WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT CASTRO AND HIS CRITICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008900040002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 16, 1971
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Castro and His Critics
Secret
N! 12
16 July 1971
No. 0379/71A
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For a man who so thoroughly enjoys being the critic, Fidel Castro has
exhibited a strong inability to accept criticism. Indeed, the more accurate the
criticism, the more outraged his reaction is likely to be. The failure of his campaign
to produce ten million tons of sugar in the 1970 harvest, and the host of other
production reverses that accompanied the campaign, however, seem to have im-
proved somewhat his receptivity to expert advice, but not his ability to accept it
gracefully.
Although on several occasions he has vehemently denounced such well-inten-
tioned and pro-Cuban analysts as Rene Dumont and K. S. Karol, Castro has initiated
in the past year many political and administrative changes that can be traced directly
to their sound critiques. His initiatives, however, are halfway measures that fall far
short of the fundamental reorientation so vital to the country's needs. His move to
reinstitute material incentives, for example, was limited and has proved relatively
ineffective in reducing absenteeism and improving labor productivity. As a result,
negative measures such as the "antivagrancy" law have been adopted and a definite
trend toward more repression is evident. In addition, the militarization of Cuban
society that both Karol and Dumont found so distasteful is continuing, albeit under
some rather thin camouflage, and the well-publicized steps toward "democratiza-
tion" have failed to bridge the gap between theory and practice. Moreover, Castro
retains his much-criticized penchant for playing the role of "supermanager," making
all key decisions and many minor ones, and involving himself in details and minutiae
unworthy of his position. His disruptive influence on the economy is therefore likely
to continue unless he can develop confidence in and delegate authority to others
more competent than he.
For their part, the Cuban people seem to have developed a lethargy born of
countless unfulfilled promises and years of stupifying rhetoric. Although dissatisfied
with their present state, they have too much respect for the security forces to
organize actively against the government. Nonetheless, their growing cynicism in the
face of increased economic hardships makes it more difficult than ever for Castro to
inspire the popular enthusiasm needed to revitalize the revolution and elicit the
continued sacrifices required to make the government's economic programs work.
The revolution seems to have run out of steam, and Castro is hard pressed to keep it
in motion.
Background and "to put myself at its service." He returned
later that year at Fidel Castro's request, and made
Rene Dumont, an aging French agronomist visits in September 1963 and June 1969, again
noted particularly in the underdeveloped world as upon invitation. His book, Cuba: Socialism and
an expert in agricultural planning, first went to Development, was published in 1964, based on
Cuba in May 1960 to study the Cuban revolution data gathered during his first three trips. It was an
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attempt to catalog the unexpected problems en-
countered by the Castro government in its head-
long rush toward development via socialism, so
that other underdeveloped countries choosing the
same path might profit from the Cuban ex-
perience. His second book, Cuba: Is It Socialist?,
was published in early 1970 and was born of
Dumont's frustration and disappointment with
Cuba's lack of political and economic progress in
spite of a decade of sacrifice by its people.
K. S. Karol, a
47-year-old Polish-born
journalist who finally
settled in Paris after be-
ing in prison in the
USSR, has visited Cuba
four times: twice in
1961, and once in 1967
and again in 1968. The
latter two visits were
lengthy ones and in-
cluded long discussions
with Castro, who gave
Karol broad access to
the revolution's leaders
and records. The result was Guerrillas in Power, a
book published in April 1970, and consisting of a
critical appraisal of Castro's first ten years in
power.
Castro's infatuation with foreign technical
experts had led him to entertain many. The Bel-
gian agronomist and sociologist Michel Gutelman,
French economist Charles Bettelheim, French
agronomist Andres Voisin, Chilean economist
Jacques Chonchol, and British livestock expert
Thomas Preston are but a few who have con-
tributed their expertise to promote the success of
the revolution. Some, like Voisin, abstained from
direct criticism of Castro's policies and thus
gained admission to the revolution's pantheon of
heroes; others, like Preston, were more forthcom-
ing with their opinions and were made to suffer
Castro's ire. None, however, managed to trigger
Castro's wrath as did Dumont and Karol. Al-
though the prime minister indirectly acknowl-
2 -
Special Report -2-
edged the validity of their arguments by initiating
edged
reforms in direct response to their criticisms, he
personally unleashed a propaganda campaign de-
signed to discredit them, even going so far as to
make the ludicrous accusation that they were!
agents of the CIA.
Part of Castro's extreme irritation stemmed
from the fact that the latest books by Dumont
and Karol were published early in 1970, just as
production statistics were indicating that the
heavily propagandized goal of ten million tons of
sugar, on which Castro had staked the "honor of
the revolution," would not be achieved. As he
admitted later, the campaign for the ten million
caused serious dislocation in other sectors of the
economy, detracting markedly from the signifi-
cant achievement of having produced by far the
largest sugar harvest in Cuba's history. Despite his
sensitivity, however, Castro recognized that the
time had come when far-reaching changes were
clearly in order.
Both Dumont and Karol had criticized Cas-
tro for his militarization of the economy and of
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society in general. Because the armed forces con-
stituted a ready source of disciplined labor, Cas-
tro frequently used troops for nonmilitary activi-
ties. The practice broadened gradually until some In December 1970, a Uruguayan publication
100,000 of the military were used in the 1970 presented an interview with Pelegrin Torras, head
sugar harvest. In addition, troops were employed of the international economic organizations sec-
in road building, dam construction, land clearing, tion of the Cuban National Commission for Eco-
and other tasks generally geared to aid the econ- nomic and Scientific-Technical Collaboration.
omy; officers were placed in many top adminis- The interview was conducted by three journalists
trative positions throughout the government. The from the Cuban Government's press agency and
military establishment even began to absorb the included the following:
educational system, and by 1970 all technological Question: You know that one criticism that
institutes and some secondary schools were under has been- made by a certain individual, not
the control of the Revolutionary Armed Forces very favorable to Cuba, is that the economy
Ministry (MINFAR). is becoming militarized. During the 1970
sugar harvest, the system of command posts
Following the publication of Dumont's and was used. It has been said that this system
Karol's books, however, efforts were made to halt will not be used during the 1971 harvest.
the process of militarization on the surface at What is your view on this matter?
least. Major Belarmino Castilla Mas, for example,
a MINFAR vice minister who was named minister Answer: The command posts were not
of education in July 1970, has abandoned his actually based on a military organization as
uniform for civilian garb, and his rank is fre- their name suggests. It is my understanding
quently dropped when his name appears in the that this is why Fidel Castro suggested that
press. The same is true of Major Jose Ramon their name be changed to Provincial Admin-
Fernandez Alvarez, former MINFAR vice minister istrations of Agriculture.... With regard to the
for training who now functions as Castilla's dep- alleged militarization of the economy, I
uty. In addition, in late 1970 MINFAR's vice should like to make a statement. The fact
ministry for military technological training was that many of our leading officials holding
shifted entirely to the Ministry of Education important governmental posts are military
(MINED). Although these changes seemed to be men is no proof that our economy and
removing the education function from MINFAR, country are militarized. Actually, the condi-
in effect they guaranteed that all secondary edu- tions under which the Cuban revolution has
had to develop since its victory, with the
cation would take on a military character. In constant threat of aggression from the North
April 1971, the MINED-sponsored National Con- American imperialists, have made it necessary
gress on Education and Culture called for the for the leaders, the first-ranking political
creation of a student militia at basic secondary cadres, to remain in the Revolutionary
schools and in the youth movement. Such units Armed Forces simply to guarantee the na-
had already been formed at the universities, and tion's defenses. And these cadres, which
inasmuch as military training is regularly given at under different circumstances would not
the preuniversity level, the militarization process have been in the armed forces, belong to
in the educational system is continuing. ranks on the highest political level, those
with proven loyalty to the revolution, the
The practice of naming military men to key true leaders of the revolution. But that is not
important administrative posts has also con- a sign of militarization; it orginates from a
tinued. When the new Ministry of Merchant particular situation in which our revolu-
Marine and Ports was formed in August 1970, tionary process had to develop.
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Major Angel Joel Chaveco Hernandez was ap-
pointed to head it. The Cubans state that this
practice is not militarization, claiming that ap-
pointees are selected because of their managerial
ability, not their military status. The appointees
allegedly maintain no formal ties with the mili-
tary establishment while performing nonmilitary
duties. Nevertheless, as of mid-1971, ten of the
government's 22 ministerial posts were held by
military officers.
Dumont and Karol also challenged Castro's
proclivity for reserving all major decisions and
many minor ones for himself. Dumont described
him as a man "with a personal power insuffi-
ciently held in check." Castro seems supremely
self-confident in a variety of technical fields not
normally related to political life, and he has un-
hesitatingly made decisions that sometimes run
counter to the advice of technical experts with
many years of experience. In May 1969, for ex-
ample, Castro made an unscheduled address to
the closing session of the Congress of the Animal
Science Institute in Havana in order to attack, on
technical grounds, the reports and theses pre-
sented by several foreign experts who had dared
to criticize his interference in the operations of
the institute. He is also reported to have replaced
Lieutenant Orlando Borrego as minister of the
sugar industry in 1968 because Borrego stated his
belief that the ten million-ton goal for the 1970
sugar harvest, which by that time had attained a
political significance in excess of its economic
importance, could not be met.
Nevertheless, following the demoralizing
speech on 26 July 1970, in which he admitted the
many problems plaguing the country, Castro
adopted several measures aimed at defusing the
accusation that he was perpetuating a "per-
sonality cult." His speeches, except for a few of
nationwide or international importance, were no
longer broadcast over national radio and tele-
vision. Whereas they previously had automatically
received full textual presentation in the press,
they began to appear in greatly reduced format in
editorial reviews or in a series of brief excerpts.
His picture was used less frequently in the press
and in January and February 1971, when several
multipage articles in the party daily newspaper
detailed three of Castro's frequent visits to the
provinces, his picture did not appear once, despite
heavy photographic coverage during the trips. To
give the appearance of "collective leadership" in
the decision-making process, Castro surrounded
himself with members of the Political Bureau, the
cabinet, and the appropriate government agencies
when chairing such events as the National Food
Industry Plenum and the Havana Provincial Light
Industry Plenum.
As befitting a man of Castro's colossal ego,
however, this de-emphasis was short-lived. By
mid-April 1971, he had resumed his normal rate
of exposure and pace of activities. In a period of a
little more than two weeks Castro gave six
lengthy speeches, five of which received full radio
and television coverage. Moreover, the 3 May
1971 issue of the party newspaper, which carried
the full text of his 30 April and 1 May speeches,
broke all records as to the number of copies
printed and distributed.
In his 26th of July speech last year, Castro
called for a separation of the duties of party
officials from those of administrators, again an
outgrowth of the criticism from Dumont and
Karol. As a hint that he might relinquish a por-
tion of his authority, he indicated that a Bureau
of Social Production would be formed within the
party and on a par with its Political Bureau. This
was followed by a spate of rumors that he would
step down from his administrative post of prime
minister, turning it over to "old" Communist and
Minister without Portfolio Carlos Rafael Rod-
riguez, and devote himself primarily to his duties
as party first secretary. Although Castro may have
seriously entertained such thoughts briefly in the
depressing period following the end of the har-
vest, he probably recognized that to give way to
Rodriguez, presumably the man most suited for
the job, would be to surrender a degree of
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authority that eventually might cost him the con-
trol of the power structure.
"...Soviet aid has been for us a decisive
factor. There are some who are not pleased that
we recognize this: filthy hack liberals prancing
about the world, charlatans who never had to face
one case, let alone the problems of a whole na-
tion, who never had to see and suffer the poverty,
the wretchedness of the whole nation. There are
many from Rome and Paris who can construct
hypothetical and imaginary worlds. Some of them
live very well for they are simple agents of the
CIA and the others are idiots...."
Fidel Castro, 22 April 1970
Such a radical transfer of power has failed to
materialize, and the possibility of Castro volun-
tarily loosening his grip on the reins seems more
remote now than ever. Neither has there been
anything more heard about the formation of the
Bureau of Social Production. The creation of such
a mechanism, unless Castro dominated it as he
now does the Political Bureau, would have re-
moved from his control all economic planning
and determination of priorities and would have
undercut his position as prime minister.
Power to the People
Castro's critics also faulted him for providing
no formal mechanism for channeling the demands
of the people to the upper echelons of govern-
ment. They observed that the governmental struc-
ture was monolithic with all authority originating
at the top.
Although Castro had for years looked upon
his direct contact with the masses during his fre-
quent trips around the island as the most funda-
mental form of democracy, he apparently recog-
nized the validity of the criticism and instituted a
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campaign
campaign of "democratization" in the govern-
ment agencies, labor unions, and mass organiza-
tions. Workers' councils were ordered set up
through popular elections by secret ballot in all
mills, factories, shops, and other work centers to
establish a means of two-way communications
between the administrator and the workers. The
workers' councils are not only supposed to func-
tion in an advisory capacity to assist the adminis-
trator in the operation of the work center, but
also to perform regulatory and punitive tasks as
well. The councils, for example, decide the dis-
tribution of major household appliances and
bicycles on a basis of job performance and need.
This was a partial concession to criticism from
Dumont, who called for the reintroduction of
material incentives for workers. They also adjudi-
cate violations of the antivagrancy law. In addi-
tion, they apparently will play a key role in
arranging for the construction and distribution of
housing for employees of their respective work
centers.
The process of "democratization," with its
popular elections and secret ballots, spread to the
labor unions, and even the government-controlled
organizations for youth and students used it when
they were reorganized in December 1970 and
early 1971. In most cases, however, "democrati-
zation" consisted of offering a slate of preselected
candidates whose political credentials had already
been carefully scrutinized; voters then approved
or disapproved of each candidate. The slate nor-
mally contained more names than there were po-
sitions to be filled. Thus the elections had
"losers," a situation that helped to create the
impression that the voters actually had a choice
of candidates. In a few centers naive party offi-
cials, lacking adequate guidance from above, con-
ducted free elections that resulted in the victory
of individuals outspoken in their criticism of the
regime. In such cases, the elections were nullified
by officials at the next higher party level.
Castro characteristically has continued to
prefer a much more direct form of communica-
tion with the workers. In a series of exhaustive
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sessions with various segments of industry in late
1970 and early 1971, he met with worker repre-
sentatives in face-to-face discussions of local prob-
lems and possible methods of solving them. This
type of "democracy" may have helped to im-
prove Castro's image, but it did little to overcome
the basic problems facing the regime.
The realization in May 1970 that the "battle
of the ten million" was lost and the subsequent
disclosure of the impact that the "battle" had had
on the rest of the economy were crushing blows
to Castro. His "mea culpa" speech on 26 July last
year, in which he bluntly acknowledged the se-
riousness of his political and economic problems,
shocked and demoralized the Cuban people. His
rhetorical and ambiguous offer to resign, followed
by his call for the formation at the highest politi-
cal level of a special body to decide economic
priorities, with its implication that he would yield
a significant degree of power, suggest that Castro,
who is remarkably well attuned to the mood of
the people, may have suffered a crisis of confi-
dence. His withdrawal from the limelight for sev-
eral months, a period spent in close contact with
the masses, probably was a time of reassessment
of himself, his methods, and his goals.
Castro emerged in mid-April 1971, however,
having weathered the crisis much as he has
weathered others in the past. His basic goals and
his methods of achieving them remain funda-
mentally unchanged. Although he may attempt to
maintain a facade of certain reforms such as de-
militarization, democratization, and collective
leadership, he will continue to rule for the most
part just as he has in the past, considering Cuba
his personal fiefdom.
Certain modest changes have already been
effected and others will be made. A new adminis-
trative layer called the district has been created
between the regional government and the munici-
pality to provide the middle-level coordination
and leadership that the province-oriented regional
Special Report - 6 -
To discredit Rene
Dumont, the Cuban
Ministry of the Interior
presented in February
1971 a television pro-
gram devoted to an ex-
pose of alleged CIA
agent Raul Alonso Olive,
a Cuban agronomist
who, prior to his arrest
in late 1969, had met
with Dumont and had
provided the Frenchman with some of the statis-
tics on which he based his criticism of the govern-
ment's agricultural policies. Following the televi-
sion program, Dumont said that he had met with
Olive at the suggestion of the Cuban Government
and that a government representative was present
during these meetings. He denied the implication
that he had been consorting with a "CIA agent."
government has failed to give. This system may
slightly improve the lot of the consumer by facili-
tating the distribution of the limited supply of
goods and services and by satisfying basic com-
munity needs. Also promising, from the stand-
point of productivity, is the appearance of more
foreign advisers and technicians to provide vitally
needed technical and administrative guidance and
assistance.
Fundamental changes, such as a realignment
of the power structure or shifts in political or
economic priorities, however, are highly unlikely,
barring Castro's physical incapacitation. Although
Castro has shown a willingness to discuss prospec-
tive economic advances in much longer range
terms-20, 25, or 30 years or more-than he has
used in the past, he still meddles deeply in day-
to-day economic matters and has retained his
tendency to promise far more than he can deliver..
His recent pledge to achieve a production rate of
100,000 homes per year by 1975 solely through
the use of "surplus labor" (i.e., using laborers
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To further discredit Dumont and Karol, the
Cuban Ministry of the Interior had poet Heberto
Padilla, detained incommunicado for more than a
month following his arrest in March 1971, insert
in his self-criticism these remarks: "I talked to
too many foreigners. For example, I talked with
K. S. Karol, the Polish-French writer-journalist. I
made pompous analyses of the Cuban political
situation for Karol. I always spoke to him with a
defeatist spirit, with a bitter counterrevolutionary
attitude toward the Cuban revolution. And Karol
was a man who wanted to hear such things be-
cause Karol is an embittered man, a man in exile
from his country. In Paris, Karol wanted to hear
such things. He heard them and he collected
them. The same thing occurred with the old
French counterrevolutionary agronomist Rene
Dumont.... I spoke outrageously to Dumont and
Karol, who slandered the revolution in their writ-
ings." Padilla described both Karol and Dumont
as agents of the CIA.
who are presently underemployed or who "volun-
tarily" extend their work day) fits into this cate-
gory and suggests that his failure to achieve the
promised annual production rate of ten million
tons of sugar by 1970 has taught him little. The
continuation of this type of interference in na-
tional economic activity bodes ill for improved
economic performance. In turn, continued eco-
nomic stagnation means continued popular dis-
content and the latter will result in further repres-
sion.
The promulgation of the antivagrancy law
last April, the arrest and persecution of poet
Heberto Padilla in March and April, and the in-
stitution of compulsory universal identification
documentation last month testify to the gov-
ernment's continued readiness to resort to further
measures of repression and population control.
The Padilla case, which was used as a platform
from which to denounce Dumont and Karol, also
demonstrates Castro's personal sensitivity to
criticism and typifies the lack of sincerity that has
characterized his efforts to remedy the deep-
rooted deficiencies that inspired the critiques. A
readiness to use repression and an unwillingness
to undertake basic remedial measures constitute
Castro's attitude toward the current domestic
situation; the remonstrations of his critics have
fallen on deaf ears.
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