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December 21, 2016
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September 17, 2008
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July 23, 1971
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Approved For Release 2008/09/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900050001-1 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Secret WEEKLY SUMMARY Secret State Dept. review completed 23 July 1971 No. 0380/71 Copy Approved For Release 2008/09/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900050001-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/09/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900050001-1 Approved For Release 2008/09/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900050001-1 Approved For Release 2008/09/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900050001-1 SECRET .CONTENTS (Information; as of noon EDT, 22 July 1971) FAR EAST Sino-US Communique Draws Support, Surprise, and Concern . . . . . . . . . 1 Indochina Vietnam: A One-Man Race? . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 3 Cambodia: The Economy Improves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Laos: Going Gets Tougher in the Plaine . 4 Communist China: Foreign Trade Contacts Expanding 7 Election Reverberations in Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 EUROPE SALT: Some Soviets Are Still Suspicious . . ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 UK-Malta: No Basis for Agreement in Sight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Portugal: Caetano Wins Modest Constitutional-'Revisions . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Bulgaria: New Government, Old Faces . 12 MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA r Sudan: Numayri Ousted by Junta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Jordan: All Over but the Shouting? . . . . . . ' . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Palestinians: Old Wine in New Bottles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Persian Gulf Federation: Nine,%Eight, Seven, Six ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Developments in Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Yemen (Sana): Fiscal Crisis,Leads to Government Change . .. . . . . . . . . 19 WESTERN HEMISPHERE Panama: The Government Puts Up a Smoke Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Caribbean: Another Futile Attempt at Regional Cooperation . . . . . . . . . 21 Brazilian Government Concerned Over Territorial Seas Problem . . . . . . . . . 23 Uruguay: Opposition Attempts Impeachment of the President . . . . . . . . 23 Argentina: Political Progress Doubtful . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 NOTES: Burma; Hungary-Romania; Iceland; Romania; Austria; Chile; 25X1 Bahamas SECRET Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Jul 71 Approved For Release 2008/09/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900050001-1 Approved For Release 2008/09/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900050001-1 SECRET FAR EAST Sino-US Communique Draws Support, Surprise, and Concern Communist China's reaction to the planned visit by President Nixon seems calculated to con- vey the impression that Peking's effort to nor- malize relations has not been accompanied by a fundamental reassessment of its basic policy posi- tions. The Chinese have moved in deliberate fashion to put the developments in Sino-US rela- tions in perspective by reaffirming their tradi- tional position on sensitive bilateral issues while attempting to assuage Hanoi's misgivings over China's future course in Indochina. In a widely publicized session with a group of visiting American scholars, Premier Chou En-lai emphasized that the US military presence in Indo- china, American commitments to Taiwan, and US military actions elsewhere on China's periphery in East Asia were still the chief obstacles in Sino-US relations. After reaffirming China's total support for the Vietnamese Communists' seven-point peace proposal, Chou reportedly insisted on a total allied withdrawal from all of Indochina, stating that this step was even more imperative than the restoration of Sino-US relations. Chou's emphasis on this point and Peking's failure to rebroadcast the hard-hitting Nhan Dan editorial of 19 July reflect the Chinese sensitivity to Hanoi's recently voiced concern over big power "collusion" at its expense. In a related development, the Chinese used the occasion of the 17th anniversary of the Geneva accords to further underscore their back- ing for Hanoi's latest peace plan. In an authorita- tive editorial of 19 July, the Chinese praised the seven points as the "correct course," and criti- cized the US for making no positive response. The editorial also claimed that the Geneva agreements marked "a great achievement" for the Vietnam- ese, but were undermined later by US actions. This statement marked the most compli- mentary Chinese public pronouncement on the agreements since the start of the Paris peace talks in 1968, and was the first time Peking has com- memorated the Geneva anniversary in several years. It could be related to recent suggestions from diplomatic and press sources that China is willing to participate in a new international con- ference on Indochina. The Vietnamese Communists have displayed deep misgivings over the Vietnam implications of the Sino-American developments. Hanoi remained silent for three days following the announcements and then produced a series of hard-hitting press commentaries which bitterly attacked US policy in Indochina and struck out at the wisdom and propriety of Peking's actions in remarkably frank terms. Although the articles made no direct men- tion of China, Dr. Kissinger's trip to Peking or President Nixon's coming visit, they sharply criti- cized "socialist" countries that respond to US entreaties, fall in with the Nixon doctrine, and compromise "socialist solidarity.- These senti- ments were given further weight and even greater explicitness by a Foreign Ministry statement of 21 July, which with unprecedented directness ex- pressed Hanoi's fear that Washington was trying to "sow divisions among the socialist countries" in an effort to wring concessions out of the North Vietnamese. SECRET Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/09/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900050001-1 Approved For Release 2008/09/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900050001-1 SECRET The articles and the official statement made it clear that the Vietnamese Communists intend to resist such outside pressures, and will not be bound by pacts or arrangements concluded behind their backs. They strongly imply that if worst comes to worst the Vietnamese are prepared to go it alone. This kind of explicit, blunt language- unmatched even in the late 1960s when Hanoi fell out with Peking over the cultural revolution and over the issue of negotiations with the US- reflects long-standing Vietnamese distrust of Pe- king's intentions in Indochina. Hanoi may fear that Vietnamese Communist interests could be- come enmeshed in big-power politics as they were in 1954, although the Vietnamese probably cal- culate that Chinese believe that it can best put to rest any notions by the Chinese that Vietnamese Communist interests can be sacrificed to their own by forcefully and quickly weighing in with the Vietnamese view. Hanoi may also hope to make it clear that Washington cannot count on relaxed tensions with Peking to lead Hanoi into compromises it would not otherwise make. The commentaries convey an implicit con- cern that the Sino-American announcement took the play away from the Viet Cong seven points and removed a good deal of the pres- sure on the US generated by that proposal. Hanoi may hope that its sharp and categorical reaction will help restore some of this pressure. Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane greeted the Sino-US developments favorably for the most part, although there was concern in some quarters that a Sino-American rap- prochement might have a prejudicial impact on national interests in Indochina. Some Cam- bodians fear that any big power peacemaking could result in a de facto partition of their country, or even the return of Sihanouk to power. The Lao, on the other hand, have been pushing for an improvement in relations with Peking and hope that China will someday exert a restraining hand on Hanoi's ambitions in Indochina. In Bangkok, the US initiative will strengthen the hand of Foreign Minister Thanat, who has been arguing in favor of a more flexible foreign policy. There is little authoritative comment from Moscow. The Soviets are likely to view the President's planned trip as a Chinese-American attempt to gain leverage for extracting con- cessions from the USSR. The projected visit is unlikely to have any immediate impact on Moscow's negotiations with Washington and Pe- king, but initially the Soviets may feel a need to demonstrate that the USSR cannot be blackmailed by pressures arising from Sino-US cooperation. Nevertheless, Soviet apprehension about meaningful US-Chinese collaboration seems sure to intensify, and in the longer run, this fear may lead Moscow to be more forth- coming in its dealings with either or both of SECRET Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/09/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900050001-1 Approved For Release 2008/09/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900050001-1 SECRET Indochina i Vietnam? to One-Man Race? With the deadline for filing only/two weeks away there is still nofirm oppositio{to President Thieu`\Big Minh, Thieu's stronges7potential chal- lenger, will apparently qualify with ease but is showing a~great reluctance to run if the odds seem to be stacked too severely against him. Moreover, Minh is not `getting'all the help he expected from the An Quangs Buddhists /who are backing him behind the scenes but rare not endorsing him openly. Big Minh\s still actively preparing for the campaign, however ar5d has invited Dr. Ho Van Minh, a highly respected Catholic moderate, to join his ticket. Dr.r Minh will probably accept, although he has voiced'fears that his own political future may be Aamaged' by slurs and pressures from the gove~ menf. Vice President Ky's chances-while never good-are ow even dimmer..Ky's arrangement with Big Minh to draw endorsements from Minh's sympathizers on the, provincial councils seems to have been effectively countered by, Thieu's con- trol o/the provincial administrations\Some coun- cilors/are now demanding money for their en- dorsements, while a number of Minh'ssother fol- lowers are proving reluctant to su ort K s nomination. As of 20 July, The increasing talk about corruption and trafficking in narcotics is bringing discredit to the military command and the Thieu government. Trading charges of corruption has long been a favorite tactic of feuding South Vietnamese gen- erals and politicians, but recent accusations are the most wide-ranging in years and have impli- cated Thieu and Ky themselves, along with other high-level figures. Coming while the Lower House and presidential campaigns are heating up, the new charges have focused attention on corruption as an issue on which the Thieu regime could be vulnerable. 25X1 Although sharply denying the recent charges, Thieu generally has tried to remain aloof from the controversy. He has kept his former protege, MR-2 commander General Dzu, at arms length since Dzu has come under heavy fire for his alleged involvement in the drug trade. Even if Thieu succeeds in dissociating himself from Dzu, however, the allegations can be exploited by those who contend that Thieu has been presiding over a corrupt and unworthy regime. The facts behind any corruption charges in South Vietnam are extremely difficult to ascer- tain. Dzu has frequently been accused of various irregular practices: selling ARVN promotions; smuggling surplus war materiel; and accepting bribes. He has not, however, been convicted and reports linking him with the drug trade have not been substantiated. The absence of a reliable and effective in- vestigative body concerned with corruption makes it difficult to distinguish valid accusations from "poison-pen" letters prompted by feuds. A Senate subcommittee has begun an investigation into General Dzu's activities, but the mounting pressures of the current election campaigns will make an objective probe at this time unlikely. The immediate question raiised by the new round of charges is whether Thieu's opponents can turn it to their own political advantage. If an antigovernment candidate is to ,profit from this, he must convince a skeptical public that he is more honest and worthy. Big Minh does have a reputation for honesty, and he and candidates associated with him may pick up some strength from a protest vote over corruption. SECRET Page 3 Approved For Release 2008/09/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900050001-1 Approved For Release 2008/09/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900050001-1 SECRET Cambodia: The Economy Improves After several weeks of steady deterioration, the economic situation has finally begun to show improvement. The upswing was especially wel- come in Phnom Penh because it coincided with the government's effort to obtain National As- sembly backing for an economic mobilization program that incorporates anti-inflationary rec- ommendations made by the International Mone- tary Fund. The rice crisis in the capital has eased some- what, as first-quality rice transported by govern- ment-organized truck convoys from Battambang Province is once again available on the open mar- ket. Commodity prices have been relatively stable during the past week. At the same time, the black market value of the riel has strengthened substan- tially. The price of a US dollar, for example, fell from 360 riels on 13 July to only 260 riels six days later. The strengthening of the riel has been at- tributed to a decline in demand for dollars and gold by local merchants and businessmen who are anxious to participate in the US AID program. In order to do so, they are required to deposit from 50 to 80 percent of the purchase price in riels. Of perhaps equal importance in explaining the sudden shift in attitudes, however, are the rumors in the Phnom Penh business community that the proposed Exchange Support Fund (ESF) will initially support an exchange rate within the range of 110 to 240 riels per US dollar. However, the ESF's establishment is still far from certain, and will depend on as yet uncommitted contribu- tions from friendly countries. Sirik Matak and several key cabinet ministers reportedly had a useful exchange on economic matters recently with National Assembly leaders. The meeting marked the first serious effort the Lon Nol government has made to consult with the Assembly in many months. Matak outlined the government's stabilization program, stressed the need to raise taxes to combat inflation, and urged closer cooperation with Saigon and Bang- kok in order to cut revenue losses due to smug- gling. Matak also indicated that he would need the assembly's help in obtaining another advance from the Cambodian National Bank to cover an- ticipated budget deficits. He sought to reassure the fiscally conservative legislators, however, that the drain on the bank would be compensated by the proposed ESF, and by increased revenues from proposed tax hikes. Matak urged great secrecy in discussing the advance, which will soon be put before a closed session of the assembly, in order to avoid possible public panic. Matak's meeting with the assembly gave the deputies a sense of participation in the country's affairs and helped dissipate the view that the legislature is held in low regard by the govern- ment. Their improved outlook should help Matak get his economic program through with a mini- mum of trouble. Laos: Going Gets Tougher in the Plaine Government forces are encountering stiffer enemy resistance in the Plaine des Jarres area. Since 13 July North Vietnamese units have at- tacked and overrun several advanced positions held by the government on the eastern edge of the Plaine. An attack on 17 July was supported by two tanks that had been operating in the area for several days. Vang Pao's forces, in turn, have launched their own operations north of the Plaine. On 16 July two irregular battalions pushed into the foot- hills north of Route 7, but suffered a setback on 19 July when an enemy attack dispersed the irregulars. Another government force is moving southeast from its base at Bouam Long, evidently 25X1 Page 4 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/09/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900050001-1 Approved For Release 2008/09/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900050001-1 SECRET LAOS: PLAINE DES JARRES AREA 0 Miles 10 O Government-held location OCommunist-held location Phou KengA) Irregular positions' ,PLAIN,#` Ban No- `e SECRET' Bouam Longo Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Jul 71 Approved For Release 2008/09/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900050001-1 ong Tieng Approved For Release 2008/09/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900050001-1 SECRET with the intention of cutting Routes 7 and 71 and thus effectively isolating scattered Communist forces to the west of the Plaine. The North Vietnamese, meanwhile, have condemned the government's occupation of the Plaine. Hanoi's authoritative party and army newspapers asserted on 15 July that Vang Pao's actions had created a "grave" situation in north Laos and the articles threatened "appropriate" Communist countermeasures. The articles still re- ferred to Communist proposals for a Laos peace settlement, however, and the tone and substance of their commentaries were similar to those issued during Vang Pao's offensive in the Plaine in Page 6 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/09/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900050001-1 Approved For Release 2008/09/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900050001-1 SECRET Communist\China: Foreign Trade Contacts Expanding Building on the momentum generated at the Canton .,trade fair last spring, Peking is further developing-.,its commercial contacts with for- eigners. With more than a 30-percent increase in trade last year, ' Japan continues to be China's most important trading-partner by a wide margin. This jump as well as recent Chinese overtures toward Canada and the relaxation of restrictions last month by the US on trade with Peking have again sparked world interest in China as a market if not as a supplier. A continued expansion of Sino - free world trade is likely under Peking's present policies, with the rate of growth being determined by the range and acceptability of products that the Chinese can offer in exchange for goods they want to buy. Although precise` data are lacking, a record, level of business probably was conducted at the spring trade fair. In contrast to last autumn's fair, the Chinese sought to buy substantial quantities of steel, machine tools, transportation equipment, and chemical products. In,return, they offered an adequate supply of their traditional raw'"materials, food products and light industrial goods. These developments suggest that Peking's.non-Commu- nist trade this year will surpass the'"total of almost $3.4 billion registered in 1970.:Unlike last year, however, when Chinese imports accounted for most of Peking's rise in trade'with the free world, Chinese exports probably .will be slightly greater than imports this year. As in the political sphere, the Chinese have recently indicated that they will welcome an ex- pansion of indirect trade with the US. The Tai- wan issue continues to preclude direct commer- cial exchanges, but Peking already has approved contracts involving foreign subsidiaries of US firms. China also is prepared to deal with US suppliers and customers through intermediaries as long as Pekii g is not officially informed of the firms' US con\iections. Even thourgh a small num- ber of US businessmen may j allowed to attend the Canton fair this fall, ).t is still questionable whether they will be perp?itted to engage in trade. If the growth in Sino-US trade is still a matter for the future, exchanges with Canada this year are likelyjto experience the greatest rate of increase among Peking's trading partners in the free worjd. In the wake of extending diplomatic recognition to Peking, an economic mission from Ottawa was given the "east-is-red" carpet treat- ment in Peking last month. China indicated it is ready to step up its' imports of a wide range of y Canadian products, including wheat, which Peking will buy first from Canada when imports are required. Italian trade promotion efforts, on the other hand, have yet to be so rewarded despite. Rome's recognition of Peking last No- vember. China is broadening its trade contacts in the underdeveloped countries on a selective basis, using the criterion of diplomatic rec- ognition to narrow t;the field. In view of such considerations as product quality and pro- tectionist sentiment in the developed countries, however, China's best hope for selling its light industrial commodities and consumer goods abroad is in the third world.tiAlthough sales in these markets will continue\to grow, such contracts are unlikely to expand rapidly enough to obviate the need to wrestle with the basic foreign trade problem, which is how to increase hard currency earnings to pay for manufactures and technology from the indus- trialized free world' SECRET Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Jul 71 Approved For Release 2008/09/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900050001-1 Approved For Release 2008/09/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900050001-1 SECRET Election Reverberations in Indonesia The government's party, Sekber Golkar, continues to improve on its already substantial victory in the 3 July parliamentary elections as the long process of official vote counting continues. The latest projection of Golkar's strength is 232 of the 360 elected seats. These 232, with the additional 100 appointed members, would give the government a basic strength of 72 percent in the 460-seat parliament. It could ex- pect further support from the minor parties. Although the traditional political parties lost heavily in the election, they appear unlikely to protest the voting. Elements in two of the major parties, the traditionalist Moslem Nahdatul Ulama and the secular National Party, contending that the government improperly influenced the elec- tion, have urged nonparticipation in parliament. Cooler heads are prevailing, however, and it is anticipated that all parties will take their assigned seats in October, salvaging what they can in the new political situation. With a substantial majority in the legislature, the government, which has few constitutional re- strictions, may now decide that legislation can be enacted if it wins only a large majority-perhaps as much as three fourths-of the vote. In the past, the government required that legislation receive unanimous support in the parliament before pas- sage. Such a change obviously could speed up the government's administrative process. With elections out of the way, the govern- ment has begun the reorganization of its quasi- party, Sekber Golkar. An army-affiliated coalition of occupation and social groups, Golkar was developed as an election vehicle. If it is to become more than a government front-or if it is to be credible and effective in that role-the present hodgepodge of organizations which make it up must be restructured. So far a "leadership council" and an "advisory council," both of which include a number of civilians, have been established, and Golkar's some 250 organizations have been grouped under five functional cate- gories. BURMA: In a further step toward, creating the appearance of a return to normality\in Burmese political life, General Ne Win on 15 July named himself prime minister and reappointed he entire army-staffed cabinet to the "new" Go ernment of the Union of Burma; the word "revolu 'onary" has been dropped from the government's fficial title. It is not clear whether the cabine will assume the policy-making functons of the ru g Revolutionary Council which c ntinues in being, with Ne Win as its chairman. These changes, which come on the heels of the restructuring of the government's Burma Socialist Program Party and the addition of some civilians to government bodies, will not alter the army's predominant role in Burma. They appear part of a process, however, that includes the prospective writing of a new state constitution and perhaps other steps designed to give some semblance of civilian artic- ipation. Page 8 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/09/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A008900050001-1 Approved For Release 2008/09/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900050001-1 SECRET -EUROPE SALT: Some Soviets Are Still Suspicious Soviet press treatment of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), which reconvened in Helsinki on 8 July, suggests that Moscow is deter- mined to press ahead for an interim accord, with an ABM limitation continuing to be its major concern. It also suggests that there are still some in Moscow who have misgivings about the wisdom of the Kremlin's course of action in the wake of the US-Soviet announcement on 20 May of an agreement to work for an ABM accord along with some limitation of offensive systems. disarmament that have taken a more strident tone. The first casts doubt on IJS motives and intentions, and the second dwells on continuing US strategic arms improvements and the danger of US forward based systems in Europe-a con- tentious issue soft-pedaled by other Soviet publi- cations since 20 May. The Red Star articles sug- gest misgivings on the part of some in the Soviet defense establishment for Moscow's present dis- armament course. A Pravda editorial that coincided with the opening of the Helsinki talks took an unprece- dentedly moderate and balanced tone. It noted that there were signs of a positive shift toward accommodation by both sides, and cited Brezh- nev's speech on 11 June, which referred to the "increasing significance" of the talks. An Izvestiya article on 9 July stressed the optimism accompanying the new round of negotiations. Both items emphasized the need to press for ABM limitation as a first priority. They also took the standard swipe at those in the US allegedly oppos- ing disarmament and pressing for new strategic arms systems, but did so only as variations on the main theme. Articles in less authoritative Soviet journals, such as USA and New Times, have gen- erally repeated the themes in the Pravda editorial. A discordant note, however, has been sounded in the military newspaper, Red Star, which has run two articles of a promised series on Moreover, an article in the June CPSU theo- retical journal, Kommunist, painstakingly and defensively justified Moscow's current disarma- ment policy, going so far as to resurrect several quotes from Lenin on the wisdom of dealing with the US. The article attacked those who criticized Moscow's policy "from the left," adding to the impression that the Kremlin's current course of action was not arrived at without some difficulty. Soviet leaders, nevertheless, put great stress on trying to convince the US of Moscow's serious intentions. Premier Kosygin, h~a=conver_sation with-US-representatives attending~t-he,sixth--Dart- mouth-?-Conference" in Kievrged on 16 July that SALT is "the focal point" of the US-Soviet relationship and, if successful, could lead to the solution of other problems. The Soviet premier echoed a point in Brezhnev's 11 June speech by claiming that if arms spending could only be curtailed, the funds could be put to better use elsewhere. SECRET Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/09/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900050001-1 Approved For Release 2008/09/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08900050001-1 SECRET -Malta: No asis for Agreement in Sight Rene tiation of t; e UK-Malta defense and financial array' gements r mains in an uncertain state following t ik~s in Valleta earlier this week between Prime Ministgr Mi toff and British De- fense Secretary Lord C'arri gton. Before leaving for London, Carrington saJthat in his view "the basis of any new agreem nt is,,not in sight" and expressed concern "abo t the differences in our two positions." Mintoff presented ,Carrington with selec- tion of various formulas offering specific rights and facilities for specific lsums. Retention of Long don's veto power over third country military use of Malta's harbors and air ields was not ruled out, provided the UK is willin? to pay forit. For his part, Carrington made clea that Br-atsh interest in Malta was based on NAT ? interests and not on UK security needs. The Brtish deputy high com- missioner told the US.: Embassy that the British would not pay more for tlje use of fewer military facilities; therefore, if NATO wants to keep Malta, it will have to help Ipay the rent." London has told NATO that the facilities likely to be available to the UK under a new ,agreement would not justify any increase in pay- ment. It has pointed out,lhowever, that the pre- vention of a Soviet presence on the island is important not jist to the British, but t II of NATO. The allie', have not yet respo d to the UK's request for, financial assis ce. London West Germany as the most likely sou'ices o ignificant assistance. Mintoff's decis' n to terminate Valleta's ties with NATO h~/been made public. Even usu- ally well- rm Labor party supporters and senior ~~evernm nt officials are completely un- aware -of Mintoff's initiative. Public silence on his NATO decree f Ilows a pattern set in Mintoff's -"other major init atives. If NATO or one of the N flies should brea this silence, it is likely to anger Mir.q,off and furth' r complicate Western relations with Malta. On the. economic front, Mintoff has ap- pealed to several Western nations for assistance and has moved to