decided to speak because he felt
obliged to respond to remarks on Cuba during
President Nixon's press interview on 16 April and
during deliberations at the current OAS meeting
in Costa Rica.
Following a rather lengthy discourse on
Cuba's tradition of heroism in the face of external
opposition, Castro turned his attention to foreign
affairs. He views the trend of events in Latin
America as shifting inexorably in his favor and
+:an see no benefit to Cuba in normalizing rela-
tions with the OAS. As usual, he was extremely
critical of the US and stated that there was "no
reason to dream of any kind of normalization of
relations with Cuba or of conciliation with
Cuba."
Castro also expressed contempt far the OAS
and stated emphatically that Cuba would never
belong to this organization, even if the US were
thrown out. Indeed, he stated that the OAS must
"disappear," and called for its replacement by a
"union" of Latin American states. Castro viewed
this union as possible only after a revolution
occurred in each Latin American country. He
described the union as the result of a long his-
torical process that would culminate in the "eco-
nomic and political union of the Latin American
people."
Castro stated that recent developments in
Latin America mark "a qualitative change in the
Latin American situation" and expressed satisfac-
tion with the "revolutionary" governments in
Chile and Peru. He stated that Cuba would be
willing to assist these countries in whatever way
necessary. Although Castro withheld his opinions
of the Bolivian Government, he expressed con-
fidence in the Bolivian people and stated that "a
revolutionary process also exists in Bolivia."
Castro thus appears to be more optimistic now
about the prospects for radical change in Bolivia.
Expressing the fear that Chile might experience
aggression from abroad, he promised that
"Cubans will be ready to go to fight for Chile.'
He also stated that when other "revolutionary
peoples ask for technical aid...or combatants, we
shall furnish them."
Castro clearly continues to adhere to his
doctrine of violent revolution. He considers the
political situation in countries such as Brazil and
Argentina one in which only violent revolution
can bring about the desired changes. ~
COLOMBIA : Student demonstrations and a
48-hour national student strike that began on 21
April are continuing to cause problems for the
government. The National University in Bogota
and other universities in provincial cities have
been closed and occupied by troops. Some stu-
dents and police have been injured in clashes and
there has been rninor property damage, Further
incidents by students are likely
The major element that has served to unify
students during the past weeks has been the
urgent need for university reform. Although the
Pastrana administration has been aware of the
problem it has been slow to seek a solution. This
week, however, the minister of education met
with university authorities to seek ways to reform
university laws. Even though the initial step that
provides a basis for negotiations between the
government and students has been taken, the
situation remains potentially explosive. If the
universities are not soon reopened the students
could lose the entire semester, blame the gov- 25X1
ernment for their misfortune, and become an
even more volatile force.
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Situation in Haiti
Public announcement of the death of Fran-
cois Duvalier on the morning of 22 April has not
so far provoked discernible disorders.
The six weeks of Duvalier's illness have ap-
parently been used to prepare an orderly transfer
of power. Jean-Claude's tenure is unpredictable,
however. It is inevitable that his youth, lack of
preparation, the probable development of pro-
and anti -Jean-Claude factions, and the eagerness
of men outside the government to make a move
before it is too late-if indeed it is not already too
late-will jeopardize his tenure. Within the ranks
of the overtly faithful, personal ambition is likely
to surface now that it is freed of the restraining
influence of Francois Duvalier. One of Jean-
Claude's first official acts was the promulgation
of a decree naming a new cabinet that includes
two men on whom former President Duvalier
particularly depended to make his succession plan
work.
The exiles and the oppositionists within the
country are believed to be too few, weak, and
disorganized to act immediately but they can be
expected to take advantage of their first oppor-
tunity in 14 years to play a political role. There
are no clear indications that Cuban or other for-
eign support to exile groups has prepared them
for immediate action, and there is no apparent
Page 26
Former President-for-Life Francois Duvalier and his
successor Jean-Claude Duvalier
From Haitian Govcr~ament poster
increase in security forces at the Presidential
Palace or in Port-au-Prince.
Fear of an invasion from abroad, however
unfounded, may inhibit any immediate struggle
for power between members of the government.
In addition, the new administration appears to be
moving swiftly to consolidate its control. In his
first public speech, Jean-Claude described himself
as an heir of his father's political philosophy and
declared that he would continue his father's work
with the "same ferocious ener I
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