WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008900040001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 16, 1971
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
Secret
16 July 1971
No. 0379/71
Copy
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(Information as of noon EDT, 15 July 1971)
Page
Indochina . . . .
Vietnath Little Military Activity, But... . . . . . 1 17
Laos: The-Dialogue Continues ` 2
Cambodia: The Grain Drain . . 3
Communist China: ,,More Pieces in the Leadership P zle . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Burma: The More Things Change... . . . . . 6
Balkan Fears: Real or Illusory? 7
USSR: Work Accelerates on the Kama Track Plant . . . . 8
Franco-German Talks: Cordiality buDitYferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Franco-Soviet Economic Relations: Mo ,Pretense than Performance . . . . . . . 9
United Kingdom: Debate Heats Up 9n EG:~Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
EC Foreign Policy Consultations Pick Up M&nentum . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Iceland: Yankee, Go Home? 12
Malta: Mintoff Asks NATO to Dave . . . . . . . . . 13
,.;/MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
South Asia: The USSR Does Not Want War on the Subcontinent . 14
East Pakistan: Gloomy Prediction . . . . . . . . . ~.. . . . . . . . . . . 15
Morocco: The King Still.Reigns... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Jordan: The Army Closes In . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Guyana Nationalizes a Bauxite Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Central American Common Market Still Shaky . . . . . . . . . . ...
Cuba: Foreign Minister's Junket 23
NOTES: Guinea; Chile
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Indochina
FAR EAST
Vietnam: Little Military Activity, But...
The level of Communist military action re-
mains low but there are numerous signs that a
new flurry of shellings and ground probes is to
begin soon. The current calm can be attributed in
part to the recent heavy rains in the northern
sector spawned by a typhoon and to seasonal
flooding in the delta. North Vietnamese infantry
and artillery units still pose a formidable threat
near the DMZ. Elsewhere, enemy units have been
getting ready for what appears to be another
monthly increase in hostilities to be conducted
for the most part by the enemy's local force and
guerrilla units.
There is nothing
nists have much more in mind than the usual
flurry of harassing attacks, which typically in-
clude light shellings, widely scattered ground at-
tacks against the more remote allied positions,
abductions, and the interdiction of roads and
waterways. The small groups of reinforcements
sent into South Vietnam from Cambodia and
Laos, for example, appear to be designed to
strengthen the enemy's local apparatus rather
than to concentrate large numbers of forces near
key urban centers and allied bases as in some
years past.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 Jul 71
the
Communists are organizing some of their people
to influence the od1come of the coming-South
Vietnamese lower house and presidential elec-
tions.
special Viet song committees there are
drawing up,:,options covering both Communist
participation tiin the elections and schemes to dis-
rupt them.
Lists of prospective candidates in Binh Dinh
are to be reviewed to" determine which ones the
Communists should .encourage the people to sup-
port, which should; be harassed during the cam-
paign, and which :ones should be targeted for
assassination because of their strong progovern-
ment positions. The Communists are also plan-
ning to collect and destroy individual identifica-
tion and voter registration cards in the hope of
fouling government checks of citizenship and vot-
ing eligibility. If these tactics are not effective,
Viet Cong agents willVattempt to encourage voters
to putCommunist propaganda leaflets in voting
boxes instead of ballots. If :none of the above
tactics seems likely to pay off,'.Viet Cong military
units may attack some' voting areas and govern-
ment security units protecting them.
F the Viet Cong are takii\g a flexible
approach toward the elections. The Communists,
however, apparently intend to concentrate more
heavily on supporting antigovernment candidates
for election than on ?acts of terrorism`, against
candidates and the electorate. Whatever they do,
it is doubtful that their influence will be.'very
great. Threats to disrupt previous South Viet-
namese elections have been followed by very few
significant incidents. Communist support fo,r
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selected lower candidates _mayfensure suc-
cess for some of them, he'Communists prob-
ably will not be able to weigh''i teavily enough
to tip the balance in the presidential c`ortest.
Laos: The Dialogue Continues
The Communists have sharply rejected Prime
inister Souvanna's proposal of 5 July for a
cease-fire on the Plaine des Jarres. In a tough and
unyielding letter to Souvanna on 11 July, Lao
Communist leader Souphanouvong stated that in
proposing a cease-fire on the Plaine, Vientiane
was, in effect, rejecting the Communist proposal
for a country-wide cease-fire. He argued that im-
posing a country-wide cease-fire was within the
power of the Laotian parties, and that in rejecting
it Souvanna was serving US interests. This is an
allusion to the fact that a country-wide cease-fire
would affect the US bombing program in the
infiltration corridor.
The Missed Meeting
^~ .~ I--lP TEET,H9
The letter comes down hard on Vang Pao's
current offensive on the Plaine, which it describes
as an "extremely serious" act. It ties Souvanna's 5
July proposal to the offensive and implies that it
is evidence that Vientiane is not genuinely inter-
ested in reaching a settlement. The letter makes
no reference to withdrawing the "special emis-
sary" who is in Vientiane or to breaking contacts
with the government. The Communists may still
hope that they can convince Souvanna that it is in
the government's interest to be more accom-
modating to their demands for talks.
The tone of the letter, however, suggests
that the Communists doubt that there will be
progress toward negotiations at least until the
military situation on the Plaine turns again to
their advantage.
The Souphanouvong letter may diminish the
high spirits now enjoyed by the leaders in Vien-
tiane, but it is not likely to change orders to Vang
Pao to take as much territory as he can. It would
be both politically and psychologically difficult
for Souvanna to rein in his troops when they have
the upper hand, and he believes that gains on the
ground will strengthen his future bargaining posi-
tion. Souvanna evidently has little expectation
that the Communists are interested in a partial
standdown in north Laos, and the chances for
early meaningful negotiations are therefore slim.
In its insistence on a nationwide cease-fire, the
latest Souphanouvong letter will only reinforce
the view that there is nothing to negotiate about
at this juncture.
Vang Pao's irregulars continue to encounter
only light resistance as they press forward on the
Plaine. On 11 July 200 of the irregulars occupied
without opposition Phou Keng, the strategic high
point overlooking the northwestern Plaine. Other
irregular units conducting clearing operations con-
tinue to discover small caches of enemy supplies.
The Communists have so far made only scat-
tered probes and harassing attacks on government
positions.
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In southern Laos, the enemy is using mortar
fire to thwart attempts by irregular units to enter
Muong Phalane. Farther south, the command post
of an irregular battalion was re-established at
PS-42, an irregular base on the southeastern rim
of the Bolovens Plateau that had been used to
launch raids on enemy supply lines. The irregulars
found no sign of enemy activity in this area.
Changes in Military Commands
The government has extensively reshuffled
its military comxnan.ders following the resignation
of General:'Ouan as commander in chief of the
Lao military forces (FAR). 'General Bounpone,
the former commander of Military Region 3, who
is not highly regarded in either his military or
personal affairs, was appointed FAR chief. Gen-
eral Kouprasith, the former Vientiane military
commander, was appointed deputy FAR chi f
Kouprasith, who has long had political as ra-
tions, appears in line for the top spot hen
Boun,pone retires in two years.
Much-criticized General Phasouk v~v'as moved
from Military Region 4 (Pakse) to t9e relatively
unimportant job of FAR chief oftaff. Colonel
Soutchay, his replacement in M 4, has proved
his ability in; leading. numerous rregular opera-
tions and should be a more) aggressive com-
mander.
~lyb change was made in
Military Region 2 were f3eneral Vang Pao will
continue to lead his irregylars.
Prime Minister Soivanna Phouma is continu-
ing his efforts to irnproye relations with the Chi-
nese Communists. -He recently instructed his cabi-
net to increase contact~.with the\`Chinese diplo-
mats in Vientiane. In line, with this policy the Lao
foreign minister hosted a dinner for,,the Chinese
which was attended by" several important Lao
officials. Th'Lao apparently hope to explore new
ways to improve relations over the long term.
The foreign minister's first bid was to a the
Chinese to build a pavilion for an annual f ~r in
Vientiane. In an interview on 9 July Souva`hna
personally cited the need for Chinese participa-
tion in any Indochina settlement and went out of
his way to stress his country's neutrality.
Phnom Penh's pessimism about its ability to
resolve the present rice crisis, and increasing pub-
lic pressure to eliminate the continuing shortages,
have prompted the government Co request imme-
diate shipment of 32,000 tons of rice from the
US under the PL-480 program, and an additional
150,000 tons for shipment next year. Phnom
Penh is also seeking to obtain trice from Tokyo
and Taipei.
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It is possible that, at present consumption
levels, rice stocks in the capital will be exhausted by
mid-November. Moreover, planting in Battambang
Province for next season's crop appears to be sub-
stantially behind schedule due to early flooding,
labor shortages, and a lack of incentives stemming
from low paddy prices. Consequently, it is possible
that only a small surplus will be available in Bat-
tambang next year for shipment to Phnom Penh.
The rice situation may be less serious than it
seems, however. Because merchants are often in-
clined to conceal the size of their rice holdings,
official figures almost certainly underestimate the
amount of rice still in private hands. In addition,
reports of rice smuggling from Cambodia into South
Vietnam appear to be highly exaggerated. The gov-
ernment-organized system of rice convoys between
Battambang and Phnom Penh is now in full swing
and should serve to ease the shortages in the capital.
he Communists re' ortedly have run{into
eus trouble in thei vigorous effort to build
Khmer Com unitt (KC),movement in
n rovi ce ofi Kampot
trict in Kampot. Theme
young Cambodians who'
large numbers of
ajor"ity of the defectors are
ned Vietnamese Commu-
nist (VC) ranks when the
tions-which may "run a
caused the VC to mistru
result, the,VC have be
KC cadres. As a
e weapons of
desertions and the wit drawal of weapon have de-
moralized KC element still serving with he VC;
they apparently are ado unhappy because vil1'ers
are not providing them with adequate food supplies
.,
Pacification and Accommodation in Kompong Cham
Kompong Cham still appears to lead the rest of
the provinces in developing a pacification program,
although progress is clearly slow. The governor of
Kompong Cham recently tezcreases will be lower
prices for manufactured` goods 'as reductions in
intracommunity tariffs gco, into effect.
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In his speech on 9 July responding to the
White Paper, Labor Party leader Wilson was
sharply critical of the entry terms negotiated by
the Tories, and strongly suggested that he would
come out -formally against entry by the end of
July. In addition,-Dennis! Healey and Anthony
Crosland, two members~of Wilson's shadow cabi-
net who had previou 1y taken promarket posi-
tions, announced that they might vote against
entry unless the government alters its present,
unpopular economic policies. If Healey and Cros-
land defect, there will no' longer be a promarket
majority in the shadow cabinet.
Labor Party leaders are simply bowing to the
tide of antimarket opinion evident in almost all
segments of its constituency. According to the
respected National Opinion Poll, sentiment
against entry-seems highest among skilled, semi-
skilled and"unskilled workers...and among Labor
supporters." In\~addition, the unio and the
rank-and-file of t e party are overwhelmingly
against entry. Thus, when the-iss ae is considered
on 17 July at the sp Jaf-Labor Party congress,
the antimarketeers,,witl~ almost certainly force
through a formal resolution opposing entry.
,T-iie timetable for jJture decisions related to
entry was also set last week. The White Paper will
be the subject of fpur days' parliamentary debate
between 21 and 26 July and the definitive vote
-on entry will be cn 28 October, following six
days of debate. Hea,~h apparently continues to be
opposed to a "free v~te" on the entry issue, that
is, one that would free MPs from 'traditional party
discipline, despite thek fact that this procedure
would probably favor\ larger promarket vote
than the narrow victory 'margin still predicted by
most British observers.'
"EC. Foreign Policy Consultations Pick Up
Differences on foreign pot-icy issues under
consideration notwithstanding the si?xmembers of
the European Communities are intensifying the
political consultations inaugurated last year. In a
series of meetings between now and the fall the
Six will pursue studies of the Middle East, as a
follow-on to the initial report on the area com-
pleted this spring, and will increasingly get into
European security issues.
At a meeting in Rome on '1-2 July the politer-
ical directors of the foreign offices of the-Six
agreed to French proposals to prepare.p'apers on
possible peace terms in the Mjddae-East and on
the "political and juridical gu'a antees" of a peace
agreement. Mediterranean polik\y as a whole will
also be discussed-in tthree groups proposed by the
Frenchrto " over the Middle Eastern, Northern
African, and European Mediterranean states. The
possibility of a UN Security Council meeting on
Momentum
Jerusalem was subsequently discussed by embas'sy
officers from the\Six in Paris at a session which
the French called on 8 July. Meanwhile, under a
mandate for taking uu "current affairs," the Six
in Rome discussed recent events in Malta-a fact
which they intend to hold closely.
A Dutch official has claimed that any papers
the Six -produce on the Middle East will be less
formal than the earlier position paper, which
aroused the ire o Israel and gave the impression
of greater agree- nt among the Six than is the
case. The French evertheless still probably hope
that continuing C"consultations will indirectly
add weight to Pari role among the Big Four.
It was decided at Rome that a working
group would explore the political aspects of East-
West security problems and of relations between
the EC and CEMA. The Germans opposed an
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Italian proposal to list mutual and balanced force
reductions -(MBFR) as a distinct topic, but have
admitted that MBFR_might nevertheless be raised
in the evolving caucus on sec~rity issues of inter-
An inconclusive iscussion was held on rria~e
closely associating the four candidates for EC
membership with the political consultations.
France still appears reluctant, for the moment at
least, to go beyond present procedures of inform-
ing the candidates following meetings of the Six.
Although the Six`seem/increasingly concerned
abou Lining the confidential nature of their
discussions, they plan to keep the US well in-
formed and, at tR request of Bonn, wi.l develop
a coordinated "inf~mation policy" vis-a-vis the
US and other importa ~t nonmember states.
On the whole, 'e political consultations
have thus far stresse procedure and played down
ovement toward ecommending common poli-
cie-s. Most member are clearly reluctant now to
go so far -in a poll ic direction that a debate on
creating new Europe n decision-making institu-
tions would be opened,. especially before an en-
larged Community including the UK becomes a
reality.
celand : Yankee, Go Home?
he- left-center government
installed this
,
week with ressive Party leader Olafur Johan-
nesson as Prime i ister, is a political oddity that
may not last long. Ir~the meantime, however, the
three-party coalition of'tbe Progressive Party, the
Communist-dominated Lair Alliance, and the
Liberal Left Party will be a oblem to Iceland's
NATO allies. The government p s to renegotiate
the country's defense agreement , the US and
to extend the country'/fishing limits "from 12 to
50 miles, to the distress of the Britis ;West
Germans, and East Europeans.
The key to putting the coalition together
was the agreement won from Liberal Left leader
Hannibal Valdimarsson. A political maverick w.ho
has previously been a leader of the Social-Demo-
crats and the Labor Alliance, Vald-irnarsson was
the big winner in last months-e ections. At 68, he
still wants to unite his party with the Social
Democrats to forma ,,W invigorated, non-Commu-
nist left. He trieding the Social Democrats
into the new co-afition, but they were convinced
that their rfy needs a period in opposition to
recover fr)6 , m a series of electoral defeats.
During the four week coalition negotiations,
Valdimarsson was aough bargainer, acquiring
more portfolios than h.is party's strength/fvould
seem to merit (Progressjves, 5; Labor Alliance, 4;
Liberal Left, 3). The rogressives,-anxious to re-
turn to power aft 5 years-on the sidelines,
were apparently prepared to be generous. The
Labor Alliance, tough out in the cold just as
long, was less flexi,le, and the new government's
program reportedly' dmits the failure of the par-
ties to achieve~"a consensus on Iceland's NATO
membership; which will be continued but periodi-
cally,- viewed. All three parties suffer serious
acfionalism, and in all there are undoubtedly
influential persons who oppose the arrangements
made`,
Although the new foreign minister, Einar
Agustsson, comes from the pro-US wing of the
Progressive Party, the', government's program in-
cludes negotiating a withdrawal of the US-
manned Icelandic Defense Force (IDC) phased
over four years; Icelapd has no armed forces of its
own. Although not an election issue, the force's
presence is an irritation to the, left or simply
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xenophobic constituencies that the coalition par-
ties represent.
Traditionally, there, has been a link between
Reykjavik's attitude tow rd a US -military pres-
ence and economic a sistance. When ,Ie-ea dfse ter
$ente4-4~ieiats-may=b eactive l}r=;tryrng-= to-sa bo-
tags t h e ` g t s r e m r i T e r f t = e f f o r t i I n many parts of the
province the local administration has disappeared,
and fear of the army combined with the assassina-
tion of collaborators by the insurgents precludes
an improvement in the situation.
The flight of workers from the cities has left
industry in sad shape. The output of jute goods in
June was only 20 percent of normal. Recently,
the shortage of raw materials has forced several
industrial plants to close, and other factories are
threatened. The sabotage of electric power lines
also threatens industrial production-one attack
cut off most power in Dacca for several days.
The many inconsistencies in Islamabad's
budget for East Pakistan over the next year sug-
gest that the province will be hard pressed to
finance many normal economic activities.
44:v in India estimate that the Ben-
galis continue to leave East Pakistan at the rate' of
50,000 a day, and the total number of refugees is
approaching seven million. Pressure on Prime Min-
ister Gandhi for military intervention continues,
and Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram told Parlia-
ment that the insurgents will win and that they
"have all our support." Nevertheless, Mrs. Gandhi
apparently still plans to follow a cautious pol-
icy.
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Morocco: The King Still Reigns..
An uneasy calm prevails throughout
Morocco in the aftermath of an unsuccessful coup
attempt on 10 July and the subsequent execution
of 10 officers alleged to have been involved.
Although the objectives of the five generals
said to have led the attempt remain obscure, their
motives probably varied. They were among the
most experienced and competent of Morocco's
army officers; all were Berbers, long considered to
be the bulwark of King Hassan; all were wealthy
as the result of having enjoyed the King's favor;
and none was known to have any sympathy for
the Moroccan opposition or the military regime in
Libya or to want to involve Morocco more deeply
in Middle East affairs.
General Medbouh, who as director of the
King's military cabinet occupied a key post in
military affairs, was identified by Hassan as the
group's ringleader. He apparently planned no
physical harm to the King, but wanted to have
sufficient pressure exerted so the King would
25X1 effect reforms needed to eliminate the corruption
that pervades all levels of the Moroccan Govern-
ment.
GUINEA:r-,Gu.inea's silt-month-old purge finally
has touched the rrii+itary high command. A court-
martial, acting on charge's ?-tvanded down by a
special commission investigating ?al4aged fifth
column activities, sentenc'd to death for freas
,..
the former armed force chief ands other
high-ranking officers./ne charges-grew out of the
army's poor perforT l'1ast November during
the Portuguese-l.ed=att ck on Conakry.
-There are few sign the terror in Guinea is
L. abating, and there may oon be a repeat of the
public show trial staged in January.
Although Hassan bestowed "all military and
civilian power" on his minister of interior, Major
General Mohamed Oufkir, it soon became evident
that Oufkir must share military responsibilities
with Major General Driss ben Omar, communica-
tions minister and former de facto commander of
all military forces. Oufkir's responsibilities will be
to clean out the pockets of resistance, while Driss
will serve as general staff to the King, who re-
mains commander in chief. The two are long-time
rivals and thus are likely to become the nuclei of
regrouped factions.
Civil authority still.is exercised by the King
and his ministers, with Generals Oufkir and Driss
playing a civil as well as military role. At a cabinet
meeting late Tuesday, over which Hassan presided
as is his custom, the government decided to pro-
pose to the council of representatives the creation
of a state security court. The government also
formed two commissions; one, a commission of
inquiry into Saturday's coup attempt; the other
will look after the families of the more than 100
persons killed by the insurgents. The considerable
properties of those executed on Tuesday as well
as those of General Medbouh and of the lieu-
tenant colonel who commanded the insurgent
unit will be allocated to a pension and com ensa-
tion fund.
as t e purge
widens, it risks p'ouoking some kind of popular
revulsion, although the?eei&no overt sign of hos-
tility by the populace to President Toure at this
time.
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Jordan: The Army Closes In
Army units this week kicked off an attack
on fedayeen strongholds in the north-the last
remaining area of significant guerrilla strength.
-Clashes- had- beery-occcrrring`-almo-st- daity- since
early July in the neighborhood of Jarash-a hilly,
wooded region where the commandos were
strongly entrenched. Although the army had been
showering the fedayeen dugouts with artillery and
mortar fire in an 1effort to dislodge them, this
tactic had been largely unsuccessful in inflicting
casualties, lowering'ifedayeen morale, or inducing
the guerrillas to expend their heavy ammunition.
The fedayeen simply continued their habit of
sallying forth from their positions on the heights
to harass groups of 'soldiers; they had also been
carrying out raids on farmers in the region to
obtain food.
After weighing the likelihood of adverse
political and propoganda consequences-partic-
ularly given the recent warming trend in Jordan's
relations with Egypt and its other neighbors-the
government decided that the situation could not
be allowed to continue. The King therefore
authorized what was intended to be a short,
small-scale ground attack-utilizing two rein-
forced brigades-to dig out the fedayeen from
their commanding 'positions and force them into
areas nearer the river, where they could be kept
from contact with more populated areas, partic-
-atarlythe Gaza refugee, camp.
The offensive was launched in the early
hours of 13 July and shows no signs of stopping.
Although guerrilla broadcasts are highly exagger-
ated, particularly with respect to casualties, the
army has clearly committed a significant force to
the battle, including tanks and infantry- ossibl
more than had originally been planned.
the fedayeen are being gradually
pushed south and west; government troops are
said to be in ebullient spirits and probably have
every intention of continuing the operation until
it is completed.
Reaction from other Arab states has been
relatively restrained, although it will probably
intensify as the fighting continues. Egypt felt it
necessary to postpone King Husayn's visit to
Cairo but did not link the delay specifically to the
offensive. An early government statement merely
said Cairo viewed the developments in Jordan
with "extreme concern," but an Egyptian news-
paper later warned that Egypt was ready to inter-
vene politically to prevent a bloodbath. Although
Palestinians meeting in Cairo appealed to the
Syrian Government to intervene, statements from
Damascus perfunctorily deplored the fighting
Egyptian, Libyan, Syrian, and Sudanese
leaders meeting in Mersa Matruh may well feel
called upon to issue sharper statements of con-
demnation and may attempt to set up some kind
of pan-Arab mediating committee. The two-man
delegation set up by President: Sadat and King
Faysal late in June has so far done little to ease
the problem, but is expected to return to
Amman. Barring massive pressures from other
Arab states, however, King Husayn probably in?? 25X1
tends to continue the operation until the feda-
yeen are driven into areas where they can be
strictly controlled.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Guya a Nationalizes a Bauxite Company
The Guyanese Government's nationalization
of the Demerara Bauxiteompany (DEMBA), a
subsidiary of the Qluminum\Company of Canada
(ALCAN), took place on 1'~ July after nearly
eight months of bitter, negotiations.
Although the government ha\resolved some
of the more immediate problems connected with
the nationalization of DEMk the Guyana Baux-
ite Company (GUYBAU), a new entity formed by
the government to operate DEM13A's former
holdings, still faces long-term problems. The min-
ister of mines and forests announced..that arrange-
ments. have been made for marketing'GUYBAU's
1971 production, which had been one of the
most serious problems.
The Guyanese 9overnment faces still other
problems, includinthe ability to compensate
ALCAN, and management of the new
pointed to replace most of t
r%reen n _-- _ .
encounter difficulty. ASS a res
output necessary to mee
s been ap-
senior-level
fenced and may
`t, GUYBAU may
he current level of
Another impoant problem to be resolved,
and one with marry political implications, is that
of the company's use of the bauxite storage and
transshipment acilities at Chaguaramas, Trinidad.
ALCAN, w ch has a long-term lease on these
facilities, laims it will need to use them all to
ensure supply of raw material to its smelting
plant, n Canada. The Trinidad and Tobago Gov-
ern however, has announced that it will take
st 'ps (including immediate discussions with
LCAN) to secure effective participation by
!Trinidad and Tobago in ALCAN's bauxite storage
facility in order to ensure their continued avail-
ability to Guyana.
The possibility of finding markets for some
GUYBAU production in Eastern Europe and the
USSR;.would appear to be good for at least the
immediate future, thus easing some of the pres-
sure on the Guyanese Government. The long term
prospects 'for retaining markets depend upon
results of current' prospecting efforts by those
countries as well as prior commitments and rela-
tionships with `other nondomestic supplies. It
would appear to be in ALCAN's interest to assist
GUYBAU in resolving both marketing and
shipping problems to ensure future compensation
payments.
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CHILE: The by-election in Valparaiso on 18 July
to fill a legislative seat in the lower house is an
important test between government and opposi-
tion forces. Although the election has been over-
shadowed by earthquakes, devastating storms,
and ballyhoo over copper nationalization, it
marks the first time that President Allende's op-
position has combined to support one candidate
against his coalition. The election promises to be
very close, but the advantages to the Socialist
candidate of the propaganda and pork-barrel re-
sources of the government are marked. In a clever
move to preclude the capture of the small but
vital Radical Party (PR) vote for the opposition
candidate, the government coalition appointed as
its campaign chief a disgruntled local PR boss.
The defeat of the Christian Democratic candidate
would discredit that party's moderate leadership
and ex-president Frei. It also would provide Al-
lende with increased political leverage of consid-
erably greater magnitude than the importance of
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Central American Common Market Still Shaky
Over the past month there has been intense
diplomatic activity within Central America in an
attempt to prevent. further erosion of the Central
American Common Market. Efforts to get Costa
Rica to remove recently imposed obstacles to
regional trade have met with some success, but
aside from this, not much real progress has been
made. Prospects remain dim for any settlement
between El Salvador and Honduras of the basic
problems that have paralyzed the integration
movement since 1969.
The latest crisis began last month when
Costa Rica became aware that it was faced with a
serious balance-of-payments problem and became
upset by the heavy influx of Guatemalan and
Salvadoran goods that previously went to Hon-
duras. Finding itself in much the same position
that Honduras had been in at the end of 1970,
Costa Rica followed in Honduran footsteps and
adopted a protectionist policy in contravention of
the Market's free trade policies.
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, fear-
ing that Costa Rica would leave the Market, ex-
plored ways in which the integration movement
could be made more responsive to Costa Rican
needs. Honduran refusal to participate in Market
activities had prevented regional decision-making
organizations from functioning. A four-member
normalization commission was proposed but
there was a fundamental disagreement as to the
function the commission should serve. Guatemala
and El Salvador, having benefited most from eco-
nomic integration, were primarily interested in
maintaining the status quo and they desired that
Page 22
the commission concern itself only with short-
term regional trade problems. Nicaragua and
Costa Rica, along with Honduras, were interested
in eliminating regional trade imbalances and in
equalizing benefits from industrialization. They
hoped, therefore, that the council would address
itself to a fundamental restructuring of the Mar-
ket. To Costa Rica's great dismay the views of
Guatemala and El Salvador prevailed, and the
main focus of the normalization commission has
been to get Costa Rica to roll back all trade
restrictions.
At the same time, regional efforts to induce
Honduras to return to the fold have continued.
The 5 July Agreement of Tegucigalpa signed by
Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua
sought to revive Honduran trade with its neigh-
bors by permitting bilateral agreements. This con-
cession to Honduras is responsive also to the
needs of Nicaragua and Costa Rica for additional
trade outlets and should relieve some of the com-
petitive pressures among the four remaining Com-
mon Market members. The agreement, moreover,
leaves the door open for informal meetings of all
five economic ministers to continue efforts to
reform the Market.
At best, however, these are stopgap meas-
ures. Honduran President Cruz is insisting on a
"global" settlement not only of all Common Mar-
ket problems but also of all outstanding difficul-
ties between Honduras and El Salvador beginning
with an agreement on border demarcation. Such a
settlement is not in sight and the forces of re-
gional disintegration are still in the ascend-
ancy.
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Cuba: Foreign Minister's Junket
Foreign Minister Raul Roa's recent 34-day
trip to Algeria, the USSR and three East Euro-
pean countries was basically a mission of showing
the flag. None of the joint communiques issued
Cuba's Foreign
Minister Roa
after his visits indicates
that significant
changes have been ef-
fected in Cuba's rela-
tionships with any of
these countries. The
fact that Roa stopped
off in several resort
areas and was accom-
panied by his wife sug-
gests that Havana
viewed the sojourn as
something of a vaca-
tion for the aging for-
eign minister.
I n Moscow, Roa
met with party Secre-
tary General Brezhnev,
Council of Ministers
Chairman Kosygin, and Foreign Minister Gro-
myko before going on to Leningrad, Kiev,
Sevastopol, and Yalta. His talks with the Soviet
leaders were described in Pravda as taking place
"in an atmosphere of cordiality and mutual un-
derstanding," and the visit was assessed as a "posi-
tive contribution to the further development and
consolidation of the fraternal friendship and
many-sided cooperation between socialist Cuba
and the Soviet Union."
Roa's reception by top Soviet officials and
the diplomatic niceties expressed in the com-
munique in Pravda set the pattern of his later
visits to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Ger-
many. In each country, Roa met with high party
and government officials, indulged in a bit of
sightseeing, and contributed to joint statements
designed primarily to satisfy the requirements of
protocol. Some of Roa's contacts included impor-
tant trade officials. Despite the Czechoslovak
radio's claim that Roa's mission to "certain social-
ist countries in Europe" was to develop "a more
coordinated and systematic approach" to bilateral
cultural and economic contacts, however, it is
unlikely that Roa would be given a task which
heretofore has been the province of Minister with-
out Portfolio Carlos Rafael Rodriguez or Foreign
Trade Minister Marcelo Fernandez Font, who
were in East Europe at the same time as Roa.
Roa's stay in Algeria fits the mold of his
visits in East Europe. He met wiith Prime Minister
Boumediene, National Liberation Front Party
chief Kaid, and Foreign Minister Bouteflika in
Algiers and then visited other cities. The joint
communique made public just prior to his depar-
ture for Cuba contained nothing new, other than
a promise by both sides to "redouble their con-
sultations for the purpose of coordinating their
actions in the anti-imperialist struggle."
The lack of definite agreements from the
trip, which is the first such journey Roa has
undertaken, do much to confirm the impression
that the Cuban foreign minister is little more than
a figurehead. He has little influence in the defini-
tion of policy and is used primarily in protocol
functions and as a mouthpiece -for promoting the
government's line in international meetings and
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