WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008800050001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 11, 1971
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2009/04/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08800050001-2
V "W Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
Secret
11 June 1971
No. 0374/71
Copy N2 0050
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CONTENTS
(Information as of noon EDT, 10 June 1971)
Page
Indochina: A New Threat in the North . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Cambodia: War on the Doorstep . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Laos: The Military Situation . . . . . . . 4
South Korea: Return of the Prodigal Son . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Communist China: Present, But Not All Accounted For . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION IN THE PHILIPPINES
Ceausescu Raises Soviet Hackles While in Peking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Yugoslav Party Moves to Control Decentralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
NATO After Lisbon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Local Elections to Test Italian Political Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Iceland: Parliamentary Election Outcome Cloudy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Israel-Egypt: Both Sides Still Far Apart on Suez Agreement . . . . . . . . . . 14
USSR-Egypt: Military Aid Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Jordan: The Noose Tightens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Libya: Money Isn't Everything . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Pakistan: Situation Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Tunisia-Italy: Seabed Boundary Dispute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Violence Becomes an Issue in Chile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Peru: Velasco's Downfall Widely Rumored . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Uruguay: The Government Leans Further to the Right . 22
NOTES: USSR - Outer Space; UN-USSR
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FAR EAST
Indochina: A New Threat in the North
North Vietnamese units in northernmost
Quang Tri Province kept up heavy shellings of
allied positions last week and also began a series
of ground attacks against isolated field positions.
Allied counterattacks and air strikes have report-
edly inflicted heavy casualties on the attackers.
Most of the ground attacks were directed at
South Vietnamese Marines participating in Lam
Son 810-a search-and-clear operation against en-
emy units operating in the central and western
sectors of the province.
more than 260 Communists were killed as against
government losses of 31 killed and 32 wounded.
Ground fighting has abated somewhat in the
central highlands, but the current respite will
probably last only as long as it takes for enemy
units to regroup for new attacks on South Viet-
namese artillery bases and other targets in western
Kontum and southern Pleiku Provinces.
The breach between Thieu and Ky is con-
tinuing to widen; they have begun to hurl accusa-
tions at each other in public, making it most
unlikely that either would consider renewing their
political marriage of convenience for the election.
Thieu has suggested that Ky resign the vice presi-
dency, but Ky rejected this, charging that the
President is a "tyrant" who relies on fraud,
threats, and pressure to gag the opposition.
President Thieu's tactics in persuading the
Lower House to pass the presidential election bill
last week have provoked considerable private
criticism in Saigon. The President's main objec-
tive-to ensure inclusion of a restrictive nomina-
tion clause in the bill-is widely viewed as an
effort to keep Vice President Ky out of the presi-
dential race. The clause requires candidates to be
endorsed by either 40 of the nearly 20C) National
Assembly members or 100 of the 550 members of
provincial councils. Several independent and pro-
government deputies have complained privately
that members of the government exerted heavy
pressure on them to vote for the bill. At least half
of the deputies are generally believed to have
accepted bribes from a presidential aide in ex-
change for their votes. One prominent deputy
claims that, although he was not offered any
money, he was warned that his campaign for
re-election in this summer's Lower House elec-
tions would suffer if he failed to vote for the
nomination clause.
In the past, similar controversies stirred up
by Thieu's methods of dealing with the National
Assembly have blown over fairly soon. Although
in this case Thieu's leading rivals for the presi-
dency may keep the matter in the spotlight for
some time, it seems likely that they will continue
to focus mainly on the contents of the election
bill rather than on Thieu's tactics in getting it
passed.
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The Vice President
hopes Minh, who seems certain to get the neces-
sary endorsement of Assembly members, will per-
suade provincial councillors sympathetic to him
to endorse Ky. Minh might be receptive to this
suggestion, realizing that his own chances would
be improved if Ky runs because the Vice Presi-
dent would draw support away from Thieu. Minh
might, however, have difficulty persuading pro-
vincial councillors to endorse Ky if Thieu ap-
peared to be the likely victor, as the councillors
might be reluctant to go on public record against
the President.
Opposition Deputy Released
The release of prominent opposition deputy
Ngo Cong Duc last week after four days of con-
finement will help calm the furor over his deten-
tion. Duc was released shortly after the Lower
House voted by a wide margin to order the exec-
utive branch to free him. As a result of the affair,
the government's image may have suffered in
Duc's home province in the Mekong Delta, where
many of the people apparently believe the dep-
uty's claim that the incident leading to his arrest
was part of a government plot to have him dis-
qualified as a candidate in this summer's Lower
House elections.
An article in the January-February issue of
an authoritative North Vietnamese party journal,
only recently available in Washington, contains
the clearest signs to date that a fundamental
change in Hanoi's war strategy took place around
the turn of the year. The article strongly suggests
that the Communists are now taking a different
approach on two basic issues: the relative priori- 25X1
ties to be attached to prosecuting the war and
developing the home front in North Vietnam; and
the kinds of military tactics that now are suitable
for Communist forces, especially in South Viet-
nam.
These questions have periodically been
topics of debate in North Vietnam as the nature
of the war has changed over the past decade.
Since 1968 the line has been that the war and the
home front have roughly equal priority and that a
long, drawn-out, low-key struggle is in prospect in
the South. The newly available article, on the
other hand, asserts categorically that the war is
North Vietnam's first order of business and that
intense, large-scale fighting involving conventional
forces is called for on the battle front.
On the first point, the article makes no at-
tempt to argue that a balance of some kind
should be maintained in the allocation of re-
sources to development at home and to the war
effort. In one remarkably candid passage illumi-
nating Hanoi's manpower mobilization effort of
the past few months, the article states: "As the
great rear area of the three theaters (Vietnam,
Laos, and Cambodia), North Vietnam has the
primary duty at the present time to seek to
mobilize manpower and material in order to meet
fully and promptly all the requirements of the
front line.... Irrespective of the situation, North
Vietnam must fully and promptly meet all re-
quirements for reinforcements for the various
theaters."
In discussing military tactics, the article
acknowledges that fighting a so-called protracted
war is basic Vietnamese Communist policy, but it
points out that "protracted fighting is not pro-
tracted guerrilla fighting"-i.e., that stand-up bat-
tles by conventional forces have an important
role. The article calls for "sudden leap-like
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developments" aimed at quickly changing the bal-
ance of forces, citing the Communist offensives of
1968 and the spring of 1965 as examples. And
just to make clear that the examples are ap-
plicable to today's war, the article asserts that the
"total defeat of the 'Vietnamization' of the
war...also involves large leaps to change the
balance of forces to the point where the enemy
will not be able to continue the war."
These ideas probably were formalized as
Communist policy at the party central commit-
tee's 19th plenary session held around the turn of
the year. Their appearance in a study journal
intended primarily for Communist cadre indicates
that they are part of the party line. More than
any other evidence available to date, the article
indicates that North Vietnam is bent on raising
the level of fighting in Indochina in the months
ahead, and that it is prepared to put much more
manpower into the war than has appeared in the
infiltration network so far this year.
Cambodia: War on the Doorstep
During the week Communist forces con-
tinued to offer strong opposition to government
efforts to dislodge them from an area just 15
miles northeast of Phnom Penh. In some of the
sharpest action in recent months, the enemy at-
tacked and broke up a Cambodian Army task
force that was attempting to reach two embattled
government positions east of the Mekong River.
The task force, which consisted primarily of
elite Khmer Krom units, was trapped by the en-
emy on 8 June after it moved out of the village of
Vihear Suor and headed east toward one of the
isolated positions at Kompong Chamlang. The
Communists first brought the eight-battalion
column to a halt by attacking it with intense
small-arms fire, and then followed up with a con-
centrated mortar and rocket barrage. Although
the task force was thrown into temporary disar-
ray, most of its elements managed to fight their
way through encircling enemy troops and return
to Vihear Suor. Preliminary casualty reports in-
dicated that 26 government soldiers were killed
and another 166 wounded. Communist losses re-
portedly totaled at least 85 killed.
Although the Communists' objectives in
holding this area are not yet clear, they may be
trying to provide a screen for an infiltration route
from the north that conceivably could be used
once the area between the Mekong and Prey Veng
town becomes inundated. Whatever the case, the
Kompong
Chamlang
PHNOM PENH Suor
uor
'Prey Veng
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government evidently is determined to keep
trying to clear this area once its forces there have
been regrouped and reinforced.
Phnom Penh also suffered through another
petroleum crisis during the week. Reserve stocks
of diesel fuel for vehicles and for the city's indus-
trial plants were exhausted, forcing a number of
the latter to shut down while one of the capital's
two power plants was running dangerously low on
fuel. The anticipated arrival of another petroleum
convoy up the Mekong was expected to improve
the situation, but only temporarily, because the
government has persistently mismanaged such de-
liveries.
Government hold location
Communist-hold location
Assembly. The president of that body informed
the government that the Assembly will dissolve
itself if the recent increase in the cost of gasoline
is not rescinded. A majority of the assemblymen
reportedly are opposed to the new price because
it imposes a heavy burden on the poorer segments
of society, and because they believe the govern-
ment acted unconstitutionally in raising the price
without consulting the National Assembly.
In responding to the Assembly's demand,
the minister of finance stated that a combination
of transportation difficulties and the requirement
for additional government revenue had neces-
sitated the price rise and, therefore, its revocation
would be "economically disastrous." He also indi-
cated, however, that he was asking the minister of
commerce to work directly with the Assembly in
order to find a mutually satisfactory solution to
the question of prices in general. This conciliatory
response evidently placated the aroused deputies,
who viewed it as a sign that the government is
willing to consult with them before initiating sim-
ilar policy changes in the future.
Laos: The Military Situation
After several weeks of relative inactivity in
the Luang Prabang area, North Vietnamese forces
on 6 June overran government high-ground posi-
tions at Phou Som Poi and Phou Pane, about 18
miles northeast of the royal capital. Elements of
the two battalions of government irregulars in-
volved are now regrouping, and so far report
casualties of 10 killed, 25 wounded, and 100
missing. Some Lao political and military officials
have warned that the rapid return to their home
military regions by Lao Army and irregular units
that had been defending Luang Prabang has left
some gaps in the city's defensive perimeter.
Smaller government units are being moved into
key positions, however, and no major new Com-
munist thrust toward Luang Prabang seems in
prospect.
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The fuel shortage has raised both the price
gasoline and the temperature in the National
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The Communists kept up their shelling at-
tacks and small-unit probes around the irregular
base at Bouam Long, north of the Plaine des
Jarres. Only limited casualties resulted, however,
and no important positions have fallen to the
Communists. On the southern edge of the Plaine,
three battalions of irregulars so far have encoun-
tered little enemy resistance to their sweep opera-
tion northeastward from Khang Kho.
The tempo of the war slowed somewhat in
southern Laos. No new Communist attacks de-
veloped in the Route 9 area of the western pan-
handle. The only major action on the Bolovens
Plateau occurred on 3 June when a North Viet-
namese battalion attacked an irregular command
post five miles east of Paksong. Government
losses were high-27 killed, 59 wounded, and 64
missing-but the irregulars have regrouped and
have reported little further enemy contact.
South Korea: Return of the Prodigal Son
Last week Pak Chong-hui appointed Kim
Chong-pil prime minister, marking the full return
to public life of one of South Korea's most dy-
namic and controversial politicians. As chief arch-
itect of the near-bloodless coup that elevated Pak
to power in 1961 and as founder of the govern-
ment party, Kim was at the center of much of the
factional strife that characterized the regime's
early years. As head of the Korean CIA, he built a
personal empire that made him both feared and
powerful. In 1968, Kim was forced to the politi-
cal sidelines when his own presidential ambitions
almost brought him into open conflict with Pak.
Kim's gradual re-emergence as a political force has
been strongly resisted by his factional opponents,
who have benefited from his political eclipse.
Kim's appointment appears to be a reward
for his strong efforts on behalf of Pak and the
government slate in the recent general elections.
Kim's political rehabilitation was also helped by
the fact that he has long been personally close to
the President and is married to Pak's favorite
niece.
Kim undoubtedly will seek to use the
premiership to strengthen his claim to be Pak's
political heir, but his room for maneuver will
depend almost entirely on the President. Al-
though Kim has considerable political appeal in
his own right, control of the new administration
remains firmly in the hands of Pak. Kim's cause
could be helped by additional changes Pak may
make among his top lieutenants. At present, the
government party machinery is in the hands of
Kim's enemies, but they are under fire from the
party rank and file because of the party's rela-
tively poor showing in the recent National As-
sembly elections. Pak's selection of officers to
head the new Assembly could also affect Kim's
political prospects.
Other cabinet changes announced along with
Kim's appointment were largely routine and pri-
marily designed to start Pak's third term with a
fresh image. The new foreign minister, Kim
Yong-sik, is an experienced diplomat who briefly
held the same position in 1963. Significantly, Pak
retained the key economic ministers, including
the deputy prime minister, who has over-all re-
sponsibility for economic planning. The incum-
bents are identified with Pak's successful eco-
nomic policies, the continuation of which he
claimed depended on his re-election. 25X1
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Communist China: Present, But Not All Accounted For
Two long-absent politburo members-Kang
Sheng and Hsieh Fu-chih-suddenly resurfaced
last week during Romanian party chief
Ceausescu's visit to Peking. Their absence almost
certainly was due to political troubles, but it is
not yet clear that either man has regained his
previous stature or that the jockeying for position
within China's uneasy ruling coalition has ended.
Indeed, the press treatment accorded the brief
reappearance of both men, who appear to repre-
sent opposite ends of the political spectrum on
the politburo, seemed an unusually contrived at-
tempt by their supporters to demonstrate that
neither side has permanently lost ground in the
complex behind-the-scenes struggle in Peking be-
tween ultraleftists and putative moderate leaders.
The actual power of both Kang and Hsieh has
diminished considerably over the past year and it
is possible that neither man has won full political
rehabilitation. In any case, continued rumors that
Chen Po-ta-Mao's long-time secretary and
China's fourth ranked politburo member-has
been purged, the conspicuous absence last week
of some other key figures associated with the
ultraleftist or more conservative forces, and nu-
merous reports of crackdowns on extremist ele-
ments all suggest that a number of crosscurrents
are roiling the waters in Peking.
Kang Sheng, who ranks fifth in the party
hierarchy and who was a leading figure on the
extremist side during the Cultural Revolution,
was present at a major reception for Ceausescu on
3 June attended by Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao.
Kang was listed in his customary place among the
regime's top leaders, indicating that he formally
retains his position on the elite politburo standing
committee. Nevertheless, he failed to participate
in substantive talks with the Romanians and did
not appear with his colleagues at subsequent re??
ceptions.
Also on 3 June, but well after the report
that Kang had reappeared, the Chinese press re-
leased a remarkable article featuring the call made
later that day on the Romanian delegation by
Hsieh Fu-chih, his first recorded public appear-
ance in over a year. The article accorded Hsieh all
his usual titles, except that of public security
minister, and by simply noting that other digni-
taries such as Chou En-lai and Madame Mao were
also "present on the occasion" gave what
amounted to extraordinary billing for Hsieh. Be-
cause Hsieh's visit had the appearance of having
been hastily contrived and Kang's re-emergence
was clearly ceremonial in nature, the whole exer-
cise had the effect of projecting both men as rep-
resentatives of opposing forces within the elite
rather than as powerful figures in their own right.
Despite his impressive list of party and govern-
mental positions, for example, Hsieh does not
appear to be actually performing any of his varied
duties at present.
In a broad sense, much of the maneuvering
within the politburo since it was formed two
years ago has stemmed from the efforts of ultra-
leftist ideologues long close to Mao to strengthen
their political positions in the face of countervail-
ing moderate pressures. In recent months the po-
litical seesaw in Peking has appeared to tip in
favor of the moderates, and a concerted effort
appears to have been made to thrust one ultraleft-
ist leader, Chen Po-ta, to the political sidelines.
Similar efforts have been made since last fall to
circumscribe the authority of his colleague Kang
Sheng, but he now appears to have gained some
sort of reprieve which may be intended by Mao
himself to demonstrate that the political seesaw
has been tipping too far and that the voices of the
left in regime councils are not to be completely
silenced.
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In any event, Peking's failure to account for is still shifting rightward or is again in uneasy
Kang's temporary eclipse and its curious handling equilibrium may not be apparent until the leader-
of the question of Hsieh Fu-chih's political status ship again turns out during the celebration of the
attest to the fluidity within the present leader- Chinese Communist party's fiftieth anniversary
PHILIPPINES: The proceedings to date of the
recently convened constitutional convention are
discouraging to the many Filipinos who had
looked on it as a promising vehicle for reform of
the Philippine political process. The' decision to
conduct the vote for convention officers by secret
ballot has been bitterly attacked on grounds that
the electorate is entitled to know how its dele-
gates vote. The secrecy is undoubtedly a smokes-
creen for the immense amount of vote buying and
chicanery that has been going on in the ostensibly
nonpartisan assemblage. The Marcoses have been
busily buying delegates, despite their efforts to
appear uninvolved.
EUROPE
Ceausescu Raises Soviet Hackles While in Peking
Tensions in Soviet-Romanian relations have
surfaced again in the past ten days as a result of
Romanian leader Ceausescu's nine-day official
visit to Peking. Given a tumultuous reception
there by Premier Chou En-lai and other Chinese
luminaries, Ceausescu later met with Chairman
Mao prior to embarking on an unprecedented
tour of south China escorted by Chou.
The warmth of the Chinese leg of
Ceausescu's trip to the Far East-later stops will
be Pyongyang, Hanoi, and Ulan Bator-was evi-
dent in statements by Chinese leaders and articles
in the Chinese press. The communique issued on
the Romanian's departure followed predictable
lines in restating Peking's and Bucharest's favorite
and often self-serving formulas, albeit in low key.
The communique's omission of extreme Chinese
formulations on ideological and foreign policy
issues underscored Ceausescu's insistence on
maintaining a balanced and independent posture.
Meanwhile, political winds from Moscow ob-
viously were intended to cast a chill over the visit.
Already nervous over China's "ping pong diplo-
macy" and other moves to improve Sino-US rela-
tions, Radio Moscow and the Soviet army news-
paper, Red Star, came down hard on Ceausescu's
trip even as the Romanian delegation was en
route to Peking. Moscow used a Romanian-
language broadcast to remind Bucharest pointedly
of the harm China has done to socialist unity, and
one Moscow commentator even cited the Soviet-
Romanian treaty of July 1970 and the Warsaw
Pact charter to stress the importance that socialist
countries attach to "coordinating their foreign
and domestic policies."
The Romanians recognized from the outset
that Ceausescu's trip would antagonize Moscow
but they apparently are not overly concerned.
Moscow's expected lectures will thus be noted
with equanimity. Ceausescu's statements in China
welcoming closer ties with Peking make clear to
all concerned that Bucharest intends to maintain
and even flaunt in the Communist and non-Com-
munist worlds its unique freedom of ma-
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_MW ~ NEW,
USSR - OUTER SPACE: The Soviets this week
asked that their draft treaty on peaceful utiliza-
tion of the moon be placed on the agenda of the
fall session of the UN General Assembly. The text
appears to cover much the same ground as the
1966 Outer Space Treaty, with no substantive
departures from the phraseology of that docu-
ment. Moscow for some time has balked at com-
Yugoslav Party
The search for national unity, the main
theme of the 18th session of the party presidium
last week, was spurred on by recommendations
that party and defense organs take the lead in
making this a reality. To ensure that the planned
government decentralization does not weaken the
federation, the presidium proposed increased
party assertiveness in safeguarding federal inter-
ests and more extensive popular involvement in
national defense.
Presidium chairman Veljko Vlahovic's tough
keynote speech to the 52-member body charged
that "uncontrolled spontaneous development" in
society had gone far enough and that the party
itself was guilty of "unprincipled compromises,"
defensiveness, and passivity, all of which con-
tributed to the recent political crisis. Vlahovic
referred to the presidium's previous session in late
April at Brioni, which dealt behind closed doors
with disturbing nationalist tendencies. He con-
cluded that the party must assert its proper role
of controlling the pace and scope of the govern-
mental reorganization.
Vlahovic indicated that the top party leader-
ship is to be restructured, in keeping with Tito's
reform plans. Vlahovic stressed that the party
presidium would become the "center" of all
major political, social, and economic decision-
making. The 15-member executive bureau would
then be charged with implementing the pre-
sidium's decisions.
tion on any issue it chooses.
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pletion of the space liability convention, not
wishing to accept binding arbitration as the ulti-
mate recourse in disputes over damage caused by
errant space vehicles. It may hope by introducing
the draft moon treaty to divert attention from
the convention, now being considered b a UN
subcommittee in Geneva.
C
Moves to Control Decentralization
He also urged the party to tighten its unity
with the workers and excoriated party members'
participation in unseemly "market-place-type dis-
cussions" and "bourgeois-chauvinist confronta-
tions." Vlahovic pointed out that the recent self-
managers' conference had shown the workers to
be considerably ahead of the party in advocating
new social programs, and he ordered closer identi-
fication by the party with the self-managers'
goals.
Tito probably intends the extended all-
people's defense program to become part of a
regular, comprehensive defense system that would
reinforce the Yugoslavs' strong inclination to rally
in the face of external danger. At the same time,
the defense system's permeation of the very roots
of society would give the party leadership an
important direct channel for mobilizing the na-
The general thrust of the numerous decisions
reached on defense policy is to create a closer
working relationship between the army, the terri-
torial defense (paramilitary) organs, and the
population at large. An innovation in defense
planning was surfaced in the presidium's an-
nounced intention to supplement conventional
and guerrilla defense plans with a scheme for
"unarmed struggle," probably passive resistance
similar to that employed by the Czechoslovaks
during the Warsaw Pact invasion in 1968.
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oLt, n r, t #?
NATO After Lisbon
The discussions of the foreign ministers last
week reflected the different views within the Al-
liance on how to promote detente while pre-
serving Western security. The European allies
were cautious about exploring Soviet overtures on
mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR),
but at the same time they were prepared to ac-
knowledge progress in the Berlin talks and to
soften the tone of NATO's insistence on a Berlin
agreement before beginning multilateral prepara-
tions for a Conference on European Security
(CES).
The procedures approved by the allies for
initially probing Soviet attitudes on MBFR-con-
tinued bilateral explorations followed by a meet-
ing of the NATO deputy foreign ministers-were
those advocated by the US. The idea of even-
tually appointing an emissary or emissaries from
the Alliance to prepare for MBFR negotiations
was adopted at Canadian urging. Although the
European allies, except France, were willing to go
as far as the combined US-Canadian approach,
they remain suspicious of Soviet intentions. The
West Germans, for example, are probably still
concerned despite recent public expressions to
the contrary, that early multilateral talks on force
reductions would undercut Western leverage in
the Berlin talks.
Paris did not associate itself with the MBFR
decisions, but its urging of allied caution on
MBFR has brought it closer to involvement in
NATO consideration of force reductions than at
any time in the last two years. The French say
they are concerned-as are the British and some
other allies-that force reductions on terms ac-
ceptable to the Soviets would weaken West Euro-
pean security. Foreign Minister Schumann has
emphasized that Moscow may hope through
Local Elections to Test Italian Political Trends
Much of the campaigning for the off-year have impact. Party leaders will analyze the out-
elections of 13-14 June is being waged on na- come for clues to the popular evaluation of their
tional issues, although local questions will also political activities since the last election. These
SECRET
MBFR negotiations to win concessions on for-
ward based nuclear-capable systems in Western
Europe that they have not been able to get in
SALT.
Schumann exhorted his European colleagues
at the ministerial to face up to the prospect of
reductions of US troops by increasing national
defense efforts instead of hoping for MBFR. The
inclination, however, of many of the European
allies-including the French-will be to seek in-
creased security in the context of a broader de-
tente instead of through domestically difficult
increases in their defense budgets. This inclination
translates into considerable latent support for an
eventual CES, which, in spite of its standing as a
Soviet proposal, is considered by many of the
allies of potential advantage to the West. This
attitude was reflected in the desire of most of the
allies to modify the wording of the Berlin-CES
linkage to make it less offensive to the Soviets.
Early commentaries by the Soviets on the
NATO meeting attributed what they called the
"purposely vague expressions" of the NATO com-
munique to disagreement among the allies. The
Soviets' own position on the relationship between
MBFR and CES has hardly been a model of
clarity. In a flurry of visits to Western capitals
before the NATO meeting, Soviet diplomats, in-
cluding Deputy Foreign Minister Tsarapkin, cre-
ated confusion with their vague presentations on
the timing of MBFR talks relative to a CES and
on the question of whether force reduction talks
could deal with foreign or indigenous forces, or
both. It is, indeed, uncertain how far Moscow's
own planning has progressed. According to Ro-
manian Deputy Foreign Minister Gliga, there has
been no Warsaw Pact stu y of MBFR.
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VL tIitL 1
signs may provoke either the retention of or
changes in the coalition government of Prime
Minister Emilio Colombo, which now includes
Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Social
Democrats.
Immediately before recessing for the elec-
tions, the government stepped up parliamentary
activity on social. and economic reforms to en-
hance its parties' prospects in the contest, which
will renew the regional assembly of Sicily, the
provincial councils of Rome and Foggia, and 158
municipal councils. Three major reforms on
which progress was made concern housing, the
universities, and taxes.
The Christian Democrats are on the defen-
sive in the election campaigns, particularly in
Sicily, Genoa, and Rome. In these areas they face
voter reaction against poor administration, un-
satisfactory economic conditions, and several re-
cent spectacular crimes. They are running scared
but are maintaining their usual electoral unity,
and are warning that neo-Fascist gains would
ultimately help the Communists. Both the Social-
ists and the Social Democrats are emphasizing the
need for reforms, but the latter are more strongly
opposed to legislative cooperation with the Com-
munists for this purpose.
The neo-Fascists of the Italian Social Move-
ment (MSI) are campaigning more aggressively,
confidently, and expensively than in the past,
appealing to conservatives' fears of a leftward
drift, as well as to growing popular nostalgia for a
more ordered society. The MSI, which polled five
percent in nationwide elections last year, is ex-
pected to improve its position, taking votes at
least from the right-wing Liberals and Monarchists
and perhaps from the government parties as well.
The Italian Communist Party (PCI) is also
emphasizing law and order and devoting particu-
lar attention to Sicily, where it has strengthened
its forces with 48 activists sent from the mainland
for propaganda and organizational work. In the
last Sicilian election in 1967, the Communist vote
Only most important of 156
municipal elections shown
ITALIAN ELECTIONS
June 13-14
dropped from 24 to 21 percent, but the Proletar-
ian Socialists, then newly organized and sup-
ported by Moscow, more than made up for the
difference by polling five percent. This year the
two parties are running together in a number of
contests, and the Communists are likely to show
an improved standing.
The Colombo government has been in power
for ten months, a relatively long time for Italian
governments in recent years. In each of the past
three years, moreover, a serious cabinet crisis has
occurred in June or July. The government may
nevertheless hope that political maneuvering
linked to the presidential election next December
will help it to survive if the voting indicates no
major shift against the coalition parties in this
month's elections.
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Iceland: Parliamentary Election Outcome Cloudy
After a two-month-long, dull and desultory
campaign, Icelanders go to the polls on 13 June
to elect a new parliament. Confronted with the
largest electorate on record because the voting age
was lowered from 21 to 20 and with increasing
fragmentation at the left end of the political
spectrum, Icelandic politicians are reluctant to
predict the outcome of the election.
The present coalition, consisting of the con-
servative Independence Party and the Social Dem-
ocrats,. has been in power since 1959 and bears
the onus for the nation's record of sustained
economic maladjustment, marked by rapid infla-
tion and repeated devaluations of the krona. At
the same time, the country's principal economic
asset-its herring fisheries-went from boom to
bust between :1965 and 1970, and Iceland has had
to readjust its fish processing and marketing to
turn a. profit from other varieties of fish, such as
cod and capelin.
Intensive overfishing by British, German,
and East European fleets has been blamed for the
disappearance of the herring from its traditional
grounds off Iceland. To protect the nation's mari-
time resources, all parties agree that Iceland's
fishing limits should be considerably extended
from their present 12-mile line, but the govern-
ment and opposition are sharply divided as to
how far and how fast to extend them. The gov-
ernment's proposal, adopted on the eve of parlia-
ment's dissolution and the opening of the cam-
paign, calls for the appointment of a committee
to draft legislation setting a 50-mile fisheries
limit, but it does not commit itself to any time-
table. The defeated opposition proposal called for
the unilateral establishment of a 50-mile fisheries
limit and a 100-mile antipollution zone by 1
September 1972.
While presiding over the transformation of
the nation's fisheries, the government has begun
to take timid steps toward diversifying Iceland's
economic base. Despite opposition cries that it is
promoting pollution and a foreign economic
take-over, the coalition has encouraged new in-
dustries financed by outside capital and based on
Iceland's abundant power resources. After many
years of hesitation, the government also finally
brought the country into the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA) in 1970. The subse-
quent efforts of major EFTA members to obtain
membership in the European Communities (EC)
has been greeted with malicious satisfaction by
the opposition, especially as the government has
been obliged to begin treating with the EC with-
out evidence to present to the xenophobic public
that the decision to enter EFTA was a wise one.
All but ignored in the campaign have been
Iceland's foreign policy, its membership in
NATO, and the continuance of the US-Iceland
Defense Agreement, with its provision for the
presence of 3,000 alien forces, with 2,000 de-
pendents, sitting on the doorstep of the capital
and controlling the country's only international
air gateway. Only the Communist-dominated
People's Alliance has raised these issues, and then
just for the record.
Parliamentary
Elections, 1967
Municipal
Elections, 1969
Independence Party
% of vote
37.5
Seats
23
% of vote
41.8
Progressive Party
28.1
18
19.4
Social Democratic Party
15.7
9
13.4
Liberal Left Party
3.7
2
6.2
People's Alliance
13.9
8
14.3
Other
1.1
4.9
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The situation within the respective political
parties presents no key to the outcome of the
election. The Independence Party and the agrar-
ian Progressive Party have only recently patched
up a number of internal disputes, and neither
group's leaders have the full confidence of their
rank and file. On the left, the emergence of the
Liberal Left Party, after a long gestation, has
drawn off support from both the Social Demo-
crats and the People's Alliance. Numerous inter-
nal splits in the new party in the course of the
campaign, however, have placed its viability in
question. At the same time, a small group of
Moscow-oriented Icelandic Communists, unhappy
with the 1968 amalgamation of its party with the
People's Alliance, has banded together in the
Reykjavik Socialist Society and announced its
refusal to support People's Alliance candidates.
Between the People's Alliance and the Reykjavik
Socialist Society stands the Brigade, a group
based on a one-time Communist youth organi-
zation, which is offering its support to the
People's Alliance on a candidate-by-candidate
basis. Ideologically unclassifiable is the newly
created Candidature Party, a youth group whose
sole program is protest, yet its few candidates
could take enough votes from the established
parties to upset close contests.
With only a two-seat majority in parliament
and facing the prospect that they will lose just
enough to push them out of power, the two
parties in the governing coalition are looking for
suitable partners to broaden their parliamentary
base. The most likely candidate is the Liberal Left
Party, if it can survive the elections with at least a
few seats and its internal organization intact. If
this alternative fails and the coalition parties lose
their majority, there is some sentiment among
members in the Independence Party to dump
their long-time Social Democratic partners and
replace them with the conservatives' old adver-
saries, the Progressive Party. I
UN-USSR: Secretary General Thant will meet
with Soviet officials in Moscow on 23-24 June
during a lengthy trip that will include stops in
Ethiopia, Mongolia, Poland, and Geneva-the site
of the UN's European headquarters. The Soviet
Union is believed still to favor another term for
Thant and probably will seek to dissuade him
from his oft-repeated intention not to serve again.
Thant's latest statement-delivered at a press
conference on 3 June-was a bit more categorical
than previous ones in that he expressed doubt
that an impasse over the succession would de-
velop and, for the first time, indicated he would
return to Burma upon retirement.
There has been a considerable proliferation
of candidacies, announced and unannounced, in
recent weeks, and this trend is likely to continue
given the rising presumption that Thant may not
be available. Helsinki is pushing hard for its UN
delegate, Max Jakobson, despite supposed Arab
opposition based on his Jewish background. The
Finn's supporters claim that their soundings have
uncovered no firm Arab osition.
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O.L1vlL.._,1
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Israel-Egypt: Both Sides Still Far Apart on Suez Agreement
Policy statements this week in both Israel
and Egypt detailed the large areas of disagreement
that stand in the way of any interim agreement
on the opening of the Suez Canal.
In a major foreign policy speech to the
Knesset on 9 June, Prime Minister Golda Meir
reiterated Israel's basic terms for an interim Mid-
dle East accord that would include the reopening
of the Suez Canal. Mrs. Meir listed nine condi-
tions that her government is demanding:
Israel with new weapons, especially aircraft, to
rectify what she termed the unequal arms balance
caused by Soviet supplies to Egypt.
In a speech on 8 June to troops along the
Suez Canal, Egyptian President Sadat renewed his
offer of 4 February to open the canal "if the
Israelis are ready to withdraw in the first stage as
part of the total withdrawal." Sadat listed three
conditions for Egyptian agreement to an interim
accord on the clearing of the canal:
-fighting on the canal must not be renewed;
-Egypt must clear and operate the waterway;
-free passage must be assured for all shipping, includ-
ing Israeli vessels;
-no Egyptian or other armies can cross the canal;
-effective and agreed supervision procedures must be
provided for the agreement;
-there must be adequate means to deter any viola-
tions;
-the evacuation of Israeli forces from the canal would
not lead to a further withdrawal before a final peace;
-the new line held by Israeli forces would not be
considered the permanent boundary;
-a permanent boundary would be determined in a
peace treaty.
The Israeli prime minister commented that
the prospects for reopening the canal have suf-
fered as a result of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty and
recent pronouncements by Egyptian President
Sadat. She also appealed to the US to supply
-Egyptian forces .must be allowed to cross to the East
Bank;
-the cease-fire would be limited to six months; if a
final settlement is not reached and total withdrawal
not achieved in that time, Egyptian forces would
have the right to complete the liberation of their
territory;
-Cairo would not concede any territory, either
through "lease" or through bargaining; the Egyp-
tians consider the border the recognized interna-
tional boundary with Palestine.
Addressing himself to the US, Sadat said, "If
the US supports Israel in the occupation of our
land, I will treat the US as Israel's partner." In an
obvious appeal for greater US pressure on Israel,
Sadat noted that the US had not yet defined its
final stand and had asked for more time. He said
that he was giving the US this time but that if it
were not used appropriately, "then we will wage
the battle." 25X1
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USSR-Egypt: Military Aid Relations
President Anwar Sadat's recent remarks on
the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation suggest that military aid agreements
between the two countries are likely to revert to
longer term commitments emphasizing a balanced
approach in building Egyptian forces into a self-
reliant organization.
Sadat's objective appears to be to create a
well-trained Egyptian armed force capable of
repelling an Israeli attack and over the longer
term to develop an offensive capability. At the
same time he appears to desire a lessening of the
current level of dependence on Soviet military
forces in Egypt.
Such long-term goals, if they are to be real-
ized, would shift the focus of the Soviet military
aid program. Since the June 1967 war there has
been a patchwork of pacts to re-equip and train
the Egyptians on materiel similar to that lost in
the war and to meet immediate threats from
Israel. There appears to have been little attention
paid to planning for an independent Egyptian
military establishment that could, for example,
assume those control functions in the hands of
the USSR since 1970. Such a goal was implicit in
the extensive preparations for arms agreements
prior to mid-1967. Negotiations along those lines
Jordan: The Noose Tightens
The army is closing in its cordon around the
remaining fedayeen enclaves in the north. Various
incidents, usually involving artillery fire against
fedayeen positions, have occurred daily since 29
May. In the Ajlun area, the army controls most of
the commanding heights and has concentrated a
number of artillery and armored units around the
town. As many as 18 armored, mechanized, and
infantry battalions are positioned on the fringes
of the wooded commando redoubt between
Jarash and Ajlun. Army and militia units control
were under way when hostilities broke out in
June of that year, but have never been resumed.
Future agreements probably will encompass
training in Egypt on the more modern types of
equipment received since early 1970. Progression
to later models probably also will be sought, such
as the replacement of the MIG-21 jet interceptor
by the swing-wing Flogger, which Moscow appar-
ently is producing for export.
A major effort over the next several years
will be to raise the technical ability of Egyptian
forces to use increasingly sophisticated Soviet
materiel effectively. Egyptian forces over the next
several years probably will take control of a ma-
jority of the SA-3 surface-to-air missiles, the
ZSU-23/4 self-propelled antiaircraft artillery, and
a variety of electronic detection, jamming, and
communications equipment now manned by the
USSR. The Soviets are likely to maintain control
of the advanced equipment of special importance
to them, such as the SA-6 surface-to-air missile
system and the new supersonic jet interceptors
that arrived early this year in Egypt. The presence
of Soviet military units in Egypt is assured for
some years to come to protect vital Soviet instal-
all the towns in the area, additional checkpoints
have been set up to restrict fedayeen movement,
and armored units have been drawn up above two
of the refugee camps. After a siege of several
days, troops entered the Gaza refugee camp on
the afternoon of 7 June and searched its inhab-
itants.
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spite- the army is more
likely to reduce fedayeen strongholds gradually in
a series of limited attacks than to launch an
all-out offensive-thus hopefully muting the out-
cries of "massacre" that can be expected from all
quarters of the Arab world.
The Syrians, too, claim to be coop-
era ing; ey have apparently moved army units
L
In the into the border area, reassuring the Jordanian
meantime, the government is negotiating with the Government that the concentration is intended
fedayeen in an effort to reduce their area of solely to control fedayeen activity.
activity.
Jordanian Army Constricting Fedayeen Enclaves
Tel Aviv-
Yafo
ISRAEL
t
U
7si Division Jordanian
Army units
W fedayeen
concentration Mafraq.
Ajlun~ om.-Suf refugee camp
__Gaza refugee camp
2nd Division Jarash
DA
?Karamah
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Libya: Money Isn't Everything
The tremendous profits from oil have not
yet enabled Libya to deal with its major domestic
problems, despite the fact that its per capita in-
come is higher than Israel's. Inadequate health
facilities and a lack of modern housing have yet
to be tackled, and Premier Qadhafi himself
stressed in a recent speech that quick solutions to
these problems cannot be expected. Complicating
the problem of social reform are poor government
planning and the inability of the revolutionary
regime to retain the services of experienced
Libyan civil servants.
The premier aired some startling statistics
about social conditions even as he promised new
hospitals and housing. He noted that 35,000
Libyans suffering from tuberculosis are walking
the streets and that others are afflicted with
scores of endemic diseases for which they are
unable to obtain any medical treatment. "How
can we run tens of hospitals with only 47 doc-
tors?" Qadhafi asked, pointing out that even
nurses are lacking. Plans for an improvement of
health facilities appear to be moving ahead
slowly; the health minister stated that bids had
been let for two 1,000-bed hospitals, one of
which will serve as the nucleus for a medical
school. Staffing arrangements-the crux of the
problem-were not spelled out.
Qadhafi also scored the lack of housing, not-
ing that Libya was a nation "living in huts or old
houses," with some 35,000 persons completely
homeless. He noted that the country lacked con-
tractors who could build houses or pave roads.
The government must build 10,000 houses annu-
ally for the next five or six years, he said, in order
to demonstrate the "greatness" of the revolution.
In 1969, the new government inherited three
major sources of skilled labor from the royal
regime: former Italian colonists, largely expatriate
oil workers, and a rudimentary civil service that
had attracted the bulk of Libya's few literate
citizens. The Italians were expelled en masse last
summer and the number of foreign oil workers
has been reduced by nationalistic pressures.
As for the civil service, poor administration
by the army officers who took power after the
revolution has been gradually driving officials into
early retirement and causing widespread discon-
tent among those who remain. The government,
feeling the pinch, has even sought to re-enlist
former civil servants whom it forced out after the
revolution, but it has had little success thus far.
The result is that an even heavier workload must
be borne by the government workers who are
sticking it out.
The Libyan police have become particularly
discontented over the treatment they have re-
ceived. As professionals, they resent the lack of
trust shown them because of their pre-revolution
service, and they are bitter about playing second
fiddle to a generally inept army in terms of equip-
ment and pay. An earlier government attempt to
retire them has recently been reversed because of
an urgent need to retain their services, but moves
to win them over seem to have failed.
As a result of these various basic problems,
the young Libyan leaders will soon be faced with
a decision on whether to use Libya's vast funds to
employ foreign personnel in needed domestic re-
forms or to hew to their xenophobic policy of
wasting money on unrealizable projects.
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Pakistan: Situation Report
Refugees from East Pakistan continue to
swarm into India, only to be confronted by sick-
ness-especially cholera-and hunger. The Indian
Government estimates that the refugees now
number more than five million, and health offi-
cials indicate that the death toll from cholera and
other diseases is probably well over 5,000. Mos-
cow has joined India in calling for urgent meas-
ures to end the flow of refugees, including greater
efforts to create conditions of security in East
Pakistan so refugees would be willing to return.
Indian relief facilities have been severely
overtaxed by the refugees who, according to some
estimates, are arriving at a rate of about 100,000
per day. The land used for refugee camps is lo-
cated mostly in low-lying areas. These sites are
now subject to monsoon flooding, and cholera,
which is largely confined to refugee areas, could
spread. The local economy in border areas is also
suffering, as prices have risen while wages for
unskilled labor, normally not much above the
subsistence level, have plunged dramatically. Al-
though Islamabad recently agreed to set up camps
on the East Pakistani side of the border to receive
returning refugees, no facilities have yet been
constructed.
International relief is being coordinated by
the UN High Commission for Refugees. Pledges of
money and relief supplies including $17.5 million
from the US have been received from a host of
countries. The US, as well as the USSR, is prepar-
ing to assist in the massive movement of refugees
to less populated areas. In a special effort to
control cholera, vaccines and rehydration fluids
are to be airlifted to India for at least the next
eight to ten weeks. India can provide foodgrains
for the refugees from its foodgrain stockpile, but
it already is critically short of dry milk, oil, and
pulses. Moreover, any foodgrains diverted from
India's stockpile of about 5.8 million tons will
have to be replaced by imports.
In East Pakistan food remains the key prob-
lem. Starvation may already be occurring in some
regions in the south hit by the cyclone last No-
vember. A World Bank team now touring the East
wing reported that populated areas in the north-
west also are critically short of food and that the
harvesting and planting of rice are being ne-
glected. The head of the team in graphically de-
scribing the over-all economic stiuation, has
commented that "if Jesus Christ were put in
charge it would take 18 months to put the pieces
together." Islamabad is finally showing signs of
being responsive to international offers of aid for
East Pakistan, but the real test of Pakistani inten-
tions will come when UN personnel arrive for
duty in the East.
Economic activity in the eastern province
remains well below normal and the US consul in
Dacca reports that economic recovery seems to
have reached a plateau. Prices of most commod-
ities in the capital are not much above pre-
hostility levels, but inflation has probably been
held in check by a 50-percent reduction in the
population. Production of jute goods-the East's
major industry-was only five to ten percent of
normal in May, and production in June is not
expected to be much higher. Businessmen stress
that no progress is possible until a political solu-
tion is found and a sense of security restored to
the community.
The economic news from West Pakistan re-
mains generally grim. Although foreign-exchange
holdings rose in May for the first time in over a
year, the increase largely reflects the unilateral
moratorium on foreign debt. A sobering note is
the stated intention of several factories in the
Punjab to lay off workers. Some factories in
Karachi already are operating one shift instead of
three. Finally, in a move to penalize tax evaders
and those Bengalis and West Pakistanis who
looted East Pakistani banks, Islamabad has re-
called its highest currency denominations. These
denominations account for 60 percent of the
value of outstanding currency.
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Italy and Tunisia
Dispute Seabed Boundary
Seabed Boundary Claims
--- Italian
Tunisian
Strait~ of icily
FRANCE V
Corsica'
Sardinia
Sicily
MALTA
TUNISIA I
j#`3
ITALY
(Sicily)
lampiona Lampedusa
It.] (It.)
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YUGOSLAVIA
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. SECRE1' N0101
Tunisia-Italy: Seabed Boundary Dispute
Potential Mediterranean oil deposits and a
disputed international seabed boundary are trou-
bling relations between Italy and Tunisia. The
controversy, which has led to the postponement
of the signing of agreements on fishing rights and
economic aid, focuses on the tiny Italian islands
of Pantelleria, Linosa, Lampedusa, and Lampione,
which lie between Sicily and Tunisia and on the
role these islands should play in the demarcation
of a seabed boundary.
The Tunisians claim that the boundary line
should be equidistant from the Sicilian and Tuni-
sian coasts with the islands entitled only to a
seabed boundary corresponding to their 12-nauti-
cal-mile territorial sea limit. The Italians, on the
other hand, maintain that the boundary should lie
halfway between the islands and the Tunisian
coast, an arrangement that would give Italy a
large part of the seabed that extends eastward
from Tunisia.
Italy's state-owned oil company, ENI, has
recently conducted seismic studies in the Mediter-
ranean, including the disputed seabed, but Italy
refuses to share these findings with Tunisia. An
Italian Foreign Ministry official has admitted,
however, that the survey has made the area in
question "most interesting." Other Italian of-
ficials maintain that the oil potential has been
exaggerated and that a friendly settlement is still
possible, perhaps modeled after treaties between
Italy and Yugoslavia and between Italy and Malta.
The Tunisians, nevertheless, are unwilling to con-
sider any compromise until they have access to
the seismic studies. The dispute is exacerbated by
the recent polarization between the international
oil companies and the producing states and by the
fact that Tunisia's neighbors-oil-rich Algeria and
Libya-have seized greater control over their
petroleum resources.
From the viewpoint of international law the
Tunisians appear to have the stronger claim. The
1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf states that, in the absence of an agreement,
the boundary will follow the median line between
opposite coastal states unless another boundary is
justified by "special circumstances." The Interna-
tional Court in adjudicating the North Sea Case
ruled that, in using equidistance or other methods
in dividing up the shelf, equitable principles
should be applied. The practice thus far has been
to ignore small islands situated near the center of
a semienclosed sea and to award to those islands
only that portion of the seabed that lies beneath
their territorial seas. The Italians have already
suggested referring the dispute to international
arbitration, which would delay exploitation of
resources for some time.
The issue portends many other seabed
boundary problems as technology permits ever
deeper sea-floor exploitation. It comes at a time
when the UN is laying the groundwork to solve
seabed sovereignty problems, among other Law of
the Sea issues, at an international conference in
1973. 25X1
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Violence Becomes an Issue in Chile
The murder on 8 June of conservative Chris-
tian Democratic leader Edmundo Perez Zujovic
will enable President Allende to enhance his
newly self-proclaimed role as protector of law and
order and to carry out his threat to crack down
hard on extremists of both the left and right.
His most likely target now is the political
right.
President Allende has also publicly
implie rig tilt involvement by linking Perez'
murder to that of General Schneider last October.
Senior military officers, however, reportedly have
discounted rightist involvement. Leaders of the
Christian Democratic Party (PDC) have demanded
that military intelligence services be allowed to
share in the investigation of the murder.
The VOP, which describes itself as a "social-
ist and revolutionary organization of the armed
proletariat," broke off from the better known
leftist extremist Movement of the Revolutionary
Left (MI R) about two years ago. The US Embassy
says that the VOP now appears to be a mixture of
extremists and common criminals.
Only recently Allende authorized a crack-
down by security forces on the MIR. Early in his
administration he tried to co-opt the MIR by
giving some of its members responsibility for his
personal security and excusing their excesses on
the grounds that he shared their ideals. On 26
May, however, he called in the two top MIR
leaders to warn them that they were threatening
his programs by their incitement of violence and
issued an ultimatum that they must support his
government or suffer the consequences. About
the same time, Allende's nephew and the chief of
his bodyguard withdrew from the MIR at his
behest, and Socialist Party leaders forced many of
their own members to drop their ties with the
group.
When Allende and an official group appeared
at the University of Concepcion, headquarters of
the MIR, on 29 May, a student leader challenged
the President to his face by calling for armed
violence, and the students booed Allende's out-
raged response. He excoriated the MIR's concept
of revolution and its tactics and said that revolu-
tions rest on the proletariat, not students.
Allende's new stance may reassure the great
majority of Chileans, perhaps most importantly
the armed forces and police. The widespread ac-
ceptance of his program and administration by
Chileans was tempered initially by concern over
his tolerance of the MIR and the violence it bred.
Having proven his stand for order by acting
against the left, Allende can with impunity seek
to pin the Perez murder on rightist extrem- 25X1
fists.
rumors continue, however
Velasco attempted to put to rest the widespread
rumors that he would soon step down voluntarily
or be overthrown by dissident army officers. The
Peru: Velasco's Downfall Widely Rumored
In a press conference on 2 June President
Most of the rumors of a pending confronta-
tion have revolved around General Artola, who
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ULUIrL 1 Now,
was removed from his post as interior minister
last month. Artola's arrest of a bishop was the
immediate cause of his departure from the cabi-
net, but there is some evidence that Velasco was
beginning to fear the general as a potential chal-
lenger. General Artola lacks a strong power base
within the military, however, and now has been
appointed military attache to France. In the
meantime he is being closely watched because
Velasco fears that he may try to organize a move
based on his popular support in Lima's slum areas
and the contacts he made while chief of the
intelligence and security services.
The more serious challenge to Velasco comes
from the growing ranks of military officers dis-
satisfied with the policies of the government.
Fear of provoking a serious split in the mili-
tary apparently has played a major role in pre-
venting a confrontation between Velasco and his
military opponents during the past two and a half
years. The President's prestige has slipped in re-
cent months, however, and discontented officers
may now believe that the repercussions of his
removal would not be too serious.
The President, however, has survived many
periods when his imminent removal was widely
rumored, proving himself to be a capable political
operator. His basic strength lies in the fact that,
more than any of his potential successors, he has
been acceptable to all factions within the mili-
tary. His role in government councils has often
been to balance the demands of the radical re-
formers in his cabinet against the wishes of the
moderates. It is possible, however, that the Presi-
dent's health, or the strains of two-and-a-half
years of being in the center of a political tug of
war, could cause Velasco to step down voluntar-
ily. Likewise, the scales may have tipped far
enough in favor of the moderates to allow them
finally to mount a successful challenge.
Uruguay: The Government Leans Further to the Right
President Pacheco seems intent on pressing
an aggressive line against leftist elements despite
significant domestic opposition.
His hard-line policies brought on another
clash with the legislature on 2 June when it
passed an education reform bill by a near unan-
imous vote despite the threat of presidential
noncompliance. The bill would establish a new
governing council for the strife-torn secondary
schools, which have been administered by the
government since last year. The strong congres-
sional action has given the President some pause,
and he has delayed action on the bill.
There is no doubt, however, that Pacheco is
determined to respond strongly to the general
violence and Tupamaro terrorism. He replaced the
minister of education, who resigned last week
apparently because of a disagreement with the
President over how to deal with student violence,
with Pedro Cersosimo, a hard-lining, pro-Pacheco
congressional deputy. Also indicative of the senti-
ment in government have been recent statements
of administration spokemen touting a new, vio-
lence-prone rightist youth group that has or-
ganized resistance to the take-over of secondary
schools by radicals. There are already allegations
that the government is directly supporting the
group.
Pacheco apparently believes-probably cor-
rectly-that the military would support his use of
harsh measures. It is this military support and
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Congress's awareness of it that have helped
Pacheco win several battles with the legislature
despite his lack of political finesse.
The resignation of the education minister
was accompanied by several other ministerial
changes, bringing total cabinet changes to nearly
70 during Pacheco's tenure. The net result has
been a more obvious law-and-order slant to the
administration, with the most recent appointees
chiefly distinguishable for this attitude and their
loyalty to the President.
The President's increasingly aggressive policy
was also demonstrated by his recent warning to
the Soviet ambassador to cease interfering in
Uruguayan affairs by funding the left's political
campaign and by police harassment of the Cuban
news agency in Montevideo. If the new leftist
coalition appears to be gaining public support as
the November elections approach, Pacheco will be
sorely tempted to expel officials from the Soviet
mission or from the Cuban news staff in order to
divert some domestic criticism and sully the
reputation of the left by linking it with foreign
elements. Mexico's recent expulsion of Soviet
officials probably would make it easier for
Uruguay to follow suit.
Pacheco may now be inclined to use an
expulsion for possible political gain in view of the
fact that Uruguay's high hopes for increased trade
with the USSR were dashed by the disappointing
results of a recent trade mission to Moscow. In
addition, the Communist-controlled labor sector
promises to be a growing problem in months
ahead, and past expulsions of Soviets have been
followed by a slackening of labor agita-
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Secret
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Constitutional Revision in the Philippines
Secret
N2 40
11 June 1971
No. 0374/71A
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CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION IN THE PHILIPPINES
The constitutional convention that convened in Manila on 1 June is the culmination of
years of growing Philippine sentiment favoring constitutional revision. The present constitu-
tion, drafted in 1935 by an assembly very much susceptible to the "guidance" of American
authority, was subject to final approval by President Roosevelt. Following World War I I, the
constitution was amended at US insistence in the context of a complicated economic,
transitional arrangement to include provisions favoring American investment. Many Fili-
pinos understandably regard this constitution as a colonial document and, in their minds,
this alone necessitates the present constitutional convention.
There is, however, another factor far more important to the background of this
convention-popular disenchantment with the domestic political status quo. Since congress
in March 1967 first put the machinery for constitutional revision in motion, the prospect of
a convention has generated considerable enthusiasm and interest among moderate students,
the liberal activist wing of the Roman Catholic Church, the urban intelligentsia and, in
general, the Filipino middle class. These reformist-minded elements see the convention as a
chance at long last to attack the corruption and blatant abuse of power that has always
typified Philippine government.
Such introspection and critical self-examination hopefully mark the start of a real step
away from the emotional Philippine conviction that the country's problems and weakness
derive from its colonial legacy and from its continuing "imperialistic" exploitation-a
colonial mentality that has hindered Filipino political development. Nevertheless, the
enthusiasm that has built up around the constitutional convention appears to be largely
naive and misplaced. There seems to be a widespread expectation within reformist circles
that the convention will prove to have an almost mystical cathartic effect on Philippine
politics-an idea that by replacing one constitution with another the many flaws of the
political system can be erased.
In actuality, the failures of the system are not rooted in the existing constitution but
rather in the ingrained characteristics of Philippine society. Although the Philippines has the
trappings of democracy-free elections and the regular constitutional transfer of power-the
Filipino society and economy remain largely under the control of wealthy families, both
long pre-eminent and newly rich. With its deep roots in Philippine society, this oligarchical
establishment has nearly monopolized political life. Politicians are preoccupied with en-
suring that the benefits of office accrue to themselves and their families. Nepotism and the
abuses associated with it are condoned if not demanded by social mores. Corruption is a
way of life. Everything about the system acts to negate a sense of responsibility as regards
the national interest and the general welfare, and it is this, rather than a constitutional
problem, that is the basic obstacle to good government in the Philippines.
Special Report .. 1 -
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Although the convention will serve as a sounding board for reformist views, the last
word on important decisions will be had by the political establishment and President Marcos
himself. The conservative, entrenched oligarchy will not stubbornly resist and defeat all
efforts at reform during the convention. On the contrary, consitutional reform has become
fashionable, and everyone is for it, including the establishment, although to different
extents and for different reasons. The convention may enact legal and technical reforms by
the score. It remains to be seen, however, how much constitutional reform can do to alter
long-standing political patterns.
When Filipino reformers talk of change and reform, what they really want is the
development of a new breed of political leadership-politicians with a sense of integrity and
social conscience who will either transform or destroy the traditional political system. This
new leadership is not presently in sight, and will emerge more from an evolutionary process
than from constitution writing.
There are, of course, positive aspects to the convention. Within certain limits it is a
serious effort at self-correction. The process of revision, however, could be far more
important than the end product. Throughout the discussion and debate that has already
taken place and will continue on the convention floor, Philippine leaders hopefully will gain
a better understanding of the social and political pressures building within Philippine society
and perhaps develop the beginnings of a social conscience.
It is difficult, however, to escape the conclusion that the exercise in constitutional
reform could result in more harm than good. In the enthusiasm surrounding the convention,
it has become common to hear public figures proclaim that the convention represents the
last opportunity for peaceful evolutionary change in the Philippines. Regardless of how ideal
a constitution the convention produces, however, Philippine politics are not going to be
transformed. The unrealistic hopes and expectations being generated by the convention
could turn into a backlash of disillusionment and a loss of faith in the system's capacity for
self-reform. I n particular, if President Marcos' actions confirm suspicions that he intends to
manipulate the constitutional convention into extending his term of office, popular reaction
will be sharp. Just how serious a backlash develops, however, will depend in large part on
what the convention does with regard to the future political ambitions of President Marcos
and his wife.
The Principal Issues: reform is inextricably bound up in the current
Marcos and the Presidency wave of popular revulsion against the Marcos
administration and the President's apparent deter-
Presidential reform is the most publicized mination to continue in power.
issue the convention will tackle. It is also certain
to be the most politically significant and con- Anti-Marcos feeling has been rising sharply
troversial item, because sentiment for presidential since the 1969 presidential elections. In becoming
Special Report - 2 - 11 June 1971
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the first Philippine president to win a second
term, Marcos resorted to coercion and corruption
on a grand scale. The landslide proportion of his
victory was not credible to the most naive ob-
server, and the misuse of public funds on his
behalf was a significant factor in bringing the
Philippine Government to the verge of bank-
ruptcy. This revelation of the enormous powers
that can be wielded by an incumbent president
acted as a catalyst on the reform movement and
greatly increased the impetus for constitutional
change. Since then, Marcos' cynical and insensi-
tive handling of student protest, the nation's con-
tinuing economic difficulties, and his generally
defensive and uncertain leadership have further
lessened his reputation. Recently Marcos has at-
tempted to improve his image by calling for a
"democratic revolution" and declaring war
against "pressure groups" and "oligarchies." This
has been embarrassingly unconvincing. In regard
to the reform movement Marcos is suffering from
what, in popular terms, can only be called a
monumental credibility gap.
Much of the anti-Marcos feeling is being gen-
erated not within the reform movement but
within the Philippine political establishment. In
Manila the crescendo of anti-Marcos vituperation
in the establishment-controlled press is intense.
Marcos is finding himself increasingly a target as
he moves further into what is his final term under
the present constitution and as his opponents
redouble their efforts to prepare the way for
future victory for themselves. The Liberal Party,
enfeebled by infighting and eclipsed by the pow-
erful political machine Marcos has developed over
the past six years, now is making every effort to
construct new coalitions against the President.
Many of the senior members of his own Nacion-
alista Party are themselves in open opposition or
engaged in secret conspiracies with the Liberals.
In response Marcos is now completing a purge of
the Nacionalista leadership designed to remove or
neutralize all those not totally loyal, and es-
pecially those who might have presidential aspira-
tions of their own. In a country where party
affiliation has never meant much, the political
Special Report
establishment now seems to be split into two
general groups-those who support Marcos and
those, regardless of party label, who oppose him.
All of this has been enough to forge an
obvious if somewhat fragile common interest be-
tween reformers and politicians out of power.
They are agreed that the power of the presidency
has become too strong and could be leading to
the perpetuation of a Marcos "dynasty." In the
ongoing public debate on presidential reform, a
broad consensus appears to have been reached
favoring a single six-year term without re-election,
as opposed to the present four-year term with
possible re-election to a second term. The anti-
Marcos opposition is insisting that the single-term
stipulation should apply to Marcos, thus making
him ineligible for re-election in the first presiden-
tial race under the new constitution. Aside from
getting rid of Marcos, reformists hope that a sin-
gle-term presidency in the future will limit the
attractiveness of the presidency, or at least the
damage an unscrupulous incumbent could do.
There is also a measure of public support for
barring close relatives of an incumbent president
from running for the office. This is patently
aimed at the first lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, an
ambitious, strong-willed woman, who, many Fili-
pinos fear, harbors ambitions to follow her hus-
band in the presidency.
What started out as a nagging suspicion
among anti-Marcos forces that the President
would attempt to tailor the presidential clause of
the new constitution to his own advantage has
turned into something approaching sullen cer-
tainty. Despite public denials of any interest in
the presidency following the expiration of his
term in 1973, Marcos, in private word and deed,
has made it clear that he is not reconciled to a
lame-duck role. Instead of seeing the constitu-
tional convention as the capstone of his career, he
appears to see it as an opportunity to gain further
time in office. In talks with convention delegates
and confidants, Marcos has expressed his approval
and support for the six-year single term.
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lJ ? s _.s L _1_ 1
Structure of the Philippine Government:
SENATE
Elected at large
HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
Elected from Districts
Vice President
Veto
Power
Fiscal
Authority
PRESIDENT
of the Philippines
L
Commission on
Appointments
Office of the _
President
yy I
I
AUDITOR
GENERAL
Commission
on Elections
SUPREME
COURT
Court of
Appeals
GOVERNOR AND
PROVINCIAL -I
COUNCIL
MAYOR AND
MUNICIPAL.
-4
COUNCIL
1
BARRIO
I
CAPTAIN
J
AND COUNCIL
*The chartered city.hos a status and political structure
approximately the some as a province.
**Usually composed of small residential units called "sitios."
Special Report -5-
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Despite his efforts to line up convention
delegates, however, it is by no means certain that
Marcos has decided on how hard to push his
preference to stay in office. He has not yet been
able to get a clear picture of how serious the
opposition to an extension of his tenure would
be. His decision may not be reached until he
assesses the showing of the candidates he backs in
next November's congressional elections.
Aside from the central question of presiden-
tial term, widespread public support has de-
veloped for limiting or removing some of the
specific powers of the executive. Under the
present constitution, a president of the Philip-
pines, less encumbered by effective checks and
balances than is a US president, can in many
instances act more arbitrarily. Without concur-
rence by congress, he can suspend the writ of
habeas corpus, declare martial law, and in times
of national emergency exercise legislative power.
Reformers would like to remove or weaken such
powers. The president now has sweeping powers
of appointment at the national level. Reformers
would like to limit his authority in this area,
especially in regard to the judiciary, which in the
past has been subject to political control. The
financial powers of the presidency are another
major target. Under the present system, the presi-
dent personally controls and releases all public
funds. This has given the president enormous
coercive influence and has encouraged the mis-
direction and juggling of public funds that has
always plagued the Philippine Government. The
convention could act in this area by making cer-
tain appropriations, like those for the courts and
congress, automatic and by strengthening the
authority and autonomy of the auditor-general.
Finally, the convention is going to spend a
great deal of time discussing the question of
Special Report
decentralization. The Philippines is a unitary
state; jurisdiction over areas such as appointments
and licensing, even at the local level, is ultimately
exercised by the national executive. For some
time there has been strong reformist sentiment to
decentralize by allocating more authority and
responsibilities to provincial and local govern-
ments. After years of debate, discussion, and
some grandiose proposals, there are a few signs
that some of this enthusiasm is diminishing. An
awareness is growing that the delegation of power
to lower levels of government that are, in many
cases, controlled by provincial political machines
and vested interests would not necessarily be such
a progressive move. Although the convention will
probably institute some measure of decentraliza-
tion, it is unlikely to go so far as to move to a
federal or semifederal system.
President Marcos has not shown his hand on
these and other proposals to limit executive
power. He certainly is not against all of them and
could probably live with them all. His only obvi-
ous and immediate interest is the adoption of a
provision that will give him the opportunity to
stay in office.
During the past several years civic and uni-
versity groups, scholars, politicians, and armchair
constitutional lawyers have been enthusiastically
engaged in studying and rewriting the Philippine
constitution. Filipinos have been inundated with
books and pamphlets suggesting drastic overhaul
of the governmental structure. The principal ef-
fect of all this debate and examination seems to
have been growing respect for the present con-
stitution, which is patterned basically on the US
model, and some realization of the dangers of
change for change's sake. The public consensus
for change now seems to have jelled along fairly
conservative lines, favoring fewer rather than
many sweeping changes. There is, however, one
substantial and rather questionable structural al-
teration that the convention may well make-a
move to a unicameral legislature. Early on, broad
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support developed among reformist elements in
favor of junking the Senate and creating a unitary
national assembly. The Senate's well-deserved
public reputation as a corrupt, rich-man's club,
even though one shared with the House, no doubt
has a lot to do with sentiment for its abolition.
Also, a lot of chic has been attached to uni-
cameralism as a more efficient and "progressive
system," especially within academic circles.
Nevertheless, a move to unicameralism remains a
dubious reform. The Senate, for all its corruption,
has occasionally served as a useful check on the
presidency; its abolition would clearly make life
easier for the executive.
Ironically, some of the strongest
proponen s o unicameralism are also bitter
enemies of Marcos and advocates of a weakened
presidency. The fact that the President and his
wife are now actively lobbying for unicameralism
and the abolition of the Senate will occasion
second thoughts on the part of many reformists.
Given the broad support unicameralism presently
enjoys among convention delegates, however, its
adoption must be considered a strong probability.
There is also some talk about giving a unitary
national assembly the right to elect the president.
This is being put forward by some reformists as
the "final solution" to traditionally corrupt
Philippine presidential elections. A number of
delegates have also suggested having the presiden-
tial cabinet drawn from the ranks of the National
Assembly. Marcos himself is said to be interested
in such a mixed presidential-parliamentary system
because of the opportunities it would offer to
perpetuate himself in power. It now appears that
such a scheme will be his fallback position if he
encounters too much opposition to his efforts to
maintain a grip on the present presidential office.
On balance, it seems unlikely that either reform-
ists or politicians would dare to disenfranchise the
Filipino people by abolishing direct election of
the president. Marcos' interest in the possibilities
of such a system, however, means that an attempt
toward this scheme can by no means be ruled out.
Special Report
The Welfare State
One general topic sure to get a lot of pub-
licity and take up a large amount of the conven-
tion's time is the question of how much and what
kind of social reform will be written into the new
constitution. For several years now there has been
widespread agitation for the incorporation of a
comprehensive social program in the new con-
stitution. Such a program would include universal
free education, health care, land reform, mini-
mum guaranteed wages-in short the entire reper-
toire of the fully developed social welfare state. A
number of reformers and politicians, most
notably former president Macapagal, are riding
this horse for all it is worth. It would be difficult
to find anyone opposed to such politically appeal-
ing programs and even more difficult to find the
money to pay for them. There is some realization,
however, that a constitutional document is not
the medium for formulating specific social pro-
grams. Even the most sincere and altruistic con-
stitutional convention could come up with little
more than a statement of principle vaguely com-
mitting the Philippines to eventual achievement
of certain social objectives. Such a commitment
may be temporarily gratifying but could even-
tually add to discontent by raising expectations
that cannot be met.
The Role of Nationalism:
US Interests Directly at Stake
Although the bulk of the convention's atten-
tion will be directed at the domestic issues dis-
cussed above, anti-US nationalism is still a force
in the Philippines and makes for good politics.
The convention could move in a number of areas
to complicate relations further between Manila
and Washington.
On the frequently troublesome issue of US
base rights, the outlook currently seems hopeful.
At present the question of the US military pres-
ence is attracting very little popular attention,
although this could change overnight given a new
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incident involving a US serviceman. Recent
opinion polls have put the base issue near the
bottom of the list of topics the people want the
convention to tackle-another reflection of the
new, critical public focus on domestic politics.
Some convention delegates may generate con-
siderable sound and fury on the base issue, and
there will, in all likelihood, be proposals ranging
from immediate termination of US base rights to
demands for greater Philippine representation in
command arrangements and more favorable terms
in areas of criminal custody and jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, to what extent the convention in-
terjects itself into base questions will largely be
up to President Marcos, who appears to want to
keep the issue out of the convention. Negotia-
tions between Manila and Washington for revision
of the base arrangement have been under way for
several months and are proceeding smoothly.
Marcos, who has never made any bones about his
desire to see the bases remain, now seems to want
an agreement concluded quickly in order to pre-
vent or discourage the convention from meddling
in this emotional and potentially explosive area.
A much greater problem appears to be
shaping up in regard to possible convention de-
cisions on economic policy and especially the
question of US "parity" rights. In 1946 the
Philippine constitution-under US prompting-
was amended to allow Americans to acquire and
engage in the exploitation of natural resources
and the operation of public utilities until
1974-privileges originally restricted to Philippine
nationals. "Parity" has persisted as a symbol of
"US economic imperialism" and has been a major
fuel for the fire of anti-US nationalism. Conven-
tion delegates are now "courageously" demanding
that parity be written out of the constitution and
not extended beyond 1974. Despite such na-
tionalistic rhetoric designed for public consump-
tion, this has not been a real issue since at least
1965 when the US officially went on record as
not favoring an extension of parity rights. Parity,
itself, seems destined to die a natural death in
1974, thus depriving Filipino nationalists of one
of their favorite whipping boys.
Special Report
Very much at question, however, is what
happens to the assets and operations acquired by
Americans in the parity area between 1946 and
1974. The US has taken the position that such
"vested rights" do not terminate in 1974. The
Philippine Government has taken the opposite
position. Before 1974, it says, US investors will
have to reduce their equity share to 40 percent;
the balance will have to be sold to Filipinos. The
constitutional convention could, if it chose to do
so, have the last word. In addition to the central
question of vested parity rights, the convention
also will consider other measures that could
jeopardize American investments outside the
parity area. There is considerable popular demand
that the new constitution incorporate an eco-
nomic policy of "Filipinization," i.e., mandatory
increased participation of Filipinos in the manage-
ment, employment, or ownership of firms now
controlled by foreign interests. "Filipinization" is
primarily favored as a means of reducing Chinese
involvement in areas such as wholesale and retail
trade and credit, but it could conceivably affect
all foreign business operations. A measure of sup-
port has also been expressed for the nationaliza-
tion of entire industries such as oil and telecom-
munications, both areas where there has been
considerable US investment.
The threat to US investment aside, such a
program of economic nationalism is bound to
have a damaging effect on an already shaky
Philippine economy. US commercial investment
in the Philippines, although small in proportion to
total US overseas investment, is significant within
the Philippine economy. If the convention does
act to eliminate vested parity rights, a consid-
erable chunk of available domestic capital will
probably be spent to buy already operating pro-
ductive facilities rather than invested in new
areas. Greater production and new jobs desper-
ately needed in the Philippines will be sacrificed,
and chances of new foreign investment will be
further dimmed.
How far this fact will go in tempering the
convention's decision remains to be seen. For
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President Marcos, who has not yet shown his
hand, economic nationalism represents a real
problem. Given the sobering experience of the
current Philippine balance-of-payments problem,
his administration is in no mood to rock the
economic boat. Nevertheless, it cannot be auto-
matically assumed that the convention will be
swayed by such rational and pragmatic factors.
Even those politicians and convention delegates
fully aware of and concerned over the dangers of
moving against foreign investment will find it
difficult to take a public stand against prevailing
nationalist sentiment. More to the real point,
Filipino economic nationalism has been and re-
mains, to. a large degree, a very convenient inven-
tion and tool of the Philippine establishment.
Wealthy Filipinos now are very much aware of
the buyer's market and fire-sale prices that will no
doubt result if American investment is forced
out: US divestiture is in their individual interest
over the short term, whether or not it is in the
national economic interest. Unfortunately, short-
term, individual interest is all too often the basis
for political decision in the Philippines.
Rising Philippine nationalism quickly spills
over into the realm of foreign policy. Although
there is relatively little support for neutralism, the
appearance of a more independent foreign pos-
ture would be welcomed by many Filipinos.
There is also growing general interest in the de-
velopment of diplomatic ties with Communist
states. The recent round of "ping-pong diplo-
macy" in particular raised Philippine fears that
Manila, with its hitherto firm anti-Communist
line, is being left at the gate. As a result the
convention may well adopt a constitutional com-
mitment to peaceful relations with "all states"-a
harmless enough measure that should please
nearly everyone. There has also been a lot of talk
favoring the new constitution redefining Philip-
pine national territory to include Sabah, thus
reiterating Manila's claim to the Malaysian state.
Given the improving relations between Kuala
Lumpur and Manila, it seems likely that President
Marcos will finesse this potentially disruptive
topic. Also in regard to Philippine national ter-
Special Report
ritory, Washington and Manila may be on another
at least minor collision course. The Philippine
Government appears determined to insert into the
new constitution its "archipelago theory." This
would define as territorial waters all the sea area
bounded by the archipelago's outermost islands.
This claim, which would restrict or prohibit non-
Filipino navigation, fishing, and seabed exploita-
tion in this extensive area, runs directly counter
to the US position on law of the sea.
The currently untroubled state of US-Philip-
pine relations could change abruptly. Philippine
nationalism, a genuine force in itself, is still
subject to manipulation by the elite for political
ends. During the Manila student demonstrations
in early 1970, for example, President Marcos
proved himself perfectly capable of using "red-
herring" nationalism to divert dissatisfaction with
him to the United States. Through overuse, how-
ever, it has become increasingly difficult for
Marcos to get away with this tactic. Also, given
the embattled political and economic position of
the administration, the President is presently
strongly inclined to seek and ensure himself of US
support. Nevertheless, a deliberate escalation of
nationalistic, anti-US rhetoric and action within
the convention is possible if Marcos or other
establishment elements come to believe that by
such means their own self-serving objectives and
interests can be obscured.
The Convention Itself.- Politics as Usual
The tack the convention will take in han-
dling the issues discussed above and the many
others it may take up cannot be divined at this
point. The convention will move slowly, running
probably nine months to a year. The first weeks
are likely to be confined entirely to procedural
and organizational work. In preconvention meet-
ings and seminars, the delegates generally showed
a lack of concern in attending to organizational
work. Little was accomplished, not even the
selection of a convention chairman. The preoc-
cupation of Philippine political parties with the
November congressional elections suggests the
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convention will not get down to business for
some months. There will be plenty of time for
opposing forces to test the water and play things
by ear. One thing seems clear, however; during
the lengthy convention, the traditional rules of
rough and tumble Philippine politics will apply.
Convention delegates, mostly from rural pro-
vincial areas, will be subjected to the persuasive
talents of competing lobbies and interest groups,
coerced, tempted with offers of money and posi-
tion and, in general, plied with wine, women, and
song. Many issues are likely to be settled in
Manila hotel rooms rather than on the convention
floor.
Despite the hopes of many advocates of con-
stitutional reform, the convention fell into the
patterns of traditional Philippine politics when its
320 delegates were elected last November. Given
the special nature of the election and the bad
taste lingering from the 1969 irregularities, the
campaign was heavily supervised and ostensibly
nonpartisan. Inevitably the election did not quite
live up to its billing. In the rural barrios, name
was far more important than constitutional issue,
and the "personal" endorsement of the local po-
litical boss determined many races. Most success-
ful candidates were linked to the political parties
and vested interests of the establishment. The
largest bloc of winners, perhaps an outright
majority, was associated one way or another with
the Marcos machine. The President, however, did
not engage in overkill along the lines of 1969.
Enough genuine reformers, independents, and
political opponents of Marcos were elected to
qualify this election as reasonably honest by re-
cent standards. All in all, the convention make-up
mirrors the existing political situation. It reflects
not only the great strength of the Marcos machine
but also the growing unrest of students, intel-
ligentsia, and other reform elements-a vocal
minority that will make the convention some-
thing more than a Marcos puppet show.
Since the elections last November, the Presi-
dent has maintained a low public posture, deny-
ing any intention to intervene in the convention.
Special Report
Although Marcos has been actively trying to
influence the selection of a pliable convention
chairman, real power could lie in the convention's
working committees-the level where Marcos'
numerical advantage is bound to pay off. In any
case, clear indications of the extent of Marcos'
control should emerge after the convention's
organizational structure develops and rules of
procedure are adopted.
The pace of the convention will probably
depend primarily on Marcos' strategy in regard to
next November's senatorial and provincial elec-
tions. Marcos is attaching considerable im-
portance to these elections and may even be
tempted to engineer a margin of victory along
1969 lines. A big win for his slate would keep his
political machine strong and intact. More im-
portantly, it could be used by Marcos as a popular
mandate justifying his desire to remain in office.
Right now, however, the President is having some
difficulty in putting together a strong senatorial
slate. His purge of Nacionalista ranks has di-
minished the number of attractive potential can-
didates and those that remain are understandably
reluctant to run for an office that may very well
be abolished by the new constitution. It seems a
good possibility that Marcos will attempt to put
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off the convention's resolution of the presidency
issue and other important items until after the
November elections.
How effective the anti-Marcos opposition
can be in countering presidential manipulation of
the convention remains to be seen. Real coopera-
tion between opportunistic politicians, reformers,
and the several genuine radicals among the dele-
gates will be difficult to achieve and even harder
to maintain. Aware that Marcos is eager to avoid
the impression of steam-rollering the convention,
the anti-Marcos forceswill miss no opportunity to
accuse him of precisely that. Public charges of
presidential intervention, some based on fact,
others probably fabricated, are already a daily
occurrence in Manila. The anti-Marcos delegates
will no doubt attempt to orchestrate their efforts
on the convention floor with outside protest
demonstrations. Orchestration or not, there will
probably be plenty of action in the streets of
Manila during the coming year on the part of
both radical groups seeking to disrupt the conven-
tion and moderates lobbying for reform.
Aside from simply embarrassing Marcos, the
opposition forces also hope to sway enough of his
support to turn events in their favor. The anti-
Marcos forces, who hail primarily from Manila
and other urban areas, as a group will comprise
the most skilled and sophisticated parliamen-
tarians in the convention. By contrast, many of
the pro-Marcos delegates are inexperienced
politicos from the provinces. Their vulnerability
to articulate argument, parliamentary finesse, and
outside protests and pressure could conceivably
weaken Marcos' control. Most realistic observers,
however, believe that the President will neverthe-
less have the votes to control the convention-at
least on the issues he considers vital. How deter-
mined Marcos is to use these votes to extend
himself in office, regardless of the public uproar it
would cause, is a question he has not yet an-
swered himself.
Special Report
The real significance of the convention lies
in the effect it will have on the future develop-
ment of the Philippines as a stable and democratic
nation. In recent years the traditional Philippine
political process has come under criticism, and
the strains are beginning to show. Some establish-
ment members now accuse President Marcos of
threatening the system by his very success in
playing the game and by his refusal to share
wealth and power by stepping down gracefully.
This jealous complaint is somewhat justified, but
the real challenge to the traditional political sys-
tem comes from a new dynamic of change and
unrest in Philippine society. Disaffection is cur-
rently centered in the student movement but is
also beginning to run through the liberal wing of
the church, the intelligentsia, and the educated
middle class in general.
This new mood is still largely confined to
Manila and other urban areas. The traditional
system still works smoothly in the barrios where
apathy abounds and a vote can still be bought
cheaply. What is happening in Manila--the politi-
cal, educational, and cultural center of the Philip-
pines-is, however, far more pertinent than the
status quo situation that exists in much of the
rest of the country. The city has all the ingredi-
ents for unrest and rebellion-tremendous and
growing disparity between rich and poor, an eco-
nomically depressed and dissatisfied labor force,
and the general air of urban crisis shared by many
great cities. Most importantly, it has a university
student population of over 300,000, who believe
they are economically exploited (higher educa-
tion in the Philippines is largely private and
profitable). The current trend toward mass action
and confrontation politics, so alien to Philippine
tradition, is unlikely to be reversed. It has already
shaken the establishment, and future Philippine
Governments will have increasing difficulty in
coming to terms with Manila and its new asser-
tiveness. Marcos is the first president of the
Philippines to run into the fact that building a
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powerful political machine and the ability to con-
trol national elections are no longer enough to
govern comfortably and effectively.
In planning his moves in regard to the con-
vention, Marcos will have to evaluate their effect
on the student/reformist movement and the situa-
tion in Manila. Exactly how he assesses this prob-
lem and the constraints it places on him is
unclear, but there are disturbing signs that the
President, increasingly isolated and surrounded by
"yes" men, does not have a good appreciation of
the depth and nature of the popular disenchant-
ment with him. In the past, Marcos has sought to
dismiss the student movement as simply a Com-
munist plot and, in traditional style, has at-
tempted to manipulate it, buy it off, and split it
up. In the final analysis he seems to have inter-
preted it mainly as a personal affront. There is
certainly little in his past record or current plans
to indicate that he sees growing student and re-
formist activism as expressive of sincere and
potentially dangerous public dissatisfaction with
his and previous Philippine administrations.
Marcos is determined to get
what he wants from the convention and is taking
the steps necessary to deal with anticipated
demonstrations in Manila. Reaction to a power
play by Marcos would be one of outrage, but,
Special Report
even though there is an air of rebellion in Manila,
a revolutionary situation does not exist. The stu-
dent movement, for all of its troublemaking po-
tential, remains immature, fractious, and ideolog-
ically divided. Although an extended period of
running confrontation in the streets might well
result, the government should be able to maintain
control of the situation. In the aftermath, how-
ever, a far greater security problem might exist in
Manila than hitherto. Martial law and/or the sus-
pension of the convention would almost certainly
further radicalize the student movement, broaden
the base of violent opposition, and, in general,
present a golden opportunity to Communist agita-
tors and organizers.
Marcos might still decide against pushing his
ambitions to the point of provoking a period of
turmoil. He still has his options open, and there is
still time to display statesmanship by abandoning
his efforts to retain power. He might yet decide
that the presidency is not worth having under the
anticipated grim circumstances. Conversely, it is
by no means certain that the students and other
reform elements have the strength and determina-
tion to challenge effectively presidential manipu-
lation of the convention or make it necessary for
Marcos to resort to repression.
Whatever the case, this much seems clear: at
a time when anti-Marcos feeling and popular
demand for reform are coalescing and reaching a
peak, the President is at the moment planning to
tailor the new constitution to his personal politi-
cal ambitions. If he successfully follows through
with these plans, there are bound to be adverse
implications for future Philippine political de-
velopment. Such a shabby ending to years of
enthusiasm for constitutional revision would go
far toward destroying moderate faith in the sys-
tem's capacity for self-reform, place further
strains on the traditional Philippine political
process, and in all likelihood usher in a new and
uncertain period of sharpened popular disaffec-
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