WEEKLY SUMMARY
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79-00927A008800040001-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
25
Document Creation Date:
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date:
November 4, 2008
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 4, 1971
Content Type:
SUMMARY
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Approved For Release 2008/11/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08800040001-3
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review DIA review(s)
completed completed.
Secret
4 June 1971
No. 0373/71
Copy N! 0053
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CONTENTS
(Information as of noon EDT, 3 June 1971)
Page
Indochina: Battling on Two Fronts-Political and Military . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
An Inauspicious Start for Cambodia's New Government . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Some Smoke, Little Fire on All Laotian Fronts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Communist China: Of Recognition and Things . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
USSR: Fuel and Power Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Sweden: Chillier Climate for US Deserters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Malta: Election Outcome Uncertain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Czechoslovakia: Successes and Failures at the Party Congress . . . . . . . . . 11
Little Headway in Reform of the UN General Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Soviets Get It Signed on the Dotted Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
India-Pakistan: Problems Mount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Argentina: Political Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Venezuela-Colombia: More Danger Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Chile: Mixing Economics and Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Trinidad-Tobago: The Dilemma of Victory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
NOTES: Philippines; Norway; Netherlands; Outer Space; Brazil; Honduras
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FAR EAST
Indochina: Battling on Two Fronts- Political and Military
The Communists have carried out another of
their periodic sharp increases in military activity
in South Vietnam. The action that began late last
week has been generally similar to that seen dur-
ing two earlier phases of enemy attacks in March
and April, with the northern half of the country
hardest hit and South Vietnamese forces bearing
the brunt of the fighting. The several dozen Com-
munist shellings that occurred were mostly light,
but stiff ground assaults caused damage in the
central highlands, the A Shau Valley, and along
the northern coast. Rockets struck Da Nang, and
a large explosion in a government building rocked
downtown Saigon.
South Vietnamese forces report killing sev-
eral hundred enemy troops in especially hard-
fought actions in the highlands and the coastal
districts of Quang Nam Province, two key areas
where the enemy has been active throughout the
spring campaign. The latest enemy attacks put
still greater pressure on the already hard-pressed
pacification program in those areas.
Heightened Communist activity will prob-
ably continue into next week. Intelligence on
enemy plans for this summer, however, is sparse.
In recent years the enemy's spring campaign has
been followed by a summer lull in the fighting
during which the Communists prepared for action
in the fall. This year, however, there are some
signs that they may intend to maintain substantial
pressure in the highlands well into the summer.
Several developments involving the three
major contenders for South Vietnam's presidency
have enlivened the precampaign period in recent
days. Vice President Ky came even closer to com-
mitting himself to enter the race following an-
other headline-grabbing speech in which he again
attacked the Thieu government on a broad range
of issues. Ky told newsmen flatly that he in-
tended to run for president but later fuzzed his
position and promised a "clarifying" statement
the near future.
President Thieu's aides have persuaded the
Lower House to reinstate a provision into the
presidential election bill requiring candidates to
be endorsed by 40 National Assembly members
or 100 members of provincial councils. Originally
the chief purpose of this provision was to limit
the number of candidates and thereby make it
more likely that the winner would receive a
majority mandate--the winning Thieu-Ky ticket
only received 35 percent of the vote in the 1967
election. Thieu did not back this provision
strongly when it encountered opposition two
months, ago, but since Ky has shown a greater
interest in the race, Thieu has been pushing it
more energetically, apparently with the hope that
it will force the Vice President out of the race. Ky
will probably have difficulty in meeting this re-
quirement.
Although Big Minh can easily line up enough
endorsements to qualify as a presidential can-
didate, he has warned that he might drop out of
the race in protest over this provision. Minh's
resolve to run has wavered periodically, appar-
ently largely because of doubts about his pros-
pects. He probably believes that his own chances
for victory would be reduced if Ky is eliminated
from the contest. Minh may also have suffered a
setback to his presidential ambitions last week
when Tri Quang, the most influential An Quang
monk, issued a statement indicating that he will
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not back any candidate in the election. The state-
ment no doubt is devised to protect the An
Quang from a loss of face in the event Minh loses,
but it does not mean the Buddhists will refrain
from backing him entirely. Several other An
Quang monks are already working on Minh's be-
half and he reportedly has named several promi-
nent An Quang senators to important positions
on his campaign staff. Tri Quang's statement
could indicate, however, that Buddhist support,
which is crucial to Minh's chances, will be some-
thing less than wholehearted.
The arrest and detention of a prominent
antigovernment member of the Lower House has
stirred up a new political controversy in Saigon.
Deputy Ngo Cong Duc was taken into custody
this week and accused of assaulting a local official
in his home district. Some press accounts claim
that he is being charged with attempted murder.
Duc's detention has caused a furor in the Lower
House, which has voted overwhelmingly to
demand that he be released. The deputy's sup-
porters are charging that the incident that led to
his arrest was a government-inspired frame-up.
Although it is unclear whether Duc's arrest
came on orders from Saigon, the deputy has been
a thorn in President Thieu's side and the President
clearly would like to see him defeated in the
Lower House elections this summer. Duc edits the
most outspokenly antigovernment paper in Sai-
gon and has called for an early end to the war. If
the deputy remains in jail, therefore, there prob-
ably will be further charges-both in Saigon and
overseas-of political represssion by the Thieu
government.
An Inauspicious Start for
Cambodia's New Government
The new government has been in office only
one month, but it is becoming quite clear that it
has not yet dispelled the sense of drift and indeci-
sion that characterized the political situation in
Phnom Penh under the previous administration.
Some high-ranking officials are already complain-
ing about the obstacles they are encountering in
trying to establish programs and policies to meet
the country's most crucial problems.
Finance Minister Sok Chhong recently ex-
pressed concern over the cabinet's lack of support
for reforms to halt continuing economic deterio-
ration. Chhong admits that currency devaluation,
price controls, and more stringent efforts to stop
payroll padding in the army are likely to be
unpopular in some quarters, but he believes that
the real difficulty is the cabinet ministers' un-
familiarity with economic problems and their
reluctance to address them.
In Tam, the able and energetic first deputy
prime minister, is having trouble lining up support
for plans to get a pacification program off the
drawing boards and into the countryside. One key
aspect of his proposed program, calling for the
military police to be rejuvenated as the national
police under his control, has run into some formi-
dable opposition. In Tam has gone so far as to
threaten to resign unless his recommendations are
approved.
The government's search for appropriate
measures to cope with its difficult and complex
problems is further complicated by Prime Minis-
ter Lon Nol's continuing involvement in day-to-
day affairs. General Fan Moeung, the project
officer in charge of the impending reorganization
of the Ministry of National Defense and the Cam-
bodian Army (FANK) General Staff, has told the
US defense attache that Prime Minister Delegate
Sirik Matak is distressed over the fact that Lon
Nol is conferring with certain FANK field officers
on a daily basis and is otherwise blurring the lines
of authority within the military establishment.
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Lon Nol's involvement appears to represent
a breakdown in the understanding that was
reached when the new government was formed,
wherein he was to serve as a figurehead prime
minister with Matak holding the real reins of
responsibility. Matak and other key officials evi-
dently are also concerned because access to Lon
Nol is being controlled by a small entourage
headed by his brother Lon Non.
Besides experiencing difficulty in coming to
grips with its major domestic problems, the gov-
ernment is now facing a potentially serious in-
crease in Communist military activity in the
Phnom Penh area. The enemy launched two small
but ineffective 122-mm. rocket attacks against
the Cambodian navy base just across the Mekong
River from the capital. Within the city itself, a
six-month standdown on terrorist activities ended
when two installations housing US personnel were
bombed. Although some heavy physical damage
resulted, there were no casualties.
Northeast of Phnom Penh, the enemy has
carried out a series of mortar and ground attacks
on a number of Cambodian positions. Govern-
ment troops, including several elite Khmer Krom
units, were able to hold their ground, however.
Preliminary casualty reports indicate 17 Cam-
bodians were killed and 200 wounded in the first
days of the fighting, while the Communists suf-
fered even heavier losses-primarily as a result of
heavy air strikes. More fighting reportedly was
continuing at midweek in this region-some of it
just ten miles from the capital-forcing the gov-
ernment to send up reinforcements.
The Snuol Story
Cambodia
Communist -controlled
South Vietnamese forces that had been op-
erating since early February in the vicinity of
Snuol withdrew to South Vietnam at the be-
ginning of the week. The decision to fall back was
made prior to a renewed round of Communist
mortar, rocket, and ground attacks, but the co-
incidence of the enemy action with the with-
drawal created the impression that the South
Vietnamese had suffered a tactical defeat. The
Communist pressure did, however, force the
South Vietnamese to abandon considerable
amounts of equipment and supplies.
Saigon's decision to close down its opera-
tions around Snuol probably was dictated by a
number of factors, including the need to shorten
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supply lines and the problem of deteriorating
troop morale in that sector. The immediate im-
pact of the pullback on the military situation in
eastern Cambodia may not be too significant,
since rainy season conditions are likely to make it
difficult for the Communists to carry out large-
scale attacks or supply buildups. Whatever the
case, Vietnamese Communist propagandists are
describing the action at Snuol as the most sig-
nificant South Vietnamese defeat since the cam-
paign in Laos this spring.
Some Smoke, Little Fire on All Laotian Fronts
The Communists took no new ground during
the past week, but it seems clear that their offen-
sive has not yet run its course. In the Bolovens
area, they are moving against elements of an ir-
regular task force operating north and east of
Paksong, but so far the irregulars have held their
ground. The North Vietnamese have not yet
launched any major ground attacks against gov-
ernment blocking positions protecting the ap-
proaches to Pakse from the Bolovens. In Pakse
itself, political and economic conditions have
improved again, and a new military command has
been set up under the control of the armed forces
chief of operations.
To the north, clashes have continued in the
Dong Hene area near Route 9. So far no major
Communist drive on Seno has developed, but
some North Vietnamese units in the Route 9 area
may be redeploying. These moves suggest that the
North Vietnamese are now planning to con-
solidate their gains around Muong Phalane and
Dong Hene, and that any further moves toward
Seno would be intended primarily to tie down
government forces well west of the infiltration
corridor.
North Vietnamese forces apparently are con-
tinuing to pull back from the Long Tieng com-
plex. Some of these units may be moving to
increase Communist strength around the irregular
base at Bouam Long, north of the Plaine, which
has been under increasing enemy pressure.
A Pathet Lao rallier has provided the outline
of what he claims is the North Vietnamese three-
year plan for south Laos from 1970 to 1972. The
plan, whose general contents were passed to
Pathet Lao officers by the North Vietnamese in
August 1970, calls for the construction of a road
system linking Muong Phine with the Cambodian
border. Some unspecified areas of south Laos are
to be "liberated" so that they could eventually be
used to support Communist forces in South Viet-
nam and Cambodia. The North Vietnamese
claimed that it would probably not be possible to
accomplish all of these objectives during the
three-year period.
Bouom-
Long
Plaine de`s
Jaires
LAOS
Contested territoryc
MVadi
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" `P4 ise okogog
Bolovens
%Plateau
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The North Vietnamese already are making
increased use of the northern part of the western
logistic corridor. Their military actions during the
1970-71 dry season offensive in south Laos lend
some credibility to the authenticity of the plan.
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma took a
flexible line in his formal response to the Pathet
Lao peace proposals of 12 May. In a letter given
to Communist emissary Souk Vongsak on 26
May, Souvanna proposed that it was time for the
two sides to get talks started without further
foot-dragging. He noted that so far their contacts
have been unproductive, blaming this on stalling
by the Communists and on their setting of pre-
conditions for the talks. He stressed the urgent
need to arrive at a total and complete cease-fire
and said that negotiations should not be limited
in any way. To facilitate talks, Souvanna sug-
gested that Souk be empowered to negotiate in
Vientiane directly with Souvanna's representative.
PHILIPPINES: A constitutional convention that
opened in Manila this week could have important
and perhaps long-lasting repercussions on Philip-
pine political life. A large segment of the popu-
lace has viewed constitutional reform as a panacea
for national ills, but even under the most favora-
ble of developments, some of their exaggerated
hopes would not be realized. There is a strong
possibility, moreover, that the convention's per-
formance may not meet even more modest ex-
pectations. Organizing sessions before the in-
augural date were characterized by petty bicker-
ing among the delegates to the neglect of funda-
mental matters, such as naming a convention
chairman. A poor performance by the convention
would strengthen the growing popular disenchant-
The line in the letter is less tough than
Souvanna's recent public statements that he
would not negotiate with the Communists while
under military pressure. The change in tone pre-
sumably reflects his desire to avoid foreclosing
the possibility of talks or conveying the impres-
sion that the government is not bending every
effort to end the war. It may also reflect the US
ambassador's recent remarks to Souvanna that
talks with the Communists might have some
utility.
Lao Communist leader Souphanouvong and
most top Lao Communist officials made a six-day
visit to Hanoi last week. This marks the first
formal visit to Hanoi by Lao Communists since
April 1965, although Souphanouvong and others
have made several unpublicized visits. The Lao
visitors were warmly received, but so far there is
little inkling of whether the substantive talks were
as convivial as the effusive and almost fulsome
public expressions of mutual regard and sol-
idarity.
ment with Marcos' administration that was re-
flected in the noisy but nonviolent student
demonstration marking the ceremonial opening of
the convention on 1 June.
Anticipated efforts by President Marcos to
use the convention to extend his tenure will
deepen this mood and increase the probability of
public displays of discontent over the working of
the Philippine political system. Although Marcos
believes he controls a firm majority of convention
delegates, the closeness of the vote-admittedly in
a poorly attended session-to invite him to ad-
dress the opening suggests that he may have trou-
ble manipulating the body.
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Communist China: Of Recognition and Things
Austria recognized Communist China last
week-the ninth country to do so since last au-
tumn. The communique stated that Vienna recog-
nized Peking as the "sole legal government of
China," a formula that now has become standard
in these situations. Still other countries-notably
Iran and Turkey-are in line to recognize in the
near future, and an announcement in one or both
cases may be made in the next month.
Not all countries are yet willing to go as far
as recognition, although it seems that most are
bested in improving relations with China.
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USSR: Fuel and Power Targets
The goals for fuel and power as outlined in
the Soviets ninth Five Year Plan show a mixture
of optimism and realism. The important oil and
gas quotas will be difficult to attain because of a
shortage of large-diameter pipe and technological
inadequacies, but the projected output for coal
and electric power appears to be within Soviet
capabilities.
Planned average annual increases for oil and
gas are slightly below those achieved during
1966-70, but the quantitative amounts are to be
larger than ever. Oil production is programed to
increase from the 353 million metric tons (MMT)
reached in 1970 to 480-500 MMT in 1975, and
gas production is to rise from 1970's 200 billion
cubic meters to 300-320 million cubic meters in
1975. The Soviet Union is the world's second
largest producer of gas and oil. Coal production is
scheduled to expand at a low rate, slightly
exceeding that achieved during 1966-70, while
electric power is to increase at an annual rate
slightly below the rate achieved during 1966-70.
Coal production is to grow from the 624 MMT
reached in 1970 to 685-695 MMT in 1975, an
attainable goal, while the electric power target for
1975 has been scaled down and now is scheduled
to grow from the 740 billion kilowatt hours of
1970 to only 1030-1070 billion kilowatt hours.
Although these decisions appear to be firm, they
were cause for disagreement that surfaced among
the leadership at the party congress in March.
Pyotr Shelest, Politburo member and Ukrainian
party first secretary, complained in his speech
that "some people" wanted less attention paid to
developing the coal industry because of the
growing role of gas and oil in the fuel balance.
Apparently to no avail, he said that "we believe
this is wrong" and argued for more development
of the Ukraine's traditional coal industry.
A limiting factor on the objectives of both
the oil and gas industries will be the shortage of
large-diameter pipe. The Soviets intend to lay
approximately 57,000 kilometers of oil and gas
Page 8
pipelines during 1971-75, which compares with
an approximate 48,000 kilometers to be laid by
the entire free world during 1971-74. To achieve
this goal the USSR will need about six million
tons more pipe than the current domestic
production capability and known scheduled
imports for the five-year period combined.
Another limiting factor involves a recent
announcement that implies that the oil drilling
rate for 1971-75 will not increase over that
achieved during 1966-69. Another problem is the
need to develop the Western Siberian and Mangy-
shlak Peninsula oil fields, which are to account
for 75 percent of all growth in crude oil produc-
tion during 1971-75, at twice the rate that the
fields of the Urals-Volga region were developed.
In the past, forced development has led to a low
recovery of reserves. Severe operating conditions
in Western Siberia and in remote areas of future
oil exploration will require huge imports of West-
ern (mostly US) technology and equipment.
Exploitation of Western Siberian gas de-
posits, which are to account for 50 percent of the
increase in output during 1971-75, faces equally
serious problems. The gas industry has not been
able to meet its goals during the past decade
mainly because of a shortage of pipe and the
equipment to build pipelines. Even with signifi-
cant increases in Western imports the gas industry
is likely to fall short of its quota because of the
difficulties involved in laying pipeline in perma-
frost regions.
The quantity of oil to be exported to the
West has not yet been announced, but because oil
is the largest single earner of foreign exchange it is
assumed that every effort will be made to main-
tain at least current export levels. During 1970,
oil exports to the West amounted to about 45
MMT, valued at $600 million. Natural gas con-
tracts with the West call for the delivery of 26
billion cubic meters of gas during 1971-75, worth
some $300 million. 25X1
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Sweden: Chillier Climate for US Deserters
Public reaction to crimes committed by
American deserters has grown consistently more
hostile in recent months and has made their cause
a political liability for the Swedish left.
Of 612 deserters who had registered with
Swedish immigration authorities as of early April,
99 subsequently returned to American military
jurisdiction, 16 emigrated to Canada, 22 were
refused asylum, six were deported, and three
died-two by suicide. Of the remaining 466, one
third have been detained by the police and one
fourth actually convicted of crimes. Despite the
recent notoriety that surrounded an attempted air
piracy and a brutal child-beating resulting in
death, most offenses by deserters fall into lesser
categories, such as trafficking in narcotics, petty
theft, simple assault, and procuring.
Even among the two thirds with no police
record, most have made no attempt to assimilate
into Swedish society. Generally without educa-
NORWAY: The government has decided to pro-
pose to North Vietnam that the Norwegian am-
bassador to Communist China also be accredited
to Hanoi sometime this fall. No decision has been
reached about the establishment of a North Viet-
namese mission in Oslo, and no consideration is
being given to seeking accreditation to Saigon for
NETHERLANDS: Although postelection nego-
tiations are expected to drag on at least until the
end of the month, Professor Steenkamp, as
formateur, has apparently discovered a consensus
among the five prospective coalition allies on the
necessity for anti-inflationary measures and gen-
eral economic austerity in the near future. The
leaders of the three confessional parties, however,
remain unreceptive to the prospect of long-term
economizing that could jeopardize their campaign
tional or vocational qualifications and unfamiliar
with the language, they are confined to the outer
fringes of the labor market. Employers are re-
luctant to invest in training programs for them
because of their reputation for floating from job
to job. Landlords are not willing to rent to the
deserters because they have been known to be
poor risks. Even their original patrons on the far
left have abandoned their charges, having found
that the motives for desertion in most cases have
not been exploitable and that the deserters as a
group are unmanageable.
On the other side of the coin, there have
been some successful adjustments. Perhaps as
many as one fifth of he deserters have enrolled in
Swedish schools, married local girls, and taken
steady jobs; to all intents and purposes they have
disappeared into Swedish society. The balance are
transients, however, and will remain so.
the Norwegian ambassador to Thailand. The gov-
ernment is moving slowly in implementing its
commitment to recoclnize Hanoi in order to avoid
introducing foreign policy distractions into the
national debate on membership in the European
Communities as well as to appease US sensitivi-
commitments to expand housing, elementary edu-
cation, and development aid. Nevertheless, the
growing seriousness of inflation and balance of
payment difficulties, along with fear of losses in
an election which might otherwise be required,
should prod the confessionals to move toward
agreeing to form a coalition with the more
parsimonious-minded Liberals and ri ht-wing so-
cialists.
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Malta: Election Outcome Uncertain
The parliamentary elections on 12-14 June are
too close to call, but there are indications that
Prime Minister Borg-Olivier's Nationalist Party is in
trouble.
Both the Nationalists and the opposition Malta
Labor Party (MLP) have been campaigning in-
tensively for the last several weeks in an attempt to
win over the undecided voters. The Nationalists
have been stressing Malta's economic accomplish-
ments under their administration while attacking
the foreign policy pronouncements of MLP leader
Dom Mintoff. In reply, the MLP-which brands the
administration as ineffective and corrupt-charges
that government incompetence in the fiscal area has
resulted in incipient inflation and an increasing na-
tional debt.
Mintoff, to the chagrin of some MLP candi-
dates, has made foreign affairs a campaign issue. His
belief that Malta should take a neutral position in
the Mediterranean is well known. His recent con-
tradictory statements on foreign policy issues, how-
ever, has allowed Borg-Olivier to speculate publicly
on the possibility of a Soviet base on Malta if the
MLP wins.
There are several factors at work in this elec-
tion that were not present in 1966 when the Na-
tionalists retained power by a comfortable, if
deceptive, margin. In the last two general elections,
the highly influential Catholic Church actively op-
posed the MLP, but since then the Church and the
Laborites have reached an agreement that elimi-
nates overt church assistance to the Nationalists.
There has also been a significant increase in the
number of young voters-25 percent of the eligible
voters are under 30-and the MLP will probably
receive a majority of these. Furthermore, only one
small party is contesting this election and it is
expected that the MLP will pick up the majority of
the votes that previously went to other minor
parties.
If the MLP wins, Mintoff would probably
attempt to renegotiate Malta's defense and financial
agreement with the British. The UK high commis-
sioner there recently told the US ambassador that
London would agree to discuss the matter but that
the talks could last for some time. The agreement,
which grants the UK responsibility for the military
security of the islands in return for development
aid, expires in 1974 and was adjusted to Malta's
benefit last year.
Mintoff, who had indicated prior to the
campaign that the NATO presence was not in keep-
ing with his goal of "positive neutrality," began
gradually to assume a more ambiguous stance as the
campaign got under way. It is possible that he
would not insist on removal of the small NATO
presence if it will agree to his demands for payment
for the use of Maltese facilities. Even the National-
ists, who maintain that the island's interests are best
served by stronger ties with Western countries, can
be expected to seek increased benefits from the
relationshi with NATO and London.
OUTER SPACE: The legal subcommittee of the
UN General Assembly's space committee convenes
next week in Geneva to attempt again to draft a
liability convention that will provide compensation
for damage caused by errant space vehicles. Ex-
pectations earlier this year that this meeting could
produce a breakthrough have been dimmed by
recent indications that the Soviets remain
intransigent on the outstanding issues. Although
they have offered to drop their insistence that only
the laws of the launching state-rather than interna-
tional law-are applicable for claims, the Soviets
still want in return a method other than binding
arbitration to resolve settlement disputes. Most
nations believe such a formulation provides inade-
quate protection for their interests.
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Czechoslovakia:
Successes and Failures at the Party Congress
A sense of cohesiveness within the top lead-
ership, such as has not existed since Husak came
to power, was apparent at the party congress last
week. Factionalism and dogmatism were
outlawed, and the minimal organizational changes
presented a collective leadership that has come to
terms with its Soviet occupier.
The party's fundamental weakness-the dis-
tance between it and the population-was also
evident, however. Pleas for socialist discipline and
energetic leadership- by party functionaries per-
meated the deliberations and underlined the
party's awareness that most Czechoslovaks remain
apathetic to its suasions. These exhortations also
reflect the frustrations of Czechoslovak leaders
who are searching for a formula to improve the
life style of the country in a situation they are
powerless to change.
Perhaps the most promising note for Czecho-
slovakia's future were hints that the regime is
looking closely at some of the economic reforms
initiated in the mid-1960s. Those changes under
consideration, however, apparently involve peri-
pheral improvements such as more efficient man-
agement procedures and do not include basic re-
forms. The regime's emphasis on central eco-
nomic controls indicates that meaningful changes
will be slow.
Little Headway in Reform of the UN General Assembly
A committee of 31 members is expected to
complete later this month a study-proposed by
Canada with strong US backing-of measures to
revamp the cumbersome structure of the UN Gen-
eral Assembly. Current indications are that the
draft proposals will fall far short of the goals
Ottawa and Washington have had in mind.
Western governments, with some African
and Soviet support, had hoped to use the study to
modify procedural rules, focusing in particular on
the need to limit the lengthy general debate that
opens each annual meeting. I he nonaligned group
has reacted sharply to this idea, terming it an
unacceptable limitation on sovereignty. One inter-
esting development in the discussion on this point
was the opposition of Yugoslavia and Romania to
a suggestion that one speaker might represent a
whole regional
was motivated
Doctrine.
group. Their contention clearly
by implications of the Brezhnev
An overwhelming majority of the 31 is
clearly opposed to the US proposal that the gen-
eral debate be held only every other year. An-
other discarded idea-offered by Italy-called for
weighing voting rights in the General Assembly in
accordance with financial contributions. It now
appears likely that the study committee will seek
at most a one-week reduction in the length of
Assembly sessions-now pegged at 13 weeks-and
possibly add hortatory remarks against verbosity
in the general debate. Some minor tinkering with
the jurisdiction of Assembly committees will
probably be recommended as well.
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Soviets Get It Signed on the Dotted Line
The treaty concluded at the end of Soviet
President Podgorny's hurried visit to Cairo last
week merely formalizes the unique relationship
between the two countries without committing
them to anything other than the expansion of
existing relations. In Moscow's view, nonetheless,
it probably serves as a useful political demon-
stration of the consolidation of Soviet influence
in Egypt.
For both countries, it is a unique document.
Apart from the recently signed treaty with West
Germany, Moscow's only treaties are with its
Communist allies or with countries that border
the USSR. Since independence, of course, Egypt
has not signed any kind of comprehensive treaty
with a great power.
The treaty is scheduled to be ratified "in the
nearest future" and to remain in force for a
minimum of 15 years. It can be renewed auto-
matically for additional five-year periods.
The document almost certainly resulted
from a Soviet initiative and is probably an effort
by Moscow to ensure the long-term viability of
Soviet interests in Egypt. The USSR recognizes
that its present position of influence in Cairo
results chiefly from its military support for
Egypt's struggle against Israel. The recent rap-
prochement between Washington and Cairo,
coupled with Sadat's purge of numerous Egyp-
tians who had been well-disposed toward the
Soviets, probably revived Moscow's fears-never
very far below the surface-that it might lose its
influence.
The document, which is labeled a treaty of
"friendship and cooperation," begins with a
pledge of noninterference in each other's internal
affairs. Other articles detail the commitment of
both parties to continue working for a political
solution of the Middle East problem and their
agreement to consult "without delay" whenever
they conclude that a danger to peace has arisen.
The treaty also describes an agreement to
further develop political, economic, and military
relations. In the military sphere, however, the
Soviets merely agree to continue strengthening
the defense capacity of Egypt and to go on train-
ing Egyptian military personnel. The language of
the treaty indicates that details of military co-
operation have been and will be set forth in other
appropriate agreements.
Reaction from Egypt and the Arab World
For his part, Sadat presumably views the
treaty as an opportunity to dispel Soviet fears.
The treaty, moreover, also provides implicit So-
viet endorsement of his recent moves against his
opponents, and the Egyptian military can now be
confident that aid from Moscow will continue for
the forseeable future. In the President's view, his
formal commitment to close consultations with
Moscow would seem to be a minimal political
price to get Soviet military assistance and to
preserve the indispensable loyalty of his military
commanders.
Egypt's entry into a treaty relationship with
the Soviet Union has thus far elicited general
approval in the Arab world.
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Official commentary from Israel has been
relatively restrained, although Prime Minister Meir
pointedly expressed concern that the treaty
threatened to "increase the imbalance of arms."
Her remarks strengthened expectations that the
Israelis will exploit those clauses of the treaty
dealing with Soviet military aid in any future
arms negotiations with the US. The Israeli press
has characterized the accord as a "serious blow to
the US peace initiative" and unsurprisingly claims
that Sadat has committed himself to policy co-
ordination with the USSR.
India-Pakistan: Problems Mount
The refugee flow from East Pakistan con-
tinues, with the total now over four million,
according to the Indians. The threat of epidemic
has been added to the problems of feeding and
housing the displaced Bengalis; their adverse
effect on the local economy and the possibility of
violence between the domestic population and
the refugees or between Muslims and Hindus have
increased. According to the press, 1,000 persons
died of cholera in one district in the six days
ending 1 June. UN officials reported that "grossly
unsanitary" camp conditions are conducive to the
spread of influenza, whooping cough, measles,
and meningitis.
UN relief efforts for both the refugees and
for East Pakistan are picking up momentum. The
UN High Commissioner for Refugees has com-
pleted a comprehensive survey of the camps in
India and has begun a massive aid effort. UN
Assistant Secretary General Kittani-an expert on
disaster relief-is en route to Pakistan where he
expects to visit Islamabad and Dacca in the course
of working out guidelines for UN aid in East
Pakistan. President Yahya Khan appears more
amenable than previously to UN insistence that it
monitor the end-use of relief supplies, most of
which will be provided by UNICEF and the World
Food Program.
Military activity along the Indo - East Paki-
stani border has increased, but so far both sides
appear to be confining themselves to defensive
preparations. In several places, the Indian Army
has replaced or reinforced paramilitary units that
had been the only forces in the immediate border
area.
Pakistan's military government is continuing
its efforts to win su ort from the East Paki-
stanis.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Argentina: Political Developments
President Lanusse is making a concerted ef-
fort to get across-the-board support for his plan
to generate constructive political activity and to
hold elections within three years. Government
officials have consulted with representatives of
nearly all of the political parties and movements
as well as with the military on the form future
politics and government should take, and each
step toward making a decision is being publicized.
The first step came on 31 May when an
11-man advisory commission made its report to
Interior Minister Mor Roig, who heads the com-
mission that is to draft a political plan for the
President by 21 June. The advisory commission's
study on institutional reform, which is to be
published in full, makes recommendations on
constitutional reform, on proposed new statutes
governing the organization of political parties,
and on a new electoral law.
Dissenting opinions were written on each
topic considered, but the majority of the commis-
sion members agreed that the government could
and should reform-but not rewrite-the constitu-
tion prior to elections, that requirements for
forming political parties should be toughened,
and that the system of runoff elections should
not be adopted. The interior minister praised the
efforts of the advisory commission in a public
ceremony and said that the political party statute
would soon be released because President Lanusse
intends to set 1 July as the date parties can begin
to organize.
The greatest potential threat to Lanusse in
carrying out his political plan is the armed forces.
In an effort to avoid any widespread dissent as
Lanusse's plan unfolds, a questionnaire covering
the same topics dealt with by the advisory com-
mission is being circulated among all generals and
admirals in the three armed services. The vast
majority of high-ranking officers generally favors
a military withdrawal from the government, and
it is hoped that soliciting their views will assure
their support of the specific means adopted. In
his annual speech to the armed forces on 29 May,
l_anusse said that he will accelerate the process of
national transformation, adding that the military
will guarantee the assumption of power to the
winner of the "free, clean elections."
Lanusse has received a remarkable degree of
cooperation from civilian politicians and labor
leaders thus far, and the cabinet reorganization
announced on 26 May may have been primarily
designed to appeal to these groups. The powerful
Ministry of Economy and Labor was dissolved
and will be replaced by four new ministries-
labor, finance, agriculture, and industry and com-
merce. Except for the Ministry of Industry and
Commerce, which remains vacant, the secretaries
serving in these posts under Economy Minister
Ferrer have been upgraded to cabinet ministers. A
separate Labor Ministry has been a demand of
labor for some time and the reorganization should
further improve Lanusse's image with the very
important labor sector. There is also speculation
that the ministers are only temporary and that
Lanusse may soon name representatives of fav-
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Venezuela-Colombia: More Danger Signals
Against a backdrop of renewed tension along
the border, Venezuelan and Colombian nego-
tiators are meeting in Rome this week to discuss
their dispute over the Gulf of Venezuela. The
chief Colombian delegate is not very optimistic
about the meeting; he has told US Embassy of-
ficials that he opposed starting the talks in the
first place. The composition of the Venezuelan
delegation suggests that Venezuela has decided to
downgrade the current meeting in Rome.
tempted to downplay the affair by asserting that
the helicopters had strayed into its territory and
that the B-25 had fired only warning shots.- 25X1
Venezuela is sensitive to Colombia s 'current cam-
paign against smuggling because it has increased
the cost of beef and raises the prospect of further
incidents.
Colombia has formally protested an incident
last week in which a Venezuelan B-25 violated
Colombian airspace and fired on two US heli-
copters that were on a surveying mission for the
Colombian Government. Venezuela has at-
With the two nations suspicious of each
other and in a state of preparedness, and with the
many opportunities for incidents, the possibility
of an unwanted and unplanne d armed clash can-
not be ruled out.
CQ,~,.4M~~P+
Attack on helicopters
y enezuelan B 25
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VENEZUELA
Colombian platoon sighted
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Chile: Mixing Economics and Politics
The Allende government's accelerated move-
ment on the domestic and international economic
fronts reflects the success that its political con-
siderations and operating modes have had in its
first seven months in power.
At home, increased interventions by the gov-
ernment of Chilean-owned businesses and farms
and the accompanying official announcements in-
dicate that the administration is ready to move
with more confidence toward the centralization
of planning and production. The first major in-
dustrial firms taken over were the large textile
factories owned by powerful but unpopular
Chileans of Arab extraction. These families are
also active in the banking business, which is now
more than 50 percent under government control.
The factories, which produce the bulk of the
country's textiles, were occupied by the workers
and taken over by the administration after only a
token price had been offered and refused by their
owners. The government calculated, and rightly
so, that few Chileans would sympathize with
these owners, who are considered economic
exploiters. The agriculture minister's recent an-
nouncement that the target of 1,000 farm ex-
propriations this year had been met by 1 June
also serves political aims. Most important of these
is the administration's determination to pre-empt
the role of the Movement of the Revolutionary
Left (MIR), which has been inciting land inva-
sions while blaming the government for moving
too slowly. On 29 May Allende attacked publicly
the MIR's violent tactics as foreign-inspired and
unacceptable.
The propaganda against US companies in
Chile is also politically adept. The nationalization
of the money-losing nitrate industry was hailed as
a recovery of natural wealth for Chile, and there
are daily attacks in the progovernment press
against the "swindles" of the large US copper
companies that are about to be completely na-
tionalized. The Ford Company, which recently
closed its plant, was accused in the government
paper of adopting a rebellious attitude toward
Chilean laws.
Chile is also vigorously exploring the possi-
bility of new international economic arrange-
ments. A Soviet mining delegation has already
arrived to assist in the expansion of copper pro-
duction. Foreign Minister Almeyda's current po-
litical trip to the Communist countries of Europe
is backed up by a high-level economic delegation
seeking aid for development projects. While in
Moscow, Almeyda, who was received by Premier
Kosygin, signed agreements that raised from $15
million to $55 million the unused Soviet credit
available to Chile for machinery and equipment.
This amount is in addition to $42 million for
industrial development projects that was also ex-
tended in 1967 but never drawn on. Part of this
project assistance will be used to build a lubri-
cants plant, a prefabricated housing construction
combine, and for a feasibility study of a fishing
port. The Allende government is more determined
to use these credits than its predecessor, which
originally negotiated them. Chile's intention to
seek development funds from CEMA is primarily
a propaganda gambit, but is also a significant
foreign policy initiative. It indicates that Allende
is going well beyond his professed nonaligned
policy in seeking special ties with Communist
European countries.
While Almeyda is scouting Eastern Europe,
the president of the Central Bank is heading a
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delegation to Western European countries in Allende is facing increasingly complicated
search of new sources of credit. economic problems at home
LIt would be consistent with his approach to
domestic political situations for him to hope to
arouse interest among non-Communist countries
by demonstrating the ease with which Chile can
approach the USSR and the countries of Eastern
Europe for coo eration.
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Trinidad-Tobago: The Dilemma of Victory
The People's National Movement (PNM)
party of Prime Minister Eric Williams captured all
36 lower house seats in the general election on 24
May, thus returning to power for the fourth con-
secutive time. In doing so, however, a constitu-
tional dilemma has developed.
The PNM won all 28 contested seats as well
as the eight uncontested ones, but mostly because
only minor opposition groups competed against
it. The major opposition party, the Action Com-
mittee of Dedicated Citizens/Democratic Labor
Party (ACDC/DLP), boycotted the election after
the government refused its demands to lower the
voting age to 18, to reform voter registration, and
to use ballot boxes instead of voting machines.
Machines were first used in Trinidad and Tobago
in the general elections in 1961 and have always
been regarded with suspicion by the opposition
parties. According to official returns, a record low
of 33.6 percent of the registered voters partici-
pated in the election. The poor turnout is a
serious setback for Williams and his party and has
raised doubts about the legitimacy of the new
government.
Trinidad-Tobago's parliament consists of an
upper house of 24 senators and a 36-man House
of Representatives. Under the constitution, the
governor-general appoints the opposition leader in
the House. That person in turn is allowed to
select four senators. Because the PNM won all the
seats in the election, Governor-General Sir
Solomon Hochoy has no one to appoint as op-
position leader. ACDC/DLP leader and former
Deputy Prime Minister A.N.R. Robinson, there-
fore, called for a declaration of a state of emer-
gency and for the appointment of an interim
government. Sir Hochoy suggested to Prime Min-
ister Williams that he try to form a high-level,
independent commission to study the problem
and suggest a solution to this constitutional
dilemma. The outgoing opposition leader in the
lower house was asked to name the four opposi-
tion senators, but he reportedly flatly refused on
moral and constitutional grounds. Although the
impasse may remain unresolved for some time,
the government probably will function whether
these four seats are filled or not, and the new
House of 36 PNM representatives will be seated
without opposition representation.
Williams' new cabinet, announced on 27
May, is composed primarily of old faces in new
ministries. A few younger PNM members have
been appointed, however, in keeping with
Williams' announced objective of bringing young
blood into the government while not breaking
continuity in the individual ministries. The most
significant aspect of the reshuffle was that
Williams relinquished a number of portfolios that
he himself had held.
Although Williams will probably solve the
political quandary brought on by his party's
crushing victory, he may do little to satisfy the
opposition's demands, which include calls for a
constitutional convention, a declaration of a state
of emergency, and a new election in one month,
Williams apparently intends to follow a firm but
cautious course for the immediate future. His
unrestrained legislative power, however, may
make it nearly impossible for him to reach an
accommodation with the opposition. As a result,
there is a real risk that he will ado t increasingly
repressive measures to control it.
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BRAZIL: The navy has begun enforcing the fish-
ing provisions of the country's 200-mile territorial
seas claim. According to US fishing industry
sources, on 1 June a US fishing boat operating 60
miles off the coast was boarded and the crew was
warned to leave the area or face a penalty of five
years in prison. Foreign Minister Gibson recently
said that strong public opinion in favor of the
200-mile claim, which was issued in March 1970,
obliged the government to enforce its regulations,
and that while it was ready to discuss with other
countries the possibility of their boatsbeing given
permission to fish within specified areas inside the
200-mile limit, the claim of sovereignty itself was
not negotiable.
The fishing provisions, set forth in April
1971, divide the claim into two zones. One ex-
tends 100 miles out from the coast, and the other
covers the second 100 miles. Only Brazilian ships
or foreign ships leased to Brazilian firms can
operate within the first zone, while other nations'
ships that pay a registration fee and an operation
tax will be allowed to fish in the outer zone. One
regulation, however, totally bans foreign firms
from fishing for crustaceans-mainly shrimp and
lobster-as part of its claim to all resources on the
ocean floor. This regulation apparently is de-
signed to force foreign firms to join with Brazilian
companies if they want to continue operating in
the area. Approximately 250-500 foreign boats,
about half of which are US-owned, work off
Brazil's northern coast. Some of the owners claim
that Brazil's regulations will make it impossible
for them to remain, and that this in turn will
adversely affect the economies of such countries
as Surinam and Trinidad and Tobago in which
they are based.
HONDURAS: On Sunday, Ramon E. Cruz will
be inaugurated as the country's first popularly
elected president since 1948. The 68-year-old
educator and diplomat will head a government
composed of members of the two major parties;
his first significant problem will be to weld these
two groups into an effective governing instru-
ment. This task will be all the more difficult
because General Lopez, the current President, is
likely to take an active interest in policy direc-
tions. Lopez is retiring from the presidency to a
position as chief of the armed forces and national
police, and his right-hand man, Ricardo Zuniga,
will remain in the new cabinet as minister of
government and justice.
In addition to domestic concerns, President
Cruz will also have to focus on foreign policy
issues soon after taking office. The other Central
American countries will probably make a con-
certed effort to persuade Cruz to resume par-
ticipation in the Central American Common
Market, and Cruz himself may wish to speed
bilateral negotiations with El Salvador before the
beginning in July of the Salvadoran election cam-
paign.
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